HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOLDS A HEARING ON
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SUPERIORITY
APRIL 15, 2015
WITNESSES: CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III (USN), COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC
GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI (USA), COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES
[*] THORNBERRY: Committee will come to order. Let me thank
our members, witnesses and guests for being here today.
Before we start on the topic of today's hearing, let me just
take a moment to welcome formally the newest Member of the House Armed Services
Steve Russell represents Oklahoma's 5th District, a retired
Lieutenant Colonel in the Army, Steve is deployed to Kosovo, Kuwait,
Afghanistan and commanded the first battalion's 22nd Infantry in Tikrit. His
unit played a key role in the capture of Saddam Hussein. So he's already in our
briefings and so forth, made an important contribution to the Committee and
we're very glad to have Steve join our members.
THORNBERRY: Today we hold a hearing on the risk of losing
military technological superiority and its implications for U.S. Policy,
Strategy and Posture in the Asia Pacific.
We probably need to get a little better about succinct
titles for our hearings. But it does, I think, bring together a lot of what we
have been examining over the past couple three months. And I appreciate the
senior-level attention within the Department on the Asia-Pacific region, as
well as technological superiority.
I realize that there are a number of serious security issues
around the world all happening at the same time. The reason that we've had some
people testify that it is unprecedented in our country's history to have so
many serious security issues all happening at the same time. But we cannot,
either on this Committee, the Department of Defense, or the country, in
general, cannot allow limited band width to have us ignore what's happening in
the Asia Pacific.
Among the issues that come to the fore, I think, in the
region for which you all have responsibility is the technological superiority
issue which has been a key focus of this committee. We've had Under Secretary
Kendall, for example, testify about our eroding technological superiority,
specially in light of some of the key investments that China is making.
It also brings together some individual unconventional
warfare tactics. We focused a lot on what Russia's been doing with little green
men. But it wasn't that long ago I read a paper about the three warfares of
China, including psychological media and legal warfare. They have their own
unconventional tactics. And of course, we have in the region North Korea and
its asymmetric attempts, both to the cyber, its missile and nuclear programs,
just to keep everyone off balance. So this region brings together a lot of what
we've talked about so far this year. And again, we appreciate everybody being
Mr. Smith is not able to be with us this week. But I will
yield to the distinguished gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, in his
place, for any comments she'd like to make.
SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, to our panel,
thank you for being before us. Obviously, the Indo-Asia Pacific arena is an
incredibly important one to our United States and to security in our world. I'm
always a little amused with the fact that everybody talks about pivoting
towards that direction. I'm a Californian. We've always been on the Pacific. So
to a large extent, we've had the opportunity to look across that Pacific and
work with the nations and except a lot of people who are originally from those
countries to our (ph) California. So I think that we are well positioned, in
particular, as Californians, with respect to understanding and having ties to
The collective security of our world is not only one of
defense and high-tech solutions to some of that, but it is also about culture
and the economy. And so, I believe that we should continue to work in the many
myriad of ways to, as we look towards that region, maintaining a significant
U.S. Military capability advantage is clearly a top priority for us from a
national security perspective. And it's entirely appropriate to take a look at
the capabilities, especially with high technology that these countries in that
region are doing.
Again, we should not pre-suppose. I think that there's
malice involved when somebody is beefing up their military or are working
towards higher military capabilities. And we shouldn't, I think, presume that
the conflict is inevitable, rather, we should be geared toward working together
in good faith of preservation of our international order.
And I think that the most significant thing that Congress
can do to help bolster the U.S. Military's technological edge and to help
advance strategic objectives in the Indo-Asia Pacific region is to eliminate
And I'm talking not just here in the Defense Committee, but
across the federal board. As I remember, Secretary Gates once said, if we don't
educate our people if our economy is not good -- and I'm paraphrasing, I'm not
saying directly -- then we don't have to worry about out our military because
it's about our economy and about our people. So I'm looking forward to hearing
the testimony today.
And Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit Mr. Smith's
statement for the record. Thank you.
THORNBERRY: Thank you. Without objection, it is so ordered.
And without objection the witnesses's complete written statements will be made
part of the record. We are pleased to have with us today the Honorable
Christine Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Admiral Samuel
Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and General Curtis Scaparrotti,
the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.
Again, thank you all for being with us. As I said, your
statements will be -- your complete statements will be made part of the record.
And your -- I would -- we would appreciate you summarizing in your opening
comments before we turn to questions.
WORMUTH: Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry and distinguished
Members of the Committee for having us here today. We're looking forward to the
conversation. And I'm sending my best wishes to Ranking Member Smith for a
speedy recovery. I know he's not enjoying that process. THORNBERRY: Madam,
excuse me. Would you mind getting that microphone right in front of you?
WORMUTH: Sure. Is that better?
THORNBERRY: That's -- that's better.
WORMUTH: The only way it works is talking right into it. So,
THORNBERRY: OK. It's a pleasure to be here to talk with you
about certainly a top priority for Secretary Carter and myself, which is our
rebalance to Asia-Pacific. I'm also very pleased to be here alongside Admiral
Locklear and General Scaparrotti. We worked closely together on a lot of
different issues. They are doing a tremendous job. And the men and women who
are out there working Pacific Command and at U.S. Forces Korea are really the
day-to-day face of our rebalance for a lot of countries in the region. So we
really appreciate the work that they do.
Both Secretary Carter and I have recently come back from
Asia, different parts of the region. But I think we both heard in a very
resounding way a lot of support from the countries out there for the rebalance
that we've undertaken and also a lot of desire to have even greater U.S.
leadership and engagement with the countries that are there.
In the past seven years, it's obviously been a time of
tremendous change and opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region. As nations there
rise and become more prosperous, it's created a lot of opportunity, at the same
time that dynamism in the region has also created a much more complex security
environment in which we are now operating.
In particular, China's very rapid military modernization,
its opaque defense budget, the -- its actions in space and cyberspace and its
behavior in places like the East and South China Seas raise a number of serious
questions for us.
THORNBERRY: Though China's expanding interests are a natural
part of its rise, it does continue to pursue activities and to make investments
that leave many countries in the region, including the United States, to have
some serious questions about its long-term intentions
WORMUTH: China's behavior in the maritime domain, I think,
in particular, has created significant friction for its neighbors. The
Government's efforts to incrementally advance its claims in the East and South
China Sea and its extensive land reclamation activities, particularly the
prospect of further militarizing those outposts are very concerning to us.
We've urged China to show restraint and to refrain from
further activities that undermine regional trust. We also have continued to
urge China to clarify the meaning of its ambiguous nine-dash line claim as a
starting point as a way to start reducing tensions and provide greater
transparency to countries in the region.
While the United States and China are not allies, we also
don't have to be adversaries. I think both of us, both the United States and
China recognize that a constructive U.S.-China relationship is essential for
global peace and prosperity.
We're therefore not only talking to China about actions they
undertake that concern us, but we are also talking to them in undertaking
activities to build transparency and to improve understanding, particularly
through our military-to-military engagement with the PLA.
We also face a number of other challenges, obviously, in the
region. Particularly, I think, of greatest concern to us in DOD is North
Korea's dangerous pursuit of ballistic missiles and its weapons of mass
destruction program. North Korea, as you all know, has repeatedly demonstrated
its willingness to use provocation as a means to achieve its end. And just in
the last year, we saw a very significant cyber attack on Sony Pictures
There are also other challenges in the region that are
magnified by a growing range of non-traditional threats, such as the increased
flow of foreign fighters, both to and from Asia, the trafficking of illegal
goods and people and devastating natural disasters, such as the cyclone we saw
last month in Bonowati.
So in response to these shifting dynamics, DOD has
consistently worked to implement President Obama's whole-of-government strategy
towards rebalancing in the Asia Pacific.
One of the most important pieces of the administration's
work in the area of the rebalance is to finalize the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Our military strength ultimately rests on the foundation of our vibrant and
growing economy. So we believe strongly that TPP is not just part of our
economic agenda, but it also a very important part of our national security
agenda. And I would urge Congress to pass Trade Promotion Authority and allow
negotiators to conclude this very important agreement.
In DOD, we're really focused in terms of the rebalance on a
couple of key lines of effort. First is strengthening our security
relationships with allies and partners in the region. In Japan, for example,
we're very close to completing a historic update of the defense guidance which
really wouldn't have been possible a decade ago.
We are also working with the Republic of Korea to develop a
comprehensive set of alliance capabilities to counter the North Korean threat.
And in Australia and the Philippines last year, we signed important
groundbreaking posture agreements that will give us enhanced access for our
forces and also allow us a lot of new combined training opportunities for our
partners in Australia and the Philippines.
Our strong friendships in the region also go beyond
traditional alliances to some of our new relationships, particularly in south
and Southeast Asia. In addition to our very strong partnership with Singapore,
where I just visited a couple weeks ago, we also are strengthening our
relationships with countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. And finally,
we're investing, of course, in our partnership with ASEAN, which is really
leading the way in terms of trying to build a more robust security architecture
in the region.
And lastly, in terms of relationships, the U.S-India
relationship is a very important and very exciting partnership. As you all
know, just this January, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi signed a Joint
Vision Statement. We also completed the first update in 10 years to our defense
framework with India. And we concluded four path finder projects for technology
development with India under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative.
In tandem with our efforts to modernize relationships in the
Pacific, the Department is also updating our forward presence. And this isn't
just about putting more assets into the region. It's also about using those
assets in new ways. For example, we've developed a more distributed model for
our Marine Corps that is reducing our concentrated presence in Okinawa through
relocating Marines to Australia, Guam, Hawaii and Mainland Japan.
The Navy is also working more on its rotational presence
concept to include being on track to have our goal of having four littoral
combat ships rotating through Singapore by 2017. We've had two of our LCS ships
go to Singapore already. And the Army will be initiating its first rotational
deployment of a brigade combat team to the Korean Peninsula later this spring.
Finally, and I think going very much to the issue of the technology concerns
this Committee is interested in, we're also bringing our best capabilities to
the Asia-Pacific region. We're making significant investments to sustain our
American technological edge into the future in the air, land, sea and undersea
domains. We are investing in precision munitions that will increase our ability
to strike adversaries from greater standoff distances and we're working on new
capabilities to allow us to continue to operate freely in space and cyberspace.
All of these efforts demonstrate the seriousness of our
department's commitment to protecting U.S. Military primacy in the Asia-Pacific
theater. And our focus on technology is really the impetus for our Defense
Innovation Initiative, which is a long-term comprehensive effort to make sure
that we enhance our military competitive edge, even as we face budget
The Department's rebalance efforts, as well as those of our
interagency colleagues, are part of a long-term project that reflect, I think,
the enduring interest the United States has in the Asia- Pacific region. We
look forward to continuing to work with Congress on the rebalance and I look
forward to questions.
THORNBERRY: Thank you.
LOCKLEAR: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today with Secretary Wormuth and General Scaparrotti, who I've
worked very closely with both of them.
Before we begin, I'd like to ask that my written testimony be
submitted for the record?
For more than three years, I've had the honor and the
privilege of leading the exceptional men and women, military and civilian, of
the United States Pacific Command. These volunteers are skilled professionals
dedicated to the defense of our nation, are serving as superb ambassadors to
represent the values and strengths that make our nation what it is -- great.
I want to go on record to formally thank our servicemembers,
civilians and their families for their sacrifices. U.S. PACOM continues to
strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the
region and demonstrate U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard our U.S. national
When I spoke to you last year, I highlighted my concern for
several issues that could challenge the security environment across the
Indo-Asia- Pacific. Those challenges included responding to humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief events, dealing with an increasingly dangerous
an unpredictable North Korea, a challenge that General Scaparrotti and I remain
aligned in addressing. A continued escalation of complex territorial disputes,
increasing regional transnational threats and the complexity associated with
China's continuous rise. In the past years, these challenges have not eased.
They will not away soon. But the Asia rebalance strategy is and has taken hold.
It is achieving its intended goals.
However, the greatest challenge remains the continued
physical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. The Budget Control Act
remains enforces, the greatest challenge in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will be
dealing with the consequences to the security of our national interest as we
respond to a rapidly changing world.
I echo the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and the Service Chief's testimony before Congress. Our nation is being
forced into a resource-driven national security strategy, instead of one
properly resourced and driven by our enduring national interest.
In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we are accepting more risk a lot
less. Sequestration will force harmful reductions in force size, structure and
readiness that will reduce liability to manage crisis faced (ph) provide
options to the President and the Congress and diminishes United States'
prestige and credibility in the region and around the globe.
In the last year, a great expense to the readiness of the
surge force's position in the continental United States, U.S. PACOM has
maintained its forward forces focused on protecting the homeland, deterring
aggressors such as North Korea, strengthening alliances and partnerships and
developing the concepts and capabilities required for us to remain dominant in
a world that is growing in complexity with threat that continue to increase
against a seemingly unending stream of constraints.
Without adequate resources, we'll be forced to make
difficult choices today that will have strategic consequences to our future.
I'd like to thank the Committee for your continued interest and the support. I
look forward to your questions.
THORNBERRY: Thank you, sir.
SCAPARROTTI: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez and
distinguished members of the Committee, I'm honored to testify today as the
commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United
States Forces Korea and also alongside Admiral Locklear and Under Secretary
On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and
their families who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea, one of our
most important allies, thank you for your support.
I've prepared some brief opening remarks and I thank you for
submitting them to the record. Last year, I testified that the combined and
joint forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea were capable and
ready to deter. And if necessary, respond to North Korean threats and actions.
Due our accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that our strong alliance is
more capable of addressing the rapidly evolving and increasingly asymmetric
North Korean threat.
In recent years, North Korea has aggressively developed and
utilized asymmetric capabilities such as cyber warfare, nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles to advance its interests. To put this in perspective over
time, in 2012, my predecessor noted North Korea's advances in cyber and nuclear
capabilities during his opening statement to this Committee.
A year later, North Korea conducted cyber-attacks on South
Korea's banks and broadcasting stations. And in 2014, they boldly projected
their cyber capabilities against Sony Pictures in the United States in an
effort to inflict economic damage and suppress free speech.
This example represents a trend that is persistent across
several North Korean asymmetric capabilities. My top concern is that we will
have little to no warning of a North Korean asymmetric provocation, which could
start a cycle of action and counteraction leading to unintended escalation.
This underscores the need for the alliance to maintain a high level of
readiness and vigilance.
SCAPARROTTI: Last year, the alliance took significant steps
in improving its capabilities and capacities to deter aggression and to reduce
its operational risk. But our work is not done. In 2015 we will maintain this
momentum by focusing on my top priority, sustaining and strengthening the alliance,
with an emphasis on our combined readiness. This includes ensuring the rapid
flow of ready forces into Korea in the early phases of hostilities and
improving ISR capabilities and critical munitions.
Based on the national security strategies of both our
nations, the United States will continue to be a steadfast strategic partner to
South Korea, and South Korea is poised to be a long-lasting and important ally
to America. Our enduring military partnership with South Korea is the
preeminent example of bilateral security cooperation and a visible element of
American leadership and our nation's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.
The men and women serving on freedom's frontier defending
the Republic of Korea remain thankful for this committee's unwavering support
in prioritizing resources that enable us to defend our national interests in
Asia, while advancing universal values and international order. I'm extremely
proud of our service members, civilians and their families serving in the
Republic of Korea and never lose sight of the fact that they are at freedom's
frontier, defending one of our most important allies and vital American
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
THORNBERRY: Thank you.
I want to ask, Admiral and General, each of you about this
issue of technological superiority. I mentioned Undersecretary Kendall has
testified that our technological superiority that we have enjoyed for years is
eroding, and we have had many other witnesses support that. There are a variety
of factors that have played into it -- what we have done to ourselves with
budget cuts, a procurement process that cannot keep up with changes in
technology, the fact that some of our competitors have stolen incredible
amounts of information from us and benefited from it. All of these things and
probably others contribute to it.
But each of you are responsible for dealing with the world
today as we find it and being prepared with plans and contingencies and using
the forces that we have today. So I would be interested, as a combatant
commander, as a commander responsible for a key area of the world, are you
concerned about these trends in technology and our ability to keep up? Are
there some areas that concern you more than others, given your area of
responsibility? Are there suggestions you have about how we, the United States,
could and should adjust to meet these changes? Kind of a broad picture of what
it's like from your end as war fighting commanders.
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, sir. Over my career my
observation is that when we were dealing with the Soviet Union in the cold war
that we had a concerted effort as a military to have that technological edge
that really provided a tremendous amount of benefit and allowed us to prevail,
I think, during that time.
As we entered the last part of this past century and we
started efforts in the Middle East, we predominantly were dealing with wars and
events where we had such a large technological superiority that -- we had air
dominance, we had undersea dominance, we had dominance in every area. And that
was good and we used that dominance.
During that time I think that our priorities for watching
what the rest of the world was doing as countries came along that had the
ability and the desire to want to improve their militaries and improve their
technological capabilities that we kind of took a little bit of a break and
didn't make the types of investments that we needed to make.
During that time our relative superiority I think has
declined and continues to decline. Some of the reasons for that, I think, are
because countries have more money to spend. There is a greater proliferation of
technology. Some of it has been stolen through intellectual property, some of
it has been sold around the world in different venues that you all are aware
The other thing that makes it challenging for us is our
general vulnerability. When it comes to the Asia-Pacific, we are a Pacific
nation but we are also an island nation, so we rely very heavily on power
projection, which means we have to be able to get the forces forward, to
sustain them forward, and we rely heavily on systems that several decades ago
weren't even known about or thought about too much and that really exist now in
the cyber world, in the space world, which if we are not careful will unveil
vulnerabilities that we have to pace with technological advancements.
To the degree of how we address these, what's important to
me is making sure that the forces we have, number one, are dominant. You never
want to go into any crisis or even in deterrence to try to manage a situation
with a force that's not dominant. It needs to be technologically superior
across multiple domains. So if you start at the top and you go from space to
cyber to air to integrated air and missile defense, to sea, maritime, to
subsurface maritime, there is technological challenges as all the militaries of
the world get better in these domains, that we must continue to pace for us to
be able to be relevant in the domains that allow us to project U.S. power in
defense of U.S. interests. Now in the build-up up to this presidential budget
submission, I made it clear through a series of processes in the Pentagon the
types of key areas where we need to maintain our focus on technological
advancement, and I think most of those were accurately represented in Secretary
Kendall's testimony. I think that if the president's budget is supported in
those areas that it will continue to get at the types of technological advances
that are critical for us to stay forward and to protect U.S. interests in the
SCAPARROTTI: Mr. Chairman, I would echo what Admiral
Locklear had to say, particularly on the peninsula. You discussed earlier the
asymmetric capabilities are being developed by North Korea. As they develop
those asymmetric capabilities they are specifically orienting on what they
consider to be some of our vulnerabilities, and through their development they
are trying to close our dominance basically.
We have to continue to develop our capabilities, to change
our posture, our concepts, our employment in order to ensure that we maintain
The last thing I would say on the peninsula is because we
are operating on a peninsula, it's a relatively small theater. Air and naval
dominance is very important to the agility that I have on the peninsula itself
if we have a crisis. So all of these things are things that I think about quite
And finally, the specific asymmetric capabilities that I
think about the most is the ballistic missile capability North Korea possesses
and our continued ability to be able to counter that. And then finally, ISR.
Many of our adversaries are becoming more proficient in determining how to work
inside of our capabilities, our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities, and also how to use deception and other means in order to limit
that advantage that we have today.
THORNBERRY: It seems to me in no area of the world is it
more true that a loss of technological superiority means increased risk to
American lives than on the Korean Peninsula, so I think that's another way to
keep in mind.
SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again for
your testimonies. I represent the largest Vietnamese population outside of
Vietnam in the world, sitting right there in Orange County, California. As I
said, we've always had our view to what's going out in the Asian countries and
the Pacific region.
Last year Vietnam and the United States agreed to ease its
lethal weapons embargo on Vietnam in order to improve the maritime security and
to address the ongoing conflicts in regards to the islands in the East Sea. But
on the other hand, I've worked enough on the Vietnamese issues to understand
that Vietnam still has -- is lacking so much with respect to its human rights
In particular, in 2000, when I went with President Clinton
for the bilateral trade agreement and then later when we took Vietnam off of
the countries of particular concern list with respect to religious infractions
in order for them to be able to go into the World Trade Organization. So we
continue to see that things don't get better with respect to the human rights
issues, or marginally at times and then worse.
So can you address for me the road map for weapons sales to
Vietnam and what types of lethal weapons would be precluded if Vietnam
continues on its road of not changing its human rights record, even with
respect to, for example, Human Rights Watch and our own State Department? They
are consistently marked very, very low with respect to human rights.
What do you see or what can we expect from this
administration and this Pentagon with respect to weapons sales to Vietnam? Are
we going to tie any conditions to lifting that embargo?
WORMUTH: Congresswoman Sanchez, thank you very much for that
We are still in the process now of working with the
Department of State, our colleagues there to work through how best to leverage
the partial lifting of the lethal weapons ban. But certainly a part of those
consultations is looking at the human rights picture in Vietnam, and we are
very much, even as we and the Department of Defense are very interested in
deepening our relationship with Vietnam, we also are committed to pushing for
greater progress on the human rights front. So that is something that we are
very much taking into account as we look at how best to work with Vietnam.
WORMUTH: I think it's fair to say that broadly speaking the
kinds of capabilities that we think would be most useful for Vietnam in terms
of its security needs are those that would be helpful to them in terms of
maritime security, in terms of maritime domain awareness, in terms of helping
them strengthen their ability to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster
So those are the kinds of areas that we're focused on with
them, and looking at what kinds of arms might be relevant to that. But we're
still in the process of figuring out how best to approach specific items they
might be interested in.
SANCHEZ: And, Madam Secretary, we've also seen, obviously, a
pretty aggressive stance by China with respect to territorial rights, or
claimed territorial rights in the E.C. What types of help could we give to
Vietnam to ensure its sovereignty over the islands that it believes are part of
their integral country?
WORMUTH: Well, I think first, as you know, we don't take a
position on the territorial claims. But we are very much committed to wanting
to see countries in the region work through diplomacy to try to resolve those
territorial disputes. So we're focused on encouraging all of the countries to
seek peaceful means for resolution, and to use diplomacy, and use available
At the same time, I think helping countries in the region
like Vietnam, but other countries as well, strengthen again their own maritime
security capabilities, and their own maritime domain awareness capabilities.
It's helpful that -- to them in terms of them being able to, again, maintain
some visibility over their territorial waters, for example. And I don't know
whether Admiral Locklear would want to add on that.
SANCHEZ: And might you also explain to me the timeline, or
how we could work together to ensure that this partial release of the weapons
ban is not detrimental with respect, in particular, to our -- I believe what
should be, and it is for me, at least -- requirement that we see better human
rights from Vietnam? What is the process in which you're going through to take
a look and figure out how we will help militarily?
WORMUTH: First and foremost, we're working with the State
Department, again, I think to try to make sure that we have agreement on what
are the basic policy parameters for how we would approach how best to leverage
the partial lifting of the ban. We are then in consultations with Vietnam about
what their needs are. So the State Department really has the lead on the -- on
talking with them about human rights, and the importance of making progress in
that area. We reinforce that message, but we have a process internal to our
government to sort of lay out our basic parameters, and then we have an ongoing
dialogue with Vietnam about what their needs are.
And that's a very active dialogue. My assistant secretary
for Asia-Pacific affairs is actually a former ambassador to Vietnam. So we have
a very active conversation with them.
SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THORNBERRY: Thank you. Mr. Jones?
JONES: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to --
Madam Secretary, I took down some notes, what you had said in your prepared
remarks, and also what you said today. We urge the Chinese, actions that
concern us, we bring this to the Chinese attention.
I am one of the individuals in the Congress that for years
have been speaking out publicly back in my district, the 3rd District of North
Carolina, about the growing debt of our nation, because I believe sincerely
that that is the biggest threat to our national security, is the growing debt.
Admiral, that's why we passed the bill. I did not vote for
it, to be honest about it, the sequestration. And then I see we continue to
play a shell (ph) game with the budget, and with the American people's money,
and find ways to continue to puff up the needs for our military.
I believe in honesty in budgeting. I don't believe in
dishonesty -- but anyway -- in budgeting. But I'm for honesty in budgeting.
This is my question to you: I have long thought -- maybe
this because I was raised in Eastern North Carolina -- that if you owe someone
money, and you can't pay them back, they just don't have the same respect for
And I look at the fact that President Bush raised the debt
ceiling seven out of eight years that he was the president. Mr. Obama has
raised the debt ceiling seven out of six (sic) years that he's been the
president. And you know, when we raise the debt ceiling, what we're saying to
the world is we can't pay our bills; that we have to sell our financial
instruments (ph) and somehow finance our debt.
OK. The Chinese buy a lot of our debt. So I really would
like to know when our representatives of our government, whether the military
or non-military are sitting there facing the Chinese, if it is a respect,
because we continue to have to borrow money from the Chinese to pay our bills.
And they see all the news articles of how we're spending
billions and billions in Afghanistan, that much of it, according to John Sopko,
is wasted. And yet, we're taking the billions and billions that we're spending
overseas that's wasted, taking away from building our military, which needs to
be rebuilt. And I get to a point that I just don't understand an
administration. And I would say this if it was a Republican administration.
How in the world can we continue to play this game of
spending, spending, spending, and borrow, borrow, borrow, and then we think we
got equal placement to talk to the Chinese about, "Read (ph) our concern
about this, and we urge you to do that," do they really listen to us?
WORMUTH: Congressman, I certainly agree that, as I said in
my opening remarks, the foundation of our vitality as a country is a strong
economy. And that underpins our ability to have a strong military.
And again, I think that's one of the reasons why we in the
Defense Department have been expressing our support for important agreements,
like the Transpacific Partnership, for example. I think China -- again, you
know, we have a very independent -- interdependent global economy at this
point. And we're very important customers for China, as are many other
countries around the world.
So I think having a robust and growing economy in the United
States is important. And the Chinese see the value of that for them. We have --
and I also think they recognize very much that even as they modernize their
military, the United States military remains the premier military force in the
And then in addition to our very strong technological track
record, we also have an operational track record that is unmatched. I mean, our
military's combat experience is unmatched by almost any country in the world.
And it's been honed over the last more than 10 years, and I think China very
much respects that as we -- as we talk to them about our concerns.
JONES: Well, I also found it very interesting that you
mentioned trade promotion authority in your comments. There are many of us who
believe sincerely that any president, Democrat or Republican, if you give them
trade promotion authority, then you are damaging our constitutional ability to
maintain a fairness in trade.
But thank you for your testimony. I yield back.
THORNBERRY: Mr. Langevin?
LANGEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for your testimony today. In particular, Admiral Locklear, I want to
thank you for your leadership at PACOM for the last three years. I thank you
for your service, and I wish you all the best of luck in your future endeavors.
If I could start with you, Admiral, you mentioned China's
aggressive shipbuilding program in addition to their significant advances in
(inaudible) warfare capabilities, Admiral. How do our forces in PACOM compare
in those aspects? And where do you believe improvements need to be made,
besides continued and sustained investment of the U.S. nuclear submarine force,
as you mentioned? I'm particularly concerned and interested -- I think the
Chinese at this point are confident that they could potentially turn the lights
off on our use of cyber capabilities on our fleet, our ability to respond, both
figuratively and literally. And so I want to know where you -- what your views
are, and how we stand.
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, sir. It's my assessment that we
remain the most dominant military power in the world from all aspects. And I
think that there's hardly a country -- there's not a country in the world,
would disagree with that today, even though I think they would recognize that
the relative parody of our relative gap between how good we are, versus how
some of the other forces may be developing, is shrinking.
In the case of the maritime forces that you've talked about
with the PRC, they are on aggressive strategy and aggressive shipbuilding
campaign. They have -- seem to have limited restrictions on how fast they can
produce systems, how fast they can produce ships, submarines. And they're
producing what I would consider to be pretty good ships and submarines.
But I still believe that we remain -- and we have the best
ships. We have clearly the best ships, the best submarines, the best aircraft
carriers, and the best people running them in the world. So I'm generally
pretty good in that case.
But when it comes to dealing day to day in the Asia-Pacific,
what I require -- first of all, we have a forward-deployed force that operates
with our host nations -- Japan, Korea -- operates extensively in that region.
And that force needs to be ready, because it's not only ready for, you know,
day to day to maintaining the deterrent oversight security of the region, this
is also critical to ensure that we're prepared for a quick reaction if we have
to do something in North Korea.
So those forces need to be ready. They need to be the best
that we have. They need to be of the highest technical capability that we have.
And to the degree that we can get -- continue to get good host nation support,
which I think we have today, we need to pursue that.
LANGEVIN: I want to speak specific to electronic warfare
capabilities, if you could, Admiral.
LOCKLEAR: Electronic warfare arena, you know, I think that
we are -- because we've operated in environments, as I said in earlier
statements, around the globe where we have limited denied area through
electronic means, I think our electronic warfare capability has diminished, has
not kept pace with where we need to be in the future. And we're taking some
steps to take a harder look at how we get at electronic warfare.
Of course, as you talk about electronic warfare, then it
starts to get into the whole cyber issues, which are now being -- we're working
hard to try to determine how we best defend our cyber assets, how we organize
ourselves to do that, how we train our workforce to be able to do that. And
that's all part of the president's budget that's come forward that gets at
those particular issues.
LANGEVIN: Well, I share your concern there, Admiral. With
regards to North Korea, both you and General Scaparrotti mentioned in your
testimonies that there are cyber actors that continue to conduct cyber actions
against South Korean military and civilian networks. How confident are you that
this isn't happening to our U.S. forces, Korea infrastructure as well? And
additionally, how are we defending ourselves, as you mentioned in your
testimony, China generating insights into our U.S. security policies, defense
networks, logistics and military capabilities through their cyber program?
LOCKLEAR: Thank you. And in regards to Korea and the threat
from North Korea, I'm confident of our ability to defend our military networks.
We work very closely with the Republic of Korea, our partners and allies, to
ensure that, because we have a combined command and control system that we
close any vulnerabilities there.
And we have -- we've been working in the past year very hard
to develop our cyber capabilities as a team. However, you know, that's an
ongoing challenge that we have to stay on top of. North Korea is getting better
LANGEVIN: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
THORNBERRY: Mr. Forbes?
FORBES: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Madam Secretary, General,
Admiral, thank you so much for your service to our country. Thank you for being
here today. We've had a couple of milestone in the last few weeks. When the
Japanese now have exceeded the number of planes they've had to scramble against
Chinese and Russian planes since the Cold War, as I understand it.
We also had the Office of Naval Intelligence print this
report -- first time they've done it since 2009 -- talking about a compelling
concern about Chinese activity in the disputed borders off the East and South
I also concur with your comments about sequestration, as it
relates to national defense, although I really question anyone on this
Committee or the administration that would suggest that we shouldn't remove
defense sequestration, unless we can also give the EPA, the IRS, and the GSA
all the money they want, or unless we can quench the thirst of every other
agency that drinks from every federal trough. To hold defense sequestration
hostage against that would be unconscionable. My concern today, as we talk
about it, Admiral Locklear, in this Committee, we talk about the high-end
technological superiority. But I'm also concerned about what we're seeing
happen at the lower end. You mentioned, I think, correctly, China launched more
naval ships than any other country in 2013 and '14. And they expect the same
for 2014 and 2015.
But I'm also concerned about what they're doing with their
Coast Guard. They now have 95 large cutters, 110 small cutters. That's a total
of 205. That's 68 ships less than the entire U.S. Navy. And they have more
ships in their Coast Guard than Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore have combined.
We don't always rate those as naval ships. But you've seen
this picture, I'm sure. This picture is of a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. They
have labeled on here tugboat number 25. It's painted white. This is one of
their amphibious naval ships. It's number 908. It's painted gray. Other than
being painted gray and the number on there, there's virtually no difference, I
don't think, between these two ships. And that's something that's really
concerning me, because we don't always measure those.
So my question for you today is not the high-end
technological superiority. But when we're seeing Iranians in Yemen, we're
seeing Russians in the Ukraine, we're seeing Chinese on the Senkakus and the
artificial islands are building up, what strategies, concepts, forces and capabilities
do you think we need to counter this kind of gray zone aggression we're seeing
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, sir. Your -- the two pictures you
showed, I think, were accurate, the way I understand it. The Chinese are
engaging in a comprehensive military modernization program that wants to
transform not only the PLA into a high-end kind of network- centric military
capable of large-scale operations, so we can talk about that.
But they're also working on the lower end to ensure that
they have a maritime security force, which we would equate to a Coast Guard or
a fisheries patrol that, by numbers, you add up all their numbers and everybody
else's and Asia's, in that category they exceed everybody else's put together.
And I think that they went down that path, after they saw what was happening in
the Senkakus. They took some of the gray holes and we observed them ship those
over to be what they would call non-combatants or maritime patrol ships by
maybe just changing the color of them.
They show no slowdown in the pace of their military
modernization, particularly in their navy. Even though their economy has
dropped a little bit, they're still on a -- about a 10-percent increase in
2014, 2015 will be a little bit more. And it's the fifth straight year we've
seen them do double-digit increases.
Of course, their military is -- on the high end, prepares
for issues around Taiwan and their, what they would call, their near-seas.
Their maritime security are put in a position to be able to gain influence,
particularly in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, to further their --
what their consider their national interest there.
Now they are doing this in combination with what we have
seen to be fairly massive land reclamation in the Spratly Islands and in the --
and upgrades to facilities in the Paracel Islands, which are the two regions in
the South China Sea.
Now the implications of that for us are that it provides an
ability for them to deploy more of these lower-end ships down there, provides
an ability to base them down there, to resupply them. It allows them to exert,
basically, greater influence over a contested -- what's now a contested area.
It -- expanded land features down there also could eventually lead to the
deployment of things, such as long- range radars, military and advanced missile
systems and it might be a platform for them, if they ever wanted to establish
an air defense -- an air defense -- an ADIZ zone down there for them to be able
to enforce that from.
Up to this point in time, the nations around them, the South
East Asian claimants have really had little success in formulating an effective
response to the PRC actions down there. None of their efforts have slowed the
PRC in the South China Sea. And they recognize that stopping the PRC would
require a change in the strategic environment down there.
So what types of things do we need to do (ph) down there?
Well, first, the force will need to stay forward. We need to have the types of
Intelligence and Search, ISR assets that allow us to maintain our knowledge of
what's going on. These are globally stressed, because of the things that we're
doing in Afghanistan and in Iraq and in Yemen. And those -- many of those assets
are similar in type to the ones we would use in that arena. So we need to
ensure that we can sense and see what's going on, because it allows me to
optimally use the forces that we have.
FORBES: Admiral, my time has expired. But would you mind
submitting that to us for the record? It's important that we have it as a
FORBES: And I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
THORNBERRY: Thank you. I appreciate it.
BORDALLO: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Secretary
Wormuth and Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti. I want to thank you for
coming today. And as the Representative from Guam, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman,
your calling the Committee together for taking time to further examine our
posture in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Admiral Locklear, I have a question for you. As the Ranking
Member of the Readiness Subcommittee, I would like to focus on training
capabilities in the Asia Pacific Region. Our Marines in Okinawa have degraded
training capabilities and the Army and the Air Force have significant
degradation of training capabilities elsewhere in the region. Can you comment
on how the Department is looking at improving these capabilities? We are moving
forward with a live-fire training range on Guam. But what about larger training
exercises and the need for improving capabilities in the Northern Marianas
Islands? I think that the Committee has questions about the cost and I
understand PACOM has a handle on many of these matters. So could you answer that
LOCKLEAR: Well, thanks for the questions. It's clear that
for us to be as far forward as we are, that we need to have adequate facilities
to be able to train and keep our forces ready at the high end. So it requires,
I think, a multi-pronged strategy. One is -- you mentioned first is your home
is in Guam, is ensuring that the Guam plan that we have for the relocation of
the Marines there stays on track and we really appreciate the support of this
Committee in doing that as we go forward. And it is on track.
As we look at the entire Guam complex and bringing those
Marines there, we envision, with the support of the Marianas Islands, Northern
Marianas Islands, governments up there, to be able to put in place a range up
that that allows not only us to keep our Marines that are there ready, but also
could bring other nations into play in that strategic part of the world for us
to be able to learn together train together and maximize the opportunity for
interoperability between our militaries.
It's also very important that in Alaska that we get the
range systems in Alaska correct, that we maintain those and that -- because
that's where we get much of our high-end training in those ranges in Alaska. As
you know, we're also working very closely with our allies in Australia and in
Northern Australia for having access to those really magnificent broad ranges
that are there, so that we could work together with them. So I think we have a
good plan, if we can bring it all together.
BORDALLO: Thank you. Thank you very much. Admiral, I have
another question for you. Can you comment on the progress of the U.S.-Japan
defense guidelines and what do you envision occurring to implement these
guidelines in the near term?
LOCKLEAR: Well, the guidelines process is ongoing. And we
anticipate that later this year that the guidelines will be completed and
signed. I think I --
BORDALLO: I was going to ask...
BORDALLO: ... yes, the Secretary as well.
LOCKLEAR: And what we -- the real key to the guidelines is
making sure that we -- first of all, that we militarily -- both countries
recognize the importance of the alliance. This is one of the most important
alliances in the world, for not only Japan, but for the United States, but also
for the region. And ensuring that we get this right and that we're able to go
forward in military way that provides a peace and security and prosperity for
the region for both countries is important. And it starts to get at the -- more
specifics of how we're going to do that. And it also forces, I think in this
case, or encourages the Japanese to kind of look at how they view the alliance
and how they're going to participate as we go forward.
BORDALLO: Thank you.
WORMUTH: Just to add on that, I think we anticipate
finishing up the defense guidelines right around the time that Prime Minister
Abe comes to Washington later this month.
BORDALLO: Oh, very good.
WORMUTH: And a couple of things that I think that are really
notable and important about the defense guidelines are, first of all, that
there will be a whole section that really speaks to the collective self-defense
vision that Japan has for the role of its self-defense forces. But it also will
have a new alliance coordination mechanism which will, again, further our
ability to work with Japan to help with its security needs, but also to look at
our security needs.
There will be a section on peacetime cooperation in the
areas of ISR, maritime domain awareness, missile defense. We will also have a
whole section that looks at international activities, as well as additional
cooperation in space and cyber. So I think that will be, you know, really
important document to bring the alliance to the next level.
BORDALLO: Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I have just one quick question.
Admiral Locklear, what will be the impact of our rebalance
strategy if sequestration remains in place?
LOCKLEAR: It remains in place, in general, in short, you'll
have less force that are less ready, that are less technologically capable in
an increasingly technological environment.
BORDALLO: Thank you very much. And I yield back, Mr.
THORNBERRY: The gentlelady's time is expired. The chair
recognizes the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for
WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you for
being here today. I just really have been impressed, Ms. Wormuth, with your
comments. And, Admiral, I'm just grateful that I have a son who's currently
serving in the Navy, and I've got three in the Army. So -- and my visits,
General, to the DMZ, again, such extraordinary people that you serve with, and
making such a difference indeed for the Republic of Korea, and their
And that's why, as I'm thinking about the cyber offensive of
North Korea, General, how is that being countered with the efforts that they've
made to disrupt the banks of South Korea, and other activities? How is this
being addressed? SCAPARROTTI: Well, sir, I think first of all, we're working very
closely with our allies as a multinational community in this regard. And we
have a very good cyber capability in the United States that's growing as well.
This is a domain that we don't necessarily have superiority in. I think there's
a lot -- there's a lot of simultaneity out there in this domain, so we work it
I think we've stayed away -- stayed ahead of it well, but
will take that kind of effort and resourcing in order to -- in order to
continue to develop our capability. That's about what I'd say here. It's
difficult to get into that much without -- you know, in an open hearing.
WILSON: Well, again, we just appreciate your efforts so
much. Additionally, Ms. Wormuth, I'm really grateful to be the chairman of the
Emergency Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. The unconventional warfare
tactics are a great concern to the entire committee, and to myself. Could you
please characterize your assessment of the unconventional strategy and tactics
being used by China, and the challenge these pose to the DOD's ability to
WORMUTH: Thank you, Congressman. I think, as Congressman
Forbes talked about, in terms of the Coast Guard capability, for example, or
the maritime law enforcement's capabilities that China has, China's has been --
China uses those assets to assert -- to try to assert additional control over
what it sees as its territorial claims. And I think that's a way where they're
sort of using assets in an unconventional way.
We're really focused, I think, on the building partner
capacity side, in trying to help partners in the region, some of the smaller
countries in Southeast Asia, for example, work on their own maritime security
capabilities to try to counter that kind of unconventional use of assets.
We also, though, are looking at -- on the more technology
side, we are looking at certainly our intelligence capabilities, and are trying
to strengthen our information operation capabilities, for example. And those
capabilities are relevant, obviously, not just in the Asia-Pacific theater, but
in many theaters around the world. I think, you know, we've seen a considerable
use of unconventional techniques in Europe recently, given Russia's activities
in Ukraine, for example.
WILSON: And certainly, that's to me such a tragedy, the
invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. I know that I had just so hoped
for a modern European-inclined Russian Federation. And that doesn't seem to be
Additionally, I'm very concerned about North Korea's nuclear
weapons policy. Ms. Wormuth, what does North Korea, the regime, what is their
-- what do you see as their capability of enhancing nuclear weapons delivery
WORMUTH: Well, Congressman, we're certainly concerned,
obviously, about North Korea's weapons-of-mass-destruction capability, and its
nuclear program in particular. You know, we -- North Korea has not tested some
of its capabilities, and we don't yet fully know what they're able to do in
terms of their ability to miniaturize, for example, a nuclear weapon.
But it's our assessment that it is prudent to plan for the
worst- case scenario, which is why we're so focused on our National Missile
Defense program, for example, and why we've made the investments to expand the
number of ground-based interceptors from 30 to 44, to try to make sure that
we're keeping track with that -- with that threat.
I think fundamentally, the North Korean regime believes that
having a nuclear capability under -- basically guarantees their regime
survival, which is why they see it as so important. I would ask, I think,
General Scaparrotti to elaborate.
THORNBERRY: The gentleman's time is expired, so would ask
the general if he could do that for the record. And the chair recognizes Ms.
Gabbard from Hawaii for five minutes.
GABBARD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll continue
along the same topic here. And I think it's important for us to recognize that
North Korea remains the most immediate military threat, not only to our
interests within the region, but really to the U.S. directly. And important for
us to focus on, this immediate threat, especially within the context of the
greater conversation that's taking place now, in seeing how we can prevent Iran
from getting to the point of having this nuclear capability.
So General Scaparrotti, I'm wondering if you can speak to
Mr. Wilson's question, but also specifically to the status of ballistic missile
defense policy within the region, and the level of cooperation that you are
getting from our partners there within the Republic of Korea and Japan
SCAPARROTTI: Well, thank you. First of all, to the North
Korean nuclear capability, I would state it this way; that they claim to have a
capability to deliver a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile.
They've paraded it, they've shown it to us, but they haven't
tested it, as the undersecretary mentioned. And that's very important in
something that's as complex as this. But I as a commander, I have to be
prudent, and assume that they can deliver one, and act on that basis.
Secondly, in terms of ballistic missile defense, we bring
our best systems to the peninsula. We work very closely with the Republic of
Korea. This year, just this funding year, they committed in the last couple
months to upgrade their PAC-2 systems to PAC-3, and they'll be doing that over
the next couple of years. And we're working closely with them over the next
year or so to increase our interoperability, and the ability to have a common
So I think we're moving in the right direction. Given the
threat, we have to keep pace with that. We have to continue to keep our focus
on that. GABBARD: Thank you. Admiral Locklear, in your written statement, you
stated that currently there are roughly 1,300 ISIS foreign fighters who are
coming from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Can you speak to specifically which
countries predominantly they're coming from? What is drawing them to ISIS
specifically? And how do you characterize the threat of these foreign fighters
coming back and returning to their home countries in the region, and continuing
these activities there?
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, Congresswoman. We are working
closely with our fellow COCOM and CENTCOM to actually have a -- try to get a
better sense of this phenomenon of foreign fighters that would be moving out of
predominantly Asia, Southeast Asia.
They come from a broad range of countries. It wouldn't --
you know, if you take a look at the list, it wouldn't surprise you that they --
you know, it wouldn't be what you thought. They come from a number of different
places. We're not sure how many of them are dedicated fighters that go forward,
or they're just kind want-to-be's that kind of trundle over there and decide
they want to sign up for a new cause.
And the numbers that are coming back, we don't have good
fidelity on that at this point in time. But what it has done, it has opened up
our information-sharing with all the countries in the region that are concerned
about this problem, which all of them are. And this isn't just a mil-to-mil,
this is a whole government agency, FBI, those types of agencies that are
working hard on the problem.
So the implications for Asia in this, if you take a look at
-- if you kind of just add up the number of Islam that is in Asia, it greatly
overwhelms the number that are in the Middle East. I mean, so there's probably
400 million-plus, I would just say, if I could just kind of make an estimate
Now, the difference is that they're generally moderate, and
they're less I think susceptible to violent extremism. And they have good
government, most of them do. They have better security environments that can
monitor what's going on in the countries.
So I think these are advantages that the Asia-Pacific has
that might not be available in all countries in the Middle East. So what we
have is an opportunity here. We have an opportunity to assist them, to assist
each other, to improve our information-sharing networks to see where this type
is going, and then to be more predictable rather than reactive, should it occur
in the theater. And we're making good end roads in that.
GABBARD: Do the governments of some of these countries
recognize this threat, and are they reaching out to work with us in partnership
to make sure that it doesn't grow?
THORNBERRY: Gentlelady's time is expired. So, Admiral, if
you could answer that for the record, we'd appreciate it.
The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, is recognized for
ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, I know that we're in discussions with
South Korea's government about the deployment of a THAAD battery on the
peninsula. Can you tell us why that would be important for the protection of
our deployed forces in South Korea to have put on that peninsula?
SCAPARROTTI: Well, the deployment of the THAAD would give us
a high-tier defense, and so therefore we would have a layered defense, and
those systems would enhance the capability of our present Patriot systems that
are on the peninsula today.
ROGERS: Admiral, how many Chinese land-based cruise and
ballistic missiles are located in your area of responsibility, and can you give
me an estimate in the dozens or hundreds, to keep it unclassified. And how many
of these are between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in range?
LOCKLEAR: If you'd let me take that for the record, I'll
provide you a complete answer.
ROGERS: Ms. Wormuth, when will the administration make a
decision on INF violation responses, and has the principals committee even met
on this issue?
WORMUTH: Congressman, we are again, I think at this point in
time, of the view that it would be beneficial to remain in the INF treaty if
possible if Russia comes back into compliance and we continue to have
conversations with Russia about that. There will come a point in time where if Russia
continues to be noncompliant, I think we will have to take action to deal with
the military capabilities that they are potentially putting in place that are
not compliant with the treaty.
This is something that is discussed at very senior levels.
There are any number of principals committee meetings where this type of
conversation may come up.
ROGERS: They have been noncompliant for years. How much
longer is this going to go on?
WORMUTH: I think, Congressman, again this is something that
we are looking at very carefully. Our view is it would be beneficial to keep
them in the treaty if possible. We have not yet made that decision but we
recognize that we cannot let the current situation go on for an indeterminate
ROGERS: In order to keep them in compliance we have got to
get them in compliance, and they haven't been for years and they are not going
to be. I hope that you all will start talking more seriously about some
Admiral, with China increasing its capability of nuclear attack
submarines, ballistic missile submarines and even aircraft carriers, how do
these developments and deployments affect U.S. force structure and planning?
LOCKLEAR: Well, certainly any increase of military forces by
the PRC require us to think through are the force that we have adequate to be
able to understand what's going on day to day. In the case of their SSBN force
becomes a homeland security, homeland defense issue that will require resources
for us to try to understand it and try to ensure our country remains safe under
In the case of aircraft carriers, I believe primarily they
will use aircraft carriers just like we do, to project power. That's one of the
deficiencies I think they're trying to overcome now, is a projection of power.
Down the road that could have global implications and it will just put further
stress on the ISR assets we have and will change the calculus on how we might
deal with any contingencies down the road.
ROGERS: Do you believe the U.S. government should be making
it a priority to ensure that China is not able to obtain U.S. technology in our
LOCKLEAR: I do.
ROGERS: Thank you.
That's all I've got, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
THORNBERRY: The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Hawaii,
Mr. Takai, is recognized for five minutes.
TAKAI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for focusing
today's hearing on the Asia-Pacific. As you know that's very important for
people from Hawaii. I wanted to welcome our witnesses. Undersecretary, Admiral
and General, thank you very much for coming.
Admiral Locklear, it is my understanding that the Pacific
fleet and the Atlantic fleet are funded through separate budget offices. Can
you speak to what advantages that has and how it supports the geographical
LOCKLEAR: Well, I would refer specific questions back to the
Navy because it's their internal workings. But my observation is it's of an
historical nature. It was put that way because of the way our fleets are laid
down globally, and a significant influence that the Pacific Fleet has the power
projection of U.S. interest into what's over half the world. I believe that
there have been historic benefits to having that divide be there. TAKAI: I
appreciate that answer. Are there any efforts underway to expand the use of
training areas in the Pacific that support engagements of our regional partners
and allies and more broadly connect ranges throughout the AOR? And can you
speak specifically to the Pohakuloa training area on the big island and the
Pacific missile range on Kauai? Some of the infrastructure needs there, and
more importantly, how resources are being allocated to support upgrades and
training ranges in the PACOM AOR?
LOCKLEAR: Thank you. As I previously laid out, we have a
series of ranges that we need to support our forward forces. During that
dialogue I did not mention Hawaii and I should have because that's where I live
and breathe and where we have tremendous requirements.
So the case of the ranges on the big Island, I'm a supporter
of moving forward with those ranges. We are in need of those if we intend to
maintain a forward footprint of Marines and Army personnel in Hawaii, which I
very fully support a robust presence there.
The PMRF missile facility, missile range out there is a
premier facility in the world as far as I am concerned, and the investments
will need to be made to keep it such. It has access to open space and open
airways and open sea space that allow us to do from Missile Defense Agency to
all the other services to be able to do the right testing and evaluation of
those systems that allow us to be relevant in the 21st century.
TAKAI: Thank you. This last question is something very
important for people, especially on a Oahu and it's in regards to our
groundwater supply. It's my understanding that recently meetings were conducted
between PACOM and the LA energy regarding the Red Hill underground fuel
facility. Though we know that fuel storage is necessary and important to
support strategy and posture of your AOR, what is the plan to upgrade the aging
infrastructure to ensure that communities that surround Red Hill, in addition
the Halawa aquifer that supplies about half the island with their water are
safe from contamination -- are safe regarding the water supply?
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir. This is a high priority for me because
we very much respect the opportunity to be in Hawaii and to have these
facilities there. The need for fuel, I mean the PACOM commander and the forces
that are under me I think are the largest user of petroleum products probably
in the world on any given day. They have to be distributed throughout a vast
area on only a very small number of nodes to be able to get at it. Historically
the Red Hill facility has provided a huge strategic reserve in case something
happens out here.
I anticipate we are going to need that strategic reserve for
a number of decades. I can't put an end date on it but it will be a number of
decades before we have visibility on how we might address that with different
types of fuels or different types of forces.
So what we have done, once we discovered that there was a
potential leak in a couple of the tanks, we took immediate action to ensure
there wasn't any damage to the water systems. We have a comprehensive plan that
DLA and my staff have brought back to the legislature in Hawaii. I'll be happy
to have somebody come brief you on that if you desire.
I think at this point in time we are in agreement, general
agreement on the way forward and that it's a good sound plan that does what you
indicated. It protects the environment of such a beautiful state.
TAKAI: Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
THORNBERRY: The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for five minutes.
SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Wormuth, my question is
for the admiral and the general but I would like to say I am interested in any
language suggestions that would cut this ridiculous appeals process that I
think is one of the problems with us fielding the equipment.
Some of these games that get played, if you will, from the
people who are purchasing the equipment that slow down our ability to field the
equipment, I think is one of the reasons that the other countries are able to
catch us, if you will. They don't have to deal with that bureaucratic process,
and that's a pretty simple thing I think we can put an end to that would help
Gentlemen, I represent Robbins Air Force Base and the airmen
and women that fly and operate the JSTARS aircraft. Last year we had worked
with the Air Force. There was a proposal to retire six of the E-8s. As you know
they're old aircraft with old technology, and to begin the recapitalization of
a new plane with a more modern radar that would give you more information.
There was a proposal for a business-class jet. I understand
there's been a new analysis demand from the combatant commanders and the
decision was made to keep the entire fleet operational at this point. I'd like
for you to speak to the value of the JSTARS, how it benefits each of your
missions. And then the Air Force's analysis of the alternatives for the JSTARS
and the recapitalization concluded that a manned aircraft was necessary,
Korea Command and Pacific Command both have benefited from
this manned platform and onboard management provided by the JSTARS. Can you
discuss the extent to what your commands' ISRs and requirements are being met?
SCAPARROTTI: Yes, sir, thank you for that question. My top
priority in terms of my requirements and request to the Department of Defense
has been ISR and specifically that aircraft, the JSTARS is one that I need
greater capability in terms of JSTARS, primarily because it provides us the
MTI, moving target indicator, and it allows us to queue my other assets. It
doesn't work alone. It works in tandem with the other assets that are airborne.
I could use more than I have today.
I appreciate the fact that the Air Force, because of the
budgeting, needs to get a new aircraft, but I appreciate the fact that they are
retaining what we have because even the loss of hours of the one that I have
today would make a difference in my indicators and warnings on the peninsula.
LOCKLEAR: It's a critically important capability in the ISR
world, also in the battle management world, particularly when you operate in a
potentially contested environments where other parts of your command and
control may be under cyber attack or space attack, having an aircraft that's
manned that has that ability to have that functionality and thinking work is
I understand the Air Force's need to recap. So we have to
manage the risk on how they bring the new systems forward. Manned versus
unmanned, I think are -- my concern right now is that we don't have the
technology able to put everything we need to in an unmanned system. I think
that's what the Air Force is probably grappling with. So what would not be
beneficial to me, or to General Scaparrotti, would be a replacement system that
didn't replace it.
SCOTT: One of my concerns is you're forced to make, through
all the DOD and the agencies, is you're forced to make decisions based on the
sequester instead of what national security needs are, is that we end up with
Army standing up for Army, and Navy standing up for Navy, and Air Force for Air
And we just need to make sure that those platforms -- those
ISR platforms that we use that operate across those, what should be imaginary
lines, if you will, don't get sacrificed. And I just -- I appreciate all of you
and what you do for our country, and look forward to continuing to work with
you to provide those JSTARS and that ISR platform. And, ma'am, if you have
suggestions on language that will stop that bureaucratic problem, we'd be happy
to work for you in the NDAA to put it in there.
WORMUTH: Thank you. I'll take that back, and we'll get back
THORNBERRY: Gentleman yields back the balance of time.
Mr. Ashford, you're recognized for five minutes. No
Mr. Nugent from Florida is recognized for five minutes.
NUGENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our
panel for being here today. And, General, having been to South Korea -- I think
I was there in 2005 or '06. I was not in this job, but I was visiting my son
who was stationed there.
That's a special area, and you certainly are at great risk
there, all of our servicemen and women, and civilians there are certainly at
great risk, particularly close in Seoul. And so I certainly do appreciate that.
I had the opportunity here just recently to go out, did not
get back out that far, nor did I get to Guam. But I got out to Hawaii and San
Diego in regards to visiting our Naval forces, and some of our Marines that are
stationed out there. And I was impressed with I guess the leadership.
And, Admiral, I met with you in Hawaii. I was impressed,
though, not only with your leadership, but the leadership of those that are in
your command, from a destroyer skipper to an LCS-4 skipper, and others in
regards to how they take their mission, and how they accomplish it, and also,
you know, at the BUDS training facility in Coronado with our SEALs.
We have -- and we talk about this all the time, about
equipment. But it's the personnel that man that equipment that makes the
difference, I think. But what I am concerned about as we move forward -- and
you've talked about it -- that we've had to accept more risks, and we're
concerned about having adequate resources.
Could you explain to us -- and maybe we can do a better job
of explaining this to the American people -- first of all, why is the
Asia-Pacific area so important to us; and B, what are the additional risks that
we're accepting because of the lack of providing the proper resources?
LOCKLEAR: Thank you, sir, and thanks for your visit to
PACOM. It was good for us.
If you take a look at Asia-Pacific today, my AOR's about 52
percent of the world, 36 stations of those nations, there's -- seven of them
are -- I mean, five of them are key allies. We only have seven defense
treaties, and five of them are there. And we believe that they're historic, and
they'll go forward and be important for the future.
Today, about six out of 10 people alive live in the
Asia-Pacific. My AOR, if you just characterize it as 83 percent water, 17
percent land, and on that 17 percent of the land, six out of every 10 people
alive live there. Eventually, if the population goes to 10 billion like we
expect it to, roughly, before it caps out, it'll go to about seven out of every
That's going to be the economic engine of the world. I think
Secretary Carter in his speech the other day in Arizona pointed out, I think
there's about half a billion middle-class consumers in the Asia- Pacific. And
by 2030, he predicted in his speech it would go to 3 billion.
So this is where the people who are going to have money are
going to be spending it in the global economy. And that global economy is where
I want my four grandsons to be able to compete in. And I want American systems
over there, systems that are similar to the value systems we have, systems of
law and order, systems of economic systems that they understand, and then they
can compete in. So what we have to do, I think, is to ensure that, number one,
that we, to the degree we can, that we maintain a security environment that's
similar to what we've enjoyed for the last 70 years, one that reflects the
security of this country, and the values of this country. To do that, you have
to be there. You have to be there in many ways. It's not just about the
military, but the military's a big component of it.
Those military forces have to be there, they have to be part
of those nations there. They have to be in there working with them. They have
to be shaping the day-to-day environment and the landscape. And so as the world
changes, and as the military capabilities in this AOR or other countries
change, we have to ensure that we have the right relevance there to ensure that
we can compete in Asia-Pacific through the next century.
NUGENT: One of the things that we really haven't touched on
is Russia's playing in that area also. And I know we talked about China, we
talk about all those things. But is Russia not playing in that area, or
starting to exert more?
LOCKLEAR: Well, Russia, in the last few months, has returned
to I would say nearly a Cold War level of activity that goes towards our
homeland, with long-range attacks, you know, exercises, and those types of
things. We also know that Russia will improve their strategic nuclear deterrent
on what's thought as their East Coast, which is in the Northern Pacific.
They also are improving their submarine force that operates
in that area, and are exerting increased influence not only in the Arctic,
which they will tend in that direction from my AOR end, but also in Northeast
Asia. And we see a greater presence of them in, just this year, in Southeast
Asia as well.
So it just adds to the amount of interesting things that a
PACOM commander has to think about every day, and the amount of ISR that I need
to track them, the sophistication of the systems I have to be able to deal with
them. I mean, the key is for us to manage the security environment on our
terms, not have to respond to someone else's.
THORNBERRY: Gentleman's time has expired.
NUGENT: Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence. And the
chairman mentioned this about the INF treaty. It think that's an important
issue for us as we move forward, particularly as it relates to Russia now
playing again in that Cold War atmosphere in the Pacific. Thank you. I yield
THORNBERRY: Thank you. And the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Bridenstine, is recognized for five minutes.
BRIDENSTINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question for
Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti. When you think about the assessment
of the technological imbalance between specifically us and China, and us and
North Korea, can you share what your assessment is right now as it concerns
cyber and space, those two elements for each one of you as it relates to China
and North Korea? Admiral Locklear?
LOCKLEAR: Well, my observation, and I'm a firm believer that
anything we choose to be dominant in, we can be. So we just have to make that
BRIDENSTINE: Are we currently dominant?
LOCKLEAR: Yes, that's my assessment.
BRIDENSTINE: Is the trajectory going to sustain that
dominance, the trajectory that is going on right now?
LOCKLEAR: Now in the case of cyber, clearly PRC's a big
actor, Russia's a big actor. I'd say they're probably at the top tier. You drop
down, they'd probably be North Korea and Iran. And then certainly, we are in
the top tier of cyber capabilities, and probably lead the way in cyber defense
capabilities, cyber understanding.
But it's, as General Scaparrotti pointed out earlier, it's
an interesting environment. It's an interesting domain that's changing rapidly.
In the case of space, I think we're -- what we've seen with
the PRC that concerns us most is their willingness to do offensive things in
space, counter-space activity, with their ASAT missile they fired a while back,
and some of the other programs I think they're developing that would limit our
ability to use those space assets in our favor, which we do need to stay
BRIDENSTINE: General Scaparrotti, would you address cyber as
it relates to North Korea?
SCAPARROTTI: Yes. In terms of cyber, as I said, I think I
agree with Admiral Locklear. I think they're probably the B team right now, but
they've since 2009 said they're going to develop that capability. And we've
seen even in the past year that capability improve.
So as I said, it's a dynamic domain. We're building teams.
We're using our intelligence to develop our skills, the types of skills we need
every day. And we're going to have to stay on that. And that has to be
As you know, in DOD, we're resourcing CYBERCOM. They train
those teams that come out and help in PACOM's headquarters and mine. And, you
know, that would be difficult to do under sequestration, I think.
BRIDENSTINE: Thank you for that. One of my concerns is that
-- and I've heard General Hyten talk about this, that, you know, satellites and
networks, they don't have mothers. And so when we think about defending our
forces, those satellites and those networks directly affect the people, those
of us who serve in our country's uniform, we do have mothers. And so from my
perspective, we need to maybe think about space a little differently. Ms.
Wormuth, would you like to address this?
WORMUTH: Congressman, if I may, I think, A, you're
absolutely right. And both the admiral and the general are right that China in
particular I think has identified space as a potential vulnerability area. And
they see that -- they see being able to hit us in space as an important way to
try to come after us if that were ever to come to pass.
Given the importance of space to all of our joint force,
that is one of the areas in the P.B. '16 budget where we made some very
specific and significant target investments to try to make sure that we stay
ahead of that curve. And I think it was very much coming from the place of
recognizing that that is an important capability that sort of underpins all of
our ability to be effective.
BRIDENSTINE: So as a Navy pilot, we have rules of
engagement, and we have hostile intent, and then hostile act. And depending on
where you are in the world and what's happening, you can respond different
When it comes to our space communication architecture, when
it comes to our GPS architecture, when these come under attack, whether it's
jamming or kinetic, this directly impacts those of us who fight war. And to the
extent that we're not fighting the war, it directly impacts the safety of those
of us who fight war. And to the extent that we are not fighting a war, it
directly impacts the safety of those of us who happen to be on the other side
of the world where there are hostile countries.
From a policy perspective, can you share with us what is the
position of the administration on how we treat, say, dazzling of an
intelligence satellite, or potentially -- can we do kinetic effects if they jam
GPS or if they jam our communication architecture in space? Can you share with
us kind of the policy on that?
WORMUTH: I think, Congressman, what I would say here is
that, again, we very much recognize that one of the key advantages we have is
the networked space-enabled force that our military has, and we want to make
sure that we protect that capability and that we continue to have the ability
to keep our forces able to operate in that networked environment. We know that
there are potential adversaries that are trying to break that capability.
If it's all right with you, I would be happy to have a team
come up and brief you about our space policy in a classified setting. I think
that would be able to address your concerns.
THORNBERRY: The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
recognizes the other gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell, for five minutes.
RUSSELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madame
Secretary, Admiral, General. Part of the concerns that I hear, Madame
Secretary, about a policy push on the trade Pacific authority, trade
partnership authority and a move to the Pacific, is that if you look at
history, when Commodore Perry went in and said we are going to open up Tokyo
and did, they immediately adopted our ways. We saw within two generations
incredible industrial capability, military doctrine, to the point where they
even defeated a world power. John Hay at the turn of the century then developed
an open-door policy with China as a hedge on Japan, almost using the same
terms, hegemony. Now we see this push into the Pacific, and while we have had
briefings here in the last couple of years with the same talks of how we're
going to expand or change our posture or do different things, now it does not
seem that the diplomatic or military advances are keeping pace with the trade
Unfortunately, in 15 years we went from ally, making ships,
signing naval treaties, to having to melt Japanese out of pillboxes and drop
atomic bombs on their cities. I would hope that as we make an advance and a
pivot into the Pacific that we do not make the same policy errors.
My question would really be to the admiral, to the general.
Missile defense seems to be the greatest short-term threat that we could
possibly face. You have limited AN/TPY-2 radars. The funding for those and the
building of those does not seem to be a priority, yet they may be the very
things that stand between us and this incredible threat. How is that being
LOCKLEAR: Well, Congressman, I would refer the specific
timelines to the Missile Defense Agency and the services who supply them. But
let me just talk about missile defense in general. I am faced with two
problems, and General Scaparrotti is part of the second one. One is I have a
homeland defense support requirement where not only do I have to defend Guam
and Hawaii from potential missile attacks, but also have to support NORTHCOM as
NORTHCOM were to transition to where we have to defend the homeland from maybe
a rogue attack from North Korea.
We have moved rapidly to put things in position in the last
decade that I think give us a relative assurance on our homeland defense. We
have guided missile destroyers that operate in the North. We put a THAAD radar,
we put that in there in about less than a month into Guam when we knew there
was a potential for a launch from North Korea, which was really -- it's
fabulous that the Army could move that fast and make it happen.
We fast tracked the AN/TPY-2 radar that was put in Shariki
in Japan, so now we have two of those going, and we are having dialogues about
where a third THAAD may go.
The second part of our problem is defending forces in the
theater and defending forces in an ever increasing environment of ballistic
missiles. These can be short-range, they can be directed aircraft carriers,
directed at ships, they can be directed at land bases. You can't defend against
all of them. There are just too many of them. You can't buy enough
What you do is you buy enough to give you confidence that
you can deter and that when conflict were to start to give you enough time to
be able to get the rest of your war plan...
RUSSELL: I appreciate that, Admiral. Thank you. In fact, it
brings up the larger concerns of power projection and even long logistical
lines for reinforcement, even if we can project power. This month in history,
over 100,000 Americans had to surrender at Bataan, not for lack of fight and
not for lack of leadership, but for lack of capacity to get to them.
With a lot of these things, I realize the constraints that
each of you live under and the policy has shifted, but we don't necessarily see
the resources coming your way. What counsel or what advice would you give to
members of Congress of how we correct that as we look at a complete pivot and
changing the economies globally, and the friction points that that will create,
and yet not have a Bataan-like future or an inability to project power and to
also sustain it, either one.
SCAPARROTTI: Yes, sir, thank you. I think in terms of
projection of power I'm probably the best example of that requirement. I have
28,500 service members on the peninsula, sufficient for today but certainly if
we begin to escalate, specifically to BMD, I'll ask for additional ballistic
missile defense assets very quickly in order to safeguard not only our military
installations but the American civilians we have there along with our ROK
So when we look at resourcing, the impact of sequestration
in 2013, et cetera, it reduces the readiness of the force. What I will need on
the peninsula is forces that arrive ready to fight in a high- intensity
conflict. Then also the impact of sequestration or reduction of resources is,
as you mentioned, I will need them on a pretty specific timeline because I have
a large adversary in close proximity to the capital of South Korea.
THORNBERRY: The gentleman's time has expired. Ms. McSally is
recognized for five minutes.
MCSALLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your
time and your testimony. General Scaparrotti, I want to talk about the
potential impact of divesting in the A-10 and the impact that's going to have
on our capabilities with your mission, and then also Admiral Locklear, in
general in the theater.
The depleted uranium on the 30 millimeters, specifically the
antitank capability. I know you've shared your testimony about how North Korea
is going more toward asymmetric capabilities, but there is still a very real
conventional threat, as you know. Should we have to deal with that, having been
a part of units that were supposed to be heading your way to be reinforcements
to those that are stationed right there, it's a pretty tight timeline to be able
to react in a very short geographic area, as you know.
So gaining and maintaining air superiority and then making
sure that we had the anti-armor capability against North Korean capabilities is
really important. So if the president's budget were to be fulfilled and the
A-10 would be divested then, you would lose the capability of the depleted
uranium in the A-10 squadrons right there at Osan. What capability gap does
that provide for you, and what are the plans to fill that gap in order to
address this particular threat?
SCAPARROTTI: Thank you. As you said, the A-10 was designed
for a specific capability and it's very good at that. Being an infantryman, I
have high regard for its ability to support ground troops. In the region I am
in, particularly in mountainous region, it also can get low and it can turn in
Having said that, I recognize too the Air Force's difficulty
in terms of the funding and the need with an aging aircraft with reduced funds
to perhaps move away from that and go to a multi-role ship. I've been assured
that if the A-10 were to come out there would be a multi-role aircraft that
would replace that squadron on the peninsula. I would need that. I would need
MCSALLY: But F-16 doesn't have the depleted uranium or the
-- I want to focus specifically on antitank. We are often talking about close
air support in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas where the A- 10 brings
unique capabilities. But if we are talking about piercing armor, an antitank
capability that the 30 millimeter with depleted uranium brings, and the F-16s,
F-15, they don't have that capability.
What gap does that create for you and what do you think is
going to be replacing that?
SCAPARROTTI: Well, I don't know from the Air Force. Frankly,
I would use air in different ways, get a multi-role aircraft and then use the
systems that I have on the ground, primarily against their armor threat. It
would open a gap in terms of having that aircraft, that specific capability.
MCSALLY: Right. And I think the last thing that we want to
be doing is relying on having to have a tank battle, right, in a day and age
when we have the capabilities and we have the plans to be able to take out
those capabilities from the air. We certainly wouldn't want to roll back that
capability and have our guys on the ground having to fight that we do actually
possess the capability in the air to be doing that with the A-10.
So you agree that it would create a gap?
SCAPARROTTI: It would, yes.
MCSALLY: Admiral Locklear, do you agree just in the larger
plans? We've been very much focusing on near-peer, conventional, potential
scenarios in the future, so the close air support and the antitank capabilities
that you would be lacking without the A-10, is that something that you think is
also a gap for the greater mission that you have?
LOCKLEAR: Well, it's certainly nice to have everything you
can have when you need it. I would say that in general in the Asia- Pacific,
other than the Korea peninsula, that the close air support mission is of a
lesser concern to me in general. But as the Air Force moves forward with the
systems, they have to move forward in the future, I think you're going to go
toward a close air support model with airplanes that have improved
precision-guided missile, weapons that can go against tanks and can deal with a
broader array of them.
MCSALLY: Thank you.
Again, we talked about the F-35 yesterday in a separate
hearing, but the munitions capabilities on the F-35 actually are not an armor-
penetrating capability and survivability is in question, especially when you do
get into that close fight. I mean, I do agree you've got a high-end challenge
that you have to deal with for sure. We've got to be able to meet that both
with air and naval forces. But if we do have men and women on the ground in
harm's way in any potential scenario, we do want to make sure that obviously we
can protect them with the best capability that we have.
So I appreciate your responses. Thanks for your service, as
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
FORBES: The gentleman -- the gentlelady yields back.
And Mr. Courtney is recognized for five minutes.
COURTNEY: Thank you, Mr. Forbes. And thank you to the
witnesses for being here today. Yesterday morning, Under Secretary Kendall was
the sort of featured speaker at the Sea, Air and Base gathering over in
Virginia. You know, packed room, talked about a lot of the same issues that are
being discussed here -- that narrowing gap that, Admiral Locklear, you referred
to earlier this morning.
But what was interesting is at the end of his remarks, he
actually, pretty passionately used a pretty good chunk of his time talking
about STEM education in this country as really a critical component of our
national security long term and particularly, you know, with the narrowing gap
that Admiral Locklear mentioned.
The STEM Education Council, which is a pretty extraordinary
coalition of Microsoft, National Association of Manufacturers, you know, all
the hard science, professional educators, American Farm Bureau, you know,
released a report recently where they talked about 23 percent of the graduate
degrees in STEM in the world today are China and 10 percent are the U.S. And
you know, that kind of -- I think, particularly, when we talk about Asia-Pacific
and the challenges and the -- again, at looking beyond just today's budget
year, you know, that point that, I think, Under Secretary Kendall was making is
And you know -- and we talk about sequestration and trying
to balance, you know, defense and non-defense, I mean, the fact is is that, you
know, education is one of those that could, you know, "pay the
price," quote, unquote, if we just had a sort of lopsided approach to
dealing with sequestration. But long term, in terms of our defense, you know,
that is just, you know, adding to that disparity that's pretty disturbing right
So I -- you know, Ms. Wormuth, and just wondered if you
maybe wanted to comment on that or anyone else about what you see out there in
terms of where China's investment and education and the, you know, increasing
capabilities that we're seeing emerging, you know, domestically from their
WORMUTH: Thank you, Congressman. I think that Under
Secretary Kendall, as he often does, was making a very good point. And we are
very much looking at the strides that countries in the Asia-Pacific region are
making in terms of science and technology and mathematics.
And it is clear that in our country, we don't -- you know,
we have a harder time, for any number of reasons, convincing our young people
to go into those areas, but it's critical. And making sure that we have the
educational policy and funding for those types of skills is what we're going to
need very much to be able to remain competitive in those fields in the future.
And I think Secretary Carter has talked about this issue as
well. And not only do we need to find ways to get more folks into those areas,
as they pursue their higher education, but also we are looking at how in the
Department of Defense, do we find ways to bring more people with those types of
skills into our system, because part of what we need to do to be able to remain
competitive and to be innovative and to get after some of these technology
challenges is to be able to bring in those, sort of, fresh people with the new,
fresh ideas. And that's something that our department probably needs to be a
little more agile about.
LOCKLEAR: I would agree, I mean, how we recruit the force of
the future has to be part of a national dialog. I mean, one percent of the
American people day to day defend it. Some of them are the most highly
technical people that this country can produce. And if we don't have a system
underpinning it that produces enough for us to lead the world, we will not be
And I know the service chiefs are all engaged on this
thought process. And where does that future force come from?
COURTNEY: Thank you. I mean, this is the 60th anniversary of
the launching of the Nautilus. And you know, Admiral Rickover, in his final
days, actually almost stopped talking about the nuclear Navy and was really
focused on U.S. education policy for precisely those reasons. And again, the
threat in Asia is where I think this imbalance is really the most acute.
And again, as we -- this Committee, you know, I -- sure look
at the big picture here in terms of just what is national defense really. What
are the building blocks of it? And having an educational system that, you know,
is prepared to provide the workforce for both the military and obviously the
people who develop our weapons systems and weapons platforms has really got to
be part of that discussion. So thank you for your testimony today.
I yield back.
FORBES: The gentleman yields back and the Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Ohio for his -- for five minutes.
(UNKNOWN): Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We talked a lot about the region today. And I want to focus
a little bit on our allies in the region and maybe touch on a little bit, if
you would, about their efforts of increasing their capabilities not only in
traditional warfare aspects, but say, cyber and space and how we're
coordinating with them, if would?
SCAPARROTTI: Sir, if you would, I'll go first with the
Republic of Korea. They have -- first, overall within their defense budget,
over the past four years or so, they've been averaging about four to five
percent increase in their defense budget. This past year it was 2.5 percent of
their GDP, which is very good, compared to, say, our NATO allies, et cetera.
And so they've been focused on meeting the capabilities that
they need, given that -- the evolving threat in North Korea, but also in order
to meet the commitments that we've made together as an alliance. And an example
being that the funding of the PAC-3 upgrade and the missiles for those this
year, Global Hawk last year to -- you know, to assist in ISR and an improvement
in their C-4 systems -- command, control, communications, computers. To enable
them, as we go to Con (ph) transition to ensure that they can lead, you know, a
combined force in a high-intensity conflict.
So overall, I think they're focused on that. Within their
budget, they have the same challenges that -- what we do, in terms of the
social demand and the competition with defense and the expense of the systems
that they have to put in place in order to increase their military's capability
and to deal with the threat that's evolving in the north.
(UNKNOWN): And what about Japan?
WORMUTH: I'm happy to speak a little bit to Japan. Again,
you know, I think we have an incredibly strong relationship and alliance with
Japan and that will be renewed and I think brought to the next level with the
completion of the defense guidelines that are going to be completed by the end
of this month.
They, as you know, are buying a large number of F-35s.
They've expressed an intent to buy the V-22. They also are working on upgrading
their Aegis platforms. They are working with us on Global Hawk, so they are
also, i think, doing a tremendous amount to upgrade their capabilities.
And then we also have a very significant cooperative
production with them for the SM 3.2 missile. That's a $3.2 billion cooperative
program with Japan.
LOCKLEAR: Well, in addition, I would say that the
Philippines who's another key ally of theirs, we have -- in negotiation for
Enhanced Cooperative Defense Agreement that's currently, you know, being
debated inside the Philippines on the political side. But that has an
opportunity to help them improve to get them to a better minimum credible
defense. It also has the opportunity for us to strengthen that alliance and
strengthen our position in Southeast Asia.
Our other ally, Australia, making good strides. I mean, it's
a great alliance. And they're -- as far as I can tell, they're increasing
defense spending. They're having good dialog about how will partner with us.
They're extending their -- thinking about extending their capabilities in
submarine war and some other areas, amphibious warfare.
So in general, I'd say the trend of our allies across the
board is that they're investing more in their defense -- and in their security,
rather than less, and they're investing more in directions that are
complimentary to our capabilities. So that if we -- so that we all enjoy the
same mutual benefits of that security architecture.
(UNKNOWN): Thank you all very much. I yield back.
FORBES: Gentleman yields back.
And with that, Madam Secretary, General, Admiral, thank you
so much for being with us today. We're getting you out right on time. And we
appreciate, as you heard all of our members express their appreciation to you,
for your service to our country. But thank you for being willing today to
educate, advise and consult with us, as we try to be a component part of the
national defense of this country.
And with that, we're adjourned.