In the process, UNC lost contact with the communists leading to confusion and concern for surprise attacks. In mid-January, Eighth Army Commander General Matthew Ridgway launched a series of offensive operations to reestablish contact with the communists and stabilize the front line. Ridgway's strategy emphasized mobility and firepower, leveraging air support and the element of surprise to exploit weaknesses in enemy positions. The 25th Infantry Division (25ID) led the reconnaissance with Operation Wolfhound, followed by the 1st Cavalry Division’s Task Force Johnson. The Turkish Brigade, attached to 25ID, conducted violent attacks in their sector, helping to push the communists northward.

UNC Air Forces and Naval Aviation conducted close air support to ground troops and significant deep strike operations to interdict communist supply lines and troop concentrations. Naval gunfire support was critical in striking communist forces close to the East and West Seas, forcing communist depots and movements deeper into the interior of the peninsula where the poor road network further slowed their movement.

By the end of January 1951, UNC had made limited gains, setting the stage for a broad-front advance by all of Eighth Army in the coming months. Although the war was far from over, the January fighting demonstrated the complexities of combined arms operations and the challenges posed by a determined and well-entrenched enemy.