

LAW AS A BATTLEFIELD: THE U.S., CHINA, AND THE GLOBAL ESCALATION OF LAWFARE

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Law is increasingly being used as a weapon of war. Unable or unwilling to challenge other states militarily, states and non-state actors use legal strategies to weaken the enemy's legitimacy. Such "lawfare" can be used to achieve a kinetic objective, to forestall one, to degrade the enemy's will to fight, and to shape the narrative of war. For example, al-Qaeda's use of human shields against U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan stopped the coalition from attacking certain military targets, and enabled al-Qaeda to carry the narrative of conflict among local populations when mass civilian casualties occurred. China is now the world's leading practitioner of lawfare. The Chinese military prioritizes lawfare as one of the "Three Warfares" that shape its military's influence operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. has no similar lawfare doctrine or strategy, even as China forces it to fight back. This Article argues that the U.S. needs to develop a lawfare strategy to combat its adversaries. It will first define the concept of lawfare and discuss how its use has evolved and escalated globally in recent years. It will illustrate this phenomenon by examining three different instances of lawfare between China and the U.S. or its allies: China's non-uniformed maritime militias, international arbitration over China's claims to the Spratly Islands, and litigation involving the U.S. and Huawei. After discussing the rise of lawfare globally, including lawfare efforts by Russia and the U.S., the Article concludes with recommendations for a U.S. lawfare strategy.

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INTRODUCTION

Law is increasingly being used as a weapon of war. As the “new endless war” shifts from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq to the information realm, states are increasingly looking beyond conventional weapons for tools that can help them win hearts, minds, and the narrative of war. This strategy is especially important for states that wish to avoid a traditional kinetic conflict, whether because they are unable or unwilling to enter one. Enter law as warfare by other means.¹

Lawfare, as defined in 2001 by then-Colonel (later Major General and Professor) Charles Dunlap, is “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”² Since that time, the term has primarily been used to refer to “battlefield exploitation lawfare,”³ also known as “compliance-leverage disparity lawfare.”⁴ This type of lawfare involves exploitation of an adversary’s compliance with international humanitarian law. For example, al-Qaeda often employed human shields in facilities used for military purposes and launched attacks from mosques, knowing that the U.S. and its coalition partners were bound by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Geneva Conventions”) and the 1954 Hague Convention on the

¹ Paraphrasing CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 23 (E.P. Dutton & Co., Ltd. 1940) (“War is a mere continuation of *politics* by other *means*.” (emphasis added)).

² CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., LAW AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: PRESERVING HUMANITARIAN VALUES IN 21ST CONFLICTS 4 (Nov. 29, 2001), <https://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/FB6P-3FHJ>].

³ This term was coined by Prof. Laurie Blank when she was a visiting speaker in my Lawfare and Information Operations Elective at Marine Corps University Command and Staff College in January 2020.

⁴ ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016).

Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflict.⁵ U.S. and allied forces therefore would be unlikely to attack these sites so as to avoid harming civilians, civilian objects, and cultural property. This type of lawfare has been successfully employed by a variety of non-state actors, including the Islamic State and Hamas.⁶

However, lawfare is not only the weapon of the weak. Today, states like China and Russia are increasingly employing law as a tool against the U.S.⁷ Among the U.S.'s potential adversaries, China has the most developed lawfare strategy, having defined lawfare as a major part of its military strategy as early as 1999.⁸ Their goals are not simply to exploit U.S. compliance with international humanitarian law, but to weaken the U.S.'s legitimacy.⁹ They are doing so to forestall the need for kinetic conflict, and also to control the narrative of conflict. In military-speak, these states may be said to be engaging in legal preparation of the battlefield: setting the conditions for negotiations for peace—or under which they might go to war.¹⁰

⁵ See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (the "1954 Hague Convention"), May 14, 1954, S. TREATY DOC. 106-1, 249 U.N.T.S. 216.

⁶ KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 284–92; Jared Malsin, 'They Just Took Us.' Mosul Civilians on Being Used as Human Shields by ISIS, TIME (Mar. 30, 2017, 5:10 AM), <https://time.com/4717319/mosul-iraq-offensive-civilians-human-shields/> [<https://perma.cc/4U34-SSHN>]; Terri Moon Cronk, *DOD Spokesman: ISIS Deliberately Misuses Mosques*, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. (Oct. 23, 2018), <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1669289/dod-spokesman-isis-deliberately-misuses-mosques/> [<https://perma.cc/2HD9-35Y5>].

⁷ U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SHARPENING THE AMERICAN MILITARY'S COMPETITIVE EDGE 2 (2018) ("China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and 'rules of the road.'").

⁸ KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 162–63 ("Additional conceptual context for the PRC's use of legal warfare is provided by a treatise titled *Unrestricted Warfare*, which was written by two PLA colonels . . . and published by the PLA in 1999. The treatise suggests various tactics—including legal warfare—that developing countries, in particular China, could use to compensate for their military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States." (citation omitted)).

⁹ See *id.* at 172–73.

¹⁰ This phrase derives from the well-known concept of "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" used in U.S. military planning processes. See U.S. Army Field Manual 34-130: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Headquarters, Department of the Army, at 1:1 – 1:3, Glossary-7 (July 8, 1994), *available at*

Despite China's sophisticated lawfare strategy, the U.S. is barely fighting back. The U.S. conducts routine Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea, but has avoided the type of conflict with China that might escalate into kinetic operations, and allowed China's island-building to progress undeterred.¹¹ It has steered clear of confrontation with Chinese maritime militia, plain-clothes fishermen who function as an extension of the Chinese Coast Guard.¹² In 2013, the Philippines filed a landmark claim against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration.¹³ The claim alleged that China violated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) due to its environmental damage, dangerous activities, and threatening of the Philippines' fishing rights in the South China Sea. The Philippines prevailed in a landmark decision in July 2016. While the U.S. urged China to comply with its ally's sweeping win, the U.S. remained cautious in its statements about the decision.¹⁴

Only within the past two years has the U.S. begun more offensive lawfare against China. In the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress barred technology made by Chinese corporation Huawei from being included in U.S. defense equipment.¹⁵ Congress's concern was that Huawei's technology would be used for spying and surveillance by the Chinese government. In response, Huawei filed a lawsuit in U.S. courts arguing that Congress violated the U.S. Constitution by doing so.¹⁶ Meanwhile, at the U.S.'s request, Canada

<https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-130.pdf> [perma.cc/HWA2-C7SV] (defining intelligence preparation of the battlefield as "a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area," consisting of four steps: 1) defining the battlefield environment, 2) describing the battlefield's effects, 3) evaluating the threat, and 4) determining threat Courses of Action).

¹¹ See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42784, U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEAS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 9, 92 (updated Feb. 6, 2020).

¹² See Niharika Mandhana, *China's Fishing Militia Swarms Philippine Island, Seeking Edge in Sea Dispute*, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2019, 11:21 AM), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-fishing-militia-swarms-philippine-island-seeking-edge-in-sea-dispute-11554391301> [https://perma.cc/ZG3U-2HZU].

¹³ S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Award, Case No. 2013-19, PCA Case Repository, at 6 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). On U.S. support for the arbitration, see *Arbitration Support Tracker*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (June 16, 2016), <https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/> [https://perma.cc/AH8D-V93U].

¹⁴ See *Arbitration Support Tracker*, *supra* note 13 (tracking U.S. statements before and after the arbitration).

¹⁵ See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1636, 1917 (2018).

¹⁶ Complaint at 1-2, *Huawei Techs. USA, Inc. v. United States*, 440 F.Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:19-cv-00159), 2019 WL 1076892.

arrested Sabrina Meng, Huawei's CFO and the daughter of its founder, on charges of fraud and violating U.S. sanctions against Iran.¹⁷ While the timing of the arrest may be coincidence, it is clear that the U.S. is using lawfare to counter Chinese warfare tactics.

The U.S. prides itself on its advanced legal system and compliance with the rule of law.¹⁸ Yet, the U.S. lawfare strategy is woefully underdeveloped compared to its adversaries'—and even its allies. China's lawfare tactics have been mirrored by Russia and other state and non-state actors across the globe.¹⁹ Recognizing this, the Office of the Legal Advisor at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), one of NATO's strategic commands, has personnel working on lawfare.²⁰ Israel has personnel dedicated to lawfare within its Ministry of Justice.²¹ The U.S. has no counterpart to these programs, in doctrine or in manpower. No agency within the U.S. government has an office dedicated to lawfare. Military lawyers are not trained in lawfare, nor are the vast majority of military officers and commanders.²² In a world where war is

¹⁷ Sarah Berman, *Witness Testimony in Huawei CFO's U.S. Extradition Case Finishes in Canada Courtroom*, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2020, 6:33 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech-canada/witness-testimony-in-huawei-cfos-u-s-extradition-case-finishes-in-canada-courtroom-idUSKBN2801BA> [<https://perma.cc/92N5-WFQZ>].

¹⁸ See, e.g., Brian Egan, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law Proceedings: International Law, Legal Diplomacy and the Counter-ISIL Campaign (Mar. 30–Apr. 2, 2016), in 110 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 300, 301 (2017).

¹⁹ See *infra* Sec. IV.

²⁰ These personnel focus mainly on providing “legal vigilance.” NATO primarily refers to lawfare as “Legal Operations.” See Major General Barre R. Seguin, Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAPE, Keynote Address at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Symposium: The Use of Legal Operations in a Context of Hybrid Threats and Strategic Competition, in Major General Charlie Dunlap, *A Warfighter's Perspective on “Lawfare” in an Era of Hybrid Threats and Strategic Competition*, LAWFIRE (Mar. 13, 2020) <https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2020/03/13/a-warfighters-perspective-on-lawfare-in-an-era-of-hybrid-threats-and-strategic-competition/> [<https://perma.cc/2L45-EPPR>]; see also Rodrigo Vázquez Benítez, *Legal Operations: The Use of Law as an Instrument of Power in the Context of Hybrid Threats and Strategic Competition*, 41 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 138, 139 (Oct. 2020).

²¹ See Yonah Jeremy Bob, *Israeli Gov't Lawyers Help NATO Fight Lawfare, Receive Awards*, JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 2, 2019, 00:53 AM), <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-govt-lawyers-help-NATO-fight-lawfare-receive-awards-600346> [<https://perma.cc/8LQF-PXP4>] (discussing the lawfare work of the Israeli Ministry of Justice's Counter-Terrorism and Foreign Litigation Division). Kittrie discusses how the Shurat HaDin Law Center is explicitly dedicated to lawfare and works closely with the Israeli government. See KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 312.

²² To the author's knowledge, the only course on lawfare currently taught at a professional military education institution in the U.S. is her own.

increasingly fought outside the conventional battlefield, lawfare will only become more important. To best its adversaries—and keep pace with its allies—the U.S. must develop a lawfare strategy.

This Article will proceed in five parts. First, the Article will propose a new definition of lawfare. The Article will argue that previous definitions of lawfare must be expanded to reflect contemporary use of law as a weapon of war, and how law is now used as a tool in the information domain to bolster and undermine parties' legitimacy. Second, I will discuss the lawfare involving the U.S. and China as a case study of the contemporary use of lawfare. This represents a critical case study of lawfare because of rising fears of kinetic conflict between the U.S. and China and the primacy of lawfare to Chinese legal strategy.²³ No state in the world currently has a lawfare strategy as sophisticated as China's. The U.S. and China have also fought legal battles in multiple arenas: in the waters of the South China Sea, through a U.S. ally in international arbitration, through legislation, and now via proxy in U.S. Courts. Third, the Article will discuss the global escalation of lawfare, showing how Russia has emulated some of China's tactics and how U.S. institutional lawfare efforts in Afghanistan suffered due to lack of a comprehensive strategy. This section will also briefly discuss other recent examples of lawfare. Fourth, the Article will explain why the U.S. needs to develop a lawfare strategy to counter its adversaries and collaborate with its partners and allies. The Article will conclude by discussing what a U.S. lawfare strategy might look like.

I

BACKGROUND: WHAT IS LAWFARE?

A. A Brief History of the Term "Lawfare"

In the 5th Century BC, the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu famously wrote that "[S]upreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."²⁴ His philosophy remains influential in Chinese military doctrine today. In the 1999 military strategy book "Unrestricted Warfare," two colonels in China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA),

²³ See NOAH FELDMAN, *COOL WAR: THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION* xi–xiv, 3–15 (2013); GRAHAM ALLISON, *DESTINED FOR WAR: CAN AMERICA AND CHINA ESCAPE THUCYDIDES'S TRAP?* vii–xx (2017); STEFAN HALPER, *CHINA: THE THREE WARFARES* 30 (2013) (report produced for the Office of Net Assessment of the Department of Defense).

²⁴ SUN TZU, *THE ART OF WAR* 14 (2020).

argued that modern warfare will no longer be defined by military means, or even involve the military at all.²⁵ Society, instead, would be the battlefield.

1. *Lawfare and China's Three Warfares*

China's military doctrine has included "The Three Warfares" since at least 1963.²⁶ The Three Warfares involve political warfare, or influence operations, designed to replace or supplement traditional military activities.²⁷ The PLA published its current statement of the Three Warfares in its 2003 Political Work Guidelines, and again in 2010.²⁸ In 2005, the PLA promulgated official guidelines on the Three Warfares incorporating the three concepts into its training and education.²⁹ Chinese government entities have also published several recent texts emphasizing that lawfare is critical to advancing Chinese interests in peacetime and wartime.³⁰

Public Opinion Warfare, also known as Media Warfare, involves shaping public opinion domestically and internationally.³¹ Public opinion is used as a weapon by using the media to propagandize and weaken the adversary's will to fight while bolstering the will and unified views of one's own population.³² The second warfare, Psychological Warfare, seeks to "undermine an adversary's combat power, resolve, and decision-making, while exacerbating internal disputes to cause the enemy to divide into factions"³³

²⁵ LIANG QIAO & XIANGSUI WANG, *UNRESTRICTED WARFARE: CHINA'S MASTER PLAN TO DESTROY AMERICA* (1999).

²⁶ Peter Mattis, *China's 'Three Warfares' in Perspective*, *WAR ON THE ROCKS* (Jan. 30, 2018), <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/> [<https://perma.cc/L8VH-VJWN>].

²⁷ John Costello & Joe McReynolds, *China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era*, 13 *CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES* 28 (Oct. 2018).

²⁸ Elsa Kania, *The PLA's Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares*, *CHINA BRIEF* (Aug. 22, 2016, 10:46 PM), <https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/> [<https://perma.cc/H99C-U3TV>].

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ See LARRY WORTZEL, *THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AND INFORMATION WARFARE* 1–2, 34 (2015), available at <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2263.pdf> [perma.cc/U8UM-GVZP].

³² Kania, *supra* note 28 (citing JUNSHI KEXUEYUAN JUNSHI ZHANLUE YANJIU BU (军事科学院军事战略研究部) [ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCE STRATEGY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT], *ZHANLUOXUE* (战略学) [THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY STRATEGY] (Military Science Press 2015)).

³³ *Id.*

The third warfare is Legal Warfare. The Chinese term, “*falu zhan*,” has been translated as lawfare.³⁴ Lawfare involves shaping the legal context for Chinese actions using both domestic and international law. Lawfare seeks to gain “‘legal principle superiority’ . . . and delegitimize an adversary.”³⁵ In China, lawfare “is seen as a form of combat.”³⁶ According to Dean Cheng, a scholar of Chinese lawfare, Chinese “writers assign equal importance to preparing the legal and physical battlefields.”³⁷ Strong coordination between legal and kinetic warfare is emphasized.³⁸ Lawfare is a complement to traditional military operations and an instrument in its own right to shape the environment for Chinese military or political actions, seize the initiative, and serve as a force multiplier.³⁹ While most commonly employed at the outbreak of kinetic hostilities, it can be used in peacetime and wartime alike.⁴⁰ Drawing on the Maoist tradition, Legal Warfare assumes that law can be an instrument of politics and political warfare efforts.⁴¹

Legal Warfare is informed by several principles: “protect national interests as the highest standard,” “respect the basic principles of the law,” “carry out [legal warfare] that centers upon military operations,” and “seize standards [and] flexibly use [them].”⁴² Accordingly, effective use of lawfare requires a nuanced and detailed understanding of relevant domestic and international law.

China uses these Three Warfares as complementary and mutually reinforcing, in both peacetime and wartime, to shape and control narratives. They serve to influence perceptions favorable to China and unfavorable to its adversaries, while hampering its adversaries’ capacity to respond.⁴³ China views the Three Warfares as a force multiplier in military or political conflict.⁴⁴ For example, lawfare can be used together with Me-

³⁴ KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 162.

³⁵ Kania, *supra* note 28, (citing JUNSHI KEXUEYUAN JUNSHI ZHANLUE YANJIU BU (军事科学院军事战略研究部) [ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCE STRATEGY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT], ZHANLUEXUE (战略学) [THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY STRATEGY] (Military Science Press 2015)).

³⁶ Dean Cheng, *Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare*, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 21, 2012), <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-without-fighting-chinese-legal-warfare> [<https://perma.cc/4FMY-CEVV>].

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² Kania, *supra* note 28.

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ *Id.*

dia Warfare to shape domestic and international perceptions to match China's view that China is the rightful legal sovereign over most of the South China Sea.

According to the 2013 Chinese Academy of Military Science's edition of *Science and Military Strategy*, the Three Warfares should be adapted for China's use based on the operational circumstance and desired outcome.⁴⁵ For example, garnering international sympathy and support can be a "powerful pillar to support the whole operational activity."⁴⁶ If the operational objective is secret, "the use of propaganda to influence public opinion can reinforce the stratagem of 'making a feint to the east and attacking in the west.'"⁴⁷ Used together, the Three Warfares can have a "'psychological frightening force' . . . against an adversary."⁴⁸ The Three Warfares can thus be used to support deception as well as to shape perceptions within the information environment.

Integration of the Three Warfares throughout China's military and political strategies positions it well to compete in our current information environment. While the U.S. Joint Forces released a Joint Publication on Information Operations in 2012,⁴⁹ China has been developing its information warfare strategy for decades and integrating it with its other strategies and tactics. In the area of lawfare, the U.S. is even further behind.

2. *Lawfare in the West*

In the U.S., the definition of lawfare is more contested. The term was popularized in 2001 by U.S. Air Force Major General (retired) Charles Dunlap (then Colonel Dunlap). Dunlap defined lawfare as "a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective."⁵⁰ Dunlap based his definition primarily on the exploitation of the Geneva Conventions by violent non-state actors,⁵¹ such as the use of human shields. The definition thus took on a pejorative connotation because of its association with tactics by violent non-state ac-

⁴⁵ Kania, *supra* note 28 (citing JUNSHI KEXUEYUAN JUNSHI ZHANLUE YANJIU BU (军事科学院军事战略研究部) [ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCE STRATEGY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT], ZHANLUJUEXUE (战略学) [THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY STRATEGY] 131 (Military Science Press 2013)).

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ *Id.*

⁴⁹ JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Nov. 20, 2014).

⁵⁰ DUNLAP, *supra* note 2, at 4.

⁵¹ *Id.* at 5.

tors and enemies of the U.S. and Israel.⁵² The definition took on a further negative gloss when international NGOs began to try to use domestic and international courts to advance grievances against the U.S. and Israel.⁵³ Perhaps in response to this, Dunlap subsequently modified his definition to include a more positive use of lawfare. In 2007, Dunlap defined lawfare as “the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”⁵⁴

In his book *Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War*—the preeminent book on the topic—Professor Orde Kittrie delineates two types of lawfare.⁵⁵ One is “compliance-leverage disparity lawfare,” which he defines as roughly equivalent to both Dunlap’s use of the term “lawfare” and what Professor Laurie Blank calls “battlefield exploitation lawfare.”⁵⁶ States and non-state actors leverage their adversaries’ compliance with international law against them. By Kittrie’s writing, tactics like Hamas’s had been adopted by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other violent non-state groups against the U.S. Kittrie’s other type of lawfare, instrumental lawfare, is the use of law to achieve a military objective. Kittrie’s prime example is the U.S.’s use of sanctions against Iran to halt its nuclear program and force negotiations.⁵⁷ The U.S. could have chosen traditional military means to achieve a similar objective, but at a much higher cost than sanctions. Since then, as law has been increasingly used to achieve traditional military objectives, as a tool to prepare the battlefield, or to force negotiations, academics have not coalesced around a single definition of lawfare. In 2010, participants in The Cleveland Experts Meeting convened and could not agree upon a definition.⁵⁸ One thing they agreed on is that the term lawfare had a negative connotation at the time, largely

⁵² See *id.*

⁵³ KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 239–40; *Is Lawfare Worth Defining? Report of the Cleveland Experts Meeting September 11, 2010*, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 11, 12 (2010) [hereinafter *Is Lawfare Worth Defining?*].

⁵⁴ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., *Lawfare Today: A Perspective*, 3 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 146, 146 (2008).

⁵⁵ See KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 11 (defining the two types of lawfare as “instrumental lawfare” and “compliance-leverage lawfare”).

⁵⁶ See *id.* (defining compliance-leverage lawfare as “lawfare, typically on the kinetic battlefield, which is designed to gain advantage from the greater influence that law, typically the law of armed conflict, and its process exerts over an adversary”); *supra* note 3.

⁵⁷ See generally KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 111–14 (discussing the U.S.’s financial lawfare campaign against Iran).

⁵⁸ See *Is Lawfare Worth Defining?*, *supra* note 53, at 13–15.

because of its use against Israel, the U.S., and its allies.⁵⁹ In 2019, one exasperated commentator referred to the concept as “infinitely plastic.”⁶⁰

Further confusing the definition of lawfare, the term entered household use due to the popularity of the Lawfare blog, a prominent site on law and national security that launched in 2010.⁶¹ Taking Dunlap’s definition as a starting point, the blog states that “[t]he name *Lawfare* refers both to the use of law as a weapon of conflict and, perhaps more importantly, to the depressing reality that America remains at war with itself over the law governing its warfare with others.”⁶² This definition framed the site’s content. It also broadened the definition of the term to the point that it is not analytically useful for academics and impossible to operationalize in the military or policy realm.

In 2016, Joel Trachtman conducted a literature review to develop his own definition of lawfare. Trachtman defines lawfare as “legal activity that supports, undermines, or substitutes for other types of warfare.”⁶³ Trachtman’s definition, too, is too broad to be useful. All warfare waged by the U.S. is supported by law—our Constitutional structure, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, international law, and the laws of war that support our military’s conduct in peacetime and wartime. Moreover, every law that involves other countries does not involve lawfare. Intent to use law as a substitute for traditional military activity, and to bolster the legitimacy of our fight and weaken that of our enemies’, is important for employing law as a weapon. To define lawfare as involving practically any use of law related to warfare does not provide useful guidance for policymakers and the military.

Trachtman is correct, however, that lawfare need not have a pejorative connotation. Jack Goldsmith has also argued this point.⁶⁴ Lawfare should not be the sole province of U.S. adver-

⁵⁹ See *id.* at 24.

⁶⁰ Eric Loefflad, *The World Revolutionary Origins of the Crime of Aggression: Sovereignty, (Anti-)Imperialism, and the Soviet Union’s Contradictory Geopolitics of Global Justice*, 12 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 29 (2019).

⁶¹ LAWFARE, <http://www.lawfareblog.com> [<https://perma.cc/X84E-55N4>].

⁶² *About Lawfare: A Brief History of the Term and the Site*, LAWFARE (Sep. 1, 2010), <http://www.lawfareblog.com/about-lawfare-brief-history-term-and-site> [<https://perma.cc/WQL2-XJMC>].

⁶³ Joel P. Trachtman, *Integrating Lawfare and Warfare*, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 267, 268 (2016).

⁶⁴ See Jack Goldsmith, *Thoughts on “Lawfare,”* LAWFARE (Sept. 8, 2010, 9:24 PM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-lawfare> [<https://perma.cc/K2PY-2R4Q>].

saries. The U.S., too, can wield law as a weapon of war. A contemporary definition of lawfare should also consider the information environment in which all military activity now occurs. Law is no longer used solely to achieve a military objective. It is used to weaken adversaries by creating facts on the ground contrary to what they would like to see or by advancing a counter-narrative to what they would like the public to believe. Lawfare can be used in “legal preparation of the battlefield,” or “shaping the environment” for future military or diplomatic actions by a country. It can be used to set terms prior to conflict, such as by defining the boundaries of territory that a state will defend. Similarly, it can also be used to set the conditions under which a military might be willing to accept peace, or a starting point for peace negotiations. Lawfare can be used during armed conflict, to prevent armed conflict, or outside of it. And it is a vital tool for winning hearts and minds.

For these reasons, I define lawfare as 1) the purposeful use of law taken toward a particular adversary with the goal of achieving a particular strategic, operational, or tactical objective, or 2) the purposeful use of law to bolster the legitimacy of one’s own strategic, operational, or tactical objectives toward a particular adversary, or to weaken the legitimacy of a particular adversary’s particular strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. This definition encompasses and broadens Dunlap’s and Kittrie’s definitions of lawfare to cover the way that states use lawfare today. It also presents an actionable definition on which the U.S. can base a lawfare strategy.

How can lawfare bolster legitimacy? Max Weber defined political legitimacy as having certain beliefs or a faith in regard to a political system: “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”⁶⁵ In the context of war, lawfare would mean undermining the legitimacy of the adversary’s cause for going to war or of certain strategy, operations, or tactics used within the war. Law might also be used to bolster one’s own legitimacy by emphasizing the justness and legality of a side’s mission. Indeed, such an emphasis on legality is critical for U.S. military recruiting, for cohesion and retention by reinforcing that they serve a cause bigger than themselves, and for ensur-

⁶⁵ *Political Legitimacy*, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA POL. PHIL. (Apr. 24, 2017), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/#DesNorConLeg> [<https://perma.cc/CYX2-7ZFS>] (citing MAX WEBER, *THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION* 382 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1964)).

ing that they maintain their honor in combat in a way that allows them to sleep at night when they return home. Over the past 20 years, emphasizing the justness and legality of U.S. military actions has also been important in winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁶⁶ For example, lawfare has been employed proactively by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan through the Rule of Law Field Force (ROLFF-A), which promoted the rule of law as part of the U.S. strategy in rebuilding and stabilizing Afghanistan.⁶⁷

Lawfare is distinct from the mere adoption of law involving a foreign nation, or the signing of a treaty. Nor do all *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello* actions taken by a state qualify as lawfare. Instead, whether a state is employing lawfare will depend on how those laws are being used—with what purpose, against what adversary, and to achieve what objective. The designation of what qualifies as lawfare and what does not will never be black and white. Nearly any *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello* legal action, for example, can be used to purposefully bolster one's own legitimacy in a fight against a particular adversary. And a law adopted for non-lawfare purposes could eventually be used at the crux of a litigation that is part of a nation's broader lawfare strategy. However, it is the action of using that law that would constitute lawfare, not the passage of the law itself.

This new definition of lawfare is neutral, free of the negative connotations of the term's history. Any side of a conflict can exercise lawfare. Indeed, with its widely-respected and highly-developed judicial system and some of the best law schools and lawyers in the world, the U.S. is well-poised to use lawfare to fight—and to win. Lawfare can be used by civilian agencies and the military alike. It can and should be employed by the military at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. While typically the Department of Defense is concerned with the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, civilian agencies may easily apply the definition above. Civilian agencies align their work with the overall strategic objectives of national policy; whether their work fits neatly into the “operational” or “tactical” categories will not always be relevant for achieving a unified effort.

⁶⁶ See Mark Martins, Rule of Law in Iraq and Afghanistan?, Remarks at Dean's Distinguished Lecture Series at Harvard Law School (Apr. 18, 2011), in HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J., Apr. 21, 2011, at 11–12.

⁶⁷ See *id.*

B. Types of Lawfare

States have employed at least five types of lawfare in recent years. The first, *battlefield exploitation lawfare*, is similar to Dunlap's initial conception of lawfare⁶⁸ or Kittrie's compliance-leverage disparity lawfare.⁶⁹ Battlefield exploitation lawfare is the exploitation of an adversary's law-abidingness, usually, its compliance with international humanitarian law.⁷⁰ Embedding civilians within legitimate military targets or hiding armed fighters in a large crowd of civilians are quintessential examples of battlefield exploitation lawfare. The second, *instrumental lawfare*, was defined by Orde Kittrie as the "use of legal tools to achieve the same or similar effects as those traditionally sought from conventional kinetic military action."⁷¹ Kittrie uses U.S. sanctions against Iran as a prime example of instrumental lawfare.⁷² The U.S. could have launched a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities to cause Iran to abandon its nuclear program. Instead, the U.S. launched sanctions to achieve the same effect. *Proxy lawfare* involves taking legal actions using adversary proxies. Lawfare between the U.S. and the Chinese company Huawei, discussed below, is a prime example of this type of lawfare.⁷³ The U.S. has battled Russian corporations in a similar manner.⁷⁴ *Information lawfare* is the use of law to control the narrative of the conflict. One party to a conflict can gain an advantage by portraying its actions as legal, or the other side's as illegal. This type of lawfare is especially important in the battle for hearts and minds. Information lawfare is often used in conjunction with other types of lawfare, as in the *Huawei* litigation. Andrés Muñoz Mosquera of the Office of the NATO Legal Adviser and Professor Sascha Dov Bachmann use the analogy of lawfare as the warhead of a missile, while information operations and strategic communi-

⁶⁸ Dunlap, *supra* note 54, at 147.

⁶⁹ KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 11.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., *id.* at 287–88 (describing the Hamas's willingness to use human shields against the United States).

⁷¹ *Id.* at 11.

⁷² See *id.* at 111–14.

⁷³ See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1636, 1917; Complaint at 10, *Huawei Techs. USA, Inc. v. United States*, 440 F.Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:19-cv-00159), 2019 WL 1076892.

⁷⁴ CORY WELT, KRISTIN ARCHICK, REBECCA M. NELSON & DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45415, U.S. SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA 64 (2020) (table showing sanctioned Russian entities).

cations power the missile's flight.⁷⁵ Lawfare itself, however, is what is lethal. *Institutional lawfare* is the purposeful creation of new domestic and international laws and institutions to achieve one's military or strategic efforts. The U.S. has practiced this type of lawfare for years by serving as the primary funder of the United Nations and other international organizations. As discussed below, China is now beginning to build international institutions of its own to counter U.S. institutional lawfare efforts.

These forms of lawfare are not necessarily new. For example, Israel has explicitly and implicitly encouraged settler outposts in the West Bank for years, creating facts on the ground to bolster its claims to land.⁷⁶ The U.S. and the Soviet Union frequently used information lawfare during the Cold War, criticizing each other's commitments to international human rights law in U.N. fora, eventually resulting in two separate core human rights conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights backed by the U.S., and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, backed by the U.S.S.R.⁷⁷ However, the use of lawfare is escalating. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State stole their battlefield exploitation lawfare tactics directly from Hamas. Russia's use of little green men in Ukraine is similar to China's use of little blue men in the South China Sea. And as conflict increasingly shifts to the information domain, lawfare is likely to become increasingly important.

Lawfare can be used before, during, and after armed conflict. It can also be employed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. For example, lawfare can be used to set the terms for conflict or for negotiation. A judicial decision in a lawsuit can legitimize a settlement in the international community. If no other enforcement mechanism is available for the decision, the judgment will still frame any future negotiations or conflict over the subject of the suit. In this way, lawfare might be considered "legal preparation of the battlefield." Lawfare can also be used to create facts on the ground that can

⁷⁵ Andr[é]s B. Mu[ñ]oz Mosquera & Sascha Dov Bachmann, *Lawfare in Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century Warfare*, 7 J. INT'L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 63, 73 (2016).

⁷⁶ See *Israel and the Palestinians: Can the Settlement Issue Be Resolved?*, BBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2019), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38458884> [<https://perma.cc/S7NJ-LNT5>]. See generally GERSHOM GORENBERG, *THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL AND THE BIRTH OF THE SETTLEMENTS, 1967-1977* (2007).

⁷⁷ For discussion of U.S. and Soviet lawfare in the U.N. during the Cold War, see, e.g., Jill I. Goldenziel, *Curse of the Nation-State: Refugees, Migration, and Security in International Law*, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 579, 610-30 (2016).

influence a conflict. As discussed below, strategically placing civilians around military targets will affect the way an adversary can legally attack. Decisions in lawsuits can also have normative power that can affect the way that parties behave in conflict. Information lawfare can also be used to frame the narrative of conflict. This can help bolster the position of the military in winning hearts and minds, achieve public support for the military's actions, and boost troops' morale by reminding them that they serve to promote moral, just cause.

To be clear, lawfare is not a perfect substitute for armed conflict. As long as territory and resources exist, states will compete for rights to and sovereignty over them. However, the use of lawfare is on the rise as a substitute for some military objectives, to prepare the battlefield in the event of armed conflict, and otherwise to support military efforts. Based on current trends and states' rational desire to conserve resources and prevent destruction of property and loss of life, the use of lawfare is likely to increase in the future.

Lawfare between the U.S. and China makes for an ideal case study of the phenomenon. First, speculation about the potential for war between the U.S. and China has occupied politicians and commentators in recent years. The Obama administration in its second term famously pivoted towards Asia even as the U.S. was waging war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Academics and other commentators have written countless books on the subject.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, the U.S. and China have every incentive not to go to war. As each other's largest trading partners, kinetic war would wreak havoc on both economies, to say nothing of the death and destruction it would cause. The U.S. and China are far more likely to continue to engage in alternate forms of competition for many years, such as trade wars and lawfare. Just as China is the U.S.'s most sophisticated military competitor, so too is China the U.S.'s most advanced competitor in lawfare. China also benefits from near-endless resources to invest in lawsuits and new legal organizations, and unlimited manpower for its battlefield exploitation lawfare tactics. China's control over its domestic information environment is second-to-none, making information lawfare towards its own population much easier than for any other state. By under-

⁷⁸ See generally, e.g., FELDMAN, *supra* note 23, (discussing the possibility of war between the U.S. and China and the nature of disputes falling below the threshold of armed conflict); ALLISON, *supra* note 23, (discussing the potential for war between the United States and China). On the primacy of lawfare to China's legal strategy, see HALPER, *supra* note 23, at 53–60.

standing lawfare tactics between the U.S. and China, one can understand similar lawfare tactics being employed all over the world.

II

LAWFARE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA

A. Background on the South China Sea

To understand lawfare between the U.S. and China, one must understand recent Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is one of the most important strategic areas of the globe. While estimates vary, approximately one-third of the world's commerce transits through the South China Sea, amounting to more than \$3.37 trillion in trade each year.⁷⁹ The Sea holds vast amounts of oil and gas reserves.⁸⁰ It is also home to about twelve percent of the world's fishing stocks, which play an important role in the economies of its surrounding countries, along with a major source of sustenance for their populations.⁸¹

China claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. A "Nine-Dash Line" began to appear on Chinese Communist Party maps in 1947, roughly tracing the perimeter of the sea just inside the coastal areas of the Sea's neighboring states.⁸² China claims the "historic rights" to all features within this Nine-Dash Line. Important features include the Paracels and the Spratlys, often referred to as "islands." Legally, these are collections of maritime features that may include islands, rocks, reefs, and low-tide elevations (LTEs), among others. In a 2009 submission to the UN Commission on

⁷⁹ *How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?*, CHINAPOWER (Oct. 10, 2019), <https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/#easy-footnote-bottom-1-3073> [<https://perma.cc/B3G8-PW4B>].

⁸⁰ *South China Sea Energy Exploration and Development*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, <https://amti.csis.org/south-china-sea-energy-exploration-and-development/> [<https://perma.cc/2UQD-JZH8>] (last visited June 21, 2021) (mapping oil and gas blocks in the South China Sea).

⁸¹ John Reed, *South China Sea: Fishing on the Front Line of Beijing's Ambitions*, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), <https://www.ft.com/content/fead89da-1a4e-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21> [<https://perma.cc/JR2Z-FRPD>] ("The South China Sea accounted for about 12 per cent of the world's fishing stocks, according to one 2015 estimate."); Gregory B. Poling, *Illuminating the South China Sea's Dark Fishing Fleets*, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Jan. 9, 2019), <https://ocean.csis.org/spotlights/illuminating-the-south-china-seas-dark-fishing-fleets/> [<https://perma.cc/YS9F-6J8F>] ("The South China Sea accounted for 12 percent of global fish catch in 2015, and more than half of the fishing vessels in the world are estimated to operate there.").

⁸² BILL HAYTON, *THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ASIA*, 58-59 (2014).

the Limits of the Continental Shelf, China asserted its sovereignty over all features in the South China Sea that fall within the Nine-Dash Line.⁸³ This letter, together with China's other aggressive activities in the South China Sea, began to concern its neighbors.

UNCLOS, to which China is a party, prescribes maritime boundaries within the Sea that do not comport with the Nine-Dash Line.⁸⁴ Under UNCLOS, each state surrounding the South China Sea is entitled to a twelve nautical mile (nm) territorial sea over which it enjoys sovereignty, as well as a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which it enjoys the sole rights to exploitation of natural resources. Foreign states have freedom of navigation and overflight within EEZs. More than sixty geographic features in the Spratlys alone are occupied by surrounding countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Large numbers of features also fall in the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by Vietnam.⁸⁵ The Spratlys and the Paracels fall within the Nine-Dash Line, and China claims them all.

The legal status of features in the South China Sea has tremendous implications for the rights of states that claim them. Islands, for example, generate twelve nm territorial seas and 200 nm EEZs, which would allow states to significantly expand their territory and exclusive access to the Sea's resources.⁸⁶ Islands are defined as naturally-formed areas of land that remain above water at high tide and are capable of sustaining human habitation or economic activity.⁸⁷ A rock,

⁸³ Note Verbale CML/17/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (May 7, 2009), available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf [<https://perma.cc/2C74-QA2A>].

⁸⁴ See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

⁸⁵ *Island Features of the South China Sea*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, <https://amti.csis.org/scs-features-map/> [<https://perma.cc/SPW8-ZTCB>] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). Vietnam claims the most features in the South China Sea, a total of twenty-nine. Vietnam, too, has built upon features in the South China Sea. However, they have avoided conflict with other countries from this practice because they have largely built on features they have held for years. Their construction has also been much smaller-scale and less environmentally destructive than China's. *Vietnam's Island Building: Double-Standard or Drop in the Bucket?*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (May 11, 2016), <https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-island-building/> [<https://perma.cc/333D-517H>]; Ralph Jennings, *How Vietnam Quietly Built Up 10 Islands in Asia's Most Disputed Sea*, VOICE OF AMERICA (Apr. 19, 2019, 4:52 AM), <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/how-vietnam-quietly-built-10-islands-asias-most-disputed-sea> [<https://perma.cc/D8JR-HL4C>].

⁸⁶ UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at arts. 3, 57.

⁸⁷ *Id.* at art. 121.

defined as a feature that appears during high tide but cannot sustain habitation and economic life of their own, generates a 12 nm territorial sea but no EEZ and no continental shelf.⁸⁸ Low tide elevations, or LTEs, are surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide.⁸⁹ They do not generate any maritime entitlement, with small exceptions.⁹⁰ Reefs do not generate their own zones and territorial claims, but are considered when measuring EEZs, continental shelves, and baselines.⁹¹ Some reefs qualify as LTEs.

B. Battlefield Exploitation Lawfare: The People's Armed Force Maritime Militia

China shores up its claims to features in the South China Sea using the People's Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFMM), colloquially known as the Chinese Maritime Militia, or the "little blue men."⁹² These men appear to be plain-clothes fishermen, but actually fall under the PLAN's (People's Liberation Army Navy) chain of command, although not exclusively.⁹³ The Chinese military contracts with local and provincial commercial organizations to operate fishing boats on an ad hoc basis, outside of their civilian and commercial duties. However, these boats engage in no fishing, have no nets, and do not follow the collision and safety regulations required for safe operation under international law.⁹⁴ Although the PAFMM is considered a "reserve force," it is actually in routine use. 200,000 PAFMM fishing boats train with and support the Chinese Navy and Coast Guard.⁹⁵

⁸⁸ *Id.* at art. 121(3).

⁸⁹ *Id.* at art. 13.

⁹⁰ *Id.* If an LTE is within a state's territorial sea, the LTE pushes the baseline out, extending the territorial sea. *Id.*

⁹¹ *Id.* at arts. 6, 47.

⁹² CONG. RESEARCH SERV., *supra* note 11, at 66; Andrew S. Erickson & Conor Kennedy, *Directing China's "Little Blue Men": Uncovering the Maritime Militia Command Structure*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Sept. 11, 2015) <https://amti.csis.org/directing-chinas-little-blue-men-uncovering-the-maritime-militia-command-structure/> [<https://perma.cc/Z57Y-KFGB>].

⁹³ James Kraska & Michael Monti, *The Law of Naval Warfare and China's Maritime Militia*, 91 INT'L L. STUD. 450, 452-54 (2015).

⁹⁴ *See, e.g.*, Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459 1050 U.N.T.S. 18, 22-37 [hereinafter COLREGS] (setting forth the rules that boats on international waterways must follow in order to avoid collisions); International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, May 31, 1929, 50 Stat. 1121 [hereinafter SOLAS] (setting forth safety standards for the construction and operation of ships).

⁹⁵ Kraska & Monti, *supra* note 93, at 452-54; 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 351, 115th Cong. (2017). Some analysts place the number of boats in China's maritime militia

China uses the PAFMM as part of a strategy known as “salami-slicing.”⁹⁶ It takes small steps to assert its claims in the South China Sea—none of which are *casus belli* on their own—that over time can accumulate to a change in the status quo. China calculates that by using civilian boats to engage in its salami-slicing activities, it will reduce the risk of escalation in the South China Sea.⁹⁷ Fishing boats appear more innocuous than naval vessels and are far less expensive to operate. Moreover, the U.S. and its partners and allies would be unlikely to fire on what appears to be a civilian boat.

The PAFMM is often employed as part of the Chinese tactic of encroachment.⁹⁸ China will send large numbers of fishing vessels toward an island to intimidate its population and establish Chinese claims to the territory.⁹⁹ For example, in April 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies observed ninety-five PAFMM vessels off the coast of Pag-Asa Is-

higher. See Derek Grossman & Logan Ma, *A Short History of China's Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us*, RAND CORP. (Apr. 6, 2020), <https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-of-chinas-fishing-militia-and-what.html#ret1> [<https://perma.cc/383V-92L6>] (citing 700,000 ships in China's “fishing militia” as of 2014).

⁹⁶ CONG. RESEARCH SERV., *supra* note 11, at 8.

⁹⁷ Kraska & Monti, *supra* note 93, at 456.

⁹⁸ Victor Andres Manhit, *Keeping the Peace Post Arbitration*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (July 27, 2016), <https://amti.csis.org/keeping-peace-post-arbitration/> [<https://perma.cc/CF42-S6SX>].

⁹⁹ See, e.g., Gregory Poling, *China's Hidden Navy*, FOREIGN POLICY (June 25, 2019, 9:47 AM), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/25/chinas-secret-navy-spratlys-southchinesea-chinesenavy-maritimemilitia/> [<https://perma.cc/45G8-A62E>] (describing the “swarm of vessels . . . that dropped anchor between 2 and 5 nautical miles from Philippines-held Thitu Island as soon as Manila began modest upgrade work on that feature”); *Still Under Pressure: Manila Versus the Militia*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Apr. 16, 2019) <https://amti.csis.org/still-under-pressure-manila-versus-the-militia/> [<https://perma.cc/EAH3-VVCB>] (“Chinese fishing vessels—apparently part of the country's maritime militia force—have been operating near two Philippine-held features in the disputed Spratly Islands”); Niharika Mandhana, *China's Fishing Militia Swarms Philippine Island, Seeking Edge in Sea Dispute*, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2019, 11:21 AM) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-fishing-militia-swarms-philippine-island-seeking-edge-in-sea-dispute-11554391301> [<https://perma.cc/37ZW-VLDM>] (“Chinese fishing vessels have swarmed the waters around a Philippine-controlled island in the South China Sea in recent months—sparking fears in Manila that Beijing is trying to assert greater control in a disputed area.”); *The Long Patrol: Staredown at Thitu Island Enters Its Sixteenth Month*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Mar. 5, 2020) <https://amti.csis.org/the-long-patrol-staredown-at-thitu-island-enters-its-sixteenth-month/> [<https://perma.cc/5E7W-ZCGL>] (“China has maintained an almost constant militia presence around Thitu Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands occupied by the Philippines”).

land in the Philippines in a single day.¹⁰⁰ Sometimes PAFMM boats are backed by Chinese Coast Guard vessels, who are in turn backed by the Chinese Navy (PLAN).¹⁰¹ This technique is called China's "cabbage strategy," in which it surrounds an island with increasingly more weaponized ships until it is wrapped like a cabbage.¹⁰² When an island is "wrapped," the Chinese ships can prevent supplies of food and drinking water from reaching the islands.¹⁰³ They can also prevent any islanders—or security forces defending small islands—from returning if they leave.¹⁰⁴

China also uses the PAFMM for peacetime force projection and several other traditional military functions.¹⁰⁵ The PAFMM's "rights protection missions" include presence missions in disputed waters, obstruction of other vessels, protection of fisheries, and development of reefs and artificial islands. The PAFMM coordinates with maritime law enforcement in these capacities. The PAFMM also performs military and intelligence functions including anti-air missile defense, light weapons use, and reconnaissance and surveillance.¹⁰⁶ They also engage in emergency response.

China is practicing battlefield exploitation lawfare by using the PAFMM. The PAFMM presents a classic dilemma under international humanitarian law because militia members do not fall neatly into the category of either combatants or civilians.¹⁰⁷ In the event of armed conflict, sailors of small coastal fishing vessels would not be legal targets under international law unless they were directly participating in hostilities.¹⁰⁸ They are not part of the regular Chinese armed forces, and they are not volunteers. They do not meet the criteria for combat-

¹⁰⁰ Center for Strategic and International Studies, *China's Maritime Militias in the South China Sea*, YOUTUBE (July 24, 2019), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2Rk1wRCfnc> [<https://perma.cc/79HR-2WG6>].

¹⁰¹ CONG. RESEARCH SERV., *supra* note 11, at 65.

¹⁰² Manhit, *supra* note 98; Harry Kazianis, *China's Expanding Cabbage Strategy*, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 29, 2013), <https://thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-expanding-cabbage-strategy/> [<https://perma.cc/EF7Y-33EH>]; Bonnie Glaser, *China's Maritime Actors: Coordinated and Directed from the Top*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Jan. 14, 2015), <https://amti.csis.org/chinas-maritime-actors-coordinated-and-directed-from-the-top/> [<https://perma.cc/ZMS4-KBET>].

¹⁰³ S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶ 1120 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016); Glaser, *supra* note 102.

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*; Glaser, *supra* note 102.

¹⁰⁵ Kraska & Monti, *supra* note 93, at 454.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.* at 456–58.

¹⁰⁷ *Id.* at 465.

¹⁰⁸ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

ants because they are not under the command of a person responsible for his subordinates, they do not wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, they do not carry arms openly, and they do not conduct their operations in accordance with the law of war.¹⁰⁹ Whether they are operating under China's command or not depends on the day, since they are contracted by China on an ad hoc basis and are not exclusively under Chinese military command. Any analysis of whether a PAFMM sailor or vessel would be a legitimate military target would be highly fact-dependent.

China's use of fishing vessels to conduct some of its military's dirty work gives it tremendous opportunities to exploit U.S. compliance with international law and the law of war. The U.S. Congress adopted the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended, or COLREGS, as the International Navigational Rules Act of 1977.¹¹⁰ Under the COLREGS, U.S. Navy ships, with a few situation-specific exceptions, are required to give way to vessels engaged in fishing.¹¹¹ To do otherwise would not only be illegal, but could result in hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars of equipment casualties, even if no lives were at stake, and would risk a diplomatic incident. If a PAFMM vessel engaged in illegal or threatening activity, a U.S. Navy ship would face a huge challenge besides any navigational danger. China would have the upper hand in any resulting information lawfare battle.

China's PAFMM is engaging in "legal preparation of the battlefield," creating facts on the ground in the South China Sea to bolster its claims to territory. The little blue men stand ready as a force multiplier for the PLAN in any future conflict with China.¹¹² In April 2019, then-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, told Chinese Vice-Admiral Shen Jinlong that the U.S. will not treat the PAFMM differently than the Chinese Navy since they are being used to advance China's military ambitions.¹¹³ Following this warning will be easier in theory than in practice. The U.S. may not legally be able to

¹⁰⁹ *Id.* at arts. 43, 44.

¹¹⁰ International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608; COLREGS, *supra* note 94.

¹¹¹ COLREGS, *supra* note 94, r. 18. U.S. Navy ships, with few exceptions, are defined as "power-driven vessels" and thus required to give way to fishing boats. In such a situation they are known as "give way vessels."

¹¹² Kraska & Monti, *supra* note 93, at 465.

¹¹³ Ankit Panda, *The US Navy's Shifting View of China's Coast Guard and 'Maritime Militia'*, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 30, 2019), <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-us-navys-shifting-view-of-chinas-coast-guard-and-maritime-militia/> [<https://perma.cc/ND9U-BBP7>].

target PAFMM vessels as they would the PLAN, and the stakes could be higher if the U.S. Navy should choose to engage with these vessels outside of armed conflict.

China's use of the PAFMM takes the battlefield exploitation lawfare previously used by violent non-state actors to a new level. China is using the little blue men, in the guise of innocent fishermen, to incrementally change the status quo in the South China Sea.

C. Instrumental Lawfare: The South China Sea Arbitration (2016)

1. *Facts*

China has threatened the Philippines through its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. Much of this aggression has occurred in the Spratlys, a group of features within the Nine-Dash Line that also falls within the Philippines' EEZ. These features and their surrounding waters are rich in natural resources and fishing stocks. In 2012, China blocked access to the Scarborough Shoal, a traditional fishing ground for Filipino fishermen.¹¹⁴ In doing so, China endangered the lives of Filipino personnel by maneuvering aggressively in contravention of the COLREGS and the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).¹¹⁵

China had also begun construction on Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, three features in the Spratlys within the Philippines' EEZ. China had occupied Mischief Reef in the mid-1990s but did not begin construction on it until 2013.¹¹⁶ Within a matter of months or years, China transformed these features from underwater reefs to above-sea artificial islands, causing severe environmental damage in the process. China built runways, hangars, control towers, and radomes upon them.¹¹⁷ China's facilities on these islands were capable of supporting advanced fighters, patrol, electronic-warfare, and

¹¹⁴ China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶ 765 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

¹¹⁵ *Id.* ¶ 766; *see also* COLREGS, *supra* note 94 (requiring power-driven and sailing vessels to keep out of the way of fishing vessels); SOLAS, *supra* note 94, at arts. 33-48 (issuing provisions regarding safety of navigation).

¹¹⁶ S. China Sea Arbitration, Award, ¶ 993.

¹¹⁷ S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Supplemental Documents of the Philippines Vol. IV at Annex 782 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) (citing *Mischief Reef*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, <https://amti.csis.org/mischief-reef/> [<https://perma.cc/24N6-WJ9D>]).

advanced early-warning aircraft.¹¹⁸ Using these airfields would expand China's Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities, which are interrelated missile, sensor, guidance, and other technologies designed to bar potential adversaries from China's backyard or its mainland. The sensors would also enable transmission of targeting data to missile launchers at sea and on the mainland.¹¹⁹

China insisted that it was not militarizing the islands, and that it had a right to build them because they fell within the Nine-Dash Line.¹²⁰ However, China was obviously preparing these islands for potential military use. China was clearly creating facts on the ground to cement its claims to these features and building islands in order to create legal claims to EEZs in the surrounding waters.

2. *The Arbitration*

The Philippines would not have been able to contest China militarily without the U.S. support. U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said in 2019 that any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines.¹²¹ Yet in 2013, the U.S. seemed to have little desire to go to war

¹¹⁸ Robert Farley, *The 1 Downside to Building Fake Islands China Didn't See Coming*, NAT'L INTEREST (Jan. 17, 2020), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/1-downside-building-fake-islands-china-didnt-see-coming-114426> [https://perma.cc/YX6X-C4ET].

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

¹²⁰ S. China Sea Arbitration, Award, ¶¶ 1020-23.

¹²¹ *Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability*, U.S. DEPT OF STATE (Mar. 1, 2019) <https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html> [https://perma.cc/PVB2-KRHU]; see also Regine Cabato & Shibani Mahtani, *Pompeo Promises Intervention if Philippines Is Attacked in South China Sea Amid Rising Chinese Militarization*, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2019, 11:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pompeo-promises-intervention-if-philippines-is-attacked-in-south-china-sea-amid-rising-chinese-militarization/2019/02/28/5288768a-3b53-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story/ [https://perma.cc/WA3K-7LKF] ("Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Friday that any attack on Philippine aircraft or ships in the South China Sea would trigger a response from the United States under a mutual defense treaty between the two countries . . ."); Claire Jiao & Nick Wadhams, *We Have Your Back in South China Sea, U.S. Assures Philippines*, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 1, 2019, 5:38 AM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-01/pompeo-says-u-s-is-committed-to-keeping-south-china-sea-open> [https://perma.cc/S7BT-5L6B] ("U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo assured the Philippines that a defense treaty would apply if its vessels or planes are attacked in the South China Sea . . .").

with China over a pile of rocks.¹²² Unable to confront China militarily on its own over these violations of its sovereignty, the Philippines turned to instrumental lawfare to achieve a military objective. The U.S. gave tacit diplomatic support to those efforts.¹²³ China viewed the Philippines as a “Trojan Horse” for the U.S. during the arbitration proceedings.¹²⁴

The Philippines initiated an arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague.¹²⁵ It alleged violations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which China is a party.¹²⁶ 167 nations and the European Union are parties to UNCLOS, which was signed in 1982 and came into effect in 1994.¹²⁷ As a party to UNCLOS, China’s participation in the arbitration was compulsory.¹²⁸ The Philippines alleged violations of their EEZ due to China’s island-building activities and blocking access to its fishermen in the Scarborough Shoal, China’s endangerment of the lives of Filipino fishermen and personnel because of their failure to comply with the COLREGS, and severe environmental damage.¹²⁹

Within a month of the Philippines filing its claim, China refused to participate in the arbitration.¹³⁰ This marked the first time a signatory to UNCLOS refused to participate in an arbitration arising from the treaty’s compulsory jurisdiction proceedings.¹³¹ In a letter delivered by the Chinese embassy to the registry of the PCA, China stated that “a true solution can only be sought through bilateral negotiation and consultation,” and noted that “China does not accept and is not participating in this arbitration.”¹³² China vociferously protested the legitimacy of the arbitration process, claiming that the arbitration

¹²² Demetri Sevastopulo & Roel Landingin, *Philippines Seeks US Support in Confrontation with China*, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), <https://www.ft.com/content/8b4cb8b2-c9bd-11e3-99cc-00144feabdc0> [<https://perma.cc/B4K9-PBGH>].

¹²³ See *Arbitration Support Tracker*, *supra* note 13.

¹²⁴ Sevastopulo & Landingin, *supra* note 122; DAVID GROTEN, HOW SENTIMENT MATTERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE 203 (2019).

¹²⁵ S. China Sea Arbitration, Award ¶ 4.

¹²⁶ *Id.*

¹²⁷ See *Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements*, UNITED NATIONS: OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm [<https://perma.cc/8B7E-SCEB>] (last updated Mar. 7, 2021).

¹²⁸ UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, arts. 188–190.

¹²⁹ S. China Sea Arbitration, Award ¶¶ 9, 22, 112.

¹³⁰ Bernard H. Oxman, *Nonparticipation and Perceptions of Legitimacy*, 37 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 235, 239 (2019).

¹³¹ See *id.*

¹³² S. China Sea Arbitration, Award ¶¶ 97, 114.

itself violated UNCLOS.¹³³ In China's view, UNCLOS required the parties to attempt to negotiate before filing an arbitration. The Philippines countered that it had attempted to negotiate.¹³⁴ Interestingly, China chose not to participate in the jurisdictional phase of the arbitration and make its arguments before the Tribunal, when it could have dropped out of the case later in the proceedings.¹³⁵ China likely was concerned that it would lose both at the jurisdictional phase and on the merits, and thought its best strategy was to attempt to debunk the legitimacy of the entire process rather than to participate at all. China may also have wished to signal that it would not comply with the decision in order to discourage the lawsuit from proceeding or to discourage other states from filing similar claims.¹³⁶

China then launched a major media campaign to denounce the legitimacy of the arbitration. On December 7, 2014, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a position paper denouncing the arbitration.¹³⁷ Xu Hong, the Director-General of China's Foreign Ministry's Department of Treaty and Law, stated that China decided to release the position paper due to misperceptions of its position and allegations that China does not follow international law.¹³⁸ Xu claimed that the white paper "debunks the Philippines' groundless assertions and projects China's image as a defender and promoter of the international rule of law."¹³⁹ In the paper, China argued that the PCA did not have jurisdiction over the Philippines' claims. More broadly, since the PCA would "have to determine, directly or indirectly, the sovereignty over both the maritime features in question and other maritime features in the South China Sea,"

¹³³ *Id.* ¶ 102.

¹³⁴ *Id.* ¶ 97.

¹³⁵ *Id.* ¶ 116.

¹³⁶ Oxman, *supra* note 130, at 246.

¹³⁷ *Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ¶ 2 (Dec. 7, 2014), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm [<https://perma.cc/CJC3-6U6V>] [hereinafter *China's Position Paper*]; see also Shannon Tiezzi, *Why China Won't Accept International Arbitration in the South China Sea*, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 9, 2014), <https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/why-china-wont-accept-international-arbitration-in-the-south-china-sea/> [<https://perma.cc/9U9J-TWBB>] (discussing China's positions for rejecting Philippines's request for arbitration).

¹³⁸ Tiezzi, *supra* note 137.

¹³⁹ *Id.* ¶ 29.

the decision would thus be invalid under Section 298 of UNCLOS itself.¹⁴⁰

The position paper went further, responding to the merits of the Philippines' arguments. China argued that a decision on the extent of China's maritime claims in the South China Sea could be reached only after issues of sovereignty were resolved.¹⁴¹ Before resorting to UNCLOS, China and its neighbors needed to negotiate over their respective claims. China also noted that the Philippines' case effectively dealt with maritime delimitation, but China had declared in 2006 that it does not accept the compulsory settlement procedures of UNCLOS, including maritime delimitation.¹⁴² Thus China claimed it would not be bound to accept the Tribunal's decision.¹⁴³ China further argued that the Philippines violated an existing agreement to settle the dispute through direct negotiations with China. China cited unspecified bilateral agreements, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which it signed in 2002 along with ASEAN member states.¹⁴⁴ China asserted its sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and its "resolve and determination to safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights," and reaffirmed its commitment to resolving disputes through direct negotiation and working with its neighbors to achieve peace and stability in the contested waters.¹⁴⁵

The position paper looked suspiciously like a legal brief. It took the form of a brief and laid out China's legal objections to both the tribunal's jurisdiction and the merits of the case. China seemed to be afraid of the arbitration and its potential consequences in the international community and for its domestic and international legitimacy.

China was correct that the PCA would not have jurisdiction to determine sovereignty over features in the South China Sea. UNCLOS covers only the rights and responsibilities of nations regarding the use of oceans, including business, the environment, and natural resources. It does not cover sovereignty. However, the Court's decision would have implications for sov-

¹⁴⁰ *China's Position Paper*, *supra* note 137, ¶¶ 29, 74.

¹⁴¹ *Id.* ¶ 59.

¹⁴² *Id.* ¶¶ 64, 72.

¹⁴³ *See id.* ¶ 75.

¹⁴⁴ *Id.* ¶ 35; *see Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea*, ASS'N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (Oct. 17, 2012), https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2 [perma.cc/UH2G-FPWX].

¹⁴⁵ *China's Position Paper*, *supra* note 137, ¶ 93.

ereignty claims. To determine whether China violated UNCLOS, the Court would need to determine the status of the various features in the Spratlys, such as whether they were islands, rocks, reefs, or low-tide elevations.¹⁴⁶

The status of these features would determine what claims they would generate to sovereign territory or natural resources.¹⁴⁷ UNCLOS defines an island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”¹⁴⁸ Islands generate 12 nm territorial seas and 200 nm EEZs, which come with the sole rights to explore and exploit natural and biological resources within the EEZ. Other nations would still have Freedom of Navigation and Overflight within the EEZ. Rocks, like islands, are “naturally formed area[s] of land, surrounded by water, which [are] above water at high tide.”¹⁴⁹ However, “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”¹⁵⁰ Rocks do generate a twelve nm territorial sea. Low-Tide Elevations, or LTEs, disappear at high tide. Under UNCLOS,

[w]here a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea . . . [but w]here a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.¹⁵¹

Accordingly, an LTE is not part of a state’s territory and cannot be appropriated.

Thus, a legally binding determination of the status of these features would have significant implications for a state’s claims over them in the future. The territorial and economic claims

¹⁴⁶ See *S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China)*, Case No. 2013-19, Award ¶ 392 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

¹⁴⁷ On the challenges of distinguishing rocks from islands under UNCLOS, see Marius Gjetnes, *The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?*, 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 191, 193–99 (2001); *S. China Sea Arbitration*, Award ¶¶ 479–82; Roberto Lavalle, *Not Quite a Sure Thing: The Maritime Areas of Rocks and Low-Tide Elevations Under the UN Law of the Sea Convention*, 19 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 43, 43–49 (2004) (examining how the South China Sea Tribunal used GEOINT products to make the factual determination that none of the disputed features in the South China Sea Arbitration met the criteria for fully fledged islands under UNCLOS art. 121(3)).

¹⁴⁸ UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at art. 121(1).

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ *Id.* at art. 121(3).

¹⁵¹ *Id.* at art. 13.

generated by each of these features would determine the rights of states that own the features. For this reason, Taiwan made the unusual move of siding with China in the arbitration. Taiwan currently occupies a feature known to the Philippines as Itu Aba and to Taiwan as Taiping Island. Late in the Arbitration, Taiwan released a position paper on the status of Itu Aba, and the Taiwan Society of International Law submitted an amicus curiae brief to the PCA claiming that Itu Aba is an island.¹⁵²

Despite China's nonparticipation, the Tribunal bent over backwards to include China's perspective. The Tribunal reviewed China's position paper and statements by Chinese officials in lieu of the state's formal arguments.¹⁵³ The Tribunal could have taken the Philippines' arguments as fact, but it took the unusual step of appointing independent experts to assess the parties' claims and measurements of contested geographic features.¹⁵⁴ Ordinarily, both parties to an arbitration would advance funds to compensate such independent experts. Since China did not participate, the Philippines bore these costs alone.¹⁵⁵ After China protested, one of the original judges even recused himself to avoid any semblance of impartiality because he had a Filipino wife.¹⁵⁶

On October 29, 2015, the Tribunal released a decision on jurisdiction, despite the fact that China did not formally contest jurisdiction in the proceedings due to its nonparticipation.¹⁵⁷ Procedurally, the Tribunal would not ordinarily have had to release a decision on jurisdiction but likely chose to do

¹⁵² Position Paper on ROC South China Sea Policy, Republic of China (Taiwan), 27–30 (Mar. 21, 2016); Amicus Curiae Submission by the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award ¶¶ 20–22 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

¹⁵³ S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award ¶¶ 14, 153 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016); Jill Goldenziel, *China Can't Ignore the Hague's Decision—But It Can Avoid It*, HUFFPOST (July 13, 2016, 3:44 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/china-cant-ignore-the-hagues-decision-but-it-can_b_57869173e4b0cbf01e9f0b74 [<https://perma.cc/Z5HT-UTBX>].

¹⁵⁴ S. China Sea Arbitration, Award ¶¶ 15, 84.

¹⁵⁵ Goldenziel, *supra* note 153.

¹⁵⁶ Anjo Alimario, JC Gotinga & Paolo Taruc, *PH vs. China: Who Are the Judges of the Arbitral Tribunal?*, CNN PHIL. (July 12, 2016, 3:39 AM), <https://cnnphilippines.com/world/2016/07/11/ph-china-the-hague-arbitral-tribunal-judges.html> [<https://perma.cc/AAC9-KA8L>].

¹⁵⁷ *See generally* S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 10–15 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) (explaining that China's refusal to participate in the proceedings does not bar the Tribunal from proceeding with the arbitration and interpreting China's statements and position papers to object to the basis of jurisdiction).

so in response to China's informal objections.¹⁵⁸ The Tribunal also showed that it was taking China's arguments seriously by effectively treating the white paper as a legal brief in evaluating the parties' arguments.¹⁵⁹ The Tribunal likely wished to bolster the international legitimacy of the decision by taking these extraordinary steps.

In the months before the decision on the merits was announced, China stepped up its propaganda efforts.¹⁶⁰ Near-daily condemnations of the arbitration appeared in the Chinese and English-language press, written by the government and affiliated groups like the Chinese Fisheries Association.¹⁶¹ Chinese academics and lawyers made high-level international appearances to criticize the arbitration, such as at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law.¹⁶² High-level ministers regularly spoke out against the case and the legitimacy of the tribunal.¹⁶³ China attempted to rally other countries to support its position.¹⁶⁴ Just weeks before the decision was announced, China attempted to debunk the legitimacy of the arbitration because the President of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), a Japanese judge who did not sit on the South China Sea arbitration tribunal himself, had appointed two judges to the tribunal after China forfeited its right to do so by not participating in the arbitration.¹⁶⁵ In China's view, China's disputes with Japan

¹⁵⁸ See PCA Arbitration Rules, art. 23 (2012), available at <https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2015/11/PCA-Arbitration-Rules-2012.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/5WUT-TVEZ>] (explaining that the arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction in the event of an objection to jurisdiction, and that the tribunal "may rule on a [jurisdictional objection] either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits").

¹⁵⁹ S. China Sea Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 10 – 15; see also Goldenziel, *supra* note 153.

¹⁶⁰ Goldenziel, *supra* note 153.

¹⁶¹ *Id.*

¹⁶² *Emerging Frontiers in the South China Sea*, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOH3ehGAjKc&feature=emb_title [<https://perma.cc/4F3R-TPFU>] (depicting panel at the 110th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law); see AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, 110TH ASIL ANNUAL MEETING: CHARTERING NEW FRONTIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (2016) available at https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/annualmeeting/pdfs/2016_Program.pdf [<https://perma.cc/4B7T-W77C>]; see also Goldenziel, *supra* note 153.

¹⁶³ Goldenziel, *supra* note 153.

¹⁶⁴ *Arbitration Support Tracker*, *supra* note 13; Michael Forsythe, *Beijing Tries to Whip Up Support for Its South China Sea Claims*, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2016), <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/14/world/asia/south-china-sea-philippines-hague-ruling.html> [<https://perma.cc/U8LS-E3CP>].

¹⁶⁵ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, *Beijing: Japanese Judge Means South China Sea Tribunal Is Biased*, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 21, 2016, 2:40 PM), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/21/beijing-japanese-judge-means-south-china-sea>

over territory in the East China Sea meant that a Japanese judge could not appoint impartial arbitrators.¹⁶⁶ China may have dismissed the arbitration, but it could not seem to ignore its existence. Instead, it appeared to be worried about the legitimacy of its own position—and about an adverse result.

3. *Decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration*

The Tribunal released its decision on July 12, 2016. By 6 AM Eastern Standard Time, the arbitration was trending on both Twitter and Weibo, China's largest social media network.¹⁶⁷ The decision was almost a sweeping win for the Philippines, more so than most observers had expected. The Court held that China's maritime entitlements in the South China Sea cannot exceed those established by UNCLOS.¹⁶⁸ In doing so, the Court effectively invalidated the Nine-Dash line.¹⁶⁹ Surprisingly to many observers, the Court also found that no features in the Spratlys qualify as islands under UNCLOS.¹⁷⁰ The Court determined that Scarborough Shoal, Fiery Cross Reef, and Itu Aba were rocks, and thus generated no EEZs.¹⁷¹ Importantly, Scarborough Shoal generated a territorial sea for the Philippines, and thus China's barring Filipino fishermen from fishing there violated the Philippines' sovereign right to fish in its territorial sea.¹⁷² Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and the Second Thomas Shoal were all found to be LTEs.¹⁷³ The Tribunal found the Second Thomas Shoal and the waters around it to be

tribunal-is-biased-china-philippines-maritime-claims/ [https://perma.cc/BES4-5G8E].

¹⁶⁶ *Id.*

¹⁶⁷ Twitter observed by author. See also Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, *After South China Sea Ruling, China Censors Online Calls for War*, FOREIGN POLY (July 12, 2016, 5:12 PM), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/after-south-china-sea-ruling-china-censors-online-calls-for-war-unclos-tribunal/> [https://perma.cc/B6DH-KAPX] ("Within hours of the [judgment's] announcement, 'South China Sea arbitration' was trending on Weibo, China's heavily filtered Twitter-like microblogging platform, and hundreds of thousands of comments poured in."); Janis Mackey Frayer, *South China Sea Ruling: What's Next for Beijing After Tribunal's Rebuke?*, NBC NEWS (July 12, 2016, 11:30 AM), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/south-china-sea-ruling-what-s-next-beijing-after-tribunal-n607851> [https://perma.cc/H8F6-9EMM] ("In the hours ahead of the ruling, #SouthChinaSeaArbitration was the top trending topic on Weibo with well over 100 million views.").

¹⁶⁸ S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award ¶¶ 277 – 78 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

¹⁶⁹ *Id.*

¹⁷⁰ *Id.* ¶¶ 643, 646.

¹⁷¹ *Id.*

¹⁷² *Id.* ¶¶ 643, 646, 716.

¹⁷³ *Id.* ¶¶ 643, 646.

part of the EEZ and the continental shelf of the Philippines.¹⁷⁴ China's island-building activities on Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef were thus illegal, since none of those features can sustain human habitation in their natural state.¹⁷⁵ The occupation of Mischief Reef was also illegal because it is part of the Philippines' continental shelf.¹⁷⁶ Although China had not made its claims explicit, most observers believed that China had claimed EEZs and continental shelves emanating from Scarborough Shoal and at least most of the Spratlys.¹⁷⁷ The Tribunal's determination that none of the Spratlys are islands not only invalidated those claims but also has broader implications. The determination means that the only EEZs and continental shelves in the South China Sea are those generated by the coastlines of its surrounding states and possibly some of the Paracels, pending determination of the status of those features. Thus, the Tribunal's findings have implications for the territorial claims of other states.

The Tribunal found that China had violated UNCLOS in several additional ways. China engaged in unlawful interference with the Philippines' sovereign rights in its EEZ and continental shelf by preventing it from exploiting natural resources there.¹⁷⁸ China also engaged in substantial violations of environmental law through its island-building, including dredging and landfill work.¹⁷⁹ China also violated the Philippines' traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal.¹⁸⁰ While both Chinese and Filipino fishermen have the right to engage in

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* ¶¶ 646–47.

¹⁷⁵ *Id.* ¶¶ 643, 646, 1043 (finding that Mischief Reef is an LTE and therefore not capable of appropriation).

¹⁷⁶ *See id.* ¶ 1043 (finding that Mischief Reef is part of the Philippines' Continental Shelf).

¹⁷⁷ *Failing or Incomplete? Grading the South China Sea Arbitration*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (July 11, 2019), <https://amti.csis.org/failing-or-incomplete-grading-the-south-china-sea-arbitration/> [<https://perma.cc/Z2JB-GZT3>] [hereinafter *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI]. China's white paper that it released the day after the arbitration, for example, states that "China has, based on the Nanhai Zhudao [islands of the South China Sea], internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf." *Id.*; *see also* Xinhua, *China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea*, STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, (July 13, 2016, 11:23 AM), http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2016/07/13/content_281475392503075.htm [<https://perma.cc/DD5P-4DXU>] [hereinafter *China's White Paper*] [appearing to assert China's claims to an EEZ and continental shelf based on its proclaimed sovereignty over the Spratlys but open to other interpretations].

¹⁷⁸ S. China Sea Arbitration, Award ¶ 716.

¹⁷⁹ *Id.* ¶ 993.

¹⁸⁰ *Id.* ¶ 814.

traditional fishing regardless of who has sovereignty over the shoal, China prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing from May 2012 onward.¹⁸¹ China also endangered the lives of Philippines' personnel at Scarborough Shoal, as well as in other areas through its failure to comply with the COLREGS required by UNCLOS.¹⁸² It failed to stop Chinese nationals from interfering with the rights of and endangering Filipino fishermen and personnel.¹⁸³ China allowed its fishers and fishermen to illegally engage in environmental destruction through harvesting of endangered species.¹⁸⁴ Finally, it unlawfully aggravated the dispute by engaging in these activities while the lawsuit was pending.¹⁸⁵

4. *Aftermath of the Decision: Information Lawfare and Effects*

China swiftly and strongly denounced the decision using information lawfare to shape the narrative surrounding the arbitration. China immediately dismissed the decision as “waste paper.”¹⁸⁶ The day after the decision was announced, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Released a white paper denouncing the decision.¹⁸⁷ In it, China continued to advance its narrative that the arbitration itself was illegal, as well as to assert its historic rights over the area within the Nine-Dash Line.¹⁸⁸ China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Lu Kang, called the Tribunal's decision “null and void” in his next regular press conference.¹⁸⁹ Using strong terms, Lu said that “the Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have abused relevant pro-

181 *Id.*

182 *Id.* ¶¶ 1105, 1109. UNCLOS Article 94 incorporates the COLREGS into UNCLOS. The Tribunal found China to have “by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal [found] China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to be in breach of Article 94 of the Convention.” *Id.* ¶ 1109.

183 *Id.* ¶ 757.

184 *Id.* ¶ 992.

185 *Id.* ¶ 1181.

186 *Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin at the Press Conference on the White Paper Titled China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (July 13, 2016), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1381980.shtml [<https://perma.cc/Q4XX-ZC2N>].

187 *See* China's White Paper, *supra* note 177.

188 *See id.*

189 *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's Remarks on Japanese Foreign Minister's Statement on the Award of South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Philippines*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

cedures, misrepresented the law and obstinately forced [sic] ahead with the arbitration, and as a result, have severely violated the legitimate rights that China enjoys as a State Party to the UNCLOS.”¹⁹⁰ China’s ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai, argued that the arbitration “undermine[s] the authority and effectiveness of international law.”¹⁹¹ Official media repeatedly characterized the arbitration as a “farce.”¹⁹² China refrained from formally announcing claims to EEZs and continental shelves emanating from features in the Spratlys at the time.¹⁹³

China launched both domestic and international media campaigns to denounce the decision. It placed a billboard in Times Square with a three-minute video that ran five times an hour, twenty-four hours per day, from July 23 to August 3.¹⁹⁴ China thus publicized its message to Americans along with foreign tourists.¹⁹⁵ China simultaneously released the video on Youtube and on Chinese television networks.¹⁹⁶ The video emphasizes that “China [was] the first to have named . . . explored and exploited” islands in the South China Sea as early as the 2nd Century BCE.¹⁹⁷ It asserts that China has continuously “exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction over” these islands and waters.¹⁹⁸ China again argues that the arbitration was illegal and that it rejects the outcome “so as to defend the solemnity of international law.”¹⁹⁹ Instead, it claims it advocates the “dual-track approach” to resolve the disputes through friendly negotiations while China works with ASEAN to maintain peace in the South China Sea.²⁰⁰ The video features experts and politicians affirming China’s claims to the area. One of them, Catherine

(July 12, 2016), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1380245.shtml [<https://perma.cc/TWN9-GZAG>].

¹⁹⁰ *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on October 30, 2015*, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1310709.shtml [<https://perma.cc/5ANG-FG6J>].

¹⁹¹ Kania, *supra* note 28.

¹⁹² *Id.*

¹⁹³ *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI, *supra* note 177.

¹⁹⁴ *South China Sea Campaign Airing in Times Square Falsely Uses British MP to Back China’s Claim*, ABC NEWS (July 28, 2016, 4:10 PM), <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-28/south-china-sea-campaign-airs-on-times-square-billboard/7670744> [<https://perma.cc/V3V9-M6PK>].

¹⁹⁵ VideoChinaTV, *A Short Video on Times Square*, YOUTUBE (July 27, 2016), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XI2s-2vjr7o&t=73s> [<https://perma.cc/M7NX-KTHT>].

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰⁰ *Id.*

West, Shadow Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs from the British Labour Party, quickly released a statement that her remarks were taken out of context from a statement in which she actually denied China's claims over the area.²⁰¹

Internationally, many states issued statements on the arbitration. The U.S., the Philippines, the U.K., Canada, Japan, Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand—all parties strongly vested in either the immediate decision or its implications for future interpretations of and compliance with UNCLOS—strongly encouraged China to comply with the decision.²⁰² Thirty-three other countries issued positive statements about the decision without explicitly calling for China to comply.²⁰³ India, Malaysia, Myanmar, and South Korea, all of which had taken no position on the arbitration prior to the decision, issued positive statements that stopped short of calling for compliance.²⁰⁴ Another eight countries made neutral statements without addressing the decision, including Brunei and Indonesia, who also have claims to features in the South China Sea.²⁰⁵ Only six countries besides China issued statements opposing the decision: Russia, Montenegro, Sudan, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Vanuatu.²⁰⁶ Taiwan's opposition to the decision was based on the Tribunal's finding that Itu Aba is a rock rather than an island.²⁰⁷ These statements are significant because China had claimed prior to the ruling that the majority of the world's states opposed the arbitration.²⁰⁸

International pressure on China to comply with the decision waned in the wake of the decision, however, because the Philippines itself has not pushed China to comply. Rodrigo

²⁰¹ Will Worley, *Labour MP Says She Was Misrepresented in China's Times Square Propaganda Video*, INDEPENDENT (July 31, 2016, 11:45 PM), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-mp-catherine-west-china-propaganda-video-times-square-new-york-120-a7165206.html> [<https://perma.cc/E9B2-NDJF>].

²⁰² *Who Is Taking Sides After the South China Sea Ruling?*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Aug. 15, 2016), <https://amti.csis.org/sides-in-south-china-sea/> [<https://perma.cc/P4F3-LS3M>] [hereinafter *Who is Taking Sides*, AMTI].

²⁰³ *Id.*

²⁰⁴ *Id.*

²⁰⁵ *Id.*; *Territorial Disputes: The South China Sea: State Interests*, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE: LIBGUIDES, <https://usnwc.libguides.com/c.php?g=86624&p=557082> [<https://perma.cc/CKR4-XYLQ>].

²⁰⁶ *Who is Taking Sides*, AMTI, *supra* note 202.

²⁰⁷ *Id.*; see *S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China)*, Case No. 2013-19, Award ¶ 632 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

²⁰⁸ Wang Wen & Chen Xiaochen, *Who Supports China in the South China Sea and Why*, DIPLOMAT (July 27, 2016), <https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/who-supports-china-in-the-south-china-sea-and-why/> [<https://perma.cc/D8LG-EBQC>].

Duterte became president of the Philippines on June 30, 2016, less than two weeks before the arbitral decision was released.²⁰⁹ Duterte quickly began to ostracize the U.S. and to warm to China.²¹⁰ For four years, Duterte refused to push compliance with the decision, despite pressure from his own people.²¹¹ In his fourth State of the Nation Address, Duterte casually mentioned that he would raise the arbitral decision with China when the time is right.²¹² In July 2019, during a visit to the Philippines, Xi allegedly offered Duterte a large oil and gas deal in exchange for abandoning the terms of the arbitration.²¹³

²⁰⁹ *Rodrigo Duterte Sworn in as Philippines President*, BBC (June 30, 2016), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36670012> [<https://perma.cc/FCP2-MWXX>].

²¹⁰ *See, e.g.*, Hannah Beech & Jason Gutierrez, *Xi Visits Philippines to Celebrate 'Rainbow After the Rain' With Duterte*, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/world/asia/xi-jinping-rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china.html> [<https://perma.cc/LTF6-MN4E>] (noting Duterte's anti-U.S. sentiments and historic visit to Beijing).

²¹¹ Renato Cruz de Castro, *Commentary: Is An Appeasement Policy Vis-a-vis Expansionist China Worth Pursuing?*, PHILSTAR GLOB. (Jan. 4, 2020, 4:10 PM), <https://www.philstar.com/other-sections/news-feature/2020/01/04/1982027/commentary-appeasement-policy-vis-visit-expansionist-china-worth-pursuing> [<https://perma.cc/4WPU-DU8E>] ("President Rodrigo Duterte, however, emphasizing the futility of confronting China . . ."); Jason Gutierrez, *Philippines Has Little Power Against China, Duterte Tells Lawmakers*, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019), <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-congress.html> [<https://perma.cc/Q9Z5-T7K6>] ("Mr. Duterte has not pressured China to accept the ruling, instead making a point of appeasing Beijing by visiting often and courting billions of dollars in investment pledges."); Franco Luna, *Philippines Is 'the Lead in the South China Sea Disputes,' Locsin Claims*, PHILSTAR GLOB. (Dec. 8, 2019, 1:42 PM), <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/12/08/1975297/philippines-the-lead-south-china-sea-disputes-locsin-claims> [<https://perma.cc/U6UW-M28R>] ("In July 2019, Duterte said that the ruling could no longer be enforced.").

²¹² *Duterte's SONA 2019*, PHILSTAR GLOB. (July 24, 2019, 3:32 PM), <https://www.philstar.com/happens/713> [<https://perma.cc/J4CF-B7WR>] ("Short of advocating a call to arms there are those who say we should stop those who fish in our economic zone. Of course we will, in due time."); Eimor Santos & Chad de Guzman, *Duterte Vows to Stop Chinese Fishing in West PH Sea 'in Due Time,' CNN PHIL.* (July 22, 2019, 6:54 PM), <https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/7/22/duterte-sona-china-west-philippine-sea.html> [<https://perma.cc/89M3-JGWQ>].

²¹³ Martin Petty & Karen Lema, *Philippines' Duterte to Meet China's Xi Over South China Sea Arbitration Win*, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2019, 4:24 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china/philippines-duterte-to-meet-chinas-xi-over-south-china-sea-arbitration-win-idUSKCN1UW0SJ> [<https://perma.cc/Q4K2-9X63>]; Helen Regan, *Duterte Says Xi Jinping Offered Him an Oil and Gas Deal to Ignore South China Sea Ruling*, CNN (Sept. 12, 2019, 9:12 PM), <https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/asia/duterte-xi-south-china-sea-deal-intl-hnk/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/3KAT-JM9X>].

Even as oil and gas cooperation appears to be increasing, however, Duterte has toughened his stance against China and in support of the rulings. On July 12 2020, the Philippines' Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin issued a statement formally recognizing the arbitration.²¹⁴ The following day, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issued a statement declaring that "Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them."²¹⁵ He stated the U.S.'s position that the South China Sea Tribunal's ruling is "legally binding."²¹⁶ The following day, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, called Secretary Locsin to assure him that China would continue to work with the Philippines and other parties to resolve maritime issues through dialogue and consultation.²¹⁷ In September 2020, Duterte made a speech before the UN General Assembly toughening his stance in support of the Award.²¹⁸ In December 2020, Secretary Locsin and Secretary Pompeo spoke about cooperation between their nations regarding the terms of the Award.²¹⁹ As this Article goes to press, it remains to be seen how the Biden administration will support compliance with the arbitral decision.

China's compliance with the arbitration has been mixed. China has not reneged on its claim to sovereignty over territory within the Nine-Dash Line.²²⁰ Accordingly, it has not abandoned its artificial islands in the South China Sea.²²¹ Nor has China conceded that the Second Thomas Shoal and its surrounding waters are part of the Philippines' EEZ and continental shelf, and Chinese Coast Guard vessels patrol near it

²¹⁴ Renato Cruz de Castro, *After Four Years, the Philippines Acknowledges the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award!*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (July 27, 2020), <https://amti.csis.org/after-four-years-the-philippines-acknowledges-the-2016-arbitral-tribunal-award/> [<https://perma.cc/S4SS-WU8T>].

²¹⁵ Michael R. Pompeo, *U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea*, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (July 13, 2020), <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/J7HD-AF6X>].

²¹⁶ *Id.*

²¹⁷ de Castro, *supra* note 214.

²¹⁸ Sebastian Strangio, *In UN Speech, Duterte Stiffens Philippines' Stance on the South China Sea*, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 23, 2020), <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/in-un-speech-duterte-stiffens-philippines-stance-on-the-south-china-sea/> [<https://perma.cc/4NFK-GQ8>].

²¹⁹ Eimor Santos, *Locsin, Pompeo Talk About Reinforcing 'Binding' South China Sea Arbitral Ruling*, CNN PHIL. (Dec. 19, 2020, 3:36 PM), <https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/12/19/locsin-pompeo-south-china-sea-arbitral-ruling.html> [<https://perma.cc/P6VX-4QVV>].

²²⁰ See China's White Paper, *supra* note 177.

²²¹ *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI, *supra* note 177.

regularly.²²² In May 2018, a PLAN helicopter also harassed a Philippine resupply mission to the *Sierra Madre*, a rusty, dilapidated WWII-era former U.S. Navy ship grounded on the Shoal by which the Philippines occupies the feature.²²³ None of this is surprising, since giving up China's territorial claims would represent a massive loss of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people and an about-face on the legal position it has advanced before the international community. Doing so would also signal a willingness to back away from disputes with China's other neighbors regarding features in the South China Sea.

In defiance of the decision, China also continues to violate the Philippines' rights to fish within its EEZ. Since 1999, China has unilaterally declared a summer fishing ban from May to August of each year in all waters north of the twelfth degree of latitude.²²⁴ China claims it does so to protect fishing stocks.²²⁵ This area includes large swaths of the EEZs of the Philippines and Vietnam. The Philippines and Vietnam have angrily rejected the ban in recent years, at times noting the arbitral decision.²²⁶

China's law enforcement vessels and maritime militia vessels also continue to operate in a dangerous manner.²²⁷ The Chinese Coast Guard, PLAN, and maritime militia vessels continue to violate the COLREGS and SOLAS at Scarborough

²²² *Id.*

²²³ Jim Gomez, *Philippines Says It Protests China 'Harassment' of Navy Boat*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 30, 2018), <https://apnews.com/575ca64f275f42f3bbb6ed3ded9821fa> [<https://perma.cc/5CRU-GLA8>]; Jeff Himmelman, *A Game of Shark and Minnow*, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 27, 2013), <http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/3Y4V-BANK>].

²²⁴ See John Reed, *South China Sea: Fishing on the Front Line of Beijing's Ambitions*, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), <https://www.ft.com/content/fead89da-1a4e-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21> [<https://perma.cc/JR2Z-FRPD>].

²²⁵ *Id.*

²²⁶ See, e.g., Nestor Corrales, *China's Fishing Ban in South China Sea Against Philippine Sovereignty—Palace*, INQUIRER.NET (May 21, 2019, 7:19 PM), <https://globalnation.inquirer.net/175440/chinas-fishing-ban-in-south-china-sea-against-philippine-sovereignty-palace> [<https://perma.cc/68TE-7UN7>] (noting that a presidential spokesperson has criticized Beijing's activities as "an affront to [the Philippines'] territory and to [the Philippines'] sovereignty"); *Vietnam Rejects Beijing's South China Sea Fishing Ban That Covers Philippine EEZ*, PHILSTAR GLOB. (May 7, 2019, 11:56 AM), <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/05/07/1915827/vietnam-rejects-beijings-south-china-sea-fishing-ban-covers-philippine-eez> [<https://perma.cc/Q9AU-SALF>] (noting that a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said "Vietnam opposes and resolutely rejects China's unilateral fishing ban decision"); Reed, *supra* note 224 (noting that "Vietnam is strongly opposed" to China's activities against Vietnamese fishermen).

²²⁷ *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI, *supra* note 177.

Shoal.²²⁸ Numerous examples exist of Chinese harassment of Philippine, Vietnamese, and other vessels, including the harassment of a Philippine resupply vessel near Second Thomas Shoal in May 2018,²²⁹ a dangerous sudden stop by a PLAN ship during a freedom of navigation operation by the U.S.S. Decatur in October 2018,²³⁰ and a ramming of a Vietnamese fishing boat in March 2019.²³¹ All of these qualify as violations of the treaties above.

In a few areas, however, China does seem to be in compliance with the arbitral decision. China has consistently allowed Filipino fishermen access to Scarborough Shoal since late 2016.²³² Access to the shoal was so politically important to the Duterte government that he claims to have made a secret verbal deal with Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2016 to allow Chinese fishing in the Philippine EEZ in exchange for the Chinese allowing Filipinos to fish at Scarborough Shoal.²³³ If true, this agreement would have traded non-compliance with one part of the arbitral ruling for compliance with another.²³⁴ Agreement or not, the arbitral ruling almost certainly caused China's decision to stop barring the Philippines from the Shoal. Its continued harassment of Filipino boats, however, signals that it has not backed away from its territorial claims.

Second, China has ceased its island-building activity in the South China Sea. After the decision, China completed its dredging and landfill work on the existing islands in the Spratlys in late 2016.²³⁵ After that, it ceased island-building operations in the Spratlys. Its last known island-building activity anywhere in the South China Sea was in the Paracels in mid-

²²⁸ *Id.*

²²⁹ Audrey Morallo, *China's Navy, Coast Guard 'Harassed' Filipino Troops on Resupply Mission on Ayungin—Alejano*, PHILSTAR (May 30, 2018, 5:01 PM), <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/05/30/1820063/chinas-navy-coast-guard-harassed-filipino-troops-resupply-mission-ayungin-alejano> [<https://perma.cc/X3SQ-93MS>].

²³⁰ *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI, *supra* note 177; Danielle Paquette, *Chinese Warship Nearly Hits U.S. Destroyer in South China Sea Near Disputed Islands*, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2018, 3:56 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-warship-nearly-hits-us-destroyer-in-south-china-sea/2018/10/02/877cc788-c5fb-11e8-9158-09630a6d8725_story.html [<https://perma.cc/2XDL-49RY>].

²³¹ Hau Dinh, *Vietnam Says Fishing Boat Rammed and Sunk by Chinese Ship*, ABC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2019, 6:15 AM), <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/vietnam-fishing-boat-rammed-sunk-chinese-ship-61550702> [<https://perma.cc/63BW-P7P9>].

²³² *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI, *supra* note 177.

²³³ *Id.*

²³⁴ *Id.*

²³⁵ *Id.*

2017.²³⁶ While it is possible that China had fulfilled its goals before it stopped its island-building activities, the timing suggests that the arbitral decision influenced it to stop.

Some hope remains that China will allow the Philippines to exploit the resources of its continental shelf. China does continue to block the Philippines from exploring for oil and gas in Reed Bank, although the Tribunal concluded that the area is part of the Philippines' continental shelf.²³⁷ However, in November 2018, China and the Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding over the area.²³⁸ The details have yet to be determined, but it is possible that an eventual agreement could allow China to comply with the arbitral decision while saving face.²³⁹

Meanwhile, China's neighbors have begun to use the decision to their advantage. On December 12, 2019, Malaysia referenced the terms of the arbitral decision in a submission with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf expressing its rights to an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm.²⁴⁰ Its filing, made in accordance with UNCLOS, would nearly double the range of the continental shelf northward from that in Malaysia's original 1979 governmental mapping.²⁴¹ In line with the arbitral ruling, the submission recognized only the territorial seas of the Spratly features and not any EEZs. China swiftly responded that the submission "seriously infringed China's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea."²⁴² China's response claimed an EEZ based on the South China Sea islands and its historic

²³⁶ *Id.*

²³⁷ S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶ 716 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).

²³⁸ See Jay Batongbacal, *The Philippines-China MOU on Cooperation in Oil and Gas Development*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Dec. 5, 2018), <https://amti.csis.org/philippines-china-mou-cooperation-oil-gas-development/> [<https://perma.cc/24PA-ZDN5>].

²³⁹ See *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI, *supra* note 177.

²⁴⁰ *Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Malaysia in the South China Sea*, UNITED NATIONS: OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mys_12_12_2019.html [<https://perma.cc/J67Y-CQN5>] (last updated Jan. 29, 2021).

²⁴¹ Sean Quirk, *Water Wars: Stare Decisis in the South China Sea*, LAWFARE (Jan. 6, 2020, 8:25 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/water-wars-stare-decisis-south-china-sea> [<https://perma.cc/RMA2-ZQWJ>].

²⁴² *Id.* (citing Note Verbale CML/14/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (Dec. 12, 2019), available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mys85_2019/CML_14_2019_E.pdf [<https://perma.cc/E87H-M86Y>]).

rights in the South China Sea.²⁴³ This response marks one of the first times that China had explicitly claimed an EEZ based on features in the Spratlys.²⁴⁴ Indonesia, too, referenced the decision in a UN Submission following a row on December 30, 2019, with China interference by overfishing in Indonesia's EEZ.²⁴⁵ Indonesia's foreign ministry cited the arbitral ruling, noting China had lost its legal arguments based on historic fishing rights.²⁴⁶ In response, China restated its stance that the ruling was "illegal, null and void."²⁴⁷ In June 2020, Indonesia made headlines when it cited the South China Sea Award in a note verbale (diplomatic communication) to the U.N. Secretary-General.²⁴⁸

China has harshly warned its neighbors against bringing additional lawsuits like the Philippines's. Since the arbitral decision was announced, Vietnam and Indonesia have been rumored to be considering such claims.²⁴⁹ Vietnam was reportedly considering a lawsuit as recently as May 2020.²⁵⁰

²⁴³ Note Verbale CML/14/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (Dec. 12, 2019), *available at* https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mys85_2019/CML_14_2019_E.pdf [<https://perma.cc/E87H-M86Y>].

²⁴⁴ *See, e.g.*, China's White Paper, *supra* note 177 (serving as an example of a previous occasion in which China claimed an EEZ based on features in the Spratlys).

²⁴⁵ Quirk, *supra* note 241.

²⁴⁶ *Id.*

²⁴⁷ Patricia Lourdes Viray, *China Insists Arbitral Ruling is 'Illegal' Amid Indonesia's Protest*, PHILSTAR (Jan. 3, 2020, 3:54 PM), <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/01/03/1981797/china-insists-arbitral-ruling-illegal-amid-indonesias-protest> [<https://perma.cc/SKF9-TJAC>].

²⁴⁸ Ankit Panda, *Indonesia Cites 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award at UN. Is That a Big Deal?*, DIPLOMAT (June 3, 2020) <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/indonesia-cites-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-award-at-un-is-that-a-big-deal/> [<https://perma.cc/CAZ8-YYAP>].

²⁴⁹ David Bosco, *Indonesia Hints at South China Sea Litigation*, LAWFARE (Nov. 12, 2015, 3:25 PM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/indonesia-hints-south-china-sea-litigation> [<https://perma.cc/P3XF-Y2AM>]; James Pearson & Khanh Vu, *Vietnam Mulls Legal Action Over South China Sea Dispute*, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019, 6:57 PM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-southchinasea/vietnam-mulls-legal-action-over-south-china-sea-dispute-idUSKBN1XG1D6> [<https://perma.cc/9JL-A642>].

²⁵⁰ David Hutt, *Vietnam May Soon Sue China on South China Sea*, ASIA TIMES (May 7, 2020), <https://asiatimes.com/2020/05/vietnam-may-soon-sue-china-on-south-china-sea/> [<https://perma.cc/6PSK-AFJM>]; Richard Javad Heydarian, *Vietnam's Legal Warfare Against China: Prospects and Challenges*, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Nov. 21, 2019), <https://amti.csis.org/vietnams-legal-warfare-against-china-prospects-and-challenges/> [<https://perma.cc/SQJ3-R5ET>]; Richard Javad Heydarian, *Vietnam Drops a Legal Gauntlet in South China Sea*, ASIA TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), <https://asiatimes.com/2019/11/vietnam-drops-a-legal-gauntlet-in-south-china-sea/> [<https://perma.cc/5QX7-UQDC>]; Quirk, *supra* note 241.

When these rumors surfaced in the news, China immediately and harshly warned Vietnam “to avoid taking actions that may complicate matters or undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea as well as our bilateral relations.”²⁵¹ China, again, seems to be running scared of a potential loss in international courts.

In the years since the arbitral decision, Chinese officials have spoken less frequently about the Nine-Dash Line as the basis to their claim over the South China Sea.²⁵² China does continue to assert historic rights to the entire area, and to rely on these rights as the basis for fishing in the EEZs of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia.²⁵³ It also bases its objections to all of its neighbors’ oil and gas claims on those historic rights.²⁵⁴

Some reports have surfaced that China is now emphasizing a new legal argument for its sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands known as the “Four Sha” claim.²⁵⁵ This claim dates as far back as 1992 in Chinese policy documents.²⁵⁶ China is asserting sovereignty and maritime entitlements extending from four groups of features in the South China Sea, which it claims are islands: Dongsha, Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha. These “Four Sha” are “respectively referred to [in English] as the Pratas Islands, Paracels, Spratlys, and the Maccliesfield Bank area.”²⁵⁷ Using UNCLOS terminology, China has drawn “straight baselines” around these features to maximize their territorial claims.²⁵⁸ However, this argument plainly violates Article 47 of UNCLOS, which states that archipelagic

²⁵¹ Ankit Panda, *China Warns Vietnam to Not ‘Complicate’ South China Sea Dispute by Seeking Legal Arbitration*, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 9, 2019), <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/china-warns-vietnam-to-not-complicate-south-china-sea-dispute-by-seeking-legal-arbitration/> [<https://perma.cc/27X9-CJZF>].

²⁵² *Failing or Incomplete?*, AMTI, *supra* note 177.

²⁵³ *Id.*

²⁵⁴ *Id.*

²⁵⁵ See Richard Javad Heydarian, *China’s ‘New’ Map Aims to Extend South China Sea Claims*, NAT’L INTEREST (Apr. 30, 2018), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-new-map-aims-extend-south-china-sea-claims-25628> [<https://perma.cc/6ZRV-B6QC>]; Julian Ku & Chris Mirasola, *The South China Sea and China’s “Four Sha” Claim: New Legal Theory, Same Bad Argument*, LAWFARE (Sept. 25, 2017, 11:00 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/south-china-sea-and-chinas-four-sha-claim-new-legal-theory-same-bad-argument> [<https://perma.cc/R772-V7WU>]; Patricia Lourdes Viray, *Shifting Tactics: China Advances ‘Four Sha’ Claim in South China Sea*, PHILSTAR (Sept. 27, 2017, 12:49 AM), <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/09/27/1742870/shifting-tactics-china-advances-four-sha-claim-south-china-sea> [<https://perma.cc/VC94-ZRXP>].

²⁵⁶ Ku & Mirasola, *supra* note 255.

²⁵⁷ *Id.*

²⁵⁸ *Id.*

baselines may be drawn only if they enclose a state's "main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1."²⁵⁹ Even if all of those features were legally considered islands, China, with its enormous total land mass, would not meet this definition. Observers see this as a way for China to advance a new legal claim for sovereignty over these features to help it save face in the wake of its discredited ones.²⁶⁰ China may also be waging that through use of UNCLOS language and an interpretation of UNCLOS, its position may become more accepted in the international community.

Considering that China has rejected the Philippines/China arbitration, it seems to be very concerned about its meaning in the international community and to its domestic populace. Its constant denunciation of any mention of the arbitral decision, its harsh warnings to its neighbors against new lawsuits, its offer of a major oil and gas deal in exchange for abandoning the decision, and its quiet compliance with some of the decision's terms all suggest that China is very concerned about what the decision means for its legitimacy in the international community. At home, China's legal defeat is seen as a national humiliation—perhaps precisely because of the importance that the country places on lawfare.²⁶¹ The arbitral decision not only has implications for China's territorial claims, but it also means that China was beaten at its own game.

D. Instrumental Lawfare: China's Novel Interpretations of UNCLOS

China also uses instrumental lawfare to advance interpretations of international law that differ from those accepted by most of the international community to support its interests. Doing so is part and parcel to its definition of Legal Warfare as discussed above. It is exemplified by China's use of legal arguments to defend its decision not to participate in the Philippines-China arbitration, discussed above. It is also evident in China's interpretation of UNCLOS to expand its territorial boundaries and EEZs.

²⁵⁹ *Id.*

²⁶⁰ See sources cited *supra* note 255.

²⁶¹ Jill Goldenziel, *China Can't Ignore the Hague's Decision—But It Can Avoid It*, HUFFPOST (July 13, 2016, 3:44 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/china-cant-ignore-the-hagues-decision-but-it-can_b_57869173e4b0cbf01e9f0b74 [<https://perma.cc/Z5HT-UTBX>].

China interprets UNCLOS standards defining coastal baselines in a way that allows it to claim more territory. UNCLOS permits the coastal state to determine its baselines by one of three methods: the low-water line, straight baselines, or archipelagic baselines.²⁶² For coastal states like China and the U.S., “the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast.”²⁶³

UNCLOS allows coastal states to apply straight baselines to measure territorial seas in select circumstances, such as when a coastline is deeply indented and cut, or if a fringe of islands exists in the immediate vicinity of the coast.²⁶⁴ China has consistently claimed straight baselines since 1958.²⁶⁵ China first specified the geographic coordinates of its straight baseline claims, which allow it to claim nearly 2,000 square nautical miles more of territorial seas than if it used the UNCLOS baseline standards.²⁶⁶ The U.S. disputes China’s use of straight baselines, noting that “much of China’s coastline does not meet either of the two [UNCLOS] geographic conditions required for applying straight baselines.”²⁶⁷ China’s lawfare tactics here are clear: interpret the law to allow for maximal Chinese sovereignty, promulgate domestic laws in support of this claim, and publicize that its territorial claims are based on internationally accepted legal grounds.

China’s creative interpretations of UNCLOS amount to a form of instrumental lawfare. It is using legal claims to assert sovereignty over the South China Sea, together with its military actions laying facts on the ground. By adopting domestic laws supporting its interpretations of UNCLOS, China bolsters its domestic law enforcement capacity against supposed encroachment of UNCLOS. It also bolsters domestic legitimacy for its claims and for any actions taken to enforce them.

²⁶² See UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at arts. 5, 7, 47.

²⁶³ *Id.* at art. 5.

²⁶⁴ *Id.* at art. 7.

²⁶⁵ See Andrew J. Thomson, Keeping the Routine, Routine: The Operational Risks of Challenging Chinese Excessive Maritime 8 (Feb. 9, 2003) (unpublished paper, Naval War College) (noting that China claimed straight baselines in its 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea, then in the 1992 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and again in the 1996 Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baseline of the Territorial Sea).

²⁶⁶ *Id.* at 8–9.

²⁶⁷ *Id.* at 8.

E. Proxy Lawfare: Huawei v. U.S.

The U.S. is now also engaged in proxy lawfare against the Chinese corporate giant Huawei. Huawei is a telecommunications behemoth and one of the biggest players in competition for 5G.²⁶⁸ In these actions, the U.S. is treating Huawei as a proxy for the Chinese state. Huawei is fighting back hard in court, with the support of the Chinese government.²⁶⁹ Huawei's lawsuits, however, are unlikely to be successful in U.S. court, and its most prominent effort to date so far has failed.²⁷⁰ Many observers believe these lawsuits are part of a broader campaign by the company—and by extension, China—to sway the court of public opinion.²⁷¹

1. *Huawei v. U.S.*

The U.S. fired the first shots in its legal war against Huawei. The 2019-2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), enacted in August 2018, blocks the U.S. government from procuring, extending, or renewing a procurement contract with Huawei for telecommunications equipment, systems, or services.²⁷² It also prohibits the U.S. government from entering into, extending, or renewing contracts with other entities that use Huawei equipment, systems, or services. Third, it prohibits executive agency heads from obligating or expending loan or grant money to contract for any “equipment, system, or service” if Huawei products are “a substantial or essential component” or “critical technology” of any system involved.²⁷³ Huawei was not the only telecommunications contractor affected by the ban. The NDAA specifies that the banned telecommunications equipment and services include any equipment produced by Huawei or ZTE or any of their subsidiaries or affiliates, as well as video surveillance and telecommu-

²⁶⁸ See Complaint at 5–6, *Huawei v. United States*, 440 F.Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:19-CV-00159), 2019 WL 1076892.

²⁶⁹ See Noah Feldman, *Huawei's Lawsuit Against U.S. Won't Win in Court*, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Mar. 11, 2019, 9:19 PM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/huawei-technologies-v-u-s-constitutional-argument-won-t-work> [<https://perma.cc/DM52-NLAT>].

²⁷⁰ See *Huawei v. United States*, No. 4:19-CV-00159, 2019 WL 1076892, at *27–29 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020).

²⁷¹ See, e.g., Feldman, *supra* note 269 (observing that Huawei's lawsuit is part of a broader propaganda campaign to make it look like “the U.S. ignores the rule of law when it comes to dealing with China”).

²⁷² John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1636, 1917.

²⁷³ *Id.*

nications equipment produced by three other named firms.²⁷⁴ The ban was motivated by a national security concern that Chinese telecommunications providers could provide a backdoor in their technology that would enable them to spy on the U.S. government.²⁷⁵ This concern was especially important in light of a Chinese law that states that all Chinese corporations must allow the state to use their products for government use upon request.²⁷⁶ Huawei also has a history of industrial espionage and close ties to the Chinese Communist Party.²⁷⁷

Huawei vociferously denied allegations that its products would or could be used for spying.²⁷⁸ On March 6, 2019, Huawei responded by filing suit against the U.S. government, as well as the secretaries of labor, health and human services, education, agriculture, veterans affairs, and the interior, along with the administrator of the General Services Administration.²⁷⁹ In its complaint before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Huawei argued that the ban was equivalent to an unconstitutional bill of attainder, that the ban violated its due process rights, and that the ban violated the separation of powers.²⁸⁰

Huawei's primary argument was that NDAA section 889 was tantamount to an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits bills of attainder, defined by the Supreme Court as laws that "legislatively determine[] guilt and inflict[] punishment upon an identifiable

²⁷⁴ *Id.* § 889(f)(3).

²⁷⁵ Stephanie Zable, *Huawei Technologies v. U.S.: Summary and Context*, LAWFARE (Apr. 9, 2019, 8:03 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/huawei-technologies-v-us-summary-and-context> [https://perma.cc/2W2B-Z45E].

²⁷⁶ See Robert Chesney, *Is Huawei a 'Foreign Power' or an 'Agent of a Foreign Power' Under FISA? Insights from a Sanctions Case*, LAWFARE (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:51 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/huawei-foreign-power-or-agent-foreign-power-under-fisa-insights-sanctions-case> [https://perma.cc/Z6A2-ZNAS] ("[A]ll Chinese companies have comprehensive obligations under Chinese law to comply when the Chinese government seeks information or assistance for national security purposes."); Murray Scot Tanner, *Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense*, LAWFARE (July 20, 2017, 11:30 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense> [https://perma.cc/5NNS-ZNB3] (describing details of China's National Intelligence Law).

²⁷⁷ Zable, *supra* note 275; see also Chesney, *supra* note 277 (providing a history of Huawei's relationship with China).

²⁷⁸ Dan Strumpf & Josh Chin, *Huawei's Mysterious Founder Denies Spying for China, Praises Trump*, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2019, 12:00 PM), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-ceo-hits-back-at-claims-company-spies-for-china-11547542616> [https://perma.cc/4DSD-GMUE].

²⁷⁹ Complaint at 7–10, *Huawei v. United States*, 440 F.Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:19-CV-00159), 2019 WL 1076892.

²⁸⁰ *Id.* at 4.

individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.”²⁸¹ The Supreme Court has not found that Congress has passed a bill of attainder since 1965.²⁸² The Court has established three tests to determine whether a legislative act imposes punishment.²⁸³ The first, the historical test, examines whether the burden borne by the allegedly punished party is similar to the kinds of burdens that have historically been deemed punishment. Second, the functional test examines “whether the burden is a means to an end or an end in and of itself.”²⁸⁴ To determine this, a court would balance the purpose of the act and the burdens it imposes. Third, the motivational test examines whether Congress’s intent was to punish a given person or entity.²⁸⁵

Huawei argued that the NDAA was tantamount to a bill of attainder because it “singled out” Huawei with the intent to punish it.²⁸⁶ Allegedly, Congress punished Huawei without any evidence of wrongdoing on the company’s part, and without any trial. Huawei argued that Section 889 also removed it from positions of trust and tarred it and its employees as disloyal and infamous.²⁸⁷ It argued that Congress’s reasons for punishing Huawei were unsubstantiated but appeared to stem from a belief that the Chinese Communist Party owns or improperly influences Huawei. Huawei asserted that the U.S. had produced no evidence of its alleged collaboration with the Chinese government. The complaint cited a 2012 report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) which noted that “it could ‘not prove wrongdoing’ by Huawei,” although the Committee also noted that Huawei did not proactively alleviate congressional security concerns.²⁸⁸ Huawei, meanwhile, claimed that it had been transparent in its business dealings and in full compliance with Congressional inves-

²⁸¹ *Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs.*, 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).

²⁸² *See United States v. Brown*, 381 U.S. 437, at 449 (1965) (holding that criminalizing a Communist Party member’s service on a labor union board amounted to a bill of attainder); *see also* Feldman, *supra* note 269 (noting that *Brown* was the last time the Court found a law to be a bill of attainder).

²⁸³ *Selective Servs. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Grps.*, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984).

²⁸⁴ *Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 909 F.3d 446, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

²⁸⁵ *Selective Servs. Sys.*, 468 U.S. at 852.

²⁸⁶ Complaint at 18, *Huawei v. United States*, 440 F.Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:19-CV-00159), 2019 WL 1076892.

²⁸⁷ *Id.* at 40–41.

²⁸⁸ *Id.* at 19–20 (quoting U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE vi (2012)).

tigations. Huawei noted that Congress raised the HSPCI report in 2018 during debates over the NDAA.²⁸⁹ It cited floor statements from members that appeared to single out Huawei for punishment, including statements that Huawei deserved the “death penalty” and was an extension of the Chinese Communist Party.²⁹⁰ In Huawei’s view, these statements provided evidence that the NDAA singled out Huawei for punishment.²⁹¹

Applying the historical test, Huawei argued that a permanent ban on doing business with the U.S. government is equivalent to acts that were traditionally considered punitive.²⁹² Huawei alleged that the passage of the NDAA caused it significant injury, including constitutional harm, economic injury from competitive disadvantage loss of contracts, and reputational injury.²⁹³ It claimed the U.S. ban was overbroad because contractors will now need to choose between federal contracting and using Huawei equipment, even if that equipment is unrelated to government work.²⁹⁴ Huawei would thus suffer secondary and devastating economic effects from the ban. Thus, Huawei argued, Section 889 of the NDAA constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder.²⁹⁵

Huawei further argued that the punishment without trial violated its due process rights. Huawei emphasized that neither it nor Huawei USA have any Chinese government ownership.²⁹⁶ Huawei argued that the ban deprived it of the freedom to conduct business with federal agencies, and caused it tremendous reputational harm, without any trial or opportunity to defend itself.²⁹⁷ The Supreme Court has specified that due process requires a legislative deprivation of liberty must be “imposed in accordance with general rules.”²⁹⁸ In spite of that directive, Huawei claims the U.S. singled out Huawei for punishment without applying the usual rules that it would when imposing punishment on another person or corporate entity.

²⁸⁹ *Id.* at 22–23.

²⁹⁰ *Id.* at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).

²⁹¹ *Id.* at 18.

²⁹² *Id.* at 39.

²⁹³ *Id.* at 31.

²⁹⁴ *Id.* at 42.

²⁹⁵ *Id.* at 44; *see also* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).

²⁹⁶ Complaint at 12, *Huawei v. United States*, 440 F.Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:19-CV-00159), 2019 WL 1076892.

²⁹⁷ *Id.* at 4.

²⁹⁸ *Id.* at 45–46; *see also* U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”).

Thus, Section 889 of the NDAA violated Huawei's due process rights.

Third, Huawei argued that the NDAA violated the vesting clauses, or separation of powers.²⁹⁹ Huawei argued that by banning Huawei from contracting with the U.S. government after a Congressional investigation, Congress made a "legislative adjudication" of Huawei's alleged wrongdoing.³⁰⁰ According to Huawei, the Constitution requires that such a determination be made by the executive or judiciary. Legislative adjudication deprived Huawei of the opportunity to contest the ban through avenues like executive consultation and judicial review.

At the time of the lawsuit, Huawei simultaneously hired two public relations firms to help press its case in the media, tying together the Chinese strategies of Media Warfare and Lawfare.³⁰¹ Both firms promptly registered with the State Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and escalated the public relations battle. Huawei was clearly as concerned, if not more concerned, about information lawfare as the battle in the courts.

Most observers found Huawei's arguments to be unlikely to succeed, if not laughable.³⁰² Harvard Law Professor Noah Feldman commented that Huawei probably did not expect to win the suit but filed it anyway so that it could win in the court of public opinion.³⁰³ Huawei would portray its arguments, and presumably its defeat, as evidence that the U.S.'s much-vaunted rule of law is a sham. Instead, Huawei would argue that the U.S. Constitution was being used as an instrument of lawfare for the U.S. government's own political gain. Around the same time, Huawei executives began to make comments disparaging the National Security Agency wiretapping scandal and supporting Edward Snowden, and to claim that Chinese law prohibits the Chinese government from interfering with Huawei.³⁰⁴ Other commentators have suggested that the law-

²⁹⁹ Complaint at 46–48, *Huawei v. United States*, 440 F.Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 4:19-CV-00159), 2019 WL 1076892.

³⁰⁰ *Id.* at 47.

³⁰¹ Zable, *supra* note 275.

³⁰² See, e.g., Evan Zoldan, *The Hidden Issue in Huawei's Suit Against the United States*, JUST SEC. (Mar. 28, 2019), <https://www.justsecurity.org/63408/the-hidden-issue-in-huaweis-suit-against-the-united-states/> [<https://perma.cc/MEZ4-FFFK>] (calling Huawei's lawsuit a "longshot"); Feldman, *supra* note 269 ("Although [Huawei's] brief cites the Constitution, as written the arguments are barely legal at all.")

³⁰³ Feldman, *supra* note 269.

³⁰⁴ Zable, *supra* note 275.

suit was motivated by Huawei's or China's desire to compel discovery, thereby allowing them access to U.S. government information; or to deter other countries who are considering banning Huawei telecommunications equipment under U.S. pressure.³⁰⁵

On February 18, 2020, Judge Amos Mazzant of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed Huawei's complaint.³⁰⁶ While the Judge found that Huawei had been named with specificity in the NDAA, he found that Congress had imposed a "permissible burden" on Huawei.³⁰⁷ Congress had the right to enact Section 889 of the NDAA, which had the non-punitive purpose of protecting national security. Section 889 was not overbroad, he said, because it "tailors the covered equipment to the types of technology that pose a risk of being disrupted by 'hostile actors' who engage in cyber-attacks and -espionage."³⁰⁸ Section 889 did not rise to the level of a statute that imposes punishment based on infamy and disloyalty.³⁰⁹ Isolated, pejorative statements by senators about Huawei are not sufficient to prove a punitive intent by Congress as a whole. The judge found that Huawei overstated its injury, noting that it "can still conduct business with every other company and individual in America as well as the remaining 169 countries and regions it currently does business with throughout the world."³¹⁰ The judge likened Section 889 to a customer's decision to take its business elsewhere. Dismissing Huawei's due process arguments, the judge noted that "[c]ontracting with the federal government is a privilege, not a constitutionally guaranteed right"³¹¹ Finally, the judge dismissed Huawei's separation-of-powers argument, noting that Congress's investigative function is essential to its ability to make laws and did not amount to an unconstitutional legislative adjudication.³¹²

In response, Huawei continued to assert that its rights had been violated. It released a statement that "[w]hile we understand the paramount significance of national security, the approach taken by the US government in the 2019 NDAA provides

305 *Id.*

306 *Huawei v. United States*, No. 4:19-CV-00159, 2020 WL 805257, at *30 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020).

307 *Id.* at *10, *16.

308 *Id.* at *24.

309 *Id.* at *11-13.

310 *Id.* at *13.

311 *Id.* at *28.

312 *Id.* at *29.

a false sense of protection while undermining Huawei's constitutional rights."³¹³ Huawei USA's security chief, Andy Purdy, argued that Huawei's products had already passed a U.S. national security review.³¹⁴ He asserted that the U.S. should have adopted a risk mitigation program for Huawei equipment of the type that it has for Nokia and Ericksson products. Purdy emphasized that those companies, both Finnish, have "deep ties to China."³¹⁵

2. Arrest of Huawei's CFO

Meanwhile, four months after signing NDAA section 889 into law, the U.S. picked another legal battle with Huawei. On December 6, 2018, Canada arrested Meng Wanzhou, Huawei's CFO, on the U.S.'s behalf.³¹⁶ Meng, also known as Sabrina Meng or Cathy Meng, is also the deputy chairwoman of Huawei's board and the daughter of its founder. Meng was charged with bank fraud and violations of the U.S.'s sanctions on Iran. On March 3, 2019, three days before Huawei filed suit against the U.S. over the NDAA, Meng sued the Canadian government for violations of the Canadian constitution related to her arrest.³¹⁷ In arguments reminiscent of those in *Huawei v. U.S.*, Meng argued in Canadian court in January 2020 that her extradition would violate the Canadian constitution because her alleged infractions were not crimes in Canada.³¹⁸ Here, Meng also appeared to be making arguments that would play to the Chinese public as if Western legal systems were mockeries of themselves, and that would make Canada look like it was in

³¹³ Sherisse Pham, *US Judge Rejects Huawei Lawsuit Challenging a Ban on its Products*, CNN Business (Feb. 19, 2020, 1:11 AM), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/19/tech/huawei-us-lawsuit-rejected/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/DU53-EJQ8>]; see also Steven Overly, *Court Rejects Huawei's Lawsuit over Federal Defense Spending Law*, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2020, 3:43 PM), <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/18/court-rejects-huawei-lawsuit-spending-115838> [<https://perma.cc/S8LW-4UKB>] (last updated Feb. 18, 2020, 7:17 PM).

³¹⁴ Jessica Bursztynsky, *Huawei Security Chief, After Court Setback, Says the Chinese Tech Giant Needs to Do More Explaining*, CNBC (Feb. 19, 2020, 8:37 AM), <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/19/huawei-security-chief-calls-for-talks-after-legal-setback.html> [<https://perma.cc/H8ZM-H8UU>].

³¹⁵ *Id.*

³¹⁶ Daisuke Wakabayashi & Alan Rappoport, *Huawei C.F.O. Is Arrested in Canada for Extradition to the U.S.*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/business/huawei-cfo-arrest-canada-extradition.html?searchResultPosition=31> [<https://perma.cc/25QZ-FQES>].

³¹⁷ Zable, *supra* note 275.

³¹⁸ See Dan Bilefsky & Tracy Sherlock, *Huawei Executive Meng Wanzhou's Extradition Fight: What to Know*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/world/canada/19meng-wanzhou-extradition-huawei.html> [<https://perma.cc/6RZG-D5GZ>] (last updated Jan. 14, 2021).

the pocket of the U.S. if it complied. As of this writing, a Canadian judge ruled against her motion and subsequent extradition hearings have occurred, but she remains under house arrest in Canada pending additional court proceedings.³¹⁹

3. *U.S. v. Huawei*

On February 13, 2020, the U.S. struck another legal blow against Huawei. A U.S. District Court in Brooklyn returned a superseding indictment against Huawei and its official and unofficial U.S. subsidiaries, plus Sabrina Meng.³²⁰ The indictment came just days after four PLA members were charged with hacking Equifax in 2017, stealing trade secrets and personal data of about 145 million Americans, an escalation of other U.S. lawfare against China.³²¹ The indictment included sixteen charges involving racketeering, fraud, money laundering, and theft of source code, conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and conspiracy to steal trade secrets.³²² All of these were related to Huawei's alleged practice of fraudulently and deceptively misappropriating technology from six U.S. technology companies. The superseding indictment also included allegations of Huawei's attempts to conceal its involvement in business in countries subject to U.S., E.U., and/or U.N. sanctions, including Iran and North Korea.³²³ Huawei USA's security chief denied these charges and claimed they are a part of a broader U.S. "campaign to carpet bomb Huawei out of existence."³²⁴ He said that the U.S.'s pressure on its allies to avoid business with Huawei and its attempts to block American companies from

³¹⁹ See Meng Wanzhou: Huawei Executive Suffers US Extradition Blow, B.B.C. (May 27, 2020), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52793343> [<https://perma.cc/9CGM-YNBV>]; Ellen Nakashima & Amanda Coletta, *U.S. In Talks to Resolve Criminal Fraud Charges Against Huawei Executive*, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2020, 3:59 P.M.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-in-talks-to-resolve-criminal-fraud-charges-against-huawei-executive/2020/12/03/4b577620-35cc-11eb-8d38-6aea1adb3839_story.html [<https://perma.cc/U7CD-NTC7>] (noting that Meng was still under house arrest in Canada with additional proceedings scheduled for February 2021).

³²⁰ Third Superseding Indictment at 1–2, *United States v. Huawei Technologies, Co.*, No. 1:18-cr-00457 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) [hereinafter *Superseding Indictment*].

³²¹ David McCabe, Nicole Hong & Katie Benner, *U.S. Charges Huawei With Racketeering, Adding Pressure on China*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/technology/huawei-racketeering-wire-fraud.html> [<https://perma.cc/7QAZ-SAC9>] (last updated July 14, 2020).

³²² *Superseding Indictment*, *supra* note 320, at 33–49.

³²³ *Id.* at 10.

³²⁴ McCabe, Hong & Benner, *supra* note 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).

selling parts to Huawei will ultimately hurt the U.S. As of this writing, a trial date has not been set.³²⁵

F. China's Institutional Lawfare

China has also been engaging in institutional lawfare. China's Three Warfares include defining the creation of law and legal institutions to support its strategic goals. The U.S. has advanced its interests for years as the primary funder of the world's most prominent international organizations, including the United Nations (U.N.), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.³²⁶ China asserts significant power through its seat on the U.N. Security Council, but exerts far less influence over the U.N.'s many agencies than the U.S. does, and gives them far fewer dollars.³²⁷ Instead, China has begun to form its own institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) as alternatives to the U.S.-led international organizations.³²⁸

Most prominent among Chinese-led international organizations is the AIIB. Around 2009, Chinese leaders began to discuss forming a multilateral development bank to rival the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank.³²⁹ This desire grew out of the then-global financial crisis as well as China's desire to increase its role in international monetary policy.³³⁰ Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013, and by 2015 the bank's articles of agreement went into force. The bank expanded rapidly. In January 2016, the AIIB had fifty-seven founding member states. Its 103 members now include close

³²⁵ See Docket, *Huawei Tech. USA v. United States*, 4:2019-cv-00159 (E.D. Tex.), available at <https://dockets.justia.com/docket/texas/txedce/4:2019cv00159/188186> [<https://perma.cc/P34W-PD7A>] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).

³²⁶ On the U.S.'s role in the creation and running of these organizations, see MARK MAZOWER, *GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA, 1815 TO THE PRESENT* 343–377 (2013).

³²⁷ See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY & DARREN J. LIM, BROOKINGS INST., *CHINA'S EMERGING INSTITUTIONAL STATECRAFT: THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COUNTER-HEGEMONY* 7–9 (2017), available at <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/92HC-88M9>] (describing China's role in international institutions).

³²⁸ See *id.* at 2.

³²⁹ Mike Callaghan & Paul Hubbard, *The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road*, 9 CHINA ECON. J. 116, 121 (2016).

³³⁰ See generally IKENBERRY & LIM, *supra* note 327, at 10–11 (providing an overview on the AIIB's history and purpose).

allies of the U.S. from around the globe, but not the U.S. and Japan.³³¹ The AIIB is now the second largest development bank in the world, behind the World Bank.³³²

The AIIB's stated mission is "to improve social and economic outcomes in Asia" through investment in sustainable infrastructure.³³³ More specifically, China intended the bank to finance infrastructure that is part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as the One Belt, One Road Initiative).³³⁴ BRI, Xi's most ambitious foreign policy effort, is a vast infrastructure-building program throughout Asia.³³⁵ China has ambitious plans to connect rural China to Europe through Central Asia, as well as a "Maritime Silk Road" that would connect Southeast Asia to China's southern provinces through ports and railways. Many observers question China's ability to fairly administer a multi-lateral development bank while simultaneously pursuing BRI, given potential conflicts of interest.³³⁶

China's ability to form multilateral financial institutions like the AIIB and NDB with breathtaking speed shows both its commitment to institutional lawfare and its potential for using it to wield significant power. China has convinced half of the world's states to join the AIIB, despite its clear conflict of interest with promoting BRI. International organizations exert significant force through "soft law," and conditionality programs

³³¹ See *Members and Prospective Members of the Bank*, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INV. BANK, <https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/55KS-4ESS>] (last updated Feb. 22, 2021).

³³² Tamar Gutner, *AIIB: Is the Chinese-Led Development Bank a Role Model?*, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), <https://www.cfr.org/blog/aiib-chinese-led-development-bank-role-model> [<https://perma.cc/PQS2-G4U7>].

³³³ *Introduction*, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INV. BANK, <https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html> [<https://perma.cc/R5UG-RY6Y>] ("[O]ur investments in infrastructure and other productive sectors seek to foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity.") (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).

³³⁴ MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44754, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB) 6 (2017).

³³⁵ Peter Cai, *Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative*, LOWY INST. (Mar. 22, 2017), <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative> [<https://perma.cc/U4BS-UQEN>].

³³⁶ See Wade Shepard, *The Real Role of the AIIB in China's New Silk Road*, FORBES (July 15, 2017, 5:14 AM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/07/15/the-real-role-of-the-aiib-in-chinas-new-silk-road/#2b79e0357472> [<https://perma.cc/HP6Y-6S3L>]; see also Yelin Hong, *The AIIB Is Seen Very Differently in the US, Europe and China*, DIPLOMAT (May 8, 2015), <https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-aiib-is-seen-very-differently-in-the-us-europe-and-china/> [<https://perma.cc/K3V5-8A2D>] ("The new bank also serves its own purpose which is to lend money to infrastructure projects of China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative.").

by the World Bank and IMF have been highly successful at causing states to fall into line with U.S. foreign policy goals.³³⁷ China will likely follow the U.S.'s playbook to exact demands from clients of the AIIB and to advance its own foreign policy goals, especially via BRI.

III

GLOBAL ESCALATION OF LAWFARE

Case studies of lawfare efforts by Russia in Ukraine and the Arctic and by the U.S. in Afghanistan demonstrate the need for a U.S. lawfare strategy to counter our adversaries' strategic and military objectives and bolster our own. Russian use of lawfare demonstrates how another U.S. adversary implements lawfare in a sophisticated way against the U.S., and how the U.S. has failed to respond. U.S. use of lawfare to support its efforts building the rule of law in Afghanistan presents a positive use of lawfare, offensively, to achieve a military objective. However, these efforts had limited success, partially because of the lack of a comprehensive U.S. lawfare strategy to support them.

A. Lawfare by Russia

Russia's lawfare doctrine is not as explicitly developed as is China's Three Warfares. No Russian term for lawfare exists. However, lawfare is at least implicitly part of the "Gerasimov Doctrine" that drives current military operations against its adversaries. The Gerasimov Doctrine, first espoused by Russian general Valery Gerasimov in 2013,³³⁸ defines Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare.³³⁹ The doctrine advocates non-military tactics over conventional warfare to achieve political and strategic goals.³⁴⁰ The doctrine prioritizes political, economic,

³³⁷ Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, *Hard and Soft Law in International Governance*, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 438 (2000).

³³⁸ Molly K. McKew, *The Gerasimov Doctrine*, POLITICO: MAGAZINE (Sept. – Oct. 2017), <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538> [<https://perma.cc/ED3T-23NN>].

³³⁹ Hybrid warfare by an adversary can be defined as "[a]ny adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives." Frank G. Hoffman, *Hybrid vs. Compound War, The Janus Choice: Defining Today's Multifaceted Conflict*, ARMED FORCES J. (Oct. 1, 2009), <http://armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/> [<https://perma.cc/MF4D-35AH>].

³⁴⁰ Valery Gerasimov, *Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country*, MIL. REV. 22, 25 (Harold Orenstein trans., Nov. – Dec. 2017),

and informational means of defeating an adversary. Updating the doctrine in 2016, Gerasimov stated that “Hybrid Warfare requires high-tech weapons and a scientific substantiation.”³⁴¹ Russia has used law to provide the substantiation behind its actions in hybrid warfare. Like China, Russia uses lawfare in connection with information warfare.³⁴² It uses law to provide legal justification for its aggressive actions, both to its own population and the international community.

Russian lawfare must be understood in the context of Russia’s criticism of international law. In general, Russia views international law as a tool that the West selectively wields against it.³⁴³ The current Chairman of Russia’s Investigative Committee, Aleksander Bastrykin, has claimed that the Russian constitution has supremacy over all norms of international law.³⁴⁴ In his view, international law is a Western hybrid warfare tool that must be fought through social, informational, and financial means. Russia’s Ombudsman, Major General Moskalkovska, has deemed human rights to be a theme exploited by the West to destabilize Russia, and that Russia should protect Russian compatriots abroad as a result. He also defines his role as protecting Russian values within Russia, which do not include international human rights law. Since the Cold War, Russia has spoken out against Western use of international law and called out the West for hypocrisy in using and flouting it.³⁴⁵ Russia has developed a lawfare strategy to defend itself against these Western actions and also to offensively and proactively achieve its own military goals.

available at <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Contemporary-Warfare-and-Current-Issues-for-the-Defense-of-the-Country.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/5AK2-EGLA>]; Ben Sohl, *Influence Campaigns and the Future of International Competition*, REALCLEAR DEF. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/09/12/influence_campaigns_and_international_competition_112280.html [<https://perma.cc/99R6-G54C>].

³⁴¹ See Mark Voyger, *Waging Lawfare: Russia’s Weaponization of International and Domestic Law*, 10 PER CONCORDIAM: J. EUR. SEC. DEF. ISSUES 32, 33 (2019), available at https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-09/pC_V10N1_en_Voyger.pdf [perma.cc/HGK4-CPEN] ((quoting Nachal’nik General’nogo shtaba Valerii [Valery Gerasimov], Po opytu Sirii [*The Syrian Experience*], voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er [MIL. INDUS. COURIER ONLINE] (2016), available at <https://vpk-news.ru/articles/29579> [perma.cc/B3BX-CGVY])).

³⁴² Mark Voyger, *Russian Lawfare – Russia’s Weaponization of International Law and Domestic Law: Implications for the Region and Policy Recommendations*, 4 J. BALTIC SEC. 35, 36–37 (2018).

³⁴³ *Id.* at 37.

³⁴⁴ *Id.* at 40.

³⁴⁵ See generally THOMAS D. GRANT, *AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE: TERRITORY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW* 171–97 (2015).

Russia has a long history of using institutional lawfare. Russia has historically enacted or adopted laws to justify foreign intervention. Lawfare scholar Mark Voyger marks the birth of Russian lawfare in 1774, when Catherine the Great attempted to use the Treaty of Kucuk-Kakarca to grant Russia the power to intervene militarily in the Balkans in support of Orthodox Christian populations within the Ottoman Empire.³⁴⁶ Russia has similarly used international humanitarian law to justify Russian “humanitarian operations” as part of its “responsibility to protect” Russian-friendly populations—whether or not they are ethnically Russian, Russian Orthodox, or Russian-speakers—in Moldova in 1992, Georgia in 2008 and 2014, Syria since 2011, and Ukraine in 2014.³⁴⁷ In a similar vein, the Duma passed a 2018 law commemorating 1783 as the date of Crimea’s ‘accession’ to the Russian empire to retroactively justify its annexation of Crimea.³⁴⁸ This law was the capstone of a hybrid warfare strategy in which lawfare played a major role in hostilities involving Russia and the Ukraine in 2014.

1. *Russian Lawfare in Ukraine*

Russia has employed a combination of battlefield exploitation lawfare, instrumental lawfare, institutional lawfare, and information lawfare in its claiming of territory in the Ukraine from 2014 through the present. On February 23, 2014, Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Victor Yanukovich, was ousted from power by a parliamentary vote.³⁴⁹ Political unrest ensued, with the U.S. and the EU supporting the parliamentary decision.³⁵⁰ Within days, on February 27, armed men stormed the Crimean parliament and hoisted the Russian flag.³⁵¹ They similarly occupied airports and additional government buildings, seizing the Crimean Peninsula in a nearly-bloodless coup. Although they wore what appeared to be Russian military uniforms, these men did not wear the distinctive insignia that

³⁴⁶ Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 36.

³⁴⁷ GRANT, *supra* note 345, at 37; *Here’s Why the Russian Orthodox Church is Deeply Connected to the Syrian War*, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/world/heres-why-the-russian-orthodox-church-is-deeply-connected-to-the-syrian-war/2018/12/19/63f60dbe-e35c-11e8-ba30-a7ded04d8fac_video.html [<https://perma.cc/PA9Y-FWLG>].

³⁴⁸ Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 36.

³⁴⁹ Shane R. Reeves & David Wallace, *The Combatant Status of the “Little Green Men” and Other Participants in the Ukraine Conflict*, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 361, 365–66 (2015).

³⁵⁰ *Id.* at 366.

³⁵¹ *Id.* at 367.

international law requires of combatants. Locals began to refer to them as “little green men,” a play on the toy soldiers popular with children, and also a reference to alien creatures from American movies who are not to be trusted.³⁵²

In March and April, these little green men, together with local protestors and the backing of Russian troops amassed at the border, began a similar takeover of majority-Russian areas of Eastern Ukraine.³⁵³ On April 6, protestors and little green men occupied government buildings and broadcast facilities in the Donbas region, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Slovyansk, and more than a dozen other towns. This time, the fight was not bloodless.

Russia used these little green men to engage in battlefield exploitation lawfare. Putin initially denied that the little green men were Russian or sent by Russia, claiming that they were local Crimean self-defense forces. Only on April 17, 2014 did Putin finally admit that they were actually SPETNATZ, or Russian Special Forces. However, he claimed that all of the fighting in Eastern Ukraine was being done by local residents.

Russia accompanied its military efforts in Ukraine with an institutional lawfare assault. A draft law was waiting in the Duma on February 28, 2014 that would have allowed Russia to legally incorporate regions of neighboring states following controlled local referenda.³⁵⁴ The following day, the little green men appeared in Crimea. The draft law was later withdrawn following the Crimean referendum, presumably because it was unnecessary after the successful and bloodless occupation of Crimea. Voyger notes that the timing of the law exemplifies Russia’s high level of integration of lawfare with its military functions.³⁵⁵ On March 16, 2014, Russia again used law to justify its actions by manipulating a referendum in Crimea, in which the vast majority voted to have the peninsula join Russia.

³⁵² John R. Haines, *How, Why, and When Russia Will Deploy Little Green Men—and Why the US Cannot*, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (Mar. 9, 2016), <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/03/how-why-and-when-russia-will-deploy-little-green-men-and-why-the-us-cannot/> [<https://perma.cc/9SRZ-76Z8>].

³⁵³ Reeves & Wallace, *supra* note 349, at 369.

³⁵⁴ See Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm’n), Opinion 763/2014, On Whether Draft Federal Law No. 462741-6 on Amending the Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New Subject Within the Russian Federation Is Compatible with International Law 2 (Mar. 21, 2014), *available at* [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2014\)004-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)004-e) [perma.cc/3A4E-XYWQ].

³⁵⁵ Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 38.

In April 2014, the Duma updated Russia's citizenship laws to allow granting of Russian citizenship based on historical, cultural, and linguistic principles. The Duma thereby granted automatic citizenship to populations of contested regions that met these historical, cultural, or linguistic criteria. Russia also prosecuted high-ranking Ukrainian leaders *in absentia* for the humanitarian crisis in Eastern Ukraine, helping to bolster Russia's case for intervention (even as Russia claimed no intervention was actually taking place).³⁵⁶ Russia then began "passportisation," or distributing Russian passports in Crimea to boost the numbers of citizens there.³⁵⁷ Russia had previously used this technique against Georgia in the contested regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Invoking the terminology of international human rights law, Russia justified these actions under its "responsibility to protect" Russian citizens as well as the right to self-determination.³⁵⁸

Few in the international community have given much credence to Russia's legal justifications for its interventions in Ukraine.³⁵⁹ However, Russia's institutional and instrumental lawfare nonetheless serves to undermine the international legal regimes designed to prevent such actions.³⁶⁰ Russian battlefield exploitation lawfare tactics in Ukraine, too, complicate compliance with international humanitarian law. Russia likely wished to have plausible deniability for the little green men's actions. If Ukrainian troops had fired on the little green men, Russia would have been able to both deny its involvement and to point a finger at Ukraine for targeting civilians. Sending in little green men instead of SPETNATZ in regular uniforms thus lessened the risk of escalation and made the optics of the conflict look less aggressive. Russia also blurred the lines of whether any conflict could be seen as an international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict, further complicating the legality of any military actions by Ukraine or foreign interventions.³⁶¹ Russia's battlefield exploitation lawfare tac-

³⁵⁶ *Id.* at 39.

³⁵⁷ *Id.* at 38–39.

³⁵⁸ *Id.* at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).

³⁵⁹ See Aaron Akinyemi, *Ukraine Crisis: World Leaders React to Unfolding Disaster in Crimea*, INT'L BUS. TIMES, <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ukraine-crisis-world-leaders-react-unfolding-crisis-crimea-1438553> [https://perma.cc/ZNL8-GUQ5] (last updated Mar. 2, 2014, 11:42 AM).

³⁶⁰ Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 38.

³⁶¹ See generally Reeves & Wallace, *supra* note 349, at 372–83 (analyzing how the Ukraine hostilities were both international and non-international armed conflicts—existing in parallel).

tics bear strong similarities to China's use of the sometimes-civilian PAFMM.

2. *Russian Instrumental and Institutional Lawfare in the Arctic*

Russian lawfare threatens to undermine global cooperation in the Arctic. The eight states with territory above the Arctic Circle—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S.—signed the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, establishing a framework for cooperative governance through the Arctic Council and agreeing to decide all disputes by consensus.³⁶² The Arctic Council has been a model for global cooperation, with member states working to establish rules of the game on issues like pollution, shipping, climate change, search-and-rescue infrastructure, and security coordination.³⁶³ Most importantly, the coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.) agreed to rely on UNCLOS for the demarcation of maritime boundaries and settlement of territorial disputes in the region.³⁶⁴ All Arctic countries except Norway, however, have opted out of UNCLOS's binding dispute resolution provisions.³⁶⁵

In 2013, Russia issued "The Strategy of Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring National Security up to 2020."³⁶⁶ The goal of this strategy was to en-

³⁶² See ARCTIC COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL ¶ 7 (Sept. 19, 1996) available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y [perma.cc/F54P-2KTK].

³⁶³ See ARCTIC COUNCIL, NUUK DECLARATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE SEVENTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (May 12, 2011), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/92/07_nuuk_declaration_2011_signed.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [perma.cc/5GQ9-U45Q] (agreeing to various solutions to approach climate change, indigenous populations, and scientific testing in the Arctic); ARCTIC COUNCIL, ILULISSAT DECLARATION (May 28, 2008) available at <https://arcticportal.org/images/stories/pdf/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf> [perma.cc/3XAS-9D5F] (declaring an intent to cooperate in reducing pollution in the Arctic Ocean).

³⁶⁴ EKATERINA KLIMENKO, RUSSIA'S ARCTIC SECURITY POLICY: STILL QUIET IN THE HIGH NORTH? 6 (Stockholm Int'l Peace Res. Inst. Pol'y Paper 45, 2016), available at <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIPP45.pdf> [https://perma.cc/JLH9-F38V].

³⁶⁵ Thomas C. Farrens, *Shrinking Ice, Growing Problems: Why We Must Act Now to Solve Emerging Problems Posed by an Ice-Free Arctic*, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 655, 671, 678 (2010); see also Sascha-Dov Bachmann & Andr[é]s B. Mu[ñ]oz Mosquera, *Current Developments: Battleground Arctica and Lawfare Opportunities*, 108 AMICUS CURIAE 19, 20 (2016) ("Article 298 allows nations to opt out (all Arctic nations except Norway have exercised this option) of the binding dispute resolution provisions . . .").

³⁶⁶ Bachmann & Mu[ñ]oz Mosquera, *supra* note 365, at 21.

force Russia's sovereignty and reinforce its military capabilities in the Arctic.³⁶⁷ Russia began to build up forces and bases in the Arctic region. Arctic Council Cooperation began to wither as a result, just as tensions began to fester over Russia's actions in Ukraine.³⁶⁸ Sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union against Russia ended a period of collaboration between Russian and Western oil companies in the Arctic, forcing Russia to suspend projects and scramble to find viable partners at precisely the moment that plummeting oil revenues put Russia's resource-driven economy in peril.³⁶⁹ Russia continued to build up its forces in the region and engage in lawfare to assert claims to sovereignty over large swaths of the Arctic.³⁷⁰ It also passed domestic legislation to support its sovereignty over the region. Russia has thus ensured that any Western interference in its Arctic activities will violate its domestic law and positioned itself to argue that such interference violates international law, as well. Bachmann and Mosquera Muñoz call this strategy "time bomb" lawfare.³⁷¹

a. *Drawing Straight Baselines to Claim the Northern Sea Route*

One major Russian strategic interest in the Arctic is the Northern Sea Route (NSR): the path through the Arctic Sea running from the Barents Sea in the West to the Bering Strait in the East.³⁷² The NSR connects manufacturing centers in East Asia with consumer markets in Europe. The NSR has several advantages over the better-traveled southern shipping route through the Suez Canal: it avoids congestion in the Strait of Malacca, piracy in the Horn of Africa, and ongoing geopolitical instability in the Middle East, and can potentially shave weeks off of transit times.³⁷³ This strategic potential, especially as an easy conduit to move Arctic oil and gas to both Western and Eastern markets, has made the NSR a significant focus of Russia's lawfare efforts.

³⁶⁷ *Id.*

³⁶⁸ Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, *The Ukraine Crisis Moves North. Is Arctic Conflict Spill-Over Driven by Material Interests?*, 53 POLAR REC. 1, 1 (2017).

³⁶⁹ KLIMENKO, *supra* note 364, at 7–8.

³⁷⁰ Bachmann & Muñoz Mosquera, *supra* note 365, at 21.

³⁷¹ *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

³⁷² L.G., *What is the Northern Sea Route?*, ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Sept. 24, 2018), <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/09/24/what-is-the-northern-sea-route> [<https://perma.cc/6AD9-7JMQ>].

³⁷³ *Id.*; Voyger *supra* note 342, at 39, 42.

Russia has used instrumental lawfare to assert sovereignty over much of the NSR. To do so, it interprets UNCLOS to its advantage. Using the concept of the straight baseline, Russia has attempted to enlarge the domain of its territorial sea using lines that connect the dots around several island groups off the Arctic Coast.³⁷⁴ Under UNCLOS, straight baselines are technically only available to archipelagic states, and in cases of small island chains in the “immediate vicinity” of states’ coastlines.³⁷⁵ Russia bases its claims on three large archipelagos, Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, and the New Siberian Islands, that are located some twenty miles off the Russian coast—straining the term “immediate vicinity.”³⁷⁶ By asserting that these straits are Russian-internal waters, Russia can use them as choke points and effectively exercise complete control over the NSR. Russia can restrict entry, charge steep transit tariffs, and impose stringent regulations on shipping vessels.³⁷⁷

The U.S. and EU have argued that Russia’s straight baselines are incompatible with international law, and that UNCLOS’s regime on international navigation trumps any Russian claim to control over the straits.³⁷⁸ Russia counters that the straits are not used by other states with sufficient frequency for international transit rules to apply.³⁷⁹ This claim has not been resolved; indeed, it has been outstanding since 1963, when the U.S. and USSR exchanged diplomatic protests after a U.S. survey of the Laptev Sea.³⁸⁰ The persistent American objection may be enough to prevent the Russian claim from solidifying, especially given the Arctic Council’s rules on unanimity in decision-making. However, the U.S.’ legal position presents other challenges. The U.S. must effectively argue that UNCLOS’s rules regarding transit passage represent a codification of pre-

³⁷⁴ See EUROPEAN COMM’N, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCTIC SHIPPING: SUMMARY REPORT 7, 16 (2010).

³⁷⁵ UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at art. 7 § 1.

³⁷⁶ See *Russia: Straight Baseline Claim*, U.S. NAVY: JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, <https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/RussiaChart.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/EHL4-N88C>].

³⁷⁷ *Cf.* EUROPEAN COMM’N, *supra* note 374, at 7 (noting that Canada could exclude entry into its waters if it applied a similar assertion to its own Northwest Passage).

³⁷⁸ See *id.* at 8, 13.

³⁷⁹ *Id.* at 8.

³⁸⁰ Andrey A. Todorov, *The Russia-USA Legal Dispute over the Straits of the Northern Sea Route and Similar Case of the Northwest Passage*, 29 ARCTIC & N. 62, 62–64 (2017). Canada has attempted to assert straight baselines in its own Northwest Passage, and thus generally supports Russia in the NSR dispute. See *id.* at 71–73.

existing customary international law. Both Russia and Canada, both members of the Arctic Council, dispute this claim.³⁸¹

b. *Using Pollution and Shipping Regulations to Control the Northern Sea Route*

Russia has also attempted to exercise significant control over the NSR through instrumental lawfare by instituting strict regulations on pollution and shipping safety. These efforts rely on Article 234 of UNCLOS, which grants states the ability to regulate pollution, including indirect pollution prevention by way of safety and navigation rules to lower the risk of accidents and oil spills, in ice-covered parts of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), “where particularly severe climatic conditions . . . create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.”³⁸² Russia uses this rule to its advantage in the NSR, applying regulations that are significantly stronger than the “‘generally accepted international rules and standards’ (GAIRAS).”³⁸³ These rules include mandatory insurance and ice-breaker escorts (both of which are expensive and exclusively controlled by Russia), as well as requirements for state approval and carrying of state pilots.³⁸⁴

This instrumental lawfare effectively allows Russia to exclude foreign military and government vessels, and to blur the boundary between the territorial sea and the EEZ, effectively allowing Russia to assert stringent control over a vastly larger area of the NSR than UNCLOS would permit.³⁸⁵ Once again, an impasse exists between U.S. claims that transit passage rules trump any right Russia has under Article 234, and Russian responses that the U.S. lacks any basis to claim transit passage rights in the NSR under UNCLOS or customary law.³⁸⁶ Indeed, until shipping through the NSR becomes a major factor in global trade, which is unlikely to occur until oil prices rise

³⁸¹ *Id.* at 68.

³⁸² UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at art. 234.

³⁸³ EUROPEAN COMM’N, *supra* note 374, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).

³⁸⁴ *Id.* at 16.

³⁸⁵ Andr[é]s B. Mu[ñ]oz Mosquera & Sascha-Dov Bachmann, *Russia’s Lawfare in the Arctic*, 17-1 OPERATIONAL L.Q. 13, 14–15 (2016).

³⁸⁶ EUROPEAN COMM’N, *supra* note 374, at 18.

significantly, this dispute will likely remain unresolved.³⁸⁷ Meanwhile, Russia continues to build military bases and search-and-rescue capacity on its Arctic coast to strengthen its claims to sovereignty in the NSR.³⁸⁸ It has also held snap military exercises in the region, in violation of an OSCE agreement, to support its intent.³⁸⁹ This buildup, which creates facts on the ground, can also be considered a lawfare “time bomb.”³⁹⁰ It gives Russia the pretext to claim Western interference with the NSR as an invasion of Russian sovereignty.

c. *Instrumental Lawfare: Claiming the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges*

In 2007, a team of Russian underwater “scientists” audaciously planted a Russian flag on the sea floor below the North Pole.³⁹¹ Russia thus tried to create facts on the ground, some six hundred miles to the north of the northernmost point in Russia’s territory, where prior efforts to claim the territory had failed.

This attempt followed a failed instrumental lawfare effort. In 2001, Russia had filed a claim before the UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).³⁹² Russia argued that, under UNCLOS, it was justified in extending its EEZ by 460,000 square miles, giving it exclusive right to vast reserves of oil and broadening the area over which it can attempt to assert de facto control under Article 234 by orders of magnitude.³⁹³ To support its claim, Russia cited UNCLOS’s provisions on the continental shelf, which allow states to delineate the outer reaches of their EEZ based on “the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin” extending from its landmass.³⁹⁴ Russia

³⁸⁷ JUHA KÄPYLÄ, HARRI MIKKOLA & TOIVO MARTIKAINEN, MOSCOW’S ARCTIC DREAMS TURNED SOUR? ANALYSING RUSSIA’S POLICIES IN THE ARCTIC 5 (Finnish Inst. of Int’l Aff. Briefing Paper 192, 2016), available at https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/bp192_moscows-arctic-dreams-turned-sour.pdf [<https://perma.cc/4TUX-QRL9>].

³⁸⁸ Muñoz Mosquera & Bachmann, *supra* note 385, at 15; Hege Eilertsen, *Four New SAR Centers in the Russian Arctic*, HIGH N. NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018, 10:09 AM), <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/four-new-sar-centers-russian-arctic> [<https://perma.cc/V7W3-Z5FJ>].

³⁸⁹ Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 39.

³⁹⁰ Muñoz Mosquera & Bachmann, *supra* note 385, at 15.

³⁹¹ Tom Parfitt, *Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed*, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2007), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic> [<https://perma.cc/ET7Y-2T9D>].

³⁹² KLIMENKO, *supra* note 364, at 11–12.

³⁹³ Bachmann & Muñoz Mosquera, *supra* note 365, at 21.

³⁹⁴ UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at art. 76, 77.

has asserted since shortly after ratifying UNCLOS in 1997 that its continental shelf includes the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges, underwater land formations that extend out from the Russian territorial sea and run for hundreds of miles below the Arctic Ocean.³⁹⁵ The audacity of this claim has been compared to Chinese machinations in the South China Sea, discussed above.³⁹⁶

Russia's claim was initially rejected in 2002 based on a lack of sufficient evidence.³⁹⁷ Russia then made scientific discovery in the region a top strategic priority, and developed more facts on the ground in the process. Russia launched at least ten scientific expeditions to gather evidence over the next decade, including the 2007 flag-planting expedition. Russia submitted a revised claim in 2015,³⁹⁸ but it has been countered by Denmark (on behalf of Greenland) in 2014,³⁹⁹ and Canada in 2019.⁴⁰⁰ Canada and Denmark also assert that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges extend from their own continental shelves, thus putting a vast area of the sea and the oil and gas reserves beneath it in contention between all three countries.⁴⁰¹ The scientific validity of the claims is difficult to evaluate, and if the ridges in question do extend fully from one continental shelf to another, multiple claims could have merit. In the meantime, the fact of multiple existing claims will likely freeze the dispute for now. CLCS rulings are strictly recommendatory, and UNCLOS Article 83 marks international agreements between states as the sole format for decisively

³⁹⁵ KLIMENKO, *supra* note 364, at 11.

³⁹⁶ See Bachmann & Muñ[í]oz Mosquera, *supra* note 365, at 21; *supra* notes 92–113 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁷ KLIMENKO, *supra* note 364, at 11–12.

³⁹⁸ PARTIAL REVISED SUBMISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN RESPECT OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2015), *available at* https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/2015_08_03_Exec_Summary_English.pdf [<https://perma.cc/V3XE-HSDF>].

³⁹⁹ PARTIAL SUBMISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: THE NORTHERN CONTINENTAL SHELF OF GREENLAND (2014), *available at* https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk76_14/dnk2014_es.pdf [<https://perma.cc/24TE-E3ET>].

⁴⁰⁰ PARTIAL SUBMISSION OF CANADA TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF REGARDING ITS CONTINENTAL SHELF IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2019), *available at* https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/CDA_ARC_ES_EN_secured.pdf [<https://perma.cc/77XH-SPY4>].

⁴⁰¹ *Frozen Conflict*, ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2014), <https://www.economist.com/international/2014/12/17/frozen-conflict> [<https://perma.cc/ZSE3-24EA>].

adjudicating contested claims.⁴⁰² Thus, a conclusive answer will likely involve a settlement.⁴⁰³ In the meantime, Russia is likely to continue to create facts on the ground to make it more likely that the settlement will be in its favor.

3. *Ukrainian Lawfare Against Russia?*

Recently, Ukraine has combatted Russian lawfare by using lawfare of its own. Ukraine filed suit against Russia in the International Court of Justice, arguing that Russia's activities in Donbas and Crimea support terrorism and violate the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.⁴⁰⁴ On November 8, 2019, the Court ruled that it has jurisdiction in the case, and as of this writing, a hearing on the merits is pending.⁴⁰⁵

It remains to be seen how successful Ukraine's lawfare will be in achieving military objectives and/or setting the conditions for negotiation with Russia. Some of Russia's other neighbors may follow suit. Estonia and Latvia have announced that they are exploring legal options to obtain compensation from Russia for Soviet occupation damages.⁴⁰⁶ Russia will likely attempt to spin Ukraine's use of the ICJ as a Western-backed attempt to use illegitimate Western legal tools against it.

B. U.S. Institutional and Information Lawfare in Afghanistan

The U.S. has used institutional and information lawfare to support its efforts in Afghanistan. The U.S. established a Rule of Law Field Force in Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) in September

⁴⁰² UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at art. 83; *Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Purpose, Functions and Sessions*, UNITED NATIONS: OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.un.org/Depts//los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm [<https://perma.cc/633U-EQAD>] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).

⁴⁰³ Iuchi Yumiko & Usui Asano, *The Functions and Work of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: How It Responds to Disputed Island Claims Among Coastal States*, THE SASAKAWA PEACE FOUNDATION: REV. ISLAND STUD. (Sept. 19, 2013), <https://www.spf.org/islandstudies/readings/b00005.html> [<https://perma.cc/HA2M-UWK3>]; *see* UNCLOS, *supra* note 84, at art. 83.

⁴⁰⁴ Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2019 I.C.J. Rep. 8, ¶1 (Nov. 8).

⁴⁰⁵ *See* Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Extension of the Time-Limit for the Filing of the Counter-Memorial of the Russian Federation (July 20, 2020), *available at* <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/166/166-20200720-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/MJP2-S6JN>].

⁴⁰⁶ Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 41.

2010 to build legal institutions within Afghanistan and bolster the legitimacy of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts.⁴⁰⁷ The idea behind ROLFF-A was that the U.S. needed to establish Afghan legal institutions to win the trust of the Afghan population and keep them from supporting violent non-state actors instead. ROLFF-A thus served to legitimize the new Afghan government while delegitimizing adversaries through institutional lawfare. Building these institutions would also provide an information lawfare function that would bolster the narrative of building a just and functional government of Afghanistan and building public trust in those institutions.

Then-Brigadier General Mark Martins, the commander of ROLFF-A, defined its actions as “lawfare.”⁴⁰⁸ In building the rule of law in Afghanistan, Martins defined rule of law as “hold[ing] that all entities in society, public and private, including the state itself, [] accountable to laws.”⁴⁰⁹ He further noted that “[t]he rule of law increases in proportion to which the laws are made by a legislature or by some process representative of the people, enforced by police and security forces that themselves follow the law, and interpreted and applied by judges who are evenhanded, honest, and independent.”⁴¹⁰ Use of lawfare—including portraying U.S. efforts as legal—creates a legitimacy and authority for the Afghan government that the enemy cannot match.⁴¹¹ People generally prefer a government that adheres to the rule of law.⁴¹² However, this only applies if the government has legitimacy: both the power to protect its people and the authority to do so.

⁴⁰⁷ SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTRUCTION, RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: U.S. AGENCIES LACK A STRATEGY AND CANNOT FULLY DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAMS COSTING MORE THAN \$1 BILLION 10 (2015) [hereinafter SIGAR Report].

⁴⁰⁸ Mark Martins, *Lawfare: So Are We Waging It?*, LAWFARE (Nov. 25, 2010, 12:01 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-so-are-we-waging-it> [<https://perma.cc/254A-KCBF>].

⁴⁰⁹ Mark Martins, *Building the Rule of Law in Theory*, LAWFARE (Nov. 22, 2010, 7:05 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/building-rule-law-theory> [<https://perma.cc/RDP2-DUJ4>].

⁴¹⁰ *Id.*; see also Mark Martins, *Rule of Law in Iraq and Afghanistan?* HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. FORUM 1, 4–5 (2011), available at https://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2011/04/Forum_Martins_.pdf [<https://perma.cc/N828-5SS8>] (arguing that Afghanistan should strengthen its dispute resolution mechanisms to achieve security, stability, and a strong government in which people have confidence).

⁴¹¹ Mark Martins, *Reflections on “Lawfare” and Related Terms*, LAWFARE (Nov. 24, 2010, 12:01 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/reflections-lawfare-and-related-terms> [<https://perma.cc/HPD9-SV7J>].

⁴¹² Martins, *supra* note 408.

Building the rule of law and legal institutions was thus considered a powerful weapon. ROLFF-A was deployed in the area where the Pashtun insurgency was the strongest. ROLFF-A had four primary objectives in ten provinces: “(1) develop human capacity, (2) build sustainable infrastructure, (3) facilitate justice sector security, and (4) promote awareness of the law and access to justice.”⁴¹³ Specific activities included improving judicial infrastructure, training judges and law enforcement, and public outreach regarding law and trials. They also improved criminal justice capacity, dispute resolution services, and anti-corruption institutions.⁴¹⁴ ROLFF-A also prioritized emphasizing the legality of other U.S. COIN actions, including “conventional warfare, counterterror operations, security force capacity building, intelligence collection, physical security measures, public information, cyber security and warfare, economic development, electoral and other initiatives to connect government to the people.”⁴¹⁵

These efforts served to delegitimize and weaken the enemy’s will on a political level. Professor Ganesh Sitaraman further emphasizes the importance of building the rule of law for counterinsurgency and integrating it into military operational planning.⁴¹⁶ Sitaraman notes that transitional justice, too, can build legitimacy in a new government and help keep infighting from harming unity of effort.⁴¹⁷ By building judicial and law enforcement capacities, and by using those for transitional justice efforts, a government can build legitimacy and win the hearts and minds of the people.

ROLFF-A’s efforts had mixed success. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that efforts to develop the rule of law in Afghanistan were hampered by at least four factors.⁴¹⁸ Two of those were funding-related: most of the interagency was unable to account for the total funds spent in support of rule of law development.⁴¹⁹ The agencies also did not implement appropriate measurement mechanisms and evaluations of the performance of their efforts. Unsurprisingly, pervasive corruption in Afghanistan also hindered rule of law development efforts.

⁴¹³ SIGAR Report, *supra* note 407, at 10.

⁴¹⁴ Goldsmith, *supra* note 64.

⁴¹⁵ Martins, *supra* note 411.

⁴¹⁶ GANESH SITARAMAN, *THE COUNTERINSURGENT’S CONSTITUTION: LAW IN THE AGE OF SMALL WARS* 241 (2013).

⁴¹⁷ *Id.* at 109.

⁴¹⁸ SIGAR Report, *supra* note 407, at i.

⁴¹⁹ *Id.* at ii.

The primary reason efforts to build the rule of law were impaired, however, was the lack of “a comprehensive rule of law strategy to help plan and guide” the efforts of U.S. agencies.⁴²⁰ The report notes that “[w]ithout an approved strategy in place, U.S. efforts may not be properly coordinated across agencies, monitored for alignment with U.S. and Afghan development goals and objectives, or managed effectively to ensure proper expenditure of U.S. taxpayer monies.”⁴²¹ The agencies did not have a consistent policy for the scope of their rule-of-law-building activities. The sixty-six programs that the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice (DoJ), State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) developed for rule of law assistance between 2003 and 2014—at the cost of more than \$1 billion—thus suffered from lack of coordination. The development of a U.S. lawfare strategy could have made U.S. rule-of-law-building efforts in Afghanistan far more effective, and likely less expensive as well.

With respect to ROLFF-A in particular, the DoD failed to implement the performance management guidelines for DoD rule of law activities, including assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of progress.⁴²² It also could not account for all of the funds spent.⁴²³ ROLFF-A never conducted a baseline study of rule of law efforts in Afghanistan, which made it difficult to measure progress. A 2011 data collection effort to assess performance on certain rule of law indicators was poorly designed, insufficiently tied to ROLFF-A’s primary operational efforts, and poorly measured and reported.⁴²⁴ DoD could not even keep track of some basic, easily-measurable statistics. In recording the number of public trials held by province, officials only recorded data for eight of ten program provinces in 2011, only three in mid-2012, and only one in late 2012. As a general matter, performance indicators were measured inconsistently across programs and provinces. Officials cited insufficient training and lack of security support as reasons for this.

The program did have some successes. These included improved security at justice facilities: training, mentoring, and technical support programs such as the Justice Center in

⁴²⁰ *Id.* at i-ii.

⁴²¹ *Id.*

⁴²² See generally, CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 71–187 (Mike Cole ed., 2011) (laying out the various measures to take when implementing the rule of law abroad and building an international order).

⁴²³ SIGAR Report, *supra* note 407, at 10.

⁴²⁴ *Id.* at 11.

Parwan. The latter efforts measurably led to more efficient case management, higher conviction rates, and improved quality of evidence in the legal process. However, frequent staff turnover, lack of institutional knowledge, and lack of information-sharing by the staff hampered these efforts. Furthermore, lack of security for justice staff also hampered ROLFF-A's efforts.⁴²⁵

The development of a lawfare strategy could have solved many of the problems with ROLFF-A that were identified by SIGAR. SIGAR recommended the creation and implementation of a comprehensive rule of law strategy for Afghanistan.⁴²⁶ It would include a common definition and clarification of the scope of rule of law activities that should be conducted by U.S. agencies. It also recommended improved mechanisms for evaluating program performance and tracking funding. It recommended ongoing assessment of the sustainability of rule of law programs by the U.S., and eventually by the Afghan government, given the security situation and persistent corruption in Afghanistan, and the level of the Afghan government's commitment to these programs. As discussed below, having a comprehensive lawfare strategy in place would have solved many of the problems identified by SIGAR.

C. Lawfare Elsewhere

Lawfare has been on the rise elsewhere in recent years. Examples abound, from Palestine's use of the International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, and United Nations to gain the recognition as a state that it could not achieve militarily, to information lawfare used against the U.S. by Iran following its killing of General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, to border disputes in the International Court of Justice that were unresolved through military conflict.⁴²⁷ Thorough discussion of these and other examples of lawfare lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, the use of lawfare by and within countries around the globe emphasizes the need for the

⁴²⁵ *Id.*

⁴²⁶ *See id.* at 22.

⁴²⁷ On Palestine, see e.g., Liron Libman, *The ICC's Prosecutor [sic] Decision to Investigate the 'Situation in Palestine' and Palestinian Statehood*, LAWFARE (Jan. 15, 2020, 8:31 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/iccs-prosecutor-decision-investigate-situation-palestine-and-palestinian-statehood> [<https://perma.cc/3JHT-YC8R>] (reporting that an International Criminal Court prosecutor intended to open an investigation into Israel's actions in Palestine). On Soleimani, see Jill Goldenziel, *Iran and the Rhetoric of International Law*, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 10, 2020), <https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/01/iran-and-rhetoric-of-international-law.html> [<https://perma.cc/KJ9A-W9KZ>].

U.S. to more holistically incorporate lawfare into its military and political strategies.

IV

ANALYSIS: WHY THE U.S. NEEDS A LAWFARE STRATEGY

The U.S. must develop a lawfare strategy in order to effectively coordinate with our allies and other law-abiding states and combat our adversaries. Indeed, the U.S. has already fallen behind in this area due to a lack of a lawfare strategy. U.S. efforts in building the rule of law in Afghanistan exemplify how an improved lawfare strategy could have enhanced and reduced the need for our military efforts there. Proactive use of lawfare by the U.S. in the future would improve efforts to advance our national strategy, reduce costs to the government, and potentially save lives.

A. Using the Legal Instrument of National Power

The U.S. has failed to include lawfare as part of its traditional discussion of the instruments of military power. The military has long taught that the traditional instruments of military power are encompassed by the acronym DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power. Some scholars have expanded this acronym to “DIMEFIL,” or “MID-LIFE,” adding financial, intelligence, and law enforcement to the instruments of power.⁴²⁸ With the exception of economic sanctions, the use of lawfare is not included in any of these, and thus is barely considered as a method for the U.S. to assert power.

Skeptics might argue that the U.S. does not need a lawfare strategy. After all, the U.S. has achieved a relatively successful foreign policy without one. Without a written strategy, the U.S. is not constrained by any particular doctrine in its use of lawfare, and may benefit from strategic ambiguity. However, the benefits of creating a lawfare strategy far outweigh the costs. The ability for the U.S. to coordinate its efforts and better collaborate with our partners and allies will strengthen its efforts and may obviate the need for some military actions. Furthermore, the U.S. needs lawfare more than ever before. First, with more of warfare shifting to the information realm, the U.S. needs to use law as part of its information strategy to

⁴²⁸ See Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton & Hyong Chu, *Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power*, 97 *Joint Force Q.* 121, 122 (2020); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL (INTERIM) 3-07.22, COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS vi (Oct. 2004).

bolster the legitimacy of its own actions and delegitimize the enemy's. Failure to do so will allow the enemy to dominate the narrative of conflict and undermine U.S. actions. Even if a battle is won on the ground, it will be lost in the court of public opinion if the public does not believe that the U.S.' actions are legal. Backlash against the U.S. government after the Soleimani strike provides a prime example of this.

Second, a U.S. lawfare strategy will be more effective the sooner that it is implemented. The U.S. has enjoyed decades of supremacy as the world's strongest superpower and the primary shaper of international law and international affairs. However, with the rise of China and with the ability of adversaries like Russia and Iran to challenge the U.S. by non-kinetic means, the age of U.S. supremacy in shaping international affairs may be coming to an end. Now is thus the time for the U.S. to take advantage of its current standing, reputation, and history of following and shaping the rule of law to develop a comprehensive lawfare strategy.

Third, and most concretely, the failings of ROLFF-A emphasize the need for a lawfare strategy. As noted above, SIGAR determined that the primary reason for the failure of many of ROLFF-A's activities was the lack of a comprehensive strategy to coordinate across government agencies and monitor and evaluate funding and programs.⁴²⁹ A whole-of-government lawfare strategy, backed by expert staff within the government, could have solved many of the problems identified with ROLFF-A. Expert staff could have supported ROLFF-A's efforts, trained military personnel in implementing the rule of law and using information lawfare to support its efforts, and provided expertise to help the U.S. and its allies monitor and evaluate ROLFF-A's accomplishments. It could also have ensured consistency and coordination across interagency efforts, and ensured more security support for civilian activities. The U.S. has standing programs for overseas prosecutorial development and rule-of-law-building efforts in Iraq within the Department of Justice.⁴³⁰ If history is any guide, the U.S. will undoubtedly be involved in more comprehensive rule-of-law-building efforts in the future. The U.S. would be wise to develop a comprehensive

⁴²⁹ SIGAR Report, *supra* note 407, at 10–11.

⁴³⁰ See *Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT)*, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-opdat> [<https://perma.cc/AP66-2B48>] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020); *Office of the Rule of Law Coordinator*, U.S. DEP'T JUST. ARCHIVES, <https://www.justice.gov/archive/iraq/rule-of-law.htm> [<https://perma.cc/S77J-QK8A>] (last updated Mar. 2018).

lawfare strategy now and build expertise within government that can coordinate future lawfare efforts.

Fourth, a lawfare strategy will also help the U.S. work more effectively with its allies and partners. Many of our allies and partners are highly concerned about lawfare and have devoted far more resources to using lawfare and developing a lawfare strategy. Israel, for example, has an office in its Ministry of Justice devoted to lawfare.⁴³¹ The Office of the Legal Advisor at NATO's SHAPE has personnel working on lawfare, which they call "Legal Operations," and convenes an annual conference on the topic.⁴³² More, better, and coordinated use of lawfare can enable mission success, improve coordination with our partners and allies, and help to save lives.

B. Lawfare's Shaming Function

A lawfare strategy may be particularly useful against China because of China's association of shame with illegality. China's reaction to the Philippines/China arbitration exemplifies China's shame at being accused of violating international law. As Professors Tom Ginsburg and Taisu Zhang have documented, Xi Jinping's government has used law to centralize its power and bolster its own legitimacy.⁴³³ The use of law to buttress Chinese governmental power dates back to the 1840s and 1850s, when law began to be seen as key to China's modernization.⁴³⁴ Many felt that China needed to adopt Western law and legal norms in order to modernize and have China compete in the global marketplace, maintain political stability, and gain geopolitical stature. Slow adoption of Western-style law and legal institutions proceeded, sans democracy. Gins-

⁴³¹ The Counter-Terrorism and Foreign Litigation Division at the Israeli Ministry of Justice has personnel devoted to lawfare. See Yonah Jeremy Bob, *Israel Gov't Lawyers Help NATO Fight Lawfare, Receive Awards*, JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 2, 2019, 12:53 AM), <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/israel-govt-lawyers-help-nato-fight-lawfare-receive-awards-600346> [<https://perma.cc/HM73-Z994>].

⁴³² See Charlie Dunlap, *A Warfighter's Perspective on "Lawfare" in an Era of Hybrid Threats and Strategic Competition*, LAWFIRE (Mar. 13, 2020), <https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2020/03/13/a-warfighters-perspective-on-lawfare-in-an-era-of-hybrid-threats-and-strategic-competition/> [<https://perma.cc/9WNM-JWEG>]; Allied Command Operations Office of Legal Affairs, *Allied Command Operations Legal Affairs Conference Held in Spain*, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE (May 20, 2019), <https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2019/allied-command-operations-legal-affairs-conference-held-in-spain> [<https://perma.cc/9YU9-2DHE>].

⁴³³ Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, *China's Turn Toward Law*, 59 VA J. INT'L L. 279, 281-82 (2019).

⁴³⁴ *Id.* at 356.

burg and Zhang argue that, with the exception of the Cultural Revolution years, China has pursued throughout its modern history a program of elite-driven legalization, including a gradual adoption of Western-style legalization. Although the Hu Jintao regime displayed some resistance to Western legalism, the Xi regime has adopted it enthusiastically since 2012, pushing domestic legal reforms.⁴³⁵

Ginsburg and Zhang cite bottom-up pressures from the Chinese people as one primary reason for Xi's enthusiasm for law.⁴³⁶ The Chinese population increasingly considers law and legality to be crucial to the government's sociopolitical legitimacy and the people's support for their government. Ginsburg and Zhang suggest several reasons why the Chinese people place a premium on legality. China's people believe that law improves the predictability and reliability of its government's actions, and that it may also be important for economic growth and personal enrichment.⁴³⁷ The Chinese people tend to be very afraid of government abuse, and believe in law as a way to check this. The population has also absorbed the government's pro-legality rhetoric of approximately the last thirty years. As a result, the majority of Chinese citizens, and especially intellectual and political elites—although not the CCP itself—share a political commitment toward law, rule-oriented government, and adjudication.⁴³⁸ Toward the end of his rule, Hu noted that the rule of law was one of the fundamental demands of the Chinese people, and because of this “the Party and the state must operate strictly according to the law.”⁴³⁹

If Ginsburg and Zhang are correct about the Chinese people's association of the rule of domestic law with government legitimacy, it follows that the Chinese people would attach strong significance to China's following international law. Adherence to international law would seem key for China's legitimacy and success as a state, and by extension, the legitimacy of its government. Other scholars have also noted China's turn to international law and international organizations to bolster its legitimacy, both domestically and in the international community.⁴⁴⁰ Whether or not China adheres to the norms of most

⁴³⁵ *Id.* at 293–94.

⁴³⁶ *Id.* at 348.

⁴³⁷ *Id.* at 352–53.

⁴³⁸ *Id.* at 354.

⁴³⁹ *Id.* at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted).

⁴⁴⁰ See XUE HANQIN, CHATHAM HOUSE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 60 YEARS IN REVIEW 3 (2013) (“Since late 1970s, China has joined almost all major intergovernmental organizations and become party to over 300 multilateral conventions.

international organizations, it has engaged more frequently with them in recent years.

The international community's "naming and shaming" of China as a violator of international law may also be significant to the Chinese population.⁴⁴¹ In an influential article, Alan M. Wachman has noted that shaming China for its human rights abuses in the international community has not been effective, and might even result in backlash.⁴⁴² However, Wachman does not consider the effect of "naming and shaming" in the international realm on the Chinese government's legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Scholars have recognized the important role of shame and guilt in Asian culture, and Chinese culture in particular, which differs from the way that these emotions are experienced in Western culture.⁴⁴³

Researchers have defined at least three sub-types of guilt and shame in Asian cultures. One type of shame, *fan zui gan*, is literally translated as the feeling of breaking a law; it is guilt associated with committing a crime, breaking a rule, or otherwise violating negative duties and externally-defined obligations to others.⁴⁴⁴ Another form of guilt concerns law-abidingness as a form of social responsibility; it is experienced as a response to one's own violations of negative duties that originate from an external source.⁴⁴⁵ An associated concept is loss of face, another type of guilt and shame that researchers have identified.⁴⁴⁶ In traditional Confucian societies, one's dignity and self-respect are tied to one's ability to fill social obligations in front of others. This form of guilt and shame stems from not having lived up to standards or values.

The importance of guilt and shame related to law-breaking in Chinese culture suggests that the nation's perceived violations of law would be especially culturally significant. China's shame at being found to violate UNCLOS in the Philippines/China arbitration is evident in its attempts to denounce the arbitration as a violation of law itself, and in the massive domestic and international media campaigns that it launched at

From a defiant challenger to an active participant, it is now taking part in the international law-making process in all fields.").

⁴⁴¹ Alan M. Wachman, *Does the Diplomacy of Shame Promote Human Rights in China?*, 22 *THIRD WORLD Q.* 257, 257 (2001).

⁴⁴² *Id.* at 259.

⁴⁴³ See Olwen Bedford & Kwang-Kuo Hwang, *Guilt and Shame in Chinese Culture: A Cross-Cultural Framework from the Perspective of Morality and Identity*, 33 *J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV.* 127, 138-41 (2003).

⁴⁴⁴ *Id.* at 136.

⁴⁴⁵ *Id.* at 139.

⁴⁴⁶ *Id.* at 136.

the time the arbitration was filed, at the time of the decision on jurisdiction, and at the time the decision came out. The government appeared afraid of not living up to the international community's standards or values, and thus had to frame its denunciation of the decision in terms of those same legal values. China's strict warnings to Vietnam and other countries considering filing lawsuits over their South China Sea claims also suggest that China is scared of being accused of violating international law,⁴⁴⁷ and potentially losing in an international tribunal.

V

WHAT A U.S. LAWFARE STRATEGY SHOULD LOOK LIKE

The U.S. must develop a whole-of-government lawfare strategy to effectively counter our adversaries and work with our partners and allies. It must reconceive lawfare as part of warfare, as our chief adversaries did long ago. Lawfare can be used strategically for offensive and defensive purposes. It can be used for legal preparation of the battlefield, and to anticipate and counter enemy actions within and outside of combat. It should be used in close connection with information operations to shape and control the narrative of conflict. It must be part of each civilian government agency's strategy and programs, and it must be incorporated into planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. A lawfare strategy must be supported by personnel with lawfare expertise who will provide training and education throughout the civilian interagency and the military and help us coordinate with our allies' and partners' lawfare efforts.

A lawfare strategy would have three primary pillars: developing a lawfare strategy, providing lawfare expertise, and training and education. A fourth pillar would involve coordinating lawfare efforts with partners, allies, and trusted experts. A lawfare strategy must involve coordination and synchronization of lawfare efforts across civilian government agencies and the military. Agencies currently involved in lawfare include the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, Department of State, USAID, Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Trade Representative. The National Security Staff and the intelligence community must also be involved in any lawfare coordination strategy.

⁴⁴⁷ See *supra* notes 249–251 and accompanying text.

A. Developing a Lawfare Strategy

The U.S. should devise a lawfare strategy in coordination with the interagency and create mechanisms for implementing that strategy throughout the U.S. government. The strategy should be developed with regard to achieving particular objectives toward particular adversaries, and also toward general actions that will prepare the legal battlefield or shape the operational environment for future U.S. military actions, or to forestall future adverse actions by other states.

To develop the strategy, the lawfare office should identify circumstances where the U.S. and its adversaries can create or are creating facts on the ground for their future advantage.⁴⁴⁸ It should also identify areas vulnerable for lawfare, such as unresolved territorial disputes between Russia and China and their neighbors, and unresolved claims to Arctic EEZs. China's dispute with Japan over claims in the East China Sea has simmered in recent years, but China is attempting to seed facts on the ground there as well.⁴⁴⁹ China may also seek to exploit "fault lines" between U.S. laws and the laws of its allies and partners, particularly during combat.⁴⁵⁰ With these vulnerabilities identified, the office can then make recommendations on how to proactively use lawfare against these adversaries or defend against potential lawfare by them.

The U.S. should proactively identify opportunities for instrumental lawfare, or legal alternatives to potential kinetic conflicts with its adversaries. It should also identify opportunities for institutional lawfare, such as avenues for the U.S. to advance its foreign policy and military objectives through international law and institutions. Conversely, it should also monitor how our adversaries are using international law and institutions to advance their own aims and make recommendations on how to counter their efforts. For example, if China is using conditional aid through AIIB to advance its foreign policy goals, the U.S. might support the World Bank in offering more attractive terms, or warn target states of China's intents in offering these loans. The U.S. should also identify opportunities for proxy lawfare by the U.S. and its allies and adversaries.

⁴⁴⁸ Trachtman, *supra* note 63, at 281.

⁴⁴⁹ See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., *supra* note 11, at 75–76 (examining China's development of defensive and offensive capabilities in the East China Sea); see also Cheng, *supra* note 36 ("China's idiosyncratic interpretations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), whether it is regarding its claims to the South China Sea or to the Arctic, should be seen as strategic-level preparation for legal warfare.").

⁴⁵⁰ See Cheng, *supra* note 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The U.S. might, for example, commence legal actions against Chinese and Russian companies besides Huawei and Kaspersky. In the past, non-state actors or their proxies have used NGOs to advance legal claims against their adversaries.⁴⁵¹

The U.S. should also evaluate the importance of ratifying international treaties, developing new international legal instruments, or participating in international courts to U.S. strategy or military efforts. For example, experts have made strong arguments that ratification of UNCLOS would positively or negatively affect U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁵² When the U.S. declines to ratify a treaty but says that it will follow customary international law, as it does with UNCLOS, the U.S. could work to delineate and publicize the U.S.' position so as to bolster relevant legal norms. If the U.S. can better articulate what areas of customary international law it follows and why, it can help shape the international narrative in its favor, influence legal strategies by other states, and delegitimize its adversaries' positions.

The U.S. should also identify opportunities for reforms of U.S. laws that restrict the U.S.' ability to combat lawfare by our adversaries, or hamper our ability to proactively fight lawfare. For example, Jill Goldenziel and Manal Cheema have documented how the First Amendment and Privacy Act have hindered the U.S.' efforts to combat Russian disinformation campaigns since its electoral interference in the 2016 presidential election.⁴⁵³ Goldenziel and Cheema proposed changes to legislation, doctrine, and policy to enable civilian agencies to better combat disinformation while protecting the civil liberties of U.S. persons.⁴⁵⁴ The U.S. could identify similar opportunities for foreign adversaries to exploit U.S. law and situations in which law hampers U.S. efforts, and propose and advocate for policy and legislative fixes. Additionally, the U.S. could work with relevant agencies to advocate for the passage of any statu-

⁴⁵¹ See generally KITTRIE, *supra* note 4, at 239–81 (detailing NGO lawfare against Israel on behalf of Palestinian causes).

⁴⁵² For an argument supporting ratification of UNCLOS, see *Seapower and Projection Forces in the South China Sea: Hearing Before the Seapower & Projection Forces Subcomm.*, 114th Cong. 4–6, 49–69 (2018) (statement of James Kraska, Professor, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, U.S. Naval War College). For an argument against ratification of UNCLOS, see Cheng, *supra* note 36. For a balanced discussion, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., *supra* note 11, at 24–26.

⁴⁵³ See Jill Goldenziel & Manal Cheema, *The New Fighting Words?: How U.S. Law Hampers the Fight Against Information Warfare*, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 81, 113–20 (2019).

⁴⁵⁴ See *id.* at 120–69.

tory authorities necessary to enable their lawfare efforts. New authorities may be necessary for the military to employ lawfare and to collaborate with intelligence agencies to do so.

The U.S. must also define an information lawfare strategy. It can identify opportunities for our adversaries to spin U.S. actions as illegal, and work to counter this. For example, if lawfare experts within the U.S. government had existed before the recent strike on General Soleimani, the military could have easily anticipated that commentators—and Iran itself—would spin the U.S.’ actions as illegal.⁴⁵⁵ Accordingly, the U.S. government could have gotten ahead of the narrative and provided substantiation that the strike was legal from the moment the strike became public. Judge Advocates trained in lawfare may have cautioned commanders against making the strike without clear evidence and strong argument for the legality of the strike, given the potential for retaliation using information lawfare.⁴⁵⁶ Before potential combat, the U.S. could engage in information lawfare by publicizing adversary violations of international law, thus framing a narrative to support the legality of its future military actions.

B. Providing Lawfare Expertise

The U.S. lawfare strategy must also involve building and providing subject matter expertise on lawfare. The most effective way to coordinate lawfare strategy and ensure the presence of U.S. government lawfare experts would be to create a central lawfare office. The office would be tasked with developing and coordinating U.S. lawfare strategy.

⁴⁵⁵ See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, *The Soleimani Strike Defied the U.S. Constitution*, ATLANTIC (Jan. 4, 2020), <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/soleimani-strike-law/604417/> [https://perma.cc/A4V4-SHYR] (examining the importance of Congressional action to ensure that the President does not set a pattern of pushing the boundaries of unilateral authority); Rebecca Ingber, *If There Was No ‘Imminent’ Attack from Iran, Killing Soleimani Was Illegal*, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2020), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/15/if-there-was-no-imminent-attack-iran-killing-soleimani-was-illegal/> [https://perma.cc/DU86-CX5W] (discussing the importance of imminence and necessity when classifying the legality of a presidential “strike” order); Rebecca Ingber & Adil Ahmad Haque, *Iran’s Shifting Views on Self-Defense and ‘Intraterritorial’ Force*, JUST SECURITY (July 3, 2019), <https://www.justsecurity.org/64800/irans-shifting-views-on-self-defense-and-intraterritorial-force/> [https://perma.cc/8ZM2-Q97N] (analyzing Iran’s shift in legal understanding of international law after striking down a U.S. drone in Iranian airspace). For an example of how the U.S. could have gotten ahead of the narrative, see Charlie Dunlap, *The Killing of General Soleimani Was Lawful Self-Defense, Not ‘Assassination’*, LAWFIRE (Jan. 3, 2020), <https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2020/01/03/> [https://perma.cc/S5VF-HJDM].

⁴⁵⁶ The author takes no position on the legality of the strike itself.

Part of the reason that the U.S. government is behind in developing a lawfare strategy is that no single office in the U.S. government “owns” lawfare. Few individuals within the U.S. government or military are trained and educated in lawfare. The staff of the lawfare office, then, would be the primary subject matter experts (SMEs) on lawfare within the U.S. government.

Where this lawfare office would be located will ultimately be determined by politics and the priorities of any particular presidential administration. Ideally, the office would be part of the National Security Staff, or an interagency effort, to avoid bureaucratic wrangling over the office’s function and assure interagency coordination. Short of that, the Departments of Justice, Defense, or State are logical places for a lawfare office. The DoJ, as noted above,⁴⁵⁷ already has an office for overseas prosecutorial development, as well as a coordinator for rule of law efforts in Iraq. It thus has some nascent expertise on subjects related to lawfare on which it can build. The DoJ, however, is not typically equipped to deal with large strategic questions of foreign policy like the DoD and DoS. The DoD, as the agency manned, trained, and equipped to fight our nation’s foreign adversaries, is well-poised to coordinate whole-of-government approaches to identifying and stopping opportunities for adversary lawfare, including making plans for military actions. The DoS, as the agency in charge of leading U.S. foreign policy,⁴⁵⁸ is best positioned to integrate lawfare into foreign policy strategy. Given the history of the DoD and DoS’s turf wars and failure to coordinate,⁴⁵⁹ however, an interagency effort may be more likely to achieve the synchronization of efforts that is crucial for a lawfare strategy to succeed. Regardless of where the office is located, it must work closely with lawfare liaisons from all of the government agencies listed above, and possibly others.

Lawfare experts within the U.S. government, whether from a lawfare office or elsewhere, would be tasked with working with the interagency to support, build, and improve their lawfare efforts. For example, lawfare experts could provide tac-

⁴⁵⁷ See *supra* note 430.

⁴⁵⁸ *Department Organization*, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm> [<https://perma.cc/7KRZ-RG3W>] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).

⁴⁵⁹ See, e.g., Josh Rogin, *The Real State-Defense Turf War Begins*, FOREIGN POLY (Nov. 3, 2009, 10:07 PM) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/the-real-state-defense-turf-war-begins/> [<https://perma.cc/A9UR-5BDW>] (discussing one example of interagency conflict between the DoD and DoS over available funds).

tical support for military activities. They could conduct baseline feasibility studies for future lawfare and rule-of-law-building initiatives, rectifying a key mistake made with ROLFF-A in Afghanistan. They could analyze compliance with international legal rulings and the soft law of international institutions to enable the military and interagency to use information lawfare to bolster U.S. efforts and “name and shame” violators of international law.

Lawfare experts could also work with the State Department to strengthen the norms of international law that China, Russia, and its other adversaries are trying to erode.⁴⁶⁰ It can create publications and send experts to advance the interpretations of international law favored by the U.S. It could also advocate for our partners and allies to resolve disputes in legal fora whenever possible to bolster their use.

Such a strategy of bolstering particular legal norms may be particularly effective against China and Russia. As noted above, China and Russia use minority interpretations of UNCLOS to further their territorial claims. The U.S. can bolster the more commonly-accepted interpretations of UNCLOS’s straight baseline and other relevant provisions to influence state opinions and eventual court rulings in its favor. The U.S. can also identify provisions of UNCLOS and other laws that are ripe for exploitation in adversary lawfare efforts.

C. Lawfare Training and Education

A lawfare strategy must involve training and education at all levels of the military and civilian interagency. Building knowledge and expertise about lawfare and the U.S. lawfare strategy throughout civilian agencies and the military will be critical to the lawfare strategy’s success.

1. *Civilian Training and Education on Lawfare*

In the civilian interagency, lawfare training and education must focus on educating personnel about existing lawfare efforts and how to integrate lawfare holistically into existing programs and projects. Some existing programs, like the DoJ’s rule-of-law-related programs, may serve a lawfare function. Personnel in those programs must be trained in lawfare to maximize the full strategic benefit of their efforts. Training and

⁴⁶⁰ See AUREL SARI, HYBRID COE, *BLURRED LINES: HYBRID THREATS AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* 5 (2018) (arguing that Russia and other states are instrumentalizing international law for their strategic objectives and that some of the methods they employ threaten the rule of law).

education will be particularly important to synchronize civilian and military lawfare efforts, especially in a situation of armed conflict.

As just one example of the importance of training and educating civilian personnel about lawfare, the support of the civilian and military intelligence communities will be critical to the success of the lawfare strategy. Civilian and military intelligence personnel must be trained in legal intelligence, including identification of when our adversaries are using lawfare, such as by creating facts on the ground. The intelligence community can also help identify and implement optimal strategies for countering it. For example, tracking Russian attempts to create legislation to justify foreign intervention, triangulated with identification of Russia's attempts to create facts on the ground, will enable the U.S. and its allies to better predict Russian political and military actions.⁴⁶¹ Russia's legislative efforts take time to prepare and are generally done publicly, because of their domestic information lawfare function. They are thus easily observable by U.S. intelligence. Tracking Russian lawfare efforts will better enable the U.S. and its allies to take action against Russian lawfare and related military actions, perhaps by getting ahead of the conflict narrative, or by filing lawsuits of their own.

Like Russia, China is engaging in legal efforts that the U.S. should monitor to determine whether they will later be used to support military action. China has passed laws that eventually could be used to support potential military action against Taiwan.⁴⁶² In March 2005, the Tenth National People's Congress adopted the Anti-Secession Law. This law, by implication, says that Taiwan is part of China and thus subject to its laws. Passage of this law alone does not qualify as lawfare. However, this law could easily be used to justify Chinese military actions against Taiwan if it should move for independence, just as Russia has used similar legislation to justify foreign aggression. The law could be used to counter claims that Chinese military action would violate international law. The intelligence community, or legal intelligence professionals, should monitor China's legislation involving Taiwan and related military actions to anticipate if, when, and how China might act next against Taiwan.

⁴⁶¹ See Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 40–41.

⁴⁶² Kim R. Holmes, *Lawfare, Chinese Style*, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 2, 2012), <https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/lawfare-chinese-style> [<https://perma.cc/WS2U-JPSY>].

2. *Military Training and Education on Lawfare*

A lawfare strategy must prioritize training and education about strategic, operational, and tactical lawfare at all levels of the military. Given the importance of identifying our adversaries' use of lawfare, especially during legal preparation of the battlefield and combat itself, it is critical that lawfare training and education not be limited to military lawyers. At a minimum, military commanders, their executive and operations officers, and intelligence officers should also be trained to identify opportunities for lawfare, and to identify when our adversaries have the opportunity to use it. For example, our adversaries may seek to raise doubts about which nation started a conflict through legal arguments.⁴⁶³ Commanders, judge advocates, and service members should be trained to carefully observe and record facts and work to seize the initiative on the information narrative to avoid false accusations.

Lawfare experts must support military planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Experts can help proactively identify opportunities to use lawfare at these levels, whether through the U.S. or its partners and allies; and how our adversaries might use lawfare against us during combat.

To train and educate service members, the military might develop a lawfare doctrine or joint publication in conjunction with relevant units, such as the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. In the military, training and education on theory, concepts, and doctrine often crystallizes around the study of a central text or publication that serves to state a service's or the Joint Forces' position on a particular topic.⁴⁶⁴ These publications are then taught throughout professional military education,⁴⁶⁵ and the ideas and terminology within them seep into the consciousness of service members. If such a publication on

⁴⁶³ See Cheng, *supra* note 36.

⁴⁶⁴ See, e.g., *Joint Doctrine Publications*, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/#:~:text=joint%20Publication%201%2C%20Doctrine%20for,Forces%20of%20the%20United%20States.&text=also%20includes%20publications%20used%20in%20development%20of%20Joint%20Doctrine> [https://perma.cc/KH76-J8YD] (last visited Dec. 24, 2020) ("Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. It promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations.").

⁴⁶⁵ CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY A-1 (2020), *available at* https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/cjcsi_1800_01f.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102430-580 [https://perma.cc/Y25A-KT5P] (noting the legal requirement for Joint Doctrine to be taught in Professional Military Education for the Joint Forces).

lawfare is designed in collaboration with the interagency, it could be used for educational purposes for civilian agency personnel as well.

Military commanders and judge advocates must receive education and training in appropriate operational tactics to combat lawfare. For example, knowing that Hamas would use human shields against it in 2014, Israel launched massive counter-efforts to seize the narrative.⁴⁶⁶ Israel issued precautions and warnings to civilians in Gaza at levels unprecedented in modern warfare. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) made thousands of phone calls and leaflet drops and used the media to reach Gaza residents in an effort to avoid casualties.⁴⁶⁷ It also called influential citizens and asked them to evacuate civilians. Israel used these tactics at great risk, since it revealed its plans to its enemy. Israel likely wagered that protecting civilians and being able to bolster its own legitimacy and counter Hamas's narrative with evidence that they had taken every precaution to avoid civilian casualties was worth these risks. Lawfare experts can prepare commanders and judge advocates for such battlefield exploitation lawfare risks and help plan to combat them.

Military commanders and judge advocates must be trained to spot opportunities for potential lawfare by adversaries and make decisions on how to counter them quickly. It will be critical for these service members to train using scenarios that require quick formulation of moral and legal responses that have high political consequences, and that may be reviewed by a future court or international organization.⁴⁶⁸

During combat, the U.S. must continue to emphasize the legality of U.S. actions as part of its lawfare efforts. To do so, junior and senior service members, officers and enlisted, must be educated on the legality of their mission and how to interface with the media on the topic. Emphasizing the legality of U.S. actions can engender public support for military actions and also bolster our own service members' will to fight. Conversely, portrayal of our adversaries' actions as illegal can help break the will of their forces if they do not believe they are fighting for a just cause.

Such use of information lawfare can be a powerful tool in affecting the will to fight—the importance of which cannot be overstated. As discussed above, China has identified the will to

466 Mu[ñ]oz Mosquera & Bachmann, *supra* note 75, at 76.

467 *Id.* at 77.

468 *Id.* at 79.

fight as crucial to military victory from the time of Sun Tzu through its most recent publications on the Three Warfares.⁴⁶⁹ The DoD has gone so far as to name “honor” as a principle of the law of war, in addition to the traditional international humanitarian law principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity.⁴⁷⁰ The DoD has done so because it recognizes that service members’ belief that their actions are legal is integral to their being able to serve with honor and maintain the will to fight. Compliance with international law is what separates the actions of service members in combat from murder and other criminal actions. For service members to believe in what they are tasked to do in combat, they must believe that their actions are legal and just.

D. Coordination with Allies, Partners, and Experts

The U.S. must coordinate with our allies’ and partners’ lawfare efforts. The U.S. should monitor these efforts and identify opportunities to support our allies’ and partners’ lawfare, or to engage in proxy lawfare through them. The U.S. should also identify our allies’ and partners’ lawfare efforts that work against its interests, such as competing claims in the Arctic, and seek to resolve these in a way that will not disturb its lawfare strategy. For example, the State Department can pressure Canada and other allies to change their interpretations of UNCLOS, if those interpretations support the lawfare efforts of U.S. adversaries.

The U.S. should also cultivate a network of trusted experts who can assist its lawfare efforts. Academics and think tanks in the U.S. and throughout the world are already studying lawfare. Mark Voyger has proposed organizing these into a “Lawfare Defense Network” that coordinates with a proposed NATO Lawfare Centre of Excellence.⁴⁷¹ The U.S.’ network should be concerned with both offensive and defensive lawfare. Independent experts in partner and allied countries, who are experts in foreign languages and legal systems, will be critical to track lawfare efforts and update a U.S. lawfare strategy accordingly.

⁴⁶⁹ See *supra* note 24 and accompanying text.

⁴⁷⁰ OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL vii (June 2005, updated Dec. 2016) (listing honor under principles in the table of contents, along with military necessity, humanity, proportionality, and distinction).

⁴⁷¹ Voyger, *supra* note 342, at 42.

CONCLUSION

Like the maritime and cyber realms, law has increasingly become a contested domain—much like a battlefield.⁴⁷² U.S. adversaries like China and Russia have highly-developed lawfare strategies. China goes as far as to define lawfare as one of the pillars underlying its military strategy. Law serves to substantiate actions taken under Russia's current military strategy, the Gerasimov Doctrine. The U.S. has used lawfare in only a haphazard manner and has not developed a lawfare strategy or even a point of contact within the U.S. government to focus on lawfare. Because of this, the U.S. has lost opportunities to use lawfare against our adversaries, and lost control of narratives critical to military success.

To prevail against adversaries, and to better collaborate with our partners and allies, the U.S. must develop a lawfare strategy. A lawfare strategy would unify and improve whole-of-government efforts to combat our adversaries using law. If the goal of war is to achieve a better peace, lawfare may help us reach that aim faster. The increased use of lawfare, despite its concerning implications, is a positive development in the history of war. States will never beat their swords into ploughshares and begin to use gavels instead. However, increased use of lawfare can conserve military resources, prevent destruction of civilian property, and save civilian and service members' lives. Law is a non-lethal but potent weapon that leaves fewer bodies on the battlefield.

⁴⁷² See Sari, *supra* note 460, at 5.

