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COMMAND HISTORY



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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

CINCPAC(JC3)
5750
Ser: 00082
20 April 1960

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From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: The Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington 25, D. C.

Subj: CINCPAC Command History, 1959; submission of

Ref: (a) SM 408-59, 17 Apr 1959

Encl: (1) 12 copies, CINCPAC Command History, 1959

1. By reference (a), the Joint Chiefs of Staff established specific requirements for annual historical reports by all commanders of unified commands, and directed the submission of 12 copies of the initial report for Calendar Year 1959 by 1 May 1960.

2. The CINCPAC Command History for the Calendar Year 1959 is forwarded in accordance with reference (a).


JOHN L. RYAN, Jr.

Deputy Chief of Staff
Foreign Military and Civil Affairs
Logistics and Administration

[REDACTED]
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INTRODUCTION

This is the CINCPAC Command History for the Calendar Year 1959. It is the history of a year when the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) was given new and significant authority to carry out the mission and tasks previously assigned to him. It is the history of a year when the Commander in Chief exercised this additional authority to improve the state of readiness of assigned U. S. forces in the Pacific, and worked to strengthen the relations, within his sphere of authority, between the United States and the free nations of Asia in their pursuit of common goals and collective security. This is the record of a year of steady progress toward the goal of preserving peace by deterring an implacable foe from aggressive adventures in the Pacific.

Since this is the first history of the Command, a considerable amount of background information is included to aid in understanding the problems which occurred in 1959. Certain events which took place in prior years are covered, and a general picture of the status of the Command is presented.¹ This information provides points of reference from which to measure the effects of changes in 1959.

The mission assigned the Commander in Chief Pacific in 1959 can be summarized as follows:

To promote the national interests of the United States of America in the Pacific area while deterring Communist aggression in that area, and if called upon,

1. More detailed summaries of the status of the PACOM are in quarterly PACOM Command Digests (CINCPAC ser 0062, 28 Jan 59 (2); ser 00545, 24 Aug 59; and ser 00747, 15 Dec 59)

To conduct a strategic defense in the Western Pacific by exploiting the capabilities of assigned U.S. forces, and such other Free World forces as may be available, in order

To defend the Western Hemisphere against attack through the Pacific, and to protect vital areas, bases, shipping, and lines of communications.

An analysis of the CINCPAC mission indicates that the principal objectives of CINCPAC to fulfill his mission were:

To achieve the best possible state of readiness of U.S. forces.

To influence forces of friendly nations in the Pacific Command (PACOM) area toward the best possible state of readiness.

To improve the military relationships between U.S., Allied, and other national forces in the PACOM area so that they might carry out coordinated actions in the pursuit of common goals. As a corollary objective, to coordinate with other U.S. government agencies in measures designed to support U.S. National policies concerning foreign countries in the PACOM area.

To carry out actions designed to counter Communist aggressions and internal uprisings of Communist-controlled groups in foreign countries in the PACOM area.

To discharge other assigned U.S. joint military responsibilities in fulfillment of his position as the senior U.S. military officer in the Pacific.

This command history discusses developments within the PACOM and the actions taken by CINCPAC, within the scope of his authority, to achieve the above objectives. It is organized so that each of the five chapters contains a discussion of CINCPAC's efforts to accomplish one of the five objectives.

THE PACIFIC COMMAND




FIGURE 1

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF U. S. FORCES

CINCPAC's first objective in the accomplishment of his mission was to achieve the best possible state of readiness of U.S. forces assigned to the PACOM so that they might effectively perform joint operational tasks. (UNCLASSIFIED)

This chapter discusses CINCPAC's activities in 1959 to attain this objective. It first summarizes the changes in U.S. and enemy force strengths during the year. Second, it relates the measures taken by CINCPAC to solve U.S. joint organizational problems, and to improve his command and control arrangements. It then describes CINCPAC's operational planning actions, and reviews PACOM joint training exercises and alert tests. Finally, it reports on CINCPAC's activities to coordinate the efforts of U.S. forces in the fields of Intelligence and Logistics. In all of these undertakings, CINCPAC worked toward the goal of securing and maintaining, for the PACOM, an adequate number of U.S. forces in proper balance which would be operationally responsive to the requirements of any military situation that might arise in the Pacific. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ENEMY AND U.S. FORCE STRENGTHS IN THE PACOM AREA

Figure 2 summarizes the estimated strengths of enemy forces and the changes which took place in these forces during the year. Although few changes in strength occurred, improvements in the quality of these forces, particularly in the field of equipment modernization, improved the enemy's already impressive military posture in the Pacific.

SECRET				FAR EAST COMMUNIST BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1959				N. VIETNAM			
		USSR		CHICOM		N. KOREA					
		AS OF DEC 1958	CHANGES DURING YEAR			AS OF DEC 1958	CHANGES DURING YEAR			AS OF DEC 1958	CHANGES DURING YEAR
GROUND**				GROUND				GROUND**			
PERSONNEL		488,000	+33,000	PERSONNEL		2,843,000	+1,000	PERSONNEL		270,000	0
DIVISIONS		31	0	DIVISIONS		148	0	DIVISIONS		14	0
NAVY**				NAVY**				NAVY**			
PERSONNEL		264,350	0	PERSONNEL		58,080	+10,000	PERSONNEL		2,200	0
MAJOR CRAFT				MAJOR CRAFT				MAJOR CRAFT			
CA		2	0	CL		1	0	PATROL CRAFT		25-30	0
CL		4	0	DD		4	0	MINE CRAFT		22	+14
DD		30	-7	DE		4	0	AIR***			
DE		15	-19	SS		24	+4	PERSONNEL		250	0
SS		97	-3	AIR**				MAJOR AIRCRAFT			
AIR***				PERSONNEL		87,000	0	LIGHT LIAISON		10	0
PERSONNEL		105,850		MAJOR AIRCRAFT				SEVERAL AIR		5	+1
MAJOR AIRCRAFT				JET LIGHT BOMBERS		470	+10				
JET HEAVY BOMBERS		15	0	JET FIGHTERS		1,935	0				
JET MEDIUM BOMBERS		250	+69								
JET LIGHT BOMBERS		610	-35								
JET FIGHTERS		1,782	-34								
REMARKS:				REMARKS:				REMARKS:			
* INCREASE COMES FROM INCLUSION OF HOME GUARD AA TROOPS PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED				* MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE, HIDDEN IN GROSS TOTALS, WAS THE ADDITION OF SIX POST WAR "Y" CLASS SS.				* REEVALUATION OF THE STRENGTH OF CERTAIN UNITS.			
** LOSSES DUE TO TRANSFER OF VESSELS TO INDONESIA AND POSSIBLY TO COMMUNIST CHINA. ALSO TO INTELLIGENCE REASSESSMENT OF HOLD- INGS. MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT, HIDDEN IN SINGLE GROSS TOTALS, WAS THE ADDITION OF ONE DD & UP TO 5 SS WITH A MISSILE LAUNCH- ING CAPABILITY.				* HIDDEN IN TOTALS IS ACCEPTANCE OF APPROX 10 MIG-15 "FARMERS" PROBABLY IN LIEU OF A LIKE NUMBER OF MIG-15's				* REEVALUATION OF UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS: ** MAJOR UNREFLECTED CHANGE IS QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF NAVAL FORCES AND DEFINITE SEPARATION FROM THE ARMY			
*** REASSESSMENT. NOTE THAT OVERALL JET TOTAL REMAINS CONSTANT.								* NO SIGNIFICANT NUMERICAL CHANGE, BUT PROBABLE COMPLETION OF SOME PILOT TRAINING IN BLOC AREAS.			

SECRET

FIGURE 2

SECRET				PACOM MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1959			
		PACFLT		USARPAC		PACAF	
		AS OF DEC 1958	CHANGES DURING YEAR			AS OF DEC 1958	CHANGES DURING YEAR
NUMBERED FLEETS		2	0	ARMY HQ		2	0
ATTACK CARRIERS (CVA)		8	0	CORPS HQ		7	0
ASW SUPPORT CARRIERS (CVS)		4	0	INF DIV (-)		3	0
CRUISERS (CA)		6	-1	MISSILE CND (AT)		1	0
DESTROYERS (DD/DDR/DL/DDE)		105	+5	ARTY BN (280MM)		1	0
SUBMARINES (SS)		18	+2	AIR DEFENSE ARTY MISSILE BN (NIKE-HERCULES)		2	0
PATROL VESSELS (DE/DER)		25	+1	ARTY BN (8" HOW)		2	0
MINE WARFARE VESSELS (MSC/ MSO/MSI)		41	+2				
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS		79	-3				
AIR ASW RONS (VP)		15	0				
AEW RONS (VW)		4	0				
CARRIER AIR GROUPS (CVG)		9	-1				
CARRIER ASW RONS (VSO)		4	0				
CARRIER ASW RONS (HS)		4	0				
FLEET MARINE FORCE (INCLUDES 2 MAR DIV/ WING TEAMS)		1	0				
REMARKS:				REMARKS:			
				* INF DIV IN HAWAII IS MINUS 1 INF BG			
				* IN PROCESS OF CONVERTING FROM F8D TO F102A ** 2 RB/WB 66 SQDN			

SECRET

FIGURE 3

There were no major changes in U.S. forces in the PACOM during 1959. Inspection of figure 3 shows that U.S. Army Forces remained at about the same level. The Pacific Fleet was reduced by a cruiser and three amphibious warfare ships but gained five destroyers, two submarines, three small ships and a carrier air group. Pacific Air Forces were reduced by two reconnaissance squadrons. Figure 4 shows the major concentrations of Pacific Command military personnel, by service.

COMMAND RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Unified Command Plan of 8 September 1958,¹ gave CINCPAC greater authority, real and implied, over U.S. forces in the Pacific than he had previously possessed. It assigned him operational command of the major combat units under the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC), the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) effective January 1959 (the specific forces so assigned were identified by a separate JCS directive²). The Executive Agency responsibility of the Department of the Navy for the Pacific Command was terminated as of the same date.³ Thenceforth, CINCPAC was authorized and directed to communicate directly with the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. Thus, instead of having varying numbers and types of forces for the discharge of specific JCS-assigned tasks as had been the case before, CINCPAC began the year with all of the major PACOM combat forces under his operational command to use as he saw fit in accomplishing the mission and tasks given him by higher authority.

1 SM 643-58 of 8 Sep 58


2 SM 741-58 of 6 Oct 58

3 SECNAVINST 5430.45 of 23 Dec 58

SECRET

PACIFIC COMMAND MILITARY PERSONNEL MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS - BY SERVICE

AS OF 31 DEC 1959



SECRET

FIGURE 4

Additionally, his channel of communication was direct to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

CINCPAC received further guidance on the scope of his authority in a JCS document dated 4 February 1959.¹ This paper defined the term "operational command" which had been used in the JCS Unified Command Plan in place of the term "operational control" used in older directives. The paper stated that CINCPAC had complete authority over the operations of assigned forces to include their employment in joint training exercises, and over the joint aspects of logistics, personnel and intelligence. Additionally CINCPAC was given directive authority for all phases of U.S. military relationships with foreign governments in the Pacific, and was instructed to review the recommendations from PACOM Service Component Commanders bearing on the budget. The JCS specified that CINCPAC's operational command would be exercised through PACOM Service Component Commanders or through commanders of JCS-approved subordinate unified commands. The substance of this paper was distributed to all major subordinate commanders in the PACOM.² A CINCPAC instruction prescribing the organization and command relationships within the Pacific Command was in process of revision during 1959 in order to bring it up to date with the new authorities delegated to CINCPAC.³


The command structure of the PACOM during 1959 included, under the direct operational command of the Commander in Chief Pacific, three Service Component Commanders (CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF); three commanders of subordinate unified commands (COMUS Japan, Korea and Taiwan Defense Command); three CINCPAC representatives (CINCPAC-REP Ryukyus, CINCPACREP Mariana-Bonin Islands (MARBO), CINCPACREP

1 SM 126-59 of 4 Feb 59

2 CINCPACINST 5410.1 of 20 Feb 59

3 CINCPACINST 03020.2 of 20 Jun 57, Pacific Unified Command Plan

1959



[REDACTED]

Philippines (PHIL); and nine Military Assistance Program (MAP) agencies: Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (CHMAAG) Cambodia, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam; Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group (CHJUSMAG) Philippines and Thailand; Chief, Programs Evaluation Office (CHPEO) Laos; Chief Military Technical Advisory Group (CHMILTAG) Indonesia; and Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team (CHMEDT) Burma.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Under the unified command of CINCPAC, the Service Component Commanders were given the responsibility for carrying out tasks assigned in Operations Plans and Instructions, and, in a general war,¹ for conducting operations with their assigned forces under CINCPAC's unified command. In a general war, for joint operations in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, CINCPAC planned to exercise operational command through the commanders of subordinate unified commands. Major naval and air force forces would support the commanders of the subordinate unified commands. In the event joint operations were required for other purposes, CINCPAC would establish a joint task force or an additional subordinate unified command. In the event of limited war or localized emergency situations, Service Component Commanders were to provide support to the local commanders or joint task force commanders deputized by CINCPAC to handle those contingencies.

CINCPAC looked to the commanders of subordinate unified commands, CINCPACREPs and Chief of MAAGs and JUSMAGs in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand to carry out localized tasks in limited emergencies not involving combat. In those limited emergencies involving combat,

1 CINCPAC GEOP 1-58

[REDACTED]

COMUS Korea and COMUSTDC had major command responsibilities for Korea, and for Taiwan and the Offshore Islands respectively; but in Southeast Asia and in Hong Kong these combat tasks would be assigned to joint task force commanders.

The primary peacetime functions of the subordinate unified commanders and the CINCPACREPS were to act as coordinating authorities¹ and to provide representation to international agencies in CINCPAC's name, in their respective countries. The former, with their joint staffs, were given broader responsibilities than the CINCPACREPS.

One of the anomalies of command arrangements in the PACOM existed in Korea. Should hostilities be resumed in Korea, the senior U.S. Military commander in Korea would operate under CINCPAC command as COMUS Korea for all contingencies except those involving United Nations intervention. In this circumstance, the senior U.S. Military commander in Korea would report with his assigned U.S. forces to Commander in Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and would conduct operations under the direct control of the JCS while CINCPAC would act in a supporting role.

The executive agency responsibility of the Department of the Navy for the United Nations Command terminated on 1 March 1959.² Directives from the U.S. Government, acting for the United Nations, to the United Nations Command were thereafter to be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. CINCUNC was directed to communicate directly with the JCS on matters concerning planning for the accomplishment of assigned tasks, strategic direction and guidance for the

1 See para 30281, UNAAF, SM771-59 of 3 Aug 59 for definition of "coordinating authority"

2 SECNAVINST 5430.45, 23 Dec 58

operational control of UN forces and the conduct of combat operations.¹ Matters involving support responsibilities and other communications not directly concerned with the foregoing were to be transmitted directly to CINCPAC for processing with the appropriate military department. COMUS Korea exercised control over ProvMAAG Korea.

One of the problems facing CINCPAC in 1959 was that of defining and refining the various command relationships which would be required to meet contingency situations that might arise in the PACOM. This was resolved through the development of new operations plans and instructions and the up-dating of old ones. These documents are discussed in other sections of this history. Certain command relationship and organizational problems which did not bear directly on CINCPAC Operations Plans (OPLANS) are covered in the following paragraphs.

U.S. Command Organization on Taiwan

U.S. military relationships with the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) generated the need for a command organization capable of: (1) administering military assistance to GRC forces, and (2) controlling U.S. forces assigned for operations in the Taiwan area or placed in supporting roles. At the end of the year 1959, these command functions were performed respectively by CHMAAG Taiwan and by COMUSTDC²,

1 JCS 202203Z Feb 59 Cite 955314

2 The second function has been performed by CHMAAG Taiwan and by a number of different Commanders with names such as Commander Formosa Liaison Center, COMFORMDEFCON(US) and COMTAIWANDEFCON(US). COMUSTDC finally evolved as the JCS recognized title. References are: CINCPAC 200336Z Oct 52, CINCPACFLT 200500Z Oct 52, CINCPAC 090034Z Apr 55, CINCPAC 232248Z Apr 55, COMFORMDEFCON(US) 251544Z Apr 55, CINCPAC 112331Z Feb 56, CINCPAC 132146Z Feb 56.


[REDACTED]

each of whom had his own headquarters and joint staff. However, this command arrangement emerged only after a series of changes. (CONFIDENTIAL)

In February 1958, the JCS approved¹ the proposed consolidation of TDC and MAAG Taiwan into a single headquarters designated USTDC/MAAG. CINCPAC implemented the JCS directive on 14 March 1958 that Phase I be effected. This headquarters was to have been the single military point of contact for the GRC; anticipated savings in personnel and facilities seemed also to make the consolidation attractive. The country team relationships and CHMAAG responsibilities to the Ambassador and the GRC were to remain unchanged. Under this concept, the separate headquarters of CHMAAG Taiwan, COMUSTDC, and Commander 13th Air Task Force (Provisional) COM13ATF(P) would have been eliminated; a new joint staff was to have been formed from the former staffs of MAAG and USTDC. Only sufficient 13 ATF(P) personnel would be retained to operate the U.S. portion of the Joint Operations Center (JOC). The CHMAAG would act also as Deputy Commander, TDC, but would maintain direct MAAG channels to CINCPAC and the Department of Defense (DOD). The Deputy Commander TDC would continue in that role as well as Chief of Staff for USTDC/MAAG Taiwan. The major subordinate units would be the three MAAG Service Sections, a Combined Service Forces Section, a Support Section and a Communications Section.

Gradual progress toward completion of Phase I of this consolidation was underway and the U.S. military population on Taiwan was being reduced when the Taiwan Straits Crisis developed in August 1958. This

1 JCS 1259/409

 emergency also coincided with a large turnover of U.S. personnel, to include both the CHMAAG Taiwan and the COMUSTDC. The new commanders had different views on the phasing of the changeover. On 31 July 1958 CINCPAC declared¹ a moratorium on further steps toward consolidation until February 1959. During the Crisis period, U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force units were deployed to the Taiwan area. The rapid developments which ensued during the emergency delayed the effort towards consolidation of the TDC/MAAG headquarters organization.

In September 1958, CINCPAC recommended² and the JCS approved³ the establishment of USITC as a subordinate unified command to conduct U.S. support operations in the Taiwan area. The subordinate component commanders designated at this time were CG U.S. Army Forces Taiwan (CHMAAG Taiwan), Commander Naval Forces Taiwan (Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force) and Commander, Air Forces Taiwan (Commander 13th Air Task Force (Provisional)). To these component commanders were assigned Army forces (less MAAG), certain Navy forces plus Marine units on Taiwan, and certain Air Force units which were sent to Taiwan. As the crisis abated, some of these units were redeployed. However, the three Component Commanders of USITC continued to be used by COMUSTDC for planning and assisting the TDC, in combined training.⁴ On 23 December 1958, CINCPAC recommended⁵ to the JCS that planned steps toward the

1 CINCPAC 312026Z Jul 58

2 CINCPAC 050330Z Sep 58 and 082010Z Sep 58

3 JCS 947808 of 10 Sep 58

4 CINCPACFLT 300016Z Jan 59. Effective 1 May, ATF13(P) and USARFT were released from opcmd COMUSTDC by COMUSTDC 240815Z Apr 59

5 CINCPAC ltr ser 000268 of 23 Dec 58

consolidation be resumed (Phase I). Therefore, at the start of 1959, command of U.S. forces on Taiwan was exercised by a partially consolidated command called COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan.

In July 1959, the JCS forwarded a Secretary of Defense decision that COMUSTDC and CHMAAG revert to separate entities,¹ and rescinded their previous approval for a consolidated command. Taiwan Base Command was shifted from CHMAAG and was placed under the command of COMUSTDC. CINCPAC, in turn, directed² necessary changes in the existing organization on Taiwan to reestablish the two commands essentially as they were in 1958 before reorganization started.

The official reason³ given to the press by CINCPAC for the change was to have the Taiwan organizational structure conform to the pattern established for other areas wherein MAAG's and operational type headquarters were separate entities. The statement elaborated further by noting that the primary functions of the two agencies differed since MAAGs administer and manage military aid to our allies while organizations such as USTDC are planning and operational commands. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Tables of Distribution, reflecting the reorganization of the above units, were prepared and forwarded to CINCPAC in September 1959⁴. The TDs that were submitted called for a larger U.S. military population than that which had existed prior to the 1958 Straits crisis. To

1 JCS 081929Z Jul 59 Cite 962043

2 CINCPAC 240225Z Jul 59 and CINCPAC ltr ser 000146 of 24 Jul 59

3 CINCPAC 010154Z Aug 59

4 COMUSTDC ltr ser 852 of 5 Sep 59 - CHMAAG Taiwan ltr MGGA of 5 Sep 59

[REDACTED]

evaluate the requested increase, CINCPAC directed a Manpower Survey Team headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Foreign Military and Civil Affairs, Logistics and Administration (FM&CA/LOG/ADMIN) to proceed to Taiwan in December 1959 to analyze personnel requirements. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Conclusions of the Team, as approved by CINCPAC, required reductions of 27 spaces from the TDC, 84 spaces from the MAAG and an addition of 22 spaces to the TBC, for a total reduction on Taiwan of 89 spaces.

CINCPAC directed COMUSTDC and CHMAAG to resubmit Tables of Distribution (TDs) based on the revised ceilings,¹ and to effect certain reorganizations. [REDACTED]

Defense of Hawaii

Until mid 1957, responsibility for the defense of Hawaii was assigned to a subordinate unified command called the Hawaiian Defense Command. This organization was disestablished by CINCPAC on 1 July 1957, and the responsibility for the defense of Hawaii was assigned to the three Service Component Commanders. In a letter to CINCUSARPAC in 1957², CINCPAC stated that this action simplified the command structure in the PACOM, avoided the piecemealing of the few major units available in the PACOM among local commanders, and that he had provided for all contingencies which might affect Hawaii in a war. CINCPAC reconsidered this arrangement in April 1959 and promulgated a CINCPAC Instruction³ which assigned to CINCUSARPAC responsibility for planning and conducting the joint defense of Hawaii. It also authorized CINCUSARPAC to delegate this responsibility to an appropriate subordinate

1 CINCPAC 312345Z and 312346Z Dec 59

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 00532 of 5 Dec 57

3 CINCPACINST 003020.6 of 10 Apr 59

commander to be designated Commander Joint Task Force 119 (CJTF 119).

A covering letter to the instructions explained that CINCPAC was making the change to allow CINCPAC and his Component Commanders to concentrate upon their broader responsibilities in a general emergency, and that Operation Alert 1959 would provide an opportunity to test and evaluate the new concepts contained in the instruction.

CINCPACAF indicated that he preferred the original command arrangement for Hawaii.¹ He apparently felt that the arrangements in the new plan would affect his flexibility in the performance of PACOM-wide air defense missions.

USARPAC OPLAN 37-59, Defense of the Hawaiian Islands, was prepared in coordination with CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF. It established planning responsibilities and provided for the activation of JTF119 in the event of an emergency. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Hawaii and 25th Infantry Division (CGUSARHAW/25th Inf Div) was assigned planning and command responsibilities of JTF119, and provision was made for succession to this command in the event that the 25th Infantry Division was deployed from Hawaii. This plan was being reviewed by CINCPAC at the end of 1959.

Terms of Reference for MAAGs, JUSMAGs, and Military Missions in the PACOM

On 1 December 1959², CINCPAC directed all CHMAAGs and CHJUSMAGs in the PACOM to review their Terms of Reference with a view to updating them and forwarding desired changes to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (CASD/ISA) for approval. At

1 CINCPACAF 210227Z Apr 59

2 CINCPAC 012225Z Dec 59

[REDACTED]

the same time, he requested comments from COMUS Korea as to whether Terms of Reference were needed for the Chief, Provisional Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (CHPROVMAAG Korea) (none were then provided him). The proposed changes were to be reviewed in 1960. (UNCLASSIFIED) ✓

During the year, Terms of Reference were prepared and forwarded to MEDT Burma¹ and MILTAG Indonesia.² Proposed Terms of Reference were also sent for comment³ to PEO Laos; final action on these was scheduled for 1960. (UNCLASSIFIED) ✓

CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION, CINCPAC COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS AT KUNIA AND PACOM COMMUNICATIONS

One of the major problems facing CINCPAC in 1959 was that of improving the CINCPAC Staff structure and developing command and control facilities and equipment so that he could exercise the greater authority given him by the JCS for the discharge of his mission. CINCPAC needed a flexible and efficient means so that he could respond effectively to fast-breaking operational situations which might occur under a variety of conditions anywhere in his vast area of responsibility. In 1959, CINCPAC undertook a number of projects to gain this end. The following paragraphs discuss CINCPAC's actions to improve the CINCPAC Staff organization, to develop a CINCPAC Command Center (CCC) at Camp H. M. Smith, to improve the procedures and equipment at the CINCPAC Operations Center (COC) Kunia, and to strengthen the PACOM Command communications network.

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- 1 CINCPAC ltr ser 00591 of 16 Sep 59
 - 2 CINCPAC ltr ser 00700 of 13 Nov 59
 - 3 CINCPAC ltr ser 00716 of 17 Nov 59

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC AND STAFF

1959

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
PACIFIC



H.D. FELT
ADMIRAL USN

CHIEF OF STAFF



H.D. RILEY
VICE ADMIRAL USN



POLITICAL ADVISOR
J.M. STEEVES
ADM 57—MAR 58

G.A. COTTRELL
MAR 58—

DC/5 PLANS & OPS



J.S. RARDT
MAJOR GENERAL USAF
Maddox

DC/5 FM & CA/LOG/ADM



E.J. MESSINGER
MAJOR GENERAL USA
APR 57—APR 58



J.L. RYAN JR.
MAJOR GENERAL USA
APR 58—

Thermer

AC/5 PERSONNEL



G.H. WARREN
COLONEL USA

AC/5 INTELLIGENCE



P.D. WYNN JR.
COLONEL USAF

AC/5 OPERATIONS



E.A. MONTGOMERY
BRIGADIER GENERAL USMC
Ban man

AC/5 LOGISTICS



H.R. WHITTAKER
BRIGADIER GENERAL USA
Edman

AC/5 PLANS



P.D. FOLET
REAR ADMIRAL USN
Siroh

AC/5 COMM & ELEC



S.A. WUNNELL
COLONEL USAF

COMPTROLLER



E.K. SCOFIELD
CAPTAIN USA
SEPT 56—JUN 58



C.N. CHRISTENSEN
CAPTAIN USA
JUL 58—

LEGAL



C.H. HARRISON
CAPTAIN USA

JOINT SECRETARY



A.S. ABAIN
COLONEL USAF
JUL 58—OCT 58



W.D. H. GLONE
LCDR USN
OCT 58—
(ACTING)

PUBLIC INFORMATION



L.C. SIMPLER
CAPTAIN USN
JUL 57—JUN 58



W.C. DISSECTI
LTJG USA
JUN 58—
(ACTING)

PROTOCOL



H.J. WOMPER
COLONEL USMC
JUN 58—MAY 59



F.C. LARUE
LTJG USMC
MAY 59—

FIGURE 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Changes in the CINCPAC Staff

CINCPAC decided late in 1958 that there was a need for an objective appraisal of the CINCPAC staff structure under the then current and projected operational concepts. To form a basis for this appraisal, he requested the Department of the Navy as Executive Agency,¹ to send a team of management experts to CINCPAC to conduct an informal survey of the joint staff, to analyze the major staff divisions and the assignment of functions, to determine the adequacy of Service representation, to weigh the adequacy of the personnel level to provide staff support of assigned functions, and to measure the efficiency of utilization of manpower in the staff. In response to this request, a Personnel Monitoring Group from Washington, headed by Read Adm. I. E. Hobbs, USN and consisting of five officers and five civilian management and manpower analysts conducted a survey during the period 9-18 December 1958. Their report was sent to CINCPAC in January 1959.²


The conclusions and recommendations of the Hobbs Committee Report were considered with care. One of the major changes which was made as a result of the Report was to combine the J5 Special Warfare Branch and the J3 Special Warfare Branch into one branch under J3. A similar consolidation of the Special Weapons Branches of J5 and J3, also under J3, was accomplished. Additionally, many recommendations on measures to improve Staff procedures, and working conditions were adopted.

The Hobbs Committee Study formed the basis for CINCPAC's recommendations concerning a new Table of Distribution. In September 1959,

1 CINCPAC 192312Z Nov 58

2 CNO ltr 7 Jan 59 from Senior Member Personnel Monitoring Group

CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



1. PERSONNEL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 2. REORGANIZATION BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 3. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 4. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 5. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 6. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 7. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 8. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 9. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000
 10. SPECIAL BRANCHES TO STAFF ORGANIZATION BRANCH 1000

FIGURE 7

[REDACTED]

CINCPAC informed the JCS that he would need an increase in the CINCPAC Staff from 457 to 563 billets. He justified his request on the grounds of his broadened role as defined in the new Unified Command Plan and because of an increased workload generated, in part by additional JCS requirements and in part by emergencies such as those in the Taiwan Straits and in Laos.¹ CINCPAC also stated his urgent need for communications and operations personnel to man the Command Centers at Kunia and Camp Smith. Informal advice at the end of the year indicated that the JCS decision on this request would be forthcoming in January 1960. At the close of the year, the CINCPAC Staff consisted of an on-board strength of 220 officers and 279 enlisted personnel as opposed to an authorized strength of 212 officers and 245 enlisted personnel.

Activities to Improve CINCPAC Command Facilities

CINCPAC activated a Command Facilities Development Group (CFDG) on 9 January 1959 to perform the following tasks:²

- a. Develop the command facilities for CINCPAC's headquarters at Camp H. M. Smith.
- b. Plan for and coordinate the development of the CINCPAC Operations Center at Kunia with the command facilities at Camp Smith.
- c. Plan and coordinate the development of CINCPAC command facilities and COC with those of the JCS and PACOM.
- d. Coordinate the electronic computer study program, using the Kunia Study Group for staff liaison purposes.

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 2067 of 15 Sep 59

2 CINCPACINST 5201.1 of 18 Nov 58

[REDACTED]

e. Monitor related matters for CINCPAC and coordinate the efforts of all military and technical personnel employed in implementing these tasks in PACOM.

CINCPAC's general concept was to develop the command facilities at Camp H. M. Smith for use in day-to-day operations and for the control of operations in limited war contingencies. The CINCPAC Operations Center at Kunia (an underground installation in central Oahu) would be used by CINCPAC in conjunction with PACOM Service Component Commanders for the centralized direction of operations in a major war or a general war. Supporting studies were needed to determine the most effective means of improving the communications of these two facilities, to make maximum use of electronic data processing and computing machines, and to design efficient physical layouts at these installations.¹

By means of ad hoc committees, conferences and planning groups, the studies related to the Command Center at Camp Smith and the Operations Center at Kunia were developed.² The principal objectives of these studies were to avoid duplication of facilities and incompatibility of Service installations with those of each other or those of the Unified Command.

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- 1 CINCPAC Proposed Policy on PACOM Command Centers of 4 Mar 59 (JC2C Paper)
 - 2 JOL Memorandum for the Record of 5 Mar 59; CINCPAC 072256Z Mar 59; Orientation and Coordination meetings were held at PACOM Hq 1-11 Apr 59, at David Taylor Model Basin in Washington during 9-11 Jun 59, and at Hq Cmdr Western Sea Frontier, San Francisco during 29 Sep - 1 Oct 59; CINCPAC ltr ser 0465 of 18 Jul 59.

[REDACTED]

On 6 March, Admiral Felt approved a planning study to provide a command center at Camp Smith and relocate the Communications Center.¹ Following this, a major effort was placed on the development of the CINCPAC Command Center at Camp Smith. The original funding request was submitted on 15 April. It was returned by the Department of Defense in August for restudy and resubmission. A reclama, submitted in September to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Properties and Installations (P&I),² was supported by a strong recommendation for approval from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Material).³

CINCPAC requested the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to extend contracts with Technical Operations Incorporated (TECH/OPS) and with Philco Corporation (Western Development Laboratory). He also requested that additional analyses be made by Department of the Navy agencies. These groups were to prepare studies concerning the use of computers, television and other display techniques to improve CINCPAC control and direction systems and to develop analyses of staff operating procedures.⁴

One conclusion resulting from the above studies was that there was a need for an Operations Analysis Section and a Command Center Section in J3. The Operations Analysis Section would include an Electronic

1 Planning Study for a Command Center and Communications Center for CINCPAC Headquarters dated 5 Mar 59

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 0614 of 17 Sep 59

3 ASTSECNAV(Material) Memo ser 0750 of 15 Dec 59

4 CINCPAC ltrs ser 0104 of 18 Feb 59, 0156 of 9 Mar 59, 0148 of 9 Mar 59, and ONR ltr ser 01235 of 30 Jun 59

[REDACTED]
Data Processing Unit. to provide programming support for the entire CINCPAC Staff. The Command Center Section would provide a unit to operate the command center facilities at Camp Smith and those at Kunia. The requirement for these ~~two~~ sections was highlighted as being the most urgent item on the CINCPAC request for a changed Table of Distribution. [REDACTED]

Improvements in PACOM Communications

It was obvious that the command facilities, no matter how efficiently organized and generously equipped and manned, would be only as good as the communications which tied these facilities together, to the JCS and to the major PACOM commanders. A vigorous program was developed by the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Electronics to modernize and improve the communications networks and associated facilities of the three military departments in the Pacific Command.

Using a study developed in 1958 as a guide,¹ CINCPAC took a number of steps in 1959 which were designed to improve the PACOM Communications System.

Steps to Improve the Communications System on Oahu.

The CINCPAC Command Center and the CINCPAC Operations Center obtained access to all world wide on-line crypto networks. This enabled CINCPAC to file 80% or more of its daily traffic on on-line networks, in comparison to 30% in 1957. This provided much better communication service.

1 CATSPAW Study, Pacific Command Long Haul Communications Study, 3 Jan 58

[REDACTED]

During 1959, CINCPAC made arrangements for planning, designing and installing KO-6A Speech Security and Secure TELECOM Equipment adjacent to the Camp Smith War Room.¹ This provided CINCPAC with the first secure voice communications capability to overseas commands.

The Aliamanu Army Communications Administration Network (ACAN) Major Relay Station was opened. This provided a hardened facility for PACOM use which reduced the vulnerability of the PACOM Communications System.

A four million dollar program for improving the Joint Military Island Cable Trunking System on Oahu was completed.² This system interconnection all military installations on Oahu with buried telephone cables.


CINCPAC established the requirement for a joint Overseas Telephone Switching Control to be located at Kunia to interconnect PACOM long haul point-to-point voice radio circuits.³

Installation of two fully automatic teletype relay centers, one at Hickam Air Force Base (AFB), Hawaii, and the other at Fuchu Air Base (AB), Japan were completed by the Airways and Air Communications Service (the communications agency for the U.S. Air Force (USAF)) by contract with Western Union. Formal cut-over ceremonies and systems check-out procedures were completed during the month of July. The equipment, typed Plan 55, was expected to enhance the Air Force Communications Network (AIRCOM) system in handling common user messages with greater speed of service and reliability in conjunction with a formidable personnel

1 CINCPAC 162354Z Sep 58

2 Minutes of Meeting, Joint Oahu Telephone Facilities Committee, 1959


3 CINCPAC ltr ser 00448 of 13 Jul 59


reduction. The systems were operated by USAF personnel, and maintenance was performed by Western Union. These two stations represented a part of the world-wide project for similar systems to be installed at other major AIRCOM relay points.


A detailed listed of collateral operational electronic equipment to be installed in CINCPAC's Command Center at Camp Smith was provided Industrial Management, 14th Naval District to insure support of communication equipment required in operation of the Command Center.¹ Coordination was effected between all CINCPAC Divisions having an operational function in the Command Center to insure that requirements were as all-inclusive as possible.

Planning and engineering assistance was provided to CINCPACFLT in order to accomplish a smooth transition of communications operations at Kunia in April 1960.²

Steps to Improve the PACOM Area Communications System



- 1 CINCPAC ltr ser 00500 of 9 Sep 59
- 2 CINCPAC 142003Z Dec 59
- 3 CINCPACFLT 012215Z Jul 59; CINCPACFLTINST 02651.1 of 28 Oct 59


CINCPAC gave considerable attention to the subject of control of electro-magnetic transmissions (CONELRAD). A proposal was received from USAF¹ which stated that all USAF AIRCOM long haul radio circuits may be operated during CONELRAD alerts subject to concurrence of the Unified Commands. Considering the extremely limited amount of navigational aid facilities operated in the 4-30 mc frequency band, CINCPAC concurred and expressed the policy that the operation of all military long-haul point-to-point radio circuits in the PACOM should be allowed continuous operation in the event of CONELRAD alerts. Similarly, commercial long haul point-to-point radio circuits which supported military operational links should also be allowed continuous operations.

A complete survey of CINCPAC estimates of Trans-Pacific Communications requirements was completed and forwarded to the JCS in October.² This study provided in general order of magnitude the estimates of changes in the present systems expected to occur in the next five years.

As a result of CINCPAC efforts,³ all long haul Joint Pacific on-line crypto circuits were to be equipped with KW-26 synchronous crypto equipment by 1 April 1960 to replace the existing non-synchronous PYTHON equipment. Installation of KW-26 equipment was expected to result in greater accuracy, speed and efficiency on message handling. ✓

Steps to Improve the Communications System in Specific Areas in the Pacific

During July, CINCPAC proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁴ that a

1 Hq PACAACS ltr of 8 Jun 59, subj "Operation of Long Haul Communication Circuits during CONELRAD Alerts (U)"

2 CINCPAC spdltr ser 00628 of 12 Oct 59

3 CINCPAC 230335Z Dec 59

4 CINCPAC 252255Z Jul 59 and 040340Z Dec 59

series of communications responsibilities charged to the CHMAAG Taiwan be withdrawn and placed under Army command and control.

A new concept of long-line backbone communication in Japan extended to Okinawa and Korea was developed by USAR Japan and supported by CINCPAC to the JCS.¹ Briefings were conducted in mid-December in Washington in support of a program to develop a first priority USAF "over the horizon" long haul communications system in Japan in support of Air Defense and Early Warning missions of the 5th AF. The system was under contract for construction at the end of 1959. USARPAC plans to extend the Pacific Scatter System into Japan, Korea, and Okinawa on an improved engineering basis were supported by CINCPAC at JCS briefings.

A four channel multiplex radio circuit was activated by the Army between CHJUSMAG Bangkok, Thailand and Clark AFB, Philippines, providing on-line service to CHJUSMAG Thailand.² This facility provided the PACOM with an improved traffic handling capability to Bangkok. A similar link was installed from Vientiane², Laos to Clark AFB by the Army. It was the first U.S. military communication service into Laos.

The day by day vigorous attention to both the overall problem and the mass of technical details paid off in terms of significant operational improvements. The CINCPAC standard of service for operational immediate and higher precedence messages, 30 minutes total handling time, was being approached between major echelons. A jointly orientated

1 CINCPAC 042322Z Dec 59

2 ADMINO CINCPAC 260245Z Sep 59

[REDACTED]

communications concept was becoming a reality without interference with the unique and special needs of the several services. 1959 could be looked back upon as a turning point in which U.S. military communications in the Pacific became focused upon unification and integration.

CINCPAC OPERATIONS PLANNING



Among other considerations influencing the preparation of CINCPAC OPLANS were the characteristics of the PACOM area and the capabilities and characteristics of enemy, U.S., and friendly forces. The vast PACOM area (largest U.S. unified command area) was mainly oceanic. On its outer periphery were located governments which were in sympathy with the Free World. These governments were located on the two major peninsulas on the Asian continent, South Korea and Southeast Asia, and on an island chain running from the Aleutians down through Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines to Indonesia. CINCPAC OPLANS had to balance the

**PACIFIC COMMAND
PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS PLANS
—1959—**

TASKS	DIRECTIVE	CINCPAC PLAN		REMARKS
		NUMBER	TITLE	
1. DEFEND THE U.S. IN A GENERAL WAR AGAINST ATTACK THROUGH THE PACIFIC, BY MAINTAINING A FORWARD STRATEGY ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.	JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)	1-58	GENERAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN	MILITARY FORCES OF THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. MUST BE OVERTLY ENGAGED
2. ASSIST THE BRITISH IN THE EVACUATION OF HONG KONG.	JSCP	23-57	EVACUATION OF HONG KONG	PROVIDES MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE BRITISH IN THE EVACUATION OF HONG KONG.
3. DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PENGUIN.	JSCP	25-58	DEFENSE OF TAIWAN	IN PHASE I-PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE IN 1959.
4. DEFEND IN KOREA.	JSCP	27-58	RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES IN KOREA.	
5. BE PREPARED TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.	JSCP	32-58	DEFENSE OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA.	PLAN IS FOR MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA ONLY. PROMULGATED IN DECEMBER 1959.
6. IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT, PROTECT AND EVACUATE U.S. SPONSORED NONCOMBATANTS.	JSCP SM 643-58	60-58	PROTECTION AND EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS.	
7. BE PREPARED TO BLOCKADE THE CHINA COAST.	JSCP	44-58	BLOCKADE OF THE CHINA COAST.	
8. BE PREPARED TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.	JSCP SM 582-58	46-58 46A-57	DEFENSE OF VIETNAM.	
9. BE PREPARED TO COUNTER COMMUNIST INTERNAL UPRISINGS IN INDONESIA.	JSCP	53-58	ACTION AGAINST COMMUNISTS IN INDONESIA.	
10. DEVELOP A REQUIREMENTS PLAN FOR THE AIR DEFENSE OF THE PACOM.	JCS SM-9-57	19-57	JOINT AIR DEFENSE OBJECTIVES PLAN.	PROVIDES OBJECTIVES IN THE PERIOD 1 JULY 1957 THROUGH 1 JULY 1961
11. ASSIST LAOTIAN FORCES TO PREVENT THE COMMUNISTS FROM SEIZING CONTROL.	JSCP	5211/59	INSURGENCY PHASE LAOS.	PARALLELS PHASE II, (LAOS) CINCPAC OPLAN 32-58.

FIGURE 8

lack of depth in the forward land areas to be defended by exploiting the mobility and flexibility of U.S. forces. The plans had to provide means for logistic support of U.S. forces operating at great distances from the Continental United States (CONUS) and in the face of a shortage of forward, U.S.-controlled base areas, communications facilities and command post sites. War planning was further complicated by austere U.S. force ceilings, the differing capabilities of friendly forces, the need for adaptability under the terms of international security arrangements varying from the formative to the firm, the expanding strength and widening capabilities of the Communists, and the complexities inherent in a U.S. tri-Service organization. CINCPAC's planning activities in 1959 were directed toward translating, in the light of the above considerations, the JCS-assigned forward strategy mission into CINCPAC OPLANS.

Concept of a Family of Plans

The number of CINCPAC OPLANS in 1959 averaged 15.¹ The principal ones are shown in figure 8. Of the 15 plans, one was for a general war, 8 were for limited wars, and 6 were miscellaneous plans.

Although the various limited war plans dealt with contingencies which might occur about the perimeter of Communist China (CHICOM) and in which the CHICOMs might be involved, there was no single plan for a war with Communist China. Late in 1958, CINCPAC approved the concept of developing such a plan and initial drafts were prepared. As the China OPLAN developed and as the work on the Cold War Plan progressed, the concept of reducing the number of CINCPAC OPLANS took form.

1 CINCPACINST 003020.1A of 3 Feb 58

[REDACTED]

It appeared feasible to group most of the separate CINCPAC Contingency OPLANS then in existence into one limited war plan, and that a family of three basic plans for situations affecting the PACOM could be developed, i.e.: (1) Cold War, (2) Limited War and (3) General War. This concept was not fully developed at the end of 1959, but represented a goal of the CINCPAC planners. [REDACTED]

General War Planning

In 1959, the CINCPAC plan for a general war (by JCS definition, a war in which the armed forces of the U.S. and the USSR are overtly engaged) was CINCPAC General Emergency Operations Plan (GEOP) 1-58. It was prepared in support of the General War portion of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for the period 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959. As no new JSCP for the following fiscal years had been received, the provisions of CINCPAC GEOP 1-58 were extended¹ to include the Calendar Year 1959. The JCS approved CINCPAC GEOP 1-58² with modifications in March and these modifications were promulgated to the PACOM in April.³ [REDACTED]

In 1959, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS two major recommendations concerning the JSCP. A CINCPAC staff study in January 1959⁴ supported a recommendation that the line which CINCPAC was required to defend in a general war should be moved from the Kra Isthmus to a location as far forward as possible in Southeast Asia. The JCS replied⁵ that the changed line would be considered for inclusion in the FY 1960 JSCP.


1 CINCPAC 262140Z Oct 59

2 JCS SM 266-59 of 6 Mar 59


3 Change #2 CINCPAC GEOP 1-58 of 15 Apr 59

4 CINCPAC ltr ser 00018 of 26 Jan 59

5 JCS 271607Z Feb 59


CINCPAC also recommended in March 1959¹ that CINCPAC be required to prepare plans to support revolutions and uprisings in North Korea, North Vietnam and China. The JCS replied² that such a requirement would be considered for inclusion in the FY 1960 JSCP. In anticipation of eventual JCS approval, a plan for this contingency, called Draft CINCPAC OPLAN 22-59, was prepared and distributed in November to the PACOM subordinate commanders for review and comment.³ ✓

Cold War Planning

CINCPAC had long realized the importance of maximizing the contribution of PACOM forces to the national cold war effort. A Cold War Activities Group (CWAG) was formed in February 1958⁴ to coordinate those activities of the CINCPAC staff and of the PACOM Components pertaining to the Cold War. Although the JCS also emphasized the importance of military contributions to this national effort in June 1958,⁵ there was no clear cut requirement for a separate cold war plan. The JSCP was divided into two main sections - general war and conflict short of general war, and it charged commanders to plan accordingly. 

CINCPAC decided late in 1958 that a separate Cold War Plan to coordinate PACOM Cold War activities was required and an ad hoc group from the CINCPAC Staff was formed to initiate the development of a PACOM Cold War Plan (CINCPAC OPLAN 70-59). This group and the CINCPAC Staff developed a basic plan with annexes during 1959. The plan was being refined at the end of 1959 prior to its submission to the Commander in

1 CINCPAC 022331Z Mar 59

2 JSC 042343Z Mar 59

3 CINCPAC ltr ser 000229 of 24 Nov 59

4 CINCPACINST 03410.1 of 25 Feb 58

5 SM 438-58 of 23 Jun 58

Chief for approval. Added impetus to completing this plan was provided by a JCS memorandum¹ in November 1959 which underlined the importance of Cold War planning and directed CINCPAC to prepare a Cold War plan for submission to the JCS by February 1960. ✓


The Cold War Plan was being developed to assign responsibilities to PACOM Commanders to combat Communism during the period short of hostilities. The draft plan indicated that many Cold War activities would be carried out in coordination with other U.S. government agencies located in the PACOM, and proposed to task subordinate commanders in response to selected courses of action which appeared in OCB plans. This concept was discussed with JCS representatives in early 1959 when they visited CINCPAC. Subsequently the JCS notified CINCPAC², in April 1959, that they had assumed the responsibility, formerly assigned to the Military Departments acting as Executive Agencies, for directing the implementation of the military aspects of approved Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) documents, and informed CINCPAC that he could expect directives assigning responsibility for implementing selected courses of action from OCB plans. In November, CINCPAC established procedures for transmitting and handling OCB documents in the PACOM and within the CINCPAC staff.³ Many of the tasks assigned PACOM Commanders by the PACOM Cold War Plan were expected to be in implementation of courses of action contained in OCB plans.

Limited War Planning



1 SM 1201-59 of 30 Nov 59

2 SM 394-59 of 15 Apr 59

3 CINCPACINST 03121.4A and 03121.6 both of 19 Nov 59



A similar effort was being made to develop one consolidated transportation annex which could be used with suitable variations in the support of plans for localized contingencies. Other plans for such matters as noncombatant emergency and evacuation activities, and logistics and communications support were prepared with an area-wide approach so that they could be adapted to the requirements of any CINCPAC OPLAN.



Planning for Mainland Southeast Asia

There had never been an overall CINCPAC OPLAN for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia. Of the two existing plans in that area, one (OPLAN 49A-55 for Laos) was obsolete, and the other (OPLAN 46-56 for South Vietnam) was obsolescent. Therefore, accelerated effort went into the major and complex task, initiated in 1958, to develop one comprehensive OPLAN for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia.

This plan, CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, was a unilateral capabilities plan in support of the JSCP. It provided for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia under conditions of conflict short of general war. Under this plan mainland Southeast Asia consisted of Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma and Malaya. The plan was forwarded, in draft, to the JCS for information and to CINCPAC subordinate commands and agencies for comment in July 1959. After numerous revisions based upon comments of reviewing agencies the revised plan was promulgated on 16 December 1959.

The plan provided for the phased deployment of PACOM forces to mainland Southeast Asia to meet either insurgency in friendly countries in the area, or external aggression by North Vietnam or Communist China. In the event of external aggression, the effort of U.S. forces, in conjunction with the forces of the nation or nations

involved, would be to contain the advance of Communist forces

Insurgency Plans for Laos and Cambodia

CINCPAC OPLAN 32(L)-59 was approved by the JCS with minor modifications as an interim expediency plan "until such time as additional Army forces are assigned to the Pacific Command and positioned in the Western Pacific (WESPAC) area and pending JCS approval of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 of which 32(L)-59 is a part."²

CINCPAC reviewed PACOM Component Commanders', CJTF116(P) and CJTF116 plans in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 32(L)-59, but formal comments by CINCPAC were promulgated only on CJTF's plan.³

Planning for the Defense of Korea, Defense of Taiwan and the Evacuation of Hong Kong

CINCPAC had promulgated, prior to 1959, plans for the Defense of Korea (CINCPAC OPLAN 27-58), Defense of Taiwan (CINCPAC OPLAN 25-58)

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 000120 of 16 Jun 59 and ser 000121 of 18 Jun 59

2 JCS 102123Z Sep 59 and JCS SM 901-59 of 10 Sep 59

3 CINCPAC 022350Z Oct 59

[REDACTED]

and the Evacuation of Hong Kong (CINCPAC OPLAN 23-57). There were many problems and opinions concerning the command arrangements established by these plans and the magnitude of the forces to be assigned the subordinate commanders listed in these plans. During 1959, draft revised operations plans for each of the above listed contingencies were prepared and were undergoing refinement at year end. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Air Defense Planning

A draft Requirements Plan for Air Defense of Land Areas for the period FY 61-66 was prepared in 1959. The CINCPAC Staff made many comments on this draft. The plan was being refined at the end of 1959. [REDACTED]

Planning for the Control of the Seas

A draft plan for control of the seas operations and blockade of the China Coast was prepared during the year. The primary mission was assigned to CINCPACFLT with CINCPACAF playing a supporting role. The draft contained additional guidance for CINCPACFLT in the preparation of his detailed supporting plan. The principal difficulty encountered in finalizing the draft was to frame the blockade in its proper

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 000199 of 10 Sep 58

[REDACTED]

perspective so as to allow U.S. forces greater flexibility in implementing control of the seas operations under the then current concepts of international law.

Hawaiian Defense Planning

CINCPAC assigned responsibility¹ for planning and conducting the defense of Hawaii to CINCUSARPAC (see preceding section on Command Relations and Organization). CINCUSARPAC prepared his OPLAN 37-59 which was being reviewed in the CINCPAC Staff at the end of 1959. CG USARHAW/25th Infantry Division was appointed as Commander JTF119 (the Joint Task Force responsible for the defense of Hawaii). In 1959, he formed a joint staff in coordination with representatives of PACFLT and PACAF, issued a JTF staffing guide, prepared detailed supporting plans for USARPAC review, and made preliminary arrangements for a command post.

Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Planning

A new Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan (CINCPAC OPLAN 60-59) was promulgated on 6 January 1959. All supporting plans by commanders in the task organization were received and reviewed by mid 1959. Annex A, Evacuation of Key Indigenous Personnel, was promulgated on 12 March 1959.

The JCS approved the plan and annex with certain changes which were subsequently published to the Command.²

During the year, it became evident, from information gathered on staff visits³ and from correspondence with subordinate headquarters⁴,

1 CINCPACINST 003020.6 of 10 Apr 59

2 SM 645-59 of 1 Jul 59; CINCPAC ltr ser 0545 of 19 Aug 59; CINCPAC ltr ser 000186 of 21 Sep 59; SM 1117-59 of 5 Nov 59; CINCPAC ltr ser 000232 of 2 Dec 59

3 Memo J5114 to JO2 of Aug 59; Memo JO3 to JO2, 0120-59 of 14 Dec 59

4 COMUSTDC ltr ser 0252 of 13 Oct 59; CINCPAC ltrs ser 0795 of 17 Nov 59, ser 0510 of 4 Aug 59 and ser 0573 of 29 Aug 59

[REDACTED]

that the State Department representatives in some PACOM countries were not aware of the increased responsibilities assumed by the State Department under the terms of a 1958 joint State-Defense Department agreement on noncombatant matters¹ and they were inclined to rely too heavily upon military commands for assistance in emergencies. During 1959, while the State Department representatives were adjusting their plans or seeking revisions of the provisions of the joint agreement, the PACOM stood ready to aid if needed and if authorized by the JCS.

([REDACTED])

PACOM FORCE OBJECTIVES

CINCPAC planning had not been limited to contingencies which might occur in 1959. As early as July 1957, the CINCPAC Staff had prepared draft objectives and requirements studies to determine the optimum force structure for the PACOM for the time period beyond that covered by capabilities plans. These studies were not promulgated, but were used within the CINCPAC Staff (e.g., they were the basis of force requirements submissions to the JCS in 1958). The strategy in the plans discussed in the preceding section, as further developed by the draft objectives studies, called for the employment of specific U.S. and foreign forces. With this in mind, CINCPAC, in May 1959, submitted to the JCS his recommendations on the FY 1962 Strategic Force Objectives for forces of countries in the PACOM area,² and, in June, his recommendations on the desired U.S. force structure for the PACOM in FY 1961.³

1 JCS 1879/51 of 7 Mar 58

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 00318 of 14 May 59

3 CINCPAC ltr ser 000116 of 11 Jun 59

~~SECRET~~

Basically, these submissions reflected a requirement for modernized national forces in the Pacific of approximately the same size as were then in being. They also stated a requirement for three fully ready U.S. Army divisions, three deployed U.S. Navy aircraft carrier task groups, and fourteen U.S. Air Force combat air or missile groups.

PLANNING AND OPERATIONS WITH U.S. COMMANDERS HAVING CONTIGUOUS RESPONSIBILITIES

The JSCP charged CINCPAC with the responsibility for coordinating the activities of PACOM forces with the activities of forces of commanders having contiguous responsibilities. This section will discuss some of CINCPAC's activities in discharge of this responsibility.

CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-59

The Commander in Chief Specified Command Middle East (CINCSPECOMME) prepared a plan in support of the JSCP for meeting limited war contingencies in the Middle East. This plan, designated CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-59, had a number of appendices, each of which planned for operations in a specific area of the Middle East. Some of these appendices called for the deployment of PACOM forces to the Persian Gulf. The number of forces to be so deployed varied with the appendix which was to be implemented. There were some inconsistencies between the number of PACOM forces called for by CINCSPECOMME's OPLAN and those which were authorized to be deployed by the JSCP. CINCPAC carefully reviewed CINCSPECOMME's plan since PACOM forces which would be deployed to the Middle East were the same reserve forces which were needed by CINCPAC to meet contingencies in the PACOM. Implementation of the appendices would require redeployments of PACOM forces to reconstitute CINCPAC's reserve.

[REDACTED]

In 1959 the JCS approved¹ Appendix V to Annex A to CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-59. Informal information received from the Joint Staff, JCS, indicated that the inconsistency between the JSCP and OPLAN 215-59 with respect to augmentation forces from PACOM would be resolved by a change in the JSCP.

CINCPAC directed² CINCPACFLT to prepare a supporting plan to provide for the deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf in support of Appendix V. This was accomplished by the promulgation³ of CINCPACFLT Interim OPLAN 80-59. A related United States/United Kingdom (US/UK) Military Study on Iraq was reviewed by CINCPAC and comments were furnished to the JCS.⁴ The forces and concept of operations in this study were the same as those of Appendix V, Annex A to CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-59.

Coordination with the Strategic Air Command and CINCAL

Much of the required coordination of [REDACTED] targeting was accomplished with the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) and Commander in Chief, Alaska (CINCAL) in the course of world-wide conferences of major U.S. commands (the last was held in September 1958). Continuing coordination was carried on in 1959 by exchange of messages and liaison arrangements.

During 1959, CINCPAC was informed that SAC had assumed the responsibility formerly held by PACAF for peacetime peripheral electronic

-
- 1 CINCNELM 192144Z Oct 59
 - 2 CINCPAC 300159Z Oct 59
 - 3 CINCPACFLT 040148Z Nov 59
 - 4 CINCPAC ltr ser 000222 of Nov 59

[REDACTED]
intelligence (ELINT) collection activities [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Consequently, the RB-66 aircraft of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance (TACRON) Wing were withdrawn from the PACOM ELINT program. CINCPACFLT continued to carry out Navy responsibilities for the program.

Additional coordination with CINCAL is described in the first section of Chapter III.

Coordination with CINCONAD

During 1959, CINCPACFLT, acting on behalf of CINCPAC, conducted coordination activities with the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) concerning modifications in the Pacific extension of the Early Warning Line. (C [REDACTED])


Coordination with the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB)

One of the tasks assigned CINCPAC was to defend the sea approaches to the Panama Canal. CINCPACFLT, who was charged with the responsibility by CINCPAC, carried out coordination activities with CINCARIB during 1959. (C [REDACTED])

JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES


Two major joint training exercises were conducted in the PACOM area during the year and an additional exercise was in the final planning stages at the end of the year. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] CINCPAC participation during Operation Alert 1959 (17-30 April) was limited to monitoring actions in Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa. (UNCLASSIFIED)





Department of Defense Emergency Plans (DODEP) Command Post Exercise









PACOM Joint Exercise








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
Targeting Activities











CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) ACTIVITIES

The success of any military operations, be they cold war, limited war, or general war, are dependent to a very substantial degree on the attitude of the civilian population in the area in which the operations are conducted. Civilian-military rapport is of particular importance in areas subject to local discontent, guerrilla operations, or infiltration by enemy agents. All of these conditions are found extensively within the Pacific Command.

CINCPAC expended a substantial effort on the development of Civil Affairs programs in the U.S. armed forces during 1959. CINCPAC, in the Pacific Unified Command Plan,¹ charged each PACOM Component Commander with being prepared "to take actions as directed within Service responsibilities with regard to Civil Affairs." More specific guidance for


1 CINCPACINST 03020.2 of 20 Jun 59

developing Civil Affairs capabilities was provided in the Civil Affairs Annex to each major CINCPAC OPLAN. However, due to austere U.S. force levels, no active duty Civil Affairs operational units were maintained in the PACOM during 1959, and CINCPAC was dependent upon the JCS for providing such units from the CONUS in the event that CINCPAC OPLANS were implemented. Nevertheless, CINCPAC endeavored to develop, within the resources available to him, a Civil Affairs capability in the PACOM.

In order that subordinate unified commanders and joint task force commanders would have going organizations to carry out Civil Affairs functions in an emergency, CINCPAC assigned¹ responsibilities for developing Civil Affairs organizations to the Chiefs of MAAGs, and JUSMAGs and the PEO Laos. The MAAG Civil Affairs advisory effort was designed to assist the local armed forces in carrying out the Civil Affairs responsibilities delegated by their own government in support of civil governmental administration, and included the functions of public safety, public health and welfare, agriculture, education, etc. On the U.S. side, MAAG Civil Affairs Sections were designed to provide liaison with other U.S. Government agencies such as the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), to insure that the local armed forces programs and projects in support of civil administration were considered in budgeting and programming of economic aid materials. Also, MAAG and JUSMAG Chiefs were required to develop the capability within the MAAG to assume ICA and diplomatic type functions under emergency conditions.

In order that Civil Affairs organizations in each area in the PACOM could be brought to full strength to meet the requirements of emergencies,

1 CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, Annex "Q", Civil Affairs


CINCPAC encouraged the development of U.S. Civil Affairs reserve units within the U.S. Civilian communities within the PACOM.¹ One such unit was active in Korea and another was approved in 1959 for activation in Taiwan. Personnel from these units were expected to be useful in emergencies since they would provide prepositioned, skilled functional specialists for use in support of combat operations to carry out ICA, United States Information Service (USIS), and similar types of operations.




Practical training for U.S. forces during 1959 was provided by the introduction of Civil Affairs play in the joint US-RCK forces exercises, in the joint US-Japanese Self Defense Forces exercises, in the Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) maneuver "Twin Peaks" at Camp Pendleton, California, and by the presentation of two weeks of Civil Affairs instruction to personnel of the 25th Inf. Div. at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii by a mobile training team from the U.S. Army CA School, Ft. Gordon, Ga.

SPECIAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

The Joint Chiefs of Staff placed increased emphasis on Special and Cold War Activities in 1958 and 1959. This resulted in a significant increase in all phases of these activities during 1959.² This section will discuss CINCPAC activities to improve the Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR), Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Escape and Evasion (E&E) capabilities of U. S. forces in the PACOM.

1 CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59, Annex Q, Civil Affairs

2 CINCPAC Notice 5400 (JO41) 7 Apr 59


The Senior War Planner, Pacific (SWPPAC) developed, or revised, concurrently with CINCPAC, the UW and PSYWAR Annexes to the OPLANS, provided or arranged for requested Target Area studies, and assisted the CINCPAC in training and equipping Special Forces. 


Psychological Warfare

During 1959, CINCPAC provided policy guidance to subordinate commanders for the preparation and stockpiling of standard psychological warfare material.¹ Propaganda material was prepared and stocked by the USARPAC PSYWAR unit and was ready for issuance in the event of hostilities. Overall psychological warfare policy guidance was provided in the PSYWAR annexes to CINCPAC OPLANS. (SECRET)

Unconventional Warfare

By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,² CINCPAC planned for the conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) in general war and in military conflicts short of general war. Planning for unconventional warfare in the Pacific Command was based on four possible situations: (1) general emergency operations involving the overt engagement of U.S. and USSR military forces;³ (2) resumption of hostilities in Korea;⁴ (3) Chinese Communist attempts to seize Taiwan and the Penghus by force;⁵ and, (4) Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.⁶

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 00257 of 24 Apr 59


2 Annex F (UW) to JSCP 1 Jul 58 - 30 Jun 59 of 13 Dec 57 (TS)

3 Annex N (UW) to CINCPAC GEOP 1-58 of 30 Jun 58 (TS)

4 Annex I (UW) to CINCPAC OPLAN 27-58 of 30 Jun 58 (TS)


5 Annex N (UW) to CINCPAC OPLAN 25-58 of 10 May 58 (TS)

6 Annex N (UW) to CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 of 13 Jul 59 (TS)


The U.S. Army 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) on Okinawa, activated in June 1957, was the basic PACOM organization for the conduct of unconventional warfare. In addition, during peacetime it was responsible to provide Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to free Asian countries to train selected officers and enlisted men (EM) in Special Forces (SF) techniques and operations.

The limited capability of PACOM U.S. unconventional warfare forces to conduct wartime operations and to command and control Allied Special Forces was substantially increased. On 24 July 1959, the Department of the Army authorized the augmentation of the 1st Special Forces Group by 240 spaces.¹ Total authorized strength of the 1st SF Gp effective 1 Jan 60 was to be 364.² The augmentation was provided: (1) to meet requirements for the employment of Special Forces in the event of revolutionary outbreaks in the CINCPAC area of responsibility, (2) to conduct operations to assist free Asian governments in combatting Communist terrorist operations, (3) to train Allied Special Forces, and (4) to provide counter-insurgency reserves for CINCPAC. The PACOM capability to accomplish JCS-directed military UW missions was significantly increased with the provision of the spaces in the 1st SF Gp.

Evasion and Escape



- 1 DA 241716Z Jul 59 Cite DA 96281
2 DA 091949Z Nov 59 Cite DA 968106

ACTIONS INVOLVING JOINT INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

All of CINCPAC's actions to support and advance U.S. national policies by the projection of U.S. military power were affected by and responsive to the intelligence which was provided him. All of the plans and many of the other problems which are discussed in other parts of this Command History were worked out in a setting which was developed by J2 from information gathered by the U.S. intelligence community. Most intelligence efforts were part of team efforts to produce plans

1 JCS 311848Z Mar 59 Cite JCS 957190


[REDACTED]

and instructions, to maintain a continuing program of estimates, to present briefs and orientation talks, and to perform routine but important intelligence tasks such as preparing the Weekly Intelligence Digest. The following paragraphs will describe some of the actions affecting J2 which were not routine and were not directly related to team projects with other members of the CINCPAC Staff. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Intelligence Material for CINCPAC

Prior to 1959 the Chief of Naval Operations, as Executive Agent, had the responsibility for providing to CINCPAC, intelligence documents prepared by all Services. In January 1959, each Service was assigned responsibility by the JCS for providing Unified Commands with that intelligence material prepared by Service intelligence elements.¹ To accomplish this change, the Services, at Department level, requested CINCPAC to forward a statement of intelligence needs. This information was forwarded to the Chief of Staff of the Army,² to the Chief of Naval Operations,³ and to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.⁴ The new procedure of receiving intelligence direct from each Service greatly reduced the time-lag of receiving this intelligence. ([REDACTED] UNCL)

[REDACTED]



Military Mapping Planning


CINCPAC's military mapping requirements for inclusion in the World Wide Mapping Program were reevaluated, and resubmitted¹ to the Chief of Staff, United States Army in accordance with revised criteria. Requirements were submitted in both graphical and tabular form arranged in order of priority. The submission included the consolidated requirements of CINCPAC and the three components and reflected mapping requirements to support operations plans.

ACTIONS INVOLVING JOINT LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES

The Taiwan Crisis in 1958, and the situation in Laos in 1959, tested pre-planned concepts and techniques of logistic support. Additionally, in each case, PACOM forces developed their logistic planning factors. Background of actions in this regard is provided elsewhere in this history.

Separate from the emergency situations, however, were the day-to-day logistic coordination requirements which had to be met. Each of the many fields presented problems, principally brought about by budgetary and personnel limitations. Although some problem areas remained

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 00444 of 11 Jul 59


unresolved, successful conclusion was reached for the majority of the problems encountered. Some of the more important logistical undertakings are discussed within this section. They are grouped to include matters concerning Logistics Planning, Supply, Transportation, Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) and Medical procedures. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Logistics Planning

CINCPAC INST 004000.1B (Logistics, Personnel and Administration)

CINCPAC INST 004000.1A was issued in 1957 to discharge certain CINCPAC responsibilities which were set forth in Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Logistics Policy (JANALP) and to obtain optimum use of PACOM logistic and personnel assets. The Instruction was the basic reference for all joint logistic, personnel and administrative matters in the PACOM. Logistics annexes to CINCPAC OPLANS referred to this instruction, and were thereby abbreviated in length. Certain deficiencies in this instruction were recognized and it became apparent that it required revision to reflect changes and to add newly developed information. This instruction was superseded on 30 March 1959 by CINCPAC Instruction 004000.1B. Significant improvements made by the revised instruction are discussed in the following paragraphs.

PACOM Service Component Commanders were required to prepare a logistic annex for each of their supporting plans to CINCPAC OPLANS. They were required to append, to each logistic annex, a statement of time-phased logistic force augmentation requirements and a time-phased table of materiel tonnages which were required for initial supply and for resupply.

██████████

Chiefs of MAAGs and JUSMAGs were required to maintain a current list of materiel deficiencies which precluded the MAP-supported forces from attaining an operational ready status. (C██████████)

PACOM Service Component Commanders were required to evaluate and report to CINCPAC on the adequacy of the stock levels authorized to be maintained to support CINCPAC OPLANS, and to forward reports of the adequacy of stock levels as specified in CINCPAC OPLANS. Additionally, all Commanders operating directly under CINCPAC were responsible for reporting to CINCPAC without delay any logistical deficiencies beyond their control which adversely affected their ability to accomplish their assigned missions. (C██████████AL)

Single Area Installation Study, Okinawa

The Secretary of Defense assigned the Department of the Army the task of conducting a study to determine the feasibility of concentrating U.S. military installations on Okinawa into a single area during the period 1960-1964. On 5 March 1959 DA, in turn, requested CINCPAC to conduct the study.¹ The initial guidance was not definitive enough for a clear-cut understanding of the problem and its scope. Consequently, CINCPAC posed further questions to DA,² answers to which were provided.³ CINCPAC passed action to CINCPACREP Ryukyus and provided him additional guidance.⁴ The study, submitted by CINCPACREP Ryukyus to CINCPAC on 5 June 1959, concluded that although consolidation of military installations on Okinawa was possible, the price which would

1 DA 051818Z Mar 59 Cite DA 955827

2 CINCPAC 070214Z Mar 59

3 DA 121523Z Mar 59 Cite DA 956171

4 CINCPAC 070215Z Mar 59

[REDACTED]

have to be paid was utterly unacceptable in terms of dollars, increased vulnerability and animosity which would develop among the local populace.¹ In his forwarding endorsement CINCPACREP Ryukyus recommended that: "... no further consideration be given to developing a military enclave on Okinawa, but instead greater efforts be made to guarantee our security interest in the Ryukyus by showing greater interest as a nation in the development of the Ryukyuan people and the Ryukyus economy." On 26 June, CINCPAC concurred in the study and the recommendation of CINCPACREP Ryukyus.² The Department of the Army subsequently advised CINCPAC that the President had agreed that consolidation of military installations on Okinawa was neither feasible nor desirable.³

Taiwan Base Command (TBC)

Experience gained during the Taiwan Emergency late in 1958 disclosed a fundamental weakness on the part of the Taiwan Base Command in responding to accelerated logistic requirements incident to the build-up of U.S. operating forces on Taiwan. The difficulty centered on common-item support and the lack of suitable funding arrangements by which TBC could establish necessary inventory levels in anticipating customer requirements. ([REDACTED])

In January 1959, CNO instituted corrective action by directing the establishment of a Navy Stock Fund Operation to facilitate furnishing general type supplies to the customers of TBC.⁴ The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (BUSANDA) made provision for establishing

1 CINCPACREP Ryukyus 1tr RIJC of 5 Jun 59

2 CINCPAC 1tr ser 00413 of 26 Jun 59

3 DA 151831Z Dec 59 Cite DA 969694

4 CNO 092216Z Jan 59

[REDACTED]

within TBC a Navy Supply Department organization to assume responsibilities for executing the stock fund operation.¹ CINCPAC instructed COMUSTDC and CINCPACFLT to take action and assume responsibilities as specified, in carrying out a new program which was designed to improve the common item support capability of TBC.² By the end of 1959, substantial progress had been made toward effecting transition to a Navy-type organization using Navy procedures for the supply aspects of TBC's mission. This undertaking was expected to be concluded by early Calendar Year 1960. ✓

Another facet of TBC's operation, which came into sharp focus as a problem area during mid 1959, pertained to the budget. The action of the JCS in July 1959³ directing the organizational separation of COMUSTDC and CHMAAG Taiwan and the assignment of TBC as a subordinate unit of TDC, brought forth a need for early resolution of the budgetary aspects of TBC's operation. This organizational change made it clearly impractical and infeasible to continue the funding arrangement whereby the overhead and operational expenses of TBC were borne by MAP funds controlled by CHMAAG Taiwan. In lieu thereof, CINCPAC recommended to CNO that TBC be authorized to submit an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Navy budget to cover all its expenses subject to reimbursement where appropriate.⁴ CNO acknowledged that the Navy must ultimately accept increased responsibilities in this area,⁵ and arranged to send a fact-finding team, accompanied by CINCPAC representatives, to Taiwan in January 1960 in an effort to resolve the problem of TBC funding. ✓

- ([REDACTED])
- 1 BUSANDA 232103Z Jan 59
2 CINCPAC 122131Z Feb 59
3 JCS 081929Z Jul 59 Cite JCS 962043
4 CINCPAC 040216Z Nov 59
5 CNO 111429Z Nov 59

Transportation

CINCPAC Integrated Transportation Plan

In response to a directive by the JCS,¹ CINCPAC, during May and June, prepared and submitted detailed sealift and airlift requirements for certain General War and Limited War situations. CINCPAC planned to use this data to develop a single PACOM Integrated Transportation Plan which could be adapted to support each of CINCPAC's OPLANS. This plan, also, was expected to be used to determine the boundaries of logistical feasibility with regard to sealift and airlift of CINCPAC operational concepts for the PACOM.


In furtherance of this objective, a conference was convened on 3 October by CINCPAC to discuss and develop procedures and responsibilities involved in the preparation of the Integrated Transportation Plan. Representatives of the JCS, Department of the Army (DA), GNO, USAF, Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) attended. The transportation requirements of CINCPAC's OPLAN for Laos (OPLAN 32(L)-59) were used to develop the formats and procedures. Based on agreements reached at this conference, CINCPAC prepared an Integrated Transportation Plan in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 32(L)-59 to forward to the JCS for approval and thereafter to MATS and MSTS for the preparation of supporting plans.

CINCPAC/COMATS Study of Peacetime Military Airlift.

The JCS directed,² on 30 May 1958, that CINCPAC and Commanding Officer, Military Air Transport Service (COMATS) conduct a joint study

1 SM 502-59 of 19 May 59

2 JCS 2016/56 of 30 May 58


of existing airlift systems within the Pacific area, and recommend to the JCS, action which might be taken to provide, during peacetime, more effective and economical airlift service, utilizing military airlift resources currently assigned or programmed for assignment in FY 1959. The study was completed and forwarded on 30 March 1959.

This study, among other things, reflected basic differences of opinion between COMATS and CINCPAC concerning the assignment, control and utilization of military transport airlift resources in the Pacific area. It was COMATS' position, on the one hand, that airlift requirements in the Pacific area could be more effectively and economically accomplished if all attached and organizational transport resources were assigned to the Single Manager for Airlift Services. CINCPAC on the other hand, maintained that PACOM assigned airlift resources (315th Air Division), including attached airlift provided by the Single Manager Operating Agency, must be assigned to and under the positive control of CINCPAC at all times.

It was further noted that the capability of the 315th AD in peacetime, on occasion, is in excess of that required to support its basic combat readiness, training missions and special projects. Special projects involved airlift as required by CINCPAC, and provision of logistic support where MATS did not operate. CINCPAC recommended that during periods of critical MATS airlift shortages, and subject to control and right of withdrawal without notice by CINCPAC, a portion of the 315th AD excess capability during peacetime could be used to fulfill common-user cargo airlift requirements in the Japan/Taiwan/Okinawa/Philippine area.

SECRET

The JCS concurred in the CINCPAC position,¹ and provided comments in substance as follows:

The theater airlift should remain assigned to CINCPAC to provide required airlift to train, support and deploy PACOM forces as necessary to support the JSCP and other emergency plans.

Where the two systems are in conflict, the efficiency obtained by placing military forces, in combat operations under a Commander of a Unified Command, from a military standpoint outweighs the economy acquired by a single manager arrangement.

Further, the 315th AD was part of the forces assigned to CINCPAC, as the Commander of the Unified Command, and should be transferred therefrom only by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense as approved by the President.

Control and Movement of Personnel via MATS.

Peacetime airlift improved in the Pacific Area during 1959 as a result of the industrial funding of MATS. Although airlift was adequate in general, one problem which arose concerned the control of passenger movements into and through the MATS system, both at originating and at inter-change points. (UNCLASSIFIED)

During June, a considerable backlog of passengers, including CONUS-bound MAP-sponsored Philippine and Vietnam students, developed, at Clark Air Base.² It was ascertained that the backlog was the result of (1) the Services and MAAGs not properly forecasting their airlift requirements, and (2) the lack of coordination between the user agencies and the Air Traffic Coordinating Offices. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The problem was reviewed and corrective action taken by representatives of CINCPAC, Western Air Force (WESTAF) and local Services who

1 JCS 2016/90 of 23 Jul 59

2 CHJUSMAG PHIL 240610Z Jun 59

met at Headquarters, 13th AF, Clark Air Base, Philippines.¹ PACOM MAAGs were advised of the problem and the procedures to be followed regarding the movement of MAP-sponsored foreign students by MATS.² (UNCLASSIFIED)

POL

Petroleum Logistical Data - Pacific Command

The Petroleum Logistical Data Pacific Command (short title PLD-PACOM) was a publication developed by the CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office which contained selected POL data for specific locations within the PACOM. The purpose of this publication was to advise all interested elements of the U.S. Military Establishment of CINCPAC POL requirements and to present in one document a comprehensive listing of the POL facilities within the PACOM. The publication contained the stockage objectives and mobilization reserve levels for bulk and packaged products and POL containers (55 gallon drums). In addition, it contained information covering POL ports (location, type piers and/or anchorage, size of vessel that could be accommodated and controlling depth of water) and POL storage facilities available in Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Prior to 1 December 1959 this publication was compiled manually. This proved to be time consuming and made it difficult to keep the PLD-PACOM current. The CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) subsequently overcame this problem by placing the information on machine cards and using electronic data processing techniques to compile and print the mats for reproduction. The PLD-PACOM could then be updated and published in a matter of hours rather than days as was the case under previous procedures.

1 CINCPAC 272141Z Jun 59

2 CINCPAC 170338Z Jul 59


Red Hill POL Storage Conversion

The Red Hill POL storage area was a Navy-owned facility consisting of 20 underground tanks with a capacity of approximately 300,000 barrels each, which were designed and constructed for the storage of non-volatile fuels (Navy Special Fuel Oil and Diesel). Over a period of several years, CINCPAC supported efforts to convert a portion of this facility to permit the storage of volatile aviation fuels in order to satisfy the increasing requirements for this type of fuel by both the Air Force and Navy.

The original cost of this conversion amounted to approximately \$6,250,000. A portion of this (\$1,560,000) was to have been funded by the Air Force and the remainder to have been funded by the Navy.

During a JPO visit to Washington it was discovered that Hq USAF had eliminated its portion of the project cost from the FY 60 budget. This was done without reference to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF or CINCPAC. In response to JPO queries, USAF personnel stated that the AF aviation gasoline (AVGAS) requirement had been materially reduced and that the Red Hill conversion project could not be supported by the AF.

CINCPAC requested Hq USAF to advise him on the basis for the reduced AF AVGAS requirement in the PACOM.¹ He also pointed out to Hq USAF that AF withdrawal could possibly jeopardize the project, and reinstatement of requirements at a later date would materially increase the cost of the total project.

The Chief of Staff, Air Force (CCFSAF) replied that although the Red Hill Conversion Project was considered valid, the project was

1 CINCPAC 090142Z Dec 58

reviewed in conjunction with other AF construction projects and its priority was not high enough to be recommended for the AF FY 60 Military Construction Program.¹

At the end of 1959, the Navy was considering abandoning the conversion project.² The new Navy plan called for converting the tankage now in diesel service to JP-5. This would meet the JP-5 storage requirements but would not relieve the Hawaiian area AVGAS storage deficit.

Aviation Gasoline Storage at Naval Station, Midway

A long standing problem at the Naval Station, Midway was that of aviation gasoline becoming corrosive while in storage. Therefore, CINCPACFLT formed a Technical Assistance Team to make an on-site study.³ At the request of CINCPACFLT, the Technical & Engineering Officer, CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office, joined the team as the senior member. The team recommended that the aqua system, a part of the overall storage complex, be abandoned due to its age and deteriorated condition.⁴ Authority to abandon the aqua system was subsequently granted by CINCPACFLT.⁵

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Although the aqua system represented a small portion of the AVGAS storage on Midway, about 70% of the total workload of fuel handling personnel was required to keep it functioning. Thus, with the abandonment of the aqua system, the overall efficiency in fuel handling operations on Midway was greatly increased, with only a minor reduction in AVGAS storage facilities.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

1 HQ USAF 301705Z Dec 58 Cite AFMSS-FL-254524

2 CINCPACFLT ltr ser 74/5223 of 28 Dec 59

3 CINCPACFLT 292052Z Jul 59

4 Report from Senior Member, Technical Assistance Team to COMHAW-SEAFRON of 7 Aug 59

5 CINCPACFLT ltr ser 74/3809 of 22 Sep 59

Corrosive Aviation Gasoline in Japan

The problem of aviation gasoline becoming corrosive while in storage at the U.S. Army Petroleum Depot, Japan was a long-standing one. Efforts to solve the problem in the past had failed to produce effective results until it was discovered that sulfate reducing bacteria in storage tank water bottoms contaminated the fuel. The problem was complicated by the construction and the location of the tanks and piping systems and their age. The ideal solution involved extensive plant modifications, but this was economically infeasible. Attention, therefore, was focused on more practical solutions. Major steps recommended were:¹ (1) eliminate all water possible from tanks; (2) use only bacteria free water; (3) clean tanks; (4) use corrosive fuel as soon as possible; (5) institute a "first-in first-out" stock rotation policy. All corrosive AVGAS was reported consumed in April 1959.

During November 1959, AVGAS in Japan was again reported to be corrosive.² Since previously recommended corrective actions had not been fully implemented, another program of emptying the tanks for cleaning and inspection was begun and was expected to continue until the Fall of 1960. Additionally, CINCPAC requested COMUS Japan and CINCPAC-USARPAC to take action to correct this situation.³

Transfer of Bulk Fuel at Sea

A conference was held between representatives of CINCPAC, COMSTS and the Commander Service Forces, Pacific (COMSERVPAC) late in 1958 to discuss the possibility of transferring bulk fuel at sea in the Pacific between MSTs tankers and fleet oilers. This resulted in an

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 1513 of 28 Aug 58

2 SUBAREAPETO Japan 170601Z Nov 59

3 CINCPAC 260526Z Nov 59

experimental transfer of NSFO between the USNS MISSION BUENAVENTURA and the USS CALIENTE (AO53) during April 1959,¹ which proved highly successful. Subsequent transfers of other POL products were accomplished with equal success. This manner of transfer of bulk petroleum products at sea was expected to assist materially in the mobile logistic support of the Pacific Fleet, and additionally was expected to increase the operational capability of CINCPAC. Three other such transfers were accomplished during 1959,² and it was planned that these operations would be continued on a training basis.

Increased Use of Super-Tankers

The JPO noted that the number of super-tankers for POL distribution within the PACOM steadily increased during 1958. At first, the change was to the 18 to 25 thousand DWT tanker with a draft of about 32 feet, and subsequently during 1959 there was a noticeable change to the 32 thousand DWT tanker with a draft of about 35 feet. The impact of super-tankers on military petroleum distribution within the Pacific Command was discussed in detail in a letter to CNO in February 1959.³

For the most part, super-tankers were scheduled to report to PACOM ports having facilities reasonably able to receive them. However it was expected that if the number of these large tankers continued to increase, considerable flexibility would be lost in the distribution of POL. Increased numbers of tanker diversions and two-port discharges were expected to result. This loss of flexibility

1 CTF-73 ltr ser 200 of 3 May 59

2 COMSERVRON 3 ltr ser 11.4-1511 of 1 Jun 59, CTF-73 240600Z Jun 59, USS ASHTABULA 110840Z Dec 59

3 CINCPAC ltr ser 088 of 2 Feb 59

was dramatically demonstrated in August 1959 when the SS TRANS EASTERN arrived off Pearl Harbor and was prevented from entering due to excessive draft.¹ The vessel was sent to other areas for off-loading.

The problem of super-tanker utilization was under continuous study. ✓
CINCPAC comments on the delivery of POL within the PACOM area by a 67,000 DWT tanker were forwarded to the Military Petroleum Supply Agency (MPSA) in October 1959.²

Medical Operating Procedure for Elements of the Pacific Command

Before 1959, joint medical instructions for the Pacific Command were published in twenty separate documents. To facilitate medical operations, the essential elements of each of these instructions were incorporated into one document, CINCPAC INST 6000.2B, and issued on 27 Nov 1959. This Medical Operating Procedure was designed for application during peace-time and during a contingency or general war.

CINCPAC GENERAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION NO. 1-59

CINCPAC wished to consolidate within the framework of a General Operating Instruction (GOI) all of his instructions to PACOM subordinate commanders pertaining to joint matters of a current and continuing nature. This single document would state the command relationships within the PACOM and would assign responsibilities and provide guidance to PACOM Component Commanders, Commanders of Subordinate Unified Commands, CINCPACREPs and Chiefs of MAAGs and JUSMAGs for joint operations to meet cold war commitments and to attain the maximum readiness for operations in the event of hostilities. The General Operating Instruction would complement CINCPAC OPLANs and would remain in effect after

1 MSTs Honolulu to COMSTS 261956Z Aug 59

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 0677 of 6 Oct 59

these plans were implemented except in those cases where they conflicted. In case of such conflicts, the CINCPAC OPLANs would take precedence. Work stated on 1 May to produce a General Operating Instruction for 1959 (GOI 1-59).

At the close of the year, all annexes to the GOI 1-59 had been prepared and were being coordinated within the CINCPAC Staff. It was anticipated that the document would be promulgated in 1960 as CINCPAC GOI 1-60. ✓

VISITS BY U.S. CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS

CINCPAC actions to improve the state of readiness of U.S. Forces in the PACOM were facilitated by briefs and discussions held with numerous representatives of U.S. governmental agencies who visited the Pacific Command.

During 1959 there were 492 visits to the Pacific Command by high ranking officials from the Department of Defense, the military Departments, the Congress, and other branches of the government. The majority of the visitors transitted Hawaii on inspection trips through the Pacific Command Area and received briefings from, or met with CINCPAC or the Component Commanders.

A CINCPAC report to the JCS for the period 1 July 1959 to 1 December 1959 contained a listing of individuals who visited the PACOM, the office or committee which they represented, and the inclusive dates of their stay.¹ The principle offices or committees represented by these visitors during the Calendar Year were:

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 0888 of 28 Dec 59

House Appropriations Committee	Secretary of Defense
House Committee on Space and Astronautics	Joint Chiefs of Staff
Senate Armed Services Committee	Ass't SecDef for ISA & MAP
House Veterans Affairs Committee	Ass't SecDef for MP&R
Senate Appropriations Committee	Ass't SecNav (Material)
Defense Sub-committee, House Appropriations Committee	Commandant of the Marine Corps
House Foreign Affairs Committee	Secretary of the Army
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs	Under Secretary of Air Force
House Committee on Armed Services	Under Secretary of the Army
Sub-committee on Foreign Operations, House Appropriations Committee	Ass't SecDef (S&L)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Ass't SecDef (Pub. Affairs)
Sub-committee on Special Investiga- tions, House Armed Services Committee	Ass't SecDef (P&I)
International Cooperation Admin.	Under SecState (Economic Affairs)
	Ass't SecState (Far Eastern Affairs)
	U. S. Court of Military Appeals

CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS OF FORCES OF NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

The preceding chapter discusses one of CINCPAC's principal objectives in the accomplishment of his mission, that of maintaining and improving the state of readiness of assigned U.S. forces in the PACOM. This chapter will discuss another CINCPAC objective, that of improving the state of readiness of the forces of the countries in the PACOM area which are not in the Communist Bloc. In 1959, the principal way that CINCPAC could influence the forces of individual countries was through his activities in supervising the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in the PACOM. Therefore, this chapter is devoted largely to a discussion of CINCPAC's MAP activities.

Chiefs of MAAGs received general military assistance and programming guidance from National Security Council (NSC) and OCB documents and from broad DOD directives. Additionally, in May 1956, CINCPAC furnished the U.S. military representatives more specific guidance¹ by means of a directive which called for the attainment of certain operational capabilities for forces in all mainland SEAsia countries (less Burma and Laos), the Philippines and China (Taiwan). In the fall of 1958, it became desirable to review this guidance to insure that it reflected accurately CINCPAC's policy that the development of local forces would be correlated to U.S. military plans and that local forces

1 CINCPAC MAP Directive #4, Serial 00091 of 22 May 1956

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would complement, rather than be adjuncts to, U.S. forces. CINCPAC subsequently developed for each country in the PACOM, a Country Mission Statement which clearly stated his concept of the roles which each country's forces would be expected to perform. By the end of 1959, with JCS approval, Country Mission Statements had been promulgated for all countries except Burma and Indonesia. This guidance, having been developed with regional requirements in mind, insured that the development of each local force was within the framework of an overall PACOM strategy. The Country Mission Statements emphasized the need for developing in each country, forces to maintain internal security and forces to delay or to defend against external aggression.

The types of forces needed to perform these two roles were different and they competed somewhat for U.S. MAP support. Military manpower was one of the strongest instruments available to political leaders of countries in the PACOM area to counter internal subversion and infiltration in 1959, and there were large manpower resources in most of these countries which could be and were (prior to and during 1959) trained to form considerable army forces. These army forces with relatively light equipment could perform counter-subversion tasks. However, there was a need for forces to defend against external aggression as well. If the armies of the countries in the PACOM area were modernized and if necessary air and naval forces were developed, these modernized and balanced forces could defend or delay against external aggression until major U.S. forces could be deployed to assist them. The problem posed to CINCPAC, in the

face of decreasing appropriations, was to achieve the proper balance of forces within each country to carry out both missions.

CINCPAC for the first time in the history of MAP in the PACOM, used the concept of programming under a regional dollar ceiling in developing the FY 1960 MAP. This required a careful weighing of requirements among countries as well as within countries before decisions could be made. The values to be weighed were often empirical ones requiring the highest order of joint deliberation. In the process, the plans and programs for each country in the PACOM were considered in context with CINCPAC's overall plans and strategy for the PACOM. The decisions were not easy ones.

As a result of the recommendations of the President's Committee to Study the Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee), steps were taken in 1959 which would lead to the development of long range MAP plans in the PACOM, beginning with FY 62. These plans were expected to result in better balanced country programs geared to the requirements of the CINCPAC strategy and the availability of funds over a three and ultimately a five year planning period.

During the time that Country Mission Statements and procedures for long-range military assistance planning were being developed, day-to-day decisions involving MAP were required. These decisions contributed toward the development of the Mission Statements and planning procedures mentioned above. Conversely, the Mission Statements and planning procedures, in draft and final form, aided in making day-to-day decisions.

The first four sections of this chapter will tell of the development of these basic policy documents and the day-to-day CINCPAC operations which influenced or were influenced by these documents. Although CINCPAC's

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interests were regional, he had to deal with the problems of separate, sovereign countries and the chapter is oriented toward CINCPAC's relations with PACOM countries as individual countries in mutual efforts to improve each country's armed forces.

COUNTRY MISSION STATEMENTS

CINCPAC directed the CINCPAC Staff, late in 1958, to develop for JCS approval, statements expressing the U.S. view on missions for the forces of each country in the PACOM area.

The double purpose of these Mission Statements was to: (1) provide MAP guidance to the U.S. authorities concerned, and (2) provide a basis for such bilateral operational planning or military discussions as might be appropriate between U.S. and national officials when the political climate permitted.

In order that the mission of respective national forces could be related to that of U.S. forces, the statements included: (1) simplified concepts for limited and general war in the specified area, (2) missions national forces should be prepared to fulfill, and (3) broad missions of U.S. forces in that area.

CINCPAC received comments upon the draft statements from PACOM Component Commanders, Chiefs of MAAGs and other appropriate commanders, and forwarded the revised mission statements to the JCS for approval.

As modified and approved by the JCS,¹ each country statement was

1 CINCPAC 250342Z Oct 58 and CNO 302245Z Oct 58 (Philippines); CINCPAC spdltr ser 00096 of 11 May 1959 (Japan); CINCPAC spdltr ser 000100 of 19 May 1959 (Korea); CINCPAC spdltr ser 000122 of 18 Jun 1959 (GRC); CINCPAC spdltr 000124 of 19 Jun 1959 (South Vietnam); CINCPAC spdltr ser 000128 of 27 Jun 1959 (Thailand); CINCPAC spdltr ser 000129 of 27 Jun 1959 (Laos); CINCPAC spdltr ser 000144 of 23 Jul 1959 (Cambodia)

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promulgated as basic guidance for MAP and for planning and discussions with local officials.

The mission statements for Burma and Indonesia, incorporating comments and recommendations from PACOM Component Commanders, were submitted to the JCS for approval.¹ The statement for Burma was approved with minor modifications late in December.² A new and revised statement for the Philippines was forwarded to CINCPACREPPHIL³ for comment with a view to submitting a revised version to the JCS for approval and to supersede all previous guidance.

AREA-WIDE MAP ACTIVITIES - DRAPER COMMITTEE ACTIONS

The 1959 activities having the most significant long-range effect on CINCPAC military assistance planning and programming were those in support of or resulting from the President's Committee to study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee). These activities are discussed below.

During the closing days of 1958, the Draper Committee, in connection with its study, requested CINCPAC⁴ to submit a costing study on: (1) the total dollar outlay required to bring indigenous forces in the PACOM area to strategic force objectives levels during the period FY 1960-1964; and, (2) the dollar shortfall between total anticipated resources (U.S. and PACOM country predicted contributions) and forecast costs. The costing study indicated that over \$13 billion would be required to reach the

1 CINCPAC 232145Z Oct 1959; CINCPAC 152115Z Nov 1959

2 JCS 231935Z Dec 1959

3 CINCPAC 120252Z Dec 1959

4 Draper Cmte 230122Z Dec 1958 Cite CAP 716 Notal and OASD/ISA 242057Z Dec 1958

force objectives indicated by the close of FY 1964. It was immediately obvious that a program of such dollar magnitude was not practical from the standpoint of anticipated fund availability or actual military requirements. It should be noted that the choice of strategic force objectives was an arbitrary decision of the Draper Committee, and was not based upon PACOM plans for country force levels. The finished study was completed on a crash basis and forwarded to Washington on 20 January 1959.¹

In March² and April,³ CINCPAC recommendations on improving MAP organization and administration were forwarded to the Draper Committee, at the Committee's request.⁴ These recommendations concerned:

(1) The role of each echelon in MAP, stressing the military man as most capable of producing military advice, recommendations and decisions;

(2) Timeliness and adequacy of guidance, deploring the tardiness of programming and funding guidance, and lack of "regionality" in the guidance received from higher headquarters;

(3) Long range MAP planning, emphasizing the pressing requirement for long range plans, including authority to discuss plans and objectives with indigenous authorities as appropriate;

(4) The need for centralized control at unified command level, pointing out that sufficient latitude had been delegated already;

(5) Programming on the basis of a dollar ceiling, cautioning

1 CINCPAC ser 0037 of 20 Jan 1959

2 CINCPAC sec ltr to the Honorable William H. Draper, Jr., of 30 Mar 59

3 ADMINO CINCPAC 040225Z Apr 1959 to Draper Committee

4 Draper Committee 232348Z Mar 1959 to CINCPAC & USCINCEUR

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against jeopardizing the military function of presenting true and justifiable military requirements;

(6) Coordination between economic assistance and MAP, stressing the need for better coordination.

The Draper Committee, in reporting to the President,¹ recommended a series of actions involving legal, administrative, planning and programming aspects of military assistance. These recommendations were approved by the President. Implementing action was begun in 1959 in a number of cases, while others were under study by Executive and Legislative agencies of the government. The recommendations affecting CINCPAC MAP activities were that:

(1) Military assistance be based on time-phased planning for three and ultimately five years, coupled with three year time-phased programs;

(2) The State Department participate at an early stage in planning, to give foreign policy guidance and that there be increased participation in the programming process by the Country Team under the direction of the Ambassador;

(3) There be a greater degree of decentralization of planning responsibility to the Unified Commands and the MAAGs and greater decentralization of programming responsibilities to the Unified Commands;

(4) Planning permit greater consultation with host country officials, where appropriate, so as to produce a more effective total effort, including better utilization of the resources of recipient nations;

1 Ltr to President of U.S. from the President's Committee to Study the U.S. MAP and the Committee's interim report, 3 Jun 1959

[REDACTED]

(5) All military assistance plans, including order of magnitude dollar guidelines by area (or by country), be approved by the State and Defense Departments before implementation;

(6) The administration of military and economic assistance include provision for continuous evaluation of programs by each responsible agency.

As a result of Executive Departments' actions on the Draper Committee Report, the CINCPAC Staff began in August 1959, to develop a directive which was expected to result in the production of PACOM long-range MAP plans for each PACOM recipient country. Also, from the development of these plans, CINCPAC expected to ascertain the supplementary guidance which he would need from the Department of Defense. These plans were expected to achieve a closer correlation of military assistance with other U.S. agency plans, policies and programs, and to establish realistic bases for annual MAP programs and activities in coordination with country contributions and capabilities. It was planned that guidance from the Departments of Defense and State and from the JCS would be supplemented by CINCPAC who would prescribe the Country Mission Statement (See preceding section), establish country dollar ceilings, state force development objectives and priorities, and define specific maintenance and training guidance. This supplementary guidance was nearly ready for formal promulgation at the end of 1959. ✓

CINCPAC forwarded ¹ copies of a new Department of Defense Military

1 CINCPAC spdltr ser 2841 of 5 Dec 1959

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Assistance Manual with Annexes, dated November 1959 to all Chiefs of MAAGs, PEO Laos, MILTAG Indonesia, and MEDT Burma with a request that they review it and submit questions to be answered by a CINCPAC briefing team. This manual reflected changes in MAP planning brought about by the Draper Committee's recommendations and provided basic guidance for future planning. Additionally, the Chiefs were notified that the CINCPAC Staff Team would visit their areas beginning in January 1960 to discuss further details of the new planning and programming procedures and to hand-carry final instructions and CINCPAC supplementary guidance for the preparation of country long-range MAP plans.

OTHER AREA-WIDE MAP PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

While the CINCPAC actions in support of or as a result of the Draper Committee report were probably the most significant MAP activities in 1959, they were all geared to long range improvements in the Program. Meanwhile, the CINCPAC Staff carried out major projects connected with the immediate needs of the Program. These activities are discussed below.

Preparation of FY 60 and 61 Military Assistance Programs

Major projects of the CINCPAC Staff were the refinements of the FY 60 and the submission of the FY 61 military assistance programs. OASD/ISA instructions for final refinement of the FY 60 and preparation of the FY 61 MAP were received in a Washington conference on 12-16 January and disseminated to the Advisory Groups by means of CINCPAC conferences in Tokyo, Manila and Saigon during 2-10 February. The programs subsequently

received from the MAAGs were reviewed and forwarded to Washington in March and April.¹

On 19 June the OSD established a requirement to revise the FY 60 PACOM MAP within a dollar ceiling of \$435 million, with an indication of priorities of retention for a possible further reduction to \$325 million.² While the exercise was successful from a mechanical standpoint, in spite of its "crash" nature, the result was militarily disappointing. The total PACOM force improvement available (under the \$435 million program) was on the order of \$147 million, far short of the military requirement. The reduced program of \$435 million was completed and forwarded to Washington on 3 July.³

Subsequently OASD/ISA directed CINCPAC to submit a FY 60 MAP of \$325 million for submission to the State Department.⁴ This program was completed and forwarded to Washington on 11 July.⁵ Both the \$435 million and the \$325 million programs were developed without assistance from the MAAGs because of the limited time in which to return programs to Washington. The scarcity of funds for force improvement also dictated the development of requirements on a regional basis by CINCPAC.⁶

When the Tentative FY 60 MAP was received from Washington,⁷ it

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- 1 CINCPAC serials 00197 of 31 Mar 59, 00219 of 9 Apr 59, 00194 of 31 Mar 59, 00195 of 31 Mar 59, 00196 of 31 Mar 59, 00210 of 6 Apr 59, 00220 of 9 Apr 59, 00207 of 6 Apr 59, 00243 of 21 Apr 59, 00254 of 23 Apr 59, 00241 of 20 Apr 59, 00234 of 16 Apr 59, 00223 of 13 Apr 59, 00239 of 17 Apr 59, 00256 of 24 Apr 59, 00231 of 14 Apr 59
 - 2 OSD 192132Z Jun cite DEF961264
 - 3 CINCPAC ltr ser 00424 of 3 Jul 59
 - 4 OSD 082230Z Jul 59 Cite DEF962101
 - 5 CINCPAC ltr ser 00445 of 11 Jul 59
 - 6 CINCPAC ltr ser 00470 of 25 Jul 59
 - 7 ASD memo I-14, 817/9 of 22 Jul 59

[REDACTED]

was forwarded to the MAAGs¹ for their use as a basis for developing FY 61 requirements. CINCPAC requested Chiefs of MAAGs to review the tentative program to eliminate all but essentials in the undefined items. Several MAAGs replied with savings that could be applied to other requirements.² Instructions were received from OASD/ISA during the latter part of August for resubmission of a FY 61 MAP.³ CINCPAC issued implementing instructions and requested that MAAG representatives report to Hawaii for a joint preparation of a revised FY 61 MAP⁴ material program under a \$602.9 million ceiling.

The meeting of programming representatives of the PACOM MAAGs with CINCPAC and Military Department representatives to determine the item content of FY 61 PACOM MAP occurred in part as a result of Draper Committee recommendations designed to bring the unified commands further into the MAP programming picture. The guidance which was furnished to the MAAGs included country dollar ceilings which had been developed by the CINCPAC Staff from area ceilings furnished by OASD/ISA. An objective of the meeting was to formulate a MAP program suitable for presentation to Congress. This meeting marked the first time that competing military requirements in an entire program submission had to be weighed within an assigned dollar ceiling (\$602.9 million). The Washington representatives hand carried these programs back to their departments on 9 September.

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 00515 of 14 Aug 59

2 COMUSFK 220324Z Aug 59 Cite UK90604 PROVMAAG-K; CHMAAG Vietnam 130235Z Aug 59 Cite MAGCH-PC805; CHJUSMAG PHIL 120548Z Aug 59, Cite 702AP; CHMAAG Cambodia 131815Z Aug 59 Cite 1330; USARMA Vientiane Laos 150900Z Aug 59, Cite PEO 1412-59; CHMAAG Taiwan 140105Z, Cite MGGD-MMG 01277 Aug 59

3 OSD 182256Z Aug 59, Cite DEF 964035 & OSD 212245Z Aug 59, Cite DEF 964258

4 CINCPAC 210832Z Aug 59

[REDACTED]

In the meantime, after considering CHMAAG¹ and JCS recommendations,² CINCPAC refined the PACOM FY 60 MAP to a reduced dollar ceiling of \$316.4 million prescribed by the JCS³ based upon the reduced FY 60 MAP appropriation. The refinement was forwarded to the JCS on 19 September.⁴

During December, OASD/ISA requested CINCPAC recommendations for a PACOM FY 61 Military Assistance Material Program within a \$570 million ceiling by 31 December.⁵ On 4 December a representative of OASD/ISA arrived with the Orange Book, an OSD printed version of the PACOM FY 61 MAP. It totalled \$621.3 million. To this had to be added \$14.6 million "other materiel" for Cambodia, Taiwan and Korea and the Indonesia program of \$19.1 million. After considering MAAG recommendations,⁶ the CINCPAC Staff designated reductions to bring the Orange Book total within the \$570 million ceiling. As a separate exercise, additions of \$28 million accompanied by full rationale and by an equivalent value in further reductions were prepared to reflect the latest PACOM requirements. The results of this work⁷ were hand carried to OSD by the OASD/ISA representative on 12 December.

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- 1 CHMAAG Cambodia 200442Z Sep 59; CHMAAG Japan 180750Z Sep 59; COMUS-KOREA 190218Z Sep 59; CHPEO Laos 192340Z Sep 59; CHJUSMAG PHIL 220735Z Sep 59; CHMAAG Taiwan 190320Z Sep 59; CHJUSMAG Thailand 190815Z Sep 59; CHMAAG Vietnam 191105Z Sep 59
 - 2 JCS Memo to SECDEF of 8 Sep 59; JCS 172243Z Sep 59
 - 3 JCS 162123Z Sep 59
 - 4 ADMINO CINCPAC 200420Z Sep 59
 - 5 OSD 022232Z DEC 59
 - 6 CHJUSMAG Phil ltr of 27 Nov 59; CHMAAG Cambodia ltr of 20 Nov 59; CHJUSMAG Thailand ltr of 25 Nov 59; CHMAAG Korea ltr of 29 Nov 59; CHPEO Laos ltr of 27 Nov 59; CHMAAG Taiwan ltr of 27 Nov 59; CHMAAG Vietnam ltr of 28 Nov 59; CHMAAG Japan ltr of 1 Dec 59
 - 7 CINCPAC ltr ser 00745 of 12 Dec 59

FY 61-63 Military Assistance Programming

During October 1959, letters to the MAAGs were¹ prepared by the CINCPAC Staff concerning planning for FY 61-63 Military Assistance Programming. These letters provided detailed instructions for preparing adjusted base programs within dollar guide lines and additions and deletions in order of priority within upper and lower limits. Responses to this planning exercise were to be used to determine country ceilings for refining the FY 61 MAP upon receipt of a PACOM ceiling in 1960 and for determining preliminary funding requirements for materiel in the FY 62 and FY 63 programs.

MAP Force Objectives

FY 62 MAP Force Objectives recommendations for PACOM countries were forwarded in July to the OASD/ISA and the JCS.² These recommendations reflected PACOM long range MAP plans, and the reductions quantitatively required by qualitative force improvements reflected in long range MAP plans.

Congressional Hearing

Background material and statistical data were prepared by the CINCPAC Staff for CINCPAC's use in his presentation to the Congress when appearing as a witness on the FY 60 MSP.

MAAG Chiefs' Conference

A PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference was held at Okinawa, 21-23 May, attended by CINCPAC, the Component Commanders, and the MAAG Chiefs. The

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- 1 CINCPAC ltrs ser 00652 of 23 Oct 59; ser 00653 of 24 Oct 59; ser 00654 of 24 Oct 59; ser 00655 of 24 Oct 59; ser 00656 of 26 Oct 59; ser 00657 of 26 Oct 59; ser 00658 of 26 Oct 59, ser 00659 of 26 Oct 59
 - 2 CINCPAC ltr ser 00441 of 9 Jul 59

central theme of this conference was the necessity for all key MAP personnel to remain constantly aware of the regional aspect of MAP in the PACOM, rather than to become entirely preoccupied with local problems. As an effective means of demonstrating this theme, each MAAG Chief was required to make a presentation on a subject of joint interest, and was afforded an opportunity to present any special problems confronting him. This conference was most successful.¹

Priority List of Accomplishments

In June the revised PACOM Priority List of Accomplishments (PLA) was published.² The principal difference from prior versions was that priorities were expressed in terms of projects, rather than in terms of units, a method which provided more positive guidance to the MAAGs.

Revision of Formats "A" (Units and Installation Description) for Army Forces

Revised Formats "A" for all army forces except those of the GRC were submitted to Washington in April and May 1959.³ They reflected improvements in army force structures and further developments in unit Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E's). A continuing problem was that of reducing some army forces which were predicated upon missions not sanctioned by the U.S., or beyond the scope of MAP support available, or ineffective or out of balance with the overall economy. Generally army forces could not be reduced unless the combat capability of remaining forces were improved through modernization.

1 CINCPAC ser 00430 of 6 Jul 59

2 CINCPAC ser 00317 of 14 May 59

3 CINCPAC ltr ser 00265 of 27 Apr 59 (Korea only)

Elimination of the Number of Equipment Makes and Models and Standardization of Equipment

At CINCPAC's request and in the interest of reducing the number of makes and models of equipment, CINCUSARPAC developed studies, by technical service, in order to prepare authorized equipment lists for MAP supported army forces. The engineer¹ and ordnance vehicle² lists were forwarded to the Department of the Army during 1959. The Department of the Army approved the Engineer list.³ The ordnance vehicle list was still under consideration at the close of 1959. ✓

War Reserve of Ammunition Levels

The stockage levels for army in-country reserves of ammunition were revised and integrated into the PACOM Priority List of Accomplishments for the MAP. Regional levels of ammunition war reserves to be stocked under CINCPAC control were also defined and placed in the PLA. Justifications for these central reserves were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in June,⁴ with a request for approval in principle in order that planning could be initiated on this project. No reply had been received at the end of 1959. ✓

Southeast Asia Tele-Communication (SEATELCOM) Project

Plans for improving communications facilities within and linking the Southeast Asia countries of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had been explored by U.S. military and ICA authorities for several years before 1959. In 1958, military consideration of a project which

- 1 CINCPAC ltr ser 863 of 29 Apr 59
2 CINCPAC ltr ser 0799 of 19 Nov 59
3 DA 151354Z Oct 59
4 CINCPAC ltr ser 00376 of 12 Jun 59

[REDACTED]

would be sponsored by ICA and partially funded by the military under MAP was initiated.¹ In FY 55, ICA received \$30 million for this project, of which \$22 million remained under the Asian Economic Development Fund. In addition to ICA funds, FY 59 MAP funds in the amount of \$6 million, were obligated by DOD.²

After joint Defense-State (ICA) agreements were reached, some national agreements were obtained in June 1958 to permit initiation of the project.³ ICA completed loan agreements with Thailand and Vietnam, and Project agreements were signed by Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. Cambodia declined to enter into these agreements,⁴ necessitating construction of by-passes. Funds previously allocated for Cambodia were proposed to be used for this purpose.⁵ At the close of 1959, ICA was considering asking the President for an additional \$2 million for the by-passes.

ICA signed letters of Intent in Nov 58 designating Television Associates of Indiana (TV Associates) as engineering contractor. Preliminary reconnaissance surveys were completed in Thailand, Vietnam and Laos; however, under the Letter of Intent, TV Associates was limited to 10 people in Southeast Asia, making any great progress most unlikely until the contracts for each country were signed.

ICA agreed to keep CINCPAC informed of pertinent aspects of the project. However, the CINCPAC Staff was concerned over continuing delays in ICA negotiations for a contract with TV Associates of Indiana, lack of detailed engineering data, and lack of evidence of any substantial

1 CNO 182011Z Apr 58

2 ICA Wash 15 Jul 9 PM 1958 (ICATO Circular X-614)

3 CNO spdltr ser 06169P30 of 21 Jul 58

4 SECSTATE 150245Z Jul 58

5 ICA Wash 28 Dec 8 PM 1958 (ICATO Circular X-346)

progress during 1958. In June of 1959 a meeting was held at CINCPAC headquarters attended by an ICA representative, the Special Assistant to the ICA Coordinator for the Southeast Asia Tele-Communications (SEATELCOMM) Project, the President of TV Associates and members of the CINCPAC Staff, during which it was decided that CINCPAC should appoint a CINCPAC Liaison Officer for the project. CINCPAC appointed the Chief of Plans & Policy Branch, J6 Division as the CINCPAC representative.¹ This officer subsequently was detailed on Temporary Additional Duty to Southeast Asia to lay the ground work for the necessary liaison between the MAAG/JUSMAG/PEO to insure that military requirements would be coordinated.

CHPEO Laos and CHJUSMAG Thailand were requested on 7 August² to submit military requirements for long lines telecommunications support required from the ICA SEATELCOMM Project, to include a chart of channels required, a tabulation of data, a priority list of accomplishments, the cable pairs required, the location of mainframes, and the requirements for international circuits and channels to connect Thailand and Vietnam in the case of Laos, and Laos and Vietnam in the case of Thailand. Each was advised that respective USOMs should be advised of the same information in compliance with the ICA contract, along with Laos and Thai total requirements for tele-communications. CHPEO Laos was further advised that programming action was required for provision of terminal equipment past mainframe in military bases.

1 CINCPAC 102122Z Jul 59

2 CINCPAC 070258Z and 070259Z Aug 59

Army Reserve Programs of PACOM Nations

Guidelines for the development of Army Reserve Programs of PACOM nations developed by CINCUSARPAC were forwarded to all MAAGs, JUSMAGs and PEO.¹ In forwarding these guidelines, it was pointed out that each country program must be tailored to the desired roles and missions of the forces and to the conditions within the country. These guidelines were expected to be most helpful as a check list from which specific plans and objectives for an Army Reserve Program for each country could be developed. However, this guidance was considered anticipatory only and not intended to spur the creation of reserve forces.

Recommended Revisions to DOD MAP Instruction S-2110.2, 15 Jul 58

The CINCPAC Staff, using its experience in reviewing programs, studied the new programming concept of utilizing order of magnitude dollar ceilings as a management tool in administering programs. Recommended changes to DOD Instructions on Programming were forwarded to the Department of Defense in August.²

Care and Maintenance of MAP Equipment

After considering recommendations from the PACOM Component Commanders, CINCPAC Instruction 4100.1, 1 October 1959, was published. It prescribed policy and procedures pertaining to the care and maintenance of equipment provided under MAP. The objective was to effect significant and continuing improvement in maintenance capabilities, standards and procedures within MAP recipient countries.

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 0646 of 29 Sep 59

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 00517 of 15 Aug 59

"Clean Sweep"

On 8 July, a CINCPAC Instruction¹ inaugurated a concentrated one year campaign to rid PACOM MAP countries of excess materiel and scrap. It was prepared in response to CHMAAG reports that the forces of nations in the PACOM area were disinclined to declare materiel as excess no matter how useless, and as a result of continuing General Accounting Office (GAO), DOD and Congressional criticism in this area. Goals of "Clean Sweep" were:

- (1) To utilize redistributable assets by transfer between services and countries within the Pacific Command;
- (2) To convince national forces that effective redistribution and disposal would not only increase their fighting potential but would also bolster justification for future requirements;
- (3) To clear out accumulated excesses in order to free storage space and to permit better maintenance of required materiel; and,
- (4) To establish continuing excess disposal programs for each PACOM MAP Country utilizing effective and proper procedures and built on a clear understanding of the problems by country forces.

CHMAAGs were directed to submit quarterly reports on the campaign. The first progress reports indicated that over \$100 million worth of accumulated excesses were reported for redistribution or disposal since the beginning of Clean Sweep.

MAP Training Activities

CINCPAC discharged his principal responsibilities for the supervision

1 CINCPAC Instruction 4500.1 of 8 Jul 59

[REDACTED]

of the MAP Training Program by reviewing, approving or recommending approval of programs submitted by CHMAAGs and by monitoring implementation of the program throughout the year. However, there were special training activities supported by MAP funds which were not routine. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Visit by Students of Thailand Armed Forces Staff College

CHJUSMAG Thailand forwarded¹ an informal request by the Thais that the U.S. support an orientation tour of Hawaii and Okinawa in September 1959 by their Armed Forces Staff College. CINCPAC concurred² in the proposal and secured OSD approval³ for discussions with the Thais. OSD approved the proposed itinerary after arrangements had been firmed.⁴ Subsequently the trip was made according to schedule.⁵

U.S. Navy Mobile Training Team for Indonesia

A nine-man Navy Mobile Training Team, requested by the U.S. Naval Attache, American Legation (ALUSNA), Djakarta, arrived in Djakarta on 19 January 1959. The mission of this team was to survey requirements for the establishment of Indonesian Navy Schools on underwater swimming and demolitions, gunnery, combat information centers, communications and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The team was provided by CINCPACFLT. Although the team was not used to its maximum potential, the visit was a significant accomplishment. This was the first time

1 JUSMAG Thailand ltr ACAR-OP of 19 Mar 59

2 CINCPAC 160321Z Apr 59

3 OSD 052116Z May 59 Cite DEF 959204; CINCPAC 080239Z May 59

4 OSD 062238Z Aug 59 Cite DEF 963461

5 CINCPAC 152103Z Aug 59; CINCPAC 210323Z Aug 59

[REDACTED]

a Navy Training team had been authorized to visit Indonesia and as such was an important step toward better Indonesian - U.S. Navy relations.¹

PACAF Operations Assistance Team

CINCPAC proposed² to PACAF that a PACAF Operations Assistance Team be established for the purpose of evaluating the combat readiness of MAP-supported country air forces and making appropriate recommendations to CINCPAC and MAAG Chiefs. PACAF concurred³ in the proposal. Accordingly, CINCPAC established the team⁴ and prescribed the terms of reference.⁵ The team made its first visit to Japan and Korea in July 1959. It visited Taiwan and the Philippines in October 1959. The reports of the team⁶ were being studied in the CINCPAC Staff and in the MAAG's at the end of 1959.

Travel of Japanese Self Defense Force Personnel to CONUS

CNO approved⁷ a proposal by CHMAAG Japan⁸ that units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet be used to transport Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) personnel enroute to CONUS for formal training. Although the primary purpose of this proposal was to reduce costs so that more MSDF trainees could be sent to CONUS schools, additional on-the-job training would be provided MSDF personnel on U.S. ships. Decisions concerning the provision of travel to each trainee were to be handled on a case-by-case

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- 1 ALUSNA Djakarta 100240Z Oct 58 and 170130Z Dec 58 and 060635Z Feb 59
 - 2 CINCPAC ltr ser 0828 of 11 Dec 58
 - 3 PACAF ltr, Subj: "AF MAP", of 10 Feb 58
 - 4 CINCPAC 060331Z Mar 59
 - 5 CINCPAC 282341Z Apr 59
 - 6 PACAF ltrs 8 Sep 59, Subj: Report of Assistance Visit JSDAF; 8 Sep 59 Subj: Report of Assistance Visit to ROKAF; 21 Dec 59, Subj: Report of Assistance Visit to CNAF; and 21 Dec 59, Subj: Report of Assistance Visit to the Philippine Air Force
 - 7 CNO ltr ser 0750P63 of 24 Jul 59
 - 8 CHMAAG Japan ltr ser 033 of 17 Apr 59

S [REDACTED]
basis.

Under the then-current DOD policy, Japan was the only PACOM MAP-supported country that was required to pay transocean travel costs for MAP trainees. At the request of CHMAAG Japan,¹ CINCPAC requested² that DOD review this policy with a view to removing the requirement. No reply to this request was received at the end of 1959. ✓

Civil Affairs Training

The mission statements developed during 1959 for the countries within the PACOM included a requirement to develop a capability within the armies of nations in the PACOM area to conduct Civil Affairs operations in order to enhance the internal security position and attain a status of readiness to meet contingency requirements.


The Civil Affairs training programs in 1959 for armed forces personnel of nations in the PACOM area included both local training and attendance at the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

[REDACTED]

During FY 59 eighty-four students from five PACOM countries attended the Civil Affairs School as follows: Korea 10, Taiwan 19, Philippines 5, Vietnam 44, Thailand 6; a 560% increase over FY 58. Fifty-eight students from eight countries were scheduled for FY 60: Korea 7, Taiwan 17, Philippines 3, Vietnam 20, Thailand 7, Japan 1, Indonesia 2, Laos 1.

1 CHMAAG Japan ltr of 15 Jun 59

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 0514 of 4 Aug 59


U.S. Civil Affairs Mobile Training Teams conducted training in Korea, Japan and Taiwan during the year, and a PACOM/USARPAC Survey Mobile Training Team visited Indonesia "to discuss, and compare Civil Affairs, Military Government (CAMG) systems".

The forces of nations in the PACOM area have also received Civil Affairs training by means of combined CPX's and logistics exercises in Korea; combined exercises FUJI, CLOVER and MAPLE LEAF and service schools in Japan; war games, exercises and local schools in Taiwan; and CPX's and maneuvers in Vietnam.

In Thailand, Indonesia and Laos where the government control was wielded to a large degree by or through the military, the commanders involved devoted a major portion of their efforts to solving Civil Affairs problems and thereby gained a practical working knowledge of many Civil Affairs matters. In this they were advised and aided by both MAAG and State Department advisers.

The Armed Forces Republic of Cambodia (FARK) demonstrated their ability to use military skills in a Civil Affairs role in the February 22-29 incident in Siem Reap province. A noteworthy success was represented by Indonesia's request for an allocation of 2 spaces for the FY 1960 12 week Allied Officers Course, thus indicating a willingness on the part of the Indonesians to be identified with the United States in the sensitive area of government control.

Special Warfare Training

In the MAP programs for certain countries in the PACOM area,

SECRET

provision was made for the support of psychological warfare units and special forces within these country's armed forces. PACOM forces provided special training for these units. In many cases, this training took the form of on-the-job training, for many of these units were engaged actively in combatting communism within their country's borders. A more detailed discussion of the operations of some of these units is contained in Chapter IV. The concept of developing PSYWAR and UW capabilities in nations in the PACOM area was in consonance with the continuing PACOM objective of assistance to free Asian nations in developing their military forces to a high degree of self-sufficiency for contingency situations.

Military psychological operations programs in Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos were supported by the use of Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and the furnishing of assistance in training under MAP. Courses in psychological operations continued to be scheduled for allied officers at the PSYWAR center, Fort Bragg, N.C. under the MAP.

Preliminary discussions were held with U.S. staff officers in Japan with regard to the establishment of a PSYWAR unit in the Ground Self Defense Force. Initiation of this unit would require sanction of the Japanese Government and could be accomplished only when the political climate was favorable. (S **SECRET**)

CINCPAC strongly supported, through MAP, the development of UW capabilities in the armed forces of free Asian countries. As a measure of PACOM progress, Free Asian Nations had trained over 4000 of approximately 5000 country UW personnel programmed under MAP. (**SECRET**)

[REDACTED]

A U.S. SF MTT from Okinawa was programmed to conduct a 16 week formal course of instruction for the FAL Special Commando units during FY 60. In view of the extension of Project Disallow (C) and other training in progress in Laos, CINCPAC cancelled the SF MTT for FY 60.¹ It was planned that the requirement for this SF MTT would be determined during refinement of the FY 61 training program.

Eight weeks training in Thailand for 200 Armed Forces Laos (FAL) paratroopers in guerrilla warfare and anti-guerrilla warfare by the Royal Thailand Army was approved by OSD.² Subsequently the Departments of State and Defense approved training of six additional cycles of 200 FAL paratroopers per cycle.³ The first cycle of FAL paratroopers completed training 15 Dec 59, and the second cycle commenced 21 Dec 59.

The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) requested eight weeks Ranger training for 20 Indonesian Officers on Okinawa to begin 1 April 1960.⁴ It was planned that training would be accomplished by the 1st SF Gp with all funding to be borne by the ICA.

In the past, political restraints limited Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) from soliciting other than minimal U.S. assistance in developing a Japanese Special Forces capability. An official request⁵ for a SF MTT to train 20 Japanese Officer instructors was approved by DA⁶, and a two week program of instruction was completed on 13 Dec 59. [REDACTED]

1 CINCPAC 230340Z Oct 59

2 OSD 152224Z Oct 59 Cite DEF066075

3 State 1140 to Vientiane 30 Nov 6 PM

4 ICA ltr to USARPAC via CINCPAC, Subj: "Ranger Training Eight Weeks Special Course in Okinawa for Twenty Indonesian Officers, FY 60" of 28 Oct 59

5 CHMAAG Japan 050700Z Oct 59 Cite ASO 9066

6 DA 021734Z Nov 59 Cite DA 967766

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PROGRAM AND DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY 1950 TO 30 JUN 1959




FIGURE 9

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MAAG PERSONNEL - PACIFIC COMMAND * BY SERVICE, CATEGORY AND COUNTRY

AS OF 31 DEC 1969





Figure 10

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MAP COUNTRY OPERATIONS

In the preceding sections of this chapter, CINCPAC's long range MAP planning and CINCPAC's area-wide day-to-day MAP activities during 1959 are discussed. All of CINCPAC's activities in support of the Military Assistance Program were related to CINCPAC's plans and strategy for the PACOM as a whole. However, in carrying out his day-to-day MAP activities, CINCPAC necessarily dealt with each country individually. This section will discuss some of the significant activities effecting individual countries in the PACOM. (SECRET)

The majority of the Army military assistance program was devoted to maintenance and training since the delivery program had been completed pending further modernization of equipment, and consequently Army MAP activities were largely routine. Accordingly, the activities which will be discussed below on a country basis will show a greater emphasis on the development of better balanced and modernized PACOM country forces, and will not necessarily reflect the degree of MAP effort in support of each PACOM country. (SECRET)

Burma

A military sales agreement was signed in Rangoon on 24 June 1958. Under the terms of this agreement, the United States undertook to furnish, against token payments in local currency, such equipment, materials and services as might be requested by the Burmese and approved by the United


States.¹ By Presidential determination, twenty million dollars were made available for such purposes out of mutual security funds for the fiscal year 1958.²

Equipment to be furnished under the agreement was predominantly for the Army. There were 6 patrol boats for the Navy and 6 helicopters for the Air Force. Delivery of the Army equipment began in late 1958 and was to be continued on a phased basis over 2 to 3 years. By the end of January 1959 all six helicopters had been delivered.³ Two of the six patrol boats were delivered in the fall of 1959.⁴

Implementation of the sales agreement was monitored in Rangoon by the Service attaches.⁵ Subsequent to an exchange of communications⁶ among CINCPAC, OSD and the American Embassy, Rangoon, a small (5 officers 3 Army, 1 Navy and 1 Air Force) Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) was authorized.⁷ The function of MEDT was to assist the service attaches in implementing the sales agreement.

Terms of Reference of the Chief of MEDT, as modified and approved by OSD, were promulgated in January 1959.⁸ On 6 March 1959, CINCPAC questioned⁹ OSD on the status of MEDT and pointed out the necessity for giving CINCPAC direct representation in Burma for implementing the military sales agreement. OSD requested¹⁰ that CINCPAC submit revised

1 State Dept Press Release No. 398 of 11 Jul 58

2 OSD 160042Z Jul 58 Cite DEF 944830

3 HQ USAF 232145Z Jun 59

4 SANA Rangoon 030214Z Dec 59 Cite WEEKA 48

5 OSD 212126Z Jul 58 Cite DEF 945197

6 CINCPAC 280450Z Aug 58, USARMA Rangoon 100719Z Sep 58 Cite C-74, |
CINCPAC 162233Z Sep 58, CINCPAC 280215Z Sep 58

7 OSD 242257Z Sep 58 Cite DEF 948553, CNO 221429Z Oct 58

8 Term of Ref CINCPAC 0028 of 16 Jun 59

9 CINCPAC 060225Z Mar 59

10 OSD 202321Z Mar 59 Cite DEF 956714

proposed Terms of Reference for CHMEDT. After coordinating with the U.S. Ambassador to Burma, new Terms of Reference which would put CHMEDT in the direct chain of military command under CINCPAC were promulgated in September 1959.¹ The new Terms of Reference were to become effective when the new Chief MEDT assumed his duties in January 1960.

The magnitude and nature of MEDT's mission under the new Terms of Reference required that additional Army personnel be assigned. By the end of 1959 an increase of one Army officer and 2 enlisted personnel had been authorized.² The officer was to be a senior Colonel of the Combat Arms to be assigned as Chief MEDT. Thus by the end of 1959 MEDT was authorized a total strength as follows:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Army	4	2
Navy	1 (as required in accordance with the delivery schedule for patrol boats	-
Air Force	1 (as required)	-

On 26 December 1959 the President made a determination authorizing an additional \$20 million for the provision of military assistance and related services for Burma.³

The American Ambassador to Burma stated in November 1959 that "In recent months, the Military Assistance Program has been relatively more successful in the achievement of these US objectives than the economic program" and "The Military Sales Agreement, it can be said, provides a

1 CINCPAC Ser 00591 of 16 Sep 59

2 CINCPAC 081910Z Aug 59, DA Joint msg dated 26 Aug 59


3 OSD 062158Z Jan 60 Cite DA 970535

SECRET NOFORN

CAMBODIA

BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA	59,496 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	8.7 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.5%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.1 ACRES
LITERACY RATE	35%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	54 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1967	\$424 MILLION
PER CAPITA	\$52
DEFENSE EXPENDITURE 1967	\$34 MILLION
AS % OF TOTAL EXPEND.	30
AS % OF GNP	5

KING - NORAMARIT, NORODOM
MINISTER NATL. DEF. - SON NOL, MOEN
CHIEF GEN. STAFF AND C.A. ARMY - SON NOL, MOEN
C.A. NAVY - CORDER, PIENNA, CAPT
C.A. AIR - MOO HOU, NEN



OVERALL OBJECTIVE
DEFEAT CAMBODIA TO THE COMMUNISTS, MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, AND PROMOTE AN ATTITUDE BASICALLY FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
ORGANIZE, TRAIN AND EQUIP CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES IN ORDER TO INSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY	U.S. AMBASSADOR ... MR. WILLIAM C. TINKLE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, G.A. ... MR. ALVIN H. GREENMAN CHIEF, MAC ... MR. GEN. C. B. FILLER ... 114

	MAP OBJECTIVE	ACTUAL	CHANGES DURING 1969
ARMY	1 INFANTRY REGIMENT, 15 INFANTRY BNS 1 ARB BN 1 REC BN	22 INF BNS, 1 ARB BN, 4 RECON BN, 28,500 OFF & ENL. PERS. (2000-MAF); 4 INF BNS	NONE
NAVY	2 PATROL CRAFT, 1 LANDING SHIP	1 PATROL CRAFT, 1 LANDING SHIP 1,500 OFF & ENL. PERS.	NONE
AIR FORCE	1 COMPOSITE SQDN	1 COMPOSITE SQDN 600 OFF & ENL. PERS.	NONE

SECRET NOFORN

FIGURE 11

keystone for the reorientation of Burma towards the United States and away from the Sino-Soviet bloc".¹

Indonesia

Early in January 1959, CINCPAC drafted a proposed long-range military assistance program for Indonesia, based on a request from CNO for one on the order of magnitude of about \$20 million a year.² All U.S. defense agencies considered it highly desirable that the proposed program be discussed with Indonesian officials. Due to the apparent impossibility of forecasting Indonesian policies, such authority was not granted by the Department of State until late August.³ On August 28th, Ambassador Jones informed both Subandrio and Djunda that, subject to availability of funds, the U.S. was planning to continue government-to-government sale of U.S. military equipment and services to Indonesia in FY 1960. No dollar figures were given at that time.

The foregoing MAP for Indonesia was primarily an Army program in view of the uncertain political allegiance of the Indonesian Air Force and the failure to generate valid naval requirements. Accordingly, CINCPAC was, as of mid November, reluctant to request obligation of more than \$16.5 million dollars of the approved Presidential determination of \$21.5 million dollars. On the basis of an increasingly friendly attitude on the part of Indonesian naval officials, and with some urging from the Dept. of Defense, a revised CINCPAC position was forwarded to Washington on 12 December.⁴ This revised position included a request to use

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- 1 AMEMB Rangoon FSD 266 of 4 Nov 1959, Subj: Analysis of the Role of U.S. Assistance programs in Burma
 2. CNO 290021Z Nov 58
 - 3 State to Djakarta 209 of 21 Aug 59
 - 4 CINCPAC 122253Z Dec 59

all of the Presidential Determination Funds (\$21.5) by adding a \$4.5 million Indonesian Navy Program.

By the end of December the FY 60 MAP for Indonesia had been reduced to illustrative programs which provided for material and training for the Indonesian Navy, Air Force and Army, with primary emphasis on the latter. Refinement of these programs was scheduled for early 1960.

During CY 1959 the U.S. Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia (MILTAG) gained in stature and ability to deal effectively with both Indonesian and U.S. officials in Indonesia. The original USAF member of MILTAG was not, however, replaced in view of the reluctance of the Indo Air Force to accept U.S. assistance. Additionally the status of MILTAG was officially defined and "Terms of Reference" for this group were promulgated by CINCPAC on 13 November 1959.¹

Japan

JGSDF Reorganization Plan

The Japanese Ground Self Defense Force submitted a 5-year reorganization plan to the MAAG in January. This plan provided for the replacement of the current 6 infantry divisions and 4 combined brigades with 1 mechanized division and 14 smaller improved infantry divisions. The self-propelled artillery and some of the light tanks required for the mechanized divisions were included in the FY 60 redefined program submitted to Washington in April.² Subsequent downward revisions, due to fund limitations deleted this equipment. However,


1 CINCPAC ltr ser 00700 of 13 Nov 59

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 00220 of 9 Apr 59

SECRET NOFORN

JAPAN

BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA	377,915 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	82 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	1%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.2 ACRES
LITERACY RATE	95%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	66 YEARS
INDUS. PROD. 1957	\$75 BILLION
PER CAPITA	\$307
DEFENSE EXPENDITURE 1957	\$307 MILLION
AS % OF TOTAL GNP EXPEND.	3
AS % OF GNP	15



EMPEROR - HIROHITO
 PRIME MINISTER - KISHO, NOBUSUKI
 CHIEF OF DEF. AGENCY - AKAGI, MUNENORI
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL - HAYASHI, KENZO, LTJEN.
 CHIEF, GROUND STAFF - SUGIYAMA, SHIGERU, LTJEN.
 CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF - UHARA, MITSUO, VADM.
 CHIEF, AIR STAFF - GENDA, MINORU, LTJEN.

OVERALL OBJECTIVE
DEFY CONTROL OF JAPAN BY ANY HOSTILE POWER. INSURE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG, FRIENDLY, CO- OPERATIVE NATION FREELY ALLIED WITH U.S.

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
TO ASSIST IN ORGANIZING, TRAINING AND EQUIPPING JAPANESE FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY, OF AS- SISTING IN DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, AND MEETING JAPAN'S MILI- TARY COMMITMENT UNDER THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY.	U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, JCA MR. GARDNER E. PALMER CHIEF, MAC MGR. 1 C. ROGERS, USAF

	MAP OBJECTIVE	ACTUAL	CHANGES DURING 1959
ARMY	9 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 4 COMBINED BRIGADES 4 BATTALIONS 2 BRIGADE BATTALIONS	6 INF DIVS., 4 COMBINED BRIGADES, 142,000 OFF & ENL. PERM.	NONE
NAVY	1 CMB-14184 / FERRY TYPES, 8 PATROL CRAFT 3 SUBMARINES, 22 MINICRAFT, 110 ASW AIRCRAFT 1 SUB-TO AIR MISSILE BATT.	37 DEPT. BATTALIONS / FERRY TYPES, 8 PATROL CRAFT, 1 SUBMARINE, 52 MINICRAFT, 70 ASW AIRCRAFT, 25,000 OFF & ENL. PERM.	+ 5 DEPT. BATTALIONS + 4 PATROL CRAFT + 10 MINICRAFT + 31 ASW AIRCRAFT
AIR FORCE	1 A/W FIGHTER SQUAD, 3 TRANSPORT SQ 2 TAC BATTAL SQ	3 B/T SQUAD, 2 TRANSPORT SQUAD 1 A/W FIGHTER SQUAD, 25,000 OFF & ENL.	+ 1 B/T SQUAD + 1 A/W FIGHTER SQUAD

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FIGURE 12

75 M41 tanks were added to the undelivered FY 50-59 MAP as a result of realignment of these programs.

T-33A Aircraft (Japan)

Action was initiated to attempt to recover some MAP furnished T-33A aircraft from Japan, for redistribution to other countries.¹

Korea

Costing Study

In October 1958, State, Defense and ICA requested that CINCPAC prepare a study of the costs involved in maintaining ROK forces capable of fulfilling the mission in Korea during the period 1959-1963.² CINCPAC was charged with making the decision on operational and equipment standards for the forces covered by the study. OASD/ISA, with the concurrence of the State Department, approved (with modifications) COMUS Korea and CINCPAC recommendations on the planning assumptions and force levels which were to be the basis of the study.³

COMUS Korea submitted the costing study to CINCPAC in May 1959.⁴ The study concluded in part that "The present US/UN/ROK force structure already assumes risks which will be materially increased if force improvements for ROKA, ROKNAVY and ROKAF, are not provided to keep pace with the increasing combat potential of the Chinese Communists and North Koreans. From an analysis of the situation, the degree of force improvement planned for ROK forces and the probability of the occurrence of this force

1 CINCPAC 100430Z Oct 59; HQUSAF 232153Z Oct 59 and CINCPAC 282309Z Oct 59

2 Joint State-Defense-ICA msg of 20 Oct 58

3 CINCPAC 070326Z Nov 58, COMUS Korea 050115Z Dec 58 Cite UK 978624 CJ, CINCPAC 130443Z Dec 58, COMUS Korea 230543Z Jan 59 Cite UK 90064 CJ, CINCPAC 040002Z Feb 59, OSD 162333Z Feb 59 Cite DEF 955060

4 COMUS Korea ltr USFK CJ 121.6 AGJ of 19 May 59

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KOREA




FIGURE 13

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improvement, it is the judgement of CINCPAC/COMUS Korea that no reduction in the ROKA below 18 active divisions is militarily justifiable over the period 1959-1963.¹

CINCPAC indicated, subject to certain modifications, general agreement with the conclusions drawn by COMUS Korea on the major force objectives required to fulfill the mission in Korea during the 1959-1963 time frame. CINCPAC noted that the costs developed in the study would exceed the funds which were expected to be available for the support of ROK forces during the period covered by the study.

Modernization of ROKA

MA7 medium tanks were shipped to Korea to replace WWII tanks in 3 of the 10 tank battalions. Training was initiated and plans were finalized for the conversion of the 3 battalions.

Plans for a Nike-Hercules Surface to Air Missile (SAM) battalion were submitted in the FY 60 refined MA program for Korea and preliminary unilateral plans were formulated in KMAC for the initiation of training when discussion with the ROK was authorized. The SAM battalion later was deleted by CINCPAC due to funding limitations. However, COMUS Korea realized his FY 50-59 undelivered, as well as his FY 60 MAP thereby providing sufficient funds to include the Nike Battalion in his FY 60 MAP.

The FY 60 refined program for the ROK Army, submitted to Washington in April,² provided for increased artillery fire power as partial compensation for deactivating 2 divisions late in 1958. Additional

1 CINCPAC 1st End, Ser 000197 of 6 Oct 59 on COMUS Korea ltr USFK CJ 121.6 AGJ of 19 May 59.

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 00220 of 9 Apr 59

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equipment for 2 reserve divisions was also included to provide full TO&E equipment in order to give those two divisions a mobilization capability. Subsequent downward revisions, due to fund limitations, deleted additional equipment for reserve divisions. Equipment to increase artillery fire power was also deleted, except that equipment for 1 additional 8" Howitzer Battalion was restored in the tentative FY 60 program.

Follow-up on GAO Reports, Korea

A special inspection team¹ continued follow-up action to overcome deficiencies in basic programming data reported by the GAO. A steady and positive improvement was noted.

The Korean Army's logistical system was reorganized in order to make the system more responsive to the requirements of the ROK Field Army.

All Weather Aircraft

The desirability of providing an all-weather capability for Korean Air Force interceptor squadrons was recognized for some time. Approval² of one squadron of F-86D aircraft for scheduled delivery in the 4th Quarter of FY 60 was secured in 1959.

Laos

The deterioration of the internal security situation in Laos occasioned by overt Pathet Lao aggression, with alleged Viet Minh assistance, in the northern provinces resulted in a series of "crash" MAP actions to improve the effectiveness of the Laotian Armed Forces (FAL) in order to increase their ability to counter aggression. Principal actions taken

1 Report of 3rd Logistics MAP Inspection Team, Korea, 1959

2 HQUSAF 192103Z Feb 59 Cite AFMMS-PP-56801

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LAOS




FIGURE 14

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are listed in the following paragraphs.

Strong CINCPAC support to repeated requests from Chief PEO¹ on behalf of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) resulted in State/DOD approval of a temporary increase of 40 additional volunteer companies in the FAL and of 4,000 additional Auto Defense troops. The first increment of carbines for the Auto Defense was provided under MAP in October 1959.

Emergency requirements for charter airlift to move essential supplies and to assist in the deployment of troops were approved by the DOD in the amount of \$125,000.² This amount was estimated to be sufficient to charter 1 C-47 and 1 C-46 for approximately 2 months. The speeded-up delivery of 2 C-47's and 3 L-20's in September 1959 alleviated the long-range requirements for charter airlift.

A second airborne battalion and a PSYWAR company were organized in the Lao Army.³

Philippines

Status of DE for Philippine Navy

The principal concern of the Philippine Navy had been the problem of acquiring a destroyer escort (DE)-size ship. A High Speed Transport (APD) was included in the FY 60 Navy MAP for the Philippines, but was deleted by CINCPAC when the PACOM program was reduced to \$325 million. It was included, however, in the list of items supplementary to the reduced program and restored at the last readings.

1 USARMA Vietnam 040900Z Aug 59 Cite PEO 1333-59

2 OSD 012207Z Oct 59 Cite DEF 966275, OSD 192220Z Aug 59

3 OSD 262131Z Aug 59

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PHILIPPINES

BASIC INFORMATION	
AREA	115,600 SQ. MI.
POPULATION	24 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	3 %
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.8 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	65 %
LIFE EXPECTANCY	38 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1957	\$ 50 MILLION
PER CAPITA	\$ 200
DEFENSE EXPENDITURE 1957	\$ 75 MILLION
AS % OF TOTAL GOVT. EXPEND.	12
AS % OF GNP	1.5

PRESIDENT - GARCIA, CARLOS P.
 SECY NATL DEFENSE - SANTOS, ALEJO
 CHIEF STAFF, AFP - CABALL, MANUEL, LTJEN.
 CG, ARMY - FAJARDO, TIRSG. BOEN
 FCIC, NAVY - FRANCISCO, JOSE, COMO
 CG, AIR FORCE - MOLINA, PEDRO, BGEN



OVERALL OBJECTIVE
TO DEVELOP THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC INTO A STRONG, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY, DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK, AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE COMMON DEFENSE UNDER DEATH.

MAP OBJECTIVE	COUNTRY TEAM
ORGANIZE, TRAIN AND EQUIP PHILIPPINE MILITARY FORCES TO ENABLE THEM TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, TO INCREASE THEIR ABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK, AND TO ENABLE THEM TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSIVE POTENTIAL OF SEATO.	U.S. AMBASSADOR - JON JOHN WILKINSON (DES) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, ISA - MA. PAUL D. SUMMERS CHIEF, JUSMAC - MAJ GEN. WILLIAM A. MYETER, USA

	MAP OBJECTIVE	ACTUAL	CHANGES DURING 1959
ARMY	1 INF DIV 3 RES DIV PHIL CONSTABULARY (10,000)	1 INF DIV, 3 RES DIVS (NO NON CAP) 122,000 INF & ENL. PERS ACTIVE PHIL CONSTABULARY (10,000) 1 RES DIV (NOO-MAP)	+3 INF DIVS (RES) 2,000 PERS TRANSFERRED FROM ARMY TO CONSTABULARY
NAVY	1 APC, 20 PATROL CRAFT, 3 MINESHAFT 7 LANDING SHIPS	21 PATROL CRAFT, 3 MINESHAFT 6 LANDING SHIPS, 6,000 OFF & ENL. PERS. (NAVY & MARINE)	+ 2 PATROL CRAFT - 1 LANDING SHIP
AIR FORCE	2 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADS, 1 TRANSPORT SQUAD 1 ALL WEATHER FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUAD	2 FTR SQUADS, 1 TRANS SQUAD, 1 AIR RESCUE SQUAD 5,700 OFF & ENL. PERS	+ NONE

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FIGURE 15

MAP Support for Philippine Marines

A significant step was taken during the period when CINCPAC recommended MAP support for one company (342 pers) of Philippine Marines, and one battalion was included in the recommended Strategic Force Objectives.³

Transfers from Philippine Army to Constabulary

In order to relieve the battalion combat teams of the 1st Division for training, 2,000 officers and men with equipment were transferred to the Constabulary.⁴

Government of the Republic of China

Modernization of the Chinese National Air Force (CNAF)

Certain actions initiated during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of the fall of 1958 were unresolved and/or continued into 1959. Among these were the replacement of the F-84G inventory, the turn-over of C-119 aircraft to the CNAF, and the modification of the F-86F aircraft for a SIDE-WINDER capability. During 1959, 80 F-100A aircraft were approved⁵ to replace 3 squadrons of F-84G aircraft with delivery scheduled to commence

1 AMEMB Manila 4147 to State (180945Z Jun 59), CINCPAC 202134Z May 59

2 CNO 212041Z May 59

3 CINCPAC ltr ser 00359 of 3 Jun 59

4 JUSMAG Phil 091.7 PC of 6 Jul 59

5 OSD 291740Z Jan 59 Cite DEF 954167

April 60. One squadron of C-119 aircraft which had been deployed to Taiwan during the Straits Crisis was approved¹ for turn-over to the CNAF. SIDEWINDER modification for 155 F-86F aircraft had been approved prior to the reporting period;² this number was later increased to 225. The majority of the aircraft had been modified by June 1959. Approval of one squadron of F-86D aircraft for Taiwan for scheduled delivery in the 4th Quarter of FY 60 was secured in 1959.³ After several months of wrangling,⁴ the GRC consented to implement their earlier oral agreement to replace one F-86F squadron with the F-86D squadron. F-86D training at Clark AFB thus "slipped" several months, but was finally started in September 1959.

This represented a continuing problem in the program for modernization and conversion of units in the CNAF. The basis for U.S. programming was that the CNAF would convert existing units to the new equipment and would simultaneously release replaced equipment, thus maintaining existing force levels. This the CNAF was reluctant to do.⁵ The CNAF desired, instead, to activate new units to use new equipment. A message to CHMAAG Taiwan⁶ emphasized the necessity for a firm commitment on the part of the CNAF lest all force improvement be jeopardized.

GRC Navy Acquisitions

The GRC Navy acquired the ex-USS LSM's 472 and 474 on 6

-
- 1 OSD 262334Z Mar 59 Cite DEF 957024
 - 2 HQUSAF 262126Z Aug 58 Cite AFMMS-PP 56417
 - 3 HQUSAF 192103Z Feb 59 Cite AFMMS-PP 56801
 - 4 CHMAAG Taiwan 040046Z Sep 59 Cite MGAFF-DO MG 01373
 - 5 CHMAAG Taiwan 170731Z Jul 59 Cite MGGC-MG 01125
 - 6 CINCPAC 280335Z Jul 59

February 1959 at Seattle.¹ These ships were commissioned MEI-WEN (LSM 254) and MEI-HAN (LSM 255). On 16 February, the ex-FLUNKETT (DD 431) was transferred to the GRC Navy at Charleston, S.C.,² and on 10 June the MCS 277³ was delivered. These ships considerably enhanced the capabilities of the Chinese Navy.

NIKE Battalion

The Chinese Nationalist Army scored a first for PACOM MAP-supported forces when the U.S. Army 2nd Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery Regiment, formally turned over its equipment and operational control of this equipment to the Chinese Nationalist (CHINAT) 1st Air Defense Artillery Battalion (NIKE-Hercules) on 15 August 1959. This was the first MAP-supported guided missile unit to become operational in the PACOM.

Exchange of MAP Information with GRC

On 7 September, 1959, CINCPAC proposed to CHMAAG Taiwan⁴ that the latter explore with COMUSTDC and the U.S. Ambassador an acceptable modus operandi whereby approved MAP force objectives for the GRC might be made known to responsible GRC defense officials. From the CINCPAC Staff viewpoint, this was considered a desirable step, since the size of the FY 60 and proposed FY 61 MAP for Taiwan was considerably less than that contained in the FY 57-59 programs. Further, while DOD approval already existed to make these disclosures through purely

1 ACSI DA 102116Z Feb 59

2 CHINFO 041702Z Feb 59

3 CNO 241750Z Mar 59

4 CINCPAC 070240Z Sep 59

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military channels, political consideration personified by President Chiang, made consultation with the U.S. Ambassador mandatory.

On 1 October¹ the issue was temporarily resolved and agreement reached between CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassador to postpone any disclosures to the GRC until the FY 60 and 61 MAP and the economic aid program assumed "some satisfactory degree of firmness".

Thailand

F-86F Aircraft for Thailand

For some time, CINCPAC had been pressing for suitable replacements for F-84G and F-8F aircraft in Thailand. Indications were that 20 F-86Fs would be approved and funded under FY 60 MAP.

Ship Deliveries

On 22 July 1959 the ex-USS HEMMINGER (DE 746) was transferred to the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) in CONUS. Delivery was contingent upon an agreement on the part of the RTN to scrap or otherwise dispose of seven obsolete ships. This was a significant step forward in the problem of the large RTN inventory of obsolete or obsolescent craft.

The transfer crew received individual training prior to the transfer and received shipboard team training before sailing the ship to their country.

Thai Army Proficiency and Force Improvements

Improvement in the training of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) was demonstrated by the excellent showing of army troops in the SEATO-sponsored exercise "Air Progress" conducted in March.

1 MAAG Taiwan 240600Z Sep 59 Cite MGCC MG01478 and CINCPAC 010333Z Oct 59

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THAILAND




FIGURE 17

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155mm Howitzers for the medium artillery battalions and 4.2 mortars to expand the heavy mortar company in each Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from 2 to 3 platoons, were programmed.¹

Vietnam

Replacement for F8F Aircraft

Replacement aircraft for obsolete F8Fs in Vietnam had been a matter of concern for some time. Jet aircraft were desired; however, provisions of the Geneva Accords precluded introducing jet aircraft into the country. AD-4 aircraft were selected as replacement aircraft until such time as jet aircraft could be introduced. Pressure by CINCPAC to provide AD-4's was exerted prior to 1959;² however, the Vietnamese Air Force's (VNAF) poor utilization of their aircraft was cited by Washington agencies as the reason for the non-support of the request. The VNAF performance had improved and the CINCPAC position was repeatedly reiterated during the first half of 1959.³ As a result of several fatal accidents involving VNAF pilots, the VNAF temporarily grounded all F8F aircraft⁴ as unsafe to fly. CINCPAC reiterated to OASD/ISA his concern over the obsolete F8F aircraft and urged that delivery of AD-4 aircraft as replacements be expedited.⁵ At last account, these aircraft were approved in the FY 60 program.

Reorganization of the Vietnamese Army (ARVN)

The reorganization of the ARVN, which was initiated late in

1 Refinement Exercise, Thailand FY 61 MAP, Sep 59

2 CINCPAC 280216Z Oct 58

3 CINCPAC 120138Z Feb 59

4 CHMAAG Vietnam 300842Z Sep Cite MAGCH-GH 971

5 CINCPAC 180400Z Sep 59

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


FIGURE 18

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1958, was stepped-up beginning in January 1959, and the project was approximately 75% complete by the end of June 1959. The reorganization plan provided for converting 4 Field Divisions and 6 Light Divisions, with a strength of approximately 8,000 and 6,000 respectively, to 7 improved divisions of approximately 10,000 each. Each Division would have a 105mm How FA battalion and a 4.2 mortar battalion. The plan also provided for 2 light (105mm) and 6 medium (155mm How) separate Field Artillery battalions to replace the former 3 medium and 5 light battalions. Major items of equipment required were programmed. The reorganization was completed in September 1959.

Ship Deliveries

In July 1959, MSC 281 was delivered to the Vietnamese Navy. This transfer was part of an approved long-range augmentation and replacement plan for the Vietnamese Navy, and was expected to improve its capabilities. The transfer crew received individual training prior to the transfer and received additional shipboard team training before sailing the ship to Vietnam.¹

MEASURES OTHER THAN MAP ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES OF ARMED FORCES OF NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

Although CINCPAC exerted his influence to improve the capabilities of the armed forces of each nation in the PACOM area primarily through his activities in the MAP, he also persuaded some of these countries to take further steps to improve their defense posture by means which

1 COMTWELVE 092318Z Jul 59


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were not directly related to MAP. One of these improvements by CINCPAC and his representatives will be discussed in this section.

The Taiwan Straits crisis in 1958, focused attention upon the measures taken by the GRC to defend the off-shore Islands. The problem was political as well as military. The GRC's deployment to defend these Islands indicated that they attached great political significance to their retention since disproportionately large garrisons were detailed to this task. As a result, during the Taiwan straits crisis one of the major problems was that of re-supplying the Island garrisons. Strenuous efforts by the GRC armed forces aided by U.S. forces resulted in the maintenance of satisfactory supply levels on the off-shore Islands during the crisis, but further improvements were needed to insure, that during periods of increased tension in the future, the position of the GRC would not be as vulnerable.

To aid in solving the resupply problem, four Barges, Amphibious Resupply Cargo (BARC) were deployed to Kinmen in the first half of 1959 for use if the CHICOMS should again initiate heavy artillery bombardment of the off-shore Islands (OSI). Four more BARCs were temporarily on Taiwan. All eight BARCs, which had a cargo capacity of 60 tons each were loaned to the GRC by the U.S. Army.

To reduce the resupply requirement on the OSI CHMAAG Taiwan entered into an agreement with the CHINAT Chief of Staff on 17 November 1958 which provided for a reduction of forces on the off-shore islands in exchange for certain improvements in the remaining forces (Doan-Wang


Agreement). Force improvement was to include increased divisional artillery, 240mm Hows and 155mm Guns and an additional tank battalion. The CHINATS agreed to reduce the divisions on Kinmen from 6 to 5 and to reduce the total off-shore island forces by 15,000 by 30 June. This was accomplished by 1 July, resulting in a defense force of 65,000 men as compared to the former strength of 82,000.¹ The 5 divisions were equipped in accordance with the improved organization, and the 155mm Guns and part of the 240mm Hows were provided. No additional tanks were provided but some M24's were moved to Kinmen from Taiwan. The CHINATS fulfilled the terms of the agreement, completing all movements on 7 July.

1 COMTAIWAN DEFCOM 3000620Z Jun 59

CHAPTER III

CINCPAC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES

The first two chapters of this command history discuss CINCPAC's activities in 1959 to improve the state of readiness of U.S. PACOM forces and to improve the state of readiness of the armed forces of each non-Communist country in the PACOM area. These were both important objectives to be attained by CINCPAC in order to fulfill his mission. However, to insure that the forces of each nation could operate in coordination with those of other nations in the pursuit of common goals, it was necessary for CINCPAC to continue existent activities and to carry out new activities designed to improve the military relationships between U.S., Allied and other national forces in the PACOM area. He did this primarily through combined and coordinated planning, combined training exercises, and planning meetings with military representatives of other countries. Also, other important military activities were carried out that were not directly related to plans and operations but which contributed to the goal of mutual understanding.

In discharging his responsibilities as the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific, CINCPAC, in coordination with representatives of other U.S. government agencies in the PACOM, carried out some activities of a political-military nature that were in support of U.S. National policies.

This chapter will discuss CINCPAC's military and political-

UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND





FIGURE 19

 military activities to strengthen relationships between the U.S. and other countries in the PACOM.

COMBINED AND COORDINATED PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Combined Planning with Canada

Canada and the U.S. had a combined plan for the defense of Canada and the U.S. called the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 300 series). CINCPAC was assigned responsibilities for preparing supporting plans and, when necessary, conducting the planned supporting operations. The combined supporting plan was called Alaska, Canada, and the United States Emergency Defense Plan (ALCANUS). CINCPAC delegated his responsibilities to CINCPACFLT since the PACOM forces involved were Naval forces only. However, CINCPAC monitored the activities of ALCANUS planners by providing representation at ALCANUS Commander's Conferences and by reviewing reports by CINCPACFLT. The commanders involved in this planning were CINCAL, CINCPAC (CINCPACFLT), CG Sixth U.S. Army, and Canadian ground, sea and air commanders. A planner's coordination meeting which was attended by a CINCPACFLT representative, was held at San Francisco on 17-20 November 1959.

Combined Planning with Japan

Through agreements which were in effect prior to the disestablishment of the FECOM, U.S. and Japan planners had been meeting secretly under formal terms of reference¹ to produce yearly Combined Joint Outline Emergency Plans (CJOEP) for the Defense of Japan. Combined Service plans in support of CJOEP's were prepared by representatives of

1 Annex A, CJOEP-59

each of the U.S. Armed Services and their counterparts in the Japan Self Defense Forces. CINCPAC assumed this combined planning responsibility on 1 July 1957 as one of the residual duties formerly performed by CINCPAC. CINCPAC charged COMUS Japan with the responsibility of representing him in this combined planning and each PACOM Service Component Commander also designated a representative in Japan to participate in the planning. CINCPAC provided guidance to his representative¹ and reviewed the annual CJOEP.

The CJOEP-59 (unclassified title PAB-59) was reviewed and CINCPAC comments and modifications were forwarded to COMUS Japan.²

Combined Planning with the Government of the Republic of China

CINCPAC had been conducting combined planning with military representatives of the GRC for a number of years. CINCPAC's representative for this planning was COMUSTDC. The first combined plan which was produced was called ROCHESTER 56 (US-GRC Combined Plan for the Defense of Taiwan and the Penghus). It was approved by Minister Yu Tah Wei and Admiral Ingersoll for promulgation on 30 January 1956.


CINCPAC directed³ COMUSTDC to develop, in coordination with the GRC, a combined plan for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus which would update ROCHESTER 56. Subsequently, the JCS directed that the planning be "coordinated" rather than "combined".⁴ The revised plan ROCHESTER 58, was submitted to CINCPAC for review. CINCPAC forwarded his comments to

1 CINCPAC ltrs ser 00528 of 22 Sep 58 and ser 00313 of 12 Jun 58

2 CINCPAC ltr ser 000114 of 6 Jun 59

3 CINCPAC ltr ser 00010 of 10 Jan 58; guidance provided by CINCPAC ltr ser 000233 of 27 Nov 57

4 JCS 042314Z Feb 59 Cite JCS 954482


COMUSTDC in November 1959¹ and sent information copies of his comments to the PACOM Service Component Commanders.

Combined Planning with the Philippines

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines recognized that armed attack on either country was dangerous to the peace and safety of the other. The JCS, through CNO as Executive Agency, approved² the CINCPAC interpretation¹ that this treaty authorized CINCPAC to conduct combined planning with military representatives of the Philippines within the Mutual Defense Board (MDB). CINCPAC directed CINCPACREP PHIL³ to participate in this planning as CINCPAC's representative and furnished him guidance for establishing a combined planning organization and for carrying out this planning. As a first step, a basic Philippine-US Defense Plan with concept of operations, intelligence, and ASW and control of shipping annexes was drafted by U.S. members of the committee and was reviewed by CINCPAC.⁴ The revised plan was then discussed with Filipino planners.

In early July CINCPAC reviewed the MDB Military Planning Committee's concept for the defense of the Philippines.⁵ CINCPAC's review indicated certain changes in the concept were desirable. Accordingly, guidance was furnished CINCPACREPPHIL providing for the introduction of an amended concept into the 14 July meeting of the MDB. The 14 July meeting produced


1 CINCPAC ltr ser 000106 of 28 May 59

2 CNO 302245Z Oct 58

3 CINCPAC ltr FF1-1(J51), 31 Jan 59(CPRS 00264-59), CINCPAC 200218Z Oct 59

4 CINCPACREPPHIL ltr ser 002, 27 Feb 59 and ADMING CINCPAC 162100Z Apr 59

5 CINCPACREPPHIL 301425Z June 59


a concept¹ which represented the consensus of both the Philippine and U.S. representatives. The latter representative, in forwarding the proposed concept to CINCPAC, stated that he believed this concept² represented the best obtainable compromise.

In analyzing this concept CINCPAC concluded that it represented a minor departure from the concept previously approved by CNO. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended JCS approval of the revised concept,³ which, although not optimum for the U.S., would achieve both U.S. and Philippine objectives.⁴

In early August, the JCS approved the concept for the defense of the Philippines, previously agreed upon by the Philippine and U.S. members of the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) at the 14 July MDB meeting.⁵ However, at the 11 August MDB meeting the Filipinos changed their position and requested that the second paragraph of the concept be reworded to reflect an extract from the Joint President Eisenhower - President Garcia statement of 20 June 1958.⁶

In view of this proposal, and in order to provide guidance for combined Philippine-U.S. planning within the MDB, CINCPAC requested CINCPACREPPHIL to send some of his planners to CINCPAC Headquarters for a discussion of all aspects of combined planning in the MDB.⁷ The discussions, held 27-31 August covered three major areas in detail: (1) the Philippine proposal to reword the previously approved concept

1 CINCPAC 080347Z Jul 59

2 CINCPACREPPHIL 180823Z Jul 59

3 CINCPAC 250342Z Oct 58 and CNO 302245Z Oct 58

4 CINCPAC 312357Z Jul 59

5 JCS 071913Z Aug 59

6 CINCPACREPPHIL 131153Z Aug 59

7 CINCPAC 180120Z Aug 59

for the defense of the Philippines; (2) roles and missions which the U.S. desired the AFP to develop a capability to perform; and (3) updating of CINCPAC policy and guidance for CINCPACREPPHIL's use in combined planning.

As a result of the Philippine request to reword the second paragraph of the concept for the defense of the Philippines (a concept which had already been approved by the JCS), CINCPAC recommended¹ that the second paragraph be retained as previously approved, but if the Philippines would not accept, that it be reworded to reflect an exact and full quote from the joint President Eisenhower-President Garcia statement of 20 June 1958, to avoid possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation. The JCS approval² of CINCPAC's recommendation was furnished CINCPACREPPHIL for use at the next MDB meeting.³

CINCPACREPPHIL reported that, at the 15 September meeting of the MDB, an impasse was reached between the Philippine and U.S. members due to the fact that U.S. members then had no authority to provide any listing of U.S. forces which might be available in defense of the Philippines.⁴

In October, the Philippines' reaccepted the concept originally developed and approved at the July meeting of the MDB.⁵ CINCPACREPPHIL reiterated that the impasse in the MDB Plans Committee could only be broken if the U.S. were willing to table U.S. forces which

1 CINCPAC 032334Z Sep 59

2 JCS 182317Z Sep 59 Cite JCS 965641

3 CINCPAC 202154Z Sep 59

4 CINCPACREPPHIL 140959Z Sep 59

5 CINCPACREPPHIL 191005Z Oct 59

~~SECRET~~
might be available in support of the defense of the Philippines; further, that the Filipinos were adamant on this point.¹ Accordingly, CINCPAC provided guidance on this matter, including authorization to table certain WestPac units which were estimated to be available in support of the defense of the Philippines.² (S ~~SECRET~~)

Planning Discussions with the United Kingdom

The Commander of the British Forces stationed in the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Bandon, Commander in Chief Far East Station (CINCFESTA) wrote CINCPAC on 10 September 1959³ recommending that they confer on subjects of mutual interest in the near future. This letter was one of a series of letters between the two commanders. The agenda which was proposed included discussions of: (1) United Kingdom military intentions in the Far East; (2) military action in South-East Asia; (3) war against Communist China; (4) Indonesia; and (5) other topics (including U.S. naval forces in the South Pacific, North Borneo, and Military Aid Programs). The letter recommended that the discussions be mainly exploratory with no commitments made or implied. The date for holding the conference was not established at the end of 1959. ✓

SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION


Since the formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, the United States had been a major contributor in the effort to strengthen and mold the organization into a unified structure

1 CINCPACREPPHIL 100643Z Oct 59

2 CINCPAC 200218Z Oct 59

3 Personal ltr, Air Chief Marshal Bandon to Adm Felt (FE/TS.76/8/Air Plans), 10 Sep 1959

SEATO ORGANIZATION



ABBREVIATIONS

SMPO—SEATO MILITARY PLANNING OFFICE
 PIO—PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
 SEC COORD—SECURITY COORDINATOR
 CIGEL—COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION, CULTURAL
 EDUCATION AND LABOR

PWG—PERMANENT WORKING GROUP
 RSC—RESEARCH SERVICE CENTER
 CULTURAL RO—CULTURAL RELATIONS OFFICE
 CSE—COMMITTEE OF SECURITY EXPERTS
 CEE—COMMITTEE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS

FIGURE 20

[REDACTED]

possessing a military capability. At the same time the U.S. assisted, through SEATO, in the program to raise the standard of living throughout SE Asia. Of these goals CINCPAC was primarily concerned with the military objectives.

Two Military Advisers meetings were held during 1959 and through Ad Hoc Committee Meetings, separate actions, and SEATO exercises significant progress was made toward reaching SEATO goals.

Military Advisers Tenth Meeting

Commencing early in January, U.S. position papers were developed for the Tenth Meeting of SEATO Military Advisers (MALOM).

MALOM was held in Wellington, New Zealand from 2-4 April. The three most significant items discussed were: the MPO Plan 2/59 (Defense of Protocol States and Thailand); the Command Structure Arrangements for SEATO; and the Military Planning Office (MPO) Plan 5/59 (Introduction of SEATO Forces into Laos) which included estimates of forces which SEATO member nations might make available.¹

The basic U.S. position on U.S. forces which might be made available to a SEATO force countering insurgency in Laos had been established and submitted to SMPO.²

A command arrangement in the event of insurgency in Laos had previously been agreed upon by the Military Advisers at the Ninth Military Advisers' Meeting. Subsequent to the Ninth Meeting, CINCPAC developed a "talking" paper on principles of command in the event a SEATO force

1 Report on the Tenth Military Advisers Conference (MALOM)

2 Report on the Ninth Military Advisers Conference (MA9M)

[REDACTED]

was required in Mainland SE Asia. The U.S. position paper was tabled at the Tenth Military Advisers' Meeting and accepted by the Military Advisers for further consideration.¹

Meanwhile, continuing staff actions were conducted concerning Part III of a SEATO Naval Study which requested SEATO acceptance of the current organization established for Naval Control of Shipping between ANZAM countries. The study was completed with minority views by Pakistan and France.

Military Advisers Eleventh Meeting

The SEATO Military advisers held their eleventh meeting (MALLM) in Bangkok during the period 22-24 September. The main topic of discussion was the situation in Laos and SEATO military actions which might be necessary to counteract the insurgency conditions in Laos. Principal to this discussion was Agenda Item A: MPO Plan 5B/59, SEATO Plan for Insurgency in Laos. The basic plan was approved and a brief of it transmitted to the Council Representatives with the request that they consult their governments as to the selection of an "appointed nation",² the nation to furnish a commander on the implementation of the Laos plan. A further message, setting forth Admiral Felt's views on the possible choices for the "appointed nation", was reported by Ambassador Johnson to the State Department.³

Action taken on the remainder of the MALLM Agenda items was in general, in conformance with previously approved U.S. positions.⁴ The

1 Report on the Tenth Military Advisers Conference (MALCM)

2 Bangkok/State 822 of 27 Sep 59

3 Bangkok/State 821 of 27 Sep 59

4 CINCPAC 280341Z Sep 59

other principal items were: MPO Plan 2B/59, Defense of Thailand and Protocol States; Review of Insurgent Threat; and Reorganization of SMPO.

Third Communications Ad Hoc Committee Meeting

The SEATO Communications Ad Hoc Committee met at SEATO Hq in Bangkok in May 1959 (COM 3M). This was the third meeting of the Communications Committee, previous meetings having taken place in Auckland-September 1955 and Pearl Harbor-January 1957. The U.S. took the initiative in proposing the meeting, which was approved by the SEATO Military Advisers out of session. A CINCPAC representative served as Chief United States Delegate for the meeting. U.S. Position Papers for the meeting were developed commencing in April 1959 with a coordination visit to the JCS (J6).

The committee, chaired by Australia and composed of representatives from all member nations, tackled a heavy program of work covering a wide range of SEATO communications problems and areas of deficiency.

While ten items were on the Agenda, the most significant items discussed were: review and make recommendations on SEATO exercise deficiencies; review and make recommendations concerning naval, air and ground radio equipment operational compatibility; review and make recommendations for requirements for communications SEATO Standard Agreements (SEASTAGS).¹

The deliberations of COM 3M confirmed the serious deficiencies which existed in the SEATO communications field and pointed up the requirement for immediate work by member nation groups and for detailed planning guidance on MPO Plan 5C/59, SEATO Plan for Insurgency in Laos, and for MPO Plan

1 Report of the Third Communications Ad Hoc Committee Meeting (COM 3M)

[REDACTED]
5B/59, Defense of Thailand and Protocol States, and for communications specialists on the staff of the MPO.

SEATO Logistics Working Party and Second Meeting of SEATO Logistic Committee

First Meeting of Logistic Working Party

At the 9th meeting (MA9M Summary Report) held in September 1958, the SEATO Military Advisers directed that a Logistic Working Party (LWP) composed of representatives from member nations, review a detailed logistic and movements study prepared by SMPO. This item was proposed between the Military Advisers and the SMPO. The foregoing set the stage for the first meeting of the Logistics Working Party in Bangkok, Thailand, 10-21 February 1959. (C [REDACTED] L)

The deliberations of the LWP revealed serious gaps in data available in SEATO concerning existing SE Asia area logistical facilities, and an absence of acceptable planning concepts and factors. The work of the LWP pointed up the importance of establishing procedures for the continuous collection and evaluation of logistical data, the establishment of planning factors, and the provision of logistical concepts and plans to support operational concepts and plans. Testing of the logistical feasibility of SMPO operational concepts was reported as an additional problem for solution within SEATO. (C [REDACTED] L)

Second Meeting of SEATO Logistic Committee

The SEATO Logistics Committee held its second meeting in Bangkok during August, largely in consequence of CINCPAC initiative and emphasis.

(C [REDACTED] L)

[REDACTED]

The committee undertook certain high priority planning tasks, provided some agreed basic planning data for use in SEATO, and sustained emphasis on a sense of urgency on logistic planning in SEATO. The objective was to insure that SEATO plans were logistically feasible. Apparent areas of disagreement or misunderstanding between the February 1959 working party recommendations and the views of the MPO were reconciled. The committee recommended that the Military Advisers approve for SEATO use, standard logistics terminology, principles, and a considerable body of planning factors developed by the committee. A further recommendation included a requirement for early action by Member Nations to place vital logistic data on Thailand and the Protocol States into the SEATO forum by the end of 1959. It was necessary to have this data in order to obtain realistic logistic planning in SEATO and to produce logistic annexes for each SEATO plan.

One of CINCPAC's concerns in SEATO planning was the degree of U.S. logistics support that could be afforded SEATO nations in the event of emergencies. In November, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS press DOD/State for the formulation of a U.S. policy on this matter as it affected Pakistani forces under SEATO in any SE Asia action.¹

Second Mapping Ad Hoc Committee Meeting

In accordance with the decision of the Military Advisers at their Tenth Meeting MALOM, the Second Mapping Ad Hoc Committee met at SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok from 16 June to 25 June 1959. A CINCPAC representative attended the meeting. The committee concluded:

1 CINCPAC 120948Z Nov 59, CINCPAC 040441Z Dec 59, State to Karachi 1404, 11 Dec 59

[REDACTED]

A requirement exists for an index of map series which should be comprehensive and complete as possible and should include aeronautical charts, nautical charts and topographic maps covering generally the SEATO area of interest. Appropriate formats would be used to meet this requirement.

Progress of topographical mapping should be reported by submission of indices by each member nation.

Progress of aeronautical and nautical charting should be reported by submission of amendments to the appropriate catalogues as and when they occur.

Some degree of dispersion of reproduction material has already been accomplished by certain member nations but, as the adequacy of this dispersion is not known, an evaluation is necessary before the Mapping Ad Hoc Committee can make further recommendations.

A technically qualified officer should be made available to the Military Planning Office for coordinating cartographic tasks.

In addition the committee concluded that certain SEATO publications reviewed at the First Mapping Ad Hoc Committee Meeting should be considered for ratification, and that the Third Mapping Ad Hoc Committee Meeting be held in February 1960. ✓

SEATO Training Exercises

The SEATO Military Advisers 1st meeting was held in Bangkok 6-8 July 1955.¹ The U.S. was delegated the responsibility for establishing principles and procedures for staging SEATO military exercises. This was accomplished by producing a small pamphlet covering the manner in which SEATO exercises would be conducted and at the same time encouraging member nations to propose and conduct SEATO military exercises. The pamphlet served its purpose until country capabilities increased and exercises become more complex. The U.S. then proposed to the Military

1. 1st SEATO M.C. Conf 8 Jul 55

C [REDACTED]

Advisers at the MALOM a new and more detailed instruction. Significant changes were proposed for the manner of scheduling SEATO exercises and additional requirements were added for inclusion of a "Scenario" "Concept of Exercise" and "Command Relationships" for each exercise.¹ These features were added in order to make SEATO exercises more realistic. The U.S. proposed instruction was accepted at the Military Advisers 11th Meeting and shortly thereafter published as SEATO Publication Number 4 (SEAP 4).

In keeping with the program for SEATO military exercises, the following major SEATO exercises, in which the U.S. participated with force contributions, were held during the year.

"KITISENA"

Exercise "KITISENA", a U.S.-Thailand jointly sponsored Command Post Exercise, was held in Thailand during the period 3 through 6 February. USARPAC provided key personnel of a Brigade Task Force [REDACTED] from the 25th Infantry Division, which in simulated play supported combined operational plans developed jointly by the United States and Thailand.

"AIR PROGRESS"

Exercise "AIR PROGRESS", an air defense, air resupply and air drop exercise, jointly sponsored by the United States and Thailand was conducted from 2 to 8 March. Air Force elements of Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom participated with the sponsoring nations. U.S. participation comprised 5 F-100's, 3 C-130's, 1 KB50,

1 Agenda Item K, SEATO MALIM

[REDACTED]

1 RF 101, 1 RB 66 plus a QM Aerial Resupply Company and normal supply and logistic aircraft. "Air Progress" was conducted to develop and evaluate the capability of SEATO tactical air and ground task forces to engage in combined operations in defense of the member nations.

"SEA DEMON"

Exercise "SEA DEMON", a SEATO maritime exercise involving naval units of the United Kingdom, United States, France and New Zealand was conducted 10 to 29 April.¹ The exercise centered around the defense of a convoy against air, surface, and subsurface attack, in the Singapore to Manila area. United States forces included one CVS, eight DD's, 2 SS, and 1 AO.

"SADDLE UP"

A combined United States-United Kingdom sponsored SEATO Amphibious assault exercise "SADDLE UP" was held in North Borneo from 1 thru 12 June.² The United States and the United Kingdom each provided the equivalent of a BLT with a regimental headquarters. The United States provided the required amphibious lift, while the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand provided support vessels.

"HALANG DAGAT"

Exercise "HALANG DAGAT", a bi-lateral Harbor Defense Exercise was conducted in the Philippines from 1 to 4 June. The United States contribution to this exercise consisted of 2 MSO's, 1SS, and 2 P5M.³

1 SEC STATE 16 Mar 10 PM

2 CINCPACFLT Deployment Schedule FY 60

3 CINCPACFLT Deployment Schedule FY 60

[REDACTED]

"HANDA"

Another combined Philippine-United States SEATO Command Post Exercise, "HANDA" was held in the Philippines from 21 to 25 June.¹ One hundred and fifty U.S. Army personnel from the 25th INF DIV participated. The exercise included the reception of a U.S. Army Division into the Philippines for further deployment in support of SEATO plans, and included the attachment of a U.S. Brigade Task Force in support of a Philippine Division to combat a local aggressor force. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SEATO/Baghdad Pact Planning

In February the Chief, SMPO notified the Chairman, Baghdad Pact Liaison Group in Bangkok that the SMPO had been authorized to participate in informal discussions with the BP Liaison Group regarding the establishment of channels for military liaison, and the type of information to be exchanged through such channels.²

The U.S. member of the Baghdad Pact (BP) Liaison Group in Bangkok (U.S. Senior Planner, SMPO) informed CINCPAC that the channel of liaison should be through the BP Combined Military Planning Office and the SEATO Military Planning Office and that the BP should initiate the first formal letter. The U.S. member concurred in the selection of the channel for liaison and that the BP should initiate the first letter. However, he felt that the proposed list of information to be exchanged was somewhat ambitious.³

1 USARHAW/25th INF DIV 160216Z Apr 59

2 CHSMPO ltr MS/145/4/59 of 26 Feb 59

3 U.S. Senior Planner, SMPO 252357Z May 59

[REDACTED]

CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the U.S. agree to the proposed channel for exchange of information between BP and SEATO and that initiative should be taken by BP CMPS upon receipt of notification from BP Liaison Group that SEATO is willing to enter into informal military liaison. Further, that initially, information for exchange be restricted to organizational matters; standardization of operational and communications procedures and techniques; terminology; and studies and estimates of the Communist threat to the respective Treaty areas which are classified not higher than confidential.¹

ANZUS

The annual meeting of representatives from Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) was held in Washington on 26 September, 1954. CINCPAC reported that the meeting was conducted in an atmosphere of mutual cordiality and that no substantive issues affecting U.S. policies or plans were raised. (C [REDACTED] L)

After the meeting, CINCPAC visited Australia for informal discussions with the Chairman of the Australian JCS Committee. The talks were held 28-30 September and covered the roles of the Australian Armed Forces, logistics, use of Australian bases, and communications. CINCPAC's remarks were guided by an outline which had been approved by the JCS.²

(C [REDACTED] L)

ACTIONS INVOLVING COMBINED INTELLIGENCE AND RELEASE OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

On occasion during the year, CINCPAC was confronted with requests

1 CINCPAC 172054Z Jun 59

2 CINCPAC 212307 Jul 59, JCS 072230Z Aug 59 Cite JCS 963542, CINCPAC 050528Z Oct 59

from various sources to release appropriate classified information to certain foreign nationals. Where possible, approval of these requests was ultimately granted by higher authority. The following actions were taken in connection with specific release authority for requests which concerned Chinese, Japanese and officials of the UN Command member nations.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Classified Briefings to High Ranking Officials of UN Command Member Nations and Visiting Foreign Dignitaries

CINCUNC requested blanket authority to present classified briefings to high ranking officials of the UN Command member nations.⁴ The

1 COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan 010305Z Jul 59

2 CINCPAC 032155Z Jul 59

3 CNO 062014Z Jul 59

4 CINCUNC ltr ser UNC BJ 350 AMJ of 3 Apr 59

[REDACTED]

JCS, on 30 April, delegated to CINCPAC¹ the authority for such release of classified information and on 7 May this authority was further delegated by CINCPAC to COMUS Korea.² The JCS, by separate message, delegated to CINCPAC authority to release intelligence for use by COMUS Korea in UN Command oral and visual briefings for UN Liaison Officers and Military Attaches.³ This authority was further delegated to the Component Commanders by CINCPAC.⁴

Additionally, CINCPAC requested CINCPAC authority to release certain classified information to visiting foreign dignitaries.⁵ Approval was recommended by CINCPAC,⁶ and subsequently received from JCS.⁷

Visit of Japanese Officials to CINCPAC

COMUS Japan proposed a visit of Japanese officials to CINCPAC and the component headquarters to permit briefings of a general informatory nature with the opportunity for questions and answers.⁸ CINCPAC subsequently approved the visit.⁹ A message was forwarded to the JCS on 11 September 1959, in accordance with the provisions of SD MIC 206/29 (Revised) requesting release authority to brief and/or discuss with the Japanese officials, matters of mutual interest on a need to know basis.¹⁰ In order to provide CINCPAC representatives sufficient latitude during the proposed briefings, broad release authority was requested from the JCS rather than attempting

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- 1 JCS 302154Z Apr 59 Cite JCS 959004
 - 2 CINCPAC 072001Z Apr 59
 - 3 JCS 301936Z Apr 59 Cite 958989
 - 4 CINCPAC 062246Z May 59
 - 5 CINCPAC 180840Z Mar 59 Cite UK 90231 BJ
 - 6 CINCPAC 190407Z Mar 59
 - 7 JCS 202054Z Mar 59 Cite JCS 398318
 - 8 COMUS Japan 030537Z Aug 59
 - 9 CINCPAC 290135Z Aug 59
 - 10 CINCPAC 110335Z Sep 59

[REDACTED]

to delineate each specific item which might enter into the discussions. The JCS approved the CINCPAC request, but advised that authority was granted only to the extent necessary for purposes of the conference, and further that authority did not include certain types of intelligence information or strategic war plans.¹

COMBINED TRAINING EXERCISES

Throughout 1959 many minor combined training exercises were conducted as part of the PACOM Component Commanders' normal training cycle. However, the following combined training exercises, because of their scope and significance were of particular interest to CINCPAC (SEATO exercises are discussed in a preceding section). (UNCLASSIFIED)


Flying Brothers

Project Flying Brothers, a non-competitive fighter weapons exercise, was held at Clark Air Base, Philippines, from 27 April through 7 May 1959. This exercise, hosted by 13th Air Force and the Philippine Air Force, was programmed and funded under the Air Force Military Assistance Training Program. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The purpose of the exercise was to assist national air forces in the PACOM area in working out techniques and problems in connection with gunnery methods and equipment. Fighter-gunnery teams from the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, the Philippine Air Force, the Republic of Korea Air Force, the Royal Thai Air Force, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force participated. In addition, there were observers from Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and The United Kingdom. (UNCLASSIFIED)

1 JCS 071915Z Oct 59 Cite JCS 966487

Project Flying Brothers was an outstanding success not only for the training received but also in fostering a spirit of mutual understanding and friendship between free Asian and allied Air Forces.¹



Field Training Exercise "HSIEN FENG"

Exercise "HSIEN FENG", a combined US/GRC Special Forces exercise was conducted on Taiwan during the period 6-29 May 59. The purpose of the exercise was (a) to test the effectiveness of training and readiness status of GRC Special Forces, (b) to test the readiness of U.S. Special Forces and Service Component UW support elements, and (c) to continue unilateral testing of intelligence planning for war by the USTDC. Exercise "HSIEN FENG" was unique in that it was the first time in the PACOM that U.S. Army Special Forces had participated in a field training exercise of this scope with the Special Forces of another country. The exercise objectives were successfully attained and proved that the concept of combined US/GRC unconventional warfare planning and operations was sound and practicable. Similar combined Special Warfare exercises were planned in Taiwan and Korea for CY 60.


PACIFIC DEFENSE COLLEGE (PDC)

In 1957, CINCPAC conducted a JCS-directed study concerning the advisability of establishing a Southeast Asian Training Center.¹ At the same time, the Philippines proposed during the 6th SEATO Military Advisors Meeting (MA6M) that a SEATO Defense College be formed.² The JCS considered both proposals,³ and directed CINCPAC to obtain Philippine concurrence (1) to withdrawing their proposal, and (2) to introducing in SEATO a joint U.S.-Philippine announcement of intention to establish a

1 Encl A to JCS 1992/570 and CINCPAC ltr ser 00040 of 5 Mar 57

2 Agenda Item F-4, MA6M of Mar 57

3 CINCPAC Staff Study ser 000229 of 26 Mar 57, CINCPAC ltr ser 000172A of 11 Sep 57


jointly operated college in the Philippines. The joint announcement was made at MASM in March 1958.¹

CINCPAC directed CINCPACREPPHIL to conduct feasibility and cost studies relative to the establishment of the college at John Hay Air Base, Baguio, P.I. or other possible sites.² The study concluded that the Baguio site was preferable.³

During 1958, CINCPAC obtained approval of the following recommendations concerning the U.S. position for negotiations on the college: that an interim college be established at John Hay Air Base; that the college be named the Pacific Defense College; and that the student body include students from certain friendly, non-Communist Asian countries which were not previously authorized.⁴ Additionally, he recommended that a planning group, formed from the U.S. members of the faculty, be ordered to Hawaii to prepare a curriculum and to requisition supplies and equipment.⁵ The planning group, seven officers and two enlisted men, arrived during August and September 1958.

During negotiations between CINCPACREPPHIL and Philippine authorities in 1958, it became apparent that the Filipinos would insist on a Filipino commandant of the college and would expect the U.S. to bear the majority of the expenses of the college.⁶ Consequently, CINCPAC recommended suspension of further discussions and a withdrawal from the

1 JCS 1992/626, CNO 201723Z Dec 57

2 CINCPAC 292340Z Nov 57

3 CINCPACREPPHIL ltr ser 002 of 8 Jan 58

4 CINCPAC 290330Z Mar 58 and 220135Z Apr 58, CNO 021801Z May 58, CINCPAC 130025Z May 58, JCS 1992/663, OSD 032316Z Jul 58 Cite DEF 944328

5 CINCPAC ltr ser 0322 of 22 May 58

6 CINCPACREPPHIL 190755Z Aug 58, CINCPAC 210426Z Aug 58, CINCPACREPPHIL 280927Z Aug 58 and 290955Z Aug 58

[REDACTED]

project, and OSD concurred with these recommendations.¹

The American Ambassador to the Philippines objected to withdrawing from the project. He stated that the Filipinos had reacted as could be expected and that a premature withdrawal from the project would not promote harmonious Philippine-U.S. relations. He recommended the continuation of the discussions.² CINCPAC agreed to continue discussions in an effort to solve the problems on a step-by-step basis and to get all of the facts into the record before agreeing to establish or terminate the college.³

Because of the lack of progress and the uncertainty on the ultimate status of the PDC, the PDC planning group was released for reassignment in January 1959. Prior to disbandment, the group completed a syllabus, curriculum, and standing operating procedures for the College and developed library and material requirements.

During the 1959 negotiations between CINCPAC representatives and Philippine military authorities, no satisfactory solutions were reached to the problem of: establishing funding responsibilities; selecting a site for the permanent college; deciding upon the desirability of an interim college; and, determining the nationality of the commandant of the college.⁴ Additionally there were difficulties in reaching agreement

1 CINCPAC 030100Z Sep 58, CNO 081815Z Sep 58, OSD 092221Z Sep 58 Cite DEF 947772

2 AMEMB Manila 090000Z Sep 58

3 CINCPAC 140601Z Sep 58

4 CINCPACREPPHIL ltr ser 08 of 30 Jan 59, CINCPAC 270040Z and 300405Z Jan 59 and 020757Z Feb 59

on the curriculum and the course level of instruction.¹

As a result of messages received from the American Ambassador, Manila,² which emphasized that the Philippines could not pay an equitable share of the annual operating costs, and an intelligence report³ which indicated that the Filipinos were using the PDC to promote their prestige, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the CINCPAC proposals for a U.S. position on funding be approved;⁴ and, that if LtGen Cabal proposed to withdraw from the project due to the unacceptability of the funding proposal, CINCPAC be authorized to accept the withdrawal and return the project to SEATO. If LtGen Cabal did not offer to withdraw, it was recommended that CINCPAC be authorized to propose withdrawal to LtGen Cabal.⁵ The JCS reported⁶ that CINCPAC's proposals for withdrawing from the PDC were awaiting review in State and OSD. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested an early decision from OASD/ISA.⁷

1959 WEAPONS DEMONSTRATION

The Weapons Demonstration, held during the period 13-21 November 1959, was designed to bring together the top military leaders of the free nations in the Pacific area, to afford them an opportunity to become better acquainted in an exclusively military atmosphere informally

- 1 CINCPACREPPHIL 110451Z Feb 59, CINCPAC 082305Z Mar 59, CINCPACREPPHIL 140551Z Mar 59, JCS 1992/703, CINCPACREPPHIL 301103Z Apr 59 and 011359Z May 59, CINCPAC 110117Z May 59, CINCPACREPPHIL 121011Z May 59, LtGen Cabal ltr of 27 May 59, CINCPAC ltr of 7 Jul 59, LtGen Cabal ltr of 3 Aug 59, CINCPACREPPHIL ltr ser 083 of 31 Aug 59, CINCPACREPPHIL 090623Z Aug 59, CINCPAC 122307Z Sep 59
- 2 AMEMB Manila 250815Z Sep 59 (1192), AMEMB Manila 14 Oct 3:00 PM (1411)
- 3 CAS Report FPM 2160 of 18 Sep 59
- 4 CINCPAC 122307Z Sep 59
- 5 CINCPAC 170150Z Oct 59
- 6 JCS 142250Z Dec 59 Cite JCS 969676
- 7 CINCPAC 161958Z Dec 59

[REDACTED]

devoid of protocol, and simultaneously therewith to have the PACOM Armed Forces put on firepower demonstrations to give the guests first-hand knowledge of the capabilities of these forces. The Chief, General Staff, Republic of China wrote CINCPAC,

"You cannot possibly envisage how your marvelously organized Weapons Demonstration has benefited me and the other members of the Chinese Delegation. The two-fold objectives outlined in your invitation were completely realized. We from all the fifteen guest countries did get the opportunity to know each other and to exchange our views candidly, something that is hoped for but seldom attained. And the Demonstration itself was superbly executed, the bad weather notwithstanding."

The Chief of Staff, New Zealand Army also wrote,

"There is little doubt that these exercises are proving of very great benefit, having as they do the two objectives, firstly of giving the senior officers concerned the opportunity of observing the employment of modern weapons and techniques, and secondly in providing a unique opportunity for gathering together, in an ideal atmosphere, officers from the wide community of nations in the Pacific Area. My delegation reports that both objectives were achieved with a high measure of success."

Invitations were extended to the sixteen free nations of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to send four of their top military leaders to the Demonstration.¹ All accepted with the exception of Burma,² which declined on the basis of forthcoming elections and reluctance on the part of Prime Minister Ne Win to permit senior military leaders to be absent from Burma at that time.

A total of fifty-six foreign officers attended. CINCPAC was successful in getting the top military leaders as twelve of those attending

1 CINCPAC messages 280426Z, 280435Z, 280436Z, 280438Z, 280420Z, 280422Z, 070017Z, 280421Z, 280423Z, 280424Z, 280425Z, 280428Z, 280432Z, 060055Z, 280429Z, 280430Z, 280431Z all July 59

2 NAVCOMMSTA WASH 020514Z Nov 59

[REDACTED]

were Chairmen of their Country's Joint Chiefs of Staff or Chiefs of Services and twenty-two others were flag or general officers. Of the twenty-two remaining many occupied responsible positions and were on the way up in their own countries.

The program included three distinct phases designed to give the guests a comprehensive multi-service impression of the United States forces operation in the Pacific.¹ Phase I was devoted to the reception and "getting acquainted" of guests at Baguio. Phase II was a CVA cruise (USS MIDWAY and USS HANCOCK) and included naval demonstrations enroute to Okinawa. Phase III consisted of firepower demonstrations on Okinawa by the Army, Marines and Air Force. Phase I was held during the period 13-15 November.

On arrival at Baguio the representatives of each country were brought to the Embassy residence where CINCPAC, assisted by CINCPAC POLAD, and members of his staff received them. After a short call they checked in at their assigned quarters. This procedure proved to be an excellent vehicle for setting the stage of informality, making the guests feel welcome, and getting the Demonstration off to a good start.

One U.S. officer and one Philippine officer were assigned to each country group as escort officers. U.S. officers were also assigned as escort officers for Phases II and III. Officers of different nationalities were purposely housed together to permit the guests to get to know each other better. This system of billeting, used in all phases, worked exceptionally well and accomplished its intended purpose.

1 CINCPAC 112340Z Jul 59

[REDACTED]

All guests were considered to have equal four star rank. To keep the Demonstration completely devoid of protocol and to further the spirit of informality, in all phases a system of drawing a table number from a bowl just before entering the dining room was used for meals. This served to thoroughly mix the guests at meals and proved to be popular with them.

In spite of rainy weather the guests were able to get in a considerable amount of recreation, sightseeing, and shopping. A successful golf tournament was held with approximately fifty per cent of the guests participating. Entertainment was scheduled nightly during all phases and one of the social highlights of the entire Demonstration was the performance of the Philippine Normal College Barangey Dance Troupe.

Phase II commenced with the embarkation of guests aboard the CVA's at Subic Bay late Sunday afternoon, 15 November. CINCPACFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT served as co-hosts for this phase. Unfortunately Typhoon FREDA was headed for the Philippines, turned north towards Okinawa, and brought bad weather which caused parts of the Navy demonstration to be cancelled. In spite of bad weather, flight operations, including bombing, strafing and rocket firing, were conducted under low ceilings and in driving rain. The bad weather had its bonus effects as the guests were quite impressed that carrier air groups could carry out combat missions under such adverse conditions. As stated in a letter received from General Peng,

"I would like to repeat my statement made aboard the U.S.S. HANCOCK that the inclement elements had rather given us a keener perception of the hardiness, training and combat readiness of your officers and men, as well as a better appreciation thereof."


[REDACTED]

Phase II concluded with departing honors aboard the carriers on Thursday morning, 19 November, in Buckner Bay, Okinawa, following which guests were transported ashore by Marine HUS helicopters.

For phase III, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACREP RYUKYUS served as co-hosts. Guests assembled at Kadena Air Base for arrival honors and following this ceremony were flown by helicopter to Bolo Point to witness the Army demonstration. High winds and rain caused cancellation of a scheduled air drop of Special Force Troops. However, helicopters were utilized as an appropriate substitute. In addition, the Special Forces units demonstrated their organization and the training techniques employed in guerrilla warfare operations to include launching of troops from a submarine. A BARC was also demonstrated.

With FREDA approaching the Island, high winds forced postponement of air events scheduled for the afternoon of 19 November and the morning of 20 November. This time was profitably utilized for viewing the static display set up at Kadena Air Base. This display created a very favorable impression on the guests. The Army, Marines, and Air Force had in their displays every type of aircraft and piece of equipment available to them. The displays were manned by trained personnel to explain the equipment and answer questions.

The typhoon passed Okinawa during the night of 19 November doing little damage and brought cloudless and clear weather by noon of the 20th. On the afternoon of 20 November the Marines demonstrated their F4D


afterburner and F4D Jet Assisted Take-off (JATO) short field take-off, and landed aircraft into Mobile Arresting Gear. This proved of great interest as many of the countries represented did not have airfields in 1959 capable of handling jet aircraft. Following this demonstration the guests were again transported to Bolo Point to witness successful missile shoots by the Army (NIKE), Marine Corps (HONEST JOHN), and the Air Force (MATADOR).

On Saturday morning 21 November, the Marines demonstrated a flame tank and the composition of a rifle squad. This was followed by an excellent forty-five minute demonstration of a vertical envelopment of a fortified position utilizing artillery, close air support, Pathfinder Teams dropped from S2F's, Helicopter-borne assault troops, and resupply by air drop from R4Q's.

The Air Force demonstrated bombing, strafing, rocket firing, napalm drops, air to air refueling, and LABS maneuvers. They concluded their demonstration with an excellent twenty minute performance by the Thunderbirds.

The Demonstration concluded with lunch at noon on 21 November following which guests started departing for their home countries.

Two areas of special activities are pertinent. These concern financial and publicity arrangements. A total of \$35,000.00 was made available to CINCPAC for direct support items connected with the Demonstration. (All costs of individual service participation were absorbed by the services involved.) These funds were made available from

[REDACTED]

appropriations with 40% provided from Navy MAP Administrative Funds, 36% Navy MAP Training, 16% Navy Operations and Maintenance, and 8% State Department representation funds. The billeting and subsistence of guests and per diem travel costs for U.S. personnel accounted for the major expenditures.

From the beginning it had been planned to avoid advance publicity to the maximum feasible extent so the desired atmosphere of informality and privacy might be enhanced. Actually, the Demonstration attracted little attention from the press except that, during Phase I, it became necessary to release a short announcement describing the program's general purpose and scope in order to prevent erroneous speculation of the Demonstration's meaning. Prior to their return to home stations the guests were advised that they were at liberty to treat the Demonstration as they wished publicitywise. Some found it expedient to disclose details of the program to their national news media.

The Weapons Demonstration brought together the top ranking officers of fifteen foreign nations to promote understanding and to observe American military resources and modern capabilities in the Pacific Ocean Area. Further, the demonstration served to reassure those present that in the face of Communist aggression U.S. forces stood ready at all times to come to their defense. It was most difficult to identify all the benefits accruing to U.S. national interest from a demonstration of this kind. Some of the benefits could best be expressed by direct quotes. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces Philippines, as spokesman for the entire group,

[REDACTED]

said at the concluding dinner,

"The combined might of the Armed Forces of the United States of America in the Pacific is roundly recognized the world over. The spontaneity with which they acted to help deter possible aggression in the Taiwan Straits over a year ago, and later, the profound concern with which the United States Government viewed recent developments in Laos, are - to my mind - unmistakable indications of the willingness and the capacity of the American people to assist their less endowed and less capable friends and allies preserve their integrity and their chosen way of life. The police action in Korea, wherein the United States took the lead and the entire free world responded as one, is another testimony along this line."

The opportunity for the senior military leaders of the countries represented, some of whom will undoubtedly occupy positions of greater importance in future years, to get acquainted with each other was of inestimable value. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Republic of Korea, stated upon his return home,

"They all stood around looking at each other the first day, were on speaking terms by the end of the second day, and were all buddies by the end of the third day."

The fact that they lived, ate, travelled, and played together was good. Many improbable combinations such as Chinese and Indonesians, Koreans and Japanese, and Filipinos and Chinese were noted. On the eve of their departure, the Cambodian delegation invited the Vietnamese delegation to a dinner at a tea house in Okinawa. Although these associations may not bring about immediate changes in the national policies of the countries represented, their close association together could not help but have a lasting beneficial effect.

Limited publicity was given the Demonstration upon the return of guests to their home countries. Some few held press conferences, and those who did praised the success of the demonstration. U.S. Embassies

[REDACTED]

reported that the demonstration created favorable impressions on all guests. Several who attended submitted written reports to their superiors, one reported as being fifty pages in length. (C [REDACTED])

It was believed that while military men could make common ground on the basis of mutual professional interests more easily than their political counterparts, these demonstrations might conceivably have served as precedents to encourage fruitful associations in other areas.

[REDACTED] (L)


The 1959 Weapons Demonstration was an excellent vehicle for promoting good will and understanding, to reassure those attending that U.S. forces stood ready to contribute to maintaining the independence of the Free Asian Nations. [REDACTED]

POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

CINCPAC, as the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific, coordinated with other U.S. government agencies in their discharge of duties which were in support of U.S. National Policy. This was an important duty because any decisions or actions bearing on relationships between the U.S. and the nations in the PACOM area strongly affected the capability of U.S. forces in the PACOM to carry out military missions under CINCPAC's strategic concepts.

Military Participation in Country Agreements

CINCPAC had a strong interest in those negotiations which took place between representatives of the U.S. and of Asiatic countries concerning security treaties, status of forces agreements, and other



agreements directly affecting U.S. armed forces which were located in the countries concerned. In the following paragraphs, these activities are discussed according to geographical areas of interest.

Japan

As a result of the economic and political restoration of Japan, the United States had been subjected to ever increasing pressures for a revision of the 1951 Security Treaty. The United States recognized Japan's desire to be placed on an equal footing with other independent nations and agreed to negotiate a revision of that agreement. Officials of the Japanese Foreign Office indicated a desire in October 1958 to amend, as well, the Administrative Agreement to make it conform to the spirit of the proposed new Security Treaty. Although the United States was opposed to a general renegotiation of the Administrative Agreement, it finally agreed to a detailed review of that document. In early May 1959, the Japanese officially presented a draft revision of both the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement.

As a result of earlier agreements with Ambassador MacArthur, CINCPAC dispatched¹ a "negotiation team" to Japan to facilitate study of the Japanese drafts and to insure that the military requirements were fully considered. On-the-scene coordination between the Embassy, COMUSJAPAN, and the CINCPAC team was unusually effective and provided a desirable precedent for the formulation of a comprehensive United States negotiating position for Status of Forces agreements.

1 CINCPAC 080628Z May 59


The principal problem areas in the Security Treaty Negotiations concerned: (1) the Consultation Formula, (2) the recognition of Japanese residual sovereignty in the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, (3) the continuation of the September 1951 Acheson-Yoshida Exchange of Notes, (4) the Japanese constitutional limitations on maintaining armed forces, and (5) the definition of the treaty area.

The most important single item to CINCPAC was the Consultation Formula. Although the Prime Minister was sympathetic to the United States desire for operational freedom in the use of its bases, he was faced with growing political clamor for restrictive language which would safeguard Japan from becoming embroiled in "an American war" resulting from the use of bases for direct or indirect United States combat operations. The matter was finally resolved through agreement on a public exchange of notes committing the United States to consult with the Japanese Government before making major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States Forces, before initiating major changes in equipment of these forces, and before using its bases for military combat operations.¹ This public exchange was to be supplemented by an unpublished "Record of Discussions" which would explain more fully the component parts of the Consultation Formula. Although these "explanations" diminished somewhat the restrictive language of the Formula, the basic obligation for consultation prior to the use of the bases for combat operations outside Japan remained unaffected. The composition of the Consultative Committee remained the same as the former US-Japanese Committee on Security

1 Tokyo/State 2745 20 Jun 59

[REDACTED]

(Japanese Foreign Minister and Defense Minister and the US Ambassador and CINCPAC) but it was permitted to act "on behalf of" the respective governments on matters pertaining to the Consultation Formula and Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

With reference to the Japanese desire for public recognition of their residual sovereignty in the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the United States was reluctant to express such a reaffirmation without an accompanying comment that it must continue its present status in those islands so long as tension and the Sino-Soviet threat existed in the Far East.

However, in an agreed minute to the Treaty it was stipulated that the Government of Japan might announce its concern for the safety of the islands in the event of actual or threatened armed attack since Japan possessed residual sovereignty over the islands. Likewise, the United States would declare its intent to consult with Japan and take necessary measures for the defense of the islands and do its utmost to secure the welfare of the inhabitants.¹

Also difficult of resolution was the problem of continuing the Acheson-Yoshida Notes. Under the provisions of that exchange, Japan was committed to the support of the United Nations Forces in the event of a resumption of hostilities against them in Korea. The Government of Japan, however, desired to limit its support commitment to logistical matters. The Japanese also insisted that any use of bases in Japan for combat operations in Korea be made subject to the Consultation Formula associated with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The problem was solved by

1 State/Tokyo 1489, 20 Dec 59; Tokyo/State 1979, 22 Dec 59

making minor modifications to a Japan proposal to the effect that the Acheson-Yoshida Notes be continued in force, that the U.S. concur that the Acheson-Yoshida Agreement was subject to the Consultation Formula, and that at the first meeting of the Consultative Committee Japan would agree that:

"In the event of an attack against the United Nations Forces in Korea, facilities and areas in Japan may be used for such military combat operations as need be undertaken immediately by the United States Armed Forces in Japan under the Unified Command of the United Nations as the response to such an armed attack in order to enable the United Nations forces in Korea to repel an armed attack made in violation of the Armistice."¹

Other problem areas, in general, were resolved during Treaty negotiations without major difficulties. However, on 3 August 1959, the U.S. entered into an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany which supplemented the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The terms were, in some instances, slightly more favorable than those which had been offered the Japanese, and the Japanese requested comparable treatment. The principal problems concerned U.S. rights within and outside bases, customs privileges, and labor practices. In all of these, the Japanese desired more authority. The U.S. reached agreement with Japan on terms which would maintain those U.S. rights which were essential to the operations of U.S. forces but would relinquish, to a degree, rights concerning individuals in the U.S. forces. Also, the rights of Japanese employees of the U.S. would be better protected in those cases not affecting security.²

With respect to U.S. non-appropriated fund employees, Japan requested

1 Tokyo/State 1946, 19 Dec 59; State/Tokyo 1507, 22 Dec 59

2 Tokyo/State 720, 10 Sep 59; Tokyo/State 721, 10 Sep 59; Tokyo/State 798, 17 Sep 59; State/Tokyo 1272, 24 Nov 59

[REDACTED]

that these employees be transferred from a direct-hire to an indirect-hire status, thus placing them under a Master Labor Contract. GOJ objection to the direct-hire system was based on their contention that the employees did not have access to Japanese courts and Labor Commissions. CINCPAC objected to the GOJ position on the grounds that the U.S. should have the right to separate such employees without excessive costs and the prospect of being over-ruled by Japanese Courts. CINCPAC noted that this would result in increased annual costs of over \$600,000 plus one time payment of \$1.5 million retirement allowances and subsequently the probable RIF of some 5,000 employees and the transfer of many activities to concessions.¹

Throughout these negotiations, CINCPAC continued to present timely comments and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many of these suggestions were incorporated into the United States negotiating position. At the end of 1959 the Treaty and Administrative Agreement were sufficiently finalized so that 19 January 1960 had been selected as the date for signing at Washington.

Korea

Principally for reasons of prestige, the Republic of Korea had been pressing the United States for a status of forces agreement since 1954. The ROK indicated a desire to exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States servicemen for off-duty offenses. The United States, however, flatly rejected this proposal on the grounds that a state of war continued to exist

1 CINCPAC 312100Z Dec 59

SE [REDACTED]
in Korea¹ (only an Armistice Agreement had been signed), and there were no status of forces agreements with other United Nations represented in Korea. As an alternative, the United States offered to discuss certain administrative matters associated with the presence of United States servicemen in Korea (i.e., claims, taxation, customs, and entry and exit).


In order to forestall the development of ill-will on this matter, on 18 May 1959, the American Embassy and CINCUNC jointly recommended that negotiations be authorized at once on facilities and areas as well as the administrative items referred to above.² It was to be understood, however, that the Republic of Korea would not be given any jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen. On 11 June 1959, the American Embassy at Seoul was handed a note proposing early negotiations on facilities and areas. Specific information on the Korean demands was not known at the end of 1959 and accordingly, the United States negotiating position was not fully formed.

In an effort to insure that all military requirements were properly considered, CINCPAC expressed a desire³ that the negotiations be handled - - on the military side - - with COMUS Korea reporting to CINCPAC who in turn would comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was deemed more appropriate than to permit Generals Decker or Magruder -- acting as CINCUNC -- to comment jointly with the Embassy directly to the State Department with information only to CINCPAC. Such a procedure would have precluded the presentation of a single, unified military view to the

1 Dispatch Seoul/State 21 Nov 57

2 Seoul/State 642, 18 May 59

3 CINCPAC 132230Z Jun 59


Defense Department. The CINCPAC position was affirmed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.¹

Taiwan

The United States and the Republic of China exchanged drafts on a proposed status of forces agreement covering non-MAAG units stationed at Taiwan following earlier negotiations extending back to 1954. The United States draft was dated 20 May 1957 and the Chinese counter-draft was submitted on 12 August 1958.²

The United States, in Taiwan, exercised exclusive jurisdiction over its MAAG personnel by virtue of the 1951 MAAG Agreement which clothed personnel of that organization with diplomatic immunity. Heretofore, non-MAAG forces had "ridden on the coattails" of the MAAG agreement. With the continued influx, however, of personnel not assigned to MAAG duties, the Chinese increased their pressure for a permanent status of forces arrangement.

After a lengthy period of somewhat desultory negotiations, the State and Defense Departments authorized resumption of earnest negotiations on "relatively non-controversial articles."³ The United States position on criminal jurisdiction — by far the knottiest issue — was not to be formulated until after completion of a study of Taiwan criminal law which was being conducted by the Department of Defense.

Chinese officials made a strong presentation of the importance they attached to the need for modification of the MAAG agreement⁴ (they

1 JCS 231952Z Jun 59

2 Encl 1 to Report of 10th Meeting - Taipei FSD 67 dtd 15 Aug 58

3 State 14 May 9 PM 59

4 Taipei 12 Aug 7 PM 58

[REDACTED]

would limit coverage to personnel of field grade and above) as well as obtaining United States responses to their proposals on jurisdiction. The United States, on the other hand, advised the Chinese Government that it was not willing to link status of forces negotiations to revision of the MAAG agreement and, pending formulation of the United States position on criminal jurisdiction, urged that the negotiators proceed to other topics.¹

A Working Group was established on Taiwan to assist in the negotiations. COMUSTDC was represented on that committee working under CINCPAC's instructions for close coordination with the Embassy in establishing the United States position during these negotiations.


CINCPAC, through COMUSTDC, participated in the working group which studied the CHINAT negotiating positions in 1959. Formal negotiations were not started in 1959. ✓

Philippines

Negotiations for revision of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement were adjourned in December 1956 when the negotiating panels became deadlocked over the issue of criminal jurisdiction. In October 1958, Ambassador Bohlen and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Serrano reinitiated exploratory talks with a view to resuming negotiations.

Once again the problem of criminal jurisdiction proved a stumbling block in the negotiations. The controversial points were (1) who should exercise jurisdiction over dependents and members of the civilian component; (2) the procedures for determining the duty status of the


1 22 Oct 8 PM 59 State 609/23 SCF Book State msgs


alleged offender at the time of the incident; (3) an acceptable definition of the term "official duty"; and (4) the mutuality of provisions for the waiver of jurisdiction.

Since both Secretary Serrano and Ambassador Bohlen felt that the talks were rapidly approaching a point of breakdown, they agreed to move on to other topics which were less controversial. It was hoped that this would establish a more amicable atmosphere for the future return to the jurisdiction issue, as well as clarify the possibility of eventual agreement.

Agreement in principle was reached in July on land requirements and the actual delimitation of areas and bases was placed in the hands of a Metes and Bounds Committee composed of members of the MDB.

During August and September, the two topics under consideration were Consultation and Duration. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Serrano desired to widen the consultation formula so that the United States would not only consult with the Philippine Government before staging combat operations from bases located in the Philippines but would also consult prior to using these bases for logistic support in situations in which the U.S. might become involved in military action. Ambassador Bohlen recommended adoption of a "general consultation" provision which would be broad enough to cover Philippine concern over logistics but would not limit U.S. ability to rely on the bases. He also requested authorization to accept the Philippine position for a duration clause which would last for 25 years but would provide for termination by mutual consent. Additionally, the clause would provide an option for renewal of



the agreement after 25 years. State-Defense did not favor the 25 year limitation and preferred a formula providing termination when both parties agreed that there was no longer a need for the bases.

¹
Ambassador Bohlen was authorized to table a memorandum which would:
(1) limit the use of the bases to Mutual Defense Treaty, SEATO and United Nations matters; (2) provide for combat consultation to include any introduction of IRBMs or ICBMs but excluding logistic consultation; (3) reduce the duration of the agreement from 99 to 25 years with a renewal clause and provision for earlier termination by mutual agreement, and; (4) state U.S. policy that armed attack against the Philippines was an attack against the U.S. through its armed forces located in the Philippines. The Philippine negotiators desired to broaden the consultation provisions, to insure that the agreement did not affect the MAP, and to widen the U.S. "policy" on defense of the Philippines in the event of armed attack to make it a "responsibility".

Alternative positions were prepared on the subject of Criminal Jurisdiction but were not tabled by Ambassador Bohlen prior to his departure in October. He did conclude a Memorandum of Agreement with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which evidenced their accord on a number of important issues.²

CINCPAC followed these negotiations closely and with great interest. Coordination between the Embassy and CINCPACREPPHIL was excellent, with the result that the United States negotiating position represented

1 23 Sep 3 PM-59-State-219/25-240; 161200Z Sep 59 Manila-634/17-240
2 Memorandum of Agreement, 12 Oct 59


a harmony of diplomatic considerations and military requirements.

Vietnam

Article 16 of the 1954 Indo China Cease-Fire Agreement (Geneva Accords) permitted the introduction of military personnel into Vietnam only on a replacement basis. It did not specify nationality. Although the U.S. was not a signatory to the Cease-Fire Agreement, it had declared its intention to abide by the terms of the Accords.

At the time of the Cease-Fire Agreement, the U.S. had 342 MAAG personnel serving in Vietnam. As French training forces withdrew, however, MAAG began to be overwhelmed by its duties. In 1956, Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) was activated to assist MAAG in the recovery of excess war materiel being returned by the French. It also assisted MAAG - confidentially - in training the Vietnamese forces. The ceiling for TERM was set at 350. Although TERM was introduced without ICC sanction, the Commission adopted a resolution in December 1958 calling on TERM to complete its activities by 30 June 1959.

In June 1959, the ICC sent a letter to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) criticizing the TERM operation and requesting GVN comments, but without setting a specific departure date for TERM. Based upon statements by the Indian Commissioner, Ambassador Durbrow believed TERM could be extended another 15-18 months. The U.S. suggested the GVN not reply to the ICC letter until September or October, at which time it would estimate the completion of TERM's mission by the end of 1960.

The U.S. suggested to the Canadians that the U.S. be permitted to

increase MAAG strength as TERM was phased out. Although the U.S. believed that it could legally increase the MAAG to 888 (total U.S. and French advisors to VN when Geneva Accords were signed), it did not intend to exceed the total figure for MAAG and TERM - 692.

The Canadians were not enthusiastic about the U.S. proposal because: (1) they doubted the juridical validity of the U.S. position, and (2) the abolition of ICC Laos and the defeat of the Polish delegation on the credits issue made it likely that India would side with the Poles just to keep the scales in balance.

On 29 October 1959, the GVN replied to the June inquiry¹ of the ICC regarding the conclusion of activities by TERM. The ICC was advised that on the basis of information available, TERM should be able to complete its mission by approximately the end of 1960. This reply was in accordance with the U.S. suggestion, and was informally approved by the Indian Commissioner to the ICC.

Ambassador Durbrow urged the State Department in October¹ that a high level approach to the Canadians on the subject of increasing the MAAG ceiling should be carried out without further delay. He noted that a phase out of TERM by the end of 1960 called for phasing in additional MAAG personnel.

Other Political-Military Problems

Many day-to-day problems affecting the relationships between the U.S. forces and host countries were solved at a local level without reference to CINCPAC but in accordance with CINCPAC's policies. However, some problems

1 Saigon 30 Oct Noon-59

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are discussed below because they bore on policy or because they were of wide interest.

Korea

At the outbreak of the Korean Conflict (25 June 1950), the United States suspended the payment of tort claims filed in Korea by Korean nationals under the provisions of the Foreign Claims Act. On 21 April 1959, the State and Defense Departments jointly announced that (1) United States Foreign Claims Commissions in Korea would resume the settlement of individual tort claims and (2) these commissions would commence the review and settlement of past meritorious claims which arose after 27 July 1953 (termination of hostilities) and were filed with United States claims authorities. No final decision was made, however, as to claims arising subsequent to 27 July 1953 but which were not filed, nor as to claims arising during the period of hostilities whether or not filed.

CINCPAC, through a coordinated effort with the PACOM Component Commanders was able to provide the Department of Defense an estimate of the number of claims anticipated for each category.¹ In addition, CINCPAC urged that waiver legislation be obtained to permit claims arising after 27 July 1953 to be filed within one year after enactment or one year after the event which gave rise to the claim, whichever was later. It also recommended that similar legislation be sought for non-combat connected claims arising between 25 June 1950 and 27 July 1953.

Ryukyus

By High Commissioner (HICOM) Ordinance No. 23, the Ryukyuan Penal

1. CINCPAC 300035Z May 59

Code was revised and brought up to date. While the new Penal Code contained noteworthy improvements for the protection of civil rights, a rather intense reaction developed in the Ryukyus and Japan over what were considered to be severe penalties authorized for certain crimes. Particular reference was made to the authorization of the death penalty for peacetime sedition and sabotage. Objection was also made to the requirement for registration of political organizations and publications. While the new ordinance might have been restrictive when compared to United States statutes, even the Japanese conceded that it was an improvement over the preceding code. It must also be recalled that the peculiar position of Okinawa, as a defensive bastion under what was tantamount to military government, did not lend itself to every nicety of criminal procedure. Consideration was being given at the end of 1959 to permit an official of the Japanese Ministry of Justice to visit Naha to discuss the new Penal Code with Ryukyuan and U.S. officials.

The casualty figures from the unfortunate crash of a jet aircraft in the Ishikawa school area on 30 June 1959 totalled twenty-two fatalities. Condolence payments were made to bereaved families, claims were paid, and reconstruction completed. Public reaction to this catastrophe was not as adverse as was originally anticipated.


Philippines

For a number of years the United States Bases in the Philippines were subjected to large scale pilferage by local nationals who entered the bases illegally. In many cases, offenders sought to evade apprehension by flight or by assault on the guards. As a result, a number

[REDACTED]

of trespassers were shot and killed. Despite sufficient evidence that the deceased were engaged in criminal activity, these shootings provoked considerable adverse reaction in the local communities. Under Philippine law, guards may fire only in self defense, however U.S. Commanders had authorized civilian guards to fire to prevent the escape of persons committing felonies, sabotage, arson or espionage. As the guards involved were Philippine Nationals, local authorities sought to exercise jurisdiction and bring them to trial on charges of murder. However, since the guards had acted pursuant to orders of military superiors, the United States objected to trial and was willing to release names involved only when local authorities certified they had sufficient evidence to establish a prima-facie case. Accordingly, only sanitized versions of U.S. investigative reports, omitting names of investigators and agents, were provided local authorities. In July, a local Philippine official charged that a number of miscreants had been murdered after apprehension by base guards and in compliance with orders of U.S. officers. This provoked much adverse publicity resulting in a request by Ambassador Bohlen for corrective action by the Philippine Government. Philippine officials however declined to repudiate the charge and requested release of OSI investigative reports to rebut the charge. As Philippine officials had sought release of such documents for some time, it appeared that the murder allegations were just another maneuver to secure said documents.

A few U.S. Servicemen were found to be engaged in smuggling activities in the Philippines. Since jurisdiction was not clear in such


cases, considerable irritation resulted. Of primary concern was proper disposition of smuggled items. Upon CINCPAC's recommendations the State and Defense Departments agreed as follows: (1) contraband should be turned over to Philippine Liaison Officers after it had served U.S. evidentiary purposes; (2) items imported without declaration would be returned to the legal owner after serving U.S. needs, with notification to Philippine authorities of when and where turnover would occur; and, (3) declared items exceeding reasonable needs of the importer would be impounded by U.S. authorities and the Philippine authorities notified (when customs duty was paid the property would be returned to the legal owner).

Negotiations having been successfully completed, the transfer of the Navy base at Olongapo and adjacent areas to the Philippine Government was accomplished at noon on 7 December 1959, by an exchange of notes signed during an impressive ceremony.

Indonesia

On 23 September 1958, thirteen male Indonesian castaways washed ashore at Tobi Island in the Trust Territory of the Pacific. They were part of a rebel movement in North Sulawesi and were bound for Manado, but had been blown off their course and landed at Tobi by chance. Their presence was discovered by United States officials in October 1958, and they turned themselves over willingly. The castaways were taken to Korrer, Palau, where they remained until 13 February 1959 when they were removed to Guam and placed in the custody of United States naval authorities. The castaways did not desire to be repatriated for fear of severe punishment.

Although it was the policy of the United States to repatriate promptly in such cases, the State Department did not wish to repatriate them forcibly. The Government of Indonesia was notified of the presence of these persons and requested to give assurances of immunity in case they were sent back. These assurances were not forthcoming. Rather the Indonesian Government requested photographs of these individuals and proposed to send an Embassy representative to interview the group.

At the urgent request of the United States, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) agreed to send a group of government officials to interview the castaways at Guam. These officials were not, however, empowered to grant immunity to the castaways, but merely to determine the identity and background of these individuals and to ascertain their desires for repatriation.

Arrangements were made to fly the GOI officials from the Philippines to Guam via MATS. In order to avoid embarrassing publicity to the GOI no public disclosures were made concerning the identity of these persons or the reason for their visit. The U.S. conducted a survey of the castaways and all but one expressed a desire for repatriation.

It was expected that this problem would be resolved in 1960.

Bonin Islands

Compensation for ex-Bonin Islanders, then residing in Japan, for loss of the "use, benefit or exercise of their property rights" in the Bonin Islands was under active consideration since 1953 when the Department of the Navy went on record to that effect regarding those individuals

1 13 Feb 10 PM-58-SecState-53

[REDACTED]

who could show title to the land in the Bonin-Volcano Island group. As the result of coordination between Department of the Navy and Department of State, a bill, sponsored by the latter providing for 6 million dollars to indemnify the ex-Bonin Islanders, cleared the Bureau of the Budget and went to the Congress on 26 May 1959.¹

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

In 1959, PACOM forces participated in activities which did not have a direct military benefit to the PACOM but which contributed to the improvement of relations between the U.S. and other nations in the PACOM. The PACOM forces participated actively in support of the President's People-to-People Program and provided relief assistance to those foreign countries which suffered disasters during the year. Additionally, they participated in military exhibitions which were primarily of a public relations nature. Although the majority of these activities were conducted under Service auspices and will not be reported in detail, CINCPAC exercised joint control over certain of these activities.

In response to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve in October 1958,² CINCPAC wrote a letter³ outlining the activities of the PACOM in the People-to-People Program and recommending steps which should be taken to improve the military participation in the program. CINCPAC noted the effectiveness of Country Information Teams, formed by the USIA in PACOM countries at the instigation of CINCPAC, to coordinate all efforts in the program, and he emphasized the

1 Encl 1 to FLT ltr ser 2469 of 20 Jun 59

2 Ltr ASD/MPR to Adm Felt, 31 Oct 58

3 Ltr Adm Felt to ASD/MPR, 22 Nov 58

value of establishing conditions so that tours in foreign countries of military persons could be lengthened and these persons and their dependents could receive indoctrination, including language training, to qualify them better to implement the program.

In May, CINCPAC forwarded ¹ a DOD document entitled "Communications Reflecting the Current Status of the Activities of the Armed Services under the President's People-to-People Program" (January 1959) to PACOM subordinate commanders, CINCPACREPS, CHMAAGs and JUSMAGs. He stressed the significance of the program in the cold war and recommended that each commander assign responsibility to one person in his staff to keep the command aware of the program. He also recommended that each commander provide special recognition to persons who had put the people-to-people idea into practice.

Disaster Relief

In 1957, the JCS assigned to CINCPAC, ² area responsibility in American Samoa, Guam and Hawaii for emergency military support to civil authorities in the event of civil defense or other domestic emergencies. Although CINCPAC was not specifically charged in this directive with the responsibility for coordinating foreign disaster relief operations, he assumed this duty as part of his area-wide responsibilities and promulgated an Instruction which established responsibilities and policies concerning the provision of PACOM military aid to civil authorities throughout the PACOM. ³ Subsequently, CINCPAC received JCS directives concerning foreign disaster relief operations which confirmed this assumption. ⁴

1 CINCPAC ser 889 of 1 May 59

2 SM 403-57 of 4 Jun 57

3 CINCPACINST 3050.1 of 7 Jan 58

4 SM 600-59 of 16 Jun 59 and SM 1138-59 of 9 Nov 59

As far as possible, CINCPAC delegated responsibilities for coordinating such aid to his subordinate commanders and representatives in each area in the PACOM. In four significant disasters of 1959, PACOM forces assisted the stricken countries (Taiwan, Japan and Korea) and thereby contributed to international good will. The principal problem facing PACOM commanders in these operations was that of securing authorization to expend military funds in time so that the disaster operations could be initiated promptly. Additional guidance and directives from the JCS during the year¹ improved this situation somewhat and enabled CINCPAC to authorize more responsibility to local commanders to initiate foreign disaster relief operations without reference to CINCPAC. A revised CINCPAC instruction, incorporating this change, was prepared in 1959 for promulgation in 1960.

Typhoons caused all of the disasters in the PACOM area during 1959 which called for the provision of military aid. There were four serious typhoons. Typhoons ELLEN and IRIS in combination with local thunder showers struck Taiwan in August and caused considerable damage. The 7th Fleet aided in disaster relief, particularly the THETIS BAY which operated off the south coast of Taiwan and provided helicopters for rescue operations as well as supplies and medical assistance. Typhoon SARAH hit Taiwan and the south coast of Korea and inflicted severe damage. Typhoon VERA caused a major disaster in the Nagoya area of Japan. All U.S. forces in the vicinity of the disaster areas caused by the last two typhoons contributed rescue teams, supplies, communications and medical relief to the local authorities.

1 SM 600-59 of 16 Jun 59 and SM 1138-59 of 9 Nov 59

Military Participation in International Celebrations

In addition to the relatively routine program of visits,¹ and local military public relations entertaining, and in addition to the Weapons Demonstration, combined military training actions and combined exercises, the PACOM forces participated in special activities designed to tighten the ties between the U.S. and other countries in the PACOM area.

The annual Battle of the Coral Sea Celebration in Australia during the period 25 April-15 May, called Handclasp V, was attended by CINCPACAF as CINCPAC's representative. PACAF provided² 4 RF 101's plus support aircraft and PACFLT provided one cruiser, a submarine and a destroyer escort division.

The JCS, in response to a CINCPAC recommendation,³ cancelled planned PACAF participation in the Queensland Centenary Celebration and the Wellington Airport Dedication. This was necessary at the time because of the heavy commitments of transport aircraft in support of the Laos operations. However, as the situation quieted in Laos, the participation of PACOM forces was rescheduled.⁴ A task force of 5th Air Force and 315th Air Division elements deployed to Australia on 11 October to participate in the Queensland Centenary Celebration and continued on to New Zealand, on 26 October, to participate in the Wellington Airfield dedication. The task force, consisting of 2 C-120's, 2 C-124's, 1 C-54, 2 F-100's, 2 B-66's, 6 RF 101's and Tanker Support, conducted fly-bys, aerial demonstrations, static displays and VIP demonstration rides. The reception was enthusiastic.

1 A visit which received more than ordinary note was that of the cruiser ST PAUL to Djakarta which aided in furthering U.S. interests in Indonesia (NAVCOMSTA 080303Z Nov 59)

2 5th AF 200639Z Mar 59 and PACAF 210211Z Mar 59

3 CINCPAC 250921Z Sep 59 and JCS 301428Z Sep 59

4 CINCPAC 071936Z Oct 59


COMBINED ACTIVITIES FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

The specific objectives of the PACOM Civil Affairs program were to develop effective U.S. and other national wartime and peacetime programs designed to furnish the maximum Civil Affairs capability to counter Communist influence, infiltration, and subversion, and to promote the contribution of the armed forces to the economic, social, and political development of underdeveloped countries. The Civil Affairs programs were fully coordinated with the Public Information, Psychological Warfare and other programs which directly or indirectly influenced the attitude of the populace and the local authorities toward the armed forces. The activities included both current programs adapted to existing local conditions and planned programs for emergencies of all types, including limited or general war.

The development programs, known under various names including "civic action," have included pacification and restoration of public order, improvement of transportation and communications, construction of public buildings and facilities, conducting of public health, public education and agriculture programs, and the performance of civil government functions by both U.S. and other national military personnel.

In view of the nature of Civil Affairs activities in each country, there was not only a need for close coordination between representatives of U.S. Armed Forces and those of the country concerned, but also a need for close coordination among all U.S. government agencies within each host country regarding their activities with their counterparts in the country. A potential source of personnel suitable for Civil Affairs duties in the armed forces of each country was those individuals in the local government's Ministries who had received practical training with the ICA, USOM

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and the State Department. Both MAP and State Department funds were used in support of many local programs which were designed to help the armed forces furnish direct support to the development of the country. The programs not only provided real assistance in the form of roads, bridges, schools, dispensaries, etc., but also contributed to the improvement of relations between the armed forces and the civil population, and trained soldiers in skills of value to them and the community on their return to civilian life.

In Laos for example, the ANL created approximately 300 6-man teams to work at the township level. Their mission included the Public Health, Agriculture, Education, Religion, Public Safety, and Public Works functions. It was planned that as additional personnel were trained the number of teams would be increased to 667, one for each tasseng (township). These teams were achieving excellent results. All ANL Battalion and Company Commanders in the territorial forces were retrained in a course of approximately 5 months duration. Half of this time was devoted to civil government and internal security subjects. Similar programs have been assisted by U.S. agencies in Thailand, Vietnam and Korea.

U.S. interest in Civil Affairs activities in Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines was primarily to insure that preparations for assuming this important duty were made by the countrys' armed forces. In Japan, U.S. CAMG advice and assistance was provided to the Ground Staff Office (GSO) by the Army Section of MAAG Japan with the assistance of the J5 (Civil Affairs) Staff Division of COMUS Japan which worked with the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) on CAMG planning, organization and training. Although Japanese Civil Affairs plans were not considered adequate in

1959, a major step toward improvement was indicated by the GSO, which, in accepting primary responsibility for CAMG affairs, selected a U.S. CAMG trained officer for full time assignment to CAMG activities. A close working relationship between GSDF and police forces and other civilian agencies on planning for emergency conditions and natural disasters was established. In Taiwan, the Ministry of National Defense was requested to analyze its CAMG plans to determine what U.S. assistance would be necessary in event of implementation. It was judged that GRC CAMG plans and current operations were capable of coping with their civil affairs problems. Two experimental CAMG groups were deployed on the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. A training cadre of 88 spaces was approved at the MND level, and 600 reservists completed CAMG training by July 1959. MAAG Taiwan estimated that an active CAMG battalion of 604 and a reserve of 35,000 spaces were needed to implement current and emergency CAMG requirements. In the Philippines, the armed forces studied the role of the Constabulary in the exercise of supervision over local police forces during emergency situations involving internal security conditions.

In 1959, U.S. representatives, with varying degrees of success, emphasized the importance to the countries in the PACOM of making adequate preparations for Civil Affairs activities, and of establishing close relationships between the armed forces of each country and the civil populace in the conduct of activities which were of mutual benefit in fighting the Cold War.

VISITING IN THE PACOM AREA

The preceding pages of this chapter discuss CINCPAC actions which were designed to contribute directly to the strengthening of relationships between the U.S. and other countries in the PACOM. There were,

however, opportunities of less pointed means toward accomplishing the same objective. These include the personal contacts made by many representatives of CINCPAC who visited foreign countries, and the visits to CINCPAC and the Component Commands by numerous foreign dignitaries. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

There were 180 visits to Hawaii during the year by high ranking foreign dignitaries. Some of these visits were stop-overs enroute to and from the mainland, while others were specifically made for briefings or discussions. All directly concerned CINCPAC or the Component Commanders. Many of the visitors came in groups of two to eight persons. There were approximately twenty eight of these groups.

The following indicative listing shows the countries and some of their distinguished representatives who came to Hawaii in 1959:

AFGHANISTAN	- Prince Sardar Mohammed Naim, Foreign Minister and Vice Premier
AUSTRALIA	- The Honorable Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister Sir Roy R. Dowling, VAdm, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, SEATO Military Advisor
CEYLON	- Gerard R.M. de Mal, Commodore, Captain of the Royal Ceylon Navy
CHINA	- Madame Chiang Kai-shek (wife of President) Shai Lai Ho, Gen, Chief Representative of Mil Staff Cte, UN
FRANCE	- Jacques Soustelle, Minister Delegate to Premier Michel Debre; in Charge of Overseas Departments, of Saharan Affairs, and of Atomic Energy
INDIA	- Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India
INDONESIA	- Achmed Sukarno, President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia
JAPAN	- Hisaki Imai, Deputy Director General, Japanese Defense Agency
JORDAN	- His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite King- dom of Jordan

KOREA - Chang Kyu Kim, LtGen, Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Air Force

LACS - Sananikone Phoui, Prime Minister, Minister of Plans, Public Works, Social Affairs and Justice

NEW ZEALAND - The Honorable Walter Nash, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs,
Cyril E. Weir, MGen, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chief of General Staff, SEATO Military Advisor

PHILIPPINES - Manuel Cabal, LtGen, Chief of Staff, AFP and SEATO Adviser

THAILAND - Pote Sarasin, Secretary General SEATO
Thanom Kittikachorn, Gen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Deputy Supreme Commander Thai Armed Forces and Royal Thai Army

SWITZERLAND - F. Andres, MGen Swiss Army, Mbr UN Armistice Commission in Korea

UNITED KINGDOM - Gen Sir Francis Festing, Chief Imperial General Staff, UK

VIETNAM - V.D. Tran, MGen, CG First Corps, Vietnamese Army

Staff Visits by CINCPAC Representatives

Numerous staff visits to conduct CINCPAC business, both MAP and matters of a joint nature, were made by CINCPAC and members of his staff during 1959. Some of the places visited and the approximate number of individuals who visited each place are indicated below:

INDIVIDUAL VISITS

<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>NON-MAP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Japan	123	38	161
CONUS	41	95	136
Philippines	92	25	117
Thailand	72	18	90
Taiwan	57	20	77
Vietnam	54	11	65

<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>NON-MAP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Korea	40	19	59
Okinawa	34	17	51
Hong Kong/Singapore	29	15	44
Cambodia	18	2	20
Guam	7	10	17
Laos	13	1	14
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTALS	580	271	851

Additionally, approximately 67 other visits were made in areas throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER AGGRESSIONS AND INTERNAL UPRISINGS

This chapter summarizes a number of actions taken by CINCPAC during 1959 to counter Communist external aggressions and Communist-inspired internal uprisings and to carry out his Cold War responsibilities. The numerically superior ground and air strength of the Communist Bloc in Asia posed an obvious threat to the Free World Nations in the PACOM area. These military forces were combined within a dangerous political-economic-military apparatus which was clearly, in the case of Communist China, pursuing an aggressive policy aimed at securing domination of all Asia. Using its combination of means, Communist China probed and pushed constantly throughout the year in its incessant search for exploitable situations. Although there was no large-scale open warfare in the PACOM area during 1959, there was no state of peace. In Korea, there was only armed truce. In the Straits of Taiwan, there was sporadic fighting underlining the irreconcilable positions of the Chicomps and the Chinats. In Vietnam, where there was also an armed truce, organized bands of terrorists murdered and kidnapped South Vietnamese. Communist subversion and Communist-inspired rebellion made the situation in Laos a matter for international concern. Against these multiple aggressions in a condition which was called the Cold War, CINCPAC directed the joint efforts of PACOM forces and guided the actions of the forces of friendly nations in the defense of the nations of the Free World.

The preceding chapters of this command history describe CINCPAC activities to improve the state of readiness of U.S. and other national forces in the PACOM area, and to improve the capability of these forces

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to conduct combined and coordinated operations in the pursuit of common goals. All of these activities had a direct bearing on the waging of the Cold War and the prevention of shooting wars since by these actions Communist aggression was often deterred. Indeed, some of the actions which are described were actually operations against the enemy. For example, much of the training of military units of nations in the PACOM area by U.S. Civil Affairs, Psychological and Unconventional Warfare Mobile Training Teams took the form of on-the-job training because many of the units trained were engaged actively in combatting Communism within their country's borders. Hence, the information contained in this chapter must be considered against the background of the many activities which are discussed in the preceding chapters. The emphasis in this chapter is on operations where PACOM forces participated directly in the Cold War, generally in crisis areas.

By 1959, the international crises in the Taiwan Straits and in Indonesia had been resolved to a position of watching and waiting with CINCPAC supervising the provision of MAP support and attempting to establish conditions which would assure that future crises in these areas would be resolved in consonance with U.S. national policies. The various types of aid to these two countries and the measures which were taken to improve relationships with them are discussed in preceding chapters and the discussion in this chapter is limited to a summary of operational incidents in the Taiwan Straits and to an account of a supply situation on the off-shore islands which received continued

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special attention during 1959.

Continuous surveillance and reconnaissance activities were conducted by U.S. forces about the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. These activities were performed principally by agencies not under the direct control of CINCPAC, but CINCPAC kept fully informed of all phases of their activities in the PACOM area.

In Laos, the undercurrent of Communist insurgency had been developing since 1945, but had never reached the point where major action was required. When overt action was taken by the Communists and the Laotian Government called for assistance, the United States gave additional aid. Although much of this aid and many of CINCPAC's actions in response to the Laos crisis are discussed in other parts of this history, the situation in Laos is described as one integrated story (with some repetition) because of its importance to the Pacific Command.

Other Cold War actions in the field of psychological warfare, are also described in more detail in this chapter.

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TAIWAN STRAITS

Although the Taiwan Straits Crisis had abated by 1959, limited Chinese Communist activity against the off-shore islands and against U.S. and GRC forces in the Taiwan Straits continued and CINCPAC maintained close surveillance of the situation in that area. CHICOM artillery continued to batter the Kinmen and Matsu Islands on alternate days in accordance with the CHICOM face-saving announcement of 26 October 1958. This firing was of a harassing nature, with approximately half of the rounds containing psychological warfare leaflets. CHINAT F-86F's fought CHICOM MIG-type aircraft off the coast of China in several engagements in which they demonstrated a heartening superiority.¹ A significant CHINAT loss was one RB-57D shot down over North China on 10 October. Throughout the year, the CHICOMs issued a series of "serious warnings" that their territorial waters off mainland China and in the Spratley Islands, Tungyin Islands, Paracels and Yin Shan and Niu Shan (22-22N, 120-30E and 25-26N, 119-55.5E) were being violated by U.S. Naval patrol aircraft and ships. This was an attempt by the CHICOMs to build up a case to justify their claims for extending the limits of their territorial waters. PACFLT forces were told² that no credence should be attached to these alleged violations and that patrolling should continue. By coordinated exercises, deployments, and maneuvers, U.S. and GRC forces in the Taiwan Straits area demonstrated their readiness to meet further CHICOM aggressions.

However, since the crisis in the area had abated, the principal activities

1 COMUSDC 060750Z and 090510Z Jul 59 describe an action on 6 July where 4 CHINAT F-86F's engaged 12 CHICOM MIG-type aircraft, destroying 2.

2 USDC ltr ser 0194, 19 Jul 59

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of many of the U.S. forces in the area during 1959 were those incident to their redeployments from the Taiwan area. Marine Air Group (MAG) 11 was authorized to return to its normal bases in Japan; VFM 451 returned 1-2 February and VFM 115 and VMA 314 the first week in March.¹ The 16th FIS redeployed to Okinawa in January. Operational control of Commander Task Force (CTF) 72 reverted to COM7thFLT on 21 March from COMUSTDC.² The 337th FIS (F104) returned to CONUS from Taoyuan, Taiwan during March. On 1 May 13th ATF(P) and U.S. Army Forces (USARF) Taiwan were released from operational command of COMUSTDC.³

In the course of the crisis, much additional U.S. equipment was furnished the GRC on loan. In 1959, a number of decisions were made for the further disposition of this property. C-119s which had been on temporary loan to the CNAF were transferred under MAP to the GRC. Of the 8 BARCs on loan to the GRC, 4 remained on Taiwan for use by the GRC but with the U.S. still retaining title, and the remainder were placed in U.S. storage. Ten 240mm howitzers were put in place on Kinmen and two on little Kinmen, and a total of 24 155mm guns were available for deployment on the Matsus. The equipment of a U.S. Nike Hercules battalion (36 launchers and 79 missiles), which was placed in position around Taipei during the crisis, was transferred to the CHINATS on 14 August 1959 after GRC personnel became proficient in handling it.

Efforts were made to decrease the possibility of incidents. During the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Peking regime on 1 October and during the GRC Double Ten Celebration on 10 October, non-official travel to Hong Kong was suspended and official travel to there was limited.

1 COMTAIWANDEFCON 300253Z Jan 59 and COM7THFLT 070708Z Jan 59.

2 CINCPACFLT 300016Z Jan 59

3 COMUSTDC 240815Z Apr 59.

Resupply to Off-Shore Islands

One of the most critical problems during the Taiwan Straits crisis was that of assisting the GRC in the maintenance of adequate supply levels on the off-shore islands. In order to keep informed on this critical situation, CNO requested COMUSTDC on 4 September 1958 to provide periodic information concerning the stock status on the off-shore islands of Kinmen and Matsu.¹ The submission of this report remained a continuing requirement since that time, and the data therefrom received close attention within the CINCPAC Staff.


The status of all classes of supply on the Kinmen and Matsu complexes during 1959 was good, following a pattern of constancy established early in the year. Only on a few occasions did levels of supply fall below those established by the GRC,² and then only for brief periods. Other than delays caused by weather, there was no major hindrance to re-supply from Taiwan to the off-shore islands.

The illustration, figure 21, shows the average stock levels maintained on Kinmen and Matsu during 1959, based on information provided weekly in COMUSTDC Logistic Situation Reports.

1 CNO 042219Z Sep 58

2 CHMAAG Taiwan 100522Z Jan 59 Cite MGAR MG00057

STOCK STATUS KINMEN & MATSU COMPLEXES, 1959 (WEEKLY AVERAGE)



LEGEND

———— GRC ESTABLISHED STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES

FIGURE 21

COMMUNIST AGGRESSIONS IN LAOS

Background - Situation in Laos Prior to 1959

Laos, a landlocked, agricultural nation of rugged mountains and dense jungle, was formerly part of French Indo China. It was bordered to the North and East for 600 miles by both North Vietnam and Communist China, in regions where the poorly marked frontier and rugged terrain made it impossible to prevent the free traffic of persons between Laos and its neighbors. During the period May through October, heavy rainfall made the extremely limited road and trail system throughout the country virtually impassable.

The Lao comprised only about half the population, though politically they were the dominant group. An assortment of tribesmen - the Ho, the Black, Red and White Thai, the Lu, Akha, Yao, and Miao occupied the mountains and outer regions of the country while the Lao were concentrated in the fertile valleys and in the region surrounding Vientiane and Luang Prabang.

Laos was ruled by a constitutional monarchy and a small educated elite from a few prominent families. Virtually no others were competent to administer the country. There was a small emerging middle class, but the majority of the population was made up of peasants, 90% of whom were illiterate.

Thus, the cultural, geographic and ethnic ties within Laos were very loose and the loyalty of the population to the central government was limited.

There were further complications to the problem of welding Laos into a strong country, capable of meeting the thrust of Communism. It inherited complex political problems when it was constituted a separate country.

Laos was under French domination for a half century until World War II. During the war, it was first occupied by Japanese and then by Chinese troops. The seeds of the Pathet Lao (Land of Laos) movement were sown in July 1945 when rebel leaders of the Kingdom of Luang Prabang (the title of the old sub-

division of French Indo China, embracing the territory which was later to be part of Laos) declared their independence from France. The rebel Lao Issara (Free Lao) movement could not stop the return of the French and the leaders fled to Bangkok in 1946 where they established a government in exile. During this period, the Vietnamese Communist troops aided the Lao Issara guerrillas and kept in touch with their leaders in Thailand. Most of the Lao Issara leaders were anti-communist and favored this assistance for nationalistic motives alone.

A French-Laos independence agreement was signed in July 1949 and the majority of the Lao Issara leaders returned to Laos. The Communist element of the movement split off and a resistance government of Pathet Lao under Prince Souphanouvong was announced. When the Vietnamese Communists invaded Laos in 1953, Souphanouvong found himself the nominal commander of a Vietnamese Communist volunteer army twice as large as his own Pathet Lao force which already was mostly Vietnamese Communists. The Pathet Lao made considerable progress so that under the provisions of the Geneva Accords in Mid-1954 they secured terms that: (1) the Vietnamese Communists withdraw from Laos; (2) the Pathet Lao regroup in two northern provinces; and, (3) the RLG and the Pathet Lao negotiate the peaceful integration of the Pathet Lao into the Lao nation.

During the years when negotiations were underway the Pathet Lao ruled the two provinces where they had been regrouped and violated the terms of the agreement. On 12 November 1957, after numerous major concessions by the RLG, final accord was reached on merging the Pathet Lao provinces with the RLG and introducing Communists in the coalition cabinet.

The Communists took advantage of their new position to expand subversive activities throughout the country. Their program took advantage of the divisive

factors in the country and appealed particularly to the rural peasants. Against this disciplined organization was arrayed a squabbling crew of conservative parties that could not agree on a single slate. The results of the 4 May 1958 supplementary elections to fill seats in Parliament created by the integration of the Northern Provinces were a complete surprise to the Conservative elements. The Communist coalition polled 40% of the popular vote and won 13 of the 21 contested seats for parliament. This alarming victory presaged a clearcut Communist victory in the 1959 General Elections.

The conservative elements gained some measure of unity to meet this threat despite reports of a coup by rightist elements. The National Assembly granted special powers to Phoui Sananikone in the hope of establishing effective anti-communist, political, constitutional, administrative, social and economic reforms. He formed a government and began the race against time to again win the allegiance of the electorate. The Communists in North Vietnam began a virulent propaganda campaign against the RLG and made several incursions by armed forces at the Lao border. They called for the reestablishment of the International Control Commission (ICC), a commission with members from Poland, India, and Canada which had been formed to supervise the implementation of the Geneva Agreements. The ICC had left the country in July 1958 following the merger of the Pathet Lao provinces and at the request of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG).


The U.S., through the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), had been carrying an extensive program to aid Laos in the rehabilitation of its economy.


U.S. Support Activities Prior to 1959

U.S. aid to Laos, prior to the Geneva Accords, was given indirectly by means of grants to the French in support of their activities in French Indo-China, of which Laos was a part. After the Geneva Accords, the French continued to furnish military advice to the government of Laos, but the French Military Mission (FMM) was reduced in strength, with no personnel assigned to training in the combat arms. It was apparent that assistance from the U.S. was necessary, if the Laotian Army was to develop into a capable fighting force.

Initially a section was formed in USOM to administer a military aid program for Laos. This arrangement was considered necessary because of restrictions in the Geneva Accords concerning the sending of military personnel to Laos. Although the U.S. was not a signer of the Accords it had announced that it would abide by the terms of the agreements.

It soon became apparent that the magnitude of the program required a separate organization. Thus the Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) an agency of the Department of Defense was established, ostensibly as a section of the USOM but actually operating as a separate element of the U.S. country team. The personnel of the PEO were all civilians, but, since their duties involved knowledge in military matters and equipment, the majority of them were reserve or retired military personnel. Mr. Rothwell Brown, who was the Chief PEO in the period preceding 1959, was a retired U.S. Army brigadier general. The principal problem of the PEO was that of securing "end use" observers who could visit or live in field installations and depots of the Laos Army and insure that U.S. equipment was being put to proper use. Through the PEO and through other U.S.


governmental agencies in Laos, the United States paid the salaries and furnished most of the military support to the armed forces of Laos and carried out other activities designed to improve the economic and political situation in Laos. The U.S. program in Laos received some criticism and it was alleged that, due to administrative and political deficiencies, the effects of much of the U.S. program were not felt in the outlying regions of the country.

A few projects were put underway by the U.S. prior to the elections on 4 May 1958 to attempt to aid the pro-Western Laotians in the elections. The most noteworthy, from the standpoint of the military, was called Project Booster Shot. This was a large military airlift of supplies to Laos, particularly to its outlying areas, in a manner calculated to exert the greatest influence upon the electorate. This operation possibly prevented complete disaster in the 4 May elections, but it could not reverse the impressive Communist gains. It became obvious that the efforts of the PEO and one-time projects to influence the electorate would not be sufficient to save Laos from Communist subjugation.

CINCPAC decided in 1958 that it was necessary to survey that portion of the program in Laos which concerned the military and that it was necessary to have the military aid program in Laos conducted by active service military personnel under the supervision of CINCPAC. He requested that an active duty general officer be assigned the duty of prospective Chief, PEO and charged with the mission, prior to assuming this duty, of surveying the situation in Laos and making recommendations. Brigadier General John A. Heintges, U.S. Army, was assigned this task.

Brigadier General Heintges studied the situation, visiting CINCPAC and Laos and conferring with experts at all levels in the U.S. government. He

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concluded that the principal efforts to improve the situation in the administration of military aid to Laos should be concentrated on measures to:¹

(1) reorganize the PEO, (2) aid in training the FAL,² and (3) improve the logistics of the armed forces in Laos.

The "Heintges Plan" outlined a comprehensive program for improving the U.S. military support to Laos. It called for an increase of the military element of the PEO by 16 military personnel with a provision that as the terms of civilians employed in the PEO expired, determinations would be made concerning the desirability of retaining the civilian space, deleting it, or converting it into a military space. It listed four steps to improve the logistical situation of the ANL. These were: (1) introducing in January 1959, U.S. logistics teams to identify and segregate for disposition obsolete equipment, and determine deficiencies of materiel that were urgently required; (2) requisitioning equipment with unobligated funds and recommending increased fund ceilings where necessary to provide urgently needed equipment; (3) insuring adequate funds for contracting internal Laos airlift to supply outlying areas; and (4) augmenting normal delivery means to Laos with military airlift from PACOM and CONUS to Bangkok or Vientiane.

The plan recommended that the U.S. aid in training the Laos Army by (1) providing personnel to form joint U.S./French teams to train each of the twelve regular ANL battalions in basic military subjects as well as ranger and special force activities; (2) assigning a field grade officer to each region headquarters to supervise the training teams and work with the ANL Regional Commander on logistical and training matters; (3) activating a

1 Encl, CINCPAC ltr ser 00678 of 13 Dec 58

2 The Laos Army was called both the FAL (Forces Armee du Laos) and the ANL (Armee National Laos) in reports from Laos. Terms are used interchangeably in this account.

[REDACTED]

training center at Seno Air Base to train recruits and MCS specialists with the PEO providing instructors, training aids and material; (4) supplementing and complementing French training of the technical services to raise the standards of handling and maintaining MAP supplies through the use of 82 Filipino technicians, and further supervising this effort through mobile training teams of 3 U.S. NCO's each; (5) providing U.S. military training and advisory teams for specialized assistance in internal security training (special forces and PSYWAR); and (6) increasing the quota to allow for 60 additional FAL representatives to take three months courses at The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia. CINCPAC forwarded this plan to CASD/ISA, with a statement concerning the degree with which it could be implemented out of CINCPAC resources. CINCPAC urgently recommended that the plan be approved.¹

At the time that Brigadier General Heintges was studying the problem in Laos, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos forwarded a Country Team Outline Plan for Action to Reduce the Influence of Communist Elements in Laos.² Oddly enough, this plan contained no reference to the fact that the ANL (FAL) was the principal unifying element of national power in Laos available to extend RLG authority into the farthest reaches of the country, but instead listed some 31 projects grouped in six categories which were expected to have a desirable impact on the Laos electorate. The plan indicated some areas where ANL (FAL) assistance would be used in implementing the projects. The projects called for improving the RLG administrative set up, aiding in public works activities particularly in the field of communications (airfields, roads, bridges, ferries, and telecommunications), and contributing to village, health, agricultural and public information improvements.

1 CINCPAC ltr ser 00678 of 13 Dec 58

2 Vientiane 724 20 Oct 5 PM PASEP NCS 211721Z Oct 58

The Crisis in Laos During 1959

The Prime Minister, using the special powers granted him by the Parliament, began early in 1959, his program to strengthen the RLG. The Army was the only reasonably cohesive element of the government which could influence the programs to combat subversive activities. The plan was for the Army to engage itself in village and district improvement projects (public works, medical aid, information, agriculture and education) and thereby achieve a measure of security and control.

At U.S. suggestion, many measures contained in the Heintges Plan and the Country Team recommendations were placed in effect. The programs proved themselves sound. Many people who had previously allied themselves with agitators resigned from their movements; rural living conditions were improving; and political unity was slowly being achieved.

As the measures began to be more and more effective, Communist propaganda and diplomatic pressures increased. Finally, in mid-1959, the communists resorted to open terrorism and fighting against the Lao populace and army units.

The event that touched off open warfare occurred early in May when the FAL decided to force the integration of the two Pathet Lao battalions into the FAL as was agreed in the merger accord. The Pathet Lao refused to cooperate, barricaded themselves within their compounds, and FAL troops were summoned to contain them.

On the theory that the battalions were acting under orders of the NLHZ leaders (Neo Lao Hax Zat-the Lao Communist Front Organization), the RLG ordered the arrest of all NLHZ leaders and closed down their newspaper in an effort to destroy communications between the leaders and the battalions. Later the same day the battalion near Luang Prabang capitulated, and the battalion at Xieng

[REDACTED]

Khouang agreed to capitulate, but during the night the entire battalion slipped away and headed for the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV). Despite continued efforts of the FAL to surround it, the unit worked its way closer to the DRV border and the majority crossed during the latter part of June. There was a series of small patrol clashes as the battalion moved to DRV. Small patrol clashes with the remnants of the escaped Pathet Lao (PL) battalion along the DRV border continued to be reported from time to time, but the military situation in Laos generally was quiet until mid-July.

The PL resumed organized warfare in Laos on 18 July when a FAL outpost at Muong Sioum in northern Sam Neua Province was attacked by a PL force described as one battalion. The force was reported to be composed of Vietminh, Black Thai, Lao and Mao. On the following day a rebel force of platoon strength attacked a FAL position at Muong Son in western Sam Neua Province. Following these initial attacks other FAL outposts were overrun, and by 28 July PL forces were in control of a large salient in western and northern Sam Neua Province. This salient was enlarged in early August and PL forces were reported on the outskirts of Muong Hiem and Hua Muong in southwestern Sam Neua Province.

The original PL forces were augmented rapidly by pro-PL inhabitants throughout the area and FAL troops were subjected to harrassing attacks in many other parts of Laos. Rebel groups were particularly active in Luang Prabang Province in the vicinity of Ban Se and Pak Seng and in central Laos around Lak Sao.

Action in eastern Sam Neua began on 27 July when Muong Dai was occupied by dissident elements. By early August, all Lao territory east of the Nam Ma River was under PL control, and insurgent troops were reported in the vicinity of Sam Teu in southwestern Sam Neua Province.

Organized attacks spread to Phong Saly Province on 30 July when Sop Nao

LAOS SITUATION MAP




Figure 22

[REDACTED]

was captured by an estimated two rebel companies. By the first of August this rebel force had moved to the southwest and driven the FAL defenders from Muong Khoua.

The Royal Laotian Government reacted slowly to the initial attacks. Operations of the Laotian Army were hampered by the monsoon season which was then in full force; inadequate communications; delayed, inaccurate, and incomplete reporting from the field; and the assignment of approximately two-thirds of its forces to widely separated areas on security missions. Additionally, the hostility of the majority of the populace in the northern provinces toward the RLG forces restricted operations. In other provinces, officials expressed concern that RLG troop movements from their areas would open the gate to dissident attack. Despite many problems facing it, the FAL had moved 1 battalion into Sam Neua by 9 August and had 2 additional battalions enroute. By 25 August FAL forces in northeastern Laos totaled 3 volunteer battalions, 5 infantry battalions, and 2 parachute battalions.

At approximately 0600 on 30 August, coordinated Communist attacks were launched against FAL defensive positions along the Nam Ma River at Muong Het, Xieng Kho, Sop Sai, Ban Sop Bau, and Muong Hang. All positions fell within 6 hours. The FAL estimated that five PL/VM battalions were used in the attack. They were supported by 105mm howitzers at Muong Het and by 57mm recoilless rifles at Xieng Kho.

Defensive positions were selected some 12 miles northeast of the town of Sam Neua. These blocking positions were occupied by FAL forces on 4 September. On the same day reports were received that three enemy columns were advancing on Sam Neua from the north, northeast, and east. Total enemy strength was estimated at over two regiments.

By 7 September only minor skirmishes had been reported along the defensive line and on 8 September FAL troops moved forward for distances up to 5 miles without opposition. From 8-25 September there was an almost complete lull in the fighting in northeastern Sam Neua Province.

On 26 September the First Parachute Battalion reoccupied Muong Het and continued to the east along the Nam Ma River, reoccupying Xieng Kho on 29 September. Concurrently, the Second Parachute Battalion was approaching Sop Hao.

Two other sizeable military actions occurred in Sam Neua Province during the month. On 7 September the 22nd Infantry Battalion occupied Muong Son and held the town though subjected to frequent mortar shelling and light attacks. In the southeastern sector of the province the town of Sam Teu changed hands four times from 12-15 September. The insurgent forces began withdrawing from the area after failing to secure the town.

In Phong Saly Province, action followed the same basic pattern. On 2 September the rebel forces occupied Pak Ban after reinforcing the units around Sop Nao. By 7 September Muong Khoua had been occupied by insurgents, who were driven out by FAL forces two days later. On 19 September FAL troops reached Sop Nao and by the end of September were engaged in mopping up operations in that region.

The general lull in insurgent activity in Sam Neua and Phong Saly Provinces was followed by a sharp rise in activity throughout the remainder of Laos. By 23 September it was obvious that the rebel forces had shifted their area of operations to central and southern Laos.


In northern Sam Neua Province, FAL units continued to press rebel forces located in the Muong Het-Xieng Kho sector and along the south

[REDACTED]

bank of the Nam Ma River. Various reports alleging that rebel counter-offensives drove the government forces from the two outposts were not confirmed. By 10 October, it was evident that the two towns were securely in government hands and FAL patrols were operating on the north bank of the Nam Ma, meeting very little resistance. In the western corner of Sam Neua Province, a Communist force, which for some weeks had been threatening the Government position at Muong Son, launched an attack on the two FAL companies defending the town. By 8 October, FAL reinforcements arrived on the scene and the enemy units withdrew.

In southern Laos, 300 armed Vietnamese, who presumably came from the Communist-dominated Vietnamese refugee communities in northeast Thailand, were reported moving from the vicinity of Pakse in Champassak Province, southeast toward Attapeu Province. In Attapeu Province, the Pathet Lao reportedly were conducting a successful "scare" program, and villagers who were taken to the DRV for indoctrination prior to 1957, disappeared from their villages, presumably to join the Pathet Lao. Dissidents in this province, apparently were taking advantage of the fact that army units from southern Laos had been shifted to northern provinces in recent months, leaving only one volunteer battalion of approximately 450 men in Attapeu.

FAL estimates of the strength of insurgent forces in Laos, in some cases, exceeded 7,000 armed personnel. United States observers in Laos generally considered FAL estimates too high and inaccurate primarily due to the inability of the FAL to correlate properly the reports received from the army units in the field. The total strength of the insurgent movement in Laos remained uncertain. However,


organized, armed insurgent groups were believed to number about 1,600. In addition, there were many other groups of lesser capabilities that posed local threats and tied down FAL elements. With these latter groups, it was believed that the overall opposition would number approximately 3,500.

On 3 September the RLG appealed to the Secretary General of the United Nations to send an emergency force to Laos to "stop aggression and prevent it from spreading". The Secretary General decided that further information was needed and in mid September introduced in the UN under article 29 of the UN Charter a request for a "procedural" subcommittee of inquiry (rather than an "investigating" group that would be substantive and thus subject to a Soviet veto). This action resulted in the dispatch of a 60 man United Nations team, led by diplomats from Japan, Italy, Argentina, and Tunisia to Laos to determine exactly what was happening there.

In their four weeks in Laos, the UN fact finders were exposed to ample but always indirect evidence that Communist Vietnam was behind the attempts to overthrow the pro-western Laotian government of Premier Phoui Sananikone. The fact finders had traveled to jungle outposts that still bore the marks of communist mortar fragments and had interviewed hundreds of refugees who had fled the communists. Most convincing of all, they had examined captured weapons and uniforms that clearly originated across the border in North Vietnam.

The UN Security Council sub-committee departed Vientiane on 13 October. Two members of the delegation and an eight-man secretariat were left behind to represent the sub-committee and receive any further evidence the RLG might wish to present. The sub-committee members

seemed convinced that their report to the security council would result in the appointment of a UN observer to be stationed in Laos.

Shortly after the sub-committee departed Laos the UN Secretary General visited Laos before passing on a UN course of action. On return to the United Nations, he sent a UN technical assistant to Laos to work out a technical operations assistance plan which embodied a formal request for assistance signed by the Prime Minister of Laos on 30 December. This program envisaged (1) sending four teams to work out a program for social and economic improvement, (2) technical assistance for public finance administration, (3) technical assistance for general administration, (4) technical assistance to production, (5) social services such as education, public health and census, and (6) air transport services. The program was considered by the UN technical assistant to be the initial stage of a UN-sponsored program which was to be financed entirely by UN funds and specialized agencies. The proposed mission would be headed by an ambassador, probably Swiss, assisted by a high-level economic official and an administrative staff.


The situation in Laos during the entire emergency was characterized by small scale skirmishes at widely scattered points throughout the country and by Communist propaganda and recruitment activities from North Vietnam.

The open fighting halted the government programs effectively. The small army units engaged in village assistance were overrun; the terrorist activities of the Communists served to shake the faith of the people in the government; and the fighting made it necessary to deploy the Army units to the threatened areas. This interrupted their training programs.

CINCPAC Activities During 1959 in Laos

The military matters concerning Laos which were of interest to CINCPAC during 1959 were divided into three main groups. There were the efforts to reorganize the PEO, to implement other features of the Heintges Plan and to carry out other projects in support of the country teams' plan; there were the measures which were taken in response to the emergency posed by the Pathet Lao activities; and, there were the planning activities by CINCPAC to provide for U.S. and/or SEATO support of Laos and by CINCPAC and PACOM forces to prepare to intervene with U.S. military force, if ordered, to assist the pro-Free World elements in Laos.

Activities to reorganize the PEO began early in 1959 and continued throughout the year. Mr. Rothwell Brown (Brig Gen USA, Retd) was replaced in February 1959 by Mr. Heintges (Brig Gen, USA) as Chief, PEO. In addition, the PEO received 9 U.S. Army officers and 8 NCO's travelling in civilian status, based on an interim T/D which was designed to initiate a phased changeover from a civilian staff to a military staff. After a trial with this organization, the new Chief PEO recommended an additional augmentation to his staff. This requirement became evident during the crisis in Laos. CINCPAC concurred in this recommendation and emphasized to the JCS and the OSD in September, the need for providing an increased level of advice and assistance to the RLG. He stated that the FAL was the principal unifying element of national power in Laos available to extend RLG authority into the farthest reaches of the country. CINCPAC concluded that existing French and U.S. efforts in training and logistics were not satisfactory in developing the FAL and that additional U.S. advice and assistance was vital if deficiencies were to be corrected and the competence of the FAL increased.


to the standard required to meet the Communist challenge. He noted that while PEO had to be adequately staffed, the eventual solution would be the formal establishment of a MAAG.

The Heintges Plan could be implemented only after coordination with the French government since it called for operational training which formerly was a complete French responsibility. The Heintges Plan had been coordinated with French as well as Laotian authorities in Laos and provided for a bilateral effort with the U.S. training element being used to round out the training effort in fields which the French could not afford to support. The French concurred in the Plan during a conference in Paris in May which Mr. Heintges attended.¹ The agreement stated that the special training team efforts would be in effect for from six months to a year but it allowed for a review of this provision. On 31 December 1959, CINCPAC recommended that the program be extended for another year.²

The portions of the "Heintges Plan" for improving the logistical situation of the ANL (FAL) contained projects which overlapped and modified actions which were recommended or were taken by his predecessor. However, the discussion of these projects will be identified with the recommendations as made by Mr. Heintges.

One of the most important measures which was recommended, was that there be introduced into Laos a TERM-type team to purge the FAL of broken down, unserviceable equipment. This 8 man property disposal team was furnished at CINCPAC direction by CHMAAG Vietnam from the TERM agency under his

1 Paris to State 29 May 11 PM

2 CINCPAC 312243Z Dec 59

control. It began operations in March 1959. By mid-August the team had rid the FAL of 4,464 tons of materiel with an estimated acquisition value of \$4.75 million, and had completed its first task. CHPEO then asked for a 3 man disposal team to dispose of economically repairable equipment and to supervise bids and sale of scrap and salvage. This request was approved and the team reported in mid-August.¹ The second corrective measure, to obtain an accurate count of equipment assets, was made a continuing action in which all assigned and TAD logistic personnel were partaking. The more accurate data obtained by this team was expected to be of material assistance in improving the quality of the FY61 Program refinement scheduled for January 1960.

In order to secure Laos cooperation for the preceding program (disposal of obsolete equipment) Mr. Heintges decided that the Laos would have to be impressed with its value. Consequently, special emphasis was placed on obtaining a token quantity of new equipment to replace those items which had been culled from the Laos supply system. These so-called "Impact Items" were funded by the Department of Defense from approved programs and other funds.² These items were furnished during, June, July and August, and did much to help the success of the preceding program.

Another program to improve the logistical situation in Laos was to obtain funds to allow for contract airlift for use in distributing supplies to outlying districts in Laos. The FAL received 2 C-47's in September which brought its total fleet up to 8; two L20's were lost during the year and five were delivered resulting in a total of 6 in the fleet; an additional 6 L19's completed the air element of the FAL. These

1 DA 241952Z Jul, USARMA Vientiane 010815Z Cite PEO 1319-59; CINCPAC 082302Z Aug 59

2 CINCPAC 030309Z Mar, DA 062219Z Apr, Telecom CINCPAC-CSD 012140Z Jun 59

[REDACTED]

aircraft absorbed the total pilot and maintenance capability of the country, but there was a need for more airlift. Several arrangements were made between USOM Laos and Air Laos and CAT for contract flights of fixed wing aircraft with supplies. Additionally at the end of 1959, arrangements were underway to provide helicopter service through contract between USOM Laos and Air American (formerly CAT). Air American would operate and maintain 4 H-19A aircraft for approximately \$37,400 per month (200 flying hours at \$186/ hour approx.)

The fourth project proposed in the Heintges Plan for improving the logistical situation in Laos was to augment normal delivery means to Laos by military airlift from PACOM and CONUS to Bangkok or Vientiane. This was done for a large quantity of supplies. MATS delivered on schedule all supplies from CONUS and Hawaii routed to Bangkok (some to Udorn on C-54's). The 315th Air Division provided airlift of items which were provided from stocks in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Both air lines operated under Project RED CAP which gave them blanket clearances. The supplies they carried had top priority even to include authorization for the use of HIGH GEAR aircraft,¹ if necessary, and all missions were accomplished on time.

The requirement, stated in the Heintges Plan, for aiding in training the FAL stemmed from the need to remedy the serious qualitative gap caused by the withdrawal of French officers and non-commissioned officers from the Laos Army. A number of these key persons were withdrawn following the Geneva Accords and still more when the Algerian situation became critical. The recommendations in the Heintges Plan called for giving basic military


training to a cadre of at least 25% of the Laos Army, primarily junior officers and NCOs from each Infantry, Airborne and Volunteer Battalion, but also including persons from technical services. This cadre, in turn could train the units of the Lao Army effectively. The secondary objective was to train the FAL in the operation and maintenance of MAP equipment. This proposal was approved in January 1959.¹

The principal training role was to be accomplished by twelve combined French-U.S. Field Training Teams which would operate in place with each of the 12 FAL Infantry Battalions, developing their cadres and then supervising the cadres' training activities. The U.S. members of the teams were to train in maintenance and technical matters while the French trained in tactics. U.S. training personnel were provided from Army Special Forces units, primarily operating as Department of the Army civilians. The movement to Laos of the "Project Molecular" teams (107 individuals in 13 teams (one a control team)) took place after some delay² during 24-31 July. It coincided with the intensification of the Pathet Lao insurgent action. The U.S. Ambassador issued instructions controlling the travel of the "Molecular" personnel.³ Because of this situation, the plan of training the 12 battalions separately was changed and Regional Training Centers for Combined Training were established within each of the four Military Regions using the personnel from the teams of Project "Molecular". Each center was under the supervision of a U.S. field grade officer called the U.S. Assistant Regional Advisor. The plan to move the teams to the field with the battalions was held in abeyance. Limited training was started

1 Ltr ASD/ISA, 13Jan59 approving CINCPAC ltr ser 00673 of 13 Dec 58

2 JCS 101018Z Jul59, JCS 202139Z Jul59, PASEP CNO 202332Z Jul 59

3 AMEMB Vientiane 5 PM, 31 Jul 59


in August at Pakse. On 1 September, all training centers started the first week of a seven week training cycle. A total of 785 Laos persons were trained under Ambidextrous (new code word replacing Molecular¹). Plans for moving the teams into the field were under discussion at the end of 1959.

In addition to training the 12 Infantry Battalions, there was the problem of training 12 constabulary-type units called "Volunteer Battalions" and two Airborne Battalions. It was planned that as the Field Training Teams moved into the field with the Infantry Battalions, the Volunteer Battalions would receive basic training from them.

Thailand and Laos made arrangements for training the two FAL airborne battalions at the Thai Infantry Center, Lopburri, Thailand. The training was conducted by Thai instructors but was closely monitored by U.S. military advisers. Since inter-country arrangements were involved and U.S. funds were being expended on a regional basis, not only OSD approval,² but State approval was secured. Initially 200 FAL paratroopers were trained, and subsequently the State Department approved training of six additional cycles of 200 paratroopers per cycle. The first cycle completed training on 15 December and the second began on 21 December.

Off-shore training of Laos personnel in CONUS schools at all levels and on-the-job training in other countries in the PACOM for FY 60 was increased by 50% over FY 59, and the program for FY 61 was 50% larger than for FY 60.

A training center was not established at Seno Air Base during 1959.

1 DA 082345Z Sep 59 cite DA 965026
2 OSD 152224Z Oct 59 cite DEF 066075

The problem became less urgent when Project Disallow teams took over recruit instruction at their training centers. However, preparations for opening the Seno Base Center continued during 1959. A cadre of 28 men was given special training at Ft. Benning, Georgia, and training aids and other equipment were assembled during 1959. At the close of the year, consideration was being given to establishing two training centers, one in the North and one in the South.

The 82 Filipino technicians to train Laos Engineer, Signal, Ordnance and Quartermaster personnel arrived in Laos in February 1959 and commenced training activities. During the first six months, they were supervised by a U.S. NCO team of 15 men. They conducted their activities in a very satisfactory manner. Additionally, 17 U.S. Military Advisers and 103 contract Filipino technicians to replace FMM technicians arrived in Laos in September-October.¹

A U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Team from Okinawa was programmed to conduct a 16 week formal course of instruction for the FAL Special Commando units during FY 60. In view of the extension of Project Disallow (C) and other training in progress in Laos, CINCPAC² cancelled the SF MTI for FY 60. It was planned that the requirement for this SF MTI would be determined during refinement of the FY 61 training program.

CINCPAC supervised a number of projects which were designed to aid the Country Team plan in Laos. Some of these are discussed in more detail in other parts of this Command History. The more noteworthy projects involving the armed services are described in the follow paragraphs.

1 CINCPAC 112337Z Jul, USARMA Vientiane 200815Z Jul, CINCPAC 010203Z Aug
OSD 212246Z Aug, CINCPAC 230045Z Aug, all 1959

2 CINCPAC 230340Z Oct 59

TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES SOUTHEAST ASIA

+++ RAILROADS

⊙ AIRFIELDS

~ RIVERS

TYPE ROADS

=== U.S. STANDARD H'WAYS

— ALL WEATHER ROADS

== DRY WEATHER ONLY

- - - LIMITED ALL WEATHER ROADS




FIG 23

S [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of tasks to be performed resulted in a heavy increase in message traffic into and from Laos. In spite of the plethora of crash projects which appeared to be unrelated to each other, most of these were parts of one or the other of the two plans. There were some projects, however, which were directly related to the crisis.

The most important activities which were directly related to the crisis were those related to the recommendations by CHPEO to increase the number of Volunteer Companies of the FAL (the constabulary type organization) from 64 to 106, and increase the Auto-Defense forces (village guard-type units, satellited on Volunteer Companies) by 4,000 men. After considerable message traffic, joint State/Defense approval of U.S. support of 40 additional Volunteer Companies and 4,000 Auto-Defense persons was secured in August.¹ These lightly equipped constabulary and home guard units were expected to defend the localities where they lived and thereby free FAL forces for operations against dissidents.

After considering the extreme lack of communications in the Southeast Asian Countries, CINCPAC requested the U.S. Army Signal Corps to move by air to Laos, large mobile radio equipment to support the immediate requirement for additional circuits. This action resulted in the establishment of a four channel circuit between Clark Air Base, Philippines and Vientiane,² and a four channel circuit between Clark and Bangkok.³

Additional circuits having multi-channel capabilities were planned and the equipment moved to Clark Air Base and Okinawa for trans-shipment to Bangkok and Vientiane when the need arose.

1 OSD 152224Z Oct 59 Cite DEF 066075

2 CINCPAC 040718Z Sep 59

3 CINCPAC 050225Z Sep 59

██████████

To aid in the implementation of CINCPAC plans as well as to aid the RLG in consolidating their country, it was apparent that construction of an all-weather road linking Pakse, Laos and Kontum, Vietnam should receive the highest priority. All efforts to secure funds, other than MAP funds, for this regional project had been to no avail despite the support of the country team and Washington agencies. In December, in response to an OSD query, CINCPAC stated a willingness to divert MAP funds to cover 1/4 to 1/3 of the construction costs, providing the total project cost did not exceed \$15 million, over a minimum 2 year period. In addition, CINCPAC urged immediate attention be given to securing funds for some less-than-permanent all-weather roads in order to secure a quick link-up.

As a result of the Pathet Lao rebellion, many additional supply items, both programmed and emergency items, were furnished Laos on a crash basis. The additional items included equipment for the augmentation of 40 additional volunteer companies of the FAL and 4000 Auto Defense men, parachutes, CAS items, 1000 carbines, 20,000 ponchos, field packs and shelter halves, panel markers, fuzes and demolitions and first aid kits.¹

CINCPAC Military Planning Activities for Laos

While CINCPAC was expediting the military measures to improve

1 CINCPAC 022254Z Sep 59

the situation in Laos, both in support of the Heintges Plan and of the Country Team plan, he also took preparatory steps to intervene in Laos with military force had the situation and his orders so warranted.

CINCPAC supported plans developed in SEATO to assist the RLG to counter Communist insurgency in Laos. MPO Plan 5B/59 for the introduction and maintenance of a SEATO Force to assist the RLG to counter communist insurgency was considered at the Eleventh Military Advisers Conference as Agenda Item A.¹ The Military Advisers approved MPO Plan 5B/59 to support the RLG in the event of proven insurgency, made an estimate of forces required to meet the situation, and determined the command structure of forces to be contributed.


In their final communique to the MALIM the Military Advisers took note of Communist inspired threats to the freedom of Laos and stated unequivocally that they recognized the need to keep their plans up to date in case future developments required military defensive action by SEATO.

CINCPAC also accelerated U.S. military planning for Laos. CINCPAC OPLAN 32(L)-59 was promulgated separately (see Chapter I) to provide for intervention with U. S. military forces.

CINCPAC reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August concerning the preparatory action he had taken to insure readiness to meet the deteriorating situation in Laos.² He advised that, in addition to preparing CINCPAC OPLAN 32(L)-59, a planning headquarters for Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) 116 was activated.

1 MS/147/13/59 of Sep 59

2 CINCPAC 152347Z Aug 59

 A joint conference was held at JTF 116 Headquarters, Iwakuni Japan on 20 August with representatives of CINCPAC, PACFLT, USARPAC, 13th AF, 5th AF, 315th Air Div., FMFPAC and U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands/IX Corps. On 25 August the JTF Operation Plan and Administrative Plan 32(L)-59 was published.

Joint Task Force 116 was activated by CINCPAC on 5 September 1959.¹ It was provided with Army, Navy and Air Force components.² Naval component, JTF 116 activated Third Marine Expeditionary Force (Provisional) (III MEF(P)) by message.³ Detachment of 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), FMF reported to the Navy Component Commander for operational control.⁴ The entire Task Force was put on alert. Personnel, equipment and supplies scheduled for movement in early air lifts and the troop carrier units supporting them were deployed to airfields in Japan and Okinawa. They were prepared to commence movement to the objective area on one hour's notice. Sea lift personnel, supplies and equipment were prepared to depart on six (6) hour's notice. The Mobile Construction Battalion (MCB) units located in Guam were deployed by sea lift to Okinawa.



The following elements of III MEF (P) reported for operational control on the 6th and 7th of September: RLT-9, 3rd MarDiv; MAG-16 (-) (Reinf), 1stMAW; LogSptGru, 3rdMarDiv; MCB-5 and, 1st Comp Radio Co.

Planning was influenced by the fact that operations in Laos would have to be largely dependent on air support. Specifically the major planning factors were: the need for rapid deployment of U. S. forces from bases located in excess of 1,000 miles from the

- 1 CINCPAC 050500Z Sep 59
2 CINCPAC 052240Z, 050824Z, 051300Z all Sep 59
3 JTF116 050826Z Sep 59
4 FMFPAC 051502Z Sep 59

LAOS 32 (L) 59
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES
AIR ROUTES & SUPPLY POINTS

D TO D+11



INITIAL US TASK FORCE

(to Vientiane except as noted)

- Hq JTF 116-III Marine Expeditionary Force (P)
- 1-BLE 3rd Marine Div (1 BLT Airlift to SENO)
- (1-BLT by sea transport where required)
- 1-Comp. MAG of 1st MAW
- 1-Logistic and Support Group
- 1-Det. 1st ANGLICO
- Elements of a Naval Mobile Const. Battalion
- Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Signal
- Det., Military Intelligence and Psychological Warfare detachments.

THE ARMED FORCES OF LAOS

- 24-Infantry Battalions
- 2-Parachute Battalions
- 1-Recon Squadron
- 1-Composite ACFT Squadron
- 4,000 Auto Defense Personnel


SCHEDULED US TASK FORCE
 (Where and When Required)

- JTF 116 Army
- Brigade Task Force of 25th Div.
- Army Logistics Command
- 1-Lt Helicopter Co.
- ACAN, Military Intelligence.
- 1-Tactical Ftr & Trans Aircraft Sqdn
- 1-Tactical Recon Sqdn
- 1-US Attack Carrier Strike Force in S. China Seas

FRENCH FORCES

- 1-French Military Mission
- 300-Advisory Personnel

FIGURE 24

 objective area; the physical inaccessibility and landlocked nature of Laos; the primitive condition of roads, bridges, railways and other facilities in the area; and, the requirement for providing support and maintaining reliable communications between widely separated echelons of the Task Force upon deployment.

Requirements were established for the initial air lifted deployment of two (2) Marine BLTs to two airfields in Laos, Vientiane and Seno, which were separated from each other by approximately one hundred and fifty air miles, and a third BLT by air or sea lift to the objective area. These BLTs were assigned the initial tasks of securing airfields to permit normal air operations followed by the task of securing certain key river crossings which were needed for the maintenance of land lines of communications into the objective area.

Further troop operations were planned to include foot, motorized and helicopter borne patrols, the securing of certain critical areas for the purpose of freeing friendly units for other operations, denying certain vital areas to insurgent forces and the conduct of anti-guerrilla type warfare. These operations would result in the further separation of units in areas dominated by dense jungle and rugged terrain.

Maximum use of helicopters for the deployment of task organizations was planned. There were requirements for lifting units which varied in size from reinforced squads to battalions.

Air support, 4.2" mortars and the weapons organic to a Marine Infantry Regiment were the only supporting weapons planned. Because of the nature of the terrain and the known composition of the enemy forces.

~~SECRET~~
operating in Laos, the use of tanks and/or Ontos was not planned.

CINCPAC directed¹ CJTF 116 on 6 October to relax the alert condition at his discretion, and to release personnel to the control of parent units, but subject to emergency recall. Staff operations continued with a reduced nucleus staff. Joint Task Force 116 was deactivated on 1 November 1959 and the Cadre Staff, Task Force 79 assumed custody of JTF 116 files for possible reactivation.²

CINCPAC reported³ the status of the many projects for Laos to the JCS in September. In this message he recommended further action which should be taken in the light of three conditions. The conditions varied from that which then existed in Laos to a condition where a full fledged U.S. MAAG would be established in Laos. In general his recommendations called for expediting the programs which are described above, and, if politically feasible, increasing the scope of U.S. training assistance to the FAL, and assuming by the military, full responsibility for projects such as airlift which under the then current arrangements had to be handled by civilian contractors.

PSYWAR ACTIVITIES IN THE COLD WAR

This section contains a discussion of activities of PACOM forces during 1959 to fight the Cold War by psychological warfare.

During the crisis in Laos, CINCPAC assisted the U.S. Country Team in improving the psychological warfare and information capability of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG). In order to make a psychological impact on the Laotians and to provide visual evidence that the U.S. would live

1 CINCPAC 060245Z Oct 59

2 CINCPAC 010220Z Nov 59, CINCPAC 010330Z Nov 59

3 CINCPAC 040508Z Sep 59 in response to JCS 021457Z Cite JCS 964721 PASEP

~~SECRET~~

up to its promises of providing material, CINCPAC directed USARPAC¹ to move a 5 KW mobile broadcast transmitter from Okinawa to Vientiane. The equipment arrived on 11 April and was operational by 21 April. The Ambassador and the CHPEO reported that use of this equipment made a favorable impact on the Laotian people and that the actual coverage of the radio transmitter was more than initially expected.² The transmitter assisted the RLG in informing the Laotian people of the danger of communism and in countering Communist claims with respect to the area.


The Department of Defense approved MAP support for a propaganda and information company within the FAL.³ On receipt of this approval, PSYWAR Mobile Training Teams from CINCUSARPAC were dispatched to assist in organizing and training the company. The company assisted in combatting Communist subversion in the outlying areas by dispatching teams to villages. The teams informed the natives of the aims of their own government and solicited support for their own armed forces. Two ten KW radio transmitters were provided the FAL for use in this program of informing the Lao populace.⁴


As a result of recommendations by the Cold War Activities Group (a group activated at Camp Smith in February 1958 to consider and coordinate military activities during the Cold War), many small actions having an impact on foreign audiences were initiated through military or other governmental channels. For example, the Group made arrangements to provide military transportation to ship to Laos school supplies which had been collected by a private group located in Hawaii. Shipment was

-
- 1 CINCPAC 240404Z Mar 59
 - 2 USARMA Vientiane 140530Z Jul 59
 - 3 OSD 312152Z Dec 58
 - 4 OSD 312250Z Dec 58 Cite DEF 952887

undertaken by Naval elements of the command.

The Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) operated by the U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity Pacific (USAB&VA PAC), is the only active PSYWAR unit in the Korean area. As directed by the JCS,¹ operations have continued since the Korean hostilities. By means of this radio network, CINCUNC continued the psychological offensive against the North Korean target audiences. In response to a request by COMUS Korea² and a recommendation by CINCPAC,³ CINCUSARPAC initiated a study of requirements for the revitalization of VUNC.⁴ This study⁵ provided a basis for programming and for long range planning for operations of the USARPAC PSYWAR unit for the next three years. As a corollary to the revitalization of VUNC, acceptance of a 50 KW transmitter located in EUCCM and offered to CINCPAC by the JCS was under study at the end of 1959.⁶ The study considered installing the transmitter in the Seoul area for use in the overall revitalization program.

- 
- 1 JCS 061537Z Cite JCS 968900 Oct 54 modified by JCS 282230Z Dec 58 Cite JCS 915598
 - 2 COMUS Korea 1tr USFK-CJ 384 AGJ of 30 Mar 59
 - 3 CINCPAC 080242Z Apr 59
 - 4 CINCUSARPAC 120249Z May 59
 - 5 CINCUSARPAC 240230Z Jun 59
 - 6 JCS 151543Z Dec 59 Cite JCS 969683



CHAPTER V

ACTIONS TO DISCHARGE OTHER U.S. JOINT MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES

The last chapter of the 1959 Command History concerns itself with CINCPAC actions of a joint nature which are not more properly associated with previous chapter headings. These actions were not directly related to CINCPAC's combat mission, but were coordinated by or were of interest to CINCPAC, as the senior US military commander in the Pacific.

Specifically, this chapter describes CINCPAC's activities to coordinate certain matters relating to over-all economy of money and manpower, and to coordinate certain aspects of activities which were not responsive to CINCPAC but which were carried out within the Pacific Command's geographical limits.

The first section of this chapter will discuss the status of the Interservice Supply Support Program. The second section will discuss a review of interservice support problems in Japan. Subsequent sections deal with several activities under the supervision of other DOD agencies which operated in the PACOM area during the year. CINCPAC's actions which are discussed in each section were in discharge of his role as coordinator in matters relating to over-all economy of money and manpower.


INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT PROGRAM

The implementation of the Interservice Supply Support Program progressed with increased satisfaction to the CINCPAC Staff during 1959. The world-wide report on interservicing published by the Armed Forces Supply Support Center, Washington,¹ indicated that the amount of interservicing transacted within the PACOM represented 56% of the total


1 DEFENSE MATERIEL UTILIZATION SYSTEM Report of Interservicing by Area Coordination Groups and Unified Commands for Semi-annual period ending 30 June 1959

INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT


(CALENDAR YEAR 1959)



SUPPLY SUPPORT PROVIDED, BY SERVICE



SUPPLY SUPPORT RECEIVED, BY SERVICE
+ CAA, COAST GUARD, MSTs, ETC



TRANSACTIONS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

FIGURE 25

world-wide interservicing dollar value for the first half of Calendar Year 1959. The illustration, figure 25, contains graphs which show a breakdown by Service and by PACOM Geographical Area of the amounts of this support which was provided and received during the year.

A change to Joint Regulations¹ vested additional responsibilities in the Service Component Commands for the execution of the Interservice Supply Support Program. This change, which CINCPAC planned to implement in 1960, was expected to modify the then current operating procedures in the PACOM by bringing the Service Component Commands directly into the program.

There were several issues related to interservicing which arose during the year. These concerned primarily the status of claimant stocks transactions, preparations by MPSA to assume responsibility for the administration of petroleum reporting and agreements transactions, the widening of the Program to include logistical support services, and the accessorial cost problem. The latter, a problem unresolved as of 31 December 1959, had the greatest impact on the program and hindered maximum interservicing. ✓

The term "accessorial costs" referred to certain expenses not included in the standard prices of materiel. For the most part these expenses pertained to packing, handling, transportation and port handling of materiel. The purpose in levying accessorial charges was to enable one Military Service to recoup certain expenses incurred in rendering support to another Military Service under the Interservice Supply Support Program.

1 Joint Regulations on Interservice Supply Support (Ch 2 AR 700-4, OPNAVINST 4000.47 Ch 1, NAVMC 1141 Ch 2, and AFR 67-76A of 31 Jul 59.)

~~SECRET~~

The subject of accessorial costs was brought into initial focus in late May 1959 when COMUS Japan informed CINCPAC of U.S. Army Japan's announced intention to begin on 1 July 1959 to levy such charges for support furnished to Navy, Marine, and Air Force elements in Japan.¹ COMUS Japan stated that the Service components in his area were not in agreement concerning the Army's proposal and requested that CINCPAC take action to provide necessary guidance. The problem was immediately referred by CINCPAC to the Service Component Commanders for review. This action, however, failed to resolve the problem and highlighted the need to pass it to Washington for resolution at the Departmental level.² The JCS informed CINCPAC that a working group composed of representatives of OASD (Compt), OASD(S&L), Army, Navy, and Air Force had been working on the establishment of a uniform policy for charging accessorial costs, and that pending completion of this study the present pricing procedures of the Departments would apply.³ Meanwhile, the Army decided to defer the proposed charges in Japan until 1 July 1960.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

REVIEW OF INTERSERVICE SUPPORT PROBLEMS, JAPAN


The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCPAC, in September 1959, to review and submit a comprehensive report on the entire Interservice Support problem resulting from the change in the composition of U.S. Forces in Japan.⁴ This requirement was initiated as a result of

1 COMUS Japan 260621Z May 59

2 CINCPAC spdltr ser 1545 of 16 Jul 59, CINCPAC ltr ser 1698 of 31 Jul 59

3 JCS 231933Z Sep 59 Cite JCS XX438037

4 JCS 241833Z Sep 59 Cite JCS 965881


a memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force which indicated reported instances of withdrawal of, or intent to alter, support which had been provided to elements of the Pacific Air Forces.

Twelve specific functions were mentioned in connection with this report. These functions, mostly of an administrative and housekeeping nature, were related to the re-alignment of many functions occasioned by the Army roll-back of forces in Japan since 1 July 1957. The principle cause of the problems was the difference concerning which Service would expend manpower and funds for certain services in support of U.S. forces in Japan.

CINCPAC passed action to COMUS Japan to provide specific factual data, and to the PACOM Component Commanders to provide other essential information.¹

Considerable effort was exerted in meeting this complex requirement and at the same time complying with a stringent deadline. Comments were received from the PACOM Component Commanders² on the data provided by COMUS Japan.³ Due consideration was given these comments, and on 22 October the completed report was submitted to the JCS.⁴

In summary, the report, although recognizing certain deviations initiated by the Army of support provided to a few Air Force elements in Japan, indicated the problems thus developed were minor in nature.

Several activities under the supervision of other DOD agencies operated in the PACOM area during the year. Three of these, the Pacific

1 ADMINO CINCPAC 260312Z Sep 59

2 CINCUSARPAC 162235Z Oct 59 Cite RJ 74216 from GPPSU-IS; CINCPACFLT 160200Z Oct 59; CINCPACAF ltr Subj, "Interservice Supply Support" of 17 Oct 59

3 USFJ ltr USLMC of 12 Oct 59

4 CINCPAC ltr ser 00650 of 22 Oct 59

[REDACTED]

Missile Range, the Eniwetok Proving Ground, and the Naval Station, Kwajalein which were of interest to CINCPAC are discussed below. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE (PMR)

The Navy had been designated Managing Agency of the tri-Service Pacific Missile Range. Although the operational aspects of the PMR were outside the cognizance of CINCPAC, coordination of Service requirements within the PACOM area was a matter of primary CINCPAC interest. In this regard, CINCPACFLT had been designated as the CINCPAC Agent to coordinate PMR requirements within the PACOM area.¹ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Of specific interest was the arrival in Hawaii in July of two Victory ships, the Dalton Victory and Haiti Victory converted for PMR recovery operations. These ships relieved four CINCPACFLT destroyers which had previously been used for this purpose.² (C [REDACTED] L)


SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR ENTERING ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND

CINCPAC, in December 1958, had proposed that Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN (CJTF 7) vice CINCPAC assume responsibility for the security clearance of personnel, ships and aircraft entering the Eniwetok Proving Ground.³ Subsequently, this was concurred in by CJTF 7 and it was agreed that CJTF 7 would assume responsibility for Proving Ground Clearances on 1 May 1959.⁴ 3201 military and civilian personnel clearances were processed by CINCPAC between 1 January and 1 May 1959, at which time the turn-over of responsibility was effected.

KWAJALEIN NAVAL STATION

The Naval Station, Kwajalein was a primary en-route stop-over of the southern air route across the Pacific. On 1 July 1959, due to

-
- 1 ADMINO CINCPAC 182135Z Sep 58
 - 2 COMPACMISRAN 152318Z Jun 59
 - 3 CINCPAC ltr ser 0833 of 15 Dec 58
 - 4 CINCPAC 280428Z Mar 59

 budgetary limitations, the Naval Station was redesignated a Naval Support Activity, and management by a civilian contractor under Navy Administration replaced military management.¹ Major support functions were manned by contract civilians and the airfield operated only during daylight hours unless there was prior notification. The Army was the Island's principal tenant.

This change in the status of the Naval Station, Kwajalein, reduced CINCPAC's flexibility to provide air lift logistic support to forces stationed in the WestPac.

1 CNO 221842Z May 59

SUMMARY

At the start of 1959, all of the major PACOM combat forces were assigned to CINCPAC for operational command. Additionally, CINCPAC started reporting directly to the JCS instead of the Department of the Navy as Executive Agency. The overall effect of these changes was to make the CINCPAC an operational commander responsible for the control of U.S. forces instead of a planning and coordinating agency. Through the continued development of new operations plans and instructions and the changing of old plans and instructions, CINCPAC defined and refined the command relationships to meet emergencies and situations in the PACOM. Also, he improved his war plans, consolidated some of his limited war plans, and broadened the scope of his planning to include measures to fight the Cold War. Additionally during the year, CINCPAC improved his control structure by reorganizing his staff, developing the command facilities at Camp H.M. Smith and the Operations Center at Kunia, by increasing the use of electronic data computers, and by improving the communications in the PACOM. Some of these developments were tested by JCS world-wide exercises, such as DODEP, and further refined. At the end of the year, CINCPAC was preparing to conduct a PACOM joint exercise to test further his plans and control procedures.

Although most of CINCPAC's planning effort was directed toward the preparation of capabilities plans, CINCPAC kept his eye on the future and made important recommendations to the JCS concerning U.S. force objectives and Pacific country force objectives. He worked to strengthen the Army through improvement in its mobility and logistic support,


[REDACTED]

to improve the Navy capability continuously to deploy carrier task groups and additional submarines to the Western Pacific, and to provide more modern Air Force units with greatly increased effectiveness.

CINCPAC devoted considerable time on other measures to improve the state of readiness of U.S. forces in the Pacific and made substantial progress in 1959 in improving his Civil Affairs, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological Warfare capabilities.

Studies which took place in 1959 clearly highlighted the fact that transportation was the most critical logistic problem facing CINCPAC during the year and the controlling factor affecting the feasibility of war plans. Steady progress was made toward gaining a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the transportation which was or could be made available to CINCPAC in the execution of his plans. Action was begun to adjust plans to the bounds of feasibility and to remove bottle-necks in order that the plans could be supported.

CINCPAC's future MAP activities were strongly influenced by events taking place in 1959 in connection with the President's Draper Committee recommendations. CINCPAC had already laid the groundwork for developing long range country MAP plans on a regional basis by preparing and securing JCS approval of Country Mission Statements which stated the U.S. concept of the roles which each country's forces were expected to perform. As a result of the Draper Committee recommendations, MAP long range planning was initiated in 1959 and regional programming under a regional ceiling began. The FY 60 MAP ceiling was reduced from \$825 million to a disappointing \$325 million, a matter of considerable concern to CINCPAC.



CINCPAC made significant progress in 1959 in support of the U.S. policy of unifying the efforts of Asian Free World nations toward common goals and mutual understanding. Among his many activities in this respect, he initiated combined planning with the Philippines armed forces, held a successful Weapons Demonstration for key military men of 15 nations, and provided full military advice and assistance during the renegotiation of the Security Treaty with Japan. All of CINCPAC's efforts were not successful; the negotiations with the Philippines for the establishment of a Pacific Defense College brought to light so many irreconcilable differences that the U.S. at the end of the year, was planning steps to withdraw its support for this project.

CINCPAC continued activities to counter Communist aggressions and Communist-inspired internal uprisings. Military assistance to Laos was reorganized and revitalized, and military efforts to aid in winning the Laos electorate for the Free World became more effective. When open Communist insurgency began in mid 1959, the U.S. responded by directing CINCPAC to accelerate the aid program to Laos. CINCPAC plans for military action to counter subversion in Laos were completed and a joint task force was assembled and detailed plans in preparation for its employment were put underway. In the Taiwan Straits and Indonesia, critical areas in preceding years, the situation remained dangerous. But 1959 was primarily a year of consolidation and continued support of previously established policies in these countries.

GLOSSARY

ACAN	Army Command and Administrative Network
AIRCOM	Air Force Communications Network
ALCANUS	Alaska Canada and the United States Emergency Defense Plan
ALN	Accounting Line Number
ALUSNA	U.S. Naval Attaché, American Legation
AMAMB	American Ambassador
AMEMB	American Embassy
ANF	Armée Nationale Française (French Army)
ANGLICO	Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ANL	Armée Nationale Laos (Laos Army)
ANZAM	Australia New Zealand Malayan Alliance
ANZUS	Australia New Zealand and United States Security Treaty
APD	High Speed Transport (Navy)
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare
ATF	Air Task Force
ATIONS	Atomic Situation
BP	Baghdad Pact (Now Central Treaty Organization - CENTO)
BLT	Battalion Landing Team (US Marine Corps)
BUSANDA	Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
CA	Heavy Cruiser, or Civil Affairs
CAMG	Civil Affairs and Military Government
CCC	CINCPAC Command Center
CCC	CINCPAC Coordination Center (Japan and Philippines)

CG	Commanding General
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CHINAT	Chinese Nationalist
CHMAAG	Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHPROVMAAG	Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Provisional
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCAL	Commander in Chief Alaska
CINCARIB	Commander in Chief Caribbean
CINCFE	Commander in Chief Far East
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief North American Air Defense
CINCQAD	Commander in Chief Continental Air Defense
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACREPPHIL	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative Philippines
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCSPECOMME	Commander in Chief Specified Command Middle East
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief United Nations Command
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CL	Light Cruiser
CNAF	Chinese Nationalist Air Force
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMFORMDEFCON	Commander Formosa Defense Command
COMSERVPAC	Commander Service Forces Pacific
COMUS	Commander United States Forces
CONAD	Continental Air Defense Command

CONELRAD	Control of Electro-Magnetic Transmissions
CONUS	Continental United States
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CVA	Attack Carrier
CVS	ASW Support Carrier
CWAG	Cold War Activities Group
DD	Destroyer
DE	Destroyer Escort
DOD	Department of Defense
DODEP	Department of Defense Emergency Plan
DTG	Date Time Group
DRV	Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (Communist)
E&E	Evasion and Escape
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FAL	Forces Armée du Laos (Laos Army)
FARK	Forces Armée République du Khmer (Cambodian Army)
FAW	Fleet Air Wing
FECOM	Far East Command (Unified - US)
FESTA	Far East Station (British)
FIS	Fighter Interceptor Squadron
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
GAO	General Accounting Office
GEOP	General Emergency Operations Plan
GHQ	General Headquarters

GOI	General Operating Instructions
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
HICOM	High Commissioner
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICC	International Control Commission
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISA	International Security Agency
JANALP	Joint Army Navy Air Force Logistics Policy
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency
JGSDF	Japanese Ground Self Defense Force
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUSMAG	Joint US Military Assistance Group
LWP	Logistics Working Party (SEATO)
MAAGJ	Military Assistance Advisory Group Japan
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MARBO	Marianas-Bonin Islands (CINCPACREP)
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MA10M	Military Advisers 10th Meeting (SEATO)
MCB	Mobile Construction Battalion
MDB	Mutual Defense Board (US - Philippines)

MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MILTAG	Military Technical Advisory Group (Indonesia)
MND	Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China)
MPO	Military Planning Office (SEATO)
MPSA	Military Petroleum Supply Agency
MSDF	Maritime Self Defense Force
MSP	Mutual Security Program
MSTS	Military Sea Transport Service
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NSC	National Security Council
NSFO	Navy Special Fuel Oil
NLHZ	Neo Lao Hoc Zat (Laotian Patriotic Front - Communist Front)
OASD/ISA	Office of the Asst Secy of Defense for International Security Affairs
OCB	Operations Coordinating Board
OPLANS	Operations Plans
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI	Off-Shore Islands
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PDC	Pacific Defense College
PEO	Programs Evaluation Office
PL	Pathet Lao
POL	Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants



POLO	Pacific Operations Liaison Office
PROVMAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group, Provisional
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RLT	Regimental Landing Team
RCK	Republic of Korea
RTA	Royal Thailand Army
RTN	Royal Thailand Navy
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SDMICC	State-Defense Military Information Control Commission
SEASTAG	SEATO Standard Agreement
SEATELCOM	South East Asia Telecommunications
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SF	Special Forces
SMPO	SEATO Military Planning Office
SS	Submarine
SWPPAC	Senior War Planner, Pacific
TACRON	Tactical Reconnaissance
TBS	Tactical Bomber Squadron
T/D	Table of Distribution
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command
TELECOM	All Electrical Communications
TERM	Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TRS	Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
UNC	United Nations Command
USARHAW	United States Army, Hawaii
USARPAC	United States Army, Pacific
USIS	United States Information Service
USTDC	United States Taiwan Defense Command
USOM	United States Operations Mission
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VN	Vietnam
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Forces
VP	Air Patrol Squadron
VUNC	Voice of United Nations Command
WESTAF	Western Transport Air Force (MATS)
WX	Weather

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
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