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CINCPAC

COMMAND HISTORY

1981

VOLUME I

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861

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Robert E. Messerli

ROBERT E. MESSERLI
Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff

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USCINCRED	29
CINCSAC	30
USCINCSO	31
CDR, RDJTF	32
CINCPACFLT	33
CINCPACAF	34
CDRWESTCOM	35
CGFMFPAC	36
COMUS Japan	37
COMUS Korea	38
IPAC	39
COMAAC	40
National Defense University	41
Army War College	42
Naval War College	43
AFSHRC(HO) Maxwell AFB	44
CINCPACREP JSTPS/SAC/JSCS	45
CINCPAC Staff	17 - 25 (including Annexes C and D)
CINCPAC Staff	46 - 65

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I

1981

Prepared by the Command History Division
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1982

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL ROBERT L.J. LONG
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

FOREWORD

(U) After almost a decade of neglect, dramatic events have re-focused world attention on the Asia-Pacific area. The United States and its Free World friends and allies have come to recognize its growing political, economic, and strategic value. Fifteen years ago the United States and Great Britain, both over a continent away, had a capability to project military power in the Arabian Gulf region that was unmatched by the USSR. Today, there has been a reversal of this relative power position brought about by the greatest military buildup in the history of the world--a Soviet buildup that is offensive in character and employment.

(U) Soviet military growth and adherence to a policy of intimidation and use of force have been especially dramatic in the Asia-Pacific area. In the early 1970s, with the bulk of Soviet military power aligned against Western Europe, the Soviet Union began developing the organization, forces, and logistic structures to project power and influence in the PACOM area while remaining strong in Europe. Maintaining a stalemate of sorts in Western Europe, the Soviet Union has expanded its presence and influence directly, as in Afghanistan, or indirectly, as in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. No longer can we view the USSR as a threat in only one part of the world. Today the threat is global, and the response must be global in scope.

(U) United States efforts to deter aggression and enhance U.S. and Free World security in the Asia-Pacific area are strongly influenced by four key factors. First, this area is absolutely vital to U.S. and allied interests militarily, economically, and politically, and the challenges faced by the United States in protecting these interests rival those faced anywhere in the world. Second, the USSR is obviously aware of the vital importance of this region and has taken calculated steps during the past decade to expand its military presence and overall influence throughout the region. Those efforts are continuing today. Third, over this same period there has been a relative decline in U.S. military power in this theater which has affected friendly and enemy perceptions of the U.S. commitment to the region. The fourth factor relates to the previous three; that is, these regional realities must be accounted for when global strategies are being developed, and as defense allocations are being made to support these strategies.

(U) The Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean area is the area in which the United States, in the decade ahead, will most likely see its resolve and readiness tested. It is clear to me that this area presents a fresh new challenge to U.S. interests, and is of increasing importance to the rest of the Free World as well. Deterring Soviet expansionist activity in the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean area, and globally, first requires acknowledging Soviet threats to vital Free World interests, then matching rhetoric with actions. The United States

and its friends and allies, therefore, must come to grips with these harsh realities and allocate defense resources for the present and for the future. CINCPAC's efforts will continue to focus on the need to allocate those resources. With the support of friends and allies, U.S. military strength can provide the means to counterbalance the Soviet challenge so that the nations of this region, and the world, can pursue the peaceful goals associated with their economic and strategic interests.



R. L. J. LONG
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

PREFACE

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records.

(U) This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

(U) The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. Annex B of the 1976 history was the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Annex E of the 1978 history was the terminal history of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (supplemented by Appendix I to the 1979 CINCPAC history, which covered Taiwan wrap-up actions). The designations of Annex A (MACV), Annex B (MACTHAI), and Annex E (TDC) are reserved to facilitate future research and reference. THe histories of U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea will retain the designations of Annexes C and D respectively. The Annexes are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is the prerogative of the subordinate unified commander.

(U) The 1981 history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for these volumes at the end of Volume II.

(U) Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages.

(U) Chapters I and III were prepared by the undersigned, assisted by Shirley A. Streck, who also compiled the glossary. Tony Koura wrote Chapters II, IV, VII, IX, and XI. Eileen O. Behana wrote Chapters V, VI, VIII, X, and supervised the physical layout of the project. The index was a joint effort.

(U) The Navy Publications and Printing Service Office, Pearl Harbor, printed and bound the volumes.

Pauline Tallman

PAULINE TALLMAN
Command Historian

TABLE OF CONTENTS[1]

VOLUME I

	Page
Letter of Promulgation	i
Title Page	iii
Foreword	v
Preface	vii
Table of Contents	ix
List of Illustrations	xxiii
CHAPTER I--THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND	1
SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND	1
SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF	15
Key Personnel Changes in 1981	15
Headquarters Joint Manpower Program	20
Redesignation of Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief of Staff	20
Research and Analysis Function Reassigned to the Plans Directorate	20
SECTION III--COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS	23
Revised Terms of Reference for Commander, U.S. Forces Japan	23
Terms of Reference for CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific	24
Memorandum of Agreement SAC-PACAF-PACOM	25
Memorandum of Agreement CINCPAC-Defense Nuclear Agency	25
U.S. Defense Respresentative	25
Triennial Review of Grade and Service Authorizations for Security Assistance Agency Heads	26
SECTION IV--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS	29
Combined Forces Command	29
Air Component Command	30
OPCON of Forces	32
CFC Improvement Study	36
Project SORAK	39
Thailand	41
Refueling Support	45
Increased Access to Indian Ocean/Southwest Asia Littoral Bases	46
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	49
Kwajalein Missile Range	50
U.S. Flag Carrier Service in Micronesia	51
Military Civil Action Teams	52
Guam Land Use Plan	53

---

1. Individual entries are unclassified. See Letter of Promulgation.

CHAPTER II--THE THREAT 55

SECTION I--SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND 55
Soviet Regional Objectives 56
Trends in the PACOM Military Balance 56
New Realities in Southwest Asia 58
Potential for Conflict 59
Pacific Command Developments: An Overview 59
Northeast Asia 59
Southeast Asia 60
Soviet Naval and Naval Air Threat 61

SECTION II--SOVIET FORCES 63
Force Structure in the Far East 63
Deployments and Combat Readiness 64
MINSK: First Soviet Aircraft Carrier in the Pacific 65
Soviet Pacific Submarine Fleet 66
Soviet Pacific Fleet Deployment Cycles 66

SECTION III-THREAT IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC 69
Soviet Threat to Japan 69
The Northern Territories Issue 69
The Soviet Military Force 71
Japanese Self-Defense Forces 72
Threat in Korea 73
North Korean Threat and the Military Balance 73
North Korean Mine Warfare Capability 76
Infiltration and Tunneling Activities 77
Implications of SAM Firing at SR-71 78

SECTION IV--THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 81
The Threat to ASEAN 81
Status of ASEAN 82
Soviet Presence and Activities in Indochina 83
Spratly Islands and the Vietnamese Navy 85
Vietnamese Threat to Thailand 86
Insurgency in Thailand 87
Indochinese Refugees 88
Threat to Malaysia 89
Threat to Indonesia 90
Internal Security in the Philippines 92
Burmese Insurgency 93

SECTION V--THREAT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA 95
The Seychelles 95
Threat to Diego Garcia 96
India 97
Soviet Aid 97

Dispute with Pakistan 97
Nuclear Developments 99
Threat to Pakistan 100
Soviets in Afghanistan 101

CHAPTER III--PLANNING 109

SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING 109
FY 83 Posture Statement 109
CINCPAC's Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services 110
CINCPAC Participation in the Revised Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 111
Global Strategy 117
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 82 117

SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS 121
CINCPAC Operation Plans 121
CINCPAC Numbered Plans 121
Unnumbered CINCPAC Contingency Plans 126
OPLANs 5000 and 5001 128
OPLAN 5027 131
CONPLAN 5040-82 132
CONPLAN 5099 133
CONPLAN 5122 134
CINCPAC Support for Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 136

SECTION III--RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER PACOM COUNTRIES 141
ANZUS Council Meeting 141
ANZUS Military Representatives Meeting 142
ANZUS Staff Level Meeting 143
ANZUS Seminars 144
U.S.-Australian Joint Staff Talks 145
Hydrographic Survey Work 145
Oceanographic Research Project in the South Pacific 146
U.S.-Japan Relationship 148
U.S.-Japan Planning and Cooperation 151
Japan Security Consultative Committee 154
Subcommittee of the Security Consultative Committee 154
CINCPAC Meeting at the Japan Defense Agency 156
CINCPAC-Japan Joint Staff Office Exchange Visit 157
U.S.-Japan System and Technology Forum 158
ROK-Japan Relationships 160
U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Relationship 164
PACOM Initiatives for Malaysia 166
U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement 169
Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board 172
PACOM Initiatives for the Philippines 173
U.S.-China Security Relationship 173

Visits to India 178
Visit of Indonesian General Officer 179
Madagascar's Economic Problems 179

SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES 181
Quarterly Report of Issues and Activities 181
Nuclear Weapons Allocations and Deployments 182
Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study 183
Nuclear Contingency Planning System 187
Cruise Missile Acquisition and Planning 188
CINCPAC Perspectives and Initiatives 197
U.S. Initiatives in the PACOM 198
PACOM Master Requirements List 199
East Asia Liaison Group 201
Contingency Fund for CINC Initiatives 202
PACOM Standardization and Interoperability 204
Joint Direction Finding Test and Evaluation 205
CINCPAC Requirements for Chemical and Biological Warfare Operational Concepts 206
Management of Studies and Analyses 206
Japan Force Requirements for Sea Lane Protection: Role of Iwo Jima 208
Defense of the Aleutians 208
Australian Analyst Exchange 210
PACOM and World Affairs Seminar 210
SAC B-52 Support 210
State of Hawaii Official to Request Survey Assistance from Soviet Oceanographic Vessel 211
JCS Chairman's Foreign Visitors Program, FY 82 212
National War College Student Visit 212

CHAPTER IV--OPERATIONS 215

SECTION I--READINESS AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING 215
Overview in April 215
Capability to Execute OPLANs 217
Changes in October 219
SIOP Revisions and Changes in Commitment 221
Nuclear Weapons Recode 221
Military Presence in the Indian Ocean/Southwest Asia 221
CVBG Transit of the Suez Canal 226
Strait of Hormuz Operations 228
Operational Command of MIDEASTFOR 230

SECTION II--OPERATIONS 233
Indian Ocean Operations and Port Visits 233
First Port Visit to Trincomalee, Sri Lanka 241
Navigational Freedom and U.S. Security Interests 243

Sea of Japan Operations 246
Pacific Port Visits 247
Japan 247
Hong Kong 248
South Pacific 248
Nuclear-Powered Ship Visits to New Zealand 249
Homeporting Changes 250
Southeast Asia Refugee Rescue-at-Sea Operations 251
SAC B-52 Programs in PACOM 253
Australia 254
Other Indian Ocean Proposals 257
Philippines 258
Japan 259
Reconnaissance Operations 261
Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program 261
PONY EXPRESS Operations 266
P-3 Operations in the Northwest Indian Ocean Area 268
Airborne Command Post Operations 272

SECTION III--OTHER OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES 275
FRESH THUNDER Operations 275
North Korean SAM Firing at SR-71 275
U.S. Response 276
Reaction to North Korean Exercise Activity 279
Collision of U.S. Submarine with Japanese Freighter 281
Collision and Aftermath 281
Report of Investigation 283
Southeast Asia POW/MIA Resolution Efforts 284
Repatriation of Remains 285
Proposal of High-Level Mission to Vietnam and Laos 287
Offer of Ordnance Removal in Laos 288
Refugee Interviews 289
Tropical Cyclones 289

SECTION IV--EXERCISES 293
Korea 293
TEAM SPIRIT 81 293
FOAL EAGLE 82 298
POTENT PUNCH/ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81 298
Other Exercises 301
Japan 301
GOPHER BROKE XI 301
FOREST BLADE 82 301
JMSDF Annual Exercise 302
ASWEX and Damage to Fishing Lines 303
ASEAN Area 304
COPE THUNDER 304
TANGENT FLASH/BALIKATAN 82 Planning 305

SEA SIAM 305
MINEX 306
MEKAR 82-1 306
TIGER BALM 81 307
ANZUS 307
KANGAROO 81 307
GONFALON 81 310
BEACON COMPASS 81 311
BEACON SOUTH 311
TRIAD 81 312
Indian Ocean - Persian Gulf 312
PHIBLEX Demonstration 312
VALIANT USHER 81-9 312
SOAFPASSEX/BEACON FLASH 313
GONZO 314
Hawaii Area and CINCPAC Headquarters 315
OPPORTUNE JOURNEY/COPE ELITE 315
FOREVER GONE 316
POLO HAT 316
POLL STATION 81 317
NIGHT BLUE 318
Exercise Evaluation Function Transferred 318

VOLUME II

CHAPTER V--LOGISTICS 319

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY 319
Logistics Review of OPLANs 319
OPLAN 5027S 320
OPLANs 5000/5001 FY 81 322
Bilateral Logistics Planning with Thailand 325
Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81 326

SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 329
Logistics Readiness 329
War Reserve Ammunition 329
War Reserve Stocks for Allies 330
Sustainability Rating Issues 331
PACOM Munitions Storage Report 333
Chemical Munitions in PACOM 333
NTPS Ammunition Interservice Support Agreement 334
Commissary Support System 335
Exchange Support 336
Fuels 337
Inventory 337
Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices 337

Petroleum Storage Posture in PACOM 337
Leased Tankage in Korea 341
Petroleum Logistics Conference 344
NTPS Vehicle Maintenance Problems 345
Increased Use of JP-5 346
Petroleum Laboratory Capability Survey 347
Laboratory Correlation Program 348
Refueling Support in Thailand 348
Taiwan 349

SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS 351
TEAM SPIRIT 81 351
Airlift 351
Sealift 352
Korean Flag Shipping and Airlines 352
Shipping 352
Airlines 352
Korean Contingency Resupply and Redistribution System 353
GAO Survey 354
MAC Users Conference 356
Near Term Pre-positioning Ships 358
Security and Basing 359
Third NTPS Maintenance Cycle Conference 359

SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING 361
FY 81/82 MILCON Programs in PACOM 361
Diego Garcia 361
Construction 362
Funding 362
Aircraft Support 364
Southwest Asia 366
Korea 366
Combined Defense Improvement Projects 366
Aircraft Beddown 367
Japan 367
Host Nation Funded Construction 367
Integrated Relocation Construction Program 367
Facilities Improvement Program 368
JFY 81 368
JFY 82 368
Sanno Hotel 369

CHAPTER VI--SECURITY ASSISTANCE 371

SECTION I--GENERAL 371
Arms Transfer Funding, Policy, and Legislation 371
Reporting Requirements 378
FY 83 Funding 378

FY 81 Manning and C-12 Aircraft 380
FY 82 Manpower Proposals 381
JUSMAG Korea Manning 381
PACOM Security Assistance Conference 382
Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar 383
Pacific Area Consolidated Ammunition Ship 384
PASOLS Project Development Group 385
Phase IV Security Assistance Training 385
PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop 386
Terms of Reference 386
ASEAN Requests 387
Fighter Aircraft 387
HARPOON 388
Performance Evaluation Group 390

SECTION II-COUNTRY PROGRAMS 391
Australia 391
Tactical Fighter Aircraft 391
Bangladesh 393
Burma 397
Fiji 399
Funding 399
Peacekeeping Force Participation 399
Lebanon 399
Sinai 401
India 403
Funding 403
TOW Antitank Missile 403
155mm Howitzers 405
Indonesia 407
Reorganization 407
IMET Funding 408
A-4 Aircraft 409
Overhaul of Indonesian Ships 409
Howitzers 410
155mm 410
105mm 410
Project INDOCOM 410
Security Agreement 411
Japan 413
M110A2 Howitzers 413
F-15 415
C-130 415
P-3C 415
AIM-9L 416
Disposal of MAP Excess Equipment 416
Korea 417
FMS Credits 417

Force Improvement Plan 419
Third Country Sale of Korean-made Defense Items 420
F-16 (PEACE BRIDGE) 422
Modernization of ROK Tank Force 426
Howitzers 427
Tankers 428
Destroyers 428
Malaysia 429
Training Support 429
Administrative Staffing 429
Aircraft 429
IMET Program 430
New Zealand 433
Pakistan 435
Equipment Requests 436
Ships 440
Destroyers 440
Papua New Guinea 443
Philippines 445
Support for F-8H Aircraft 445
Engineer Equipment 446
Disposal of Excess Small Arms 447
Singapore 449
Pilot Exchange Program 449
Training Costs 449
Sri Lanka 453
Ship Transfer 455
Thailand 455
Funding 455
Aircraft 457
MANPAD System 458

CHAPTER VII--COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 461

SECTION I--COMMAND AND CONTROL 461
The PACOM Command and Control System 461
Command and Control System Improvements 462
CINC C2 Initiative Funds 462
WWMCCS 464
Realignment of Record Communications 465
Combined Ground Command Post Terminal 466
Teletype Upgrade for Command Aircraft 467
UHF Satellite Communications Upgrade for Command Aircraft 467
Relocation of TACAMO Pacific 468
TACAMO Pacific Programming 469
Airborne Command Post 470
Joint Crisis Management Capability Program 471
Theater Nuclear Forces C3 471

Planning for Southwest Asia Communications 474

SECTION II--INTEROPERABILITY WITH PACOM ALLIES 477
Joint/Combined Interoperability of Tactical C2 Systems 477
Improving Communications in Korea (TPICK) 478
COMSEC Plan for Korea (CPICK) 479
U.S.-Japan Air Defense C2 (BADGE) 481
U.S. Forces Japan Coordination Center 483
COMSEC Interoperability with Japan 483
ANZUS C3 Interoperability Planning 485

SECTION III--TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT 487
Frequency Management 487
Upgrading Telephone Systems on Oahu 488
C3 for Near Term Pre-positioning Ships 489
Contingency Deployment of Satellite Terminal 490
Hardening to EMP (Project APACHE) 491
Jam Resistant Secure Communications 495
Hawaii Area Wideband System 496
Communications Security 497
JCS COMSEC Master Plan 497
COMSEC Equipment Stockpile Proposal 498
Threat to PACOM Communications 498
Special COMSEC Monitoring 500
Exercise COMSEC Monitoring 501
COMSEC Material System 501
Sealed Authentication System Inspection 502

CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES 509

SECTION I--MILITARY PERSONNEL 509
Environmental and Morale Leave 509
Military Customs Program 512
Predeparture Clearance 512
PACOM Military Customs Conference 513
Customs Report 513
Alcohol and Drug Abuse 515
Awards 516
ROK/US Combined Forces Command Service Badge 516
DOD Awards for CFC Component Headquarters 516
Republic of Korea National Crisis Service Medal 517
PACOM Awards 517

SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 519
Foreign National Personnel Administration 519
Korea 520
Philippines 520
Total Comparability Compensation and Pay Increases 520

Severance Pay 521
Sick Leave Benefits 521
American Express Labor Dispute 521
Japan 523
Direct Hire 524
Australia 525
Compensation for Third Country Nationals 525
Offshore Labor - Diego Garcia 526
Position Classification Control 527
Cost of Living Allowance 527
Performance Appraisal 528

CHAPTER IX--INTELLIGENCE 529

SECTION I--SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 529
PACOM Data Systems Center 529
Intelligence Data Handling System 532
Special Security 534

SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 537
Intelligence Deficiencies in PACOM 537
Project SENIOR GAZE Demonstration 538
SENIOR RUBY Deployment to PACOM 541
COMFY LEVI Deployment Proposed 541
Proposed TALLYMAN Korea Demonstration 542
HUMINT Collection Program in PACOM 544

SECTION III--INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 547
Targeting 547
PACOM Management 547
Target Intelligence Production Plan 547
Automated Tactical Target Graphics Production 548
ATTG Release to the ROK 549
ATTG Format 550
ATTG Miniaturization 551
Target Folders 551
Hardened Artillery Sites File 552
Forward Area Neutralization Graphic 552
Unconventional Warfare Targeting 553
Target Nominations and Deletions 553
Cruise Missile Planning 554
Weaponeering 555
Automated Installation Intelligence File 556
AIF Release 556
AIF Executive Agent Transfer 557
Other AIF Developments 558
Order of Battle Intelligence 558
Intelligence Support to the RDJTF 559

J2

SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE 563
Sharing with Australia and New Zealand 563
Sharing with Japan 565
Intelligence Exchange with the Philippines 567
Singapore 568
Intelligence Support for Thailand 569

CHAPTER X--OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES 571

SECTION I--Official Activities of the Commander in Chief 571
Trips and Associated Speeches 571
Distinguished Visitors to the Command, Meetings with News Media Personnel, and Local Speeches 577

SECTION II--Comptroller Activities 589
Obligation of Consumer Funds for Expense-Type Material 591
MAP Representation Funds 591
O&M,Navy Funding for CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific 591

SECTION III--LEGAL AFFAIRS 593
Philippine Customs, Immigration, and Quarantine Negotiations 593
Philippine Extradition Treaty 594
Rossi v. Brown 597
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 597
PACOM Confinement Statistics 597
Philippines 598
Korea 598
ANZUS Status of Forces Agreement 599
Exercises 599
POTENT PUNCH 81 599
ANZUS Exercises 599
Travel to Macau 600
Environmental Laws and Regulations 600
PACOM Legal Conference 602

SECTION IV--PUBLIC AFFAIRS 605
Tours and Visits 605
Vice President Bush Press Conference 605
40th Anniversary of Hawaii Attack 605
Pacific Stars and Stripes 606

SECTION V--SECURITY 609
Demonstration at CINCPAC Headquarters 609
Security of Senior Military Officers 610

SECTION VI--INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES 611
Program Management 611
Exercises 611

Staff Visits 613
Physical Security 614
Explosives Safety Surveys 615

CHAPTER XI--SELECTED CHRONOLOGY 1981 617

Glossary 637

Index 649

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Title	Page
Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific	iv
The Pacific Command	2
Command Relationships in PACOM	3
Command Organization	4
Subordinate Unified Commands and CINCPAC Representatives	5
U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups	6
PACOM Area Personnel	7
CINCPAC Component and Subordinate Unified Command Staff Personnel	8
U.S. Security Assistance Organization Personnel	9
Military Personnel Assigned Strength in PACOM	10
Available Forces	11
Deployment of Major Ground Units	12
Deployment of Naval Air and Ship Units	13
Deployment of Major Air Force Units	14
Authorized Strengths of CINCPAC Staff Directorates	17
Key CINCPAC Staff Personnel	18-19
Disputed Territories	70
Soviet Forces Deployed in the Northern Territories	70
Communist Far East Ground Strength	104
Communist Naval Strength	105
Summary of Communist Far East Air Forces	106
Summary of Communist Far East Missile Forces	107
Critical Shortfall Munitions in PACOM	328
PACOM Sustainability Posture	332
PACOM POL Issues	337
1981 POL Issues	339
Bulk POL Data, PACOM	340
PACOM Petroleum Storage Construction Projects	342
Near Term Pre-positioning Ships	357-358
Diego Garcia	360
FY 81 and FY 82 MILCON (Diego Garcia)	363
FY 1981 PACOM Country Security Assistance Program	376
PACOM Security Assistance Programs	377
PACOM Security Assistance Programs (Administrative Costs)	379
Country Summary--Australia	392
Country Summary--Bangladesh	394
Country Summary--Burma	396
Country Summary--Fiji	400
Country Summary--India	404
Country Summary--Indonesia	406
Country Summary--Japan	412
Country Summary--Korea	418
Status of ROK Requests to Market U.S.-origin Defense Items	423

Country Summary--Malaysia 430
Country Summary--New Zealand 432
Country Summary--Pakistan 434
Country Summary--Papua New Guinea 442
Country Summary--Philippines 444
Country Summary--Singapore 450
Country Summary--Sri Lanka 452
Country Summary--Thailand 456
Defense Satellite Communications System 503
Commercial Satellite Military Leased Circuits 503
Submarine Cables 504
AUTOSEVOCOM Wideband Connections 504
AUTOVON Switches and Interconnections 505
AUTODIN Switches and Interconnections 505
AUTODIN Conferencing Network (AUTOCONET) 506
Voice Alert Network (CVAN) 506
WWMCCS Intercomputer/ADP Network 507
PACOM Military Customs Inspections/Examinations 514
President Chun Doo Hwan and Admiral Long 578
Vice President Bush and Admiral Long 581
Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Admiral Long 585

CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

~~(C)~~ PACOM strength remained approximately the same in 1981 when compared to 1980. There was a slight increase in the number of military personnel assigned when looking at the 1979 and 1980 numbers; however it should be noted that overall strengths were at their lowest in the history of the command during those years.

(C) A comparison of military strength by Service follows:[1]

	1 January 1981	31 December 1981	Change
Army	49,899	46,907	- 2,992
Navy	155,011	159,273	+ 4,262
Marine Corp	63,000	72,230	+ 9,230
Air Force	39,648	43,384	+ 3,736
Total	307,558	321,794	+ 14,236

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1981 and the change from 1980 are shown in the following table.

	Military		Dependents	
	31 Dec 81	Change	31 Dec 81	Change
Guam	7,321	- 673	11,819	- 626
Hawaii	41,035	+ 641	60,262	+ 1,104
Japan	40,924	- 1,201	27,907	- 6,333
Korea	38,388	- 412	11,589	- 1,495
Philippines	12,977	+ 856	19,681	+ 363

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of those forces throughout the PACOM. The information on these charts was current as of 31 December 1981, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

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1. Strengths were derived from the Unit Status and Identity Report.

THE PACIFIC COMMAND (U)



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 3, REVW 13 Feb 02.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 4, REVW 13 Feb 02.

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND ORGANIZATION (U)

1 (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC):

a (C) CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: **To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and discharge United States military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Indian Ocean; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority.** His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west longitude, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, and the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east longitude *(including the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden)*. It also includes Japan, the Republic of Korea, the countries of Southeast and Southern Asia *(including Pakistan and India)*, and the islands *(except the Malagasy Republic)* in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians *(excluding air defense)* but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Island.

b (U) CINCPAC exercises operational command of JCS-assigned or attached forces through the PACOM Service component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces *(when established)*

c (U) CINCPAC exercises military command over military agencies, offices, organizations, and commands which administer security assistance programs within the PACOM area and coordinates activities within the PACOM area through established coordinating authorities who are designated United States Defense Representatives *(USDRs)* or CINCPAC Representatives *(CINCPACREPs)*.

d (U) CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. military adviser or representative to the following organizations:
(1) (U) ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative.
(2) (U) Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and Co-Chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board.
(3) (U) U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on Military Defense Matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.
(4) (U) ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting: Delegate.
(5) (U) ROK-U.S. Military Committee, Plenary Session: Member.

2 (U) PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:

a (U) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).

b (U) Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).

c (U) Commander, U.S. Army Western Command (CDRWESTCOM) *(less the geographical areas of Japan and Korea)*.

d (U) The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, or installations under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate

e (U) The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Security Assistance Program are prescribed in the DOD Military Assistance and Sales Manual and CINCPAC Instruction 4900.8.

3 (U) COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are two subordinate unified commands in the PACOM

a (U) United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA)*, Seoul, Korea.

b (U) United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUSJAPAN)*, Yokota Air Base, Japan.

4. (U) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPs) CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed:

a. (U) Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI), Agana, Guam.

b. (U) Commander U.S. Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines)*, Subic Bay, Philippines.

c. (U) USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia)*, American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

d. (U) Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI)*, is the CINCPAC Representative Thailand (CINCPACREP Thailand), Bangkok, Thailand.

e. (U) Commander Naval Station Adak (COMNAVSTAADAK) is the CINCPAC Representative Aleutians (CINCPACREP Aleutians), Adak, Alaska.

f. (U) Commander Mid-East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) is the CINCPAC Representative Indian Ocean (CINCPACREP Indian Ocean).

g. (U) CINCPAC Representative Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command/Joint Strategic Connectivity Staff (CINCPACREP JSTPS/SAC/JSCS), Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

h. (U) CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific (CINCPACREP SW PAC), Suva, Fiji.

i. (U) CINCPAC Liaison Officer to U.S. Readiness Command/Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force/Joint Deployment Agency (CINCPAC LNO REDCOM/RDJTF/JDA), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

5. (U) CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS: Security Assistance Programs, including Foreign Military Sales, are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:

a. (U) Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan ..... Tokyo, Japan
b. (U) Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand ..... Bangkok, Thailand
c. (U) Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines ..... Manila, Philippines
d. (U) Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea ..... Seoul, Korea
e. (U) Chief Office of Defense Cooperation, India ..... New Delhi, India
f. (U) U.S. Defense Representative, Pakistan* ..... Islamabad, Pakistan
g. (U) Military Attache for Defense Programs, Indonesia* performs the security assistance functions of planning and programming for Indonesia ..... Jakarta, Indonesia

h. (U) U.S. Defense Attaches Australia, Burma*, Malaysia*, Nepal*, New Zealand*, Singapore*, and Sri Lanka* are responsible for the Security Assistance function for their respective countries.

i. (U) CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific is responsible for the Security Assistance function for Fiji.

j. (U) Deputy Chief of Mission, Australia, is responsible for the Security Assistance function for Papua New Guinea.

6. (U) CINCPAC Liaison Officer to Commander, Alaskan Air Command.

* *Designated as U.S. Defense Representatives. Also serving in that capacity are the U.S. Defense Attaches in Bangladesh, China, and India, and the U.S. Defense Liaison Officer in Hong Kong.*

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 5, REVW 13 Feb 02.

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS & CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
KEY PERSONNEL

U.N. COMMAND/U.S. FORCES, KOREA/EIGHTH U.S. ARMY/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

Commander in Chief/Commander/Commanding General	GEN	John A. WICKHAM, Jr.	USA
Deputy Commander	LT GEN	Winfield W. SCOTT, Jr.	USAF
Chief of Staff	BGEN	Joseph T. PALASTRA, Jr.	USA
Special Asst ROK Military Affairs & CHJUSMAG-K	MAJ GEN	Jere W. SHARP	USA
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Thomas A. EPPERSON	USA
CDR HQ UNC (Rear)/Secretary UN JT BD & Deputy UN Rep	COL	Albert BOLE	USA
Chief of Protocol Section	LCOL	Jon M. PETERSON	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J1	COL	Thomas F. SEEBODE	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J2	BGEN	Jimmy C. PETTYJOHN	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J3	MAJ GEN	William C. MOORE	USA
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff/J3	COL	Brian H. CURRIE	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J4	BGEN	Robert W. POINTER	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J5	BGEN	Dennis J. MURPHY	USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Donald B. GRIGGS	USA
Chief Armistice Affairs Div & Secretary UNCMAC	COL	Kenneth T. TRINKLER	USA
CDR MILPERCEN-K/Adjutant General	COL	Kenneth D. MEADOWS	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/Comptroller	COL	Leo S. BOYD	USA
Public Affairs Officer	COL	Richard G. HYDE	USA
Judge Advocate	COL	Thomas ANDREWS	USA
Inspector General	COL	Robert D. ALHOUSE	USA
Staff Chaplain	CH (COL)	Charles R. GIBBS, III	USA
Commander, United States Air Forces Korea	LT GEN	Winfield W. SCOTT, Jr.	USAF
Commander, United States Naval Forces Korea	RADM	James G. STORMS, III	USN

UNITED STATES FORCES JAPAN

Commander/Commander Fifth Air Force	LT GEN	Charles L. DONNELLY, Jr.	USAF
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	Marc A. MOORE	USMC
Secretary Joint Staff	CAPT	Tommy H. WARREN, Jr.	USN
Assistant Chief of Staff/J1	CAPT	Edward W. HILLE	USN
Assistant Chief of Staff/J2	COL	Francis V. VARALLO	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J3	COL	George HOLT, Jr.	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J4	COL	Robert T. CARNEY	USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff/J5	COL	Frank L. DAY	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Harold M. DONATH	USAF
Chief Okinawa Area Field Office	LCOL	Robert P. HODOR	USA

SPECIAL STAFF ADVISERS FROM COMPONENT COMMAND STAFFS

Chief Protocol Section (5AF)	MAJ	Bertram G. HAHN	USAF
Public Affairs Office (5AF)	COL	Robert E. RAYFIELD	USAF
Director for Safety (5AF)	LCOL	John P. STEFFEN	USAF
Chaplain (5AF)	COL	Newton V. COLE	USAF
Legal Advisor (5AF)	COL	George M. NAKANO	USAF
Surgeon (5AF)	COL	Fred O. BARGATZE	USAF
Comptroller (5AF)	COL	Gordon L. WOHLFEIL	USAF
Provost Marshal (5AF)	COL	Harry K. ROGERS	USAF

Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan	LT GEN	Roscoe ROBINSON, Jr.	USA
Commander Naval Forces Japan	RADM	Donald L. FELT	USN

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

Commander	LCOL	Joe B. HARVEY	USA

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE ALEUTIANS

CINCPACREP/CO, NAVSTAADAK	CAPT	George R. ALLENDER	USN

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE AUSTRALIA

CINCPACREP/USAF Liaison Officer/U.S. Defense Representative/U.S. Designated CO for Australia & New Zealand	COL	Gene E. TAFT	USAF

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE INDIAN OCEAN

CINCPACREP & COMIDEASTFOR/U.S. Defense Representative	RADM	Charles E. GURNEY, III	USN

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF/STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND/ JOINT STRATEGIC CONNECTIVITY STAFF

CINCPACREP JSTPS/SAC/JSCS	CAPT	Herndon A. OLIVER	USN

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE PHILIPPINES

CINCPACREP/COMUSNAVPHIL	RADM	Richard M. DUNLEAVY	USN
Chief of Staff	CAPT	Robert F. McCULLOUGH	USN
Commander Thirteenth Air Force	MAJ GEN	Kenneth D. BURNS	USAF
Vice Commander	COL	Charles E. GOODWIN	USAF

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

CINCPACREP	CDR	Dwayne O. NORRIS	USN

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE THAILAND

CINCPACREP	COL	Richard L. WEAVER	USA

PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES

Commander	COL	Joseph E. BURLAS	USA

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 8, REVW 13 Feb 02.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION INDIA (ODC)

Chief	LCOL	John G. PATTERSON, Jr.	USAF

OFFICE OF MILITARY ATTACHE FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, INDONESIA

Chief	COL	Albert C. WALDACK	USA
Executive Officer	MAJ	Dennis A. WASHBURN	USA
Chief, Operations Division	LCOL	Richard D. TOMLIN	USMC
Army Program Coordinator	LCOL	Anthony H. NORMAND	USA
Navy Program Coordinator	CDR	Donald K. EDGERTON	USN
Air Force Program Coordinator	LCOL	William F. BRYANT, Jr.	USAF

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN

Chief, MDAO	COL	Johnny H. EDMUNDSON	USAF
Deputy Chief	MR.	David T. KENNEY	CIV
Director of Air Defense Programs	LCOL	Jack L. JONES	USA
Director of Naval Aviation Programs	CDR	Richard A. HOHLSTEIN	USNR
Director of Air Force Programs	LCOL	Ralph H. BACUE	USAF

JOINT U.S MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP, KOREA

Chief	MAJ GEN	Jere W. SHARP	USA
Chief of Staff	CAPT	Francisco A. VELAZQUEZ-SUAREZ	USN
ACS Plans & Programs	COL	James W. THAR	USAF
ACS Development & Acquisition	COL	John J. VARGO, Jr.	USA
ACS Logistics (Acting)	LCOL (D)	Meredith A. DECKER	USAF
	LCOL (R)	Richard H. KENYON	USA
Secretary Joint Staff	LCOL	Roger W. THORNBERRY	USA
Chief Army Section	COL	Philip Y. BROWNING	USA
Chief Navy Section	CAPT	Jon J. GERSHON	USN
Chief Air Force Section	COL	William P. STEWART	USAF
Chief Marine Corps Section	COL	Richard L. BRINEGAR	USMC

OFFICE OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE PAKISTAN (ODRP)

U.S. Defense Representative Pakistan (USDRP)	COL	Sidney B. HUDSON	USAF

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, PHILIPPINES

Chief	BGEN	John W. FOSS	USA
Chief, Logistics Division & Chief, Air Force Service Section	COL	Thomas H. MAUS	USAF
Chief, Management Division & Chief, Navy Service Section	CAPT	Leonard M. RAUSCH	USN
Chief, Support Division	LCOL	Robert W. THOMPSON	USA
Chief, Marine Service Section	LCOL	Doyle E. STOUT	USMC
Chief, Ground Forces Service Section	LCOL	Gary DEBAUCHE	USA

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, THAILAND

Chief	COL	Richard L. WEAVER	USA
Supreme Command Liaison Officer	LCOL	Charles L. SHAW	USA
Chief, Army Division	COL	George R. GOETZKE	USA
Chief, Navy Division	CAPT	George S. PHILLIPS	USN
Chief, Air Force Division	COL	John M. KILBORN	USAF
Chief, Training Liaison Branch	LCOL	James E. BROWN, Jr.	USAF
Chief, Support Services Branch	CAPT	Jack C. FRINK, Jr.	USA
Chief, Admin/Programs Branch	MAJ	Earl D. BICE	USAF

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 9, REVW 13 Feb 02.

PACOM AREA PERSONNEL-SERVICE-CATEGORY-LOCATION (U)
ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1981

COUNTRY	GRAND TOTAL	MILITARY					U.S. CIVILIANS						LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS						DEPENDENTS				
		TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	ODA*	AAFES	TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	ODA*	AAFES	TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	USMC
ALASKA (ADAK)	2,233	1,197		1,197															1,036		1,036		
AMERICAN SAMOA	11																		11				11
AUSTRALIA	1,645	611	4	346	260	1	16		14	2			207		207				811		367	420	24
BANGLADESH	4	2	2																2	2			
BURMA	4	4	3	1																			
CHINA	8	5	3			2													3				3
DIEGO GARCIA	847	847		846	1																		
GUAM/TTPI	24,913	7,321		3,576	3,743	2	5,773		4,451	1,014	17	291							11,819	64	6,779	4,912	64
HAWAII	156,776	41,035	17,131	9,281	5,991	8,632	25,479	4,973	16,208	2,919	9	1,370							90,262	27,016	44,348	8,849	10,049
HONG KONG	77	27	5	15	5	2													50		28	7	15
INDIA	11	8	3	1	4														3	2		1	
INDONESIA	89	34	10	12	10	2													55	13	31	7	4
JAPAN	97,238	40,924	2,251	5,776	13,321	19,576	7,148	952	2,361	1,650	1,104	1,081	21,259	3,886	10,659	5,512		1,202	27,907	2,695	6,869	15,363	2,980
JOHNSTON ISLAND	136	136	133		3																		
KOREA	73,022	38,388	27,159	321	10,896	12	1,799	1,227	41	177	237	117	21,246	16,278	206	2,629	29	2,104	11,589	8,831	260	2,405	93
MALAYSIA	4	4	2		2																		
MIDWAY ISLAND	341	341		341																			
NEPAL	1	1	1																				
NEW ZEALAND	161	57	3	43	11														104	11	68	25	
PAKISTAN	14	10	5	1	4														4	2		2	
PHILIPPINES	54,008	12,977	26	4,204	8,636	111	1,771	1	680	498	521	71	19,579	4	14,157	4,428	1	989	19,681	29	7,470	11,400	782
SINGAPORE	29	8	4	4															21	4	17		
SRI LANKA	5	3		3															2		2		
THAILAND	467	108	14	71	13	10	33		6		27		184	159	17		8		142	32	28	71	11
AFLOAT/EMBARKED																							
WESTPAC/INDIAN OCEAN	39,981	39,981	3	37,917		2,061																	
MIDPAC/EASTPAC	63,663	63,663		61,626		2,037																	
UNSPECIFIED	110						39		24	14	1		71		71								
PACOM CONUS FORCES	124,915	74,022	145	33,611	484	39,782													50,893		29,619		21,274
TOTAL	640,793	321,794	46,907	159,273**	43,384	72,230	42,058	7,153	23,785	6,274	1,916	2,930	62,546	20,327	25,317	12,569	38	4,295	214,395	38,701	96,922	43,462	35,310

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 22, REVW 13 Feb 02.

* *Other Defense Agencies*

** *Includes also 80 personnel assigned in Antarctica.*

CINCPAC, COMPONENT & SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		U.S. CIV	LOCAL HIRE CIV	TOTAL MIL AND CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
CINCPAC	110	56	93	148	20	13	116	79	339	296	105		740
CDRWESTCOM	102	50							102	50	194		346
CINCPACFLT			154	283					154	283	75		512
CINCPACAF							467	460	467	460	218		1,145
COMUSJAPAN	15	8	10	6	8	2	19	13	52	29	35	8	124
COMUSKOREA	104	110	30	48	14	3	95	84	243	245	55	24	567
ABNCP	11	2	8	1	4	1	12	5	35	9	1		45
JCRC	1	1	1	3	0	2	1	3	3	9	2		14
ADP	5	13	5	17	0	0	8	14	18	44	27		89
GRAND TOTAL	348	240	301	506	46	21	718	658	1,413	1,425	712	32	3,582

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~ p. 23, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL (U)
ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE & CIVILIAN CATEGORY

CATEGORY	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIV	TOT US PERS	LOCAL HIRE
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
ODC INDIA							1		1		1	2	4
MADP INDONESIA	5	1	1	2	1	0	3	2	10	5	3	18	15
MDAO JAPAN	1	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	6	0	5	11	5
CHJUSMAGKOREA	44	31	22	15	6	3	30	22	102	71	28	201	49
ODR PAKISTAN	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	1	4	8
CHJUSMAGPHIL	11	2	3	2	1	0	5	1	20	5	5	30	4
CHJUSMAGTHAI	8	3	4	2	2	0	10	4	24	9	5	38	17
TOTAL	71	37	32	21	10	3	53	29	166	90	48	304	102

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 24, REVW 13 Feb 02.

SOURCE: J13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM (U)

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1981

	ARMY	*NAVY*	*MARINE CORPS*	*TOTAL NAVY & MC*	*AIR FORCE*	*TOTAL*
FORCES UNDER CINCPAC'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL	43,027	154,469	67,933	222,402	24,920	290,349
OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM NOT UNDER CINCPAC'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL	3,880	4,804	4,297	9,101	18,464	31,445
TOTAL MILITARY FORCES IN THE PACOM AREA	46,907	159,273	72,230	231,503	43,384	321,794

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 21, REVW 13 Feb 02.

AVAILABLE FORCES (U)

ARMY	NAVY/MARINES	AIR FORCE
OPCOM TO CINCPAC*		
1 Army Headquarters 1 Corps Headquarters 2d Infantry Division with 5 Infantry Battalions 2 Armor Battalions 1 Cavalry Squadron 4 Artillery Battalions 1 Air Force Battalion 25th Infantry Division with 6 Infantry Battalions 1 Cavalry Squadron 3 Artillery Battalions 1 Air Defense Battalion 1 Air Defense Battalion with 4 HAWK Batteries 7 Separate Aviation Companies 1 Engineer Group 1 Signal Brigade 1 General Support Group 1 Heavy Boat Company	2 Numbered Fleets 6 Attack Carriers** 14 Cruisers** 74 Destroyers/Frigates** 1 Submarine (SSBN) 47 Submarines (SS/SSN)** 31 Amphibious Ships** 1 Patrol Hydrofoil Missile 6 Carrier Wings* 29 Fighter/Attack Squadrons*** 9 Electronic Surveillance Squadrons*** 6 Early Warning Squadrons*** 10 Carrier ASW Squadrons*** 4 LAMPS Squadrons 12 Patrol Squadrons*** 6 Tanker Detachments 1 Light Photo Squadron 2 EC-130Q VLF Relay (TACAMO) Aircraft 9 SOSUS Stations 1 Naval Special Warfare Group * *Includes Naval Air Units deployed to LANTCOM/EUCOM.* ** *Does Not include units deployed from LANTCOM/EUCOM.* *** *Does not include units with a primary mission of training.* 2 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) Headquarters I MAF 1st Marine Division with 9 Infantry Battalions 1 Tank Battalion 3 Artillery Battalions 1 Assault Amphibious Battalion 3d Marine Aircraft Wing with 8 Fighter/Attack Squadrons 1 Photo/Reconnaissance Squadron 1 Tanker Squadron 1 Observation Squadron 10 Helicopter Squadrons 1st Force Service Support Group 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade with 1 Infantry Battalion 1 Tank Battalion 1 Artillery Battalion III MAF 3d Marine Division with 5 Infantry Battalions 1 Tracked Vehicle Battalion 2 Artillery Battalions 1st Marine Aircraft Wing with 4 Fighter/Attack Squadrons 1 Tanker Squadron 2 Helicopter Squadrons 3d Force Service Support Group 1st Marine Brigade with 3 Infantry Battalions 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Brigade Service Support Group 1 Aircraft Group with 2 Fighter/Attack Squadrons 4 Helicopter Squadrons	2 Numbered Air Force Headquarters 3 Air Division Headquarters 3 Tactical Fighter Wings 1 Composite Wing 1 Tactical Airlift Wing 9 Tactical Fighter Squadrons 1 Tactical Fighter Training Aggressor Squadron 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 2 Tactical Air Support Squadrons 1 Special Operations Squadron 1 Airborne Command & Control Squadron. 1 Airborne Warning & Control Support Squadron 2 Tactical Airlift Squadrons 1 Aeromedical Airlift Squadron 1 Tactical Air Control Group 1 Tactical Control Squadron 1 Tactical Control Flight 1 Direct Air Support Squadron
IN PACOM BUT NOT OPCOM TO CINCPAC		
Army Reserve Units 1 Infantry Battalion 1 Civil Affairs Group 1 Engineer Construction Battalion 1 Corps Headquarters (AUG) Army National Guard Units 1 Infantry Brigade USASA Units in the Pacific	8 Destroyers (Naval Reserve Training) 9 Mine Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training) 4 Amphibious Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Training) 11 Auxiliary Ships 1 Fleet Composite Operations Readiness Group Naval Oceanography Command Units	2 Air Divisions (1 SAC, 1 MAC) 2 Strategic Wings (SAC) 1 Bomber Squadron (SAC) 1 Air Refueling Squadron (SAC) 4 Strategic Reconnaissance Detachments (SAC) 1 Composite Group (HANG) 1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (HANG) 1 Test Group (AFSC) 3 Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons (MAC) 1 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (MAC) Air Weather Service Units (MAC) Air Force Communications Command Units (AFCC) Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS)

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 10, REVW 13 Feb 02.

SECRET

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS (U)



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 13, REVW 13 Feb 02.

DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS (U)
WESTPAC



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 16, REVW 13 Feb 02.

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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS (U)



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 19, REVW 13 Feb 02.

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SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1981

Commander in Chief Pacific

(U) Admiral Robert L.J. Long, USN, continued to serve as Commander in Chief Pacific throughout the year. CAPT Anthony A. Less, USN, replaced CAPT Paul David Miller, USN, on 19 August as his Aide and Executive Assistant.

Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN Robert W. Sennewald, USA, became Chief of Staff on 20 July, replacing LT GEN Freddie L. Poston, USAF. The Service rotation of the billet was the first change for this position since 1973. As noted below, the position of Deputy Chief of Staff was also converted, from Army to Air Force. The title of General Sennewald's position was changed to Deputy Commander in Chief Pacific/Chief of Staff in October, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

Deputy Chief of Staff

(U) MAJ GEN Robert B. Solomon, USA, served as Deputy Chief of Staff until 5 August. COL Frank J. Apel, Jr., USAF, who continued to serve also as the Joint Secretary, was named Acting Deputy Chief of Staff and Inspector General upon General Solomon's departure and served in that capacity through the end of the year. During the absence of the Chief of Staff from 9 to 19 October, COL Apel also served as Acting Chief of Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff designate, MAJ GEN Robert E. Messerli, USAF, was scheduled to report for duty on 3 February 1982.

Director for Personnel

(U) COL Samuel H. Fields, USAF, became Director for Personnel on 16 March, replacing COL Edward D. Reyes, USAF, who became a member of the Inspector General's staff.

Director for Intelligence

(U) James C. Pfautz, USAF, was promoted from Brigadier to Major General on 9 March, with a date of rank of 1 August 1977. He served as Director for Intelligence throughout the year.

Director for Operations

(U) MAJ GEN William R. Maloney, USMC, became Director for Operations on 26 June, replacing MAJ GEN John K. Davis, USMC. General Davis was promoted to

Lieutenant General and assumed duties as Commanding General, Fleet Mairne Force Pacific on 30 June. COL Paul L. Weiland, USAF, was relieved as Deputy Director by BGEN Michael A. Nelson, USAF, on 9 March. The deputy's rank was not unprecedented; general officers had served as Deputy Director for Operations from April 1968 to July 1975.

Director for Logistics and Security Assistance

(U) RADM Edwin R. Kohn, USN, replaced RADM R. G. Bird, USN, on 15 July.

Director for Plans

(U) RADM R. W. Chewning, USN, became Director for Plans on 22 July, replacing RADM E. E. Tissot, Jr., USN, who retired.

Comptroller

(U) CAPT Malcolm C. Reeves, II, SC, USN, relieved CAPT Glenn L. Gaddis, USN, on 1 September.

Commander, Intelligence Center Pacific

(U) CAPT Richard R. McDonald, USN, replaced COL R. E. Littlefield, USA, on 1 June.

AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES[a]

	1 January 1981				31 December 1981			
	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
CINCPAC	7	16	0	23	7	16	0	23
Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff	4	1	3	8	3	2	1	6
Deputy Chief of Staff	2	0	1	3	2	0	1	3
Political and USICA Advisers[b]					1	0	3	4
Inspector General	5	2	0	7	5	2	0	7
Office for Public and Governmental Affairs	14	10	10	34	14	10	10	34
Joint Secretary	8	43	16	67	7	41	15	63
Personnel Directorate	17	18	11	46	16	18	12	46
Intelligence Directorate	37	73	7	117	38	72	7	117
Operations Directorate	93	56	7	156	93	56	7	156
Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate	57	20	15	92	56	19	14	89
Plans Directorate	52	24	10	86	67	28	20	115
Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate	37	16	15	68	38	16	15	69
Comptroller	3	1	7	11	3	1	7	11
Staff Judge Advocate	4	3	1	8	4	4	1	9
Surgeon	3	2	1	6	3	3	1	7
Research and Analysis Office[c]	2	0	9	11				
Total	345	285	113	743	357	288	114	759
Airborne Command Post	34	9	1	44	34	9	1	44
PACOM ADP Systems Support Group	24	48	27	99	22	48	27	97
Intelligence Center Pacific	118	166	65	349	125	172	74	371
Joint Casualty Resolution Center	3	9	2	14	3	9	2	14
Pacific Stars and Stripes	4	39	0	43	4	39	0	43
Sub-total	183	271	95	549	188	277	104	569
GRAND TOTAL	528	556	208	1,292	545	565	218	1,328

a. JCS 132216Z Aug 81 approved the CINCPAC Headquarters JMP for FY 82. Other approval messages were JCS 132218Z Apr 81 for the ABNCP for FY 82, JCS 262122Z May 81 for the ADP Systems Group for FY 82, JCS 262104Z May 81 for the JCRC for FY 82, and for IPAC, JCS 221941Z Apr 81, JCS 271950Z May 81, JCS 261433Z Jun 81, JCS 151607Z Sep 81, CNO 301419Z Oct 81, and CNO 181424Z Dec 81.

b. Separated from Chief of Staff authorizations.

c. On 29 May 1981 the Research and Analysis Office became the Research and Analysis Division of the Plans Directorate.

KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

ROBERT W. SENNEWALD
LT GEN **USA**
Deputy Commander in Chief
Chief of Staff

FRANK J. APEL, Jr.
COL **USAF**
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff,
Acting Inspector General,
and Joint Secretary

MICHAEL V. CONNORS
FSO-2 **CIV**
Political Adviser

ALFRED J. LYNN
GM-15 **CIV**
Chief, Office for Public
and Governmental Affairs

SAMUEL H. FIELDS
COL **USAF**
Director for Personnel

JAMES G. PFAUTZ
MAJ GEN **USAF**
Director for Intelligence

WILLIAM R. MALONEY
MAJ GEN **USMC**
Deputy Chief of Operations

MICHAEL A. NELSON
BGEN **USAF**
Deputy Director for Operations

EDWIN R. KOHN
RADM **USN**
Director for Logistics
and Security Assistance

ROBERT W. CHEWNING
RADM USN

JAMES E. THOMPSON
BGEN USA

JAMES M. ROCKWELL
MAJ GEN USA

MALCOLM C. REEVES II
CAPT SC USN

RICHARD J. GRUNAWALT
CAPT JAGC USN

LEWIS H. SEATON
RADM MC USN

Photo

not

Available

JAMES P. BROWN

Headquarters CINCPAC Joint Manpower Program

(U) The authorized strengths of the CINCPAC staff directorates and certain other organizations are as shown in the accompanying chart. In the proposed Joint Manpower Program for FY 82, submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS on 3 June 1981, the Joint Mobilization Augmentation portion was extensively revised, establishing new requirements for the Inspector General and the Personnel; Operations; Plans; and Command, Control and Communications Systems Directorates. Compensation was provided by deletion of several billets within the Graves Registration Office and deletion of all Joint Mobilization Augmentation requirements for the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post. A net total of 25 added augmentation billets was requested for an FY 82 total of 447. The recommendation was approved virtually as submitted.[1]

(U) Annual production of the revision of the headquarters organization and functions manual was brought in line with the Joint Manpower Program submission and future revisions were to be published with the annual JMP cycle.[2]

Redesignation of Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief of Staff

(U) On 14 October CINCPAC requested that the JCS forward to the Secretary of Defense a change in the Joint Manpower Program to redesignate the Chief of Staff as the Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief of Staff. CINCPAC said the change would enhance the stature and prestige of his principal assistant, particularly while he was representing CINCPAC at senior level meetings and conferences and hosting distinguished visitors to the headquarters. He said that CINCPAC was unique among the unified commands in that the headquarters did not have a Deputy CINC. He noted that the order of command succession should parallel that of the other unified commanders. He did not intend or foresee any command relationship consequences flowing from the redesignation. (The order of succession of command was established by JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces; CINCPAC was to be succeeded by the next senior officer "present for duty" who was eligible to exercise command, regardless of Service affiliation.) The JCS approved the change on 22 October.[3]

Research and Analysis Function Reassigned to the Plans Directorate

(U) In 1974 a Review and Analysis Office was created under the Deputy Chief of Staff and functioned as staff code J021. The functions previously performed by the Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC and certain of

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1. J134 HistSums May and Aug 81 (U).
2. J134 HistSum May 81 (U).
3. CINCPAC 140400Z Oct 81 (U); J73/Memo/S363-81 (S) of 8 Oct 81, REVW 31 Dec 00, Subj: Redesignation of CINCPAC Chief of Staff as Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff (U); JCS 222109Z Oct 81 (U); CINCPACNOTE 5402 of 26 Oct 81 (U), Subj: New Title for the Chief of Staff.

the functions previously performed by the Scientific Analysis Group of the Operations Directorate were assumed by the new office. In 1976 the office title was changed to Research and Analysis Office and reassigned as staff code J77. On 29 May 1981 the office was again realigned, this time as a subordinate element of the Plans Directorate, and assigned the staff code J55, the Research and Analysis Division. Thus, the Plans Directorate was charged, in keeping with command objectives, with total responsibility for the functions of major research, development, analysis, and requirements.[1]

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1. J02/Memo/38-81 of 29 May 81 (U), Subj: Staff Realignment; CINCPACNOTE 5400 of 22 Jun 82 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Headquarters Staff Realignment.

SECTION III--COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

Revised Terms of Reference for Commander, U.S. Forces Japan

~~(S)~~ The Terms of Reference (TOR) for CINCPAC's subordinate unified commander in Japan were revised in 1981. In mid-1980 COMUS Japan had proposed such a revision. He had advised that the recommendation for change was based on developments in the progress of bilateral planning with the Japanese, combined with the thrust of the Japan Self-Defense Force-U.S. Forces Draft Defense Plan, which proposed to depict COMUS Japan as a Combat Commander in the defense of Japan. Other considerations concerned the conduct of joint exercises and training and the number and relationship of COMUS Japan's component commands. On 14 July 1980 COMUS Japan forwarded a recommended revision to the TOR that reflected the changes he believed necessary to establish the authority and proper relationships required to carry out his added responsibilities.[1]

~~(S)~~ COMUS Japan's TOR had last been revised in March 1978. While he was designated a subordinate unified commander, the TOR had been cast to insure that his functions and responsibilities would correspond to those of a CINCPAC Representative. For example, the TOR limited him to representative and coordination type functions. They also listed only an Army component commander.[2]

(C) The proposal was staffed and submitted to CINCPAC for consideration in December 1980. At that time CINCPAC saw no necessity to make this change. On 1 May 1981 COMUS Japan forwarded amplifying rationale to support the modification and clarification. The CINCPAC staff supported a revised TOR.[3]

(C) COMUS Japan noted that three years earlier the existing TOR contained adequate guidance and authority. With the approval of the Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Responsibilities in November 1978, however, the mission and responsibilities had increased substantially. He had embarked on a bilateral planning effort with the Japanese to conduct studies on combined defense planning plus a host of associated activities. The result had been a CINCPAC-approved Draft Defense Plan, an increase in combined military activities with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and increased dialogue with the

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1. J5622 HistSum Aug 81 (S), DECL 8 Sep 87; COMUS Japan Ltr to CINCPAC, 14 Jul 80 (S), DECL 10 Jul 86, Subj: CINCPACINST S3020.2H (COMUSJAPAN TOR)(U). CINCPAC Instruction S3020.2 (series) concerned Command Relationships in the Pacific Command and was a collection of terms of reference for the various agencies with which CINCPAC had a TOR relationship. Each command's TOR was incorporated in an enclosure to the basic CINCPAC instruction, COMUS Japan's as enclosure 2.
2. J5622 HistSum Aug 81 (S), DECL 8 Sep 87.
3. Ibid.

Japanese on military matters relating to command, structure, command and control, and military interoperability.[1]

~~(S)~~ There were three major differences between the TOR and the proposed revision. The mission statement had read that COMUS Japan acted as CINCPAC's representative in Japan. The revision stipulated that COMUS Japan served as CINCPAC's subordinate unified commander in Japan. Earlier, COMUS Japan had been shown to have only one component command, the U.S. Army Japan. The revision designated Army, Navy, and Air Force components. COMUS Japan's old planning responsibilities had been to insure that U.S. Army plans were prepared in support of CINCPAC plans. The revision gave him responsibility for U.S. unilateral and bilateral planning with Japan.[2]

(U) Admiral Long approved the revised TOR on 19 August 1981.[3]

Terms of Reference for CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific

~~(C)~~ As noted in the 1980 History, a new naval officer billet was created in Suva, Fiji, to serve U.S. and CINCPAC interests in the newly emerging independent nations of the South Pacific. The first such representative, who was considered a member of the CINCPAC staff, became operational in Suva on 1 October 1980. Limited administrative support was provided by the Embassy, which also provided office space. The CINCPACREP was incorporated into the Fiji Country Team.[4]

(U) In 1981 Terms of Reference for the CINCPACREP were approved by Admiral Long and forwarded to all concerned on 14 March. His mission was to represent CINCPAC, as directed, in relations with Southwest Pacific island nations, U.S. governmental agencies, and civilian organizations in his area of responsibility. He was directly responsible to CINCPAC for the coordination of matters of joint concern involving U.S. personnel and organizations. His geographic-area of responsibility included the Solomons, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, Nauru, Fiji, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tonga, Vanuatu, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis, and Futuna. He was to keep CINCPAC informed of political and military matters that could have international implications or impact on the CINCPAC area of responsibility.[5]

(U) He was named U.S. Defense Representative for his area of responsibility and other areas as directed. He was also to carry out reponsibilities as Designated Commanding Officer for Fiji, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tonga, Vanuatu,

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1. COMUS Japan 010608Z May 81 (C), REVW 30 Apr 87.
2. J5622 HistSum Aug 81 (S), DECL 8 Sep 87.
3. Ibid.; CINCPACINST S3020.2H CH-6, Ser S85 of 9 Feb 82 (S), DECL 9 Dec 87, Subj: Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (U), Encl (2).
4. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 22-23.
5. J5614 HistSum Mar 81 (U); CINCPAC 140419Z Mar 81 (U).

French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis, and Futuna. He was to coordinate activities and interests, as appropriate, with U.S. Embassies in Fiji, Wellington, Canberra, and Port Moresby.[1]

~~(C)~~ On 15 July CINCPAC established quarterly reporting procedures for the CINCPACREP to provide a formal means of reviewing activities taking place in the area, both on-going and projected.[2]

Memorandum of Agreement SAC-PACAF-PACOM

(U) On 20 March 1981 Admiral Long signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Strategic Air Command and Pacific Air Forces that established a SAC Liaison Element in the PACOM, with an operating location at Headquarters PACAF, at Hickam Air Force Base. The Liaison Element was to be staffed with four officers (one O-6, one O-5, and two O-4s) and one enlisted administrative assistant. The agreement became effective 1 March 1981.[3]

(U) The SAC representatives were to perform liaison functions regarding strategic initiatives, forward basing, and force structure in the Pacific and in Southeast and Far East Asia. They were to assist in developing long-range contingency and general war plans, and they were advise CINCSAC on the status of CINCPAC planning that could involve commitment of SAC resources.[4]

Memorandum of Agreement CINCPAC-Defense Nuclear Agency

(U) On 24 November 1981 Admiral Long signed a Memorandum of Agreement between Headquarters PACOM and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). The agreement had been signed earlier by LT GEN Harry A. Griffith, USA, Director of the DNA, and established a DNA Liaison Element for the PACOM that would be staffed with at least a Navy commander and an administrative clerk provided by Headquarters DNA. The DNA representative would provide liaison to CINCPAC on all matters concerning PACOM Theater Nuclear Force modernization. The agreement was effective on 24 November.[5]

U.S. Defense Representative

(U) On 24 November the CINC of the U.S. European Command advised CINCPAC that he planned to assign the Commander of the Mid-East Force responsibility as

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1. Ibid.
2. J561 HistSum Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC 150113Z Jul 81 (C), DECL 7 Jul 87.
3. J5624 HistSum Feb 81 (U); Memorandum of Agreement, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command; Headquarters, Pacific Command; and Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces.
4. Ibid.
5. J5413 HistSum Nov 81 (U)

U.S. Defense Representative for Djibouti, if CINCPAC knew of no reason why the step should not be taken. COMIDEASTFOR had previously been assigned such responsibility for Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. COMIDEASTFOR was the CINCPAC Representative Indian Ocean. CINCPAC advised USCINCEUR that he concurred in assigning the additional U.S. Defense Representative responsibility to COMIDEASTFOR.[1]

Triennial Review of Grade and Service Authorizations for Security Assistance Agency Heads

(U) The chiefs or commanders of Security Assistance agencies in the PACOM were designated by grade and Service by the JCS, and that structure was subject to triennial review. In May 1981 the JCS directed that the unified commanders review those authorizations. CINCPAC reviewed the Country Team and component command inputs in preparation for submitting his recommendations to the JCS. There was only one recommended change from existing authorizations, upgrading the Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand, from the 06 to 07 level. Because there was an in-process transition in the Embassy's senior leadership, the Ambassador designate's concurrence was not then available. (Recommendations were contingent on Ambassadorial concurrence.) As a result, recommendations were forwarded with the Thai position to be commented on at a later date.[2]

(U) The component commands were in general agreement, with the following exceptions. CDRWESTCOM had suggested changing the Service of the Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation India from Air Force to Army. CINCPACAF had suggested delaying rotation of the Chief, Military Defense Assistance Office, Japan, from Air Force to Army for one more cycle. Also, CINCPACAF had suggested changing the Chief of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia to a rotational position between the Air Force and the Army.

(U) CINCPAC recommended no change to any of the existing authorizations with the grade level for Thailand deferred until Ambassadorial input was received. The submission to the JCS was as follows:[3]

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1. J5613 HistSum Dec 81 (U); USCINCEUR 240510Z Nov 81 (U); CINCPAC 040405Z Dec 81 (U).
2. J131 HistSum Sep 81 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser S514 (U) of 24 Sep 81, Subj: Authorization of Grade and Service Responsibility for Nominating Chiefs/Commanders of Security Assistance Activities/Organizations.
3. Ibid.

Position	Grade	Service Responsibility	
CHJUSMAG Korea	08	Army	Non-rotational
CHJUSMAG Philippines	07	Army	Non-rotational
CHJUSMAG Thailand	07	Army/Air Force	Rotational
CHUSDLG Indonesia	06	Army	Non-rotational
CHMDAO Japan	06	Air Force/Army/Navy	Rotational
CHODC India	05	Air Force	Non-rotational
ODR Pakistan	06	Air Force	Non-rotational

SECTION IV--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

Combined Forces Command

~~(S)~~ As noted in the 1980 History, several initiatives to improve command arrangements in Korea had been delayed because of the assassination of President Park and the politically turbulent transition which followed his death. The result of the political uncertainty was imposition by the JCS of a restriction on discussing these initiatives with the ROK Government until the air had cleared. During the same period, the United States watched carefully the outcome of the Kim Dae-jung matter. Kim was a long-time political opposition leader who had been tried and convicted on sedition charges and sentenced to death, a sentence the United States considered extreme. In January 1981 the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. At about the same time, martial law in the ROK was lifted.

~~(C)~~ In view of the improved political climate, CINCPAC on 24 January 1981 requested that the JCS lift restrictions they had imposed and permit the ROK Government to be informed of planned Combined Forces Command improvements. He also asked to proceed with the necessary bilateral actions necessary for accomplishing those improvements.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In a memorandum from the Director of the JCS Joint Staff to the Secretary of Defense on 27 February, the JCS said that CINCPAC and COMUS Korea had been advised of the lifting of the restriction and that the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Improvements Program was progressing in a very "satisfying" manner. The actions that required bilateral participation were being pursued. The JCS summarized the status of the various actions.[2]

(C) The improvements program had begun following the Twelfth Security Consultative Meeting in October 1979 at which the ROK Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed to seek ways to increase even further the responsibilities of the Combined Forces Command. The Secretary of Defense directed a review of options for closer peacetime and wartime integration of U.S. and Korean combat capability within the CFC structure, with an instruction to specifically examine command arrangements, including peacetime operational control of combat units. The CINCPAC recommendations had been forwarded to the JCS on 8 February 1980, the JCS provided their comments on each recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on 16 May, and on 23 October 1980 the Secretary had provided his decisions or comments. One of those decisions involved the role of the CFC Air Component Commander.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 242133Z Jan 81, REVW 24 Jan 87.
2. MJCS 35-81 of 27 Feb 81, DECL 24 Feb 87, Subj: ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)(U), which cited Memorandum by the Acting Under Secretary of Defense dated 29 Jan 81.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 48-58.

Air Component Command

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ As noted in the 1980 History, the Commander, Fifth Air Force (who was also COMUS Japan) had been designated to serve as the CFC wartime air component commander. He already commanded the Korea-based fighter units as well as the RF-4C and F-15 rotational detachments at Osan, and was knowledgeable of Korea OPLANs and immediately available in case of a contingency. The CFC planned to exercise the new air component command relationship, as described below, during Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 81 and continue its activities thereafter. The USAF supported 10 additional manpower spaces for the air component command staff.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In a personal message to Admiral Long and CINCPACAF early in 1981, COMUS Japan advised that he would discuss the concept with the U.S. Ambassador and selected Japanese officials and he foresaw no adverse reaction. They were familiar with his role as Commander of Fifth Air Force units in Korea, and he believed it should not be treated as a major change that might invite unnecessary and undesirable press editorial or public discussion. "U.S. organizational arrangements are often tough enough to comprehend in English," COMUS Japan said, "I don't relish trying to articulate them in Japanese."[2]

~~(S)~~ Command arrangements in and for Korea could be a complex matter. Prior to activation of the CFC, an Air Force lieutenant general (who was not in the PACAF chain of command) was the deputy CINC of the United Nations Command (UNC) and Deputy Commander for U.S. Forces Korea. An Air Force major general, who was Commander, 314th Air Division, was commander of the Air Component Command (ACC) for the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea. After activation of the CFC, the lieutenant general was additionally designated the Chief of Staff for the CFC and Air Component Commander for CFC/UNC/USFK. As a result of the CFC Improvements Study in 1980, the Secretary of Defense specified that an additional lieutenant general be designated as the wartime Commander of the Air Component Command (CACC) for the CFC. After designation of the Fifth Air Force Commander as the wartime CACC, the memorandum of understanding between CINCCFC and CINCPACAF had to be updated to include peacetime and wartime CACC functions and responsibilities. While the matter was under study, CINCPACAF had proposed to transfer all ACC functions from the lieutenant general to the major general. CINCCFC, however, only concurred in the transfer of the UNC/USFK ACC functions from the lieutenant general to the major general, and retained the CACC peacetime functions with the lieutenant general. The agreed upon relationships are outlined in the material that follows.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, p. 51.; HQ USAF 111515Z Dec 80 (S), DECL 8 Dec 86; MJCS 35-82 of 27 Feb 81 (S/NF), DECL 24 Feb 87, Subj: ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)(U).
2. CINCPAC 100350Z Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~(BOM), which retransmitted AFSSO 5AF/COMUSJAPAN 060330Z Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~(BOM), REVW 2 Jan 87.
3. J5623 HistSum Jun 81 (S), DECL 14 Apr 87.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ On 4 June 1981 a Memorandum of Understanding for Air Component Command command arrangements was completed by General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea, and LT GEN James D. Hughes, USAF, CINCPACAF. The memorandum was based upon directives from the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force Chief of Staff. In accordance with the memorandum, the Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces Command, a USAF lieutenant general, would wear three more "hats." He would serve also as Deputy CINC of the United Nations Command; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; and peacetime Commander of the Air Component Command of the Combined Forces Command. The Commander Fifth Air Force was the wartime Commander of the Air Component Command for the CFC.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ It was understood that peacetime and wartime CACC responsibilities and functions would be specified in the ROK-U.S. agreed upon CFC ACC Terms of Reference. In response to heightened tensions on the Peninsula, the wartime CACC would deploy to Korea to serve as CACC when requested by CINCCFC and in coordination with CINCPAC. Passage of command would be as directed by CINCCFC. In peacetime, the USAF lieutenant general in Korea (the CFC Chief of Staff) would serve as CACC to assure an appropriate level of combined staff seniority and day-to-day control of CFC ACC matters. In peacetime, the Commander, Fifth Air Force would normally perform as CACC, in Korea, during the employment phase of significant CFC exercises. The degree of participation would be mutually established by CINCCFC, CINCPAC, and CINCPACAF. CINCCFC had direct access to Commander, Fifth Air Force on CFC-related matters. The Fifth Air Force Commander had similar access to CINCCFC. Both peacetime and wartime CACCs would have direct access to CINCPACAF, and vice versa, keeping CINCCFC fully informed. Both peacetime and wartime CACCs would exercise direct coordination in a manner to achieve a positive and timely passage of command and insure continuity between peacetime planning and wartime operations. CINCPACAF, through Commander, 314th Air Division, would contribute to the ACC staff in accordance with U.S. JCS manpower authorizations.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A second part of the Memorandum of Understanding established the CINCUNC, CINCPACAF, and COMUS Korea agreement pertaining to the relationship of CINCUNC and his air component command, the CINCPACAF-Commander Fifth Air Force-Commander 314th Air Division relationship, and also the relationship of COMUS Korea to his air component command. (For purposes of the memorandum the USAF component commander was referred to as COMUSAFK.)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Commander, 314th Air Division was designated as COMUSAFK and as Commander, UNC Air Component Command (COMUNCAIRCOMP); as such he was responsible to CINCUNC-COMUS Korea in U.S. air component related matters. (The 314th Air Division staff would serve as the COMUSAFK and COMUNCAIRCOMP staffs.) He could conduct and coordinate USAF surveillance and reconnaissance as

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1. J5623 HistSum May 81 (S), DECL 19 Jun 87, which had as enclosure the Memorandum of Understanding for ACC Command Arrangements of 4 Jun 81.
2. Ibid.

directed by CINCPACAF in support of CINCUNC-COMUS Korea. He would represent CINCPACAF in negotiations and discussions with ROK and other U.S. agencies concerning activities or operations involving the USAF. Negotiations with ROK Government agencies were to be conducted with the advice and concurrence of COMUS Korea in other than routine/administrative Service-to-Service matters that did not impact on the war fighting mission.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Commander, 314th Air Division was to plan, coordinate, and conduct USAF exercise participation in joint and combined exercises in coordination with the CFC CACC. As Commander, Korea Air Defense Sector, the Commander, 314th Air Division would provide protection for peacetime aerial reconnaissance operations, conduct air defense activities concerning U.S. installations as directed by Commander Western Pacific North (COMWESTPACNORTH) Air Defense Region, who was also Commander, Fifth Air Force, and coordinate with the CACC for the support provided by CFC-assigned air defense forces. CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea would deliberate with one another for the purpose of reaching mutual agreement on all actions that significantly affected combat readiness and the capability of USAFK prior to implementation, and advise on significant USAF force programming issues that related to operational capabilities in Korea. CINCPACAF would advise COMUS Korea of operational readiness of USAF forces in Korea and those in WESTPAC that would be provided to COMUS Korea in the event of hostilities. This would include logistics sustainability issues or other activities that would impact on operational capabilities.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Finally, COMUSAFK would be responsive to, coordinate with, and support COMUS Korea in areas of mutual operational interest, such as development of Time-Phased Deployment Lists; augmentation force reception; staging, support, and operational planning; interface of transportation, logistics, and communications systems; the peacetime aerial reconnaissance program; search and rescue; airlift, and other such matters.[1]

(U) On 16 June CINCPAC informed COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, and CINCPACAF that he concurred in the Memorandum of Understanding (U).[2]

OPCON of Forces

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Another of the Secretary of Defense's 1980 decisions relating to the improvement of CFC capabilities was exploration of the possibilities of placing additional U.S. forces under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the CFC during peacetime. In 1979 COMUS Korea had discussed placing the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and the 314th Air Division under the peacetime OPCON of CINCCFC. He noted that when the CFC had been established the ROK had relinquished OPCON of virtually all of its combat forces to the binational headquarters. The United States had placed under the OPCON of the CFC only the 38th Air Defense Brigade (scheduled for withdrawal) and two USAF aircraft, when they were not

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 162229Z Jun 81 (U)(BOM).

committed to peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program duties. ROK military officials had noted the disparity. When the 38th Air Defense Brigade was inactivated (the last battalion to be disestablished in 1982), there would be no U.S. forces under the CFC on a full-time basis.[1]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC at the time said that the 2d Infantry Division was the only force in the PACOM that should be considered as a possible candidate for assignment to CFC's OPCON in peacetime. CINCPAC recommended that no additional U.S. forces be placed under the OPCON of the CFC,[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The subject was a matter of continuing comment by all involved during the first half of 1981, with much of the communication through "back channel" messages. In a February meeting with the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the ROK Minister of National Defense said that while great strides had been made since the inauguration of the CFC, he felt that the close working relationships would be complemented and improved by peacetime control of U.S. forces. He thought the CFC either had to be reorganized or control extended over certain operational units.[3]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In April the Minister of National Defense told COMUS Korea that the Korean people had to be shown that force commitments to the CFC were based on the principle of equality. That was what the summit meeting between President Reagan and President Chun Doo Hwan had been all about. He said that the 2d Division and the 314th Air Division should be OPCON in peacetime and he could not understand any of the complications that COMUS Korea said had to be considered. He had also advised COMUS Korea that there would never be a problem with a Korean acting in the temporary absence of the U.S. commander because the acting ROK commander would be required to clear operational orders with a U.S. officer in the chain of command.[4]

~~(S)~~ On 4 April CINCPAC advised the Army Chief of Staff (and COMUS Korea) that little had occurred to alter his view and that he did not support shifting OPCON of U.S. air and ground combat forces to the CFC in peacetime. The Admiral said, however, that there should be a look at shifting some reconnaissance assets to CFC OPCON and consider chopping (Change of Operational Control) 2d Division and 314th Air Division units at a specified time, such as the setting of U.S. DEFCON 2. (Defense Readiness Conditions ranged from a normal day-to-day military posture (DEFCON 5) to a full alert posture (DEFCON 1). Normal DEFCON posture for U.S. Forces in Korea because of tension on the Peninsula was DEFCON 4.)[5]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. I, p. 56.
2. Ibid., p. 57.
3. OSD 062239Z Feb 81 (~~C~~)(~~BOM~~), DECL 6 Feb 87.
4. SSO Korea 030700Z Apr 81 (~~S/NF~~)(BOM), REVW 2 Apr 87.
5. CINCPAC 042206Z Apr 82 (~~S~~)(~~BOM~~), DECL 4 Apr 87.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The JCS advised that although there were substantive policy differences on the matter, neither Service nor Joint Staff elements had identified any U.S. procedural or legislative impediments to possible OPCON. While there was no specific authority to pass OPCON of U.S. elements to multinational organizations, neither was there any prohibition.[1]

~~(S)~~ Prior to the Security Consultative Meeting held in California in late April, Admiral Long again provided his thoughts in a personal message to the Chairman and other members of the JCS, and to General Wickham. He again outlined his reservations about transferring OPCON. He recommended that a decision not be made until all factors involved had been carefully evaluated and that the U.S. delegation to the SCM should indicate that the matter was under review by the JCS. He believed we could be responsive to other Korean desires and not press faster than prudence would dictate on the complex OPCON issue.[2]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC reiterated his views to the Chairman on 17 April, but advised that if a fall-back position was in the best U.S. interests, we could consider an option leading to OPCON of the 2d Division and the 314th Air Division to CFC at U.S. DEFCON 2, as set by the National Command Authority. He had reservations about this, however, because of a lack of precise definition of terms.[3]

~~(S)~~ At the SCM meeting agreement was reached that CFC Operational Control of U.S. Forces in Korea should proceed to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the CFC. On 2 July the JCS directed that at U.S. DEFCON 3, OPCON of the 2d U.S. Infantry Division, and at DEFCON 2, OPCON of the 314th U.S. Air Division, would be transferred to the CINCCFC. Procedures governing those actions were implemented on 15 July. On 8 July CINCPAC directed that all holders of CINCPAC Instruction S3010.4L, the PACOM Alert System, implement the new OPCON procedures.[4]

~~(S/ROKUS)~~ On 8 September General Wickham delivered the notification letter to ROK Defense Minister Choo Yong Bok. He referenced the discussions between Minister Choo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger at the Thirteenth SCM. He said he was pleased to inform Minister Choo that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the following change in alert condition actions: at U.S. Defense Condition 3, operational control of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division would be transferred to the Commander in Chief, ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command. At U.S. Defense Condition 2, operational control of Commander, U.S. 314th Air Division and assigned U.S. Air Force combat forces would be transferred to the Commander in Chief, ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command. He concluded, "I am

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1. JCS 061905Z Apr 81 ~~(S/NF)(BOM)~~, REVW 6 Apr 87.
2. CINCPAC 100620Z Apr 81, DECL 9 Apr 87.
3. CINCPAC 170831Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 16 Apr 87.
4. CINCPAC 180351Z Jul 81 ~~(S)(BOM)~~, DECL 31 July 87 and 180201Z Jul 81 ~~(C)(BOM)~~.

confident that these actions will enhance the capability of the Combined Forces Command to respond quickly to acts of aggression, particularly in the critical initial hours of any renewed hostilities."[1]

~~(S)~~ Earlier, in preparation of the letter to Minister Choo, the subject of public release of the information was addressed. On 10 August CINCPAC advised that the proposed letter was to be classified Secret and that no public release of OPCON change was intended. He recommended to State and Defense Department officials and the Chairman of the JCS that General Wickham deal with any questions on the subject verbally with ROK officials. The Chairman replied that public disclosure should refer only to the transfer of OPCON to CINCCFC of "major US ground and air combat units during periods of increased tension." Such a statement should satisfy ROK desires for public disclosure without revealing the details of U.S. alert procedures. CINCPAC requested that General Wickham follow the Chairman's guidelines in his discussions with Minister Choo.[2]

~~(C)~~ The news release approved for use noted that there had been a modification of procedure for the operational control of major U.S. ground and air combat units in the ROK. Based on agreement at the SCM, the operational control of those combat units would be transferred to the CINCCFC when tensions increased in Korea. The modification upgraded the capability of the CFC to react more rapidly during the early phase of aggression, the release said. CINCPAC also provided some questions and answers that could be used. Asked if the modification would pass OPCON at an earlier stage than previously approved, the reply could be, "Yes." Asked about the two various stages, however, the answer was to be that as a matter of policy the Defense Department did not normally discuss Defense Readiness Conditions.[3]

~~(S)~~ In a related DEFCON issue, on 12 August CINCPAC advised his component and subordinate unified commands that, effective 1 September, CINCCFC had the authority short of declaring DEFCON 3, and prior to the transfer of OPCON of U.S. Forces to the CFC, to upgrade the readiness of U.S. Forces in the ROK by implementing selected readiness measures. A number of measures were outlined, such as increased early warning and intelligence collection efforts, activation of the crisis action system, and review of UNC/CFC Rules of Engagement.[4]

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1. SSO Korea 110713Z Sep 81 ~~(S/ROKUS)(BOM),~~ DECL 11 Sep 87.
2. CINCPAC 180351Z Jul 81 ~~(S)(BOM),~~ DECL 31 Jul 87; SSO DIA 101240Z Aug 81 ~~(S)(BOM),~~ DECL 10 Aug 81; JCS 221445Z Aug 81 ~~(S)(BOM),~~ REVW 17 Aug 87; CINCPAC 290056Z Aug 81 ~~(S)(BOM),~~ DECL 23 Aug 87.
3. COMUS Korea 110805Z Sep 81 (U); CINCPAC 122107Z Sep 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 10 Sep 87 or authorized public release.
4. CINCPAC 121853Z Aug 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 30 Aug 01 REAS 6.

CFC Improvement Study

(U) As mentioned earlier in this discussion, on 27 February the JCS provided a summary of the status of the various ROK-CFC improvements that had been the subject of much study in 1980.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The status summaries are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. The first two have already been addressed (designation of CFC Chief of Staff and OPCON of U.S. Forces). Next was a study of air and naval component staffs. The USAF staff had approved Terms of Reference developed by CINCPAC, PACAF, and COMUS Korea for the Air Component Command staff, and bilateral planning was proceeding. As noted above, the Air Force would support 10 additional manpower spaces. U.S. Navy manpower actions had been completed to establish two O5 billets on the Naval Component Command staff. Formal designation of the Commander Naval Forces Korea staff as dual-hatted to the Naval Component Command had been held in abeyance until the caveat against advising the ROK Government of the initiatives was lifted. No Terms of Reference were required for the Naval Component Command.[2]

(U) Regarding Operations Security training, the CFC had assigned a ROK Army O4 and a U.S. Army O5 to CFC OPSEC billets. The CFC had also developed monthly OPSEC orientation briefings for newly assigned personnel and distributed the OPSEC orientation briefing to the CFC component and subordinate commands. They planned still further expansion of the OPSEC effort.

~~(S)~~ Regarding nuclear exercises, the JCS noted that COMUS Korea's nuclear exercise play was limited to unilateral exercises only. In conjunction with CINCPAC, limited and regional nuclear objectives employment command post exercises were conducted semi-annually. Their purpose was to evaluate command and control, target analysis, and selective release to include ad hoc tasking, through the chain of command to the operational U.S. unit. The scope of exercise play was to increase through planned JCS sponsorship of similar exercises.

~~(S)~~ In February, the Chairman of the U.S. JCS extended an invitation to the Chairman of the ROK JCS to participate in a combined U.S.-ROK command post exercise called POTENT PUNCH. (See the Operations Chapter of this history for additional details.)

~~(S)~~ The CFC/USFK Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Master Plan would incorporate the Communications Security Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK), the Telecommunication Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK), and all applicable plans required to perform

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 50-56.
2. MJCS 35-81 of 27 Feb 81 ~~(S/NOFORN)~~, DECL 24 Feb 87, Subj: ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC)(U).

command and control within the ROK. Adjusted project completion had been revised to 1 April 1981. Implementation of CPICK and TPICK would continue as a separate action from the C3I Master Plan project. No additional communications requirements had been identified for prioritization beyond those already established in CPICK/TPICK and other CINCPAC coordinated plans.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ CINCPAC had requested uniform release guidance on War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA), to provide for a realistic determination of material requirements to be used in the development and management of ROK and U.S. war material requirements. The JCS advised that in assessing the request, they had determined the following:

- WRSA stocks for the ROK were retained by the respective responsible Services as U.S. War Reserve Material until transferred to the ROK under Foreign Military Sales procedures when authorized by Congress.

- Release of WRSA information was controlled by the respective Service's policies on disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments.

- Selected portions of classified military information relating to U.S. Army WRSA stored and maintained in ROK facilities had been released to the ROK, in accordance with established release procedures.

- When Air Force WRSA stocks were stored in Korean facilities, release of information necessary for maintenance of those stocks also would be controlled by the Air Force's disclosure policy.

- Air Force logistics policy, however, was to not release to the ROK Air Force WRSA information pertaining to the type, quantity, and location of authorized and on-hand WRSA because munitions in WRSA (for the ROK Air Force) might be required in other theaters.

- While WRSA requirements were not releasable, PACAF planning factors, adjusted for the ROK concept of operations/support, were releasable to the CFC to develop an air requirement package for defense of Korea and should satisfy the CINCPAC study objective for meaningful bilateral planning for development of War Reserve requirements.

- The management of WRSA stocks, however, remained fully in the purview of the respective Services, who were responsible for their U.S.-owned War Reserve stock programs of which WRSA was but a part.

(U) The JCS advised, therefore, that while certain Army WRSA stocks were committed essentially to defense of the ROK, Air Force WRSA were periodically recomputed on variable worldwide requirement overages, were highly transportable, and might be required in other theaters. It was not appropriate, therefore, the JCS said, for the Air Force to release WRSA stock information

as did the Army. Uniform guidance for release of such information, which would adequately protect Air Force programming flexibility, would necessarily be over-restrictive on release of Army WRSA information, and therefore was undesirable. PACAF planning factors could be made available to the CFC, however, as a basis for bilateral planning for development of War Reserve requirements.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the Theater Nuclear Force Study, the JCS noted that they had requested the assistance of the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Director of Net Assessment and advised the Under Secretary of Defense of intentions to address TNF requirements and improvements in the Pacific region.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Regarding intelligence disclosure policy, the JCS advised that the Defense Intelligence Agency had been supporting the ROK with intelligence through the CFC. All intelligence forwarded to the ROK by the DIA was coordinated with CINCPAC and forwarded to COMUS Korea (J-2) for release to the ROK. To assist in improving the flow of intelligence, the DIA, on an initiative basis, reviewed all intelligence on North Korea for release to the ROK. The following areas were considered for release: air, ground, naval, and missile order of battle data; Table of Organization and Equipment; the Automated Installation File; electronic warfare data; indications and warning intelligence; all hard copy documents produced on North Korea; and current intelligence sent out daily on items of interest in the CINCPAC area. The DIA had requested that the Services perform a similar review of all intelligence products on North Korea. Also, CINCPAC chaired an annual Foreign Disclosure Workshop in Seoul that was used for the purpose of discussing foreign disclosure problems in Korea and elsewhere in the PACOM. The DIA co-chaired the workshop. DIA initiatives were also underway to expedite and facilitate release of sensitive compartmented imagery-derived data on North Korea to the ROK.

~~(S)~~ The JCS outlined a COMUS Korea assessment of the adequacy of rear area security. Upgrading of the system continued through bilateral efforts. While progress was being made, much remained to be accomplished. Efforts continued to further develop U.S. installation and ROK rear area security unit coordination procedures using both liaison personnel and improved communications techniques. If rear area security forces were to neutralize North Korean ranger commando operations and accomplish base protection missions, there had to be qualitative and quantitative improvements in weaponry and supporting equipment. Units being tasked to perform those missions were the homeland defense and reserve forces that were lightly armed; possessed little in the way of communications, transportation, or basic supply assets; and trained only a few hours on a quarterly basis.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In the matter of tactical air support coordination, there were language problems between ROK controllers and U.S. tactical air augmenting forces, and interoperability problems with tactical secure voice equipment. Several programs had been designed to increase the effectiveness of tactical

air operations in Korea while minimizing employment problems such as the transition into the Korean Tactical Air Control System. For example, tactical air forces actively participated in exercises and deployment within the area. The National Security Agency had advised, however, that the VINSON tactical secure voice equipment (the system that would be used on our most modern aircraft) was not releasable to the ROK. Consequently, direction and control of tactical aircraft would be difficult and work-arounds would have to be identified.

~~(C)~~ A number of additional initiatives were listed. CINCPAC had requested and the JCS approved seven additional USAF billets to add senior air expertise to the CFC/USFK staffs in FY 81-83. The CFC assessment and improvement program, called Project SORAK and addressed in some detail below, continued early in the year. The JCS and the Services would be advised of the results of each phase and any redirection provided by the study steering group.[1]

Project SORAK

~~(S)~~ Project SORAK was a study by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a Combined Forces Command assessment and improvement program that had begun in 1980. (The name was not an acronym, but the name of a prominent mountain peak in the Republic of Korea.) Three contractors were involved, the Santa Fe Corp., the System Planning Corp., and BDM. The contractor effort was coordinated by a steering group with CINCPAC, DARPA, and COMUS Korea membership, and chaired by COMUS Korea. Additionally, there was a North Asia Assessment Group which would provide the expertise of appropriate Government laboratory and agency representatives.[2]

~~(S)~~ In December 1980 the project director and the DARPA representative had recommended that the steering group support accelerated development of several systems to enhance CFC effectiveness, and demonstrate several of those systems in Korea. The various systems were specified in a message from COMUS Korea on 8 January 1981, and CINCPAC support for the recommendations was passed to DARPA on 10 January.[3]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ By May it had become apparent that funds would not be available as had been hoped. Funds for Project SORAK had not been included in FY 81 supplemental funding; however, they had been specifically excluded from the bill "without prejudice" by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.[4]

~~(C)~~ On 19 June CINCPAC advised the JCS that the loss of FY 81 supplemental funding was unfortunate. It would delay the on-site demonstration of equipment

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, p. 47.
3. J5133 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 28 Feb 87; CINCPAC 100323Z Jan 81 (U).
4. OSD 042003Z Jun 81 ~~(C)(BOM)~~, DECL 1 Jun 87.

that had the potential for solving some of the defense shortfalls in Korea, particularly in the indications and warning area. CINCPAC believed actions should be initiated to inform appropriate Defense and Congressional officials about the objectives, progress, and potential positive impact of the SORAK study. He advised that both he and COMUS Korea strongly supported the study in that it had the potential to focus the long-needed attention of Washington on the critical needs of the forces in Korea. Study efforts had already vividly illustrated the North Korean-ROK force imbalance in favor of the North, and recommendations had been made concerning near-term improvements to redress the shortcomings. Those recommendations had not only addressed the equipment to be demonstrated, but also badly needed ROK force improvements, such as additional field artillery battalions and hard-structure munition procurement. Study efforts by this time were focusing on long-term improvements necessary to solve additional problems. CINCPAC believed, however, that attempts to fund a portion of the SORAK initiatives through the ROK Government should not be pursued at that time.[1]

~~(S)~~ While the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering had hoped to assure funding of $42 million in the FY 82 budget, that amount was reduced to $5 million. The House-Senate conference had stated that this was for program management activities in Project SORAK, a "Korean equipment upgrade." The conference had said that before this major new initiative was undertaken, however, complete plans, schedules, and life cycle costs must be provided as well as the terms of any host nation funding agreement. In addition, while the demonstration was largely drawn from DARPA developed technology and DARPA therefore should play a major role, the demonstration was more properly a joint Army and Air Force project requiring close coordination with Commander in Chief Pacific, and the Services should be active participants.[2]

~~(S)~~ On 23 December the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering provided a new description of the project and new cost projection. He described it as a demonstration of conventional technology that DARPA planned to conduct in the ROK. It would be fully funded by DARPA, but the ROK was expected to provide troops, weapons, and analysis in support of the demonstration. The senior ROK officials who had been briefed had shown strong interest and indicated they would be able to provide support.

~~(S)~~ He further described the program as designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of DARPA-developed technologies in performing advanced intelligence, surveillance, early warning, and battle management functions in the western sector of the ROK. He proposed funding of $5 million in FY 82, $35 million in FY 83, another $35 million in FY 84, and $10 million in FY 85.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 190256Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 Jun 87. (Most of the message traffic on the subject throughout the year was BOM.)
2. OSD 232120Z Dec 81 ~~(S)(BOM)~~, DECL 23 Dec 87.
3. Ibid.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC was preparing a reply at the end of the year. On 30 December COMUS Korea had provided his thoughts to CINCPAC. He fully concurred in the revised description of the project, and urged that DARPA correct the misleading description contained in the House-Senate conference report. It was not merely a "Korean equipment upgrade," but a demonstration of DARPA technologies that would have worldwide application. He fully expected the ROK to provide troops, weapons, and analysis as required to participate in and support the demonstration. He thought the only foreign affairs implication foreseen would flow from any future effort to request ROK funding for demonstrations that were not directly associated with their participation.[1]

Thailand

~~(S)~~ Early in 1980 the Thai Prime Minister had mentioned Thailand as a possible base of operations. In a related matter, the Air Force had recommended that the JCS investigate the political feasibility of operating B-52s from U-Tapao. The JCS had asked CINCPAC for his views. CINCPAC said he supported initiatives that would permit greater utilization or enhancement of the capabilities of forces assigned to, or stationed in, the PACOM. He supported the concept of B-52 staging operations from U-Tapao to support Indian Ocean operations. He recommended, however, a gradual phased approach, using P-3 and MAC flights prior to the initiation of KC-135 and then B-52 operations in order to permit an assessment of Thai public attitudes at each stage. A State Department official noted that the matter was a question with broad strategic and international relations implications, as reacquiring base rights in Thailand would also have immediate impact on the regional political situation in Southeast Asia as well as the political situation in Thailand. CINCPAC replied that he recognized that there were important policy considerations that would come into play with U.S. military use of U-Tapao or other facilities in Thailand beyond the activity that was already taking place at Don Muang Airfield. What he would like to see developed, he said, was assured access to an air facility like U-Tapao in the event we needed it on very short notice to support a contingency in the Indian Ocean area. CINCSAC endorsed the CINCPAC proposal.[2]

(U) U-Tapao had been a major U.S. facility in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. SAC B-52s had begun flying strategic bombing missions from U-Tapao over Vietnam in April 1967. With the bombing halt in August 1973 they had flown 250,000 flying hours of the ARC LIGHT missions out of U-Tapao. After the U.S. forces withdrew from Thailand in mid-1976, the Royal Thai Navy had used the airfield to support primarily S-2 and helicopter operations.[3]

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1. COMUS Korea 300710Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 58-60.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 118-119; CINCPAC 052016Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 3 Jun 87.

~~(S)~~ In response to a CINCPAC request, the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand inspected U-Tapao on 16 September 1980. They found the general condition of the key facilities "good." They recommended follow-on inspections by functional experts before any firm decisions were made. The recommended order of priority was POL, the liquid oxygen plant, demineralized water plant, and civil engineering/electrical power. Another inspection was made by SAC in response to a PACAF request. SAC sent an engineer to Thailand to inspect and evaluate fuel facilities at U-Tapao and ocean tanker facilities at Sattahip/Samaesan. The detailed inspection report (called the Nettlemen report) recommended that only one of three concepts could be supported within 60 to 90 days; that was a "show of force" of four to eight B-52s.[1]

~~(S)~~ Throughout the later part of 1980 discussion of use of the airfield continued, with CINCPAC, CINCSAC, the JCS, and the Secretary of Defense supporting the U-Tapao initiative. In February 1981 the Secretary of State directed U.S. Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz to request access from the Thai Prime Minister.[2]

~~(S)~~ On 27 March 1981 the U.S. Ambassador in Thailand advised that the Thai government had requested that a substantial part of the U.S. military air traffic then transiting Don Muang be rerouted through U-Tapao in order to relieve air traffic congestion to be caused by construction later in the year. They asked that this be done quietly and without fanfare or announcement on the part of the United States. The Ambassador cautioned that this was very important because the matter could be totally misinterpreted in Thailand. The Ambassador said that he intended to ask initially that all P-3 flights, as well as other selected flights, make their in-transit stops at U-Tapao. Eventually, as cargo handling facilities were improved, this might be extended to all but the scheduled C-130 MAC channel flights. The Ambassador also provided a rough concept of operations and a request for U.S. assistance in repairing U-Tapao refueling trucks.[3]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC concurred with the outline of concepts and agreed that P-3 operations could be shifted during the last half of April. He also responded that technicians and parts to repair the R-5 refueling trucks were available from Clark Air Base in the Philippines.[4]

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1. J454 HistSum Sep 80 ~~(S)~~; CHJUSMAGTHAI 181221Z Sep 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 18 Sep 86; J4/Memo/S771-80 of 24 Sep 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 22 Sep 86, Subj: Facilities Requirements at U-Tapao (U); SAC ltr ~~(S)~~, 24 Feb 81, DECL 13 Nov 86, Subj: Trip Report (U).
2. J5323 HistSum May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 9 Jun 87; SECSTATE 043679/260153Z Feb 81 ~~(S)~~ (EX), XDS 1 2/25/11.
3. J5323 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 Apr 87; AMEMB Bangkok 16658/271001Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, GDS 3/27/87.
4. J5323 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 Apr 87.

~~(S)~~ The first P-3 arrived at U-Tapao on 26 April and spent two nights. Everything went smoothly. The Thais cooperated completely. There was no press play and it did not appear that the public was knowledgeable of the switch of flights.[1]

~~(S)~~ The subject was still very closely held in both Thailand and the United States. Public affairs guidance had been approved by Washington agencies and the Thai foreign minister. No information was to be volunteered. In response to questions, the replies would be that the United States had been allowed to use U-Tapao from time to time for some years to support joint Thai-U.S. naval exercises in the Sattahip area and U.S. Navy ship visits to Sattahip and Pattaya, and as an alternate airport to Don Muang for some transit flights. At Thai request, the rest and refueling stops for military aircraft transiting Thailand were being shifted from Don Muang to U-Tapao. Some flights unloading cargo for the Bangkok area would continue to use Don Muang. There had been several P-3 and cargo flights per week. Regarding the condition of U-Tapao, the airfield had been used by the Thai government as a military facility and as an alternate airport for international airliners. The basic facilities were in good shape, and the required services were available from the Royal Thai Navy, which operated the base. No U.S. military ground crews would be stationed at U-Tapao, and no U.S. planes based there.[2]

~~(S)~~ As a first step toward a survey of U-Tapao, CINCPAC requested views on the survey team's composition, timing, and items of interest from MAC and SAC as well as his Air Force and Navy component commands. A conference was held at CINCPAC's headquarters from 27 to 29 March to develop Terms of Reference for the team. The Ambassador in Thailand requested that the team be divided up, if possible, to keep U.S. presence down.[3]

~~(S)~~ A CINCPAC Plans Directorate staff officer served as executive agent and team chief for the 13-man survey group, which visited Bangkok from 26 July to 7 August. The team arrived and departed incrementally, as the Ambassador had requested. Their mission was to assess the condition and capability of the airfield and supporting facilities to support P-3, C-130, and C-141 aircraft operations in the near-term and the eventual capability to support tanker, tactical air, wide body aircraft, and B-52 contingency operations. The site survey was to focus on improvements necessary to bring the facility to full operational readiness in order to accommodate on-going and future U.S. operations. The team members were made well aware of the sensitivity of U.S.

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 20683 of 28 April, which was retransmitted as SECSTATE 111157/300654Z Apr 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~, RDS-3 4/27/01.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 20705/281000Z Apr 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~, RDS-3 04/28/01.
3. J5323 HistSum May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 9 Jun 87; CINCPAC 022202Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 29 Apr 87; AMEMB Bangkok 20706/281002Z Apr 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~, RDS-3 04/27/01.

access and were cautioned that no mention was to be made to Thai personnel of possible future uses beyond on-going USN and MAC operations.[1]

~~(S)~~ On 11 October CINCPAC advised the Chairman and the other members of the JCS, and his Air Force and Navy component commanders of the completion of the survey. He said that the survey reinforced his opinion that U-Tapao had high potential for support of significant contingency operations. Prior to any increase over the on-going operational tempo, however, problems with POL, insufficient ground and material-handling equipment, transportation, security, C3, and billeting had to be resolved. The local political climate regarding increased U.S. access as well as Thai plans for upgrading U-Tapao for their own increased utilization were also factors that had to be considered. The upgrading of facilities at Diego Garcia would enhance our ability to respond to Southeast and Southwest Asia contingencies, but even then could not support all envisioned operations.[2]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC recommended that initiatives be taken "now" to gain access and to program resources for the upgrade of U-Tapao to support the entire range of options, but it should be noted that any discussion of B-52 employment at U-Tapao was still a very sensitive subject and should continue to be closely held.[3]

~~(C)~~ Some comment against any revival of U.S. military presence surfaced in the Thai press in October. One article implied that Thailand was moving too close to the United States and that increased U.S. involvement, paralleling the assignment of Ambassador Dean, could move the country "back to the dictatorship of the past" if not carefully watched. An Embassy officer noted that the media treatment reflected latent Thai sensitivities to a more expansive U.S. role. Memories of unpleasant aspects of U.S.-Thai relationships during the Vietnam era remained strong, he said, and would continue to influence the Government's approach to dealing with the United States.[4]

~~(S)~~ On 6 November CINCPACAF provided his comments in Air Force channels. He advised that although guidance indicated that further planning for the

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1. CINCPAC 052016Z Jun 81 (S), DECL 3 Jun 87; CINCPAC 270137Z Jun 81 (S), DECL 25 Jun 87.
2. CINCPAC 110807Z Oct 81 (S), REVW 8 Oct 01.
3. Ibid.
4. AMEMB Bangkok 47653/151162Z Oct 81 (C), GDS 10/14/87. Ambassador John Gunther Dean had served in various Embassy posts in Southeast Asia. Prior to being appointed Ambassador to Cambodia from 1974 to 1975, he had served in other Embassy positions in Saigon 1953-56, in Laos 1956-58, as Regional Director of Civil Operations and Rural Development in Central Vietnam 1970-72, and Deputy Chief of Mission in Laos 1972-74. On 12 April 1975, with a folded American flag under his arm, Ambassador Dean left Cambodia in the last helicopter, just before extraction of the Marine landing force sent to execute Operation EAGLE PULL.

Strategic Projection Force did not involve U-Tapao, there were other contingency reasons for upgrading "this outstanding facility." He listed support of Thailand in a contingency, a peacetime show of resolve for U.S. support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a logistics throughput base for Southwest Asia/Indian Ocean operations and contingencies, as a back-up throughput base for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force vice Atlantic-only routing, and as a viable alternative to Clark Air Base (that is, it was closer to likely contingency operations).[1]

~~(S)~~ Initiatives gathered momentum later in the year. With the concurrence of the State and Defense Departments, the Ambassador, and the JCS, plans were formulated to gradually increase the tempo of U.S. aircraft transits through U-Tapao, although expanded operations for ASW and ocean surveillance had not been approved by the end of the year.[2]

Refueling Support

~~(S)~~ As noted in the discussion above, one of the early requirements prior to use of U-Tapao for transit was for fuel truck repair. The two technicians from Clark Air Base, one an R-5 refueling operator and the other an R-5 maintenance technician, had been scheduled to depart on 1 April, but an attempted coup d'etat in Thailand caused CINCPAC to hold the action in abeyance for a while. (The coup was unsuccessful; Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon remained in power.)[3]

~~(S)~~ The USAF had advised they would assume support responsibility for providing 700,000 liters of fuel for U.S. requirements in Thailand and that CINCPACAF would assume responsibility for purchasing the fuel and monitoring support provided to transiting aircraft. CINCPAC, therefore, designated CINCPACAF as the executive agent for CINCPAC for the purpose of negotiation and conclusion of a memorandum of understanding necessary to insure adequate refueling support for U.S. aircraft.[4]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In April CINCPACAF had provided one temporary duty fuel vehicle maintenance technician to rehabilitate and maintain the two refueling trucks at U-Tapao. In June CHJUSMAGTHAI, with Embassy concurrence, recommended a permanent change of station billet be established for one year to replace the temporary duty operation. On 20 October CINCPAC advised the Ambassador that he

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1. HQ PACAF 062030Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~; REVW 31 Oct 87.
2. J5323 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 4 Jan 88; SECSTATE 309340/210203Z Nov 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~, XGDS-1 11/20/01; AMEMB Bangkok 54982 ~~(S)(EX)~~, XGDS-1 11/20/01, which was retransmitted as SECSTATE 260915Z Nov 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~; CINCPAC 110257Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~; DECL 10 Dec 87.
3. J5323 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S)~~; DECL 7 Apr 87; CINCPAC 012032Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 1 Apr 87.
4. CINCPAC 240342Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~; DECL 19 Jun 87.

wanted to task PACAF to establish such a one-man unit in Bangkok with duty station at U-Tapao. As introducing non-Security Assistance manpower into Thailand was a sensitive issue, he wanted to be sure the Ambassador was personally aware of the proposal and agreed. Ambassador Dean concurred in the establishment of the position with the understanding that the technician be placed under the sole Operational Control of the JUSMAG. The billet was to be established for a period of one year and further renewal would require the Ambassador's approval. The technician would be supervised and receive guidance exclusively from the JUSMAG, and would have no direct links to PACAF. The existing ground rules remained in effect: there would be no visits to U-Tapao by military personnel, including PACAF, unless specifically authorized by the Mission. The Ambassador said the reintroduction of American military personnel not linked to the Security Assistance program was a highly sensitive issue. He believed the Thais should be encouraged to the maximum to operate, support, and service the equipment, as well as upgrade facilities, and U.S. manpower involvement should be kept to the minimum.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ CINCPAC next informed the Chairman of the JCS, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and principals in the State and Defense Departments about his plans for the PCS billet. The JCS advised that they concurred with the need to provide vehicle maintenance support and suggested that CINCPAC consider retaining the technician in the Third Tactical Fighter Wing at Clark, with a classified duty location of U-Tapao. Orders delineating the change in duty location should include a statement that he was under Operational Control and Administrative Control of the Chief of the Air Force Section, JUSMAGTHAI.[2]

Increased Access to Indian Ocean/Southwest Asia Littoral Bases

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's area of responsibility included the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east longitude, including the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden. The western land boundary was at the Afghanistan-Iran border. Use of military facilities in other countries in Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa by PACOM forces was increasing, however, and CINCPAC was involved in planning for access to some such facilities.[3]

~~(S)~~ In May the JCS provided for comment a study of facility requirements in support of U.S. strategy in Southwest Asia. CINCPAC requested and received inputs from his component commanders, which were considered for his reply to the JCS. That reply, on 12 June concurred with the direction and objectives of the paper. CINCPAC fully supported the long-term goal of achieving a permanent presence in the area and concurred that Diego Garcia should remain the primary

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1. CINCPAC 202350Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 10 Oct 87; AMEMB Bangkok 48878/221206Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-3 10/22/01.
2. CINCPAC 281927Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 16 Oct 87; JCS 152200Z Dec 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~, DECL 7 Dec 87.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, p. 33.

supporting location for the Near Term Pre-positioned Ships, particularly in view of the vulnerability of those ships in other regional locations. CINCPAC also concurred that facility requirements and priorities for Southwest Asia should be reviewed on a continuing basis. He then provided specific comments on individual recommendations or conclusions in the study.[1]

Oman

~~(S)~~ The possible use of a new Omani naval base (Wudam Al-Alwa) came under study in 1981. In July the Embassy in Muscat advised that plans were progressing for construction of the new base at a point about 60 miles up the Batinah coast from Seeb Airport, halfway between the towns of Al-Musanaia and As-Suwayh. These plans called for building breakwaters out from the flat, sandy coast. Cost had been variously estimated at between $206 million and $290 million (U.S). It was possible that the harbor might be constructed to allow for future expansion and deepening, thus giving Oman the possibility of offering the facilities to deeper draft ships of other navies, which would be a departure from previous practice. It was recalled that when the Omanis had eventually agreed during access negotiations to U.S. use of Mutrah port, they had been reluctant to do so because of the port's high visibility (as it was in the center of the capital area). The planned new naval base, which would include an airstrip to accommodate C-130 size aircraft, was purposely located far from a populated area. At the same time, it would be linked by a good road to Seeb Airport and the main military complex.[2]

~~(S)~~ On 10 August CINCPAC provided his thoughts to the JCS. He said the possible new facility could be "extremely valuable" to USN operations and U.S. access should be actively sought. He proposed that the Omani Government should be approached to determine the extent to which it was willing to allow the United States to participate in use of the facility. As a site for emergency repairs, upkeep, Mobile Logistics Support Force operations, or as a tender site, the new facility would add considerably to our readiness, sustainability, and flexibility. Modification would be necessary, however, if the base were to have any significant value for use by U.S. forces.[3]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC said he realized that the proposal had to be approached cautiously, given past dealings with the Omani Government and its preference for low visibility U.S. presence. Additionally, dredging and breakwater costs might prove prohibitively high. Nevertheless, U.S. access to the naval

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1. J5613 HistSum Jun 81 (S), DECL 6 Jul 87; CINCPAC 121839Z Jun 81 ~~(S), DECL~~ 10 Jun 87, which also referenced CINCPAC 031951Z Jun 81 ~~(S), DECL~~ 3 Jun 87, which was concerned with planning responsibility for land-based communications in the Southwest Asia region.
2. AMEMB Muscat 2912/111145Z Jul 81 ~~(S), RDS-3~~ 7/10/91.
3. CINCPAC 102320Z Aug 81 ~~(S), DECL~~ 5 Aug 87.

facility with appropriate improvements would offer advantages "not now enjoyed in the Arabian Sea region."[1]

~~(S)~~ A short time later CINCPAC provided his view of specific requirements for potential uses in detail. Requirements were listed for varying harbor uses, and he listed a composite of desired capability at the naval facility and airfield, such as harbor depth and entry channel width, bunkering capability, pier space, and airfield upgrading.[2]

~~(S)~~ On 16 December the State Department outlined requirements for the Wudam project to the Embassy in Muscat, noting that the costs associated with such an expansion could range upwards of $600 million. They said it was too early to assess actual requirements. Also, the Navy's position to Congress had been to support improvements to facilities in use rather than entering into construction of new facilities, so a major Congressional review could be expected. The Department asked for the Embassy's views on the Oman Government's receptivity should the United States decide to broach U.S. access to Wudam. Care was to be taken to indicate that U.S. interest was solely exploratory.[3]

~~(S)~~ On 23 December the Embassy provided a preliminary response, which restated previous Omani interest, but cautioned that once committed, U.S. credibility would be on the line.[4]

~~(S)~~ In an unrelated matter concerning Oman, late in December 1980 the Embassy in Muscat had provided the Omani text of a U.S.-Omani agreement on naval and intelligence cooperation. CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to comment on the suitability of the text, and CINCPACFLT concurred in principle. No further CINCPAC action was required.[5]

Sudan

~~(C)~~ The JCS invited CINCPAC to be represented on a survey team that was to visit various locations in Sudan to determine if facilities might be useful to the U.S. military. CINCPAC declined, but requested that the headquarters be kept apprised of the survey results.[6]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 120639Z Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 3 Aug 87.
3. SECSTATE 332154/161522Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-3 12/09/01, which was transmitted to CINCPAC by CINCPACFLT 180427Z Dec 81.
4. J5613 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 Jan 88; AMEMB Muscat 9700/230730Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-3, 12/22/01.
5. J5613 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 15 Jan 87; AMEMB Muscat 7755/220600Z Dec 80 ~~(S)~~(EX), RDS-1, 12/22/00, which was retransmitted as JCS 151434Z Jan 81; CINCPACFLT 210001Z Jan 81, REVW 15 Jan 87.
6. J561 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 Sep 87.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) The CINCPAC Command History for 1968 first addressed the status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and possible U.S. land use requirements there. Thus, for many years the status of negotiations regarding the political future of the territory had been of interest to CINCPAC. The TTPI had been assigned to the United States in trusteeship in 1946 just after World War II. This trusteeship agreement was the last of the 11 trusteeships established after the war. Support facilities in the area could serve as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in the PACOM. The United States and the Northern Marianas had signed a covenant in 1975 to form the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas at such time as the trusteeship agreement was terminated. For other islands, negotiations were still in progress. The island groups had become fragmented and had become separate entities, i.e., Palau; the Marshall Islands; and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), which consisted of Kosrae, Yap, Truk, and Ponape.[1]

(U) Negotiations centered around a Compact of Free Association and subsidiary agreements. When conditions were acceptable to the negotiators they would subsequently have to be presented to the voters of Micronesia for approval by plebiscite, and then submitted to the U.S. Congress as a joint resolution for enactment into law. The United States would also have to decide in what form to present the completed arrangements to the United Nations and how, formally, to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. The Free Association status that the Micronesian entities had chosen had no exact precedent in U.S. constitutional practice of international law. The autonomy the Micronesian states would exercise exceeded that of U.S. Territories, while defense authority in the freely associated states was broad ranging and of a different nature than treaty relationships with even the closest American allies.[2]

(U) The 1981 round of talks was held at Kaanapali, on the Island of Maui, Hawaii, from 3 to 9 October. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Under Secretary of State William Buckley initially, and after his departure by a representative of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations. The Presidents of the Marshall Islands and FSM attended as did the Vice President of Palau. Three CINCPAC staff officers monitored the meetings, as much of the negotiation concerned military use rights and related matters.

~~(C)~~ At the opening session all delegations supported timely ending of the trusteeship in the context of Free Association with the United States, based on previously initialed compact and subsidiary agreements. The U.S. delegation assured the Micronesians of previously agreed levels of financial support in the compact, but stressed that the Administration would support no increases in compact funding. (This was the first session under the Reagan Administration.)

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 60-64.
2. Ibid.

In multilateral sessions the subjects of extradition, postal services, the Status of Forces Agreement, and the budget process under the compact were discussed. In bilateral talks with the Marshalls the subjects examined included interim use of the Kwajalein Missile Range (discussed below), nuclear claims, and military use and operating rights. Some of the sessions were intended to set the framework for further negotiation in Washington of subsidiary agreement on Federal programs and services.[1]

(U) A Honolulu newspaper journalist contrasted the October 1981 talks with those held in October 1971. Earlier, he said, the talks had been underway for two years and the Islanders were talking tough; unless America agreed to a new status called Free Association, they might pursue independence. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. went along and a breakthough was hailed, with talk of ending the trusteeship by 1975. In 1981, however, all still agreed on Free Association, but the United States was talking tough. "No more funds beyond that already agreed upon, and longer sole military rights to the area," the journalist said, was "their bottom line." He concluded that no one was talking breakthough and few were willing to publicly guess when the trusteeship might end.[2]

(U) On 1 December President Reagan named Honolulu businessman Fred M. Zeder, II, to be his Personal Representative in the continuing status negotiations, to succeed Peter R. Rosenblatt. Mr. Zeder would be nominated for the rank of Ambassador while serving in this capacity.[3]

Kwajalein Missile Range

~~(C)~~ The Kwajalein Missile Range interim land use agreement expired on 30 September 1981. There were a number of islands leased by the U.S. Government in the Kwajalein Atoll; the islands and lagoon provided an impact area and instrumentation and support facilities for this portion of the Pacific Missile Range. Inert warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from Vandenberg AFB, California, impacted in the Kwajalein lagoon. In 1979, there had been a "sail-in," in which some disgruntled islanders occupied several islets, mostly with women and children. They were land owners who were protesting lease terms and other matters. An agreement was finally signed later in 1979, to be renegotiated each year until the trusteeship was terminated.[4]

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1. J5614 HistSum Oct 81 (U); CINCPAC 071132Z Oct 81 (C), REVW 6 Oct 87, 082335Z Oct 81 (C), REVW 8 Oct 87; 110803Z Oct 81 (C), DECL 10 Oct 87, and 080135Z Oct 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC 090459Z Oct 81 (U).
3. SECSTATE 319655/022210Z Dec 81 (U).
4. CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 53-54.

(U) At the status negotiation meetings on Maui in October, a six-month extension was agreed to by President Amata Kabua of the Marshall Islands and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The interim use agreement was finally initialed on 15 December. It was to be in effect from 1 October 1981 to 30 September 1982, or until the entry into force between the two governments of the Compact of Free Association, whichever came first. It could be extended if necessary.[1]

(U) The President of the Marshalls also provided a draft of a letter agreeing to a 30-year military use and operating rights agreement to be concluded under the compact, with the provision for extension of that agreement for an additional 20 years, upon prior request by the Government of the United States and subject to mutually agreed terms.[2]

~~(C)~~ Negotiation of precise language was expected to take place in January 1982.

U.S. Flag Carrier Service in Micronesia

(U) On 5 September Admiral Long requested the support of the Chairman of the JCS regarding the continuation of U.S. flag carrier services in Micronesia. The approval of a pending merger of the airline serving Micronesia (Continental/Air Micronesia) and another carrier (Texas International Airways) could mean the loss of such U.S. services in Micronesia. The existing carrier provided the only commercial air link between U.S. military installations in Guam, Kwajalein, and Johnston Island, and was one of two U.S. flag air links between Japan and Micronesia. The existing arrangement effectively kept this important area from reverting to the foreign flag carrier dominance that existed prior to Continental's entry into that market. Those air services contributed to the accomplishment of U.S. defense activities in the PACOM. The board's approval of the proposed merger was before the President at the time for a decision.[3]

(U) On 17 October the State Department reported that the President had advised the Civil Aeronautics Board that he would approve the board's decision providing for the merger of the two airlines. The President's letter notifying the board, however, said that he was aware that many had expressed concern about future levels of air service to the Pacific Islands, including those within the TTPI. The President reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the economic development of the TTPI, and recognized the importance of commercial air service to that development. In that regard, the board's decision approving the acquisition included safeguards designed to prevent unilateral reduction of air service to the islands. The President additionally

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1. CINCPAC 160602Z Dec 81 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J561 HistSum Sep 81 (U); CINCPAC 050133Z Sep 81 (U).

encouraged interested Executive Departments to develop, as appropriate, additional safeguards to insure that the TTPI continued to receive adequate air service.[1]

Military Civil Action Teams

(U) For many years there had been a program in which Military Civil Action Teams managed by CINCPAC worked in various parts of the Trust Territory. They were small (9 to 13 men) engineering teams who worked on small-scale construction tasks such as road-building or improvements, small building construction, etc. The program was funded jointly by the TTPI Government and the Defense Department and provided a military presence that had been helpful and well received.[2]

(U) CINCPAC provided his annual assessment of the program to the JCS on 1 August. He said the importance of the program in Micronesia could not be overemphasized if the U.S. Government was to maintain its strategic interest and deny the use of Micronesia to foreign powers. The maintenance of a military presence and the positive goodwill that had already been established by the teams strongly supported the interests and objectives of the U.S. Government there. With TTPI funding approved for five teams through FY 82, coupled with the expressed desires of the Micronesians to continue the program even after termination of the trusteeship, the progress already made toward accomplishment of the Defense Department's objectives could be best maintained through continued Service funding of the team members.[3]

(U) Approval had been given to employ five teams in FY 83: two Navy 13-man teams to Palau and Yap, two Army 13-man teams to Ponape and Kosrae, and one 13-man Air Force team to Truk. There could be some funding complications that might require a realignment of the FY 83 deployments, however.[4]

(U) On 17 July the Commander of the U.S. Army's Western Command proposed shortening the tour length for Army team personnel from 8 months to 6 months. Formerly the Army's policy had been to use all volunteers, necessitated by the 8-month temporary duty tour length with "unaccompanied" tour credit. WESTCOM would have the authority to deploy personnel for 179 days, however, without Department of the Army approval. While they believed that the volunteer system had merit, it did not always insure that the most qualified individuals were deployed because the manpower pool was very limited. There would be no severe impact on the costs incurred by the TTPI.[5]

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1. J561 HistSum Dec 81 (U); SECSTATE 171208Z Oct 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, p. 64.
3. J561 HistSum Aug 81 (U); CINCPAC 010542Z Aug 81 (U).
4. Ibid.
5. J561 HistSum Aug 81 (U); CDRWESTCOM 172200Z Jul 81 (U).

(U) CINCPAC asked for comments from his representative in Guam and the TTPI. The CINCPACREP replied that the team members fulfilled a dual role: they accomplished small scale construction projects and, equally important from the standpoint of Defense Department interests, cultivated and maintained a favorable public image and welcome military presence in the area. Shorter tour lengths would diminish the rapport developed by the teams with local island leaders and the community as a whole. Also, the additional 2 months of activity would be removed from the most productive middle portion of the deployment, as the relatively less productive start-up and wind-down periods incident to team turnovers would be unaffected. There would be additional transportation cost and also the indirect cost in diminished productivity in both construction and community relations. He also said whether the use of non-volunteers would prove as effective in sustaining the community action aspects of the mission would remain a challenge to leadership. He concluded that a six month cycle could be accepted, however. He advised that the strong interest and commitment of WESTCOM to the success of the program was recognized and greatly appreciated.[1]

(U) CINCPAC advised CDRWESTCOM that 8-month tours were preferable but that 6-month tours would be acceptable. Foremost consideration should be placed upon mission accomplishment, CINCPAC said.[2]

(U) In July Headquarters PACAF requested that the composition of the team for Truk include additional personnel skilled in horizontal construction instead of personnel skilled in vertical construction. Since planned projects for the team on Truk did not include vertical construction, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS an exception to the normal Truk team composition.[3]

Guam Land Use Plan

(U) In December 1974 the Deputy Secretary of Defense had requested that the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force conduct a joint study to develop a mid-range land use plan for Guam. The study was completed in September 1977 and the Secretary of Defense approved it in March 1978. The purposes of the study had been to determine landholdings to support mid-range (eight-year) DOD presence on Guam, to examine joint and efficient use of available land, and to determine land holdings for release.[4]

~~(C)~~ CINCPACFLT had directed implementation of the Guam Land Use Plan in December 1979. In October 1980, however, the CINCPACREP Guam had expressed concern to CINCPAC over further turnovers of excess U.S. Government land to the

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1. CINCPACREP Guam 280630Z Jul 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC 040245Z Aug 81 (U).
3. J561 HistSum Aug 81 (U); HQ PACAF 290217Z Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC 040246Z Aug 81 (U).
4. CINCPAC Command History 1978 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 310.

Government of Guam. It was the CINCPACREP's view that further land turnover transactions should be held in abeyance pending resolution of certain perceived deficiencies. He cited an apparent lack of a coherent long-range (20-year) strategic objectives plan in the West and North Pacific, the lack of long-range base development and contingency plans for Guam and the Marianas, and the need to preserve existing government-held land for contingency purposes in the event of a rollback from one or more of our forward bases, such as in the Philippines.[1]

~~(C)~~ CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF studied the base denial and rollback scenarios and the effect they could have on existing and future land holdings on Guam. Their deliberations were made with a view toward evaluating Navy and Air Force mission priorities and force mixes that would be the most practical and effective in supporting the operational requirements of the forward defense strategy. Their conclusion was that the land shown for retention in the Guam plan, in conjunction with the land being considered on Tinian and Babelthuap, was sufficient to meet on-going and potential future needs.

~~(C)~~ While the CINCPAC staff concurred with the conclusions developed by the Air Force and Navy, a number of major events had occurred in the PACOM since the Guam Land Use Plan and other formal studies had been concluded. These included the large-scale continuous Indian Ocean naval presence, the increased Soviet threat (including the Soviet presence in Vietnam), the recognition of China and questionable availability of Taiwan bases in a conflict, and the renegotiable Philippine basing agreements. In order to insure that those and other emergent considerations were factored into the overall PACOM basing scheme, the staff began a PACOM basing requirements study. The effort was designed to define the theater basing necessities for all of the Services in an era of changing commitments and expanding requirements. Among the requirements was the need to support rapid force deployments, to determine the optimum basing structure needed to support U.S. wartime objectives, and to consider requirements for fallback bases and facilities in the event existing bases were lost or reduced because of host nation considerations. It was believed the results of this study would enable the command to more accurately articulate immediate and future basing requirements.

(U) In the meantime, however, the land turnover transactions that were in progress proceeded as scheduled.[2]

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1. J5322 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C), DECL~~ 10 Feb 87.
2. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE THREAT

SECTION I--SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(U) In an article prepared at the end of the year for publication in early 1982 Admiral Robert L.J. Long, CINCPAC, stressed the importance to the United States, its allies, and friends, of the vast Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean area of the world. Over the last 15 years U.S. and Free World interests in this area had grown so much that the security, economic, and political health of the region had worldwide repercussions. U.S. trade with its Asia-Pacific neighbors, for example, exceeded $120 billion a year, and for the past three years was greater than U.S. trade with all of Western Europe. During the last 10 years U.S. trade with the Republic of Korea grew by over 600 percent; with Japan, by over 200 percent. Asia-Pacific trade accounted for a quarter of all U.S. foreign trade, and this did not include the Mideast oil trade.[1]

(U) Oil from the Arabian Gulf region valued at nearly $150 billion a year transited the Indian and Pacific Oceans to reach industrialized nations in both the east and west. While the United States depended on Arabian Gulf oil for only about 7 percent of its total oil needs, many Pacific allies were much more dependent: the Philippines and Japan for 70 percent; the Republic of Korea for 95 percent. In addition, over half the oil consumed in Western Europe passed through the Indian Ocean. The economies of the Free World depended upon continued, unrestricted access to this oil.[2]

(U) The same point, said Admiral Long, could be made about Free World dependence on the minerals and other raw materials of Southeast Asia or Central and Southern Africa--materials critical to industry and defense. Access to these essential raw materials, in turn, was dependent upon freedom of navigation on the oceans that separated the continents.

(U) While the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas had grown in strategic and economic importance, these were the areas where vital interests were most frequently and most seriously challenged. Peace had been broken there many times since World War II, and it was in this area where Free World and communist ideologies collided. Border conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and Marxist revolutionary movements characterized every shared national boundary. Where borders were not contested internal threats to security persisted, threatening

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1. Admiral Robert L.J. Long, "Asian Pacific Realities," prepared for publication in Strategic Review, cleared by OASD for public release, 28 Jan 82 (U).
2. Ibid; J2/Memo/SO55-82 of 4 Jun 81 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Command History 1981; Review of Draft.

not only regional stability but the political and economic security of the entire Free World as well.[1]

Soviet Regional Objectives

(U) While these complex internal and external forces weighed heavily on the politics of the region the fundamental security problem, said CINCPAC, stemmed from increasingly direct and indirect Soviet military involvements in and near areas vital to Free World interests. As recently as 1973, Premier Leonid Brezhnev had said the goal of the Soviet Union was ". . . to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends: the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa." Soviet control over these areas could mean the collapse of Free World economies, or else accommodation with, and ultimate domination by, the Soviet Union.[2]

(U) Soviet military growth and adherence to a policy of intimidation and use of force was especially dramatic in the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean area, said Admiral Long. While the Soviets had maintained a stalemate of sorts in Western Europe they continued to expand their influence; directly, as in Afghanistan, or indirectly through proxies or surrogates, as in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. In the early 1970's, with the bulk of Soviet military power aligned against Western Europe, the Soviets began developing the organization, forces, and logistics structures to project power and influence to the east and south--while remaining strong in Europe. They continued this development and in 1981 possessed a significant, two-front war fighting capability which they regularly exercised in simultaneous field training maneuvers. These exercises were large scale, of long duration, and routinely involved high-level Soviet Ministry of Defense participation, in both nuclear and conventional scenarios. The United States and its allies did not have an exercise scenario that paralleled these Soviet exercises in either scope or complexity.[3]

Trends in the PACOM Military Balance

(U) Over the past 15 years the Soviets had not only significantly increased the size of their forces but also had dramatically improved their quality, said CINCPAC. Since 1965 Soviet Far Eastern ground force strength nearly tripled, while U.S. Pacific Command ground forces declined by about 60 percent. (CINCPAC used 1965 as a basis for comparison to remove the bias caused by the U.S. buildup in Vietnam, more accurately reflecting the trend.) The Soviets added 300,000 to their ground troops since 1965. When grouped with the forces of North Korea and Vietnam, they comprised a force of over two

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 110036Z Dec 81 (U), quoting Brezhnev's remarks to President Siad Barre of Somalia in Prague, as extracted from testimony by General Alton D. Slay, USAF, before the House Armed Services Committee on 13 Nov 80.
3. Admiral Long, "Asian Pacific Realities" (U).

million that could face the United States and its allies in a Soviet-backed regional conflict in the Western Pacific area. The Soviets had over 50 ground combat divisions in the Far East, not including forces in or near Afghanistan. An additional 9,000 Soviet ground troops occupied the Northern Territories, which they took from Japan following World War II.[1]

(U) As an air threat the Soviets had over 2,000 fighter and interceptor aircraft in their eastern military districts. In recent years more sophisticated MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft had appeared. It was interesting to note, said Admiral Long, that in 1980 the Soviets replaced more fighter aircraft with new-generation fighter aircraft in their Far East Air Forces than the United States had in its entire Pacific Air Forces.

(U) On the strategic side the Soviets continued to expand their theater nuclear delivery capability, in both quantity and quality. The recent addition of the swing-wing BACKFIRE bomber in both Long Range Aviation and Naval Aviation variants brought the number of Soviet bombers to over 300. The Naval Aviation BACKFIRE, with its KITCHEN cruise missile, could interdict shipping lanes in the East and South China Seas. It could also reach targets as far east as the Aleutians and Midway Island, and return to the Soviet Union without refueling. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Force had a full range of medium, intermediate, and intercontinental range ballistic missiles. The most significant new development was the addition of the mobile SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile to the Soviet Far East Forces.

(U) The most dramatic improvement was in the Soviet Navy, said CINCPAC. The Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1971 had been primarily a coastal defense force, rarely venturing outside home waters. In 1981 it was the largest of the four Soviet fleets and comprised over 30 percent of the entire Soviet Navy. It was a modern blue water navy equipped with the newest combatants, including the most recently built KIEV-class aircraft carrier, the MINSK; cruise missile surface ships and submarines; and the DELTA-class SSBN, their longest range ballistic missile submarine. The Soviets had been outbuilding the United States in submarines by about 4 to 1. Fifteen years before, they were just embarking on a serious submarine building program; in 1981, in the Pacific alone, they already had deployed over 100 submarines, over half of which were nuclear powered. The United States, on the other hand, had fewer than 50 submarines deployed in the Pacific Command area.

(U) The Soviet Union had also significantly improved its sealift capability, to an 18-million-ton merchant marine and a worldwide fishing fleet, both of which could be placed under the operational control of the navy. Combatants included the newest amphibious ship, the IVAN ROGOV, which carried naval infantry. It stopped twice at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, en route to the Indian Ocean.

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1. Ibid; J2/Memo/S055-82 of 4 Jun 82 (U).

(U) From Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, Soviet reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft regularly operated over the East and South China Seas. Soviet access to Vietnam had come at the price of over $3 million a day in economic and military assistance to the Vietnamese--assistance that propped up the Vietnamese economy and supported their operations in Kampuchea. Of probably greater significance, Soviet access to these facilities afforded them a forward naval base some 2,000 miles, or five full steaming days, closer to the Indian Ocean than the nearest home bases of Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok, improving their ability to support a fleet that continuously operated along the vital sea lanes that led from the Persian Gulf.

(U) In 1968 the Soviets began deploying to the Indian Ocean, about the same time that the British withdrew from the area. They gradually increased their presence to the point where they maintained about 25 to 30 ships in the area on a regular basis, supported from anchorages, ports, and airfields in South Yemen and Ethiopia. Regular patrols operated in the Northern Arabian Sea, and were never far from the Strait of Hormuz, potential choke point for Persian Gulf oil.

New Realities in Southwest Asia

(U) CINCPAC said events in Southwest Asia illustrated the importance and fragility of this area. Before the beginning of the protracted conflict in September 1980 between Iran and Iraq 15 to 16 million barrels of oil per day moved by tanker along the sea lanes leading from the Persian Gulf. In the month following the start of that conflict the flow was reduced by nearly half. It later returned to existing demand levels, but CINCPAC said this clearly illustrated the effect that Soviet sponsored or supported instabilities could have on the continued availability of this vital resource.[1]

(U) The potential for regional instability in the Southwest Asia area remained high at the end of the year. Despite sporadic ground and air engagements the Iran-Iraq war continued to be a stalemate, with Iraq holding the Shatt al Arab waterway, the former boundary between the two countries, and Iran firmly resisting all offers to mediate the dispute.

(U) On Iran's eastern border about 93,000 Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. The situation there was one in which the Soviets controlled the cities while Afghan resistance fighters controlled the countryside. The Afghan military was demoralized and largely ineffective. Desertion of Afghan soldiers to the Muslim tribal groups was common. The tribal resistance elements were gaining confidence, but they lacked the equipment and organization necessary to conduct large scale operations. The Soviets had not paid a very high price in terms of personnel and equipment losses to remain in Afghanistan, noted CINCPAC; however, they would have to increase their military strength there if they wished to combat the resistance.

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1. Ibid.

(U) Soviet presence in Afghanistan also posed a threat to Pakistan, where Soviet covert support of tribal factions in the region made this area a potential target for subversive activity should the USSR attempt to develop a gateway to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan.[1]

Potential for Conflict

(U) Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in early 1981 Admiral Long issued his assessment of the situation in the Pacific Command. Although he believed the probability of nuclear conflict remained low, the United States had to continue to modernize its nuclear forces to reduce its susceptibility to nuclear blackmail or pressure in other confrontations between the Soviets and the United States and its allies. CINCPAC felt that the prospects for global conventional war with the USSR might be increasing. Regional conflicts, provoked directly or indirectly by the Soviets, also increased the possibility of a direct U.S.-USSR confrontation. In both nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities the Soviets had been expanding and modernizing at a relentless pace for years, said CINCPAC. Relative U.S. superiority in conventional forces had declined, and in some respects had been eliminated.[2]

(U) While much of Soviet military strength remained oriented toward Europe, the Far East appeared to be receiving increased emphasis. The primary Soviet preoccupation had been China, but increasingly Admiral Long saw the Soviets probing for opportunities in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. He said the danger of regional crises in the Pacific Command would, in all probability, remain high, particularly in Southwest and Southeast Asia. In Southwest Asia the Soviets maneuvered for control over Arabian Gulf oil and for access to warm water ports. With a large military force in Afghanistan, use of port and air facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen, and ready access to other ports in the region, the Soviets were developing a substantial presence around the Indian Ocean. In Southeast Asia the Soviets carefully worked to expand their presence and influence. Vietnamese efforts to eliminate resistance in Kampuchea risked spillover into Thailand. China watched the situation closely, as did the Soviet Union, which continued to pour economic and military aid into Vietnam and to expand their use of port and air facilities there.

Pacific Command Developments: An Overview

Northeast Asia

(U) Japan's effort on defense, although increasing as Japanese public concern began to mount over the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union, was, in CINCPAC's view, not keeping pace. Militarily the United States continued to work closely with Japan to improve its defense capabilities. Gains were being

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1. Ibid.
2. Statement by Admiral Long before the House Armed Services Committee, 20 Feb 81 (U).

made in bilateral planning, combined exercises and training, and in the depth of substantive defense policy discussions between the two countries. Japan's support for U.S. forces had been extremely valuable. The provision of base facilities, housing, and support infrastructure had contributed to the effectiveness of the U.S. forces. The United States also welcomed Japan's decision to provide more economic and financial assistance to other nations in the region where the two countries shared security interests. Nevertheless, Admiral Long said the United States should continue to urge Japan to shoulder a greater share of the burden to defend itself.

(U) The Republic of Korea had undergone a period of political transition in 1980. During this process, however, Korea's commitment to security and stability on the peninsula had been unwavering. Korea's economic dificulties, brought on in large measure by the rising price of oil, had made it difficult to proceed on schedule with the ROK Force Improvement Program. Tensions between North Korea and the Republic of Korea remained high. Military force trends on the peninsula were not favorable to the ROK and the United States. North Korean ground forces were near the 700,000 mark, while South Korean ground forces numbered approximately 540,000. The north also held a significant edge in tactical fighters, submarines, and other naval combatants and ground force equipment, including armor. To insure continued peace on the peninsula and to contribute to the stability of the region, CINCPAC believed it was necessary to improve both ROK and U.S. forces stationed there.[1]

(U) Admiral Long said the United States had several parallel interests with China, particularly a shared concern over Soviet expansionist activities. Chinese forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet border tied down a quarter of the Soviet Union's ground and air forces. This continued to be a very important factor in the global power equation. CINCPAC was supportive of taking careful advantage of these parallel interests both regionally and globally.

Southeast Asia

(U) The immediate concern in Southeast Asia was that Vietnamese pursuit of Khmer resistance forces could spill across the border into Thailand, and this could induce a second incursion by China into Vietnam from the north. The major underlying problem in Indochina, however, was that the existing situation provided the Soviets opportunities to expand their presence and influence in the region. To that time, the Soviets had taken full advantage of these opportunities, and their presence in Vietnam had increased steadily during 1979 and 1980. The facilities at Cam Ranh Bay had, for all practical purposes, become a Soviet warm water forward base to support distant operations in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia.

(U) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprised of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, continued to grow as

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1. Ibid; J2/Memo/5055-82 of 4 Jun 82 (U).

an economic force and to evolve politically. The five ASEAN nations had been particularly effective politically, noted CINCPAC, in pulling together against Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea. Thailand counted heavily on ASEAN, the United States, and China to inhibit Hanoi from any substantial incursion into Thai territory. CINCPAC said it was essential, therefore, that the United States continue to recognize its commitment to Thailand under the Manila Pact and that it respond quickly to Thai requests for military assistance.[1]

Soviet Naval and Naval Air Threat

(U) The Soviet Union maintained a balanced inventory of more than 200 combatant surface ships and submarines in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Supported by an improved basing structure and more capable land-based air forces, including the BACKFIRE bomber, the Soviet fleet was in a position to challenge U.S. naval forces in both oceans.[2]

(U) As the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan attested, the Soviet Union had both the capability and the will to project massive military force into non-European areas on its periphery. Soviet power gravely threatened the security and integrity of nearby nations, and increased the likelihood of direct conflict with the United States. This was especially so in Southwest Asia, where the United States and its allies were vitally concerned with continued access to Persian Gulf oil supplies. Several factors had contributed to the growing Soviet ability to project power into Southwest Asia. Among these were: continuing Soviet efforts to modernize and strengthen forces suited to cross-border operations; steady efforts to improve the logistics and command, control, and communications capabilities for supporting these forces; the positioning of Soviet ground and air forces in Afghanistan; and diminished U.S. access to the region in the wake of the revolution in Iran.

(U) Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was increased between mid-December 1979 and early February 1980. The normal contingent of some 18 to 20 units (general purpose submarines, 6 surface combatants, 11-12 auxiliaries) was increased to between 30 and 36 units (general purpose submarines, 10-12 surface combatants, 16-18 auxiliaries). Activity in the Indian Ocean included close surveillance of U.S. forces, and training in the Gulf of Aden and Socotra Island areas. Overall, the surveillance effort in the Northern Arabian Sea had been continuous but limited. The remainder of the Soviet squadron was concentrated in anchorages in the southern Red Sea, the western Gulf of Aden and Socotra Island--all normal operating areas. The Soviets maintained a small force of MAY maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft in the area for periodic surveillance of Western forces operating in the Arabian Sea.

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1. Ibid.
2. COMIPAC 130104Z Mar 81 (U), quoting from CJCS U.S. Military Posture Statement for FY 82.

(U) A Soviet presence in the South China Sea, with support from Vietnamese ports and airfields, offered several military advantages: a presence astride a major sea line of communication between the Indian and Pacific Oceans; an improved, though limited, capability for sealane interdiction; a capability for quick contingency augmentation of Indian Ocean forces, thereby increasing crisis responsiveness; and a staging area for surface ships, submarines, and aircraft to monitor U.S. and Chinese naval activity.

(U) The Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Force, as a whole, was a balanced organization of about 370 combat aircraft assigned to perform antiship strike, maritime reconnaissance, and ASW missions. Long-range BEAR F ASW aircraft had joined the force, and a FORGER vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) fighter unit arrived with the carrier MINSK in mid-1979. Initial transfer of BACKFIRE missile carrier aircraft to a strike regiment in the Pacific occurred in 1980.[1]

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1. Ibid.

SECTION II--SOVIET FORCES

Force Structure in the Far East

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Traditionally, Soviet Far Eastern forces had lagged behind other Soviet military regions in terms of quality and quantity of arms and equipment. This pattern was reversed, however, and Soviet Far Eastern forces in 1981 posed a significant threat in the Pacific region. Ground forces in the Far East theater consisted of 52 maneuver divisions (46 motorized rifle and 6 tank), of which 26 were combat ready, capable of deploying in 24-48 hours. They were being equipped with some of the newest tanks, personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, air defense systems, anti-tank weapons, and transport vehicles on a scale comparable with Soviet forces opposing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the European theater. These forces were adequate to defend against an attack by the People's Republic of China (PRC) or to conduct a limited invasion of the PRC. Soviet ground forces in the maritime areas were adequate as an early warning/defensive force under existing world conditions. In the event of a major war, however, additional forces would be required to adequately defend vital harbors and other facilities.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Soviet Pacific Fleet, after years of neglect, had been improved both in quantity and quality through the transfer from other fleets of the newest and most modern combatants. The number of major surface combatants had increased by one-third in recent years, and fleet capabilities and fire-power had also significantly risen. Ineffective open-ocean ASW had been a major weakness in Soviet naval operations. Efforts to overcome this problem included the transfer to the Pacific of the aircraft carrier MINSK and additional KRESTA and KARA Class guided missile cruisers. Amphibious assault capabilities were improved somewhat with the addition of the IVAN ROGOV LPD (which had temporarily returned to the Baltic area), but still remained limited because of the lack of other amphibious ships and carrier-borne close air support.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Soviet air forces in the Pacific Command area consisted of over 3,000 combat aircraft, including 304 bombers, 1,013 air defense fighters, 956 ground attack aircraft and combat assault helicopters, and 144 ASW, plus reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and other support aircraft. These were deployed primarily opposite the PRC border. Tactical and air defense aircraft were generally sufficient for the USSR's security in the Far East. Overall, Soviet air forces in this area possessed sufficient assets to conduct major air operations against China, Japan, and Korea, although not concurrently. Strike, interdiction, or minelaying could be conducted against surface ships and shore installations in or along the East China Sea, Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, North Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea, Arctic Ocean, and northern Indian

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 22 Sep 81, Subj: Soviet Force Structure in the Far East Theater (U), REVW 22 Sep 01; J2/Memo/S055-82 of 4 Jun 82 (U).

Ocean. Strategic and peripheral strikes could be conducted against the United States or any other country in PACOM.[1]

Deployments and Combat Readiness

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union maintained 5,000 to 8,000 personnel in Vietnam, approximately 2,000 in Laos, and 450 in Kampuchea. Nearly a quarter of the Soviet personnel in Vietnam and Laos were military. Since January 1980 the USSR had maintained an almost continuous presence of four long-range BEAR turboprop aircraft at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Soviet naval ship presence in Vietnamese ports had increased markedly since February 1979, with ships operating out of both Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet naval activity out of Vietnam and regular transits of the Strait of Malacca emphasized their maritime presence in Southeast Asia. This presence could become a threat to ASEAN countries, especially if Soviet naval strength were applied in support of Vietnamese claims in the Spratly Islands or the contested area near Natuna Island.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Over 5,000 Soviet military technicians and troops were stationed in Indian Ocean littoral states. In the South Pacific, in a recent development, the Soviets had sought to take advantage of the emergence of newly independent island states. Soviet offers of assistance to these new nations included airfield upgrading, supplying aircraft and scholarships, and fisheries assistance in return for Soviet use of shipping and port facilities for their own fishing fleet. All of these offers had been refused by the island states.[3]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Soviet missile forces at home were normally maintained at constant combat readiness, which was a low combat alert posture. Soviet Naval Aviation, Long Range Aviation, Military Transport Aviation, and Frontal Aviation (except counter-air regiments), normally did not maintain a ground alert status. Soviet aerospace defenses were normally at a low alert posture of command, early warning radar, SAM, aircrew/support personnel, and missile and aircraft readiness. Naval readiness was maintained at different levels. Approximately 12-15 percent of the nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force was deployed at all times, with the majority of other units maintained at immediate or modified readiness. At least one-half of all Soviet naval units were in a state of unlimited readiness (surge capable, able to put to sea), and from 12 to 15 percent maintained an immediate readiness posture (fully armed, manned with combat complement, and deployable within three days).[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL),~~ 5 Oct 81, Subj: Soviet Threat in PACOM/ Focus on SEA (U), REVW 5 Oct 01.
3. Ibid.
4. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF),~~ 6 Feb 81, Subj: Soviet Combat Readiness (U), REVW 6 Feb 87.

MINSK: First Soviet Aircraft Carrier in the Pacific

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Construction on the MINSK, second of the KIEV Class aircraft carriers, began in December 1972; it became fully operational in 1978. These were the largest (at 37,100 tons full load displacement, 273 meters overall, and 47.2 meters beam) and most heavily armed warships ever built by the USSR. Moreover, for the first time, the Soviets combined antisubmarine and antiship sensors and guided missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, relatively advanced self-defense capability, and extensive command and control equipment on one ship. A third KIEV Class carrier was being fitted out in 1981, and a fourth was under construction.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The KIEV Class was designed specifically for vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft; it had no catapults or arresting gear. The aircraft complement was normally composed of a mix of 15-17 YAK-36 FORGER aircraft and 28-32 HORMONE A/B helicopters. The FORGER's primary roles were air defense and antiship strike within a radius of about 500 kilometers. Its armament was limited to 4 air-to-air missiles carried on wing-mounted pylons. The HORMONE A had a standoff ASW capability, and the HORMONE B video-link system transmitted over-the-horizon radar surveillance and targeting data to SS-N-3, SS-N-9, SS-N-12, and possibly SS-NX-19 equipped strike platforms.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The KIEV Class aircraft carriers were equipped with the 500 NM range nuclear capable SS-N-12 missile, and were the only Soviet combatants, other than the KYNDA, to carry surface-to-surface missile (SSM) reloads. The ships also carried the SA-N-3 (used in both SAM and SSM roles), SA-N-4 short range SAM, 76.2 mm guns, ADMG-23 Gattling-type guns, RBU-6000 rocket launchers with automatic reload capability, and SUW-N-1 launched FRAS-1 ASW rockets. This mix of weapons provided 360-degree protection, with firing arcs overlapping the beam. A PUNCHBOWL radome, tentatively associated with radar ocean surveillance satellites, provided long range locational information for targeting SSMs. The ships were also equipped with electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems, chaff launchers, deceptive devices, and possible jammers to provide shipboard antimissile integrated defense plus communications/surveillance radar jamming and deception.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Missions attributed to the KIEV Class CVHG included strategic and tactical ASW, area control/denial, area command and control, ocean surveillance, amphibious assault support, and projection of power ashore. Mission accomplishment appeared to be limited by: inadequacies of Soviet ASW sensors and poor initial detection capabilities; the FORGER aircraft's small engine, high wing loading, armament restrictions, and lack of a sophisticated air intercept radar; inability of the ship's air defense system to withstand a medium to large scale attack by Western aircraft; and space and ordnance

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1. IPAC Point Paper (~~S/NOFORN~~), 9 Jan 81, Subj: Capabilities and Characteristics of the MINSK (U), REVW 9 Jan 87; DOD Report (U), "Soviet Military Power," released 29 Sep 81, p. 41.

compromises made in order to accommodate both aircraft and extensive, varied weapon systems.[1]

Soviet Pacific Submarine Fleet

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Since 1970 the Soviet Pacific Submarine Fleet increased in size from 106 to 136 active boats--an average annual growth rate of nearly three submarines a year. Of greatest significance, ballistic missile submarines of this force grew from 13 to 32, and of these the number of SSBNs ballooned from 5 to 25. Also, nuclear-powered general purpose SSNs increased during this period from 6 to 22. The number of cruise missile subs remained unchanged at 24, but those that were nuclear powered (SSGNs) increased from 17 to 20. The accelerated pace of technological advance could be seen in yet another aspect of this same data. In 1970 the Soviets had only three second-generation nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific. By 1980 this number had increased to 40 Type IIs. Second-generation nuclear submarines included Cs and Vs (with Type II power plants) and Ys and Ds (with Type III power plants).[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In every instance these new submarines had been larger, more technologically advanced, and more complex to operate, with sophisticated new weapons and command and control systems. This placed increased demands on the Soviet Union's limited high-technology and financial resources to build and keep the subs functioning, as well as on a limited pool of highly skilled professional sailors to operate them. The Soviet Navy, like its U.S. counterpart, had a low retention rate in skilled senior personnel, particularly in the high-technology specialties. Newly constructed Type II/III SSBN's joining the Soviet Pacific Fleet, however, appeared to be fully utilized. This force clearly had precedence in receiving the best personnel as well as superior maintenance support, which contributed to a high degree of overall readiness and reliability. A similar degree of preparedness was not as apparent among this fleet's other classes of submarines, particularly in comparison with similar subs in the Northern Fleet in European USSR.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ All classes of Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines conducted frequent operations in local waters, training regularly in tactics, weapons employment, and command and control. However, out-of-area patrols were not carried out at a level commensurate with assigned assets or prospective missions. Consequently, the invaluable experience to be gained from the greater demands of prolonged, distant deployments on ships and men did not accrue.[3]

Soviet Pacific Fleet Deployment Cycles

~~(S)~~ Soviet Pacific Fleet surface combatants and cruise missile/attack

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Intelligence Summary (~~S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT~~), Jul 81, pp. 8-10, REVW 1 Jan 01; J2/Memo/S055-82 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
3. Ibid.

submarines deployed out-of-area on a regular basis to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, while ballistic missile submarines conducted continuous patrols in the Eastern Pacific and Sea of Japan/Northwest Pacific. There appeared to be no established deployment pattern for individual hulls. However, owing to the number of SSBNs available and the number of patrols maintained, the percentage of time deployed for each operational SSBN hull was far higher than for surface combatants and SSGNs/SSNs.[1]

~~(S)~~ YANKEE and DELTA SSBN deployments, to the Eastern Pacific and the Sea of Japan/Northwest Pacific, respectively, were usually for periods of 78 days. On an average, 20 percent of YANKEE and DELTA SSBNs were on patrol and 40 percent were in port but combat ready.

~~(S)~~ ECHO II SSGN deployments to the Indian Ocean were usually for periods of 6 months, while ECHO SSN and CHARLIE SSGN/VICTOR SSN deployments to the South China Sea were for 5 months and 3 months, respectively. Operationally available cruise missile/attack submarines usually spent approximately 20 percent of their time deployed.

~~(S)~~ Surface combatant deployments to the Indian Ocean were for periods of about 7 months. There was no established deployment pattern for the South China Sea, but deployments of approximately 3 months had been noted. As an average, operationally available surface combatant forces normally spent 12 percent of their time deployed. Soviet Pacific Fleet surface combatants and submarines generally spent less time operating out-of-area than did their U.S. counterparts.[2]

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1. IPAC Point Paper (S), 6 Feb 81, Subj: Soviet Pacific Fleet Deployment Cycles (U), REVW 6 Feb 87; J2/Memo/SO55-82 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
2. Ibid.

SECTION III--THREAT IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Soviet Threat to Japan

(U) The Soviet Union did not sign the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, and technically a state of war continued to exist between the USSR and Japan. Nevertheless, the two countries reestablished diplomatic relations in 1956. Relations between the two nations had been cool, and were likely to remain so throughout the 1980s, in the opinion of the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC). The Japanese were apprehensive about Soviet intentions and the implications of a militarily stronger USSR. A long standing problem was Moscow's refusal to settle the Northern Territories issue (see below) on terms acceptable to Japan. Moscow, on the other hand, was unhappy with the trend in Tokyo's approach to security issues; i.e., Japan's justifying its defense improvements based on a growing threat from the USSR.[1]

(U) Economic ties between Japan and the Soviet Union had existed since 1956. Japanese interests in the USSR were in resource development projects (Siberian oil, gas, coal, and timber), but their costs somewhat dampened the enthusiasm. The pace of Japanese involvement had slowed sharply in recent years. Yakutsk natural gas and Sakhalin oil and gas development were the existing major projects. The Soviets wanted and needed Japanese technology and financing. Trade volume between the two countries (about $4.6 billion per year) was minor, when compared with Japan's trade with other nations. Further, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the closing days of 1979 had resulted in a drop in trading activity that continued through 1981.[2]

The Northern Territories Issue

~~(C)~~ The dispute over the Northern Territories was a major issue blocking the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet post-World War II peace treaty. The territories in question consisted of a group of small islands--Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai group--north of Hokkaido. The argument stemmed, in part, from the question of whether some or all of the disputed islands formed a part of the Soviet Union's Kuril chain, geographically and historically. Tokyo contended that all four had been considered an integral part of Japanese territory under the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1855 and the Treaty on the Exchange of Sakhalin and the Kurils of 1875, and that the Kuril Islands were only those extending north of Etorofu Strait. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had been inclined to concede the validity of Japanese claims to Habomai and Shikotan, but not the larger islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.[3]

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1. IPAC Point Paper (U), 22 Sep 81, Subj: Soviet Relations with Japan.
2. Ibid.
3. IPAC Intelligence Summary ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, Apr 81, pp. 11-12, REVW 1 Jan 01.

DISPUTED TERRITORIES



SOVIET FORCES
DEPLOYED IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES



(Maps by IPAC)

~~(C)~~ Under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan had renounced its claim to the Kurils, but the treaty did not provide a precise geographical definition of the extent of the Kuril Islands and it did not state to what nation the islands would be ceded. Later, in the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of October 1956 ending the state of war between the two countries, the USSR did agree "to hand over to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, provided that actual handing over will be carried out after the conclusion of a peace treaty." This commitment was an important element of the Japanese contention that the entire territorial issue remained open and negotiable.

~~(C)~~ In 1960 the Soviets withdrew the offer to return the Habomai group and Shikotan, pegging it to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The Soviet Union took the position that this treaty and the presence of foreign (American) troops on Japanese soil created a "new situation." Subsequently, they became even more obdurate, claiming that the disputed islands were an integral part of the Kuril chain, that territorial transfers at the end of World War II were final, and the issue, therefore, was irrevocably closed. Declarations of 200-mile fishing zones by both countries aroused new controversy about rival claims to the islands. Nonetheless, in concluding fishing agreements, the Japanese and Soviets managed to finesse these claims, and the dispute remained unresolved.

~~(C)~~ Over the past several years the Soviet government had become increasingly frustrated by Japan's refusal to accept the claim that the Northern Territories were (and would remain) Soviet possessions. Beginning in May 1978 the Soviets initiated a sizable deployment of combat and construction units and equipment to Etorofu and Kunashiri. Early in 1980 the Japanese government, for the first time, publicly characterized the Soviet presence in the disputed Northern Territories as a potential threat to Japan. The total Soviet ground force strength on these islands was estimated to be a reduced-strength motorized rifle division of approximately 8,000 troops.[1]

The Soviet Military Force

~~(S)~~ Since 1978 the number of Soviet naval ships deployed in the Pacific on any given date ranged from a low of 11 to a high of 47. This high had been reached in March 1979 as a result of the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, and included 22 combatants. More recently, Soviet naval ships deployed in the Pacific had numbered between 20 and 30, with many of these staging from Vietnamese ports. Submarine patrol areas included the eastern Pacific, Philippine Sea, East China Sea, Sea of Japan, and the area north of Midway Island.[2]

~~(S)~~ The Soviets periodically flew aerial reconnaissance and open ocean navigation flights throughout the northern Pacific and to areas as far south as Guam and Wake Island. Strategic air capabilities also continued to be upgraded in the Soviet Far East. The first Naval Aviation BACKFIRE bomber regiment was being formed at Alekseyevka near the Soviet Pacific coast. The assignment of the BACKFIRE to this area increased the strategic air threat to Alaska, the continental United States, and the majority of the PACOM area. A Long Range Aviation BACKFIRE regiment at Belaya in the south-central Soviet Union also presented an increased strategic threat to the western Pacific.

~~(S)~~ The Soviets would have to redeploy their forces if they were to invade Japan, weakening their strength in other areas. The direct threat to Japan, therefore, depended on Soviet relations with China, the United States, and NATO. Soviet capability to attack Japan was constrained by limited amphibious lift capability in the Pacific--enough only to lift about 6,000 naval infantry. Existing Soviet basing of combat aircraft within combat range of Hokkaido was insufficient to provide control of the air over a beachhead against Japanese air defenses. The Soviets also had only limited airmobile capability within range of Japan. However, additional assets could be deployed to forward bases on Sakhalin or in the Kurils.

~~(S)~~ In view of the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the vulnerability of Japan's sea lines of communication (LOC), naval action against those LOCs was much more likely than a Soviet attempt to seize Japanese territory.

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/REL JAPAN),~~ 10 Dec 81, Subj: Soviet Threat in the Pacific and Northeast Asia (U), REVW 10 Dec 87.

The contention of the United States was that the stronger the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were, the more Soviet forces it would take to succeed, and the less likely it was that they would opt to attack Japan.[1]

Japanese Self-Defense Forces

~~(C)~~ Japan's FY 81 (1 April 1981 - 31 March 1982) defense budget was about $11.4 billion, or 0.906 percent of gross national product (GNP) and a 7.6 percent increase over 1980 spending. In total dollar amounts, Japan's defense budget ranked eighth in the world, but lagged far behind other nations in percentage of GNP committed to defense spending. For example, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom each spent $26-28 billion, or some 3-5 percent of their GNP for defense. Japan's FY 81 budget requests by service totaled $4.4 billion for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), $2.4 billion for the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and $2.6 billion for the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF).[2]

(U) For FY 82 the defense budget request totaled about $11.2 billion, a nominal 7.5 percent increase over 1981 spending (because of changing exchange rates). Service requests reflected an increase of 2.4 percent for the GSDF, 13.6 percent for the ASDF, and 9.2 percent for the MSDF. Several negative factors impacted on increased funding: the large budget deficit, public reaction to new taxes, and the low priority assigned to defense spending as a whole. At the end of 1981, IPAC estimated that the final FY 82 budget would be less than the request, with an increase of only 6.2 percent. Real growth (after inflation) in spending was estimated to be 3 percent or less.[3]

~~(C)~~ Japanese attitudes toward defense and global responsibilities had changed dramatically. Events which only a few years before would have created a major political sensation were being treated almost routinely in 1981. Defense issues received broader support in the Diet, and favorable comments in the media were becoming common. Public debate of defense issues was more realistic, and a growing acceptance of the Soviet military threat was apparent. However, this threat was not seen by Japan to be as acute or as imminent as that perceived by the United States. Further, Japanese law and interpretation of the constitution constrained a broad and rapid development or modernization of the military forces. While the Soviet threat was generally recognized, most polls showed the public believing that the existing defense force size was about right, and there was little support for increased spending.[4]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Japan's armed forces, while defensively oriented by the constitution, were still considered one of the strongest non-communist forces

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper (C), 12 Feb 81, Subj: Japan's FY 1981 Defense Budget (U), REVW 12 Feb 87.
3. IPAC Point Paper (U), 10 Dec 81, Subj: Japan's FY 1982 Defense Budget.
4. IPAC Point Paper (C), 10 Dec 81, Subj: Projected Japanese Self-Defense Force Improvements (U), REVW 10 Dec 01.

in the Pacific Command area. However, the military was organized and equipped only to defend against a small-scale invasion, and U.S. support would still be required to repel a major attack. Japan did not possess a viable offensive force, and would have to devote a much larger portion of the budget to be considered a significant military power in the Pacific. Principal tactical forces consisted of 13 infantry divisions, 10 air interceptor squadrons, 6 SAM groups, 60 ASW escort ships, 14 submarines, 41 mine warfare ships, and 220 MSDF aircraft.[1]

~~(C)~~ The latest Japan Defense Agency Mid-Term Operations Estimate, developed in 1979, was a 5-year procurement plan that provided for main items of equipment to upgrade the self-defense forces. The 1984 objective called for, among other things, a total of 574 Type 74 tanks, 137 Type 73 armored personnel carriers, 201 155mm self-propelled (SP) howitzers, 43 203mm SP howitzers, 27 destroyers, 45 P-3C ASW patrol aircraft, 16 submarines, 100 F-15 fighters, and 63 F-1 close air support aircraft.[2]

Threat in Korea

North Korean Threat and the Military Balance

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ North Korea enjoyed an advantage over South Korea in almost every category of combat strength and equipment. In ground forces the north outnumbered the south by nearly 1.3 to 1 in total manpower, and held a 2.5-to-1 advantage in tanks and assault guns and a 2.2-to-1 lead in field artillery and multiple rocket launchers. The advantage in field artillery was made even more overwhelming when the effective weapons ranges were compared. The north's longer-range guns gave it an advantage of 9 to 1 in field artillery capable of firing 15 km or more. In antiaircraft artillery North Korea held a 4.7-to-1 superiority.[3]

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In the air, North Korea held a numerical advantage of 1.5 to 1 in fighter aircraft and possessed the only bomber force on the peninsula. The numerical edge in fighters was offset somewhat by the extended age of the north's MIG-15/17/19 aircraft and by the superiority of the south's all-weather F-4s. At sea, North Korea had the third largest Asian navy with a 7.3-to-1 advantage over the Republic of Korea in coastal patrol and missile attack craft. The north had the only submarines, although the south had some larger units (most of World War II vintage). Most of North Korea's ships were less than 7 years old.

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 12 Jan 81, Subj: Japanese Military Capability for Self Defense and Japan's Possible Military Role in the Pacific (U), REVW 12 Jan 87.
2. IPAC Point Paper (C), 10 Dec 81, Subj: Projected Japanese Self-Defense Force Improvements (U), REVW 10 Dec 01.
3. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, 13 Oct 81, Subj: North Korean Threat and Military Balance (U), REVW 13 Oct 01.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ On balance, North Korea's military forces were stronger than those of the ROK. Without timely and effective U.S. military involvement, the forces of the north had a good chance of making early and significant territorial gains in an invasion of the south. If war erupted, the primary battle would be fought on the ground, where North Korea held superiority in numbers of men and units, in firepower and mobility, and in stocks of military supplies. The north's advantage would be enhanced by a wider array of tactical options. It could go to war with the important advantage of advance preparation and of choosing the time and place of attack. Although these advantages would be limited by Korea's rugged and defensible terrain and by the south's fortifications, a rigid forward defense north of Seoul left the ROK with little capability for flexible action.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Warning of an attack would be one of the decisive factors affecting South Korea's capabilities for a successful defense and could mean the difference between a meaningful delaying action and significant early reverses. With 3 to 5 days' alert before an attack, and under favorable fighting conditions, the south would be far more able to defend itself successfully. IPAC believed the ROK might make limited gains in redressing some of North Korea's advantages, but improvements by both sides over the next 5 years probably would not substantially alter the military balance.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In spite of North Korea's edge in military strength and its potential for achieving surprise, several factors deterred it from launching a major attack. These included the strength of South Korea's military forces, stability of the ROK government, U.S. commitment to defend its ally, and the desire of China and the Soviet Union to maintain the status quo. Pyongyang's continuing investment in its military at the expense of the overall economy, however, indicated that North Korea planned to maintain its option for war as a means of achieving its overriding goal of reunification. Should North Korean leaders perceive a notable weakening in major deterrent factors in the future, IPAC believed they might consider military intervention. Widespread and prolonged instability in the south, accompanied by a serious deterioration in U.S.-ROK relations, would be the most dangerous developments that might induce the north to attack.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The following comparison was made by IPAC of North and South Korean ground, air, and naval forces as of 1981:[1]

	NORTH KOREA	REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Ground Forces		
Personnel Strength	685,500 (a)	544,300 (b)
Infantry Divisions/Brigades	37	24 (c)
Armor Divisions	2	0
Armor Brigades/Regiments	6	3

1. Ibid.

	NORTH KOREA	REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Ground Forces (cont.)		
Marine Divisions	0	2
Tanks and Assault Guns	2,945	1,224
Artillery	4,280	2,850
Multiple Rocket Launchers	2,045	0
Antiaircraft Artillery	9,000	1,900
Air Forces		
Personnel Strength	51,400	32,600
Fighters	635	414
Bombers	84	0
Transports	279	77
Helicopters	89	382 (d)
Trainers	122	92
Naval Forces		
Personnel Strength	31,300	23,700 (e)
Attack Submarines	19 (f)	0
Destroyers/Frigates	2	18
Missile Boats	21	11
Amphibious Craft/Ships	116	28
Coastal Patrol Types	327	61

Notes:

(a) Unclassified OSD/PA figure was 700,000.
(b) Includes ROK Marine Forces.
(c) Includes 2 ready reserve divisions at full peacetime TO&E, and the 88th Brigade which would become a division on M-Day.
(d) Includes Army and Navy helicopters.
(e) Excludes ROK Marine Forces.
(f) Excludes one 41-m transport submarine.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In mid-1981 General John A. Wickham, Jr., COMUSKOREA, advised Admiral Long of disturbing new trends in the Korean military balance which indicated a substantially greater North Korean military capability than was previously assessed, and which pointed to an even greater capability in the years ahead. At the same time, the ROK Force Improvement Plan was lagging and there was little prospect that economic conditions would permit a dramatic turnabout in the next several years. Developments of specific concern to COMUSKOREA included the following:[1]

- An electronics equipment plant in North Korea was producing two antiaircraft artillery (AAA) fire control radars for the ground forces that appeared to be of native design or modification, and probably were of local manufacture. The previous assessment had been that there was little likelihood

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1. COMUSKOREA 030231Z Jul 81 ~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~(EX), REVW 2 Jul 01.

North Korea could produce any sophisticated electronics equipment in the next decade (the 1980s).

- There was evidence, based on weapons shipments to Iran, that North Korea had been mass producing two, and possibly three, ground weapons systems that previously were assessed as being beyond their technological capability.

- A study of North Korean military industrial plants, completed in April 1981, concluded that more than half of the existing plants were undergoing major expansion during the 1976-1980 period.

- An in-depth review of North Korean artillery in the three corps areas immediately north of the DMZ showed that one-third to one-half of the towed artillery pieces deployed there had been converted to self-propelled (SP) systems. Although conversion had been in progress for several years, the rate and extent showed a dramatic increase. One unofficial estimate placed the countrywide SP artillery at 1,400--vice 580 at the time the earlier estimate was prepared. The deployment of SP AAA systems, including a newly confirmed probable 37mm weapon, was also increasing.

- The resurgence of naval construction also appeared to be of greater scope and significance than previously believed. New construction included a North Korean version of the OSA Class guided missile patrol boat and another vessel of unique design.

~~(S)~~ Although evidence on some of these developments had been building for some time, newer information and studies served to highlight the cumulative importance. At the same time, COMUSKOREA said there might be other equally significant programs ongoing or in preparation that had not been surfaced. A sustained high-priority effort in U.S. intelligence collection and analysis was required to keep abreast of North Korean force developments. He added that planning for ROK force improvement had to take full cognizance of these trends in North Korea's capabilities. Finally, unless unforeseen developments altered existing trends, COMUSKOREA believed that 1985 could see a further negative divergence in the military balance.[1]

North Korean Mine Warfare Capability

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ North Korea had no surface ships specifically designed for minelaying, but many units were equipped with mine rails which provided a capability for minelaying operations. Their 4 WHISKEY and 15 ROMEO Class submarines could carry 24 and 28 mines, respectively, in lieu of torpedoes. North Korean aircraft could also be used for minelaying; however, no related training had ever been noted. The north had only a limited minesweeping capability.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper (~~S/NF~~), 12 Feb 81, Subj: North Korean Mine Warfare Capability (U), REVW 12 Feb 01.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ North Korea was estimated to have approximately 7,000 Soviet-supplied naval mines in its inventory. About 5,000 were believed to be of the MKB variety, the standard Soviet moored contact mine; 1,400 were probably AMD-1000 and AMD-II-500 magnetic induction bottom mines; about 700 were obsolete M-26 and MYAM moored mines.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Aircraft capable of conducting minelaying operations included the AN-2 COLT light transport and IL-28 BEAGLE bomber. IPAC believed it was highly improbable, however, that North Korea would use the AN-2 in such a role. Minesweeping capability was limited to only two patrol ships (PGF).[1]

Infiltration and Tunneling Activities

~~(C)~~ North Korea committed six known hostile acts of armed infiltration attempts against South Korea during 1980: five by sea, resulting in the capture of one agent, the killing of 18 agents, and the sinking of three agent boats; and one across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), resulting in the killing of one agent. The ROK suffered five killed and nine wounded during these actions. North Korea's continuing attempts at infiltration demonstrated the emphasis they placed on it. In past years the bulk of detected infiltration attempts occurred during the March-October time frame; however, this pattern had apparently changed, and future attempts were expected at any time during the year.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ North Korea had been actively engaged in tunneling under the DMZ since 1972. Three tunnels leading into the ROK from the north were intercepted, with the last one being neutralized in October 1978. The biggest problem in detecting and neutralizing suspect tunnels was in locating their axes. It was also extremely costly and time consuming. Photographic intelligence detected a number of additional suspect tunnel sites--based on activity, spoil, and equipment--along or near the northern boundary of the DMZ, and of these, 18 were identified. Underground sounds, explosions, and vibrations continued to be heard or felt at several suspect and known tunnel sites. Sounds of tunneling also continued to be detected at the third discovered site, and borehole drilling was continued in an attempt to intercept additional axes of the main tunnel.[3]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Continuing activity indicated that North Korea had not given up on its tunneling efforts. These tunnels posed a serious threat to ROK forward defenses. Large numbers of conventional or unconventional forces could be inserted via these tunnels, at or just before the initiation of hostilities. The second and third discovered tunnels had been deep under the surface, about

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 28 Jan 81, Subj: North Korean Infiltration Attempts (U), REVW 27 Jan 87.
3. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NOFORN)~~, 30 Jan 81, Subj: Tunnel Detection/Neutralization Efforts (U), REVW 29 Jan 87.

2 by 2 meters in bore, and 1,600 and 3,500 meters in length, extending well south of the military demarcation line. Although these three tunnels had been neutralized, it was not known how many branches of these tunnels existed, or how many more of the suspect tunnels had been completed.[1]



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1. Ibid.

SECTION IV--THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Threat to ASEAN

~~(C)~~ Although the Soviet Union traditionally had lacked any significant presence in Southeast Asia, this trend was reversed after the consolidation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 1975. After that time the USSR began to provide direct economic and military support to all three Indochinese states, and obtained access to bases for intelligence collection activities and naval deployments into the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union also supported Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, the most critical issue existing in Southeast Asia in 1981, and opposed ASEAN diplomatic initiatives at the United Nations for a political solution.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In Southeast Asia the USSR maintained diplomatic relations and exchanged resident ambassadors with all five ASEAN members (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines), the three Indochinese states (Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea), and with Burma. The Soviets actively sought expanded trade relations with non-communist countries in this area, and had well-established joint shipping ventures in Singapore and the Philippines. Despite the Soviet emphasis on cultural and economic exchanges, however, ASEAN members saw both short and long term threats from the USSR. Soviet base activities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, long-range reconnaissance flights over the South China Sea, and naval power projection through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean, were viewed as growing capabilities in opposition to the U.S. presence at Subic and Clark in the Philippines. For the future, the Soviet Union was expected to extend its influence in all three Indochinese states by continuing to capitalize on Vietnam's military needs and economic weaknesses. At the same time, Soviet diplomatic and economic missions were expected to pursue increased contacts in the ASEAN states, including more joint venture proposals, more requests for ship visits and aviation access, expanded diplomatic residence, and large scale tropical commodity purchases.[2]

~~(S)~~ This rising interest in the ASEAN states reflected a Soviet desire to exercise a worldwide presence for purposes of prestige, international competition with China, diplomatic assistance to Vietnam, and sensitivity to exposed sea LOCs between European Russia and the Soviet Far East. The USSR had generally been critical of ASEAN; for much of its existence, this grouping had been labeled a U.S.-sponsored military alliance. The Soviets were also apprehensive that ASEAN could be used eventually by the Chinese to obtain their own objectives in the region. Moscow had little leverage with ASEAN members, and only minor contacts with insurgent and dissident groups there. The Soviets, at the

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 21 Dec 81, Subj: Soviet Involvement in Southeast Asia and Relations with ASEAN (U), REVW 16 Dec 01.
2. Ibid.

same time, were generally disliked and distrusted by the ASEAN population--but probably less feared than their competitor, China.[1]

~~(S)~~ China had long had an interest in the ASEAN states because of their proximity to the PRC, their large ethnic Chinese population, and because of the potential for trade. China's policy with regard to Southeast Asian nations underwent a change because of the deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations, the 1979 war between the two, and its aftermath. Since then, Beijing chose to emphasize state-to-state relations with ASEAN members, at the cost of curtailing aid to communist movements in the region. China desired a strong ASEAN to counter Vietnamese efforts to exercise "hegemony" in Southeast Asia. In particular, the PRC strengthened its relationship with Thailand, promising assistance in the event of attack by Vietnam. China was also attempting to woo those states with which it had no diplomatic ties--Singapore and Indonesia.[2]

Status of ASEAN

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Prior to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, ASEAN was a somewhat moribund organization arguing over tariff and economic schemes and fulfilling few important functions. Although leaders from member nations met with each other, little of substance had transpired. Also, while bilateral security agreements and exercises within ASEAN had increased since 1974, the members deliberately avoided broadening the organization into a multilateral defense pact. Military cooperation included bilateral operations, planning, and exchanges, but Thai and Indonesian efforts toward multilateral defense postures were strongly resisted by the rest of ASEAN. It was unlikely, in the opinion of IPAC, that ASEAN would develop into a military alliance, even in the extreme case of a full-scale Vietnamese invasion of Thailand. Only Singapore would likely commit other than token forces to support Thailand.[3]

~~(S)~~ Singapore had had difficulty obtaining maneuver space for both its army and air force. Malaysia would not allow Singapore access to Malaysian air or land space for military training purposes, despite their supposedly integrated air defense systems. As a result, Singapore used Philippine air space for air training and Taiwanese maneuver areas for tank and mechanized infantry training. The Thai and Malaysians, however, ran combined, coordinated, and unilateral operations along their common border as the insurgent situation warranted.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Vietnam's basic tactic in dealing with ASEAN was to undermine its unity. Of all the members, the Philippines had been the most muted concerning the war in Kampuchea. Manila did not feel particularly threatened by either Vietnam or China, and thus could be somewhat detached. It had come

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1. IPAC Point Paper (S), 17 Apr 81, Subj: Soviet and Chinese Activities in ASEAN (U), REVW 17 Apr 87.
2. Ibid.
3. IPAC Intelligence Summary ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, Apr 81, pp. 1-4, REVW 1 Jan 01.

under severe criticism from Vietnam for having supported U.S. efforts during the Vietnam war and for allowing U.S. bases at Clark and Subic. The Philippines was expected to support the majority ASEAN position but would not lead the way on the Kampuchean issue.

~~(C)~~ Thailand was uncomfortably aware of its frontline position in ASEAN's confrontation with Vietnam. The Thai felt that ASEAN's solid stance opposing the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea increased the pressure on the SRV to withdraw. The Thai also believed that their best short-term defense against a Vietnamese invasion was world opinion; therefore, they intended to keep world attention focused on the situation in Kampuchea. Bangkok was also insuring that Khmer resistance forces received sufficient arms to tie down the Vietnamese.[1]

Soviet Presence and Activities in Indochina

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In Vietnam the Soviet Union maintained 5,000-8,000 advisory personnel, including 2,500 military; in Laos they had approximately 2,000, including about 500 military; in Kampuchea Soviet personnel totaled some 450. Soviet advisers and technicians could be found within government echelons and in transportation, logistics, and military activities, as well as in economic and agricultural projects. Assistance to Vietnam had been the most extensive, with support valued at an estimated $1.8 billion for 1979. Aid was reduced to about $1.3 billion in 1980, and continued at an annual rate of about $1.1 billion in 1981. Approximately one-half of the assistance to Vietnam went to upgrading the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). As a result, Hanoi had the largest and best equipped fighting force in Southeast Asia. The remainder of Soviet aid supported some 100 economic projects designed to improve Vietnam's productivity. An example was the agreement in 1981 authorizing the expansion of Soviet oil and natural gas exploration rights along the Vietnam coast.[2]

~~(S)~~ Soviet naval-associated deliveries to Vietnam during 1979-1980 included PETYA Class light frigates, missile and other patrol boats, a minesweeper, landing ships, HORMONE ASW helicopters, STYX antiship missiles, and coastal defense missiles and radars. In return, Moscow obtained the use of Vietnamese naval and air facilities. In March 1981 the Soviets delivered two more OSA-II Class guided missile patrol boats (PTG) to the Vietnamese Navy. This brought to eight the number of PTGs in the Vietnamese inventory that had arrived since 1974.[3]

~~(S)~~ In Laos some 1,500 Soviet advisers and technicians were involved in the repair and construction of airfields, highways, hydroelectric plants, and

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid; IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 3 Jun 81, Subj: USSR Presence and Activities in Indochina (U), REVW 3 Jun 01; IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 24 Mar 81, Subj: USSR Presence and Activities in the SRV (U), REVW 26 Mar 87.
3. CINCPAC 040134Z Mar 81 ~~(S/REL INDONESIA)~~, REVW 3 Mar 87.

medical facilities. The USSR was also reportedly involved in assisting Laos in the exploitation of natural resources and the development of agricultural communes. About 500 Soviet advisers were assisting Laos in the reorganization and modernization of the Lao People's Liberation Army. Reports indicated that they had been assigned down to regimental level in artillery units. The USSR had also provided Laos with $40 to $50 million annually in economic assistance, and this was expected to increase to as much as $600 million between 1981 and 1985.[1]

~~(S)~~ Over $200 million in "urgent" aid was provided to Kampuchea during 1979 and 1980. The Soviets continued to assist in developing Kampuchean capital and social infrastructures, and reconstructing the economy. There were also indications that some Soviet advisers were involved in the planning and conduct of military operations against Khmer resistance forces. In addition, the USSR agreed to actively support Kampuchea's 1981-1985 Five-Year Economic Program.

~~(S)~~ The first deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft to Vietnam occurred in April 1979. Since then, TU-95 BEAR D reconnaissance aircraft and TU-142 BEAR F ASW aircraft maintained an almost continuous air reconnaissance capability at the Cam Ranh Bay military complex. Two BEAR Ds and two BEAR Fs were deployed at that base. This provided the USSR with the capability to observe U.S. and other countries' maritime activities in the South China and Philippine Seas, to conduct intelligence flights against the PRC, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and to perform ASW operations and training east of Luzon. In addition to flying reconnaissance, Soviet pilots were deeply involved in the training of Vietnamese Air Force pilots and maintenance people. Until May 1981 twelve AN-12 CUB transport aircraft had been deployed at Tan Son Nhut Airfield in Ho Chi Minh City, flying 10-20 logistical support missions a week throughout Indochina. CUB strength was reduced to five in May, probably because of improved Vietnamese Air Force transport capability.[2]

~~(S)~~ Soviet naval ships began making calls at the Vietnamese ports of Da Nang, Cam Ranh, Haiphong, and Ho Chi Minh City from February 1979. Since that time their presence increased markedly, with naval units basing out of both Da Nang and Cam Ranh. Cam Ranh was the primary maintenance and resupply base for Soviet ships operating in the Southeast Asia area. In addition, Soviet naval craft had made port calls at Kompong Som in Kampuchea.[3]

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 3 Jun 81, Subj: USSR Presence and Activities in Indochina (U), REVW 3 Jun 01.
2. Ibid; IPAC Point Paper (S/REL JAPAN), 10 Dec 81, Subj: Soviet Threat in the Pacific and Northeast Asia (U), REVW 10 Dec 87; J2/Memo/S055-82 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
3. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 3 Jun 81, Subj: USSR Presence and Activities in Indochina (U), REVW 3 Jun 01.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Soviet Union also constructed two FIX-24 direction finding systems on the Cam Ranh peninsula, and they began improving the airfield there. In 1980 they upgraded the air traffic control system, installed a ground controlled approach radar, emplaced storage tanks, conducted general maintenance on the seaward runway overrun, and established a land-based naval communications site. Later, the Soviets delivered a 4,500-ton drydock, established a floating pier and degaussing area, and put in a Park Drive mobile communications satellite terminal at Cam Ranh.[1]

Spratly Islands and the Vietnamese Navy

~~(S)~~ The issue of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, a group of geographically ill-defined coral isles, cays, and reefs extending over a wide expanse of the South China Sea, had been in dispute for more than a century. The SRV had occupied six islands of the group which were seized from the former South Vietnamese government in 1975. There had since been numerous low-level incidents between the Vietnamese and other claimants to the area. The SRV claim to a number of islands in the Spratly group was based on historical records of casual visits by Vietnamese fishermen. Other claimants, particularly the PRC, had more convincing and better documented claims. The remaining claimants were the Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Vietnam's interest in these islands evidently was related to the prospect of oil deposits in the offshore seabed, as well as to their strategic location near important sea lanes. Eventually, believed IPAC, Vietnam would probably like to control all of the Spratlys to help legitimize its questionable claims of sovereignty in the area. Should there be a significant development, such as a major discovery of oil, it was possible the Vietnamese might attempt to reinforce their claims in the Spratlys by military action.

~~(S)~~ Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines all maintained armed garrisons on various islands in the group. The SRV occupied Spratly Island, Southwest Cay, Sin Cowe Island, Sand Cay, Namyit Island, and Amboyna Cay. All, except the last, were fortified with 122mm artillery, 37/57mm antiaircraft artillery, trenches, bunkers, and numerous fixed positions for automatic weapons. Amboyna, apparently because of its small size (180 by 75 meters), was fortified only with a personnel trench and 10 to 12 foxholes. In all, an estimated 450 Vietnamese personnel were permanently garrisoned in the Spratlys. With the exception of Amboyna, all islands claimed by Vietnam had helicopter landing pads. In addition, Spratly Island had a 565-meter runway that could support utility and small transport aircraft such as the SRV's C-7As.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The ability of Vietnam to project power into the Spratlys was restricted by the size and capabilities of its navy, which was essentially only

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Intelligence Summary ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, Jan 82, pp. 2-4, REVW 1 Jan 02.

a coastal defense force. There were an estimated 106 operational craft in the inventory, excluding coastal junks and miscellaneous small craft. Most of the ships captured from South Vietnam were believed to be nonoperational. The three principal combatants of the SRV Navy were two PETYA Class frigates and one U.S.-built cutter retrofitted with STYX cruise missiles. Other important combatants included 8 OSA-II and 3 KOMAR patrol boats with STYX missiles, as well as a number of amphibious warfare vessels, minesweepers, and auxiliaries.

~~(S)~~ IPAC believed the operational Vietnamese navy, as constituted in 1981, was insufficient to conduct an effective coastal patrol and surveillance mission, and could not by itself successfully carry out offensive operations against islands in the Spratly group held by other countries. It was also unlikely the Soviets would actively support such actions because of the serious political risks involved in such a blatant act of aggression, for the questionable gains to be achieved.[1]

Vietnamese Threat to Thailand

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ At the end of 1981, IPAC believed that Vietnam would not attack Thailand in the near future. However, the possibility always existed that the SRV could conduct sweep operations along the Thai-Kampuchean border which could escalate into a major confrontation. Likewise, the SRV could change its strategy and decide to establish a buffer zone along the border, seize and hold Thai territory, or exercise any of several other options available to it. Thai armed forces were not manned, trained, nor equipped to counter a large-scale PAVN assault. Although Thailand was trying to improve on its shortcomings, a significant change in the near term was not expected.[2]

~~(S)~~ The Vietnamese had 21 division equivalents in Kampuchea. Eight of these were within 50 miles of the Thai border. PAVN forces could conduct combat operations across the border with up to divisional strength. However, about four divisions would be needed to establish a buffer zone. Factors that limited the PAVN from initiating decisive action against Thai territory were:[3]

- If the eight PAVN divisions near the border were used in the assault, other PAVN forces would have to be used to restrict infiltration and activities of Khmer resistance forces.

- To counter the perceived PRC threat to the home territory, over one-third of PAVN forces were committed to northern Vietnam, including the air force's best aircraft and air defense systems.

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF),~~ 24 Nov 81, Subj: SRV Threat to Thailand (U), REVW 24 Nov 01.
3. Ibid.

- PAVN forces in Kampuchea suffered from logistical, morale, and command and control problems.

- The perceived Soviet foreign policy in Southeast Asia was probably deterring any Vietnamese notion to attack Thailand. SRV's ailing economy and reliance on the USSR for virtually all forms of aid made Soviet concurrence necessary for any major offensive.

- The SRV had not deployed fighter aircraft to Kampuchea, and operating out of bases in Vietnam would limit loiter time and weapons load for missions into Thailand. Forward deployment of air force elements into Kampuchea would be necessary for a combined forces assault.

Insurgency in Thailand

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) had been in decline since its December 1978 falling out with Vietnam. Prior to 1975 the CPT had received virtually all of its material support through both North Vietnam and China, and although some equipment and training continued to be provided by Hanoi, the CPT was inspired and supported primarily by the Chinese. In 1981 the CPT revolutionary movement became weaker politically, militarily, and economically, and the party was generally at a standstill or in decline throughout the country. Factors contributing to this decline were a lack of appealing national issues, loss of propaganda support from southern China, loss of base areas for resupply and training in Laos and Kampuchea, and the Thai Government's amnesty and development programs. The estimated strength of the CPT armed insurgent group was 7,050. Responding to this decline in the revolutionary movement, there were indications that the CPT was taking a greater interest in urban operations. Reasons for this shift in strategy could be declining mass support in rural areas and infiltration by an alleged Soviet/Vietnamese faction.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A critical factor in the long term outlook for Thailand and its communist insurgency was the possibility of cooperation between the CPT and the Vietnamese. While a change in revolutionary philosophy on the part of the existing CPT leadership was unlikely, believed IPAC, a change to a younger, more pragmatic, more ethnic Thai leadership was possible. Along this line, in June 1979, a former Thai labor leader split from the pro-Beijing CPT to form a new communist movement which had strong backing from Moscow and Hanoi. This group was headquartered in Paksane, Laos, and was estimated to have a strength of 300.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although the Thai Government had recently been more concerned with the threat posed by Vietnamese forces stationed along the Kampuchean border, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon had stressed that the insurgency problem would continue to be the greatest threat to the nation's security. The

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 24 Nov 81, Subj: Update on Insurgency in Thailand (U), REVW 25 Nov 01; J2/Memo S055-82 of 4 Jun 82 (U).

government's response to the CPT had traditionally been a varying mixture of military suppression operations and economic development projects. These efforts, although somewhat successful, had not resulted in controlling the insurgency. In the meantime, the CPT remained a serious, though momentarily dormant, threat to the stability of Thailand.[1]

Indochinese Refugees

(U) In the 6 years since the communist takeover of the governments of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1975 more than 1.4 million Indochinese had fled the new regimes to seek asylum in neighboring countries or elsewhere. The refugee flow increased rapidly in late 1978 and early 1979, primarily because of warfare in Kampuchea and Vietnamese persecution and expulsion of ethnic Chinese. Total arrivals in countries of asylum for 1981 were expected to be 75-85,000. More than three-fourths of all Indochinese refugees had been permanently resettled, and major recipients, as of 31 December 1981, included the following countries:[2]

United States	567,652
China	265,334
France	83,113
Canada	81,402
Australia	60,706
West Germany	21,369
Belgium	5,125
Denmark	2,438

~~(C)~~ The refugee camp population in Southeast Asia at the end of 1981 was approximately 258,000. In addition, there were estimated to be more than 190,000 Khmer in encampments along the Thai-Kampuchean border. The number of Indochinese refugees in ASEAN countries as of 31 December 1981 was as follows:

Thailand	188,107
Philippines	23,329
Malaysia	9,845
Indonesia	14,991
Singapore	657

Indochinese refugees in other areas of Asia at that time were:

Hong Kong	12,960
Japan	1,798
Macao	1,196
Taiwan	345

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Intelligence Summary ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, Jan 82, pp. 8-9, REVW 1 Jan 02; J2/Memo/S055 of 4 Jun 82 (U).

(U) Thailand, the key refugee center, was attempting to reduce radically the number of new people arriving in-country. The government announced a new policy which decreed that after 15 August 1981, all Vietnamese or Lao refugees entering Thailand would be placed in "detention centers" and not allowed to resettle or volunteer for repatriation. The charge had been made that because the resettlement program had been so effective, many people decided to leave their homeland and resettle in countries with better standards of living. These people were not considered "refugees." Thailand and other first-asylum countries of Southeast Asia noted the change in attitude by the United States and other countries of final resettlement, and they decided to reevaluate their own policies on accepting refugees. They feared they could be saddled with large numbers of unwanted Indochinese refugees if major policy changes were made by the major resettlement countries.[1]

Threat to Malaysia

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In 1979 the Malaysian Government concluded that Vietnam might be in a position in 2 or 3 years to pose a conventional threat to the country. In response, Malaysia embarked on a rapid military modernization and expansion program which would double the personnel strength of all three services, add equipment, improve base facilities, and increase the military's maneuverability and firepower by 1983. The objective of the Malaysian plan was to transform the basically counterinsurgency force into a credible conventional one with a capability to cope with external threats from within the Southeast Asian region. While Malaysia had adequate financial resources for a gradual expansion, problems in training, manpower, logistics, and maintenance would make the goal difficult to reach by 1983.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Under the upgrading program, the army planned to double its strength to 100,000 and raise its reserve force to 120,000. At the end of 1981 it had a strength of some 76,000 personnel. The Army was also in the process of purchasing new equipment, and had agreed late in the year to buy 165 SIBMAS armored personnel carriers from Belgium. The navy was to develop improved maritime surveillance and mine warfare capabilities to patrol Malaysia's unilaterally declared 200-mile exclusive economic zone, protect offshore petroleum assets, and assist in keeping the Strait of Malacca open. To achieve this, the navy had contracted for two corvettes from West Germany and three mine-countermeasures ships from Italy. It also acquired a 4,000-ton command and control ship from West Germany. The navy planned to purchase additional fast patrol craft and possibly some mines.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Malaysia's air force was the smallest in ASEAN and had only 20 combat aircraft. To improve its capability, the government planned to increase air force strength to 12,000 personnel, build new airfields, and make several

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 10 Dec 81, Subj: Objective of Malaysian Armed Forces Modernization/Upgrading (U), REVW 10 Dec 87.

major aircraft purchases. They intended to develop a full fighter ground attack and close air support capability. The air force had already bought 44 Pilatus turboprop basic trainers from Switzerland and signed an agreement to purchase 88 refurbished A-4 Skyhawks from the United States. Near the end of 1981, however, the Malaysian Government was reconsidering the purchase of A-4s, in favor of a possible A-7 or even F-16 purchase. Costs and availability dates were key factors to weigh in making this decision.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) and the Northern Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) were the two active insurgent groups in Malaysia. In the 1970s personality and ideological conflicts split the CPM into three rival factions. The original CPM-Central Committee remained the largest faction, with an armed following of some 1,500. The CPM-Revolutionary Faction, with an estimated 130 guerrillas, broke away from the central group in 1970. The CPM-Marxist/Leninist group split in 1974. It was the fastest growing of the three, increasing from 200 at first to an estimated 825 armed members in 1981. While all three were Beijing-oriented, the two splinter groups favored increased terrorism and objected to China's establishment of diplomatic relations with Malaysia. The CPM was predominantly Chinese in composition and had not been effective in winning over ethnic Malays or broadening its base even among the Chinese minority.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The CPM guerrilla force operated in groups of from 5 to as many as 60 members. In peninsular Malaysia some 2,100 communist terrorists on the Thai side of the border and another 400 terrorists on the Malaysian side continued to carry out attacks periodically against Malaysian security forces and development projects. In Eastern Malaysia there were approximately 110 NKCP members in Sarawak and about 25 in Sabah. The various communist factions received no appreciable assistance from outside sources, although Beijing continued to maintain party-to-party relations. A clandestine radio station was operated by the CPM from southern Thailand, where they also obtained most of their income through extortion and taxation.[3]

Threat to Indonesia

~~(S)~~ Soviet activity in the South China Sea, together with its invasion of Afghanistan, appeared to be having a sobering effect on past Indonesian complacency about the USSR. Such complacency had been based on Indonesia's historically ambivalent attitude towards the Soviet Union, its independence from Soviet trade and aid ties, the constraint on its reactions by a policy of non-alignment, and its more emotional preoccupation with the Chinese threat to Southeast Asia. Although Jakarta's anti-communism and suspicion of all great powers had limited the Soviet Union's maneuverability, Indonesia did not begin

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 9 Dec 81, Subj: Insurgency Threat to Malaysia (U), REVW 9 Dec 87.
3. Ibid.

to perceive the USSR as a security threat until recent years. Soviet activities in Vietnam and the intervention in Afghanistan were largely responsible for Indonesia's change of attitude.[1]

~~(S)~~ Initially the Suharto government tended to rationalize Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, and even saw a strong Vietnam with hegemony over Indochina as a potential buffer between China (which Indonesia saw as expansionistic) and ASEAN countries to the south. Similarly, although increasingly watchful of Soviet ambitions in the region, many Indonesians believed that Vietnamese nationalism would soon reassert itself and Hanoi would limit its dependency on the Soviets. President Suharto had even said that increased U.S. and other Western contacts with Vietnam might increase Hanoi's self-confidence vis-a-vis China, and might help wean Vietnam from the Soviet Union. In any event, many Indonesians believed that a restricted Soviet presence could serve Jakarta's interests by acting as a counterbalance to alleged Chinese expansionism. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was more difficult for Jakarta to dismiss. Following strong protests from the majority Muslim community in Indonesia and criticisms from the Suharto government, Soviet-Indonesian relations began to deteriorate in 1980.

~~(C)~~ Jakarta was also concerned about the possible implications of the 1980 offshore oil agreement between Moscow and Hanoi. While there was no evidence that the pact provided for an increased Soviet naval presence, Indonesia feared that permanent Soviet bases might be justified by Moscow as necessary to protect exploration ships and drill rigs from allegedly hostile powers. Since sections of the potentially oil-rich area north of Natuna Island were claimed by both Jakarta and Hanoi, Indonesia felt that it could be considered a hostile power by Vietnam. Partly in response to the prospect of a growing Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea, Indonesia began to upgrade its navy, to hold naval exercises in the disputed area, and to improve the air facility on Natuna.

~~(S)~~ Although Indonesia began to perceive a greater Soviet threat, the Chinese problem still loomed. The Soviets were hopeful that Jakarta's traditional distrust of China would cause Indonesia to move away from the ASEAN position on Kampuchea. However, the invasion of Afghanistan and the oil agreement strengthened Jakarta's resolve to remain a politically active ASEAN member and to support the group's stand on Kamupchea. Although Indonesia was unlikely to be overly alarmed over Soviet actions in Indochina, bilateral relations between Jakarta and Moscow were expected by IPAC to probably remain cool.[2]

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 4 Nov 81, Subj: Indonesian Views of Soviet/SRV Relationship (U), REVW 4 Nov 87.
2. Ibid.

Internal Security in the Philippines

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The strongest and potentially most damaging internal threat to the government of President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was the New People's Army (NPA), the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines/Marxist-Leninist. The NPA had cadre in place throughout much of the country and conducted extortion, kidnapping, and liquidation operations against selected informers, local politicians, military personnel, and business entities identified with the Marcos regime. The NPA further capitalized on propaganda opportunities created by military abuses, economic disparities, restrictions on oppositionist political activity, and unfulfilled government promises. In recent years the NPA had stepped up overt military operations against the AFP. Total NPA strength was estimated at between 5,000 and 6,500 regulars, of which about 3,500 were armed and the remainder served in active combat support roles. An additional 5,000 service support personnel did not participate in military operations but were actively engaged in logistic and other support functions.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Muslim secessionist movement, in contrast with earlier years, was desultory in 1981 and seemed to be suffering from logistical and command linkage breakdowns, a lack of direction of short-term tactical objectives, and some restrictions on resource assistance from Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leaders living in the Middle East. Muslim rebels in the Philippines were estimated at 13,000 regulars, of whom over 9,000 were armed.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Total strength of the AFP was about 160,000, with 70,000 in the army, 43,400 in the constabulary, 27,600 in the navy (including 8,780 marines and 3,600 coast guard personnel), and 16,800 in the air force. The ground forces were the most heavily engaged against the NPA and the MNLF. When combined with the urban security mission in Manila, these operations kept the AFP fully committed throughout the archipelago. With the lifting of martial law on 17 January 1981 there were indications that the AFP had become somewhat constrained in executing security measures.[3]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The AFP could not withstand a major external conventional attack without assistance. Because of inadequacies in the budget the military had not even received the fuel necessary to maintain maneuverability in the field, which offset its advantage of superior strength in combatting insurgents. Low maintenance standards, logistics difficulties, materiel obsolescence, and low morale compounded this problem. The AFP would require

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 4 Nov 81, Subj: The Internal Security Situation in the Philippines (U), REVW 4 Nov 01; IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 4 Nov 81, Subj: Fact Sheet, Philippines (U), REVW 4 Nov 01.
2. Ibid.
3. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 4 Nov 81, Subj: Force Structure and Limitations of the Philippine Military (U), REVW 5 Nov 87.

major upgrading to contend with any serious external support for the NPA, a renewed and determined urban terrorism campaign, or external pressures.[1]

Burmese Insurgency

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Burma was a politically stable country, whose self-imposed isolation had kept it out of the mainstream of Asian political and economic dynamics. U Ne Win, President of Burma since he ousted U Nu in a bloodless coup in 1958, retired because of ill health on 9 November 1981. The Burmese Parliament selected U San Yu to succeed Ne Win, who remained as chairman of the Burma Socialist Program Party. There were several bases of power within Burma, but the only one worth considering in the short run was the army. The Burmese Army of 163,000 completely dominated the small, poorly equipped air force (9,000) and navy (7,000).[2]

~~(C)~~ The Burmese Government was opposed by as many as 30 or more separate insurgent organizations, which varied widely in strength, capability, and purpose. The Burmese Communist Party, with an armed strength of some 15,000, was the only insurgent group that posed any real political or military threat to the central government. However, the party, although supported by China, was a long way from reaching the point where it would be strong enough to expand from its border sanctuaries. The other insurgent elements were mostly ethnic and/or narcotics smuggling groups, with armed strengths of up to 3,500 personnel.[3]

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Burma's geography and economic policies made the total eradication of drug trafficking by insurgents a difficult task. There was no practical military solution, without Thai cooperation and common border control--which was beyond the realm of possibility for either the Burmese or the Thai. Even the Burmese Communist Party had become deeply involved in the opium trade as a means of financing its insurgency. American anti-narcotics assistance (providing aircraft, communications equipment, and intelligence) had greatly increased the frequency, level, and efficiency of Burmese field operations and the favorable results of these actions were becoming evident. Since 1974 the Burmese armed forces and police had initiated a series of poppy plant eradication programs. The Burmese had also experienced considerable success in interdicting and disrupting the narcotics caravans that carried the opiates south to Thailand. Continuing pressure on the traffickers was indicative of the importance the government placed on combating this activity, since it was primarily through the narcotics trade that the insurgents were able to acquire funds to maintain their organizations.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 16 Nov 81, Subj: Implications of Ne Win's Retirement on US/Burma Relations (U), REVW 16 Nov 87.
3. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 25 Nov 81, Subj: Status of Burmese Insurgency (U), REVW 25 Nov 81; J2/Memo/S055 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
4. IPAC Point Paper ~~(C/NOFORN)~~, 4 Nov 81, Subj: Status of Anti-Drug Trafficking Campaign Aimed at Insurgency Forces (U), REVW 4 Nov 87.

SECTION V--THREAT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

The Seychelles

~~(C)~~ Located midway between the coast of Kenya and the U.S. naval facility on Diego Garcia, the Seychelles were of strategic importance to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States maintained a satellite tracking station on the main island of Mahe, and the USSR was the Seychelles' major arms supplier. While rumors abounded in diplomatic circles that the Soviets were seeking naval access to the islands, the Seychelles had maintained a nonaligned stance, despite the government's criticism of the U.S. military presence on Diego Garcia.[1]

(U) The islands were under French rule from 1756 to 1814, when they were turned over to the British under the Treaty of Paris. The Seychelles became a separate British Crown Colony in 1903, and a sovereign republic in 1976. In June 1977 supporters of Prime Minister Albert Rene overthrew the government while President James Mancham was in London, and installed Rene as president. He promptly suspended the constitution and dismissed the parliament. In June 1979 the socialist Seychelles People's Progressive Front became the only recognized political party in the country.

~~(C)~~ On 25 November 1981 a large group of white mercenaries landed in Mahe aboard a Royal Air Swazi aircraft. In a gun battle at Pointe Larue Airport the Seychelles security force foiled the coup attempt, but not before 44 of the mercenaries had hijacked an Air India plane and flew to South Africa. The mercenaries, led by South African Michael Hoare, were arrested in Pretoria and subsequently released, with charges being filed only against Hoare and four of his men. This action convinced Rene of South African complicity in the coup attempt.

~~(S)~~ Following the aborted coup, the Soviet Union and France provided prompt support for the Rene Government. Two Soviet combat ships arrived in the Seychelles on 29 November and a French naval ship made a 1-day port call on the 28th. The Soviet ships, a KARA Class guided missile cruiser and a KRIVAK Class frigate, returned again to Victoria Harbor on 30 December. The American Charge d'Affaires in Victoria said these ships represented the growing dependence of the government on Soviet naval power in the face of a mercenary threat from South Africa. The Soviet Ambassador told the Charge that these ships did not have naval infantry embarked, but that they were certainly capable of putting ship detachments ashore to work as infantry. The ALLIGATOR Class amphibious transport that was in Victoria Harbor in early December, the Soviet Ambassador claimed, had about 100 naval infantry troops aboard and prepared to assist the Government of Seychelles if requested.[2]

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1. IPAC Intelligence Summary ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, Jan 82, pp. 24-25, REVW 1 Jan 02.
2. Ibid.; AMBEMB Victoria 02208/310533Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ While the Rene government claimed to be nonaligned, its socialist policies had led to concern in diplomatic circles that the republic's deepwater harbor in Victoria would become a Soviet naval installation. The 700-man Seychelles People's Liberation Army received training from Tanzanian instructors and was equipped with Soviet-supplied weapons. The Rene government's relations with the United States remained correct, despite its criticism of the U.S. military presence on Diego Garcia. The lease for the NASA tracking station in the mountains of Mahe, formerly $1 million a year, was renewed for 10 years in June 1981 at an annual rent of $2.5 million. In addition, the United States assured Rene that economic support funds of $2 million per year would be approved by Congress. The new rent was considerably less than the $10 million a year originally demanded by Rene. IPAC believed that Rene's paranoia concerning the possibility of a West-supported coup attempt, plus his socialist principles, would probably lead him to closer relations with the Soviets. But it was unlikely that he would permit exclusive Soviet access to the islands' naval and air facilities.[1]

Threat to Diego Garcia

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The most credible threat to Diego Garcia continued to be from unconventional attack by former island plantation workers or politically motivated cadre from Mauritius, some 1,300 miles to the southwest. There were indications that the Libyans and possibly the Soviets were actively assisting Marxist groups on Mauritius. The Mauritian Militant Movement, a Marxist oriented party, publicly espoused the return of Diego Garcia to Mauritius, to include the use of force if necessary. This group had been in contact with the Libyan People's Bureau in Port Louis, Mauritius, and was believed to be receiving money and training from Libya. The exposed location of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean made it an attractive target for international terrorist groups which considered any attack against U.S. military personnel or installation politically desirable.[2]

~~(C)~~ Diego Garcia's small size, narrowness, and flat terrain limited the size, disposition, and maneuver potential of forces defending the island, thereby increasing its vulnerability to attack. The exposed nature of facilities on the island also contributed to its vulnerability to both conventional and unconventional attack. (See Plans Chapter for defense plans.)[3]

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1. IPAC Intelligence Summary ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, Jan 82, p. 26, REVW 1 Jan 02.
2. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, 12 Jan 81, Subj: Threat to Diego Garcia (U), REVW 12 Jan 87.
3. Ibid.

India

Soviet Aid

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The Soviet Union continued to provide India with generous military and economic aid in order to maintain its close relations and insure Indian reliance on Moscow. Since 1954 the USSR had provided India with about $2.2 billion in economic aid and $4 billion in military equipment. India was the Soviet Union's major trading partner among the developing countries. New Delhi's heavy dependence on Moscow was being reinforced as India sought more sophisticated hardware to counter U.S. arms aid to Pakistan.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Soviet deliveries on the May 1980 $1.4-billion arms agreement commenced in late 1980 and were continuing through 1981. The Indian Air Force would receive MIG-23 FLOGGERS (90 assembly kits and 165 licensed for internal production), 8 MIG-25 FOXBAT reconnaissance aircraft, and air-to-air missiles and electronic equipment. The Indian Army would receive some 300 T-72 tanks (with an option to switch to newer-generation T-80 main battle tank in 1983), 150 BMP-1 armored combat vehicles, and antitank and SA-6 air defense missile systems. The Indian Navy would receive three NANUCHKA Class missile patrol craft, SS-N-2 STYX missiles, and KA-25 helicopters. New Delhi was also seeking the SAM-8 or SAM-9 missile, and was considering the purchase of AN-32 medium transport aircraft, AN-76 heavy transport aircraft, and POLNOCNY Class medium landing ships.[2]

Dispute with Pakistan

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said in August 1981 that Indian concern over advances in the Pakistani nuclear program was exacerbated by mid-year U.S.-Pakistan military-economic negotiations, particularly the possible provision of F-16 aircraft to Islamabad. The media highlighted Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's public utterances of seeing "war clouds on the horizon," an alleged Pakistani military buildup along the border, and shooting incidents along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. DIA believed these were probably intended by the Gandhi administration to muster domestic support for government programs, stimulate concern in Washington over increasing Indo-Pakistani tension to discourage U.S. decisions to supply arms (or at least more sophisticated arms) to Pakistan, pressure Pakistan into modifying its nuclear and defense programs, and provide a rationale for requesting increased support from the Soviet Union. The media campaign succeeded in generating fears in India that hostilities might be forthcoming. The USSR also picked up on the theme of Indo-Pakistani tensions, accusing Islamabad of provocations, and promising India aid in countering Pakistani improvements in conventional arms.[3]

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL/REL UK/AUS/NZ)~~, 7 Dec 81, Subj: Soviet Initiatives in India (U), REVW 7 Dec 01.
2. Ibid; J2/Memo/S055 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
3. DIA 140345Z Aug 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~, REVW 13 Aug 01.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ New Delhi would monitor Pakistan's nuclear developments and subject its acquisition of conventional armaments to intense scrutiny. India was expected to increasingly pressure Pakistan to limit its military ties with the United States and abandon the development of nuclear weapons. If, as a last resort, India decided to attack Pakistan, the nuclear facilities would be principal targets, but predicting the timing of such a decision was problematic, said DIA.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In the event of war, and because of India's overwhelming military superiority, Pakistan could only hope to deter an Indian victory long enough for the United Nations or the superpowers to impose a cease-fire. India's 990,000-man army had 12 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 7 independent brigades deployed against Pakistan. These units were capable of immediate offensive and defensive operations against Pakistan; 1 armored and 7 infantry divisions were available for reinforcement. For Pakistan, all but 4 infantry divisions of its 408,000-man army in 16 divisions and 4 brigade groups were deployed against India. Their army divisions were inferior in equipment and organization, however. In addition, the Indian Air Force and Navy enjoyed a similar superiority over their Pakistani counterparts. Against a major Indian invasion, estimated DIA, Pakistan's military forces were capable of maintaining organized resistance for only 2 to 3 weeks.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Indian military action aimed solely at Pakistan's nuclear installations appeared unlikely because of the high probability that any such attack would precipitate general warfare, including attacks on India's own nuclear facilities. Major conventional hostilities also remained unlikely for the immediate future. Minor shooting incidents along the cease-fire line in Kashmir could be expected to continue and could escalate into wider hostilities. Pakistan would continue its attempts to avoid hostilities with its militarily superior neighbor. However, said DIA, Indian concern over Pakistani nuclear developments had been heightened in 1981, and Indian opposition to U.S. military assistance had become particularly vocal. In the future, should the Indian political leadership conclude that Pakistani nuclear and/or conventional capabilities threatened Indian preeminence on the subcontinent, it could favor military action during which Pakistani nuclear facilities would be high-priority targets.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Islamabad took New Delhi's threats in stride and, when announcing formal acceptance of the U.S. aid package in mid-September, offered to exchange guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force with India. This offer surprised New Delhi to such an extent as to result in its inability to make a substantive response. Indian leaders bickered for 2 months over the timing and method of conveying the response, then challenged Pakistan's sincerity and dredged up the history of similar Indian offers. Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Rao, in late

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1. Ibid; J2/Memo/S055 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
2. DIA 140345Z Aug 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~, REVW 13 Aug 01.

November speeches, however, made statements which appeared to indicate a willingness to pursue the proposal. Mrs. Gandhi reportedly would allow negotiations with Pakistan to proceed in order to demonstrate a desire to improve relations and avoid an arms race on the subcontinent, feeling that such a stance would be useful in discussions in New Delhi in late December with the U.S. Secretary of State. However, India's minimum demand reportedly would be that Pakistan halt its latest arms acquisition program, a demand Gandhi knew would be unacceptable to Islamabad.[1]

Nuclear Developments

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ [redacted]

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ [redacted]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ [redacted]

1. DIA 071151Z Dec 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~, REVW 6 Dec 01.
2. IPAC Intelligence Summary ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~, Oct 81, pp. 14-16, REVW 1 Jan 01.

[redacted]

Threat to Pakistan

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The Soviet Union was exerting pressure on Pakistan in an attempt to induce President Zia Ul-Haq to change his firm policy of opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, curb Pakistani aid to the Afghan resistance, avoid close alignment with the United States and China, and curtail lobbying at international forums against Soviet policy. Soviet-Afghan forces increased the frequency and intensity of their air and ground violations of the Afghan/Pakistan border in an attempt to intimidate General Zia to curb aid to the resistance, undermine his credibility as defender of Pakistani territory, and push Afghan refugees into more populated parts of Pakistan. Moscow was also attempting to undermine the Zia government by providing aid to Pakistani leftists, including students and Baluchi/Pushtun separatists. IPAC believed a Soviet military move against Pakistan was possible, especially if Pakistan appeared on the verge of disintegration or its army was tied down by mass civil unrest.[2]

~~(S)~~ The Pakistani military would engage any major Soviet-Afghan incursion into their territory. However, the overwhelming military superiority of the Soviets and their demonstrated willingness to utilize military might precluded any overt military action Pakistan might take in response to the situation in Afghanistan. IPAC said Pakistan's response would continue to be covert. The mainstay of Pakistan's covert activity had been the training and arming of selected Afghan resistance groups, an approach which had reportedly been in operation since at least early 1980. Pakistan was very sensitive about this issue, and closely guarded all information on the location of any training centers or weapons dispersal sites. The Soviets intensified the number of air incursions into Pakistan, strafing border posts and Afghan refugee centers in an effort to demonstrate displeasure with Pakistani support to the resistance. Such actions outraged both the Pakistani Government and the general population. It appeared increasingly likely to IPAC late in 1981 that Pakistan might fire on future Soviet-Afghan incursions into Pakistani airspace.[3]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Soviet and Afghan aircraft violated Pakistani airspace in the border region at will. Most of these incursions were for reconnaissance and/or "hot pursuit" of Afghan rebel forces. Those involving hostile action were designed to intimidate the government of Pakistan and disrupt the Afghan resistance. Periodic cross-border attacks could be expected to continue, and

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper (~~S/NF/WNINTEL/REL UK/AUS/NZ~~), 7 Dec 81, Subj: India, Pakistan, USSR, Afghanistan Relations (U) REVW 7 Dec 87; J2/Memo/SO55 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
3. IPAC Point Paper (~~S/REL UK/AUS/NZ~~), 7 Dec 81, Subj: Pakistani and Indian Military Options in Afghanistan (U), REVW 7 Dec 87.

would be publicly reported only when there was political and diplomatic advantage to be gained by Pakistan. These attacks in themselves were not likely, said IPAC, to escalate into a major confrontation between Pakistan and the Soviets. Pakistan claimed there had been 371 airspace violations and 62 "territorial violations" since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, but there was no intelligence to confirm or deny this claim.[1]

(U) On 5 September 1981 the Ministry of Defense in Islamabad announced that two Afghan MIG-17s had crossed into Pakistani airspace three times that day and strafed a border post at Domandi (north of Chaman in Baluchistan). Two civilians working at the post were reportedly wounded and some damage was inflicted on the post itself.[2]

~~(C)~~ The Pakistan Government reported yet another attack by Afghan helicopter gunships on 2 December. In this latest incident two helicopters entered Pakistani airspace near Inam Bostan, about 10 miles from Nushki in Baluchistan. They allegedly strafed two civilian buses, killing five and injuring three people. The helicopters also reportedly rocketed a frontier corps post at Inam Bostan and retreated into Afghanistan when personnel at the post returned fire. Taking a somewhat stronger line than had previously been the case, the Pakistan Government lodged a strong protest with the Afghan Charge in Islamabad and told him that Pakistan had taken serious note of the repeated violations of its territory resulting in the loss of lives, and warned that it would be justified in taking appropriate countermeasures in exercising the right of self-defense. In terms of loss of life, the 2 December 1981 incident was the most serious to that date and was likely, believed the American Embassy in Islamabad, to contribute further to the growing public reaction and concern that the government should offer greater protection to the people.[3]

Soviets in Afghanistan

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ By the end of 1981 the Soviets had been militarily involved in Afghanistan for a full two years, with the primary objective of trying to maintain the existence of the Kremlin-installed Babrak Karmal government in Kabul. Soviet forces had been able to seize and maintain control over most major urban centers. However, this control was tenuous and was challenged daily by resistance sniper and sapper attacks. Neither the Soviets nor the decimated Afghan Army maintained any significant control over the rural areas, and overland routes were routinely interdicted by resistance forces.[4]

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~, 16 Sep 81, Subj: Afghan Intrusions Into Pakistan (U), REVW 16 Sep 01.
2. AMEMB Islamabad 11596/060331Z Sep 81 (U).
3. AMEMB Islamabad 16117/030548Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 3 Dec 87.
4. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, 22 Sep 81, Subj: Soviet Military and Political Situation in Afghanistan (U), REVW 22 Sep 01.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Soviet Union appeared to have the primary political goal of gaining international recognition of the Karmal regime as the legitimate government, and in so doing, attaining tacit acknowledgment of the claim that its presence was the lawful fulfillment of a request for help from a legal government. The attainment of such recognition would greatly boost Soviet efforts to label foreign aid to the resistance as unlawful interference in a country's internal affairs. Consequently, Kabul and Moscow had rejected all suggestions of negotiations that did not involve direct dealings with the Karmal government. The United Nations had offered to mediate any talks that might develop; however, no softening of Soviet/Afghan demands was expected.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ At the end of the year the Soviet Union had the following forces committed to Afghanistan:[1]

93,000 troops in-country
32,000 troops on the Soviet-Afghan border
160 MI-8 HIP assault helicopters
94 MI-24 HIND attack helicopters
36 MI-6 HOOK transport helicopters
40 MIG-21 FISHBED fighters
15 SU-17 FITTER C/D ground attack aircraft
12 SU-25 RAM J attack aircraft

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The price to the Soviets for their occupation of Afghanistan had been relatively light, with the cost approximating $2.5 million per day and a casualty rate of less than 1 percent per month. In addition to a tenacious resistance, the Soviets had to contend with deep fractures and internecine fighting within the Afghan People's Democratic Party. This lack of unity greatly hampered their attempts to formulate a functional government. Most estimates placed the party's membership at only about 50,000, underscoring the government's lack of popular support.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Afghanistan's neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, had joined most members of the Islamic Conference, the ASEAN members, and China, in condemning the Soviet presence and had broken or reduced their diplomatic relations with the Karmal regime. In an effort to assist the Afghan resistance the Saudis, Egyptians, Chinese, and Malaysians had actively provided monetary aid or military equipment to the resistance through the Pakistani government. Among the major PACOM area powers, only India and Vietnam had not condemned the Soviet invasion. New Delhi saw political differences with Moscow as less significant than the dependable, on-going military and economic aid relationship with the Soviets.[3]

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1. Ibid; J2/Memo/S055 of 4 Jun 82 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 12 Jan 81, Subj: Current Reaction of the Afghan People, Neighboring Countries, and PACOM Countries to the Continued Presence of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan (U), REVW 12 Jan 87.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ At the end of the year the Soviets appeared to have four basic options remaining in Afghanistan: maintaining the status quo, augmenting their forces, withdrawing their forces and capitulating, or settling for a political compromise. For the near term, it appeared most likely to IPAC that the Soviets would implement force augmentation in Afghanistan. Soviet forces there continued to be plagued by chronic problems of urban terrorism, inability to secure major LOCs, and an apparent increase in the effectiveness of the resistance. The Afghan military, numbering roughly 25,000, suffered from poor training and low morale, with most of the members at least sympathizing with the resistance forces. The low effectiveness of the Afghan Army continued to force the Soviets to remain the dominant power in the country.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The Afghan resistance enjoyed the support of the majority of the Afghan population, thereby insuring its continued struggle. With two years of combat experience and expanded foreign support, the resistance was showing signs of enhanced combat effectiveness. It controlled most rural portions of the country. The continued deterioration of the security situation would most likely compel the Soviet Union to augment its forces in Afghanistan. The resistance would not abate, however, as long as the general populace viewed the Soviets as anti-Islamic invaders. Consequently, it appeared to IPAC that the Soviets would ultimately be forced to seek a political solution to the problem.[2]

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1. IPAC Point Paper ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL/REL UK/AUS/NZ)~~, 7 Dec 81, Subj: Soviet Military Options in Afghanistan (U) REVW 7 Dec 87.
2. Ibid.

COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH (U)

USSR·

MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY

7	Combined Arms Army Headquarters	
3	Corps Headquarters	
46	Motorized Rifle Divisions	(TO 12,468)
6	Tank Divisions	(TO 9,768)
4	Artillery (Gun) Divisions	
6	Motorized Rifle Brigades	
12	Artillery Brigades	
7	SS-1 (SCUD) Brigades	
4	SS-12 (SCALE BOARD) Brigades	

PERSONNEL.....434,000··

· Includes Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaykal, and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia.

·· Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews and support elements of the air forces; (d) Internal Security Forces (33,250) and Border Guard Troops (8,750).

CHINA

126	Infantry Divisions	(TO 14,308)
38	Artillery Divisions:	
17	Field Artillery	(TO HOW 6,654)
4	Antitank	(TO 3,083)
17	Antiaircraft Artillery*	(TO 5,351)
12	Armored Divisions	(TO 6,642)
3	Airborne/Air Transportable Divisions	(TO 9,995)
35	Border Defense/ID Divisions	(TO 6,987)
48	Garrison Divisions	(TO 8,728)
14	Railway Engineer Divisions	(TO 14,188)
299	Independent Regiments	

PERSONNEL Army:.....3,926,000

** 30 Additional AAA divisions are subordinate to the Air Force Defense Command of the Air Force.*

NORTH KOREA

8	(possibly 9) Conventional Corps	
1	Special Corps	
25	Infantry Divisions	(TO 10,400-11,700)
3	Mechanized Infantry Divisions	(TO 11,400)
4	Motorized Infantry Divisions	(TO 11,400)
2	Armored Divisions	(TO 8,000)
5	Infantry Brigades	(TO 3,300/9,000)
5	Infantry Brigades (Reinforced)	(TO 2,940)
	At Least 20 Light Infantry/ Reconnaissance Brigades	(TO 3,800)
6	Armored Brigades	(TO 1,900)
3	Amphibious Brigades	(TO est 1,750)

PERSONNEL:.....Current estimated Strength 685,000

VIETNAM

REGULAR FORCES

46	Infantry Divisions	(TO 10,400)
15	Economic Reconstruction	(TO 10,000)
9	Engineer Divisions	(TO 10,000)
10	Artillery Regiments	(TO 1,200)
27	Independent Infantry Brigade/Regiments	(TO 3,000)
37	Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments	(TO 1,000)
10	Engineer Regiments	(TO 1,200)
8	Surface-to-Air Missile Regiments	(TO 950)

PERSONNEL:.....Regular Army 750,000-1,000,000

Militia — estimated to consist of 1.6 million people's militia/self-defense forces and three million reserve forces.

REGIONAL/LOCAL FORCES:

Full-time troops assigned to provinces/districts armed with semi-and automatic weapons and medium caliber artillery weapons.

SECURITY FORCES:.....Armed Public Security Forces 16,500

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 52, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH (U)
FAR EAST & PACIFIC

CATEGORY		USSR	CHINA	NORTH KOREA	VIETNAM	KAMPUCHEA	TOTAL
SUBMARINES	NUCLEAR						
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	25	1				26
	CRUISE MISSILE	20					20
	TORPEDO ATTACK	22[1]	2				24
	DIESEL						
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	7	1				8
	CRUISE MISSILE	4					4
	LONG RANGE ATTACK	24 (1)					24 (1)
	MEDIUM RANGE ATTACK	14 (17)	105	19			138 (17)
	UNDETERMINED/MISCELLANEOUS TYPE	5		1			6
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS	VSTOL CARRIER	1					1
	CRUISERS (MISSILE)	9					9
	CRUISERS (GUN)	3 (1)					3 (1)
	DESTROYERS (MISSILE)	7 (1)	10				17 (1)
	DESTROYERS (GUN)	10 (5)					10 (5)
	FRIGATES (FF/FFG, MISSILE)	9	24				33
	FRIGATES (FFL, GUN)	42	5	2	2		51
MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS & SUPPORT SHIPS	PATROL SHIPS	198	1,032	406	67[7]	34[7]	1,737
	MINE WARFARE TYPES	93	44		1		138
	AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES	55	57	123	35		270
	NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPES	230	322	4			556
	SERVICE CRAFT	[4]	1,275[5]	100	157		1,532
PERSONNEL STRENGTH		308,100[6]	325,000[7]	31,300	6,000	UNK	

NOTE (U) Figures in parentheses indicate additional units in reserve

[1] (S) Includes 2 YANKEE SSN conversions.
[2] (U) Many Vietnamese units believed to be inoperable.
[3] (U) Figure is approximate as present status of Kampuchean Navy is difficult to determine.
[4] (U) Included in Auxiliary Count.
[5] (U) Includes about 450 LCM, LCU.
[6] (U) Includes personnel in Naval Aviation, Navy Infantry, and Coastal Defense.
[7] (U) Does not include 38,000 personnel of Naval Air Forces

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~; p. 56, REVW 13 Feb 02.

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES (U)

	USSR[1]		CHINA		NORTH KOREA	VIETNAM	TOTAL
	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	AIR FORCE	
COMBAT AIRCRAFT[2]							
Bomber (Long-Range)	97	18					115
Bomber (Intermediate Range)	85	102	107	9			303
Bomber (Medium Range)			419	131	72		622
Air Defense Fighter (Day)			3,296	583	323	56	4,258
Air Defense (All Weather)	683		281	49	129	185	1,327
Counter Air	330						330
Ground Attack	606	16	568	31	18	57	1,296
Reconnaissance	226	43	171	28	34	4	506
Electronic Warfare	44	17	5				66
Command, Communications, Control, AWAC	8	8	433	22			471
Airborne Refueling	25	21					46
Antisubmarine Warfare							135
Helicopter-Combat Assault/Gunship	554	135[3]			53	18	625
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT[4]							
Transport (Long-Range)	2				2	1	5
Transport (Medium-Range)	162	10	184	11	12	61	440
Transport (Short-Range)	157	14	85	32	277	53	618
Training	1,014	14	2,399	180	265	239	4,111
Helicopter-Support (Heavy)	35	12	3			22	72
Helicopter-Support (Medium)	338	19	198	55	13	88	711
Helicopter-Support (Light)	69	3	7		23		102
Research and Development			18	2			20
Utility/Miscellaneous	246				3	3	252
TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT	3,018		6,133		629	320	10,100
TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT	2,095		3,174		595	467	6,331
GRAND TOTAL	5,113		9,307		1,224	787	16,431
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS	148,000	22,000	492,000[5]	38,000	47,000	12,200	759,200

[1] (U) Includes all combat and support aircraft in the Far East, Transbaykal, Siberian Central Asian, and Mongolian Military Districts and the Far East Bomber Corps

[2] (U) Combat Aircraft. Fighter and bomber aircraft, which are used in fighter, ground attack, bomber/tanker, antisubmarine warfare roles, or reconnaissance/electronic warfare roles.

[3] (U) Includes antisubmarine warfare helicopters.

[4] (U) Combat Support Aircraft: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of utility liaison aircraft, and jet fighter trainers

[5] (U) Includes 220,500 Personnel assigned to SAM and AAA units

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 50, REVW 13 Feb 02.

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES (U)

COUNTRY		TYPE	COMPLEXES	SITES	LAUNCHERS
USSR*	SURFACE TO SURFACE	ICBM IRBM (SS-20 BASES) TOTAL	8 10 18		458 90 548
	SURFACE TO AIR	SA-2 SA-3 SA-5[1]	145 73 33		
CHINA	SURFACE TO SURFACE	ICBM IRBM } 64 MRBM } TOTAL		10 64 74	4 — 6 60 — 101 41 — 50 105 — 157
	COASTAL DEFENSE	CSSC-2		23	90
	SURFACE TO AIR	SA-2		115[2]	564 (est.)
NORTH KOREA	SURFACE TO AIR	SA-2		128 (45 OCC)	273 (est.)
VIETNAM	SURFACE TO AIR	SA-2 SA-3[3]		26 17	142 49

* *Far East, Transbaykal, Siberian, and Central Asian Military Districts.*

[1] *(S) SA-5 complexes may consist of 1 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.*
[2] *(S) Ninety-four occupied: CHICOM SA-2 sites may consist of 6 launchers.*
[3] *(S) Battalions move between prepared sites, four of which are known to be outside the Hanoi, Haiphong, Phuc Yen Triangle.*

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NE)~~ p. 49, REVW 13 Feb 02.

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CHAPTER III

PLANNING

SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 83 Posture Statement

(U) As had been the case every year since 1973, the Chairman of the JCS again asked CINCPAC to provide input for his annual posture statement, which he presented to the Congress. The Chairman asked CINCPAC for current information and assessments regarding PACOM support for U.S. national security objectives; challenges to U.S. security objectives; U.S. force and supporting capabilities to counter the challenges to U.S. security at the time and in the near future; an assessment of existing and near-term risks; and other subjects appropriate for inclusion.[1]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's reply, which provided some personal thoughts, was dated 25 September 1981. First he said that the details he had submitted in the previous year's input remained valid. CINCPAC stated:[2]

> The most demanding challenge facing the U.S. military in the decade of the eighties will be to develop and to demonstrate the capability to successfully defeat the growing Soviet threat to vital U.S. interests throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas without compromising our capability to win in Europe.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC noted that while the Chairman's FY 82 statement had been an excellent product and its thrust and direction generally on track, he recommended a reorientation that focused on three points. First, the PACOM area was eminently important to vital U.S. and Free World interests, not only militarily but economically and politically as well. Second, the Soviets were well aware of this and had taken numerous steps over the previous decade to improve their capabilities and expand their influence throughout the region. Third, there had been a general reduction in U.S. force levels in the theater during this same period, a trend that not only affected our capabilities, but also adversely impacted upon allied and adversary perceptions of the U.S. commitment in the region. Those realities had to be accounted for when global strategies were being developed and defense allocations were being made to support them.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC said the picture in the PACOM area had changed dramatically. The military, political, and economic importance of the vast PACOM region had increased enormously. The Soviets had clearly recognized this and had taken

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1. JCS 041425Z Sep 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC 250430Z Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 23 Sep 87.

impressive steps to increase their presence and influence; we had not. Priorities established in the new Defense Guidance (discussed below) were a much needed first step. "Now we must reallocate and earmark a significantly larger share of our total defense resources to the Pacific Command to support those priorities, and I believe the posture statement is the appropriate vehicle for emphasizing these imperatives."[1]

CINCPAC's Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services

(U) For some years CINCPACs had been making annual appearances before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. On 20 February 1981 Admiral Long appeared before the committee for testimony and a statement of posture and requirements in the PACOM. In his written statment prepared for the committee, Admiral Long said:[2]

> The recurring theme in my statement to you is the need to redress the imbalance in forces and influence, both real and perceived, between the United States and the Soviet Union in the area of the Pacific Command. A fundamental tenet of US defense policy has been that the United States, in conjunction with its allies, must be able to deal simultaneously and successfully with one major and one minor non-nuclear contingency--the so-called one and one-half wars strategy. Implicit in this concept for some was the view that a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation can and will be contained to the European theater--a notion that I find hard to accept. Given the fact that the Soviet presence and military capability in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions are steadily increasing--both quantitatively and qualitatively-- I conclude that a US force structure designed for one and one-half wars is no longer valid. We need to meet the Soviet Soviet threat as it is, not as we would like it to be. We cannot predicate national defense policy on a strategy that may concede the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific to the Soviets. We must begin now to build a force structure for the 1980s that will protect our fundamental national interests wherever they are challenged.

(U) In his opening statement to the committee, Admiral Long said that in his testimony the previous year he had stated that the United States and its

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1. Ibid.
2. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2614, Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, and H.R. 2970, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, and Consideration of Report on the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1982., Part I. (U).

allies retained a slim margin of superiority over the Soviets in the Pacific Command. "Today I must report that I no longer believe that the margin that we need exists. Frankly, it is too close to call." He urged that "we shift the real and perceived balance of power in the Pacific and Indian Ocean away from the Soviets."[1]

CINCPAC Participation in the Revised Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

(U) On 27 March 1981 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, III, published a memorandum on management of the Defense Department's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that notified agencies throughout the department that the Reagan Administration intended to revise the system. Inherent in the revision was the intention to involve the unified and specified commanders in all aspects of the system. Revision to the PPBS was further outlined in a second memorandum from the Deputy Secretary in early June in which he detailed a calendar of events and milestones for the FY 83-87 planning and programming cycle.[2]

~~(S)~~ That second memorandum was closely followed by the "transition year" FY 83-87 Defense Guidance on which CINCPAC provided formal comment. That document, which replaced the Carter Administration's "Draft Consolidated Guidance" documents, outlined in broad terms the national security objectives and provided guidance to the Defense Department, the Services, and the unified and specified commanders on roles, missions, and capabilities. The significance of the transition year Defense Guidance was that it signaled a fundamental policy shift from regional conflict with a NATO orientation to one that noted the need for an aggressive, global defense capability that could carry the war to the Soviets "at times and places of our choosing." Admiral Long endorsed this change in emphasis, believing that the change would allow the PACOM to receive attention more in proportion to its position in U.S. defense needs and with respect to the growing Soviet threat in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.[3]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC said that while the policies and objectives were "ambitious," they were the "right ones," and the funding shown should support real progress toward that achievement. "We must not forget, however, that the greater part of the distance can only be traveled via an expansion of forces sufficient to match or exceed Soviet power simultaneously in key air, land, and sea areas."[4]

(U) CINCPAC also provided thoughts on some working details. He noted that his headquarters was not geared for and time might preclude comment on or full review of each PPBS phase. There was also some concern that the plan of action

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1. Ibid.
2. J5323 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 Jan 88; JCS 012228Z Apr 81 (U).
3. J5323 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 Jan 88.
4. CINCPAC 170930Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Apr 87.

did not allow sufficient time for CINC actions, or necessary documentation for theater commanders to contribute effectively to advertised goals.[1]

~~(S)~~ In July CINCPAC was notified by the JCS Director of Plans and Policy of JCS intent to include the unified and specified commanders in testimony before the Defense Resources Board (DRB) on the Service FY 83-87 Program Objectives Memoranda. Based on input from the component commands and his own staff, Admiral Long appeared before the board on 7 and 10 August. In his 7 August presentation Admiral Long noted the significance of the Pacific Command and the threat confronting it and made specific recommendations for Program Objectives Memoranda inputs. These generally included emphasis on readiness, sustainability, and modernization of existing forces prior to wholesale force building, and a request for more of these enhancements for PACOM forces because of the PACOM force mismatch with the Soviet Union and its surrogates.[2]

(U) In his last comments to the Secretary of Defense on Defense Guidance 83-87, Admiral Long said that it was a tremendous improvement over past guidance and was "essentially on track."[3]

(U) In a memorandum dated 14 October the Executive Secretary of the DRB forwarded the first four sections of the FY 84-88 Draft Defense Guidance, requesting comments from principals in the Defense Department, the Chairman of the JCS, and the CINCs of the unified and specified commands. Three sections of the draft had been prepared for the first time in this edition and the executive secretary asked that those be given particular attention. Those three--the threat assessment and opportunities, strategic guidance, and force planning guidance--as well as a section on policy guidance were the subject of a CINCPAC message of 26 October. The executive secretary's definitions of the new sections and CINCPAC's comments are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.[4]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC first noted that he was providing his thoughts on major issues addressed in the draft and some suggested measures for reducing the strategy-force mismatch. He said that the overall direction and guidance of the draft served to highlight the widening gap between our programmed forces and the tasks they should accomplish to achieve our strategic objectives. Recognizing that the strategy-force mismatch would exist for some time to come, he explained, "we should not overlook the opportunity for offensive actions that could help in redressing this deficiency....we should plan to act decisively

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1. CINCPAC 151645Z May 81 (U).
2. J5323 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 Jan 88. The Defense Resources Board was the Defense Department's highest program and budget-writing council.
3. CINCPAC 252200Z Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 25 Aug 87.
4. OSD Memorandum of 14 Oct 81, Subj: "For Comment" Draft Defense Guidance, FY 1984-1988 (U); CINCPAC 260305Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 24 Oct 01; J5326 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 3 Nov 87.

rather than waiting to react defensively to challenges initiated by our adversaries."

~~(S)~~ Section I concerned the threat assessment and opportunities. The executive secretary had described it as a strategic appraisal of the predicted national security situation of the United States, which focused on the mid-term period of the guidance, but also including some of the long-term concerns. CINCPAC said he generally concurred with the thrust of the section. As the draft indicated, the expanding threat would present a wider set of contingencies and theaters where crises and conflicts might occur, as well as many new planning and force requirement complexities.

~~(S)~~ Section II concerned policy guidance. CINCPAC again agreed with its overall thrust. In particular he endorsed those subsections that supported greater Service cooperation, and "coalition synergy" with our allies through enhanced security assistance, training, and host nation support. He supported the emphasis on nuclear, biological, and chemical requirements and on the crucial role that space would play in our strategic planning. CINCPAC called attention to the need for a comprehensive resource policy/strategy. He suggested that the Defense Guidance mandate development of a fully coordinated strategy that identified and prioritized exactly which energy and strategic material resources we and our allies depended on, what the actual supply requirements would be in the event of a conflict, what alternate sources or materials were available, and how long we could afford to delay direct military actions in support of resupply efforts.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC considered regional defense policies inconsistent and imbalanced. He believed that each geographic region should receive similar treatment. He said we should focus on using security assistance efforts to draw into our "sphere of influence" those nations that could otherwise contribute strategic raw materials and bases and/or access to the Soviets and their surrogates.

~~(S)~~ Section III concerned strategy guidance. The executive secretary said it was based in the main on the recommendations to the Secretary by the JCS. CINCPAC described it as basically on target, with a couple of exceptions. First was strategic prioritization needed for force flexibility. The Defense Guidance statement that strategic priorities did not necessarily dictate the sequence of force employment was extremely important, he said. "I need such flexibility to use my forces where they would be most effective."

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC said that without question, U.S. forces should be capable of deployment to any theater where they were most needed. "Yet the only redeployment planning requirement in the DG is the possible movement of PACOM forces to Europe." CINCPAC repeated his position on this matter, which CINCPACs had made known to national-level planners time and again for the previous 15 years.

~~(TS)~~ What CINCPAC was referring to was the "Swing Strategy," the plan to redeploy significant numbers of PACOM forces, ships, and aircraft to reinforce the European and Atlantic Commands in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Since 1967 CINCPACs had believed this strategy that had come into being right after World War II was no longer viable and they had become increasingly insistent about the subject in recent years, as discussed in previous editions of this History.

~~(S)~~ Section IV concerned force planning guidance. The executive secretary said that this section included both long-term planning goals and mid-term objectives that were considered "attainable" and "challenging." "Since mid-term objectives are necessarily judgmental, this draft should be regarded merely as the opening of a dialogue aimed at refining them." CINCPAC advised that he had "some major concerns with the content and direction of this section." Where the guidance in the previous three sections stressed an expanding, global strategic approach, this part of the document continued to dedicate most of our resources to only two theaters, thus limiting our ability to respond in a global context, such as Northeast Asia, Africa, or Central/South America. In that regard, he recommended that the illustrative tables be expanded to include equally plausible scenarios in other theaters throughout the world and include probable U.S. offensive actions to counter Soviet activity. "In essence, the DG tends to lock in the status quo and inhibit our deployment flexibility."

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ He discussed the pre-committing of general purpose forces to NATO and Southwest Asia. While there might be utility for the deployment planner, "it inhibits our overall flexibility to react to a widening global conflict." He said our CONUS-based active and reserve units should be trained and equipped to go when and where necessary.

~~(S)~~ Regarding mobility, CINCPAC said that the ability to move forces to contingency areas in response to the global strategy hinged on a greatly expanded lift capability. In addition to facilitating responsiveness in contingencies, a fully credible, capable lift support structure provided an effective deterrent. In order to correct existing deficiencies in the mid-term, CINCPAC said Defense Guidance should require early programming and procurement of additional air, sea, and amphibious lift and aerial refueling enhancements. He also supported initiatives to enlist allied commercial sea and air assets in the event of contingencies.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC summarized:[1]

> Overall, I remain convinced that the rapidly evolving global threat, which the DG effectively recognizes, is not adequately accommodated in terms of force planning, in that we continue to tie our guidance to pre-directed levels of regional support and prioritization. In order to meet the expanding threat with what will inevitably be insufficient forces, we must move now to make those forces ready, mobile and sustainable, and plan from the outset for a whole spectrum of contingency situations. Therefore, I would point out, we should also plan for some offensive operations to eliminate the enemy's capabilities which threaten the U.S. or our forward deployed forces.

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC also outlined the need for a broad policy regarding strategic resources that sought to identify those resources on which both the United States and our allies were dependent, their points or origin and quantities on hand, and requirements in a contingency for resupply. Armed with this detailed data, Admiral Long reasoned that the United States would sequentially employ forces to sustain access to these materials based on actual need, thus freeing up some forces for use elsewhere. He also noted the requirement for more mobility and sustainability for our forces in order to achieve the global strategy mandated by the draft Defense Guidance. Again, CINCPAC's testimony was well received.[3]

~~(S)~~ In a personal message to the Chairman on 2 November, CINCPAC described his recent discussions with the JCS, officials in the Office of the Secretary

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1. Ibid.
2. J5323 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 Jan 88. ~~(S)~~ POMCUS was an Army program to preposition "division sets" of stocks in Europe to be set aside for the use of early reinforcing units coming from the United States (USEUCOM 1980 Historical Report (~~TS/FRD~~)).
3. Ibid.

of Defense, and members of the DRB regarding the draft Defense Guidance as "most rewarding." He noted that the emerging global focus was encouraging; however, continued reference in both the draft Defense Guidance and the Joint Strategic Planning Document to the redeployment of PACOM forces to Europe, however caveated, caused him concern. This was particularly true, he said, since that reference was the only guidance in the documents pertaining to the redeployment of forces. The Chairman replied that he would insure that CINCPAC's concerns were understood during upcoming Defense Guidance deliberations.[1]

~~(S)~~ In December CINCPAC was asked to comment on Section V of the draft Defense Guidance, which addressed resources planning guidance for FY 84-88. In his response, CINCPAC said that he had earlier been greatly encouraged by the movement toward a truly global strategy and the evolving recognition in the FY 83-87 Defense Guidance and the first four sections of the Defense Guidance for FY 84-88 that no single geographic region deserved programming efforts and resource commitments to the exclusion of others. CINCPAC pointed out that we needed to produce a more mobile, flexible force structure that was able not only to meet the threat at its point of origin, but also to carry the conflict to the enemy at times and places of our choosing.[2]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC continued:[3]

> Unfortunately, the draft resources planning guidance appears to be a step backward. By equating worldwide conflict with NATO and any NEASIA conflict with Korea, we narrow our strategic focus and reverse the progress which we had begun to achieve in our strategic thinking. Section I correctly notes that Europe is probably the most costly and therefore least likely region for conflict. A large scale, "worldwide" conflict could expand throughout SWASIA, the Pacific, and the Atlantic, but not focus initially on the European area because of the consequences to both sides. Plannning within the northern region of the PACOM area must also consider Japan and the Aleutians, in addition to Korea, because of their extraordinary geographic and political importance. The key to improving the strategy/forces mismatch with scarce resources is to develop a mobile, ready, sustainable force structure which can be brought to bear as necessary. Overall recommendation is to maintain the direction of the previous sections of the draft DG in Section V and to continue intensive development of a truly global strategy.

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1. CINCPAC 020730Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 1 Nov 01; JCS 171931Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Nov 87.
2. CINCPAC 180030Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 87.
3. Ibid.

(U) The draft Defense Guidance was scheduled to be published in January 1982, and as the year drew to a close Admiral Long and his staff were awaiting receipt to find out how well PACOM comments throughout the year were incorporated in the first full-year Defense Guidance published by the Reagan Administration.[1]

Global Strategy

[redacted]

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 82

~~(S)~~ The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was the near-term document in the JCS Joint Strategic Planning System. It addressed the application of in-being forces and capabilities to tasks and contingencies. It constituted the annual JCS tasking of CINCPAC for certain plans and activities. The FY 82 JSCP was promulgated by two JCS papers (Volume I concerned concepts, tasks and

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1. J5323 HistSum Dec 81, DECL 11 Jan 88.
2. J5321 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 4 May 87.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 042209Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL 26 Mar 87.

planning guidance, and Volume II concerned forces) and was effective for planning on receipt and for operations on 1 October 1981.[1]

~~(S)~~ The FY 82 JSCP had several significant philosophical changes. Any force or resource deficiencies identified during plan development, for example, were to be documented with a risk assessment and included in the plan summary. The JSCP acknowledged the serious mismatch between U.S. mid-term military strategy and available forces and resources. It noted that more help was required from allies and that the United States did not possess a credible capability to employ forces simultaneously in a major and a lesser contingency. In addition, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force forces might be tasked to respond to contingencies worldwide.[2]

~~(C)~~ The FY 82 edition introduced the term "Preconflict Measures," which were designed "to provide the NCA [National Command Authorities] with a range of options . . . and to facilitate decision making during execution planning." All operation plans were required to include a series of preconflict measures for possible implementation before D-Day.

~~(S)~~ A departure in the plan for the U.S. European Command and the Atlantic Command was the requirement to prepare OPLANs to accomplish their tasks both with and without PACOM augmentation. The addition of the "without PACOM augmentation" was new.[3]

(U) As was the case every year, some new tasks were assigned for the PACOM, some deleted, some moved in sequence or otherwise modified. Some of those new or revised taskings are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

(U) One new task was to coordinate planning with other unified and specified commands in accordance with the Joint Operational Planning System. Another was to be prepared to support refugee evacuation, disaster relief, and other humanitarian missions as directed by the JCS. (CINCPAC had been performing such tasks routinely.)[4]

~~(S)~~ While the word "swing" was not used, the concept was. (For an explanation of the "swing" concept, see "CINCPAC Participation in the Revised Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System" earlier in this chapter.) In instructions for movement of forces that deployed or redeployed in support of OPLANS, new tasking required planning for Operations Security and deception to divert enemy forces from the routes that would be taken and to preserve the secrecy of actual movements.

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1. J5/Memo/T2135-81, 7 Oct 81 (~~TS~~), REVW 8 Jun 01 REAS 2-301e(6), which referenced SM-409-81 and SM-532-81.
2. J5/Memo/T-981-81, 31 Jul 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 8 Jun 01, REAS 2-301c(6).
3. Ibid.
4. J5/Memo/T2135-81, 7 Oct 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 8 Jun 01 REAS 2-301e(6), which referenced SM-409-81 and SM-532-81.

~~(S)~~ Plans to deny hostile commanders the ability to command and control their forces effectively were to be developed, while maintaining effective control of U.S. forces in the face of enemy command, control, and communication countermeasures.

~~(S)~~ In the preparation of OPLANS or provisions in general planning for the PACOM, the following priorities pertained: defense of Hawaii and the Aleutians (exluding air defense), Guam, the approaches to Alaska, the west coast of the CONUS, and connecting LOCs. This was the first time Guam had been assigned the same priority as Hawaii, the CONUS, etc. Second in importance to those tasks was to assist in the defense of Japan.

[redacted] 1.5

[redacted] 1.5

~~(S)~~ Again, as part of a strategic defense, "while emphasizing support to NATO," plan for redeployment of designated forces to LANTCOM and USEUCOM as indicated in the forces volume, to include protection of forces before and during transit.

~~(S)~~ With the forces available, plan actual and deceptive operations to induce the Soviets to maintain forces in a defensive posture in the North Pacific and to refrain from shifting ground, naval, and air forces to the European theater.

~~(S)~~ Plan for defense of bases and lines of communication in support of U.S. forces, including Diego Garcia. This was the first specific mention of Diego Garcia.

~~(S)~~ Plan for withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Western Pacific, if support diminished to the extent that they could no longer be sustained.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~(TS)~~ A new tasking required the preparation and maintenance of CONPLANS to support Thailand in case of attack by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Two options were required: one concerned augmented U.S. logistic support only, and the second concerned the employment of U.S. forces to assist Thailand in countering a major SRV attack. The plan was to include employment of air and naval forces, but exclude the commitment of major ground combat forces (division size or larger). However, deception operations should be planned to deceive the SRV as to the size of force commitments. Planning should include provisions for attack of targets in Kampuchea, Laos, and the SRV. Such planning would not be coordinated with the Royal Thai Government, however, until directed by the JCS.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC was tasked to provide primary nuclear planning support to the Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, through USCINCRED, and execution support directly to the Commander, RDJTF, or as directed by the JCS. CINCPAC was to coordinate with USCINCEUR, CINCSAC, and/or CINCLANT, as required, for alternate nuclear options and support for Commander, RDJTF as required.

(U) Finally, CINCPAC was to be prepared to provide a military headquarters to plan, conduct, and control military support of civil defense in Hawaii and U.S. possessions in his assigned area of responsibility.[1]

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1. Ibid.

SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC staff was continuously in the process of preparing, revising, or studying the requirements for planning for many contingencies and operations. Most numbered CINCPAC Operation Plans were the responsibility of the Plans Directorate, although other staff elements contributed directly with specialized input, particularly for detailed functional annexes to plans. Some plans were prepared or revised by the Operations Directorate, in which case they were usually promulgated by letter or message. The following list identifies CINCPAC contingency plans and their status as of mid-October 1981. (The Plans Status report, from which this list was compiled, was changed from a quarterly to a semi-annual report in 1981 with publication in March and October.)[1]

CINCPAC Numbered Plans



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1. CINCPAC Plans Status Report, Ser T107, 16 Oct 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 1 Oct 01, REAS 2-301c(6). The following definitions pertained. An OPLAN was an operation plan for the conduct of military operations that could be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. Complete plans included deployment/employment phases, as appropriate. A CONPLAN was an Operation Plan in Concept Format, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require expansion into an OPLAN or OPORD prior to implementation. An OPORD was a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

Number	Title	Date of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks
[redacted]			
5020 CONPLAN	Response Options to Democratic People's Republic of Korea Provocations ~~(C)~~	CH-3, 22 Dec 80	(U) Current.
[redacted]			

Number	Title	Date of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks
[redacted]			
[redacted]			
5065 CONPLAN	Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment (U)	26 Jun 77/ CH-3, 3 Mar 80	(U) Under revision.
[redacted]			
5076 OPROD	OPORD for Mobile Collection Operations Against Foreign Missile & Space Associated Activities ~~(C)~~ (PONY EXPRESS)	8 Nov 78	(U) Current.
[redacted]			
5088 CONPLAN	Fishery Conservation Zone Contingency (U)	21 Dec 76/ CH-3, 4 Mar 81	~~(C)~~ Current. CONPLAN provides for operations to oppose foreign military forces supporting vessels fishing in the U.S. fishery conservation zone without proper permit.
[redacted]			
[redacted]			

Number	Title	Date of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks
			quadripartite governments of France, Federal Republic of Germany, U.K., and United States to act in concert to preserve their mutual rights and interests in Berlin againstUSSR encroachment.
[redacted]			
5107 CONPLAN	Lava Flow Control to Protect the City of Hilo, Hawaii (U)	21 Jul 78	(U) Under revision. When next revised, will be issued as a CINCPACINST.
5111 OPLAN	PACOM REDOUBT (U) (Supported document is CINCPACINST 3461.1D, Subj: Policies/Procedures for Processing Formerly Captured U.S. Military Personnel Within PACOM)	21 Jun 76/ CH-1, 24 Jun 77	(U) Current.
[redacted]			

Number	Title	Data of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks

[redacted]

Number	Title	Date of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks
[redacted]			

Unnumbered CINCPAC Contingency Plans

Title	Date of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks
[redacted]		

Title	Date of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks
[redacted]		
Civil Defense (U) (Supported document is CINCPACINST 3025.1B, Subj: Military Support of Civil Defense (U))	4 Apr 79	(U) Current.
CONPLAN GRAPHIC HAND (U)	4 Sep 79	(U) Current. CDRWESTCOM is planning agent.
[redacted]		
Evacuation of ADCOM Sites in PACOM (U)	CINCPAC 100300Z Jan 75 CINCPACAF 052315Z Feb 75 Modified by CINCONAD 192125Z Mar 75	(U) Current. Provides agreed CINCPAC-CINCAD procedures for emergency situations involving ADCOM sites/facilities in PACOM.
GARDEN PLOT (PACOM)(U) (CDRWESTCOM is CINCPAC planning agent.)	1 Apr 81	(U) Current. Also see Civil Disturbances. The PACOM supporting plan to Department of the Army OPLAN GARDEN PLOT. Plan

Title	Date of Issue/ Last Change	Status/Remarks
		provides for organization of JTF 110 from PACOM resources for employment in event of directed Federal military intervention in civil disturbances in Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, and the TTPI.
Hijacking of Civil Aircraft in PACOM (U) (Supported document is CINCPACINST 3722.2D)	5 May 80	(U) Current.
MDB-OPLAN 1-70 (U) (CINCPACREP-PHIL is CINCPAC planning agent)	3 May 71 CH-4, 17 Dec 74	(U) Under revision. Combined U.S.-Philippine contingency plan for the defense of the Philippines.
Ships Subjected to Harassing or Hostile Actions (U) (Supported document is CINCPACINST S3100.4B)	11 Jan 79	(U) Current. Provides operational instructions, primarily for MSC and hydrographic survey ships whenunder CINCPAC operational control and engaged in sensitive operations or operating in sensitive areas.
Policy Concerning Aircraft from the USSR, China, or Aligned Countries Landing on Airfields where U.S. Military Operational Units are Based (U) (Supported document is CINCPACINST S3700.1G)	11 Aug 78	(U) Undergoing annual review. Outlines policy and procedures for incidents which involve aircraft and aircrews from communist or communist-controlled countries landing on airfields where U.S. military operational units are based.

OPLANs 5000 and 5001

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) In 1981 the Joint Deployment Agency at MacDill AFB, Florida, began TPFDD refinement procedures for CINCPAC OPLANs 5000 and 5001, and also 5027-81, the plans whose execution would require the maximum PACOM effort. The conferences were attended by representatives of many headquarters and they are addressed in detail in the Logistics chapter of this history.

[redacted]

(U) The Phase II TPFDD Refinement Conference was conducted from 5 to 9 October, again at the Joint Deployment Agency. Conference objectives were to coordinate the resolution of Transportation Operating Agency (TOA) shortfalls with CINCPAC representatives; coordinate supported commander changes with the Services and the TOAs; coordinate changes submitted by supporting commanders, the Services, and/or the TOAs; incorporate approved changes into the TPFDD; coordinate TOA production of finalized movement schedules and tables; and incorporate movement schedule and table information into the TPFDD. All conference objectives were met during the Phase II conference with the exception of incorporating movement schedule and table information into the TPFDD. Finalized movement tables would not be completed until the TOAs had "reflowed" the TPFDDs.

(U) Earlier, on 8 July, CINCPAC approved both OPLANS and forwarded them in August to the JCS for approval.

~~(C)~~ On 26 October CINCPAC staff and component command action officers were briefed regarding updates and changes to OPLANS for FY 82. Formal internal and external tasking correspondence was promulgated on 30 October for response by 1 February 1982. A separate planning directive for Appendix 1 to Annex C was published on 26 October 1981. Its preparation was separate from, but dovetailed with, on-going FY 82 revisions to the basic 5000/5001 plans.[2]

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1. J5213 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 5 Jan 88.
2. Ibid.



1. J5411 HistSum Oct 81 (~~TS~~), REVW 5 Nov 01.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.



1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. I, pp. 109-110.
2. J5211 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 12 Jan 88; COMUS Korea 100400Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 3 Apr 87.
3. CINCPAC 200322Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 28 Apr 87.
4. JCS 230031Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 Jul 87.



1. CINCPAC 170522Z Nov 81, REVW 15 Nov 87.
2. CINCPAC Command Histoy 1979 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. I, pp.159-163.
3. Ibid.
4. J522 HistSum Dec 81 (~~TS~~), REVW 2 Jun 01.



1. Ibid.
2. J5212 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 17 Apr 00, which cited CINCPAC 310105Z Jul 80.



CONPLAN 5122



1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 112241Z Sep 81 (U).
3. CINCPAC 010042Z Nov 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 9 Feb 86.



1. J5612 HistSum May 81 (S), DECL 22 May 87; CINCPAC 261012Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 22 May 87. The Logistics chapter in the CINCPAC Command History for 1980 outlined the planned construction and improvements.
2. AMEMB Port Louis 02501/190901Z Dec 80 ~~(C)~~, GDS 12/18/86 and 02442/081238Z Sep 81 (U).

[redacted]

CINCPAC Support for Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

[redacted]

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1. CINCPACFLT 020505Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 30 Nov 01, retransmitted to the JCS as CINCPAC 152013Z Dec 81.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 111-112.
4. JCS 012218Z Apr 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 30 Mar 87



1. J541 HistSum Dec 80 (~~TS~~), REVW 19 Jan 01, which referenced Vol. I of the FY 81 JSCP.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 280157Z Jan 81 (~~TS~~), REVW 21 Jan 01.
4. CINCPAC Ltr Ser T30 of 20 Mar 81, (~~TS/FRD/WNINTEL~~) REVW 13 Mar 01, Subj: Appendix 1, Annex C, COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81 (Nuclear Operations) (~~TS~~).
5. RDJTF Appendix 1 to Annex C to COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81 of 8 Jun 81 (~~TS/FRD/WINTEL~~) REVW 13 Mar 01.



1. Ibid.
2. J5411 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(TS),~~ REVW 8 Sep 01, which referenced JCS Memo/SM-619-81 of 3 Sep 81.
3. J5411 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(TS),~~ REVW 8 Sep 01; Planning Directive for CINCPAC Nuclear OPLAN 1003-81, Ser T88 of 8 Sep 81 ~~(TS)~~ REVW 8 Sep 01.



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1. Ibid.
2. J5411 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(TS)~~; REVW 8 Jan 02.
3. J5322 HistSum Mar 81 (U).
4. Ibid.

SECTION III--RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER PACOM COUNTRIES

ANZUS Council Meeting

~~(C)~~ The tripartite Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Pact members normally held Council meetings once a year, usually in the summer, and rotated the meetings among the three capitals. Each country delegation included a Military Representative and CINCPAC served in that capacity for the United States. The Thirtieth ANZUS Council meeting was held in Wellington, New Zealand, on 22 and 23 June 1981. The United States delegation was headed by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., with Admiral Long as Military Representative. In his invitation to the Admiral, Secretary Haig had noted that CINCPAC had traditionally led the portion of the meeting on U.S. strategic posture in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, "lending invaluable expertise to important discussions." The Secretary said he hoped the Admiral would agree to continue that tradition.[1]

(U) The principal delegates to the Council meeting from New Zealand were Minister of Foreign Affairs Brian Talboys and Minister of Defence David S. Thomson. Australia's representative was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anthony A. Street. A total of 7½ hours of discussion took place during three sessions in the two-day meeting.

(U) A communique issued following the meeting provided highlights. Major areas of discussion were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, defense cooperation, arms limitation, ASEAN, Japanese developmental assistance to the Pacific region, regional relations with China, the proposed Sinai Multinational Peacekeeping Force, the Law of the Sea treaty, and world economics.[2]

(U) During a speech by Secretary Haig at the Ministerial Dinner on 22 June, the Secretary repeatedly referred to ANZUS as the "spinal column" of all that was peace, stability, and progress in the Pacific region.[3]

1.5b d

[redacted]

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1. J5611 HistSum Jun 81 (U), SECSTATE 126487/150035Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 5/14/87.
2. J5611 HistSum Jun 81, which contained a copy of the communique. The communique was also transmitted as AMEMB Wellington 03252/231239Z Jun 81 (U).
3. AMEMB Wellington 03244/222324Z Jun 81 (U).

Secretary of State assured the ANZUS members that the United States did not envision a regional role for Japan.[1]

[redacted]

(U) The Council agreed to meet in Canberra in 1982 at a time convenient to all members.

ANZUS Military Representatives Meeting

~~(C)~~ In conjunction with the ANZUS Council Meetings, Military Representatives usually held their own meeting. In 1981 such a meeting was held in Wellington, New Zealand, on 24 June with Admiral Long representing the United States. Other principals were Chief of the Australian Defence Force Staff Admiral Sir Anthony M. Synnot and Chief of the New Zealand Defence Staff Vice Admiral Neil D. Anderson. Foremost in the three-hour discussion of ANZUS-related military issues were the Sinai Multinational Force and U.S. suggestions made in the ANZUS Council for expanded Australia and New Zealand military activities and capabilities.[3]

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 231957Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 23 Jun 89.
2. Ibid.
3. J5611 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 9 Jul 87; CINCPAC 242341Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 24 Jun 87.



(U) The summary of proceedings was approved by all of the Military Representatives, with CINCPAC concurring with the record, as amended, on 16 October.[2]

ANZUS Staff Level Meeting

(U) The Fourteenth ANZUS Staff Level Meeting was held from 6 to 9 April in Department of Defence offices in Canberra, Australia. CINCPAC was represented by his Deputy Director for Plans, Brigadier General J.E. Thompson, USA, accompanied by three staff officers. Other principals were Brigadier G.A. Hitchings of the New Zealand Army and Brigadier G.J. Murphy of the Australian Army. The principals reviewed the report of ANZUS Seminar 7 and approved administrative amendments to the ANZUS Planning Manual and amendments to the Combined Operations Categories.[3]

~~(C)~~ A number of items were to be forwarded to the Military Representatives for consideration. One was the concept of a purely ANZUS exercise. The group noted that the on-going policy of designating certain national exercises as ANZUS exercises meant that the usefulness of such exercises in disclosing and solving ANZUS interoperability problems was limited by the prime national requirements of the exercises. There had been no exercise designed and conducted specifically for ANZUS purposes and thus many areas of interoperability,

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1. Ibid.
2. J5611 HistSum Oct 81 (U), CINCPAC 162235Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 1 Sep 87.
3. J5611 HistSum Apr 81 (U); see CINCPAC Command History 1980, Vol. I, pp. 120-121 for a discussion of the planning manual and the combined operations categories.

including command and control and logistics, had not been evaluated or tested in the combined environment. To enhance ANZUS interoperability, consideration should be given to conducting an ANZUS command post exercise, sponsored by one member, but planned and directed by a combined staff. To such end, it was believed that an ANZUS seminar should develop the concept for such an exercise.

(U) The participants noted the need for ANZUS Military Policy Statements and agreed with the seminar recommendation to develop formal methods of promulgation of these statements. A seminar was tasked to study the scope of the policy statements, review Military Representative records, extract agreed policy, and recommend methods of promulgation. They also asked for approval of an interoperability policy statement and asked the MILREPs to note amended planning manual changes and the 1982-86 exercise forecast.[1]

ANZUS Seminars

(U) ANZUS Seminars were the working level conferences designed to promote the effectiveness of ANZUS military operations. The semiannual conferences both resolved problems passed to them by higher level ANZUS bodies and initiated their own ideas. The first such seminar had been held in March 1976 at Camp Smith, with subsequent seminars rotating among participating countries. On 18 November 1980 CINCPAC asked his component commanders for inputs for agenda items that would help resolve problems or increase ANZUS effectiveness. On 9 December CINCPAC forwarded agenda proposals to Australia and New Zealand.[2]

(U) ANZUS Seminar 7 was held in Wellington, New Zealand, 23-27 February 1981. The U.S. delegation was headed by Captain C.H. Nordhill, USN, a Plans Directorate staff officer. Group Captain J.A. Paule of the Royal Australian Air Force was the chief Australian delegate and N.R. Win, a captain in the Royal New Zealand Navy, was the Chief New Zealand delegate. Topics discussed included ANZUS Planning Manual changes, interoperability, beach intelligence sharing, and Combined Operations Categories.[3]

(U) Seminar 7 recommended that a number of matters be considered at the Fourteenth Staff Level Meeting (discussed above). It also recommended they task Seminar 8 to continue the development of the beach intelligence sharing program and to review past Military Representative discussions and extract policy resolutions. (See also the Intelligence chapter of this History.)[4]

~~(C)~~ The second of the semiannual meetings, Seminar 8, was held at Camp Smith from 31 August to 4 September 1981. The Australian and New Zealand delegates were the same as at Seminar 7; CINCPAC was represented by Captain J.L.

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1. Ibid.
2. J5611 HistSum Dec 80(U); CINCPAC 180326Z Nov 80 (U); CINCPAC 090316Z Dec 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 29 Nov 86.
3. J5611 HistSum Feb 81 (U)
4. Ibid.

Marshall, USN. Major topics of discussion were promulgation of ANZUS policy, ANZUS Planning Manual guidelines, exercise planning conference requirements, investigation of air and sea lift capabilities, progress on tri-national publications, and interoperability issues.[1]

(U) Recommendations of Seminar 8 to the Fifteenth Staff Level Meeting were:[2]

- Endorse the concept of a single publication to promulgate ANZUS Military Policy documents.

- Endorse the draft ANZUS Military Policy Document and forward it to the Military Representatives for approval.

- Endorse New Zealand assuming custodian responsibility of the proposed ANZUS Military Policy Document.

- Clarify the extent to which they intended to monitor ANZUS interoperability issues in the multinational forums.

- Clarify usage of the Staff Level Meeting minutes as a reference document.

(U) The Seminar 8 report also included the list of policy statements extracted from Military Representative records.[3]

U.S.-Australian Joint Staff Talks

(U) U.S.-Australian Joint Staff Talks were held annually. The 1981 talks were held in Canberra on 26 and 27 February. The Vice Director of J5 in the Organization of the JCS led the U.S. delegation. CINCPAC had been invited to send a representative and he named Colonel E. Gene Taft, USAF, the CINCPACREP Australia.[4]

Hydrographic Survey Work

~~(S)~~ At the June 1981 meeting of the ANZUS Military Representatives, Admiral Synnot, Chief of the Australian Defence Force Staff, had asked Admiral Long in a private conversation about U.S. hydrographic surveys at Christmas Island, a small coral outcropping about 10°S, 105°E that belonged to Australia. After appropriate staffing, CINCPAC replied that there had been no U.S. Navy hydrographic or acoustic surveys in the area. The most recent hydrographic

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1. J5611 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 4 Sep 87.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J5611 HistSum Feb 81 (U).

chart held was by the Royal Navy, dated 1959. The Australian officer sent his thanks and said that Australia had no plans for laying a hydrophone system off Christmas Island.[1]

Oceanographic Research Project in the South Pacific

~~(C)~~ The United Nations' Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) sponsored a Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in the South Pacific (CCOP/SOPAC). At the ninth annual meeting of the CCOP/SOPAC in October 1980, the USSR had offered 80 days' ship time by Research Vessel KALLISTO (or CALLYSTO) to undertake work of common interest in the South Pacific, such as hydrographic research, seabed coring, etc. The Soviet proposal was met by a CCOP/SOPAC counterproposal with some differences. For example, the Soviets proposed to commence research in September 1981 with a call to Suva, Fiji, and finish in December, also with a call to Suva. The CCOP/SOPAC proposal would have the ship begin in Port Vila, Vanuatu, and end in Honiara, in the Solomon Islands. The State Department advised Embassies in the region and Europe and CINCPAC that the Department agreed with a recommendation of the Embassy in Suva, supported by Port Moresby, that it would be in U.S. foreign policy interest to provide an alternative to the Soviet proposal.[2]

~~(C)~~ On 1 January 1981 the State Department advised that the Soviets were beginning to display an inordinate interest in scientific research in the Pacific Ocean. While the Department was working on an alternative to the Soviet offer to the CCOP/SOPAC, other activities had come to light. One was an offer by a Soviet joint venture partner to a large New Zealand firm to make a trawler available for two years for New Zealand fisheries research. Provisioning would cost the USSR about $7.3 million. Also, a request had been received from the Soviet Embassy in Washington to conduct scientific research during February or March 1981 approximately 18 nautical miles from Saipan. Further, a study of the Minke whale was under way in Southwest Pacific waters, involving two Japanese ships and one Soviet ship, sponsored by the International Whaling Commission.[3]

~~(C)~~ On 6 February CINCPAC weighed in with remarks to the JCS. He agreed with concerns that had been expressed by the Ambassadors in Fiji and Papua New Guinea and supported the recommendation to offset the Soviet move in the South Pacific. In recent months, he noted, nations in the area had looked less favorably on the Soviets as a result of the Afghanistan issue. "Measures taken to limit Soviet presence and influence in the South Pacific could pay long term dividends," CINCPAC said.[4]

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1. J5611 HistSum Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 4 Aug 87; CINCPAC 080153Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 1 Jul 87.
2. SECSTATE 162330Z Dec 80 ~~(C)~~, XDS-1 12/12/00.
3. SECSTATE 000294/01/010659Z Jan 81, GDS 12/31/86.
4. CINCPAC 060103Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Jan 87.

~~(C)~~ Later in February the Government of the Solomon Islands advised ESCAP and CCOP/SOPAC that after careful consideration the Government regretted it would not permit the R.V. KALLISTO to carry out the proposed joint CCOP/SOPAC-USSR cooperative cruise in Solomon waters. Then the Solomon Islands Foreign Secretary asked for assurances that the United States would soon take steps to embark on a suitable project to the specifications of the South Pacific nations.[1]

~~(C)~~ Earlier, in June 1980, the Kingdom of Tonga had granted permission for a Soviet vessel to conduct oceanographic research in its waters. It would, the Soviets said, study the growth of reefs and also clarify questions about satellite pictures of the area. On 19 February 1981, however, Tonga supported efforts to keep the Soviet vessel out of the South Pacific.[2]

~~(S)~~ On 5 March 1981 the State Department advised that the U.S. Defense Department had made available $750,000, New Zealand, $50,000, and Australia up to $700,000 for oceanographic research in the area in 1981-82. In addition, Australia planned to offer hydrographic assistance of up to $1.3 million to the Solomon Islands in 1982 and 1983 as an initial step toward possible future assistance to other Pacific states in this area of development.[3]

~~(C)~~ By June, U.S. inter-agency consultations involving the State Department, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research, and the U.S. Geological Survey had resulted in a determination that the ONR would have the responsibility within the U.S. Government for developing a program proposal for discussion with the other ANZUS members.[4]

~~(C)~~ The funding had not been resolved by 15 September, when the U.S. Ambassador to Suva expressed his concern about not yet receiving authorization from Washington to sign a Memorandum of Understanding as agreed to by Australia, New Zealand, and the CCOP/SOPAC in August. He said if the United States was not able to work out financing of its share of the programs, particularly the U.S. Geological Survey project (because of its energy focus the USGS project was of most interest to the Pacific island nations), "we will not only lose credibility with our Pacific island friends but will once again open the door to Soviet involvement, as the Soviets are offering to do precisely the kind of research involved in the USGS proposal." Problems with funds for the USGS proposal were also the subject of a message from the U.S.

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1. AMEMB Port Moresby 0236/110105Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, EO 12065 N/A and 6186/232254Z Feb 81 (U).
2. AMEMB Suva 1892/032149Z Jun 80 ~~(C)~~, GDS 6/3/86 and 0685/190245Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, RDS-1 2/19/11.
3. SECSTATE 056165/052228Z ~~(S)~~(EX) RDS-1, 3 - 3/5/01; AMEMB Canberra 5375/010450Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, XDS-1, 6/1/01.
4. SECSTATE 161947/192012Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 6/19/87.

Ambassador to New Zealand who advised that a report had been received in which a high ranking Vanuatu official said they had heard from a U.S. scientist that he could not attend a 6 October meeting because the U.S. Government was unable to provide the necessary funding for the project.[1]

~~(C)~~ Following receipt of the Ambassador to Suva's message, CINCPAC again provided his thoughts to the JCS and the Secretaries of Defense and State. He urged that every effort be made to continue to counter Soviet initiatives in this increasingly important area. He agreed with the Ambassador that failure to support this effort would cause a loss of U.S. credibility and provide the USSR with yet another opportunity to expand in the South Pacific.[2]

(U) Both the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense responded that Admiral Long's concern was shared in Washington.[3]

~~(C)~~ Following the registration of complaints with the U.S. State Department by the embassies of both Australia and New Zealand, the Department assured them they would press for funding through the Agency for International Development, an agency of the State Department.[4]

~~(C)~~ The 10th session of the CCOP/SOPAC flatly rejected the Soviet offer and accepted the ANZUS offer. As agreed at the 5-15 October meeting at Port Vila, Vanuatu, the United States through the Office of Naval Research would provide 60 days' research time for the Research Vessel KANA KEUKI ($750,000 provided by ONR) and 41 days' research time for the RV LEE, with associated follow-on research, travel, and training to be provided by the U.S. Geological Survey with funding of $1,135,000 from the Agency for International Development. A Memorandum of Understanding was developed and was expected to be signed by the member states.[5]

~~(C)~~ The CCOP/SOPAC "officially" dubbed the project the "SOPAC cruise," which could cause a little confusion in the PACOM as that term had been applied to training and goodwill cruises by U.S. Navy ships to various Pacific Island nations begun in 1978.

U.S.-Japan Relationship

[redacted]

1. AMEMB Suva 3365/150445Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, RDS-1 9/15/91; AMEMB Wellington 04991/280448Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 9/28/87.
2. CINCPAC 250205Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 18 Sep 87.
3. JCS 082000Z Oct 81 ~~(C)(EX)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87; SECDEF 012131Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87.
4. SECSTATE 260849/292045Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 9/29/87.
5. J5621 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 9 Oct 87; AMEMB Suva 4620/190434Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, RDS-4 10/19/01.



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1. AMEMB Tokyo 11192/170340Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, RDS-3, 06/16/11.
2. Ibid. Other Americans who spoke to the press or others with allegations about nuclear weapons and Japan were Daniel Ellsberg, who had disclosed the "Pentagon Papers" in the 1970's, and long-retired Navy Admiral Gene R. La Rocque.

make the case, which would have been central 10 years earlier, that Japan was endangered by the presence of nuclear weapons in its ports and territorial waters.[1]

~~(S)~~ Throughout the spring, also, while all of these events had been taking place, the United States had been attempting to define more precisely just what "getting Japan to do more" about defense really meant. The U.S. Ambassador noted in March that the United States should insure that our signals could not be misread or "used" within Japan's body politic. It seemed to him, he said, that our unfocused pressure to "do more," to increase budgets or to procure more hardware did not convey a clear enough sense of what we wanted. Because so many voices were speaking (State Department, Defense Department, private citizens, many members of Congress), the United States inevitably sent mixed and highly ambiguous signals that in many cases were misinterpreted, sometimes intentionally and sometimes unintentionally, but which did not produce any lasting results.[2]

~~(S)~~ A joint State-Defense Department message sent in reply to the Ambassador on 14 March agreed that there was a need for the United States to speak with one voice. The message contained a summary of the consensus reached at a meeting of the East Asia Interdepartmental Group on 13 March. Subject to approval by higher authorities, the summary was to be used as a basis for discussions with Japanese leaders and defense officials in the months ahead. The message outlined the U.S.-Japan division of labor, military roles and missions, problem areas in security relations, and a U.S. proposal for a credible, more equitable, and constitutionally acceptable sharing of defense responsibilities in the security area.[3]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC advised that he welcomed this timely formulation of U.S. policy. He believed it would serve well the continuing efforts to foster military cooperation and to guide bilateral military planning with the Japanese military. He considered it important to relate carefully what we did at the policy level to the military-to-military bilateral planning process. He said we needed also to explore fully the military-to-military contacts in making the points that needed to be made. He offered some specific comments. Regarding the State-Defense statement that we did not want Japan to acquire "autonomous capabilities," CINCPAC recommended expressing the thought by the phrase "independent military capability." This was a more descriptive term that avoided confusion as there were some autonomous capabilities that we wanted Japan to achieve, such as air defense. CINCPAC also said he believed it was necessary to accompany any request to Japan to do more with reassurances that the United States would continue to be a reliable ally. "Failing to do so

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1. Ibid.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 03777/050201Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), RDS-3, 03/04/11.
3. SECSTATE 066168/142330Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), RDS-3, 3/14/11.

could raise doubts about our intentions in Northeast Asia and stimulate the growth of an independent Japanese defense capability we want to avoid."[1]

(U) Within this framework, then, representatives of the two countries met in many forums to discuss the on-going relationship. From Summit meetings in Washington to the more routine inter-government and inter-military meetings that took place throughout the year, the interaction continued. A number of specifics about these meetings, especally those involving CINCPAC and the military-to-military dialogue, are addressed in the material that follows.

U.S.-Japan Planning and Cooperation

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 170817Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL 31 Mar 87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 128-129.
3. J5214 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 5 Jan 88.
4. J5112 HistSum May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 May 87; CINCPAC 282207Z Apr 81 (S)(BOM), DECL 28 Apr 87.



1. J5214 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 5 Jan 88; J5112 HistSum May 81 ~~(S),~~ DECL 30 May 87; COMUS Japan 210455Z Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 20 Aug 87.
2. J5112 HistSum Dec 81 (U), COMUS Japan 210455 Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 20 Aug 87; COS Tokyo 081124Z Apr 81 ~~(S/NF)~~(BOM), REVW 8 Apr 01.

[redacted]

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1. COMUS Japan 210455Z Aug 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 20 Aug 87.
2. CINCPAC 032126Z Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Aug 87.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 21800/041036Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 12/04/87.

~~(S)~~ By the end of 1981 the CINCPAC and COMUS Japan staffs had developed a list of study areas to meet transportation and support requirments, including access to Japanese lift, POL, and medical supply assets.[1]

Japan Security Consultative Committee

~~(C)~~ The highest ranking security consultative forum between the United States and Japan had been established on 19 January 1960 through an exchange of notes between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Japan. Senior participants were the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, who acted as co-chairman; CINCPAC, who served as principal adviser to the Ambassador on military and security affairs; the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was also co-chairman; and the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. COMUS Japan served as military adviser in the absence of CINCPAC. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) was established under the authority of Article 4 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Often years intervened between SCC meetings. There had been a meeting in July 1976 in Tokyo and the next, the Seventeenth, had been held in November 1978. Planning for the next meeting, Security Consultative Committee Meeting XVIII, continued throughout 1981, but it had been difficult to find a date suitable to all the principals. The meeting was scheduled for 8 Janauary 1982.[2]

Subcommittee of the Security Consultative Committee

~~(C)~~ In addition to the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), there were other, lower ranking security consultative mechanisms. One was the Security Consultative Subcommittee (SSC). This group was formed to provide follow-up "working level" talks at the Vice Minister-Ambassadorial level subsequent to meetings of the SCC. The first such meeting had been held in May 1967. The SSC had no decision-making authority. As a consequence, frank and open discussions on contentious issues could be conducted.[3]

~~(C)~~ On 20 April 1981 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Designate) for International Security Affairs, as chairman of the U.S. delegation for SSC XIII, invited CINCPAC to be one of the principal delegates. He proposed an agenda. CINCPAC replied on 27 April that he looked forward to participating and described the bilateral security issues proposed by the Assistant Secretary as an excellent framework to guide the sessions. The Assistant Secretary had also proposed that the principals keep their accompanying staffs to a minimum. CINCPAC said he shared the concern for promoting an atmosphere of confidentiality by limiting the number of participants to only the essential principals. The Assistant Secretary also asked CINCPAC to present a briefing on the

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1. J5214 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 5 Jan 88.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. III, pp. 600-601; CINCPAC 302217Z Apr 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Apr 86; J5 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. CINCPAC Command History 1977 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. III, p. 601; J5112 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

regional threat at the first session, to follow his own overview of the global situation.[1]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC forwarded a report on SSC XIII to the Secretary of Defense following the 10-12 June meeting in Honolulu. The U.S. delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Francis J. West, Jr., Ambassador to Japan Mansfield, and Admiral Long, had made a strong presentation on the global Soviet threat; outlined regional security issues; sketched a possible wartime scenario involving a Soviet-Japan confrontation; described what they considered a rational division of labor on Japanese defense between the United States and Japan; and pointed out specific areas where Japan should improve its self-defense capability.[2]

~~(S)~~ Regarding the division of labor in the Northwest Pacific, the United States would continue to provide the nuclear umbrella and offensive conventional forces. Japan should have the capability to defend itself and adjacent waters, as well as sea lanes 1,000 miles out. In Korea, the United States would provide the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces, but Japan should provide economic aid as well as logistic support for U.S. units engaged in Korean defense. In the Indian Ocean, the United States would again provide the umbrella, but Japan should help support bases in Japan that contributed to U.S. Indian Ocean efforts. Japan should also continue economic assistance promised to countries in the Indian Ocean area. In defense technology, Japan and the United States must cooperate more on research and development. Japanese self-defense improvements included a need to modernize and augment land, sea, and air defense forces; establish a 60 to 80 day stockage of all supply items; strengthen command and control; unify inter-Service doctrine and intelligence; and expand joint exercises. U.S. delegates also made a strong request for additional Japanese financial assistance (cost-sharing) for U.S. Forces in Japan.[3]

~~(S)~~ The Japanese delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Counselor Katori, Japan Defense Agency Administrative Vice Director General Hara, and Ambassador Okawara. The Japanese delegation responded cautiously, reviewing familiar Japanese domestic political constraints, but went on to say that the government would do as much as the national consensus would permit. The basic message was that Japanese popular sentiment had turned in the right direction on defense, but the kind of action the United States was asking for would still take time. They welcomed assurances of continuing U.S. commitment to Japan's defense and regional security. They stressed Japan's determination to achieve the force

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1. OSD 202309Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 17 Apr 87; CINCPAC 271927Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL 30 Apr 87; CINCPAC 030038Z ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL 30 Jun 87.
2. CINCPAC 121736Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jun 87. The meeting were held at the Ilikai Hotel in Waikiki, an area of Honolulu. Meetings were closed to all but conferees.
3. Ibid.

levels provided in its basic defense outline through the 1983-87 mid-term operations estimate, but cautioned against expectations of Japanese capabilities exceeding those quantitative levels in the outline. A supplementary budget for munitions and supplies would not be forthcoming in 1981. They also expressed willingness to strengthen defense technology cooperation with the United States, but stated that Japan's legal ban on military-related exports required that the Government move with caution. On cost-sharing, they recognized the need for increased contributions, but noted that such measures had to be taken within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement. Concerning an overall acceleration of the on-going Japanese defense effort, the Japanese team was explicit in urging that the United States not expect more than was realistically possible.[1]

CINCPAC Meeting at the Japan Defense Agency

(U) Admiral Long visited Japan from 16 to 20 April. While there he met with Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency Joji Omura, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, Admiral Tsugio Yata, and other high ranking JDA officials. The purpose of the visit was to present the CINCPAC view on the changing strategic balance in East Asia and to encourage Japanese efforts to improve Japan Self-Defense Force capabilities to adequately defend Japan. CINCPAC's visit followed soon after the 9 April collision between a U.S. submarine and a Japanese freighter in the East China Sea. Thus, Admiral Long had to preface his remarks by expressing regrets over the incident and advising that the United States was attempting to resolve unanswered questions as soon as possible.[2]

~~(C)~~ Admiral Long stressed the extraordinary U.S. defense effort and the enormity of the area we must cover. He said the United States could not do it alone, but needed the help and cooperation of our allies. He anticipated that the United States would ask Japan to do yet more in its own defense.

~~(C)~~ When the JDA Director General expressed concern about recent stepped-up activities of the Soviet Fleet in waters surrounding Japan, CINCPAC agreed that the Soviets were very active in that part of the world. He said they had apparently made the decision 10 years earlier to be prepared to fight on two fronts, both Europe and the Far East. To this end they had built up command, control, and communications capabilities, logistics systems, etc., to the point where, in the U.S. opinion, they had achieved that capability. CINCPAC said two significant developments had been the deployment of Soviet BACKFIRE aircraft to areas north of Vladivostok, from which they could cover the sea lines of communication surrounding Japan, and the addition of more new fighter aircraft in the preceding year than the U.S. total in the Pacific Air Forces.

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1. Ibid.
2. J5112 HistSum May 81 (U); ADMIN CINCPAC 181255Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, which readdressed AMEMB Tokyo 07011/181044Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, XGDS-3, 4/18/01.

~~(C)~~ Vice Minister Hara said that Japan continued to further its defense efforts to correspond to the U.S. initiative. He asked what the United States expected from Japan. CINCPAC said at the outset that it was very important to realize that the only real challenge to the Free World in a military, economic, social, or political sense was the USSR. The Russians sought areas of weakness globally. He described the use of Soviet proxies or surrogates.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC said Japan could contribute to security in two ways. First was by exerting utmost efforts to improve its own capabilities to defend its territory. By doing so, Japan would also contribute to East Asian peace and stability. Secondly, by maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Japan security system, including sharing the costs of U.S. forces, Japan would increase and enhance this effort. The Japanese discussed the progress already made and the fact that public understanding of defense issues was still insufficient, as shown by polls. CINCPAC expressed appreciation for the thoughts provided, but said that there was growing concern within the United States about security and this was at a time when the United States itself was cutting back severely on social and other programs to increase defense efforts. He anticipated that Japan would get additional requests to do more in defense of Japan--not globally, but for self defense.[1]

CINCPAC-Japan Joint Staff Office Exchange Visit

(U) The CINCPAC-Japan Joint Staff Office (JSO) Exchange Visit Program had been in effect since 1974. The purpose of the visits was to promote understanding and exchange views on mutual security matters. The location of each visit alternated between Tokyo and Honolulu. The seventh visit of a CINCPAC delegation to Japan took place from 7 to 11 December. CINCPAC's Director for Plans headed the CINCPAC delegation. The Japanese delegation was led by LT GEN Katao and RADM Inoyama. An officer from the OJCS Plans Staff was a representative.[2]

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC Director for Plans advised Admiral Long that the exchange had been beneficial in gaining a greater appreciation of the Japanese concerns, perceptions, and problems impacting on the mutual security relationship. He noted that the meeting had focused on two specific areas. The first was U.S. defense policy. Discussion had begun with a CINCPAC briefing of the strategic and regional situation update. The Japanese expressed their concern on the sensitivity of a U.S. coalition strategy with Japan and the role that China and the Republic of Korea would play. The CINCPAC Director emphasized U.S. awareness of political sensitivities, but also pointed out that the United States sought to develop a relationship with China that would maintain the strategic balance and that there was no implication of conveying trilateral cooperation or security arrangements with Korea.

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1. Ibid.
2. J5112 HistSum Dec 81 (U); J5/Memo/S2516-81 of 22 Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87, Subj: CINCPAC-Joint Staff Office (JSO) Exchange Visit (U).

~~(S)~~ In the matter of bilateral planning, the Japanese made a number of major points. First, the Japan Joint Staff Office anticipated completing their review of the Japan Self-Defense Force service support plans to DEFPLAN 5098 and submitting them to the Joint Staff Council by March 1982. They said some of the small-scale exercises were expected to begin in 1982, and they expected completion of the Japan Defense Agency Coordination Center by August 1983. Three outstanding issues needed to be resolved. These concerned the release of secure communications equipment, improvement in communications connectivity, and identification of the type and amount of mutual communications equipment required.[1]

U.S.-Japan System and Technology Forum

(U) In 1980, as a result of an agreement between the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Administrative Vice Minister of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), a program of cooperation had been initiated in weapon research, development, and acquisition, to include technology exchange and discussion of requirements in various mission areas. A System and Technology Forum was to be the mechanism by which the program would be conducted and the first two meetings of that forum were held in 1980, the second in Tokyo in December. During the December 1980 meeting, the basic areas discussed were Foreign Military Sales co-production and air defense.[2]

~~(C)~~ The third meeting of the forum was held 14 and 15 December 1981 in Tokyo. CINCPAC Plans Directorate staff members had attended all meetings of the forum. Year-long discussions with the Japanese had indicated a more positive attitude and the JDA had portrayed the forum as demonstrating strong U.S. interest in technology transfer and in Japan arms export policy. At the third meeting the United States was represented by Michael Lorenzo, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (International Programs and Advanced Technology), and Japan by JDA Equipment Director General Wada. At the third meeting the United States urged the creation of a bilateral industry-to-industry symposium and formation of a sub-working group of experts to study cooperative research and development in the area of air defense. Mr. Lorenzo said that when the United States talked of technology transfer, it included everything up to total weapons systems, and stressed again the strong desire of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to have industry-to-industry participation--U.S. industries talking directly to Japanese industries. He thought it was proper for a U.S.-Japan defense-industrial symposium to be held within six months after the new Japanese arms export policy was in place.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/ERD~~), Vol. I, pp. 153-155.
3. J5311 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~; DECL 7 Jan 88; AMEMB Tokyo 22633/180652Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 12/18/87.

~~(C)~~ On the Japanese side, Mr. Wada said that the JDA needed more detail on format, procedure, and specific technology sought by the United States before proceeding with organizational initiatives.

~~(C)~~ The second day of the forum meeting began with a JDA presentation on its air defense plans. The United States representative responded that he believed Japan needed a longer-range surveillance aircraft--the AWACS. The Japanese responded that they expected to be able to operate with USAF E-3As (AWACS) already stationed on Okinawa.

~~(C)~~ As the meeting was drawing to a close, the Japanese presented a draft proposal of areas of agreement and a summary of objectives coming out of the third meeting. This included a statement that both sides agreed to promote the mutual flow of technology on the basis of reciprocity. The U.S. representative wanted to amend the statement, but the proposed revision, according to the Japanese, would go well beyond existing Japanese government policy. The U.S. representative pressed further to achieve specific objectives, but could not. A compromise was reached in which the press announcement would show the two sides had agreed to a "joint study" of long-term air defense requirements. It was also agreed that the U.S.-proposed summary of objectives would be left for JDA review and response at a later date. This solution permitted the United States to leave a clear statement of objectives it wished included in the outcome of the Japanese government's deliberations on how to exclude the United States from Japan's restrictions on weapons exports. Both sides agreed to reconvene the forum in mid-1982, if possible.[1]

~~(C)~~ In a personal message to Admiral Long on 28 December, COMUS Japan outlined his thoughts on the forum meeting. He listed a number of concerns, including the fact that the infrastructure for technology transfer and joint research and development ventures in the NATO arena had taken 30 years to develop and refine. In the NATO alliance each member would come to the aid of the other if attacked, a role significantly different than the U.S.-Japanese relationship under the Mutual Security Treaty, in which the element of reciprocity was missing. The Japanese, consequently, did not have the same sense of urgency nor did they perceive a great need to transfer technology or to engage in joint research and development ventures. Also, when one looked at the procurement portion of the JDA budget and then subtracted the money being spent on U.S. weapons systems, there was very little left that would cause Japanese industry to "beat a path to the doorway" of the JDA.[2]

~~(C)~~ More importantly, he expressed concern regarding the apparent insufficient understanding on the part of some of the participants on both sides as to the appropriate role of the forum (and similar efforts) in respect to the on-going U.S.-Japan bilateral planning process. Such forums should not be allowed to precede or drive the bilateral planning process, he said. U.S.

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1. Ibid.
2. COMUSJAPAN 282244Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87..

agencies not involved in that process should not be involved in the actual definition and refinement of roles and missions as well as the weapons systems immediately involved. This was a military responsibility. He expected the System and Technology Forum efforts to have a long-term focus on evolving technologies and their application to future force concepts, rather than to the immediate bilateral force planning issues. Such efforts could easily be counterproductive to the on-going bilateral planning. Weapons should not dictate the limits of policy objectives or national interests. The suggestion that Japan needed AWACS was an encroachment on the military bilateral planning charter that could have the potential for disrupting the entire process. He recommended that the United States develop well defined forum objectives and a well-thought-out strategy for achieving them.[1]

ROK-Japan Relationships

(U) The United States enjoyed close relations with both Japan and Korea, but for historic reasons the feelings between our two friends and allies were more strained. As a former foreign correspondent for the New York Times put it, "Many centuries of close cultural connection between Korea and Japan, instead of mitigating the mutual antagonism of the two peoples, only exacerbate it." He continued that the Japanese were sublimally resentful that virtually their entire heritage from China, which ran the gamut from Buddhism and the Confucian ethic to the martial arts and geisha, had flowed to Japan through Korea, a far more ancient civilization. Subjugation of Korea had been their revenge. The Japanese had been ruthless colonizers on the peninsula, and the Koreans had never forgotten. Japan had occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945. Only the Japanese language was allowed to be taught in Korean schools. Resisters were tortured. Thousands of Koreans were shipped to Japan as cheap labor. Those forced migrants by 1981 formed Japan's largest ethnic minority, and were a depressed community, victims of discrimination and contempt. It was 20 years after Japan's surrender following World War II before Tokyo and Seoul established formal diplomatic relations. Anti-Korean furor in Japan continued to affect relations between the two countries as recently as 1973, when ROK agents kidnapped Kim Dae-jung, Korean opposition political leader, in downtown Tokyo.[2]

~~(S)~~ This same theme was reiterated in a message from the U.S. Ambassador to Japan in December 1981. He said the United States had to keep fully in mind the historical perspective of Korean-Japanese relations. Centuries of interchange, conflict, and misunderstanding, and a half century of harsh colonial rule had left their legacy. While comparisons were difficult, the relationship as seen from Tokyo was somewhat reminiscent of that between the Greeks and the Turks or the British and the Irish.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. Honolulu Advertiser (U), 26 Oct 81, p. A-6. "Japan-Korea relations cooling", by Robert Trumbull.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 21545/020620Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-3, 12/01/89.

[redacted]

(U) In January 1981 ROK President Chun Doo Hwan commuted to life imprisonment the death sentence of Kim Dae-jung, "resolving" the affair. In March, Japan's Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito traveled to Seoul, in a visit a Japanese newspaper described as putting once-strained Japan-Korea relations back on a course toward normalization. At the same time, however, the visit underscored the wide gaps in perception that existed between Tokyo and Seoul over security on the Korean Peninsula. During the ensuing exchange of views, ROK officials called on Japan to recognize that the ROK faced an "imminent threat" from North Korea. Foreign Minister Ito, on the other hand, highly praised President Chun's proposal for a summit between the leaders of North and South Korea and said Japan would help create a favorable environment to ease "tension" on the Korean Peninsula. Economic matters were also discussed.[2]

~~(S)~~ [redacted] the United States had been working on ways to try to begin improving relations between the military forces of the two countries. The message traffic on the subject was mostly "personal for" and "back channel," as members of the U.S. military community (CINCPAC, COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, the JCS), the Ambassadors in Japan and Korea, and the State Department sought to lay a groundwork for a beginning.

~~(S)~~ On 1 June CINCPAC forwarded an explicit "game plan" for fostering ROK-Japan cooperation. It was the product of inputs from CINCPAC's subordinate unified commanders and the Ambassadors to the two countries. All agreed that the United States should remain a low-visibility, backstage catalyst with the program carefully paced to the evolving political situation. "A slow deliberate pace is anticipated and close embassy coordination with Governments of Japan and Korea will be required to preclude misunderstandings," CINCPAC said. Specific initiatives were grouped into near-term (FY 81-82), mid-term (FY 83-84), and long-term (FY 85 and beyond) timeframes. A thorough step-by-step evaluation would be required and progression from one phase to another would be predicated on a favorable military and political assessment of results.[3]

~~(S)~~ In the near-term, we would encourage visits by officers of one country to the other to observe exercises or to view training procedures. The visits would be scheduled in conjunction with U.S. participation in the exercises or training event and then only with the prior concurrence of both governments. In the mid-term such activities as reciprocal port visits, publicizing of combined search and rescue operations, etc., were encouraged. In the long-

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1. Ibid.
2. COMUS Japan 090811Z Mar 81 (U).
3. CINCPAC 240220Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL 31 May 87.

term, direct exchange of tactical intelligence or air surveillance information, combined exercises, etc., were thought possible.[1]

~~(S)~~ Both the State Department and the JCS indicated support for the proposed "game plan," but both offered amplifying comments and a number of cautions. The cautions dealt mostly with the sensitivities of the two countries, noting that the plan had contemplated a gradual approach, testing the waters as things moved along. The State Department, however, wanted to flag some categories to underscore how important it was that they not be given premature publicity or move beyond the conceptual stage without full reassessment in the light of prevailing circumstances.[2]

~~(S)~~ By late July, CINCPAC advised his component commanders of the close-hold planning that had been going on and invited staff officer-level participation in a meeting to discuss the initiatives, sensitivities, and proposed future actions.[3]

~~(S)~~ On 7 November CINCPAC advised the Washington community, principals in the countries involved, and his component commanders that the working level assessement of near-term initiatives had been completed and that he intended to authorize U.S. Forces in Korea and Japan to informally test the water with their counterparts on the most promising initiatives that had been identified. CINCPAC cautioned all concerned that the proposals remained within the previously coordinated guidelines for pacing initiatives with the evolving political situation.[4]

~~(S)~~ The near-term initiatives were as follows:

- Invite ROK Naval Marine Force officers to visit Okinawa as guests of the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (early in 1982).

- Invite ROK Air Force officers to observe Exercise COPE NORTH in Japan (February 1982) and Japan Air Self-Defense Force officers to observe a COPE JADE exercise in Korea (in May 1982).

- Invite Japan Ground Self-Defense Force officers to the ROK as guests of the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (mid-1982).

- Concurrent hosting of ROK Navy/Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force midshipmen during a SEVENTH Fleet mid-1982 shipboard training program.

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 142000Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~(BOM), REVW 19 Jul 87; SECSTATE 195071/240206Z Jul 81 (S)(EX), RDS 07/23/01.
3. CINCPAC 240647Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Jul 87.
4. CINCPAC 072303Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Oct 87.

- Invite ROK Army/Japan Ground Self-Defense Force officers to observe Exercise TROPIC LIGHTNING in Hawaii in June 1982.

- Invite ROK Army officers to observe Exercise GOPHER BROKE in Hawaii (late in 1982). Japan Self-Defense Forces were scheduled to be an active participant.

- Conduct a Northeast Asia security seminar in Hawaii during the same time frame as the GOPHER BROKE exercise.

[redacted] 1.5 (a)

~~(S)~~ The Chairman of the JCS advised that he supported the plan; he requested that CINCPAC keep all interested agencies advised of the outcome of his efforts.[2]

~~(S)~~ The U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo supported a number of the initiatives, cautioning that we could not be overly optimistic about the pace of improvement in bilateral relations nor could we expect this improvement to proceed according to a neat timetable. He said that relations were too complex and troubled for that. He asked some questions about the proposed Northeast Asia security seminar, saying that if the U.S. Government were sponsoring it, he might want to take a closer look at subject matter, participants, etc. In all of the initiatives, he said we must be guided by the bilateral political situation and by the reactions of the Koreans and Japanese themselves. He believed it would be actively harmful for the United States to try to force the pace. The United States could not engineer or lead, only act as a catalyst.[3]

~~(S)~~ The U.S. Ambassador in Seoul applauded Ambassador Mansfield's view that the United States should serve as a catalyst in aiding closer Korean-Japanese relations and he believed that there was a wide range of areas where that role could be active rather than passive.[4]

~~(S)~~ The State Department advised CINCPAC (in a joint State-Defense Department message) that they appreciated the careful approach taken in developing the program. They supported the objective and believed it was an achievement that would over the longer term enhance our defensive posture in East Asia. The Department concurred with the responses of the Embassies in Tokyo and Seoul, with the additional caveat that the United States avoid presenting the series of steps as a package, but address them on an ad hoc

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 211951Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Nov 87.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 21545/020620Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-3, 12/01/89.
4. AMEMB Seoul 9045/030817Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-3, 12/3/89.

basis. Given the sensitivities of the Japanese and Koreans about one another, the Department believed that much misunderstanding could be avoided and a good deal of time saved if the approach on each proposal was carefully coordinated in advance between the respective embassies and commands. They authorized CINCPAC to proceed along the lines he had outlined. Under no circumstances, however, should invitations be extended without the concurrence of the country to which a third party was being invited.[1]

U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Relationship

(U) As discussed in some detail in the 1980 History, the Government of the Republic of Korea had undergone a major transition following the assassination of President Park Chung-hee on 26 October 1979. After a period of some political turbulence, retired general Chun Doo Hwan was inaugurated as president on 1 September 1980. Another Korean political matter the United States had watched closely was the trial and death sentence of opposition leader Kim Dae-jung. In January 1981 President Chun commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment.[2]

(U) President Chun Doo Hwan was one of the first heads of state to call on newly inaugurated President Reagan when they met in Washington early in Februaury 1981. It was announced following their meeting that President Reagan had reaffirmed the American security commitment and advised that the United States would maintain its existing level of troops deployed in Korea. This abrogated the announced policy of Jimmy Carter following his inauguration four years earlier to remove U.S. ground forces from Korea. That process had later been held in abeyance by President Carter and withdrawal had never actually occurred. President Reagan said he was pleased that the present level of the United States military presence in Korea would be maintained. "This makes," he said, "a vital and indispensable contribution towards not only peace in Korea, but peace and tranquility in the Northeast Asia region."[3]

~~(S)~~ On 13 April, during a visit to Korea, Admiral Long met with President Chun for approximately 75 minutes. The ROK Defense Minister, Choo Young Bock, ROK JCS Chairman Lew Byong Hion, the U.S. Ambassador, and COMUS Korea were also present. As a Security Consultative Meeting was scheduled for later that month, CINCPAC cautioned the President that the ROK Government should not expect all issues to be solved at the SCM.[4]

[redacted]

1. SECSTATE 330574/150158Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), RDS-3, 12/14/89.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/ERD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 41-47.
3. Honolulu Advertiser (U), 3 Feb 81, p. A-1.
4. CINCPAC 171156Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), REVW 15 Apr 01.

[redacted]

(U) SCM XIII was finally held on 29 and 30 April 1981. The U.S. Secretary of Defense was host at the Presidio of San Francisco and the ROK Minister of National Defense, Choo Young Bock, headed the Korean delegation. Admiral Long attended as a delegate. (Admiral Long also attended the third plenary session of the ROK-U.S. Military Committee, which met on 28 April at the Presidio.) At the SCM the delegations agreed that the continuing buildup of North Korea posed a serious threat to the security of the ROK. Also, that the ROK was pivotal to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and in turn, vital to the security of the United States. The two sides agreed to pursue defense improvements in several areas to include wartime resupply, combined U.S.-ROK military exercises, and force upgrade of U.S. and ROK forces. Agreements were also reached on ROK requests to sell U.S.-origin defense items to third countries. (Agreements reached regarding Operational Control of U.S. forces by the Combined Forces Command are addressed in greater detail in Chapter I of this history.) Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the annual SCM and agreed to hold the next meeting in 1982 in Korea.[2]

~~(C)~~ On 4 August CINCPAC was advised that the Washington-based Korea Review Group would be reoriented. Established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1978 the group had been principally concerned with issues relating to the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces and on measures to overcome the existing military imbalance on the Korean Peninsula. In 1981 the group would be reoriented to serve as a forum for review and follow-up on post-SCM actions. On 7 October CINCPAC provided the Office of the Secretary with recommended agenda items for a November meeting of the group, incorporating the recommendations of COMUS Korea and the Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea.[3]

~~(C)~~ In another forum, meetings of the Military Armistice Commission continued in Korea. In anticipation of the 409th such meeting, to be called by the United Nations Command, CINCUNC advised that a proposal would be made to the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers that each side provide prior notification of major military training exercises. (See "Reaction to North Korean Exercise Activity" in the Operations chapter.) The JCS concurred with the proposal. CINCPAC, however, advised the JCS that the proposal, as stated, was too broad, and should be reoriented toward the two sides agreeing to develop a mutually agreed formula regarding exercise notification. The JCS subsequently concurred with the CINCPAC modification and advised CINCUNC accordingly. The 409th MAC meeting convened on 28 December and CINCUNC

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/ERD)~~, Vol. I, p. 46.
2. J5111 HistSum May 81 (U); CDR USASIX SFRAN CA 302136Z Apr 81 (U), which transmitted the joint communique of the SCM as released to the media.
3. OSD 041330Z Aug 81 (U)(BOM); CINCPAC 072240Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87.

presented the proposal. The Korean-Chinese People's Volunteer side, however, did not directly respond to it.[1]

PACOM Initiatives for Malaysia

~~(S)~~ In October 1980 the Malaysian Prime Minister met in Kuala Lumpur with the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet. The Prime Minister expressed deep concern at expanding Soviet military capabilities and requested increased training support for the Malaysian Armed Forces. He said Malaysia would remain unaligned, but he also emphasized that his country and others in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had to ultimately depend on American strength and assistance for their security. On 10 November 1980 CINCPAC proposed to the Ambassador certain initiatives that could be offered to the Government of Malaysia in a "carefully phased increase in military-to-military contacts with the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces." CINCPAC said he fully realized that the initiatives must not proceed too quickly and create an adverse reaction. CINCPAC mentioned such possibilities as intelligence exchange programs, certain exercise initiatives, deployment of aircraft or ship visits, personnel exchange programs, and visits by high ranking U.S. military people.[2]

~~(C)~~ On 3 December 1980 the U.S. Defense Attache in Kuala Lumpur requested a list of the U.S. Army Western Command's proposed initiatives. Subsequent to receipt, the Attache replied with his recommendations on the WESTCOM initiatives (which were of the type discussed above) on 15 December, non-concurring with four of the proposals. CINCPAC advised CDRWESTCOM that he concurred in the Attache's recommendations. The Admiral said that PACOM efforts to satisfy Malaysian requirements should be geared toward the most cost effective programs in fulfilling local requirements. "Care needs to be taken in not proceeding too quickly with the whole spectrum of proposals which are available." He considered the Attache, who was in close coordination with both the Embassy and the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces, in the best position to determine local requirements and to recommend the appropriate pace of increased military-to-military contact. "It is important that all concerned work closely with the Country Team to fully coordinate the specifics of our efforts to assist GOM [the Government of Malaysia] in meeting its training support requirements," CINCPAC said.[3]

~~(S)~~ In a related action, the Attache on 11 December 1980 forwarded specific Royal Malaysian Armed Forces training support requirements to CINCPAC

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1. J5113 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C-REL ROK),~~ DECL 31 Jan 88; CINCUNC 180640Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~ DECL 29 Dec 81; CINCPAC 190307Z Dec 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 87; JCS 200139Z Dec 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 19 Dec 87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD),~~ Vol. I, pp. 131-132.
3. J5121 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Jan 87; CINCPAC 110406Z Dec 80 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 86; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 1197/150705Z Dec 80 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 86; CINCPAC 242349Z Dec 80 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 86.

for review. CINCPAC asked for the comments of his component commanders, with information copies of replies to the Attache. CINCPAC concurred with the proposals the components had presented and added some further staff recommendations. Regarding the briefing on electronic warfare concepts and doctrine, CINCPAC said the level and range of detail desired would determine whether the briefing should be presented by the PACOM component commands or CONUS Service staffs. Substantial lead time would be required. Concerning Malaysia's request for a preliminary estimate for a computerization project, it was difficult to provide the data when the level of support and product desired had not been specified. He understood they only wanted a "ballpark" figure for budgeting to be adjusted when the level of support was determined, so he estimated U.S. support would cost approximately $200,000 (U.S.).[1]

~~(S)~~ It was not until 12 February 1981 that the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia advised CINCPAC that she had deliberately withheld a specific response to CINCPAC's message of 10 November 1980 pending indications of Malaysian receptivity to the proposals offered by CINCPAC's component commanders. She informed CINCPAC that the recommendations for the most part had been widely accepted, particularly the WESTCOM program. Proposals from CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT were still being studied in detail by the Ministry of Defense naval and air staffs.[2]

~~(S)~~ Of importance to note, the Ambassador continued, was the Malaysian unwillingwness to become involved in a formal "exchange" program, with the full implications of that term. The Malaysian government was of the opinion that "exchange" implied a formal relationship or agreement between the Malysian and U.S. Governments and by extension could be misunderstood as inferring a change in the Government's non-aligned foreign policy. By way of semantics, they preferred that either liaison officers be attached to the respective organizations (ours and theirs) or individuals designated as attached for training, thereby circumventing a potentially uncomfortable political issue.

~~(S)~~ Regarding Air Force and Navy training, the Ambassador advised that the Malaysians thought it essential that representatives of PACAF and CINCPACFLT visit Malaysia to coordinate effective on-the-job training and observer programs with the Malaysian services. The Ambassador urged that such representation be limited to the colonel-captain level to preclude unwarranted high visibility. In another matter, the Chief of the Operations Staff desired that the Ambassador investigate the feasibility of CINCPAC providing a joint warfare team to Malaysia on a semi-annual or annual basis to provide lectures and instruction in joint warfare organization, planning, and operations for the Malaysian Armed Forces Defense College and Joint Staff. The Ambassador asked for CINCPAC's comments.

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1. USDAO Kuala Lumpur 1187/110800Z Dec 80 ~~(S)~~, DG/C/85, DECL/86; CINCPAC 052105Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Dec 86.
2. USDAO Kuala Lumpur 0818/120340Z Feb 81 ~~(S)~~, GDS-02/11/87.

~~(S)~~ The Ambassador was of the opinion that the proposals generated thus far would in the long run result in a closer military-to-military relationship between the Services of the respective Armed Forces.[1]

~~(S)~~ On 12 March CINCPAC provided a reply to the Ambassador and guidance to his component commanders regarding steps toward military-to-military contact. He said that all concerned would treat carefully the requirement to refrain from formal exchange programs. To this end, the CINCPAC staff would coordinate with the Attache regarding the details of component staff visits to Kuala Lumpur and in accommodating the request for a joint warfare team visit. "Be assured the CINCPAC and component staffs will do all that is necessary to assist in these important initiatives and will work closely with Country Team members to meet new requirements," CINCPAC said.[2]

~~(S)~~ The next day CINCPAC advised the Attache that readjustments of terms could be made to accommodate the Malaysian sensitivities toward formal exchange programs. He outlined visits by members of component staffs that had been scheduled. He also advised that discussions held at CINCPAC and WESTCOM headquarters in February with a Malaysian officer had revealed the scope of the requirement for joint operations planning, which was focused at the tactical level. It was also learned that the United Kingdom military had presented a series of joint operations planning lectures and exercises to the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College and that the U.S. team visit was expected to serve as a counterpart or complement to the U.K. presentations.[3]

~~(S)~~ Admiral Long made his first visit to Malaysia from 31 May to 4 June, meeting with the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, and senior defense and military officials. The visit was described by the Embassy as "highly successful." Malaysian leaders discussed the threat they perceived from the USSR, Vietnam, and China, and their desires to improve Malaysian military defenses. They saw the United States as playing a significant part in that process. The Chairman of the JCS advised the Admiral that he supported the efforts to continue high-level military-to-military contacts as a means to generate better U.S.-Malaysian relations.[4]

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In an August report following a visit to the region, the Commander, SEVENTH Fleet proposed an attempt to gain access for P-3 aircraft to Butterworth Royal Malaysia Air Force airbase. He said that while he had sensed a coolness on the part of the U.S. Embassy staff when he broached the subject to the Country Team, he considered this a high priority item to be pursued as improved relations permitted. He outlined a strategy to introduce this

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 122115Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Mar 87.
3. CINCPAC 132257Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Mar 87.
4. CINCPAC 060243Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 5 Jun 89; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 9650/080700Z Jun 81, RDS-1, 4, 06/05/01; JCS 111456Z Jun 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~, DECL 8 Jun 87.

concept. CINCPAC advised that he strongly supported efforts to strengthen military-to-military relations through exercises, visits, training, etc. He said that efforts with Malaysia must be pursued with particular care if they were to be successful. It was a worthwhile objective to look at ways to develop some access to Butterworth, "but we must recognize that this could be a highly sensitive issue for the Malaysia leadership." He asked CINCPACFLT for a plan prior to CINCPAC's raising the subject with the Ambassador. Work was to be done on a "close hold" basis.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ CINCPACFLT provided his plan and CINCPAC forwarded the concept to the Ambassador on 21 October. The Ambassador's immediate response outlined some suggestions for modifying the plan, such as omitting at first any reference to Indian Ocean operations because that was a sensitive issue. He said that if the United States attempted to solicit agreement for a program of regularized access for P-3s to Butterworth "now or in the near future, the Malaysians would reject the idea out of hand." On the other hand, he agreed that this might be a good time to test the possibility of periodic, case-by-case access. On 19 December, however, CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that as a result of discussions with the Ambassador, all initiatives on Butterworth should be held in abeyance until further notice."[2]

U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement

(U) On 7 January 1979, after a decade of intermittent negotiations, an amendment to the Military Bases Agreement had been signed. The bases were at the hub of Pacific air and sea lines of communication. Also, the training, logistics, and repair facilities at those bases contributed substantially to the pursuit of U.S. security interests in Asia and the Indian Ocean. Review of the agreements by both countries would be required again in 1984, however.

(U) In 1981 CINCPAC provided semi-annual reports on implementation of the 1979 agreement to the JCS. In a report of 9 Janauary CINCPAC advised that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, General Romeo C. Espino, continued as Philippine Bases Commander. As of the beginning of the year, there were 615 AFP personnel at Subic Bay, 785 at Clark Air Base proper, 31 at John Hay Air Station, 28 at Camp O'Donnell, and 10 at Wallace Air Station. The personnel were involved in base gate and perimeter security duties. Construction of additional perimeter security towers at Clark had been completed. Single flag poles (for the Philippine flag only) had been erected at the entrances to San Miguel, Camp O'Donnell, and Wallace Air Station.

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1. J5121 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Oct 87; COMSEVENTHFLT 240816Z Aug 81 ~~(C/N/F),~~ DECL 24 Aug 87, retransmitted as CINCPACFLT 250015Z Aug 81; CINCPAC 192213Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~; DECL 30 Sep 87.
2. J5121 HistSums Oct 81 ~~(S/NF)~~ DECL 30 Nov 87 and Dec 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL 31 Jan 88; CINCPACFLT 100055Z Oct 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL 30 Sep 87; CINCPAC 210303Z Oct 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL 31 Oct 87; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 1163/230311Z Oct 81 ~~(S),~~ GDS 10/22/87; CINCPAC 190340Z Dec 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL 31 Dec 87.

CINCPAC reported that positive cooperation and coordination between AFP and U.S. forces had eliminated sensitive issues and a warm, beneficial relationship had been maintained.[1]

~~(S)~~ In the 15 July report, CINCPAC advised the JCS that working groups had been established at CINCPAC and CINCPACREP Philippines to formulate a "game plan" for the 1984 review of the MBA.[2]

~~(C)~~ Earlier, in May, CINCPAC had cautioned his component commands and all involved to be extremely careful in all discussions, both official and unofficial, with Philippine officials to insure that there was no possibility of compromising the U.S. negotiating position prematurely. He named the CINCPACREP Philippines as his in-country point of contact for all military matters regarding the negotiations. CINCPACREP Philippines was to coordinate with the Embassy in Manila.[3]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC provided some initial thoughts on the negotiations "game plan" in a message on 24 June. He also established some milestones, which culminated with forwarding the plan to Washington for review on 15 September.[4]

~~(S)~~ On 14 November CINCPAC forwarded his plan to the JCS, with information copies to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Service headquarters, the Embassy in Manila, and CINCPACREP Philippines. He said he believed the prospects for the required 1984 review were "reasonably good," barring the death or incapacitation of President Marcos or other domestic turmoil, and assuming the U.S. ability to meet Philippine requirements on the key issues of compensation and defense commitment. On compensation, the 1979 package of $500 million had been criticized by the Philippine military for the following reasons. First, Military Assistance Program grants would terminate in FY 81. Secondly, because they received little benefit from the Economic Support Fund. A third was because because they could not afford the high interest rates for Foreign Military Sales credits. The issue of U.S. defense commitment related closely to President Marcos' perception of how the United States treated him in political terms. There were a number of long-standing lesser issues that CINCPAC believed were capable of managment through established mechanisms. CINCPAC named criminal jurisdiction, labor, customs, immigration, quarantine, and taxation as those lesser issues.

~~(S)~~ Admiral Long listed the first U.S. objective as continued unhampered use of the facilities, preferably beyond 1991. Assurance of 20 years' tenure, he noted, would help greatly with Congressional funding and such issues as homeporting of U.S. ships. (Earlier, in a meeting with President Marcos in

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1. J5121 HistSum Jan 81 (U); CINCPAC 092131Z Jan 81 (U).
2. J5123 HistSum Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC 150114Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87.
3. CINCPAC 092038Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 7 May 87.
4. CINCPAC 240400Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 Jun 87.

Manila on 27 May, Admiral Long had been discussing possible homeporting of another aircraft carrier overseas. While Subic was an attractive site, he said, possible termination of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991 cast a shadow over not only homeporting but Congressional funding in general for U.S. bases. President Marcos then said he was "now" telling U.S. Congressmen and Senators that he viewed the MBA in terms of "reassessment not termination" in 1991.) CINCPAC sought to keep the review process as brief and non-contentious as possible to preserve a good security atmosphere in the Philippines and in the region. He thought it was important to avoid triggering the review prematurely. He also thought it important to increase Philippine perception of the importance of U.S. forces and facilities in the Philippines to overall regional stability. He believed officers with experience in past negotiations should be on the negotiating team.[1]

~~(C)~~ On 18 November the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, John H. Holdridge, acknowledged CINCPAC's plan for the negotiations as "helpful" and "constructive." He added, "Your detailed analysis of our objectives and of the major and other issues we can expect to face during the review itself or during the period leading up to it will stand us in good stead." He fully agreed with CINCPAC's recommendation on the subsidiary issues.[2]

~~(S)~~ The Charge d'Affairs in the Embassy in Manila sent his agreement with CINCPAC's "excellent" message. He said the Embassy believed CINCPAC's analysis of the situation and the overall strategy suggested were quite sound and fully supported Mission objectives in the Philippines. He advised that the United States should avoid the assumption that the review must necessarily be a formal one like that which led to the 1979 amendments, and we should seek to bring the Philippines around to the same view. Also, the United States should state from the outset that our bilateral mandate was solely to review the way the MBA was functioning, not to renegotiate its terms.[3]

~~(S)~~ The JCS concurred in mid-December, describing the proposed planning factors as a useful reference in structuring the review preparation. They fully agreed with the strategy of trying to resolve as many subsidiary issues as possible prior to the review. They proposed to establish by the autumn of 1982 an interagency review working group including representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the Agency for International Development, the Services, and the JCS to discuss review procedures and strategy. They planned to use the 1978 negotiating format during the review, with the Ambassador dealing with President Marcos and giving overall counsel and direction. They also planned to have a senior military officer head the military-to-military

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1. J5123 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(S)~~; CINCPAC 142214Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 3 Nov 91; AMEMB Manila 11844/280249Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-1 5/28/01.
2. SECSTATE 306138/180151Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/17/87.
3. AMEMB Manila 28660/070834Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-04, 12/7/01.

team. CINCPAC's recommendations would be sought prior to designation of the military-to-military review team members.[1]

Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board

(U) On 28 May Admiral Long co-chaired the 23rd Anniversary Meeting of the Republic of the Philippines-United States Mutual Defense Board in Manila. The visit to the Philippines provided the Admiral an opportunity to meet and become more familar with the leaders of that country and U.S. Country Team members. CINCPAC reaffirmed continued U.S. support for the close security relationship between the two countries.[2]

(U) On 14 July CINCPAC nominated his new Director for Plans, RADM Robert W. Chewning, USN, to be the senior adviser to the U.S. co-chairman (CINCPAC). The nomination was accepted at the monthly meeting held on 30 July.[3]

~~(C)~~ Late in August the Embassy in Manila received a note from the Philippine Foreign Minister, Carlos P. Romulo, proposing that the MDB be chaired by the Defense Ministers and that the co-chairmen be made vice co-chairmen. (CINCPAC's counterpart as co-chairman was the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that a counter proposal be offered to include the Minister of National Defense of the Philippines and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as members of the Council of Ministers and leave the existing MDB composition intact. Admiral Long noted that the MDB had been for many years an effective vehicle for military-to-military discussions of matters of mutual interest. The change the Philippines proposed would add an additional administrative layer and preclude the U.S. panel from removing sensitive issues from the MDB forum and elevating them to higher authority for resolution.[4]

~~(C)~~ The JCS advised that they preferred that the existing MDB structure remain intact, but they were also cognizant of Philippine sensitivities and desired to remain responsive to their needs. They were working with the State and Defense Departments to formulate a position that minimized any Washington-level participation.[5]

(U) Admiral Long, as U.S. co-chairman, presided at the MDB meeting held at Subic Bay on 19 November. Major achievements of the MDB during the previous six months had included intensification of bilateral exercises, including participation or observation by personnel of third countries; revision of the

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1. JCS 141615 Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 Dec 87.
2. J5122 HistSum May 81 (U); CINCPAC 080832Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 May 87.
3. J5123 HistSum Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC 140021Z Jul 81 (U).
4. J5123 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Oct 87; CINCPAC 160034Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87.
5. JCS 282300Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~(EX), DECL 18 Sep 87.

MDB operations plan for the mutual defense of the Philippines; completion of a joint survey of the boundaries of the facilities used by the United States; and establishment of several standard operating procedures to improve overall board objectives. During this visit Admiral Long again met with President Marcos, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.[1]

PACOM Initiatives for the Philippines

~~(C)~~ On 10 April CINCPAC provided the JCS with a statement of PACOM-proposed initiatives designed to maintain the close working relationship with the AFP and to best insure continued use of facilities there. CINCPAC believed we must foster long-term support among the Philippine military, particularly the rising generation of middle and lower-ranking officers. Contact with that group had been very sporadic in recent years. CINCPAC's proposed initiatives were all of minimal or no cost to the AFP. Some required Washington-level action, others, action by CINCPAC's component commanders or U.S. commanders in the Philippines. Principally the initiatives involved schooling or training, exchange programs, exercises, and the like.[2]

~~(C)~~ The JCS advised CINCPAC that most of the near-term personnel initiatives appeared feasible and should assist in demonstrating the desire for a continued, close working relationship. The U.S. Services would be requested to initiate appropriate actions within their established programs. They noted that the Organization of the JCS did not have a joint Service exchange program or an organized program to manage and supervise such a program.[3]

~~(C)~~ On 12 May CINCPAC requested that CINCPACREP Philippines introduce the JCS-approved initiatives to the AFP by means of the Plans Committee of the Mutual Defense Board. On 5 August CINCPAC advised the JCS of the AFP Chief of Staff's thoughts detailing his comments and observations on the proposed initiatives. Most concerned student exchanges. The Chief of Staff said he was highly appreciative of CINCPAC's concern in promoting a mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries and the two armed forces. He said he would give the matter the fullest possible "reciprocation."[4]

U.S.-China Security Relationship

(U) As noted in the 1980 CINCPAC history, the first distinguished Chinese visitors representing that government in its renewed association with the United States had stopped in Hawaii en route to or from Washington visits.

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1. J5123 HistSum Oct 81 (U); CINCPACREP Phil 050900Z Nov 81 (U).
2. J5123 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 May 87; CINCPAC 100507Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Apr 87.
3. JCS 301548Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 28 Apr 87.
4. J5123 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Oct 87; CINCPAC 050521Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Jul 87.

During that year Admiral Long and his staff had provided a number of thoughts on the U.S.-Chinese security relationship, based in part on the accelerating pace of the establishment of relations between the two countries.[1]

~~(S)~~ In January 1981 CINCPAC was asked for his comments on a JCS working paper dealing with the U.S.-Chinese security relationship. On 19 January CINCPAC described the study as thought provoking and said the conclusions were valid. He said that the political, economic, and military interaction between China and the USSR should be addressed as it was those relationships that appeared to be the dominant factors driving the Chinese to closer ties with the West. He said he did not concur with the position on China's ability to invade Taiwan. "CINCPAC's position is that China has the capability to successfully invade Taiwan now assuming Beijing is willing to accept massive losses in men, materiel, and prestige, and that the PRC is capable of acquiring local air and naval superiority."[2]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC said that his earlier input had questioned the value of brainstorming the U.S.-Chinese relationship 20-plus years into the future, and that his review of this paper reinforced that opinion. He said that because of the many variables, it was not possible to develop a complete scenario. Has Japan rearmed? What has developed in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India? What will be the influence of the countries of Southeast Asia? What has been the impact of technological advances in the United States and the USSR? Surely those two nations would not have stagnated as China developed. "Since postulation of a complete scenario would require considerably more time and effort, and anything less is non-contributory. . . .[the chapter addressing this study] could be deleted."

(U) In conclusion, CINCPAC, repeating that he considered the study conclusions valid, provided additional clarifying comments that he believed required emphasis. He said:[3]

- A clearly defined US strategy for the establishment of a US-PRC security relationship must be developed and stated in a manner which leaves no doubt as to our position and course to be followed.

- No need to move precipitously. Considering that neither immediate nor long term gains can be assured, there is little sense in rushing matters.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 122-126. ~~(C)~~ China was not assigned to CINCPAC in the Unified Command Plan, but was, of course, of immense interest to this command.
2. J5122 HistSum Jan 81 (U); CINCPAC 192355Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Jan 87.
3. Ibid.

- The implications of increased Chinese military capabilities, and the already considerable effects of current PRC forces on the USSR argue for restraint in a US-PRC security relationship.

~~(S)~~ On 11 May the JCS published a paper that reflected their position on the scope and objectives of Sino-U.S. military relations. In the introduction to that paper they noted that the Sino-Soviet estrangement had provided opportunities for China and the United States to consider a security relationship that would serve the interests of both. Common concern for the Soviet Union's military expansion had stimulated the relationship and led to the normalization of diplomatic relations. Subsequently, the United States-China security relationship had assumed both global and regional significance and had expanded to include a number of converging and parallel interests. The implications of that relationship extended to other Asian nations, whose views would also have to be considered as the pace and direction of the future U.S. security relationship with Beijing was determined.[1]

[redacted] 1.5 (b)(1)

[redacted] 1.5 (b)(1)

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[redacted]

1. JCS 021342Z Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Aug 87, which was extracted from JCS SM SM 159-81 of 11 May 81.

States should seek to promote a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and in doing so demonstrate to Taiwan and the PRC that it was in their mutual interest to cooperate with the United States and its allies both in deterring Soviet expansion in Asia and defending against the Soviets in wartime.

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC noted that most past communications had been infrequent, non-interactive and non-substantive, which was in keeping with the behind-the-scenes nature of China policy development. Such practices, however, were incompatible with mission requirements. CINCPAC believed that the United States needed a means to incorporate the field commander's input on a regular basis and to exchange views with one of the principal policy implementers. An active dialogue would improve CINCPAC's ability to carry out effectively the security responsibilities imposed. He requested the support of the JCS in developing an effective mechanism for integrating CINCPAC into China security policy development and policy implementation decisions.[3]

[redacted]

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1. Ibid.
2. J5122 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87; CINCPAC 190651Z Sep 81 ~~(TS)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87.
3. Ibid.











Collision of U.S. Submarine with Japanese Freighter

Collision and Aftermath

(U) The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) collided with the Japanese motor vessel NISSHO MARU at 090132Z April 1981 (1032 hours local time on 9 April) at 31°23'N/129°05'E (in the East China Sea off the southwest coast of Kyushu). GEORGE WASHINGTON displaced 6,697 tons submerged and had a complement of 13 officers and 134 enlisted men. MV NISSHO MARU weighed 2,350 deadweight tons, had a crew of 15, and was carrying a cargo of raw cotton and miscellaneous goods. It was en route from Kobe, Japan, to Shanghai, PRC. At the time of collision, GEORGE WASHINGTON was participating in an ASW exercise with a U.S. Navy P-3C aircraft from Misawa AB, Japan.[3]

(U) The leading edge of the submarine's sail struck and ruptured the motor vessel in the engineroom. The submarine's captain quickly ordered the boat to surface. He made a periscope sweep and observed NISSHO MARU but saw no apparent damage above the waterline. To preclude identification as an SSBN, the captain ordered the boat to submerge to periscope depth. No unusual list or trim of the surface ship was observed. He lost the vessel about 5 minutes after the collision because of weather, at a range of approximately 1,250 yards. The P-3C, informed of the collision, could not locate the stricken ship. NISSHO MARU sank in about 15 minutes. Thirteen survivors were rescued by a Japanese destroyer some 18 hours after the sinking.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 212215Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 18 Dec 87; CINCPAC 231815Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 22 Dec 87; CINCPAC 280604Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 28 Dec 01.
2. USAFK 300555Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 30 Dec 87; CINCPAC 310406Z Dec 81 (U).
3. COMSEVENTHFLT 020900Z May 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL 2 May 87.
4. Ibid.

~~(TS)~~ GEORGE WASHINGTON filed the initial report of collision to CTF 74 at 090304Z April, saying it had hit a foreign "trawler" of unknown nationality. The collision occurred in limited visibility at periscope depth. The trawler's stern marking was believed to be "NISSARU MARU." It appeared to be moving slowly with no visible damage observed during a brief visual contact astern. The submarine was operating submerged and intended to remain stationary.[1]

~~(TS)~~ In SITREP Number 2, sent almost 2 hours later, GEORGE WASHINGTON reported it had surfaced within one minute of the collision and sighted a trawler about 500 yards on beam heading slowly away. After the collision the submarine cleared the area 8 NM to the north, contacting the P-3C to check on the well-being of the trawler. The collision impact had shuddered the submarine, rolling it about 10 degrees to port. The extent of damage was unknown, but all systems were normal.[2]

(U) The JMSDF in Tokyo informed COMNAVFOR Japan at 092345Z (100845 local) of the sinking of a Japanese ship by a submarine, and CTF 74 informed COMSEVENTHFLT that the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON collision probably had resulted in that sinking. The Secretary of the Navy released a statement in Washington on 10 April deeply regretting the accident and the possible loss of life of two crewmembers of the Japanese ship. CINCPAC also expressed his deep regret to the Japanese government on 11 April over the sinking and possible loss of life. He said a full investigation of the incident was underway. COMUS Japan released a statement to the Tokyo news media on 11 April expressing his sorrow for the crewmen and their families. The U.S. Ambassador called on the Japanese Foreign Minister to convey regrets expressed by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Foreign Minister requested a full study be made of why the report to Japan was delayed by almost 35 hours after the accident. Much public controversy was expected.[3]

(U) Japanese papers reported that Admiral Long paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki at the latter's official residence on 16 April and expressed his regret over the collision. He conveyed an American plan to complete the investigation of the accident within 30 days and report the results to Japan. Prime Minister Suzuki asked Admiral Long for a speedy disposition of questions regarding the cause of the accident, failure by the submarine to rescue the crew, delay in reporting the accident to Japan, compensation, and how to prevent recurrences. Admiral Long then paid a courtesy call on the Foreign Minister, who asked for an interim report of investigation before the Suzuki-Reagan summit meeting in May.[4]

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1. Ibid; CTU 74.5.0 090239Z Apr 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 9 Apr 01.
2. CTU 74.5.0 090445Z Apr 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 9 Apr 01.
3. COMSEVENTHFLT 020900Z May 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL 2 May 87; CHINFO 110408Z Apr 81 (U); CINCPAC 112315Z Apr 81 (U); COMUSJ 130501Z Apr 81 (U); COMUSJ 150403Z Apr 81 (U).
4. COMUSJ 170501Z Apr 81 (U).

(U) The Japanese Maritime Safety Agency found the bodies of the two missing crewmen (the captain and first mate) at about 1700 hours on 21 April, near Yaku-shima (island), Kagoshima Prefecture.[1]

Report of Investigation

(U) In a preliminary report of investigation completed on 2 May, it was the opinion of the investigating officer that the collision resulted from a combination of the following factors:[2]

- The Officer of the Deck (OOD) failed to observe the MV NISSHO MARU during his low power search with the No. 1 periscope when USS GEORGE WASHINGTON reached periscope depth, about 4 minutes before the collision. The adverse weather conditions existing at the time of search contributed to the OOD's failure to see the ship.

- The OOD did not hear the SONAR report of a noise level and the Quartermaster of the Watch did not insure that the OOD was aware of the report from SONAR. The SONAR supervisor failed to repeat the report when there was no acknowledgement.

- The expectation by the OOD and the electronic support measures (ESM) operator that an exercise aircraft was overhead when the No. 2 scope was first raised, which allowed them to discount the possibility that the strong ESM contact was a surface search radar.

- The confirmation of the presence of the exercise aircraft when the OOD, upon raising the No. 2 scope, perceived the aircraft to be making an attack on the submarine, further reinforcing the lack of concern over surface contacts.

- The failure of the OOD to raise the No. 2 scope again after allowing time for the aircraft to pass overhead.

- The adverse SONAR conditions which precluded sufficient opportunity to obtain, locate, and identify the MV NISSHO MARU as she bore down on the submarine.

~~(S)~~ GEORGE WASHINGTON was the "give way" vessel under the circumstances and was the vessel obliged to observe and avoid NISSHO MARU. The failure of the submarine to pursue and observe the surface vessel after the collision was the result of the commanding officer's perception that only a minor hit had occurred, that NISSHO MARU had not been significantly damaged, and that it was necessary for him to remain unidentified as an SSBN. The investigating officer believed the sub's captain, while aware of Navy regulations to render

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 7216/211227Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 21 Apr 87.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT 020900Z May 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), DECL 2 May 87.

assistance to the other ship after a collision, was more acutely aware of the security requirements imposed on submarine operations in general and SSBN operations in particular. Moreover, he considered it dangerous for an SSBN, with 16 missiles to safeguard, to remain on the surface or at periscope depth.[1]

~~(C)~~ The report of formal investigation, dated 14 May, recommended that the captain of GEORGE WASHINGTON be detached as commanding officer, for cause, for failure to take appropriate action to ascertain the status and safety of NISSHO MARU and in submerging below periscope depth and clearing the area without having conducted a sufficient inquiry into the condition of that vessel. COMSUBPAC concurred that detachment for cause was appropriate. COMSEVENTHFLT also issued punitive letters of reprimand to the submarine commander and the officer of the deck at the time of collision.[2]

~~(C)~~ The final report of the collision was presented to the Japanese government, together with a letter from the Secretary of Defense, on 24 August. The Japanese Foreign Minister said in a letter of acknowledgement on 8 September to the Secretary of Defense that he was convinced the report gave a full explanation on the causes of the incident and its aftermath. Further, the report amply demonstrated the sincerity of the U.S. government as well as its desire not to allow the incident to cause undesirable effects on the friendly relations between the two countries. The Minister requested that the Navy take necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents in the future, and asked that pending claims be settled as expeditiously as possible.[3]

(U) In his final report on the incident, COMNAVFOR Japan informed the Navy Judge Advocate General that his Judge Advocate had presented a settlement check on 18 December to the Kobe Navigation Service Company in Osaka in exchange for an executed release. A Navy news release was issued to the press at the same time indicating that this payment represented the final settlement of all claims received from Japanese claimants. It further stated that the U.S. Navy deeply regretted this tragic accident; however, the settlement was achieved more quickly than usual for a case of this complexity, and the Navy appreciated the cooperation of the claimants and their attorneys in helping to accomplish the prompt and mutually agreeable resolution of these claims.[4]

Southeast Asia POW/MIA Resolution Efforts

(U) The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) was a joint Service organization functioning under the operational control of CINCPAC. JCRC headquarters was located at Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii, and a liaison office was located at the American Embassy Bangkok. The mission of the

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1. Ibid.
2. COMSUBPAC 270330Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 27 May 87; CNO 280014Z May 81 (C)(EX), DECL 31 May 87.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 16505/080759Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 Sep 87.
4. COMNAVFOR Japan 180737Z Dec 81 (U).

JCRC was to assist the Services in resolving the status of U.S. military and civilian personnel missing-in-action (MIA) and confirmed dead but not recovered in Southeast Asia. LCOL Joe B. Harvey, USA, assumed command of the JCRC on 12 January 1981, vice LCOL Stephen M. Perry, USA. Total unit complement was three officers (1 USA/1 USN/1 USAF), nine enlisted (2 USA/3 USAF/3 USN/1 USMC), and two DOD civilians.[1]

Repatriation of Remains

(U) At the beginning of the year a total of 76 sets of U.S. remains had been repatriated to the United States after the Vietnam War. Of these, 72 sets were from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 6 repatriation events, 2 sets were from the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), and 2 sets were from the People's Republic of China. Before 1981 the last repatriation had occurred in August 1978. Three more sets of remains were repatriated by the SRV in 1981, to raise the total number of remains repatriated by the end of the year to 79. In addition, 9 sets of remains were obtained from Laos through unofficial channels during the year. Of these, 8 were determined to be of Southeast Asian origin and 1 was tentatively identified as that of a U.S. Serviceman. Repatriated remains were taken to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), for analysis and positive identification.[2]

(U) Late in 1980 the JCRC Liaison Officer in Bangkok had received a small quantity of human remains from Laos which were allegedly those of an American Serviceman. The remains were delivered to the CILHI, but at the beginning of 1981 were still unidentified. Three months of JCRC analysis culminated in the selection of a candidate case, and the remains were tentatively identified as those of a missing individual. The JCRC Liaison Officer subsequently acquired additional portions of the same remains, and the identification was made positive.[3]

(U) Early in 1981 the SRV informed the Solarz Congressional Delegation in Hanoi that it would welcome a second visit by "MIA experts" (the first working level visit, in October 1980, produced no substantive results although data on four missing U.S. personnel were passed for the Vietnamese to investigate). After several exchanges, the visit was arranged and LCOL Harvey and two others from the JCRC traveled to Hanoi in May. In the course of the meeting SRV officials discussed their progress on the four cases proposed in 1980 and announced that remains of three persons were ready for turnover. Encouraged by this exchange of information, the JCRC developed an agenda for another meeting as well as an invitation for Vietnamese specialists to visit Honolulu again, as they had in 1978. Both events failed to transpire in 1981.[4]

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1. JCRC HistSum 1981 (U)
2. JCRC Point Papers (U), ca. 24 Mar 81 and 24 Nov 81, Subj: Repatriation of U.S. Remains from SEA.
3. JCRC HistSum 1981 (U).
4. JCRC HistSum 1981 (U).

(U) Following the announcement in May that the Vietnamese would repatriate the remains of the three missing Americans, a JCRC and CILHI recovery team led by LCOL Harvey departed Clark AB via MAC C-130 early on 7 July. They spent approximately 4 hours on the ground at Gia Lam Airport (Hanoi) and returned to Clark late in the afternoon. The remains were placed in U.S. transfer cases at the Clark AB mortuary and flown to Hickam AFB on a MAC special mission C-141 aircraft, accompanied by the recovery team. On arrival at 0900 hours on 8 July, an appropriate joint ceremony was conducted under the direction of CINCPAC/J36. The remains were taken to the CILHI for identification.[1]

(U) The CILHI identified the remains and forwarded recommendations to the Army Adjutant General. The Armed Services Graves Registration Office convened a joint review board on 20 July which concurred with the CILHI's findings. The next-of-kin were notified through the Services. The remains were identified as those of CDR Ronald W. Dodge, USN; LT Stephen O. Musselman, USN; and CAPT Richard H. Van Dyke, USAF. On 21 July a joint departure ceremony was conducted at Hickam AFB and the remains were flown to Travis AFB. They were processed by the U.S. Army mortuary at Oakland and turned over to the next-of-kin for final disposition.[2]

~~(C)~~ On 13 July the JCRC Liaison Officer in Bangkok was called by an American civilian who said he had in his possession the remains of four U.S. Servicemen who had died in an aircraft crash in Laos. He delivered a small basket of fragmentary remains to the liaison officer. The civilian claimed he had visited a U.S. C-130 crash site in Laos during June with a Lao resistance unit and found various fragmented articles of clothing, equipment, and aircraft parts. The villagers allegedly told him how they, under Pathet Lao orders, had disposed of the crewmen's bodies. Later, in Bangkok, the civilian said he received bone fragments of four of the crewmen through intermediaries, but could not confirm that they had come from the wreckage he visited. The liaison officer shipped the small package of remains via diplomatic pouch to Manila and military courier to Hickam AFB. The JCRC turned them over to the CILHI for examination on 20 July.[3]

~~(C)~~ On 13 August a representative of the National League of Families, George Brooks, and a Lao national, identifying himself as "Kassem," turned over to the JCRC Liaison Officer in Bangkok a quantity of remains alleged to be those of Americans lost in Laos. The liaison officer told American television news reporters covering the event that the United States would accept remains from any source that did not demand payment. The liaison officer informed JCRC headquarters that the remains appeared to be three skulls or portions thereof, plus a minute quantity of charred and fragmented remains. Kassem claimed to be

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1. J361 HistSum Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 13 Jul 87; JO3/7422 HistSum Jul 81 (U).
2. Ibid; OASD(PA) News Release No. 341-81, 21 Jul 81 (U).
3. J361 HistSum Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 13 Jul 87.

a resistance leader living in Thailand and said he hoped to have additional remains in the near future to deliver to U.S. authorities.[1]

(U) It turned out that Brooks had paid Kassem for these remains. The Executive Director of the National League of Families, Ann Mills Griffiths, was briefed by the JCRC and CILHI commanders at their headquarters in Honolulu, and she also visited CINCPAC headquarters on 31 August. At CILHI she was informed that the latest four sets of remains received at the laboratory from Laos were identified as Mongoloid and unlikely to be the remains of U.S. Servicemen. Later, CILHI announced that all eight sets of remains turned over to the JCRC Liaison Officer in Bangkok in July and August had been positively identified as eight separate and distinguishable Mongoloid males of Southeast Asian origin.[2]

Proposal of High-Level Mission to Vietnam and Laos

~~(C)~~ The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs advised of a State/Defense Memorandum to the President proposing a high-level POW/MIA mission to Vietnam and Laos. The mission would impress on those governments the importance with which the United States viewed this issue and also keep pressure on them to be responsive to U.S. concerns. It would deal solely with the POW/MIA issue as a humanitarian one and not involve political or economic matters. To emphasize the non-political nature, it was anticipated that the mission would be headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific), Richard L. Armitage, and include a low-ranking officer from the State Department. This information was passed by the JCS to CINCPAC on 20 August.[3]

~~(S)~~ Officials from both State and Defense Departments met in New York with the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations on 19 November to present the U.S. proposal for a joint mission to visit Hanoi for a review of the POW/MIA issue. The Ambassador said his government's willingness to cooperate in the search for MIAs was directly related to the overall state of relations between the two countries, which was not favorable. However, he would forward the proposal to Hanoi.[4]

~~(C)~~ The U.S. Embassy Vientiane presented to the LPDR government on 24 November a similar proposal for a U.S. mission to visit Laos on POW/MIA matters. This was categorically rejected by the Lao on the basis that there was no time to receive the mission--and apparently because of American charges about Laotian use of chemical and biological warfare against resistance elements. Secretary Armitage kept Admiral Long informed of these developments,

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 35673/131055Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 13 Aug 87; USDAO Bangkok 35834/140839Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Aug 87.
2. J361 HistSum Aug 81 (U); OASD(PA) New Release No. 433-81, 18 Sep 81 (U).
3. SECSTATE 220410/191444Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 17 Aug 87.
4. SECSTATE 310958/220123Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), REVW 20 Nov 01.

and said the United States intended to wait until there was an official response from the SRV before acting on the LPDR answer.[1]

Offer of Ordnance Removal in Laos

~~(S)~~ The LPDR had had a long-standing complaint that unexploded ordnance on the Plain of Jars was a hazard to agricultural activities. A Congressional Delegation led by Senator S.I. Hayakawa proposed to the LPDR a limited ordnance removal program in exchange for access to crash sites in that area. The Plain of Jars contained 13 crash sites of interest to the JCRC, 4 of which had the possibility of casualty resolution.[2]

~~(C)~~ The State Department's initial reaction to the Hayakawa proposal was generally favorable. The U.S. Charge Vientiane was instructed to inform the LPDR Foreign Ministry that the United States was interested in seriously pursuing the Senator's proposal, which would benefit both countries. The ordnance removal program would be designed to clear access to one or more known crash sites, make a systematic search of the treated area for remains of MIAs, and return the area around the crash site to a safe condition for civilian occupation and use. The LPDR should also be made aware that lack of official means had led some family members to turn to private individuals who claimed that through cooperation with Lao resistance organizations they could provide remains of dead Americans. Official cooperation in searching for remains would help to insure that this humanitarian matter be dealt with properly, as part of the normal conduct of relations between the two countries.[3]

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC advised the Secretary of State and the JCS on 11 October that screening of all available data resulted in the selection of four crash sites in the Plain of Jars area which had the best casualty resolution potential. These sites and circumstances surrounding the losses were provided. In descending order of priority, they were: an O-1 crash on 7 November 1972, an O-1 crash on 30 December 1970, an F-4D crash on 21 September 1972, and an A-26 crash on 8 July 1969. In all cases the crew was known to have perished with the aircraft.[4]

~~(C)~~ A call by the U.S. Charge on the LPDR Foreign Ministry on 18 November revealed that the LPDR was not interested in having Americans come into Laos for ordnance removal purposes. They stressed instead the need for "humanitarian assistance" from the United States, and were already doing all they could to search for remains based on data provided to the LPDR by the embassy. A State Department official again discussed the proposal with the LPDR Charge in

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 1169/240930Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 24 Nov 01; CINCPAC 290067Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~(EX), DECL 25 Nov 87, quoting msg from DASD Armitage.
2. JCRC Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 31 Oct 81, Subj: Ordnance Removal and Casualty Resolution Project in the LPDR (U), DECL 31 Oct 91.
3. SECSTATE 254696/232337Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 23 Sep 87.
4. CINCPAC 110810Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87.

Washington in December. It was pointed out that the project would initially be limited in scope, but could be expanded depending on results obtained. No further progress was made on this project or the proposed visit by a U.S. mission before the end of the year.[1]

Refugee Interviews

(U) The first task which confronted JCRC following its organization in 1973 was the collection of data concerning each of the missing individuals. By 1976 virtually all domestically available information had been collated and placed in information retrieval systems. The large number of refugees who joined in the exodus from communist Southeast Asia was seen as a fertile source of casualty resolution information, and by 1981 JCRC interviewers were routinely visiting refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines for this purpose.[2]

(U) During 1981 the JCRC initiated efforts to expand this operation, and permission was obtained in September to visit camps in Hong Kong and Macao also. JCRC interviewers, fluent in Asian languages, conducted over 200 initial and numerous follow-on interviews during the year. Of these, one-fourth were correlated to known cases, and others were assessed to be of potential value. JCRC analysts conducted immediate analysis of all reports. In addition, the reports were forwarded to the DIA for concurrent, and in many cases more long range and detailed, analysis.[3]

Tropical Cyclones

(U) A tropical cyclone was the general term for a non-frontal low pressure system of synoptic scale, developing over tropical or sub-tropical waters, and having a definite organized circulation (counterclockwise in the Northern Hemisphere; clockwise in the Southern). A tropical storm was defined as a warm core tropical cyclone with maximum sustained (average over a 1-minute period) surface winds in the range of 34 to 63 knots; a typhoon or hurricane was one with maximum sustained surface winds of 64 to 129 knots (called typhoons west of, and hurricanes east of, 180° longitude); a super typhoon or super hurricane had maximum sustained surface winds of 130 knots or greater.[4]

(U) In 1981 a total of 79 tropical cyclones occurred in the PACOM area, as follows: 29 in the Western Pacific, 17 in the Eastern Pacific, 13 in the South Pacific, 17 in the South Indian Ocean, 1 in the Arabian Sea, and 2 in the Bay of Bengal. They were generally more frequent in the Western Pacific and

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 1139/191003Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 18 Nov 87; SECSTATE 331483/152309Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 7 Dec 01.
2. JCRC HistSum 1981 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC Instruction 3140.1Q (U), 7 Jun 82, Subj: Tropical Cyclone Warning and Weather Reconnaissance.

Eastern Pacific during the summer and fall months and in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific during the winter and spring months because of the earth's seasonal tilt in its rotation around the sun. Of the 79 tropical cyclones, 34 reached typhoon/hurricane strength and 2 reached super typhoon strength. Most never made landfall, or did so after diminishing in strength. The following caused loss of life and/or property damage, or were otherwise significant to the PACOM.[1]

(U) The first Northern Hemisphere storm of the year was Tropical Cyclone 01 (FREDA). She formed southwest of Majuro on 12 March and slowly moved northwest until recurving northeastward near 14 degrees north latitude. Subsequently, FREDA reached her maximum intensity of 105 knots on 15 March. The next day she passed just west of Wake Island, causing extensive damage with wave and wind action. Maximum winds at Wake were estimated to be 75 knots.[2]

(U) Tropical Cyclone 15 (THAD) was the only Western Pacific tropical system in August to reach typhoon intensity. He formed 400 miles south of Okinawa on 16 August and then intensified to a maximum of 85 knots as he moved northeast. THAD made landfall just east of Tokyo on 22 August with 55-knot winds, resulting in 17 dead, 22 missing, 82 injured, and more than 3,000 homes flooded. Damage to U.S. military bases was minor. THAD passed over eastern and northern Honshu and western Hokkaido with winds of 50 to 60 knots before dissipating over Sakhalin on 23 August.[3]

(U) Tropical Cyclone 20 (CLARA) formed southwest of Guam on 15 September and transited northwest in nearly a straight line until dissipating over land north of Hong Kong on 22 September. She caused the greatest damage passing just north of the Philippines with maximum winds of 115 knots on 20 September, making 3,725 people homeless in the northeastern Luzon province of Cagayan. A Philippine Navy destroyer was run aground and capsized off Calayan Island north of Luzon when CLARA hit with full force. A U.S. Navy ship and USN and USAF helicopters assisted in the rescue of 18 sailors. Many more drowned and the destroyer was a total loss. In the Eastern Pacific Tropical Cyclone 12E (JOVA) reached 70 knots early on during her westerly track toward Hawaii. However, JOVA dissipated over water some 60 miles north of the islands on 21 September, causing no significant weather effects in Hawaii.[4]

(U) In the Western Pacific both Tropical Cyclones 22 (ELSIE) and 24 (GAY) followed similar tracks after formation in the vicinity of Guam. ELSIE reached super typhoon intensity while advancing northwest with maximum winds of 150 knots on 28 September. She threatened Okinawa before curving to the northeast on 30 September, still bearing maximum winds of 110 knots. ELSIE dissipated east of the Kurils on 3 October. GAY passed closer to Okinawa on 21 October,

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1. J37 HistSums Jan-Dec 81 (U).
2. J37 HistSum Mar 81 (U).
3. J37 HistSum Aug 81 (U).
4. J37 HistSum Sep 81 (U).

resulting in maximum winds of 63 knots being recorded there. Although no significant damage was experienced on Okinawa, GAY caused some flood damage to homes in the Kanto area of Japan as she passed just offshore of Chiba Peninsula on the main island of Honshu with maximum winds of about 65 knots on 22 October. GAY dissipated on 23 October east of Hokkaido.[1]

(U) In November Tropical Cyclones 25 (HAZEN) and 26 (IRMA) followed similar tracks after their formation east of Guam. HAZEN caused severe flooding and damage to property on Saipan as she tracked over that island on 15 November with winds of 45-55 knots. HAZEN then tracked west and passed 60 miles south of Manila on 20 November before entering the South China Sea and dissipating over China. IRMA was the most severe typhoon to hit the Philippines in years. She reached her super typhoon intensity of 135 knots while crossing the Philippine Sea, making landfall northeast of Manila on 24 November with maximum winds of 95 knots. IRMA caused over 100 deaths and extensive property damage in the Philippines. After crossing over central Luzon she curved back to the northeast and dissipated south of Okinawa on 27 November.[2]

(U) In the Bay of Bengal Tropical Cyclone 31-81 formed east of the Andaman Islands on 7 December, tracked north, then northeast, and made landfall on 10 December near Calcutta with 50-knot winds before dissipating over Bangladesh. Tropoical Cyclone 31-81 resulted in more than 100 people killed and 100,000 made homeless in India and Bangladesh.[3]

(U) Tropical Cyclone 29 (LEE) formed northeast of Guam on 23 December and tracked westerly, making landfall on Christmas Day in the central Philippine Islands with maximum winds of 90 knots. He passed over Samar and Mindoro and continued west-northwesterly over the South China Sea before changing course to the east-northeast and dissipating over water on 28 December. Typhoon LEE caused major damage in the Philippines, resulting in 137 people killed, 782 injured, and some 500,000 made homeless.[4]

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1. J37 HistSum Oct 81 (U).
2. J37 HistSum Nov 81 (U).
3. J37 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
4. Ibid.

SECTION IV--EXERCISES

Korea

TEAM SPIRIT 81

~~(C)~~ TEAM SPIRIT was a JCS-directed, CINCPAC-sponsored, joint/combined large-scale annual field training exercise (FTX) in the Republic of Korea and contiguous waters. TEAM SPIRIT was PACOM's largest exercise and was designed to stress training for deployment, reception, employment, and redeployment of ROK and U.S. forces responding to possible contingencies in the Korean theater. It was first conducted in 1976 with a total ROK/U.S. participation of 45,500, and repeated in the spring of every year since then. TEAM SPIRIT 79 was the largest, in terms of numbers, with 167,900 troops involved. TEAM SPIRIT 80 had approximately 145,000 participants. It saw the first use of sealift for deployment and redeployment of equipment and supplies.[1]

~~(C)~~ TEAM SPIRIT 81, sixth in the series and held 1 February - 10 April 1981, had 156,700 participants. The U.S. force numbered 56,700, of which 21,800 were from bases outside Korea. A total of 708 aircraft and 46 ships were involved in the exercise. Strategic deployment extended from 1 February to 6 March, tactical deployment from 6 to 10 March, combat employment from 11 to 19 March, strategic redeployment from 21 March to 10 April, and the related amphibious exercise (largest ever conducted in conjunction with TEAM SPIRIT) was held from 14 to 18 March.[2]

~~(C)~~ General Wickham, the CINCUNC/CINCCFC, described the scenario and summarized results of the exercise for Admiral Long on 23 March. He said TEAM SPIRIT 81 was a success by any standard, demonstrating effective interoperability on the ground as well as in the air and on the sea. Intelligence play portrayed two adjoining countries, Blue and Orange, with associated military forces. The role of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) as player/controller responsive to both Blue and Orange forces allowed the CFC to orchestrate all elements in a realistic scenario, with each side receiving maximum freedom of maneuver.[3]

~~(C)~~ The FTX area of over 11,000 square kilometers was designed to accommodate actual participating ground forces--one Blue field army with a corps and three divisions and a separate Orange corps with two divisions. The 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii included one of its own brigades plus a battalion from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, a ROK Marine regiment, and a ROK Army regiment. Notional forces were played outside the FTX area to influence ground

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1. J3513 HistSum Mar 81 (U); J3513 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 3 Apr 81, Subj: TEAM SPIRIT 81 (U), DECL 24 Mar 84.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCUNC/CINCCFC 230200Z Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 23 Mar 87.

maneuver and provide offensive air/interdiction targets for the air component. The amphibious landing was made in conjunction with the major counteroffensive executed by the Blue force. There were no winners or losers in the exercise; consequently, both Blue and Orange forces conducted similar defensive and offensive maneuver operations and both received comparable training benefits. The philosophy of the exercise was to provide optimum training for all forces within the time-phased, integrated, combined/joint environment. Solid troop-leading procedure at the unit level was emphasized.

~~(C)~~ There were many firsts in TEAM SPIRIT 81. Chemical defense was incorporated for both ground and air forces and in the amphibious beach area. Ground tactical commanders controlled electronic warfare (EW) assets, permitting integration of EW in maneuver, fire support, and close air support plans. Moreover, the active EW environment helped train operators to work through or around extensive jamming. This was the most extensive use of EW in any exercise in Korea. Unconventional warfare/special warfare (UW/SW) operations were handled under the centralized command and control of the CFC through the Combined Unconventional Warfare Element. These operations were conducted in the rear areas of all forces. Receipt, issue, and utilization of the first increment of CPICK (Communications Security Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea) equipment was accomplished. This equipment provided limited secure FM voice capability down to ROK Army division. It was compatible with U.S. units, and was a plus in the U.S. operations security (OPSEC) program.

~~(C)~~ A successful test of the Korean Contingency Resupply/Redistribution System was conducted. Additionally, ROK and U.S. ground units exchanged POL support for the first time. A successful test of the Combined Airlift Office concept was conducted to improve procedures in requesting and allocating tactical airlift. Tactical airlift activity more than doubled over TEAM SPIRIT 80, and was much more realistic for aircrews.

~~(C)~~ The largest amphibious landing since the Korean War was conducted by the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) in concert with ROK Navy Marines. USMC aircraft deployed to in-country sites and participated in the pre-frag (prearranged fragmentary air operations order) air campaign under the control of the Air Component Command (ACC). This included the deployment of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) which operated and interfaced with the USAF/ROKAF Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS). Air activity involved the successful exercise of a 72-hour pre-frag (as would occur in wartime), and joint air-to-ground training including live fire. Deception operations were practiced during the maneuver phase of the exercise. In addition, deceptive radio traffic was used to mask movement of the ROK reserve divisions from their wartime positions into the exercise area. All participating units were prepared to carry out wartime missions, should hostilities or a crisis occur. At the conclusion of the exercise, several ground force units practiced rapid movement from the exercise area to wartime mission areas.[1]

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1. Ibid.

~~(C)~~ The ACC conducted a 3-day sortie surge in which extensive combined/joint training was accomplished. Over 8,000 sorties were flown during the full exercise period. The wartime commander of the ACC was present for the first time to control the air effort for the CFC, allowing the peacetime commander to concentrate on his CFC Chief of Staff mission. (See Chapter I for a discussion of these command arrangements.) The ACC operated from the Hardened Tactical Air Control Center (HTACC). Extensive and effective camouflage was practiced everywhere and minimal maneuver damage occurred.

~~(C)~~ CINCUNC/CINCCFC said this exercise demonstrated again the need for an extensive, reliable, tactical communications capability for the CFC and USFK/EUSA. [redacted] To improve tactical mobile capability, the early permanent deployment of ground mobile satellite terminals to Korea was essential, along with modest force structure increases and equipment modernization in deployed U.S. Army signal battalions. [redacted]

~~(C)~~ From a force standpoint, General Wickham said TEAM SPIRIT 81 was about the right size. This appeared to be particularly true with the ground forces. Maneuvering and controlling a 5-division force on the ground was difficult (he thought TEAM SPIRIT might be the largest ground exercise in the Free World). A U.S. division headquarters and a portion of its forces should continue to be brought in, with possibly modest adjustments in force augmentation to emphasize mobile firepower such as attack helicopter companies in place of additional infantry. Not only would these units provide an added dimension, but they could stimulate ROK efforts to further improve their firepower and permit integration of attack helicopters into the scheme of maneuver. The mobility and lethality of attack helicopters would contribute significantly to integrated firepower capabilities, including artillery and airpower.

~~(C)~~ ROK and U.S. forces officials, as well as numerous senior visitors, considered TEAM SPIRIT 81 a highly successful exercise. General Wickham said performance of the ROK Armed Forces was uniformly better than the year before, showing more flexibility, sophistication, and confidence. The enhanced training and lessons learned would contribute to improved readiness of the combined and joint forces.[1]

~~(C)~~ In amplifying remarks on 7 April, General Wickham apprised CINCPAC and Service Chiefs of other accomplishments of TEAM SPIRIT 81. Army units successfully integrated, controlled, and maneuvered units of diverse cultures, military doctrine, and language in superb fashion. The 25th Division (headquarters plus one brigade) participated in the FTX as a combined U.S./ROK division, OPCON to the Combined Field Army's V ROK Corps.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCUNC/CINCCFC 071105Z Apr 81 (~~C~~), DECL 7 Apr 87.

~~(C)~~ The SEVENTH Fleet conducted with distinction combined antiair, antisubmarine, mine/countermine, salvage, unconventional events, and amphibious operations. In addition to offensive and defensive training with the ROK Navy, the operation projected power ashore from a combined ROK/U.S. Naval and Marine force. III MAF's 8,000-member Task Force 79 joined with a ROK Marine landing team in conducting this operation. Squadrons from the 1st Marine Air Wing conducted pre-frag air campaign sorties. The wing's MACCS deployed and operated in the ROK for the first time, interfacing with the USAF KTACS. It subsequently operated in a uni-Service role, controlling Marine TACAIR supporting the amphibious landing.

~~(C)~~ Over 110 PACAF, TAC, MAC, and Air National Guard aircraft deployed to Korea for TEAM SPIRIT air operations, augmenting the 314th Air Division. General Wickham said all elements performed in outstanding ways. SAC B-52s supported the exercise from Guam, and TAC E-3As provided AWACS coverage from Okinawa. Deploying aircraft gave reassuring evidence of wartime capabilities. For example, F-111s from Cannon AFB, New Mexico, were ready to fly operational missions 4 to 6 hours after arriving at the beddown base. MAC strategic airlift did excellent work in bringing in augmentation units, and tactical airlift within the ROK more than doubled over the year before. In summary, said CINCUNC/CINCCFC, TEAM SPIRIT 81, which included many firsts, was complex and demanding. U.S. forces participation was the largest ever and demonstrated both a commitment to a resolute ally and deterrence in Northeast Asia.[1]

(U) According to CINCPAC's final evaluation report, MAC airlifted to and redeployed from Korea some 19,496 passengers and 7,441 short tons of equipment. The airlift consisted of 216 C-130 missions, 357 C-141 missions, and 22 commercial widebody missions, and cost $22.4 million. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) employed two large MAINE Class roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, one MSC-owned RO/RO, and three C-4 breakbulk ships for the deployment of 36,610 measurement tons consisting of 2,300 vehicle equivalents (including 33 helicopters and 3 M-60 tanks). The $6.6 million spent for the sealift would have cost more than $50 million if moved by air.[2]

(U) Of special interest for this exercise was the use of contract widebody commercial aircraft (11 B-747s and 1 DC-10) from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) in a peacetime environment. This was the third TEAM SPIRIT exercise to be supported by the CRAF. Each 747 could carry an equivalent of four C-141A loads. Cargo-configured 747s were extremely useful in deploying small vehicles and trailers, but 2½-ton or larger trucks had to be deployed empty. Also, 747s with full loads could not be used at Osan AB, which had weight restrictions. Commercial loading equipment was necessary because standard Air Force loaders could not reach the upper cargo deck.

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1. Ibid.
2. J3512 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC Ltr J35/Ser C183 ~~(C)~~, 11 Aug 81, Subj: Evaluation Report: Results of Strategic Deployment/Redeployment for TEAM SPIRIT 81 (U), DECL 11 Aug 87.

(U) The JCS and Headquarters CINCPAC did not participate in TEAM SPIRIT 81, although their Crisis Action Teams would be expected to be thoroughly involved in matters of strategic movement and execution in any serious contingency involving the defense of Korea. Active participation of the JCS and/or CINCPAC Crisis Action Teams was complicated by the simultaneous scheduling of TEAM SPIRIT with the JCS Command Post Exercise (CPX) IVY LEAGUE, and the CFC's emphasis on the execution/ground maneuver phase rather than on the mechanics of receiving the out-of-country forces.

(U) Late funding authorization from the JCS was a recurring problem for TEAM SPIRIT because planning occurred over two fiscal years. Scheduling and conduct of TEAM SPIRIT during the February-March time frame, coupled with CINCPAC lead time requirements of 100 and 120 days for submission of airlift and sealift requests, respectively, translated to a need for funding authorization in October. Historically, the JCS had not been able to provide funding authorization in this period. Approval of the Federal budget for FY 81 was further complicated by the Presidential elections and change in administrations. To offset the problems created by delayed funding authorizations, a budget ceiling for TEAM SPIRIT 81 was established by the JCS for planning purposes. Force lists and milestone schedules were established accordingly.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC said TEAM SPIRIT in reality remained a loose collection of component exercises with little "joint scripting" to pull it all together. There was neither JCS nor CINCPAC play, little intelligence play, no indications and warning buildup, and a lack of any exposure or reaction to DEFCON changes. CINCPAC said every effort should be made to continue to improve the joint aspects of the exercise. Movement of forces was not governed so much by free play or tactical decision as by a predetermined schedule heavily influenced by political-military, rather than tactical, considerations.[1]

(U) VALIANT FLEX 81-2 was the Navy's designation for the amphibious phase of TEAM SPIRIT 81, mentioned above. Some 20,000 U.S. sailors and Marines of the SEVENTH Fleet joined 11,000 of their ROK counterparts off the southeast coast of Korea to participate. Highlight of the exercise was an amphibious assault 15 miles north of Pohang. Waves of assault craft and troop-carrying helicopters were followed by fixed-wing aircraft providing close air support. Most of the U.S. and ROK Marines were on the beach within 15 minutes, successfully completing the crucial element of any such operation--the rapid buildup of combat power ashore. The Navy/Marine team also participated in other exercises in and around the Korean Peninsula during TEAM SPIRIT 81. These exercises provided training in salvage operations, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), close air support, naval gunfire support, minelaying and sweeping, and countering enemy forces during an at-sea transit by the task force.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. CNO 281541Z Mar 81 (U).

FOAL EAGLE 82

~~(C)~~ Exercise FOAL EAGLE 82, held 7-20 November 1981, was a joint/combined, ROK/U.S. unconventional warfare FTX to conduct UW Task Force operations and provide ROK commanders an opportunity to plan and evaluate rear area security measures. The Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force headquarters was activated at the ROK Army Special Warfare Command at Seongnam. Three personnel from CINCPAC/J36, 15 from the Joint Special Operations Support Element, and two CINCPAC Army Reserve Mobilization Designees provided U.S. augmentation to the task force. U.S. special operations forces participating in the exercise included the 2d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group; three MC-130E aircraft of the 1st Special Operations Squadron; three C-130E aircraft of the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing; one submarine, the USS GRAYBACK (SS-574); one swimmer delivery vehicle; and one USN SEAL platoon from Naval Special Warfare Group ONE. Participants totaled approximately 3,900 ROK and 650 U.S. personnel.[1]

~~(C)~~ FOAL EAGLE 82 turned out to be the largest and most successful UW exercise ever conducted in Korea. In addition to providing realistic training for U.S./ROK UW forces in combined operations, the exercise provided training for ROK rear area security forces in counterinfiltration operations. A total of 266 UW teams (over 3,500 personnel) were infiltrated into operational areas in the ROK using airdrop, maritime, and overland infiltration techniques. Including rear area security forces, approximately 350,000 personnel were involved in the exercise.[2]

(U) Significant events included: 3 mobile strike force missions which simulated reaction against a North Korean commando attack against U.S. and ROK airfields; an "Entebbe-type" rescue operation of hostages at Kimhae AB, which involved a combined air assault with 3 U.S. C-130 and 3 ROK C-123 aircraft; a laser target designator demonstration on Nightmare Range utilizing F-4 aircraft from the 314th Air Division; and a survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and recovery exercise on Cheju-do which provided training for approximately 40 U.S. and ROK aircrew members. The exercise received high visibility in the ROK government. The commander of the U.S. element (CINCPAC/J36) and 11 other U.S. officers were invited to a dinner at the Blue House as guests of ROK President Chun Doo Hwan. The ROK Minister of National Defense, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCCFC, and CFC/C3 were also in attendance.[3]

POTENT PUNCH/ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81

~~(C)~~ Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81, a regionally oriented, procedural, limited war command post exercise sponsored by the JCS, was conducted during 13-18 September. It was fully integrated with the CFC Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81,

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1. J361 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 31 Dec 89; J3512 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 29 Oct 87.
2. J361 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 31 Dec 89.
3. Ibid.

one of an annual, large-scale, ROK-defense CPX, involving elements of the ROK, U.S. Forces Korea, and PACOM. For the first time since JCS CPX EIGHT BELLS 79 (cancelled because of the Iran hostage crisis), the JCS invited the ROK to participate in a major CPX.[1]

~~(C)~~ POTENT PUNCH 81 was designed to provide for the participation of senior government officials, exercise military staffs and appropriate plans, test contingency/crisis management systems and procedures, evaluate selected portions of the WWMCCS during a period of major regional crisis, and exercise and evaluate the Joint Deployment System. The broad scenario for POTENT PUNCH 81 depicted an ever-worsening situation with all intelligence indicators displaying North Korean forces preparing for an attack along traditional invasion corridors. As the situation became more volatile, the ROK mobilized and the CFC, in conjunction with ROK authorities, prepared to implement plans for the defense of the ROK. ROK National Command Authorities requested U.S. military assistance and CINCUNC/CINCCFC and CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that plans for the defense of Korea be implemented.

[redacted] b(1) a.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC participation throughout the exercise was extensive. During the pre- and post-exercise phases of ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81 (8-13 and 18-23 September), duty-hour response cells in the headquarters and throughout the command provided CINCCFC with expertise and support necessary for realistic play. During the POTENT PUNCH 81 portion (13-18 September), the complete crisis action staffing of CINCPAC was exercised. Besides formation of the Operations Action Group, Operations Planning Group, Logistics Readiness Center, and a Joint Exercise Control Group, for the first time a Deployment Management Team was formed. Its purpose was to act as an interface between the Joint Deployment System and Headquarters CINCPAC, since this was the first time that the system had been exercised in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 5027. For the deployment portion of the exercise, CINCPAC served as the supported CINC. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, CINCCFC became the supported CINC, with CINCPAC and others supporting.

(U) Highlights of Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81 were numerous. Of particular significance at the CINCPAC level was the extensive flag/senior officer

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1. J3523 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 7 Oct 87; CINCPAC 151801Z Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 Aug 87; CINCPAC 040055Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87.

participation. Briefings of each day's exercise activities were an integral part of each morning briefing held in the Command Center Briefing Room. Each afternoon, CINCPAC, along with his senior battle staff, received extensive briefings with the questions being raised receiving the highest level guidance of any CPX previously held in the headquarters. Overall, POTENT PUNCH/ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81 was one of the most significant CPXs for the Pacific Command in many years.[1]

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Shortly after the conclusion of the exercise, CINCCFC advised CINCPAC and the CJCS that there was no doubt that integration of POTENT PUNCH and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS would lead to improvements in ROK/U.S. force readiness and transition to war capabilities. The crisis action system and wartime plans were exercised thoroughly and demonstrated again the importance of unity of effort in the defense of Korea. As expected, the exercise surfaced issues demanding resolution. The extensive use of the "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" caveat continued to be a source of friction in combined headquarters and interfered with planning as well as execution of operations. General Wickham said considerable progress had occurred in both intelligence and operations; however, similar progress was needed in the logistics area if his forces were to be fully prepared for conducting combined operations. The equal-partnership atmosphere in the U.S. relationship with the ROK called for progress in the area of release authority.[2]

b.(1)
a.

[redacted] Also, transitioning from peacetime to wartime rules of engagement (ROE) highlighted the need for refinement of the rules. When war was imminent and hostile actions were initiated by the enemy, front line commanders needed more flexibility of response than the existing ROE permitted. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network system generally was unreliable and impaired the tracking of deployment changes. Tactical satellites were used for the first time for communicating between CFC and subordinate headquarters. This proved to be very effective. The computer-assisted simulation of selected national intelligence systems was also used for the first time. It appreciably increased exercise realism; provided good, reliable, real-time data; and, more importantly, exercised the skills of intelligence analysts.

(U) CINCCFC said this integrated exercise provided the best training in the ULCHI-FOCUS LENS series ever. All ROK officials, including President Chun, the Minister of National Defense, and the ROK JCS were impressed with the extent of the exercise, lessons learned, and the highlighting of problems for resolution. He said PACOM and OJCS participation also enhanced its value.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. Korea 050810Z Oct 81 ~~(S/NF)~~(EX)(BOM), REVW 5 Oct 87.
3. Ibid.

Other Exercises

~~(C)~~ Other routine Korea-area exercises were: COPE JADE (semiannual joint/combined FTX of air defense, interdiction, and close air support); UDT/SEALEX (quarterly combined FTX of UW/SW operations); COPE STRIKE (periodic joint/combined FTX of close air support with live ordnance); MINEX/EODEX (quarterly combined FTX using USN aircraft in minelaying and ROKN minesweepers for clearing); SALVEX (quarterly combined FTX of salvage operations); ASWEX (combined FTX of ASW operations); and VALIANT USHER (combined FTX of MAU-size Navy-Marine amphibious operations.[1]

Japan

GOPHER BROKE XI

~~(S)~~ GOPHER BROKE was a semiannual corps-level CPX with a defense of Japan scenario to exercise USA IX Corps, JGSDF, and subordinate division staffs. GOPHER BROKE XI was conducted at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, from 31 August to 4 September. It was significant in that it involved 60 personnel from the JGSDF and 8 from the JASDF, in addition to over 600 U.S. participants. Officially, owing to political sensitivities, the Japanese were listed only as observers for this exercise. The next exercise in this series was scheduled for April 1982 at Camp Fuji, Japan, with the name changed to YAMA SAKURA I. This exercise was to be managed completely by the JSDF, and IX Corps would be invited to participate. GOPHER BROKE was to be replaced by FOREST BLADE in the future.[2]

FOREST BLADE 82

~~(S)~~ FOREST BLADE 82 was a U.S.-GOJ, joint/combined CPX conducted from 19 to 23 October at Joint Staff Office (JSO) and USFJ Headquarters locations in Japan. Objectives were to execute and evaluate U.S. and Japan emergency action procedures in response to respective NCA decisions; the USF-JSDF defense plan for Japan; crisis staffing procedures of the respective headquarters during increasing preparedness conditions and conventional hostilities against Japan; procedures for the collation, dissemination, and utilization of tactical and national level intelligence information in a combined environment; plans for deployment of forces; and command procedures, coordination procedures, and existing communications systems performance. Participants also developed media response and release coordination procedures for emergency situations and exercises and identified areas requiring further study or improvement.[3]

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1. J3513 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 14 Jul 81, Subj: Joint/Combined Exercises Conducted in Korea for FY 81 (U), DECL 19 Jun 87.
2. SSO Zama 140628Z Aug 81 (U)(EX)(BOM); J3512 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 29 Oct 81, Subj: FY 82 Combined Exercises - Japan (U), DECL 29 Oct 87.
3. J3512 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Oct 87; CINCPAC 260331Z Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 14 Sep 87.

~~(S)~~ The scenario for FOREST BLADE 82 was based on the defense of Japan, and the exercise was sponsored by COMUS Japan and the JSO Chairman. Participants were USFJ and JSO staffs. No operational forces were involved. It was conducted under the Guidelines for Japan/U.S. Defense Cooperation, 27 November 1978, and the Memorandum for Conduct of Joint Studies and Associated Activities by USFJ-JSDF, 15 February 1979. In September 1980 Headquarters USFJ had conducted a CPX study in coordination with the JSO. CPX FOREST BLADE 82 was a major step forward in JSDF/USF relations leading to an FTX programmed for 1985. USFJ and JSO had made basic plans to gradually expand FOREST BLADE exercises during the intervening 5 years to enhance interoperability and to exercise the bilateral plan for the defense of Japan.[1]

~~(S)~~ FOREST BLADE 82 was considered a success in every respect. It was less structured than other CPXs, and allowed for considerable free play. The full spectrum of threat environments was covered, including a blockade, air and naval attacks, and a coordinated invasion of northern Japan. Exercise FOREST BLADE was a solid base upon which CINCPAC could build a realistic program of future exercises with the JSDF as quickly as the political environment would allow. COMUS Japan told CINCPAC that this exercise represented a very positive step toward establishing a more significant military relationship with the Japanese. CINCPAC fully supported the program. He also agreed with COMUS Japan's recommendation that Service component participation in the next FOREST BLADE CPX would be highly desirable. CINCPAC was prepared to assist in every way possible, and could provide a player cell to represent higher headquarters for exercise play.[2]

JMSDF Annual Exercise

(U) CINCPACFLT advised COMSEVENTHFLT on 19 September that SEVENTH Fleet's participation in the upcoming JMSDF "Annual Exercise," 23-30 September, would mark a significant milestone in U.S.-Japan cooperation. For the first time, the U.S. Navy was being invited to participate in Japan's largest naval exercise of the year. The realistic scenario--defense of Japan and her sea lines of communication--provided the U.S. Navy with a unique opportunity to further strengthen the existing close ties between the Navy and the JMSDF. The Navy's last major combined exercise had resulted in some unfavorable incidents creating adverse public reaction (see below). Therefore, CINCPACFLT said it was very important that SEVENTH Fleet forces fully support the JMSDF in projecting a positive image, as the Navy's performance would be under the closest scrutiny.[3]

~~(C)~~ The JMSDF Annual Exercise was conducted as scheduled. JMSDF forces numbered approximately 90 ships and 90 aircraft, and SEVENTH Fleet provided 5

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1. Ibid.
2. J3512 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Oct 87; CINCPAC 052319Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 2 Nov 87.
3. CINCPACFLT 192135Z Sep 81 (U).

destroyers/frigates (with 1 LAMPS detachment), one conventional submarine, and patrol aircraft. Joint operations were professional, safe, and without incident. COMSEVENTHFLT informed CINCPACFLT that while the USN role was modest, the JMSDF was very pleased with what it did. He said the JMSDF was even more pleased that the precedent had been set, and was already looking toward the next Annual Exercise, tentatively scheduled for September 1982. The JMSDF wanted much more ambitious combined operations. COMSEVENTHFLT apprised CINCPACFLT that while he did not think he would want a battle group-level participation (JMSDF should have the lead and the larger force), he anticipated a more complex exercise with considerable integration of USN/JMSDF forces.[1]

ASWEX and Damage to Fishing Lines

~~(C)~~ While engaged in ASWEX 81-6U with the JMSDF in the Sea of Japan off the west coast of Hokkaido, U.S. Navy ships were alleged to have cut the lines of some 48 Japanese fishing boats. The damage occurred on the night of 14 May and early morning hours of 15 May at three locations, and was apparently caused by several American surface ships and a submarine. The civilian boats were engaged in long-line fishing for salmon and trout, using gear extending as far as 30 kilometers behind the craft. The lines were equipped with floats and a series of hooks from 1½ to 7 meters below the surface. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that the U.S. Embassy determine whether U.S. ships were involved, their names and nature of operations, and what sort of compensation might be expected. Additionally, continued operations were resulting in further damage, and the ministry asked that these activities be halted.[2]

~~(C)~~ The incident received wide media coverage on 16 May. They speculated that the ships involved were most likely U.S. warships on the way to Phase 2 of joint exercises with the JMSDF, and would cast a shadow over U.S.-Japan relations, coming in the wake of the still unresolved NISSHO MARU incident of the month before. The embassy said an incident of this type could normally be kept within manageable proportions, but the fact that it occurred so soon after the submarine collision and in the midst of a Japanese Government crisis had made it into a complex problem that could cause more grief than it should. The Ambassador urged a prompt investigation, an apology if the Navy was indeed at fault, and assurance to the GOJ of compensation if required. The United States might also be forced to consider seriously a GOJ request to call off the remainder of the ASWEX, depending on reaction to the incident.[3]

(U) COMNAVFORJAPAN released a statement on 16 May, saying four USN ships were in the general area of the alleged damage and it was possible that the lines were cut as a result. U.S. Navy ships operated under strict guidance to avoid interference with fishing operations, and any damage that might have resulted was inadvertent and sincerely regretted. The GOJ had been requested

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1. Ibid.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 8912/160906Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 15 May 01.
3. Ibid.

to provide specific details of claimed damages so that the question of compensation could be promptly pursued. Further, the U.S. ships in question had completed their operations and had departed the area.[1]

~~(C)~~ COMSEVENTHFLT informed CINCPACFLT on 21 May that in meetings with JSDF officials, they had agreed to early termination of MULTIPLEX 81-3 (the final portion of the on-going USN/JMSDF exercise series) on 22 May in order to preclude further adverse publicity and opposition from Japanese fishing interests. Additional line-cuttings were reported on 20 and 21 May, and USN and JMSDF ships in the area were being blamed.[2]

ASEAN Area

COPE THUNDER

~~(C)~~ COPE THUNDER was a periodic (approximately 8 times per year), full spectrum air and combat training exercise with USAF, USN, and USMC forces in WESTPAC. It was conducted at the Crow Valley Range and within Philippine airspace. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) participated in April 1980 for the first time since 1978. COPE THUNDER was also of significant third-country interest. CINCPAC advised CINCPACREPPHIL on 4 March that he continued to support third-country involvement in exercises conducted in the Philippines, especially of ASEAN member countries. This remained a priority CINCPAC item.[3]

~~(C)~~ In 1981, COPE THUNDER 81-4 was unique for two reasons. PACAF forces conducted a pre-COPE THUNDER air defense exercise (ADX), and then held their first air-to-air dedicated COPE THUNDER. In the ADX they confirmed their ability to respond to an airborne threat to the Philippines, and in the FTX they explored tactics and strategies for gaining air superiority. Heavy emphasis was placed on AWACS battle management. CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC and CSAF that all objectives were exceeded in the exercises, and he was certain that Philippine officials gained a greater appreciation for U.S. willingness and ability to participate in the defense of their country.[4]

~~(C)~~ COPE THUNDER 81-5, 13-24 April, added three other unique aspects to these exercises. Number 75 Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force, deployed eight A-4 aircraft to the Philippines and participated in the first week of flying 58 air-to-air, close air support, strike, strike control and reconnaissance, and composite strike missions. This was the first participation by a third country in COPE THUNDER, and was highly successful. On 23 April two B-52 aircraft participated in two composite strike forces, simulating an attack on

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1. COMSEVENTHFLT 161002Z May 81 (U).
2. COMSEVENTHFLT 211522Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 21 May 87.
3. J3511 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 5 Oct 81, Subj: Philippine Exercises (U), DECL 17 Sep 87; J5123 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Apr 87; CINCPAC 042006Z Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Mar 87.
4. AFSSO PACAF 072335Z Mar 81 ~~(C)~~(BOM), DECL 17 Feb 87.

Crow Valley from high altitude. This was also the first employment of B-52s in COPE THUNDER, a long-sought USAF objective. The guided missile destroyer USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7), the third ship participant in two years, provided training on 23 April for F-4 and B-52 aircraft. A B-52 searched for, located, and simulated an attack on the ship during the morning and two Kunsan F-4Ds with Clark F-4G WILD WEASEL support made a coordinated attack in the afternoon using intelligence passed by the B-52. The bombers also provided fighter intercept training for PAF F-5 and F-8 aircraft. The 3d Air Division Commander on Guam was very appreciative for this chance to participate. The B-52 airborne commander remarked that he had not seen or heard such realism since he last flew over North Vietnam.[1]

~~(C)~~ COPE THUNDER 81-7, 14-25 September, saw the Royal Australian Air Force participate for the first time in the exercise. The PAF also took part. The Republic of Korea Air Force and the Royal Thai Air Force sent observers to this exercise.[2]

TANGENT FLASH/BALIKATAN 82 Planning

~~(C)~~ Formerly, TEMPO CAPER had been an annual amphibious training exercise conducted in the Philippines under the sponsorship of COMSEVENTHFLT. Participants had been one company each of USMC, USA, Philippine Army (PA), Philippine Marines, and USN/Philippine Navy ships. CDRWESTCOM requested expansion of U.S. Army participation to a battalion task force level, with proportionate PA units in TEMPO CAPER 81. Discussions with components resulted in an informal agreement to revise the exercise concept, and CINCPAC accepted its sponsorship. However, because of Philippine domestic considerations and lack of agreement by components on exercise location, TEMPER CAPER 81 was cancelled. CINCPAC then proposed an overall concept for TANGENT FLASH 82, incorporating the training aspects of the TEMPO CAPER series. All parties agreed to conduct the exercise at Dingalan Bay/Fort Magsaysay. In July CINCPACREPPHIL conducted an initial planning conference for the exercise. As a result it was agreed to rename the exercise TANGENT FLASH/BALIKATAN 82 (balikatan being a Filipino word for "cooperative effort") and schedule it for 20-31 May 1982. The second planning conference, to be hosted by the Philippines, was scheduled for January 1982 in Manila.[3]

SEA SIAM

~~(C)~~ All exercises with Thailand during 1981 were combined naval exercises sponsored by CINCPACFLT through COMSEVENTHFLT. SEA SIAM was a semiannual ASW training exercise conducted in the Gulf of Thailand. USN forces normally

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1. J3512 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 May 87; 3AD 010750Z May 81 (U).
2. J3511 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 5 Oct 81, Subj: Philippine Exercises (U), DECL 17 Sep 87.
3. J3511 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 3 Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, Subj: Exercise TEMPO CAPER/TANGENT FLASH (U), DECL 3 Nov 87.

included surface combatants, one submarine, and patrol aircraft. The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) usually participated with patrol boats, coastal gunboats, and ASW aircraft. SEA SIAM 81-2 was held from 27 April to 10 May, with the purpose of building experience in antiship and antisubmarine warfare tactics and to enhance the spirit of cooperation and readiness of participating forces. USN ships and aircraft taking part included USS BERKELEY (DDG-15), USS HEPBURN (FF-1055), USS JOHN YOUNG (DD-973), USS ELLIOT (DD-967), USS BARBEL (SS-580), and P-3 aircraft from Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, SEVENTH Fleet.[1]

MINEX

~~(C)~~ MINEX/EODEX was a periodic USN/RTN mining exercise conducted in the vicinity of Sattahip or Songkhla, and was designed to train USN units in aerial minelaying and RTN units in the subsequent sweeping and recovery operations. USN participants included either P-3s or TACAIR from carriers and explosive ordnance disposal and mine operations maintenance advisory group personnel. The RTN normally participated with minesweeping craft. MINEX ALPHA was conducted by Commander Carrier Air Wing TWO (CVW-2) in conjunction with units of the RTN on 14 March. This MINEX was the first with Thailand using tactical aircraft from a carrier. The RTN was eager to have the RANGER Battle Group and air wing participate. It was judged an unqualified success, and the RTN was anxious to host similar mining exercises in the future. A pre-exercise brief was held at JUSMAGTHAI Headquarters, Bangkok, on 9 March. Phase 1 of the exercise was the actual laying of the minefield by CVW-2 aircraft. Phase 2 was minesweeping operations by RTN ships, and Phase 3 was recovery of the practice mines. The practice minefield was approximately 8 NM south of Utapao Airfield. All 24 mines were placed precisely on target by A-6, A-7, and S-3 aircraft, with F-14 and EA-6B escorts. A debrief at Sattahip Naval Base indicated that sweeping was accomplished during Phase 2 with no problems encountered. CVW-2 said that as a first-time target, the area was superb for aircrew training.[2]

MEKAR 82-1

~~(C)~~ MEKAR 82-1 was the first of a planned series of small-scale maritime exercises designed to promote mutual understanding and interoperability between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) by inter-ship exercises. It was conducted 8-9 October in the South China Sea, near Johore. Participants were USS INGERSOLL (DD-990) and three RMN fast attack craft - missile. "MEKAR" was a Malaysian-derived term formed by combining the first two letters of the Malay word for Malaysia with the last three letters of the Malay word for America. Mekar also meant bloom or blossom in the Malay language. While maintaining a careful, nonaligned international political posture, Malaysia had indicated a desire and pursued initiatives to increase military interactions

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1. J3514 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 29 Jul 81, Subj: Thailand Exercises (U), DECL 29 Jul 87; CNO 251956Z Apr 81 (U).
2. J3514 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 29 Jul 81, Subj: Thailand Exercises (U), DECL 29 Jul 87; COMCARAIRWING TWO 271121Z Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Mar 82.

with the PACOM. The second exercise in this series, MEKAR 82-2, was scheduled for May 1982.[1]

TIGER BALM 81

(U) Exercise TIGER BALM 81, held 18-23 October, was the first in a planned combined CPX series between WESTCOM and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). It was a map exercise designed to train division- and brigade-level headquarters in the planning, conduct, and control of ground operations, and to evaluate plans and procedures of participating forces. TIGER BALM 81 was hosted by the SAF 3d Division at Jurong Camp II. U.S. Army participants were a brigade headquarters player cell of 12 persons from the 7th Infantry Division and two control cells of 18 persons total from WESTCOM. SAF personnel (total 58) were three brigade headquarters player cells, a headquarters cell from the 3d Infantry Division, and control staff.[2]

ANZUS

KANGAROO 81

~~(C)~~ The KANGAROO series was an Australia-sponsored, large-scale air, land, and maritime exercise involving U.S. (USN, USMC, USAF, and USA), Australian (RAA, RAAF, and RAN), and New Zealand (RNZA, RNZAF, and RNZN) forces. The first in the series had been held in 1973, the second in 1976, and the third in 1979. KANGAROO 81 was conducted from 11 October to 4 November 1981, at Shoalwater Bay, Queensland. The next one was scheduled for October-November 1983.[3]

~~(C)~~ A U.S. amphibious assault rehearsal for Exercise KANGAROO 81 was conducted 28-29 September over Learmonth Beach, located in the Exmouth Gulf, North West Cape, Western Australia. Approximately 600 Marines went ashore via surface and heliborne assaults. Four ships, 22 helicopters, and a battalion landing team were involved, with a total of approximately 3,600 USN and USMC personnel. Operations were not conducted beyond the beach high water mark or outside designated helicopter zones. This was the first USN/USMC training in the North West Cape area of Australia.[4]

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1. J3514 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 1 Oct 87; J3514 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 9 Dec 81, Subj: U.S.-Malaysia Combined Exercises (U), DECL 9 Dec 87.
2. J3514 HistSum Oct 81 (U); J35/Memo/340-81 (U), 13 Oct 81, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise TIGER BALM 81.
3. J3514 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 6 Oct 87; J3514 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 17 Dec 81, Subj: Joint/Combined Exercises Conducted in and with Australia and New Zealand (U), DECL 17 Oct 87.
4. J35/Memo/C311-81 ~~(C)~~, 23 Sep 81, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise KANGAROO 81 Amphibious Assault Rehearsal (U), DECL 23 Sep 87; J313 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 13 Oct 87.

~~(C)~~ The aim of KANGAROO 81 was to exercise participants in combined and joint operations in a conventional, low-scale, mid-intensity conflict in the defense of Australia. The basic scenario depicted increasing tension between Australia and Orangeland over sovereignty of an island to the east of Australia and access to oil and gas resources. The ANZUS partners--Australia, New Zealand, and the United States--acknowledged a common interest in containing Orangeland aspirations and that a contingency existed. Forces were assigned and placed in an appropriate alert status. Participating forces totaled 19,950: U.S., 4,725; Australia, 13,900; New Zealand, 1,290; and U.K., 35. Strategic U.S. airlift/sealift for deployment included 9 C-141 sorties, 1 B-747 sortie, 1 DC-8 sortie, 1 MSC ship transporting 7th Infantry Division equipment from Oakland to Hawaii, and 1 MSC ship transporting 7th and 25th Division equipment from Hawaii to Brisbane.[1]

~~(C)~~ U.S. Army participants totaled 724: an infantry battalion and support personnel from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; a brigade headquarters and elements of a military intelligence battalion from Fort Ord, California; and elements of the 7th Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. USAF participants totaled 423 personnel and included 6 F-15, 2 E-3A, and 3 KC-135 aircraft from Kadena AB, Japan; 7 B-52D/H missions from Andersen AFB, Guam; and elements of the 18th Combat Support Group from Kadena AB. USN participants totaled 1,762: Amphibious Squadron THREE (CTG 76.3) with USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), USS DENVER (LPD-9), USS ALAMO (LSD-33), and USS SCHENECTADY (LST-1185), and elements of an EOD group. USMC participants totaled 1,816: 31 MAU (CTG 79.4) with a battalion landing team (5 tanks, 6 howitzers, 12 landing vehicles), a composite helicopter squadron (12 CH-46, 4 CH-53, 2 AH-1H, 2 UH-1N), and a service support group.

~~(C)~~ Royal Australian Army forces totaled 8,500: 1 division (Blue) and 1 brigade task force (Orange); RAN totaled 4,000 and included 1 aircraft carrier, 2 destroyers, 3 frigates, 2 submarines, 1 destroyer tender, 3 minesweepers, 1 amphibious ship, 1 training ship, 4 heavy landing craft, and 3 fast patrol craft; RAAF totaled 1,400 and included 9 F-111s, 10 MIRAGE IIIs, 6 P-3B/Cs, transports, and helicopters. New Zealand forces were an infantry battalion, elements of a special air service squadron, 2 frigates, 8 A-4s, 1 P-3B, helicopters, and transports. The U.K. supplied 2 Nimrod aircraft.[2]

(U) KANGAROO 81 was rated by all PACOM participating commands as being the most successful yet conducted in the series. It saw the first use of sealift for movement of exercise equipment to Australia. Personnel positioned by B-747 and C-141 aircraft were supplied with this equipment. The cheaper cost of sealift enabled a larger-scale participation. Vehicles were convoyed from the port at Brisbane to the exercise area near Rockhampton, a distance of approximately 500 miles. U.S. infantry personnel joined with the New Zealanders to

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1. J35/Memo/C332-81 ~~(C)~~, 6 Oct 81, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise KANGAROO 81 (U), DECL 6 Oct 87.
2. Ibid.

form the Allied Brigade, which was commanded and controlled by the Joint Forces Headquarters. This brigade, flanked by the Australian Brigade, maneuvered to link up with the USMC amphibious assault force and successfully trapped the aggressor Orange force.[1]

(U) The F-15s flew 147 of 153 scheduled sorties and also were able to fly a limited number of dissimilar air combat missions with Australian MIRAGE and A-4 aircraft. F-15 intercepts against B-52s resulted in simulated B-52 destruction before they reached their targets. The B-52s flew aerial mining operations and 4 of 8 scheduled BUSY BOOMERANG (low-level terrain avoidance training) missions. The amphibious landing by the MAU was preceded by naval gunfire support and airstrikes on the beach. Timing, tactical employment, communications, and subsequent support ashore went extremely well. Umpire evaluation determined that considerable damage was inflicted on the aggressor force.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A CINCPAC IG team that observed KANGAROO 81 said the most successful element of interoperability in this exercise was the spirit and genuinely positive attitude of personnel involved. The timeliness and precision of the ship-to-shore movement during the amphibious assault was impressive. A number of problems surfaced during the exercise, however. [redacted] (b)(1) 9. The system which most significantly failed the test of interoperability, according to the IG team, [redacted]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A major problem of the exercise was that there had been no final planning conference conducted by the Blue Force command. Overall exercise planning was done under the auspices of the Australian Joint Exercise Planning Staff, but actual Blue and Orange Force employment planning was relegated to the respective commanders. In the case of Blue Force employment, planning was largely delegated to the individual Services. Consequently, misunderstandings emerged at the headquarters level. A final planning conference would have uncovered many inconsistencies. Another problem which most

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1. J35/Memo/377-81 (U), 10 Nov 81, Subj: K81 Input for Thursday's Brief.
2. Ibid.
3. IG HistSum Dec 81 (U); IG/Memo/S129-81 ~~(S/NF)~~, 3 Dec 81, Subj: KANGAROO 81 Evaluation Report (U), REVW 19 Nov 86.

significantly affected U.S. forces was airspace management and control. It was a pervasive dilemma which exercise directives had not fully addressed. Given the broad aspects of the problem, the CINCPAC IG observers believed it might be more appropriate to fault exercise planning rather than the directives, but the net result was that it hampered U.S. aircraft performance.

[redacted]

(U) Following completion of the exercise, the Chief of the Australian Defence Force Staff sent a message to CINCPAC, saying KANGAROO 81 was a great success. Notable among the accomplishments was the high level of interoperability achieved between the Australian Defence Force and Allied units. CINCPAC passed this message to those concerned and added his own appreciation to all who participated.[2]

GONFALON 81

~~(C)~~ Exercise GONFALON 81 was a significant JCS-coordinated, joint/combined unconventional warfare exercise conducted in various training areas on North Island, New Zealand, from 13 November to 18 December. GONFALON was a triennial UW exercise which alternated with WESTWIND (sponsored by Australia) and THERMAL GALE (sponsored by the United States). The next in this series was to be THERMAL GALE, scheduled for October 1982 in the Hawaiian Islands, and sponsored by CINCPAC. Contingents from Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia, participated in GONFALON 81. It was the largest and most successful special operations exercise ever conducted in New Zealand.[3]

~~(C)~~ Participating were 115 personnel from New Zealand, 114 from the United States, 17 from Australia, 20 from the United Kingdom, and 23 from Malaysia. The U.S. contingent included special operations cadre from CINCPAC, U.S. Army elements from the 7th Special Forces Group, a detachment from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), 1 MC-130E from Clark, 1 C-130E from Clark, 2 combat control teams from Clark, and 1 SEAL platoon.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 142215Z Nov 81 (U).
3. J3514 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 6 Nov 87; J361 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 87.
4. Ibid.

~~(C)~~ GONFALON 81 was conducted in two phases, a 2-week training course followed by a 2-week FTX, called Operation LANCER by New Zealand. Subjects taught during the first phase included mountain climbing, amphibious operations, jungle tracking, airborne operations, close quarter battle, weapons, demolitions, surveillance, booby traps, and air resupply. The training was highlighted by a surveillance course taught by the U.K. Special Air Service team, based on experiences in Northern Ireland, and a booby trap course taught by the Malaysian Special Service Regiment team. Combined operations during the FTX included raids, reconnaissance operations, a VIP snatch, sabotage, bridge and dam demolition, ambushes, prisoner rescue, shipboarding, and hostage rescue. The highlight of this phase was the highly successful hostage rescue operation.[1]

~~(C)~~ A CINCPAC IG observer called Operation LANCER a total success. All unit operations were multinational, with very few problems in interoperability. Participation by the USAF 1st Special Operations Squadron element was singled out as superb. The USAF team met all 23 mission requirements with precision. Nighttime low-level terrain-following flying under total blackout conditions was impressive. The U.K. team brought a sophisticated HF radio which was packaged in a Samsonite briefcase. It was programmable and could transmit burst messages at the rate of 600 words per minute. By laying out a long wire antenna, the operator could communicate directly from New Zealand to the United Kingdom. The system was impressive and its application to UW was obvious.[2]

BEACON COMPASS 81

(U) BEACON COMPASS was an annual combined sea control exercise involving U.S., Australian, and New Zealand forces in maritime operations. BEACON COMPASS 81 was conducted from 11 to 19 May in waters off Western Australia. Nearly 10,000 sailors from the three navies were involved.[3]

BEACON SOUTH

(U) ANZUS navies participated in BEACON SOUTH 81-2, a combined exercise off Western Australia, 4-6 May, in air, surface, and ASW operations. The exercise involved 10 ships, about 120 aircraft, and almost 8,000 men from the three countries. U.S. participating ships were USS MIDWAY (CV-41), USS REEVES (CG-24), USS KIRK (FF-1087), USS LOCKWOOD (FF-1064) and USNS MISSISSINEWA (T-AO-144).[4]

(U) Elements of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet and the RAAF participated in a 2-day combined naval exercise in the Indian Ocean off Western Australia in late

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1. J361 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87.
2. IG HistSum Dec 81 (U); IG/Memo/C143-81 ~~(C)~~, 31 Dec 81, Subj: Exercise GONFALON 81 (U), REVW 31 Dec 87.
3. J3515 HistSum May 81 (U); COMSEVENTHFLT 170748Z May 81 (U).
4. CNO 090001Z May 81 (U).

August. Named BEACON SOUTH 81-4, the exercise was designed to improve the effectiveness of participating units in reconnaissance, maritime, and air operations. Participants included four ships, about 70 aircraft, and more than 5,000 men from the United States and Australia.[1]

TRIAD 81

~~(C)~~ Exercise TRIAD 81 was a JCS-coordinated, routine, joint/combined ANZUS air/land CPX conducted in New Zealand, 10 February - 1 March. It was designed to enhance ANZUS interoperability and was held in three phases. The first was an air defense/interdiction exercise, the second an air/ground exercise, and the third a land CPX. U.S. participants were cells from the 25th and 7th Infantry Divisions, Hawaii Army National Guard, and IX Corps U.S. Army Reserves; PACAF controllers/instructors; and a tactical air control party from the 22d Tactical Air Suppport Squadron.[2]

Indian Ocean - Persian Gulf

PHIBLEX Demonstration

~~(S)~~ The Kenya PHIBLEX Demonstration, a significant combined amphibious assault exercise, was conducted 20-21 January. This was the second exercise of its type in Kenya and marked the first time the Kenyans participated in other than an observer role. PHIBLEX was designed to demonstrate the execution of a heliborne and waterborne amphibious assault landing for officials of the Kenya government. Objectives were to convey the importance the United States placed on maintaining a well-trained forward deployed amphibious force and to further develop a closer military relationship with Kenya. Participating U.S. forces were USS TARAWA (LHA-1), USS ST. LOUIS (LKA-116), USS BARBOUR COUNTY (LST-1195), the 31st MAU, and an underwater demolition team (UDT) detachment. Kenya forces participating were 50 personnel of an artillery battalion, 4 F-5, 4 Hawk, and 1 Puma aircraft.[3]

VALIANT USHER 81-9

~~(S)~~ Approximately 2 years of negotiations with the Government of Kenya came to fruition 9-13 September with VALIANT USHER 81-9, the first major SEVENTH Fleet exercise to be conducted in Kenya waters and the first MAU-size combined amphibious exercise to be conducted on the east coast of Africa. Kenya naval, air, and army units joined forces with the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet Amphibious Ready Group. Combined operations included sea control of the area, landing of U.S. Marines ashore, close air support of the landing by the Kenya Air Force (KAF), and combined maneuvers ashore by the 31st MAU and the Kenya

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1. CNO 291533Z Aug 81 (U).
2. J3514 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 19 Mar 87.
3. J3522 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 10 Feb 87.

Army (KA) combat team. Participating were approximately 3,500 U.S. and 360 Kenyan personnel.[1]

~~(S)~~ Close air support and pre-D-Day preparation operations were called impressive by CTF 76. The KAF was consistently on time and on target for each of eight sections flown. Communication on all air control and coordination circuits was excellent throughout. Kenya Navy (KN) patrol boat operations provided excellent training for both USN and KN participants. Offensive and defensive roles for the patrol boats were developed and practiced. Task Group maneuvers went well, using a new signal book promulgated by the KN. Combined USN UDT and KN clearance diving unit operations were productive. Operations ashore moved over 20 km from Green Beach. Tactical evolutions included simultaneous surface and helicopter assaults on D-Day. Both USMC and KA units participated in additional heliborne assaults on D+1. Only limited mechanized activity was realized because of numerous farms and villages and poor traffica-bility. The culmination of the ashore phase was the seizure of the objective by a coordinated USMC/KA night attack.[2]

~~(S)~~ A weak point in the exercise, as observed by CTF 76, was the landing site itself which was marginally suitable and proved most challenging. A high tidal range, offshore sandbars, and poor traction on the beach, compounded inland by a high water table and collapsing surface crust, grounded, mired, or stuck most boats and vehicles. Obviously, maps and charts of the area were inadequate for amphibious operations.[3]

~~(C)~~ The U.S. Country Team in Kenya said in general the exercise was a success. Kenyan forces appeared to be pleased with their participation. The Country Team suggested that in future exercises, increased emphasis be placed on command, control, and communications to further improve the Kenyan spirit of participation as well as their level of training. The operations orders provided to the Kenyans were too long (163 pages) to be effectively used.[4]

SOAFPASSEX/BEACON FLASH

~~(S)~~ Several exercises termed "SOAFPASSEX" (Sultanate of Oman Air Force Passing Exercise) had been conducted in Oman. These exercises were restricted to U.S. aircraft using the air/ground weapons training range at Rubkut, near Thumrait. SOAF had not participated. The exercise series was redesignated "BEACON FLASH" in mid-1981, and eventual SOAF participation was anticipated.[5]

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1. J3522 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 28 Sep 87; CTF 76 171300Z Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Oct 87.
2. CTF 76 171300Z Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Oct 87.
3. Ibid.
4. KUSLO Nairobi 20613/171422Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 31 Dec 86.
5. J3522 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 17 Sep 81, Subj: Exercises in Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf (U), DECL 17 Sep 87.

~~(C)~~ SOAFPASSEX 81-1 was conducted in the vicinity of Thumrait, 6-7 April. Scope was limited by SOAF to USN aircraft utilization of Rubkut Range for air-to-ground weapons training. Fifty-four A-7E/A-6E/F-4S sorties were flown, expending 347 practice bombs and 3,400 rounds of 20mm ammunition. Five E-2B communications relay sorties were also flown.[1]

~~(S)~~ BEACON FLASH 81-5 was conducted 19-20 September at the Rubkut Range. This was a combined USN/SOAF PASSEX/air-ground/low-level/dissimilar air combat training exercise, with SOAF defending Thumrait against a simulated USN strike. Aircraft from USS AMERICA (CV-66) participated.[2]

~~(C)~~ BEACON FLASH 82-1 and 82-2 were significant exercises conducted by the USN on 2-3 November and 30 November - 1 December, respectively, in the vicinity of Thumrait and the Persian Gulf. They were low-level navigational training exercises. SOAF did not participate; however, participation was anticipated in future exercises of this type.[3]

GONZO

~~(S)~~ GONZO was a series of exercises conducted in Oman, with USN forces simulating air strikes against Masirah Island, while other USN aircraft defended. SOAF had not participated, but planning had included Omani forces. Future Omani participation was anticipated.[4]

~~(S)~~ Exercise GONZO 81-4, 25 June - 1 July, was approved by the Omani Foreign Ministry. It included a multi-aircraft strike against a simulated land target on a portion of Masirah Island. The Government of Oman had no objection to the exercise, but strongly emphasized that no publicity should be given to it. Oman had been under verbal attack in many quarters of the Persian Gulf, and news of the exercise would be most unwelcome to the government.[5]

~~(S)~~ GONZO 81-5, a significant combined USN/SOAF exercise was conducted 13-15 September. It exercised participants in a multi-threat environment. A feature of this exercise was a USN simulated air strike against Masirah Island defended by Rapier missiles. The remainder of the exercise took place over international waters in the Arabian Sea north of 12 degrees north latitude. Taking part were two carrier battle groups led by USS AMERICA and USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63).[6]

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1. CTG 70.1 111945Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Apr 87.
2. J3522 HistSum ~~(S)~~, DECL 28 Sep 87; COMSEVENTHFLT 070126Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Sep 81.
3. J3522 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 23 Oct 87.
4. J3522 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 17 Sep 81, Subj: Exercises in Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf (U), DECL 17 Sep 87.
5. AMEMB Muscat 2573/160800Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 10 Jun 01.
6. J3522 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 28 Sep 87; COMSEVENTHFLT 050930Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87.

~~(S)~~ GONZO 82-1 was a significant USN/USAF/British Royal Navy joint/combined exercise in the North Arabian Sea to train participants in AAW, ASW, antisubmarine UW, and ECM operations. There was no SOAF participation. Features of the exercise included battle group versus special action group operations, integrating allied ships into battle group operations, weapons training, and missile and gunnery firing. B-52s also participated.[1]

Hawaii Area and CINCPAC Headquarters

OPPORTUNE JOURNEY/COPE ELITE

(U) OPPORTUNE JOURNEY (OJ) was a JCS-coordinated series of exercises consisting of routine air/sea deployments of 25th Infantry Division units from Schofield Barracks, Oahu, to the Pohakuloa Training Area on the island of Hawaii, followed by joint air/ground operations, battalion test and evaluation, combined arms operations, and operations in a hostile electronic warfare environment. COPE ELITE (CE) was a JCS-coordinated series of exercises designed in part to support OJ. It involved close air support and fire integration support sorties for the 25th Division, search and rescue, and dissimilar air combat training with various USN, USMC, and HANG aircraft. It was determined late in the year that the two series no longer qualified as JCS-coordinated exercises and were deleted from the JCS schedule for FY 83 and beyond. Future OJ exercises would be scheduled and funded by the Army and contain provisions for tactical air support participation. The CE series was discontinued as of 11 November 1981.[2]

~~(C)~~ CINCPACAF had been hosting short informal visits by members of foreign air forces to observe OJ/CE exercises in Hawaii. These visits proved to be very popular, and he had received direct inquiries from other countries regarding future invitations. As a result, CINCPACAF planned to invite officers from Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan to the exercise to be held in May. He requested CINCPAC concurrence on inviting Pakistan. CINCPAC concurred in the plan, but believed the invitation should be deferred until a Pakistan decision was reached on a pending U.S. aid offer. Keeping in mind the policy of even-handed treatment of India and Pakistan, CINCPAC also recommended CINCPACAF consider extending a similar invitation to India as a follow-on to a Pakistani visit.[3]

~~(C)~~ In August CINCPACAF again requested CINCPAC comments on inviting Pakistan to send observers to Exercise OPPORTUNE JOURNEY/COPE ELITE. CINCPAC concurred, saying the successful visit of a Pakistan military security assistance team to Washington had set the stage for an invitation. Pakistan's

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1. J3522 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Sep 87; J35/Memo/S373-81 ~~(S)~~, 9 Nov 81, Subj: Briefing Input for Exercise GONZO 82-1 (U), DECL 30 Sep 87.
2. IG HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 110431Z Nov 81 (U).
3. J5612 HistSum May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 5 May 87; CINCPACAF 220440Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 21 Apr 87; CINCPAC 072032Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 5 May 87.

response would provide an indication of their overall willingness to publicly display their acceptance of U.S. military cooperation and assistance.[1]

(U) OJ 81-4, 8 September - 26 October, and OJ 82-1, 19 October - 20 November, were together the largest ever held in the series. OJ 81-4 included a task force of 4,200 personnel. Supplies, 1,700 pieces of equipment, and 800 personnel deployed by sea to Kawaihae on Hawaii, using the U.S. Army vessel PAGE and USNS COMET. The balance deployed by air. Supporting the Army were C-141s (34 sorties), C-130s (37 sorties), and F-16s (50 sorties). The division deployed 47 helicopters, in addition to other equipment. OJ 82-1 was a continuation of the prior exercise, with the primary objective of training in tank, artillery, and helicopter gunnery. COPE ELITE 82-1 continued to provide TACAIR support for the first two weeks of OJ 82-1, with 40 planned F-16 sorties.[2]

FOREVER GONE

~~(S)~~ FOREVER GONE was a series of exercises that relocated CINCPAC (or another staff officer if CINCPAC was not available) by Marine helicopter from his Camp H.M. Smith headquarters to the Airborne Command Post at Hickam AFB with the declaration of DEFCON 2 or 1. The helicopters were assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade, Kaneohe MCAS. A FOREVER GONE exercise was conducted on 6 January. The Chief, CINCPAC ABNCP simulated the CINC's relocation and was flown to a rendezvous with the BLUE EAGLE aircraft. He then flew a local training flight with the ABNCP.[3]

~~(S)~~ The second FOREVER GONE exercise of the year was conducted on 23 June. The CINCPAC ABNCP Communications Standardization Officer, acting as the CINC, was flown to Hickam, where he flew a local training flight on BLUE EAGLE. The third FOREVER GONE exercise was carried out on 24 November, when the CINCPAC Director for Operations was flown from Camp Smith to the ABNCP, where he also flew a local training flight with BLUE EAGLE.[4]

POLO HAT

[redacted]

1. J561 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 Sep 87; CINCPAC 160024Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Aug 87.
2. J3511 HistSum Oct 81 (U).
3. J3322 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 26 Jan 87.
4. J322 HistSums Jun and Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 Nov 87.
5. ABNCP Point Paper ~~(S)~~, ca. 30 Oct 81, Subj: Review of JCS Exercise Programs (U), DECL 30 Oct 01.



(b)(1), sec 1.5 (a),(g)

1. Ibid.
2. J3523 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S),~~ DECL 10 Apr 87.



Exercise Evaluation Function Transferred

(U) At the direction of the Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff, the Exercise Division (J35) transferred the headquarters exercise evaluation function to the CINCPAC Inspector General (IG) in October. Subsequently, the Deputy IG dispatched observers to major PACOM exercises and submitted evaluation reports for the record.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. J3322 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 1 Apr 01.
3. J3512 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

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VOLUME II[1]

CHAPTER V--LOGISTICS 319

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY 319
Logistics Review of OPLANs 319
OPLAN 5027S 320
OPLANs 5000/5001 FY 81 322
Bilateral Logistics Planning with Thailand 325
Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81 326

SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 329
Logistics Readiness 329
War Reserve Ammunition 329
War Reserve Stocks for Allies 330
Sustainability Rating Issues 331
PACOM Munitions Storage Report 333
Chemical Munitions in PACOM 333
NTPS Ammunition Interservice Support Agreement 334
Commissary Support System 335
Exchange Support 336
Fuels 337
Inventory 337
Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices 337
Petroleum Storage Posture in PACOM 337
Leased Tankage in Korea 341
Petroleum Logistics Conference 344
NTPS Vehicle Maintenance Problems 345
Increased Use of JP-5 346
Petroleum Laboratory Capability Survey 347
Laboratory Correlation Program 348
Refueling Support in Thailand 348
Taiwan 349

SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS 351
TEAM SPIRIT 81 351
Airlift 351
Sealift 352
Korean Flag Shipping and Airlines 352
Shipping 352
Airlines 352
Korean Contingency Resupply and Redistribution System 353
GAO Survey 354
MAC Users Conference 356

---

1. Individual entries are unclassified. See Letter of Promulgation.

Near Term Pre-positioning Ships 358
Security and Basing 359
Third NTPS Maintenance Cycle Conference 359

SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING 361
FY 81/82 MILCON Programs in PACOM 361
Diego Garcia 361
Construction 362
Funding 362
Aircraft Support 364
Southwest Asia 366
Korea 366
Combined Defense Improvement Projects 366
Aircraft Beddown 367
Japan 367
Host Nation Funded Construction 367
Integrated Relocation Construction Program 367
Facilities Improvement Program 368
JFY 81 368
JFY 82 368
Sanno Hotel 369

CHAPTER VI--SECURITY ASSISTANCE 371

SECTION I--GENERAL 371
Arms Transfer Funding, Policy, and Legislation 371
Reporting Requirements 378
FY 83 Funding 378
FY 81 Manning and C-12 Aircraft 380
FY 82 Manpower Proposals 381
JUSMAG Korea Manning 381
PACOM Security Assistance Conference 382
Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar 383
Pacific Area Consolidated Ammunition Ship 384
PASOLS Project Development Group 385
Phase IV Security Assistance Training 385
PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop 386
Terms of Reference 386
ASEAN Requests 387
Fighter Aircraft 387
HARPOON 388
Performance Evaluation Group 390

SECTION II-COUNTRY PROGRAMS 391
Australia 391
Tactical Fighter Aircraft 391
Bangladesh 393
Burma 397

Fiji 399
Funding 399
Peacekeeping Force Participation 399
Lebanon 399
Sinai 401
India 403
Funding 403
TOW Antitank Missile 403
155mm Howitzers 405
Indonesia 407
Reorganization 407
IMET Funding 408
A-4 Aircraft 409
Overhaul of Indonesian Ships 409
Howitzers 410
155mm 410
105mm 410
Project INDOCOM 410
Security Agreement 411
Japan 413
M110A2 Howitzers 413
F-15 415
C-130 415
P-3C 415
AIM-9L 416
Disposal of MAP Excess Equipment 416
Korea 417
FMS Credits 417
Force Improvement Plan 419
Third Country Sale of Korean-made Defense Items 420
F-16 (PEACE BRIDGE) 422
Modernization of ROK Tank Force 426
Howitzers 427
Tankers 428
Destroyers 428
Malaysia 429
Training Support 429
Administrative Staffing 429
Aircraft 429
IMET Program 430
New Zealand 433
Pakistan 435
Equipment Requests 436
Ships 440
Destroyers 440
Papua New Guinea 443
Philippines 445
Support for F-8H Aircraft 445

Engineer Equipment 446
Disposal of Excess Small Arms 447
Singapore 449
Pilot Exchange Program 449
Training Costs 449
Sri Lanka 453
Ship Transfer 455
Thailand 455
Funding 455
Aircraft 457
MANPAD System 458

CHAPTER VII--COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 461

SECTION I--COMMAND AND CONTROL 461
The PACOM Command and Control System 461
Command and Control System Improvements 462
CINC C2 Initiative Funds 462
WWMCCS 464
Realignment of Record Communications 465
Combined Ground Command Post Terminal 466
Teletype Upgrade for Command Aircraft 467
UHF Satellite Communications Upgrade for Command Aircraft 467
Relocation of TACAMO Pacific 468
TACAMO Pacific Programming 469
Airborne Command Post 470
Joint Crisis Management Capability Program 471
Theater Nuclear Forces C3 471
Planning for Southwest Asia Communications 474

SECTION II--INTEROPERABILITY WITH PACOM ALLIES 477
Joint/Combined Interoperability of Tactical C2 Systems 477
Improving Communications in Korea (TPICK) 478
COMSEC Plan for Korea (CPICK) 479
U.S.-Japan Air Defense C2 (BADGE) 481
U.S. Forces Japan Coordination Center 483
COMSEC Interoperability with Japan 483
ANZUS C3 Interoperability Planning 485

SECTION III--TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT 487
Frequency Management 487
Upgrading Telephone Systems on Oahu 488
C3 for Near Term Pre-positioning Ships 489
Contingency Deployment of Satellite Terminal 490
Hardening to EMP (Project APACHE) 491
Jam Resistant Secure Communications 495
Hawaii Area Wideband System 496
Communications Security 497

JCS COMSEC Master Plan 497
COMSEC Equipment Stockpile Proposal 498
Threat to PACOM Communications 498
Special COMSEC Monitoring 500
Exercise COMSEC Monitoring 501
COMSEC Material System 501
Sealed Authentication System Inspection 502

CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES 509

SECTION I--MILITARY PERSONNEL 509
Environmental and Morale Leave 509
Military Customs Program 512
Predeparture Clearance 512
PACOM Military Customs Conference 513
Customs Report 513
Alcohol and Drug Abuse 515
Awards 516
ROK/US Combined Forces Command Service Badge 516
DOD Awards for CFC Component Headquarters 516
Republic of Korea National Crisis Service Medal 517
PACOM Awards 517

SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 519
Foreign National Personnel Administration 519
Korea 520
Philippines 520
Total Comparability Compensation and Pay Increases 520
Severance Pay 521
Sick Leave Benefits 521
American Express Labor Dispute 521
Japan 523
Direct Hire 524
Australia 525
Compensation for Third Country Nationals 525
Offshore Labor - Diego Garcia 526
Position Classification Control 527
Cost of Living Allowance 527
Performance Appraisal 528

CHAPTER IX--INTELLIGENCE 529

SECTION I--SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 529
PACOM Data Systems Center 529
Intelligence Data Handling System 532
Special Security 534

SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 537
Intelligence Deficiencies in PACOM 537
Project SENIOR GAZE Demonstration 538
SENIOR RUBY Deployment to PACOM 541
COMFY LEVI Deployment Proposed 541
Proposed TALLYMAN Korea Demonstration 542
HUMINT Collection Program in PACOM 544

SECTION III--INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 547
Targeting 547
PACOM Management 547
Target Intelligence Production Plan 547
Automated Tactical Target Graphics Production 548
ATTG Release to the ROK 549
ATTG Format 550
ATTG Miniaturization 551
Target Folders 551
Hardened Artillery Sites File 552
Forward Area Neutralization Graphic 552
Unconventional Warfare Targeting 553
Target Nominations and Deletions 553
Cruise Missile Planning 554
Weaponeering 555
Automated Installation Intelligence File 556
AIF Release 556
AIF Executive Agent Transfer 557
Other AIF Developments 558
Order of Battle Intelligence 558
Intelligence Support to the RDJTF 559

SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE 563
Sharing with Australia and New Zealand 563
Sharing with Japan 565
Intelligence Exchange with the Philippines 567
Singapore 568
Intelligence Support for Thailand 569

CHAPTER X--OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES 571

SECTION I--Official Activities of the Commander in Chief 571
Trips and Associated Speeches 571
Distinguished Visitors to the Command, Meetings with News Media Personnel, and Local Speeches 577

SECTION II--Comptroller Activities 589
Obligation of Consumer Funds for Expense-Type Material 591
MAP Representation Funds 591
O&M,Navy Funding for CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific 591

SECTION III--LEGAL AFFAIRS 593
Philippine Customs, Immigration, and Quarantine Negotiations 593
Philippine Extradition Treaty 594
Rossi v. Brown 597
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 597
PACOM Confinement Statistics 597
Philippines 598
Korea 598
ANZUS Status of Forces Agreement 599
Exercises 599
POTENT PUNCH 81 599
ANZUS Exercises 599
Travel to Macau 600
Environmental Laws and Regulations 600
PACOM Legal Conference 602

SECTION IV--PUBLIC AFFAIRS 605
Tours and Visits 605
Vice President Bush Press Conference 605
40th Anniversary of Hawaii Attack 605
Pacific Stars and Stripes 606

SECTION V--SECURITY 609
Demonstration at CINCPAC Headquarters 609
Security of Senior Military Officers 610

SECTION VI--INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES 611
Program Management 611
Exercises 611
Staff Visits 613
Physical Security 614
Explosives Safety Surveys 615

CHAPTER XI--SELECTED CHRONOLOGY 1981 617

Glossary 637

Index 649

SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Logistics Readiness

[redacted]

War Reserve Ammunition

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC 132340Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 7 Oct 96.
2. Ibid., J423 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88.
3. J423 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; JCS 161948Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 14 Jan 87; J423 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 7 Jan 82, Subj: PACOM FY82 War Reserve Ammunition Posture (U), DECL 7 Jan 88.

31 December 1981

	Requirements	On Hand	Days of Supply
Army/ROKA	1,019,050	638,200	34
Air Force/	78,685	96,225	90+
ROKAF	59,519	22,868	34
Navy/Marine (Air)	160,424	145,295	81
ROKN	18,647	6,222	20
Marine (Ground)	23,447	47,063	90+
Totals	1,059,672	955,873	

War Reserve Stocks for Allies

(U) During 1981 the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) program continued to require that the Services procure, or retain in their inventories, stockpiles of ammunition to insure support for selected ROK forces in time of war, until in-country ROK production and external resupply could meet the estimated combat consumption.[1]

~~(C)~~ In determining 1981 WRSA ammunition requirements under CINCPAC OPLAN 5027S, each U.S. Service computed ammunition requirements for its ROK counterpart in its ammunition stockage objectives. Pre-positioned stocks were oriented towards accommodating total consumption and attrition for forces until continuous resupply from CONUS could be established. For FY 81, Service requests and Congressional funding were as follows (in millions of dollars/short tons):[2]

	Requested		Funded	
Army	94	/ 24,000	76.5	/ 26,500
Air Force	8.37	/ 3,190	8.4	/ 3,200
Totals:	102.37	27,190	84.9	29,700

(C) The Navy requested no FY 81 WRSA ammunition funding because of ongoing analyses to ascertain transportation costs associated with shipping WRSA ammunition to meet ROK Navy requirements. The Air Force ultimately determined that it could not use the WRSA funding because improved technology ammunition was not excess to their needs for filling ROK Air Force WRSA needs. USAF funding was redistributed within the DOD WRSA program. Congressional WRSA ammunition

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1. J423 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88.
2. Ibid.

allocations for PACOM in recent years are shown below in millions of dollars/ short tons.[1]

PACOM WRSA Program (Class V)

FY	Army	Navy	Air Force	Contingency*	Total
76/77T	93.8/ 41,000	0	0	0	93.8/ 41,000
77	125 / 57,100	0	0	0	125 / 57,100
78	224 /111,600	6/1,422	40 /16,000	0	270 /129,022
79	72.2/ 38,000	10/2,400	4.2/ 2,000	3.6	90 / 42,400
80	79 / 32,000	8/1,800	4.8/ 900	3.2	95 / 34,700
81	76.5/ 26,700	0	0	6.3	85 / 26,700
Totals:	672.7/306,400	24/5,622	49 /18,900	13.1	758.8/330,922

* Contingency funds were allocated for appropriate excesses which might become available.

Sustainability Rating Issues

(U) In December 1981 the CINCPAC Logistics Directorate hosted a meeting to discuss sustainability rating issues pertaining to all OPLANs. In attendance were representatives from component commands and the Institute for Defense Analysis. Discussions centered on the shared concern that sustainability ratings only measured War Reserve Materiel stocks pre-positioned in-theater. (See accompanying chart.) A better picture of OPLAN supportability would result if other parts of the sustainability equation could be measured. These included CONUS and theater (Service and Defense Logistics Agency) depot stocks, unit stocks, host nation support, allied stocks, and U.S. industrial capacity and transportation.[2]

(U) It was noted that not all Services managed stocks by supply class. In order to arrive at even a somewhat imprecise Sustainability Rating, manual calculations were often required. Component commands had to subdivide supply classes to properly depict or define the reported items. In some cases non-Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel stocks were reported. For example, PACFLT had to count unit stocks in Class V while FMFPAC counted "mount out" stocks, which were also considered unit stocks. Computing gross days of supply implied absolute substitutability within a supply class. No provisions were made in JCS guidance (SM-646-80) for reporting sustainability of allies but CINCPAC did include Sustainability Ratings on WRSA data in his semi-annual SITREP. CINCPAC was planning to develop an instruction on sustainability reporting to aid in refining methodologies.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. J4232 Point Paper (U), 6 Jan 82, Subj: Sustainability Rating Issues.
3. Ibid.

PACOM SUSTAINABILITY POSTURE (U)
AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1981

CLASS OF SUPPLY	EUSA			25TH INF DIV			PACFLT		FMFPAC			PACAF		
	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	* S-RATING
I SUBSISTENCE	44	58	3	29	96	1	ASHORE STOCKS NOT REPORTED PER CNO GUIDANCE.		15	88	2	30	50	3
II CLOTHING	10	13	4	8	27	4	—	1	16	26	4	—	50	3
III BULK POL	52	86	2	NOT AUTHORIZED.			95	1	NAVY MANAGED ITEMS.			—	—	4
III PACKAGED POL	9	12	4	22	74	3	ASHORE STOCKS NOT REPORTED PER CNO GUIDANCE.		NAVY MANAGED ITEMS.			60	100	1
IV BARRIER	66	88	2	NOT AUTHORIZED.			100	1	56	92	1	NOT AUTHORIZED.		
V AMMUNITION	26	49	4	AUTHORIZED BASIC LOAD ONLY.			—	4	59	98	1	—	—	4
VII END ITEMS	26	35	4	18	61	3	ASHORE STOCKS NOT REPORTED PER CNO GUIDANCE.		11	16	4	—	87	2
VIII MEDICAL	21	28	4	20	66	3	100	1	26	43	4	—	—	4
IX REPAIR PARTS	18	24	4	18	27	4	99.6	1	52 AVIATION REPAIR PARTS REPORTED BY PACFLT.	87	2	20 INCLUDES WAR READINESS SPARES KIT/BASE LEVEL SELF-SUFFICIENCY ONLY.	—	3

* S- Ratings:
S-1 *Fully Combat Sustainable (90-100%)*
S-2 *Substantially Combat Sustainable (75-89%)*
S-3 *Marginally Combat Sustainable (50-74%)*
S-4 *Not Combat Sustainable (0-49%)*

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 30, REVW 13 Feb 02.

PACOM Munitions Storage Report

(U) In conjunction with the Service component commands, CINCPAC determined that there was a continuing need for a single document depicting the munitions assets and storage status in PACOM. In January 1981 CINCPAC amended guidance for submission of quarterly reports. At the beginning of February CINCPAC hosted a meeting of representatives from PACFLT, WESTCOM, PACAF, FMFPAC, and the Army's Central Ammunition Office-Pacific to discuss storage data input procedures, format, types of information to be included in the report, Service responsibilities, and other related items. Submissions received from the components for the remaining three quarters in 1981 were consolidated into a two-part computerized report depicting data by Service, country, and base. The assets portion was further broken down by class, and the storage by type. The product was then distributed to the components and proved useful in the decision making process and in monitoring PACOM capabilities in support of current and planned operations, especially regarding potential reallocation of munitions storage facilities and redistribution of munitions assets.[1]

Chemical Munitions in PACOM

(U) During 1981 chemical munitions within PACOM continued to be stored at Johnston Island. These were JCS stocks managed by the Army (WESTCOM) and represented part of the national deterrent stockpile, but they were not pre-positioned war reserve munitions. While the Defense Nuclear Agency had overall responsibility for the island, WESTCOM controlled that portion used for storage of chemical munitions.[2]

~~(C)~~ The munitions consisted of 13,758 short tons of nerve and mustard agents contained in artillery projectiles, bombs, M-55 rockets, land mines, and bulk ton containers in conditions as shown below:

Serviceable	3,896 (short tons)
Maintenance required	4,006
Demilitarization or disposal required	5,625
Disposal required	231

~~(C)~~ In October 1980 Admiral Long had highlighted a need for continued emphasis on demilitarization and disposal of the unrepairable munitions to the Army Chief of Staff. He wanted to avoid creating environmental problems and attracting unfavorable public attention. A DOD Explosives Safety Board survey in July 1981 pointed out minor shortcomings in the renovation and maintenance of the munitions. Some of the Army's planned corrective actions included up-rade and repair of corrugated metal buildings used as above-ground storage; funding of $1.15 million in FY 83 by WESTCOM for modernization and expansion of

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1. J4236 HistSums Jul 81 and Jan 82 (U).
2. J423 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 14 Jan 88; J423 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 31 Dec 81, Subj: PACOM Chemical Munitions Status (U), DECL 14 Jan 88.

the munitions maintenance facility; and a pending request for $22 million by the Army in the FY 84 Military Construction program for 19 new magazines as permanent storage for serviceable munitions after demilitarization. For the long term, the Army was to begin concept and design of a demilitarization facility in FY 82 with construction scheduled for FY 84-89 at a projected cost of $74 million. Until its completion, 215 one-ton containers, with acid decontaminants which had been neutralized, would remain on Johnston Island.[1]

[redacted]

NTPS Ammunition Interservice Support Agreement

~~(C)~~ During June 1980 two of the Near Term Pre-positioning Ships (NTPS) were loaded with munitions and later deployed to Diego Garcia. The SS AMERICAN CHAMPION had approximately 11,800 short tons of Army and Air Force munitions and the SS AMERICAN COURIER 3,700 short tons of Marine ground and air munitions. Plans called for interim dry-dock maintenance to be performed every two years at various WESTPAC locations, but different types of munitions required varying inspection intervals and there was no established interval for extended on-board ship storage. In September 1980 CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to develop an interservice support agreement, in coordination with other CINCPAC component commands, for the maintenance and inspection of ammunition aboard the NTPS.[3]

(U) CINCPACFLT hosted a conference in March 1981 to document mutually agreed upon Service logistics support requirements for ammunition, as well as Marine Corps non-ammunition material aboard the ships. In addition to the component commands, representatives from the Air Force Logistics Command, Ogden Air Logistics Command, and the Naval Magazine at Subic Bay discussed funding of maintenance, logistics support, Service responsibilities, and other related items. Time sequencing for maintenance in conjunction with dry-docking was agreed upon as well as Service responsibilities concerning personnel augmentation and payback policies. Subsequently a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 302037Z Oct 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 7 Oct 86.
2. J423 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 14 Jan 88.
3. J4236 HistSum Mar 81 (U); J4231 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 1 Aug 80, Subj: Maintenance Concept for Near Term Prepositioned Ships Munitions (U), DECL 1 Aug 86; J423 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

was drafted which contained general guidance for maintenance of the NTPS ammunition by CINCPACFLT on a reimbursable basis while the ammunition was offloaded during biennial dry-dock maintenance of the break-bulk ships. The MOU was signed by PACFLT, FMFPAC, WESTCOM, and the Air Force Logistics Command and was effective as of 24 November 1981.[1]

Commissary Support System

(U) The lack of adequate commissary support for American Embassies in the Pacific had long adversely affected the morale of DOD members of our Country Teams. This was continually highlighted during Performance Evaluation Group visits to security assistance organizations which relied on established American Embassy commissary cooperatives for support. Early attempts by CINCPAC to provide assistance were directed at support from commissaries at Clark AB (Air Force) and Subic Bay (Navy) in the Philippines for selected embassies, Bangkok and Jakarta, and for the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the consulate at Hong Kong. Although support provided to these cooperatives was an improvement over some previous methods, problems continued. The overseas DOD commissaries were not adequately stocked nor did they have the facilities to fully support embassy operations. Moreover, embassy cooperatives routinely experienced a shortage of desired items, and there was a continuing problem with the quality of merchandise provided.[2]

(U) Other CINCPAC efforts had explored alternate transportation methods for remote embassies, principally through space available cargo on MAC flights. The Air Force, however, required reimbursement for transportation and these costs proved prohibitive for the cooperatives. In October 1979 CINCPACFLT forwarded a request to CINCPAC from the American Ambassador to Islamabad to secure subsistance support from the Navy Commissary at Subic. In December CINCPAC solicited information from 10 embassies in PACOM, plus the AIT, to determine the level of commissary suport being provided from DOD and other sources. (Initially embassies in Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila were not included because support from local DOD commissaries was considered highly satisfactory.)[3]

(U) After analyzing responses, CINCPAC recommended three alternative courses of action. CINCPAC asked the DLA, if they concurred with CINCPAC's preferred alternative, to seek coordination with the Navy Resale and Services Support Office (NAVRESSO), Brooklyn, New York, on the scope, feasibility, and resources required to establish a support system from the Navy Commissary Consolidated Warehouse at Oakland, California. Subsequently, the NAVRESSO agreed to provide support for dry provisions from the Oakland warehouse. Additional support in the areas of freezer, exchange, and package store items would be

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1. Ibid.; CINCPACFLT Ltr ~~(S),~~ Ser N41B/S43, 24 Nov 81, Subj: Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Near Term Prepositioning Ships (NTPS) Ammunition (U), DECL 30 Sep 88.
2. J4233 HistSum May 81 (U).
3. Ibid.

considered after effective implementation of the system for dry grocery items. During the remainder of 1980 CINCPAC continued coordination with the Naval Supply Systems Command, the State Department, the Navy's Field Support Activity in Washington, as well as the previously mentioned agencies, on various aspects of creating the new commissary support system.[1]

(U) Representatives from embassies in Bangkok, Beijing, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kathmandu, Manila, New Delhi, Rangoon, Tokyo, and the AIT met in Manila from 31 March to 3 April 1981 for briefings on the proposed commissary support program and training in various Navy Commissary procedures by members of the NAVRESSO staff. Indications at the conference were that seven embassies would seek support at the earliest possible date; three others would possibly participate later; and representatives from Colombo, Hong Kong, and Port Moresby who could not attend expressed interest.[2]

(U) The system developed for the embassies in PACOM provided a permanent, reliable source for a widerange of commissary merchandise at a favorable cost and within reasonable lead times. Grocery items were bought at the cost to the Navy's Regional Commissary Store warehouses in Oakland, plus an accessorial charge of 3.25 percent and transportation costs. The latter were negotiated by the U.S. Despatch Agency (the State Department organization responsible for shipment of merchandise to overseas embassies), who had verified with the Commerce Department authority to use foreign flag vessels for 25 percent of their total shipments. This allowed additional flexibility to obtain the most favorable transportation rates available. The system, as developed by CINCPAC and NAVRESSO, commenced in June. Other benefits of the system were revised internal stock control procedures, increased fill rates, a shorter pipeline, and a delayed billing system. Reports from Country Team personnel acclaimed the success of the program.[3]

Exchange Support

(U) Exchange support to U.S. personnel at embassies and at Defense Attache Offices was also undertaken as a project monitored by CINCPAC but managed and operated by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Pacific Region. This program was designed to give U.S. personnel the opportunity to buy exchange merchandise at embassy stores at prices comparable to those charged at regularly established exchanges. They could also receive special order merchandise with regular shipments. Since the service began in 1981, two embassies participated on a regular basis and were laudatory of the program.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 190347Z Apr 80 (U).
2. Ibid.; J42 Memorandum for Record (U), 7 Apr 81, Subj: Minutes of Manila Conference for Pacific Overseas Area American Embassy Commissary Support.
3. J4233 HistSum May 81 (U); CINCPAC 220532Z Sep 81 (U); CINCPAC 290131Z Apr 82 (U).
4. J4/Memo/S849 (U), 31 Aug 82, Subj: CINCPAC Command History 1981; review of draft.

PACOM POL ISSUES

(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)



* Naval Distillate phased out in 1974.

Source: J422

Fuels

Inventory

(U) By the beginning of 1981 the PACOM fuel inventory position had improved significantly. Between April 1980 and January 1981 the total inventory had increased 13.6 percent (from 17.99 to 20.44 million barrels of petroleum for all PACOM terminals). This was attributable to full contract coverage of 1981 petroleum requirements, reduced consumption by operating forces (mainly because of standard stock fund price increases), sources outside of PACOM had supported increases in Indian Ocean requirements, and there was a slight increase in available tankage. Through the end of 1981, inventories remained at or near 20 million barrels.1

Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices

(U) Standard bulk petroleum prices experienced only a modest increase when compared with the previous year. FY 82 prices per gallon were as follows: JP-4: $1.39; JP-5: $1.42; DFM: $1.37; AVGAS: $1.60; MOGAS: $1.29; Unleaded MOGAS: $1.32.2

Petroleum Storage in PACOM

K1



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1. J4222 HistSums Jan 81, Jan 82 (U).
2. J4222 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. J4232 Point Paper ~~(S),~~ 28 Aug 81, Subj: Sustainability of Pacific Command Forces (U), DECL 28 Aug 87; J422 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(S),~~ DECL 4 Nov 87.

1981 POL Issues
(in thousands of barrels)

BY PRODUCT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
AVGAS	3	7	8	5	2	11	2	0	19	3	2	4	66
JP-4	1,310	935	1,419	1,074	1,098	962	1,286	940	1,180	958	961	1,022	13,145
JP-5	375	371	438	489	507	469	377	443	419	324	620	435	5,267
MOGAS	79	70	79	92	64	61	103	80	136	58	96	102	1,020
Diesel	757	1,060	1,001	963	825	524	652	685	672	857	1,150	614	9,760
NSFO	119	39	93	87	66	98	55	85	58	89	66	87	942
TOTAL	2,643	2,482	3,038	2,710	2,562	2,125	2,475	2,233	2,484	2,289	2,895	2,264	30,200

BY AREA

Diego Garcia	69	168	53	68	80	63	73	119	123	65	66	73	1,020
Guam	203	164	228	271	75	234	255	174	206	123	268	221	2,422
Hawaii	677	590	805	849	896	369	647	529	536	487	811	418	7,614
Japan	998	748	873	578	540	693	599	669	670	654	945	822	8,789
Korea	328	266	394	150	147	209	147	153	379	223	271	297	2,964
Philippines	368	546	685	794	824	557	754	589	570	737	534	433	7,391
TOTAL	2,643	2,482	3,038	2,710	2,562	2,125	2,475	2,233	2,484	2,289	2,895	2,264	30,200

Source: J422

BULK POL DATA, PACOM
(MILLIONS OF BARRELS)



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 34, REVW 13 Feb 02.

Leased Tankage in Korea

(U) For a number of years CINCPAC had documented POL storage deficits in the PACOM, particularly for JP-4 in Korea. A March 1978 memo from the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics (ASD/MRA&L) had granted the DLA authority to fund for leasing of 500,000 barrels of tankage in Korea, but the DLA found there was no tankage available. In early 1979 the DLA requested authority from the ASD to negotiate a contract to have tankage constructed for lease. The legality and propriety of using DLA stock funds, vice MILCON funds, to construct the tankage for lease purposes was subjected to a lengthy review by the OSD Legal Counsel and the ASD Comptroller. Whereas the Legal Counsel determined it would be legal to use the stock funds, the Comptroller recommended disapproval because such use would set a new precedent.[1]

(U) Meanwhile, in late 1979 a revision to DOD Directive 4140.25, Procedures for Management of Petroleum Products, was being expedited which, it was hoped, would allow the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) to use stock funds to "build-to-lease" storage, thereby obviating the need for an OSD consensus on the issue. Also, the JCS had asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense for interim authorization for the DLA to lease tangkage in Korea, should it become available, to overcome the longstanding, serious U.S. war reserve storage deficits. As backup action, the DFSC included construction of the 500,000 barrel tankage in the DLA FY 82 MILCON program in the event that OSD did not ultimately approve use of stock funds. (Note: The desired provision was deleted from the revised DOD Directive 4140.25 when it was published on 15 May 1980. See also the 1980 CINCPAC History, pp. 247-249.)[2]

1. J422 HistSum Aug 79 (U).
2. J422 HistSums Oct 79, Jan 80 (U).
3. JCS 2461/182151Z Apr 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 17 Apr 86; COMUSK 260545Z Sep 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 22 Sep 86; J422 HistSum Dec 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 13 Jan 87; CINCPAC 202043Z Dec 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 18 Dec 86.





1. J422 HistSum Jan 81 (~~S~~), DECL 6 Feb 87; AFLC 142155Z Jan 81 (~~S~~), DECL 18 Dec 86; J422 HistSum Feb 81 (~~S~~), DECL 5 Mar 87; HQ (USAF) WASH DC 022103Z Feb 81 (~~S~~); DLA 032130Z Feb 81 (~~S~~), REVW 3 Feb 87; JCS 211457Z Feb 81 (C), DECL 13 Feb 87.
2. J422 HistSum Mar 81 (~~S~~), DECL 8 Apr 89; CINCPAC 192235Z Mar 81 (~~S~~), DECL 18 Mar 87.

(U) In April the DLA advised that the expedited FY 82 project had been submitted to Congress, and two members of the DLA staff briefed the project to the House Appropriations Committee. One of the DLA staff members, when appearing before Committee staff assistants on 12 May, learned that the DLA 500,000 barrel project had been dropped from the FY 82 program because it had not passed the requisite 35 per cent design stage. Such action occurred because the DLA had not had a chance to tell the Committee that by using Air Force standard design the project could be considered more than 35 percent designed.[1]

(U) Meanwhile, access, acquisition, topological surveys, and contract procedures for the four planned sites for the DLA MILCON effort continued as did efforts to obtain Senate and House committees' approval for inclusion in FY 82 funding. As 1981 closed CINCPAC was notified that the Congress had deferred the project from FY 82 to FY 83 and that the Vice Director of the JCS had signed a memo to the Secretary of Defense requesting that the project be included in the DLA FY 83 MILCON as an add-on. The Defense Resources Board was scheduled to meet in January to prioritize projects prior to Presidential presentation of the FY 83 budget to Congress.[2]

Petroleum Logistics Conference

(U) A PACOM Petroleum Logistics Conference was held at Camp Smith from 21 to 23 October 1981. Approximately 80 military and civilian PACOM POL managers, as well as representatives from CONUS and state and local industries, met for discussions and briefings covering 33 agenda items. At the opening, RADM E. R. Kohn, USN, CINCPAC's Director for Logistics and Security Assistance, stated that the conference would stress OPLAN supportability. Brief overviews of the major CINCPAC OPLANs, with emphasis on OPLAN 5027, were presented to the military attendees to explain the relationships of POL requirements in the logistical annexes to the overall OPLANs.[3]

(U) Representatives from the Defense and Service Departments portrayed the status of their respective fuels programs. The Commander of the Petroleum Distribution System-Korea provided a comprehensive review of his organization, its capabilities, recent improvements, the Trans-Korea Pipeline, and the inland distribution plan. Other area presentations included Red Hill storage in Hawaii and facilities at Adak, Okinawa, and Japan. A Military Sealift Command representative addressed the availability status and future of the MSC tanker fleet, including the NTPS tankers. A working group reviewed and voted to support DFSC proposed initiatives to increase FY 82 peacetime stockage levels by 4.5 million barrels and added a recommendation for additional tankage at

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1. J422 HistSums Apr, May 81 (U).
2. J422 HistSums May, Jun 81 (U); J4222 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 14 Jan 88; DLA 291330Z Dec 81 (U).
3. J4222 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2767 (U), 21 Dec 81, Subj: Minutes of the 1981 CINCPAC Petroleum Logistics Conference.

Guam. CINCPAC, FMFPAC, and other concerned representatives met with counterparts from the RDJTF and the Army to discuss proposed concepts of operation under RDJTF OPLANs. Items of particular concern were the identification of en route MSC and MAC refueling requirements and quality control problems associated with long-term storage of POL under the NTPS environment. Also discussed were ongoing efforts to reduce the grades of POL on the NTPS.[1]

NTPS Vehicle Maintenance Problems

~~(C)~~ During the February 1981 embarkation maintenance cycle at Naha, Okinawa, Marine Corps personnel discovered two problems involving vehicles aboard one of the NTPS, the USNS MERCURY. One had to do with fuel and preservative oil interaction; the other with brake fluid deterioration. Preservative oil (specification VV-L-800A) had supposedly been added to the diesel fuel prior to loading the diesel-powered vehicles aboard ship. Its purpose was to enhance the preservative qualities of the fuel and prevent corrosion of the vehicle fuel system. After six months aboard the ship, the high temperatures experienced in the Indian Ocean caused the diesel fuel and preservative oil to interact, forming a jelly-like precipitate. This, in turn, clogged the fuel filters and fuel lines, and otherwise hindered the proper operation of the vehicles when started.[2]

(U) Samples of the clogged fuel filters and fuel were sent to the U.S. Army's Mobility Equipment Research and Development Command (MERADCOM) laboratory at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Analysis there revealed that not only was VV-L-800A the incorrect type of preservative oil, but also that some samples indicated that another type preservative oil had been used. Through a series of conferences with the CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office (JPO), FMFPAC G-4, and MERADCOM personnel, it was determined that the best solution was to substitute JP-5 for the diesel fuel-preservative oil mix in the NTPS vehicles. The rationale for using JP-5 was that it was more thermally stable than diesel fuel; it would make a good flushing medium; and it was available within PACOM. After persuading the Commander, Military Sealift Command, to allow the use of JP-5 in the vehicles, the JPO arranged through PACFLT for the USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) to deliver 5,000 gallons of JP-5 to Okinawa for servicing the NTPS vehicles.[3]

(U) The second problem noted was deterioration of the brake fluid in some of the off-loaded vehicles. The type of fluid used conformed to specification VV-B-680, a commonly used petroleum-based brake fluid. Severe deterioration was noted in those vehicles which had been in general use prior to loading aboard ship. The JPO determined that deterioration could have been prevented by use of a silicone-based brake fluid conforming to specification MIL-H-46176. FMFPAC G-4 agreed, however, the decision had been made not to use it because it

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1. Ibid.
2. J4224 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 5 Mar 87.
3. Ibid.

was not yet in the USMC supply system. Additionally, the necessary changeover procedures were not available.[1]

(U) The JPO contacted the Defense General Supply Center to verify that limited stocks of the silicone-based brake fluid were available. Then they contacted MERADCOM to obtain changeover procedures. Nevertheless, FMFPAC decided against changing brake fluid in all vehicles aboard the MERCURY during that maintenance cycle. The limited amount of time and manpower available to effect changeover prior to reload and the limited number of vehicles experiencing total brake failure or fluid deterioration were cited as factors influencing this decision.

~~(C)~~ It was expected that the vehicles loaded aboard two other RO/ROs (roll-on, roll-off) would also exhibit both problems. Therefore, FMFPAC planned to have adequate manpower and products available to handle both problems should they occur during the next scheduled maintenance cycle.[2]

Increased Use of JP-5

(U) There were continuing efforts to reduce the number of grades of fuels used in order to simplify supply, transport, and storage requirements and diminish rotational demands. PACOM effort in 1981 focused on reducing the number of grades carried on the NTPS tankers from four to two by substituting JP-5 for JP-4 and DF-2.

(U) JP-4 was a naptha based fuel which gave better performance than the cheaper kerosine-based JP-5. However, it had a much lower flashpoint (well below room temperature). Because of the safety factor of its higher flashpoint (140^{0}), it was necessary to use JP-5 on aircraft carriers. Consequently, the Navy had decided it was more practicable to use JP-5 on shore as well as on carriers, in spite of higher costs and other undesirable characteristics. The F-15 and F-16 were the only USAF aircraft that did not list JP-5 as an alternate fuel. This limitation necessitated pre-positioning JP-4 on-board the NTPS POL tanker in support of the RDJTF. In 1980 the Air Force had begun testing the use of JP-5 in F-15s and F-16s. F-100 engine tests were completed in May 1981, and flight tests were to follow between June and September. Air Force headquarters advised that testing could be accelerated if properly justified.[3]

(U) In July CINCPAC submitted rationale for accelerating the test program in order to meet the short-range goal of substituting JP-5 for JP-4 aboard the NTPS POL tanker during the August 1981 rotation cycle. Although acceleration of the test program would cost additional monies, the estimated savings could amount to $2,150,400 annually in reduction of sailing days, 16 for each

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J422 HistSum May 81 (U).

rotation. Otherwise, every 90 days the tanker had to go to Subic Bay to discharge the JP-4 because there was no JP-4 tankage at Diego Garcia, then to Bahrain for refilling. Other long-term benefits which would accrue from the certification included improvement in other fuel tanker resupply efforts throughout the PACOM and enhanced availability of JP-5 in emergencies for Navy Indian Ocean units. Also, refueling response time would be reduced when F-15s were diverted to locations, such as Cubi Point, where only JP-5 was normally available.[1]

(U) Although the Air Force acted on CINCPAC's justification, the testing completion slipped to October, and conversion had to wait until the November rotation. Meanwhile, CINCPAC coordinated the proposed conversion to storage of JP-5 with all parties concerned, and USREDCOM concurred with a CINCPAC proposal to use JP-5 in lieu of DF-2 to meet requirements on the NTPS, thereby further reducing the types of product carried on the tankers to two. Based upon authorization received in late November, the NTPS tanker USNS SEALIFT MEDITERRANEAN was loaded with only JP-5 and MG-1.[2]

(U) There remained, however, an Army requirement for JP-4 to support CH-47 helicopters. In December the JPO learned that the Army was in the process of revising specifications to allow use of JP-5 for up to 300 hours in the T-55-L-7B/C engines used in certain models of the CH-47. Authorization for up to 75 hours use of JP-5 was received telephonically on 16 December and formal authorization for extended use was expected in 60 to 120 days. This flexibility would also aid certain naval stations which had to refuel Army helicopters. Meanwhile, testing of JP-5 in the F-16s continued through the end of 1981.[3]

Petroleum Laboratory Capability Survey

(U) In September 1980 a CINCPAC JPO representative conducted an on-site survey of the petroleum testing laboratories in Okinawa, Japan, and Korea to evaluate the ability of each to perform required petroleum tests. A survey was also made of laboratories in Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines. An analysis of the data collected revealed that all laboratories had test capability shortfalls in both receipt testing and storage life testing of both fuels and lubricants. In addition, the two laboratories designated as Class A facilities (Pohang, Korea, and Hakozaki, Japan) were incapable of providing full procurement quality surveillance testing. In all cases, the testing shortfalls were the result of a lack of necessary equipment or repair parts. The results of the findings were reported to the responsible Service commands (the Army Energy Office and the Navy Petroleum Office) and the DFSC in March 1981.[4]

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1. J422 HistSum Jun 81 (U).
2. J422 HistSums Oct, Nov 81 (U).
3. J4222 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
4. J4224 HistSum Mar 81 (U).

(U) Both the Army and Navy took positive steps to eliminate the shortfalls. The Army assigned responsibility for establishing and equipping a Class A laboratory in PACOM to the Eighth Army and it was subsequently established at the Petroleum Distribution System Korea's laboratory at Pohang. Based on a worldwide petroleum laboratory capability survey conducted in 1980, the Navy considered the testing capability of Navy-operated laboratories in the Philippines, Japan, Guam, and Hawaii to be adequate. However, procurement action was initiated in April to upgrade a test facility at Diego Garcia to perform Class B tests to cover receipt of JP-5 via tanker.[1]

Laboratory Correlation Program

(U) For many years there had been provisions in the PACOM for correlating POL test results among various military laboratories. Triannually uniform sets of product samples were sent to each participating laboratory. The participating laboratories would then analyze the samples and forward the results to the CINCPAC JPO where the results were compared and analyzed to determine that the individual tests were within tolerances. These results were then returned so that the participating laboratories could identify failures in equipment, calibration, or technique.

(U) In December 1980 the JPO, in cooperation with the Defense Fuel Region-Pacific, invited all major oil refineries in the Pacific area who provided petroleum products to U.S. forces to join the PACOM Petroleum Laboratory Correlation Program. By the end of November 1981, 11 military and 8 civilian laboratories were participating in the program which provided them complete correlation data. This expansion insured that uniform laboratory testing procedures were used throughout the PACOM, thereby assuring optimum quality of the petroleum products provided to PACOM units.[2]

Refueling Support in Thailand



1. J4224 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
2. J4224 HistSum Jan 81, Jan 82 (U).
3. SECSTATE 29229/050330Z Feb 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), GDS 2/4/87.

[redacted]

Taiwan

[redacted]

1. J422 HistSums Apr, May 81 (~~S~~), DECL 11 May, 3 Jun 87.
2. J422 HistSums Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep 81 (~~S~~), DECL 9 Jul, 25 Aug, 8 Sep, 9 Aug 87.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (~~TS/FRD~~), Appendix I, pp. 39-41, 85-86; PACAF History 1979 (~~S~~), REVW 2010, pp. 603-605, 613-614.

[redacted]

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1. Ibid.; J4222 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 Jan 88; Presidential Memorandum ~~(S)~~, 26 Oct 81, Subj: Drawdown of War Reserve Fuel Stocks on Taiwan ~~(C)~~, REVW 10/9/87.
2. J4222 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 Jan 88; J4224 HistSum Feb 82 ~~(C)~~, DECL 2 Mar 88.

SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS

TEAM SPIRIT 81

(U) A number of significant logistics events transpired during Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 81. The exercise entailed the largest strategic deployment of augmentation forces ever undertaken in the PACOM. Selected forces were deployed from 21 CONUS and out-of-country PACOM airfields to 8 airfields in Korea. It was the largest use of sealift for any exercise and the largest use in the PACOM of commercial wide-bodied aircraft for air deployment (11 B-747s, 1 DC-10). It was also the first test of the Korean Contingency Resupply/Redistribution System and the first use of an NTPS in an exercise. (See the Operations Chapter of this History for exercise details.)[1]

Airlift

(U) The airlift deployment (1 February-5 March) and redeployment (22 March -10 April) involved 357 C-141 missions, 216 C-130, and 22 wide-body commercial contract aircraft missions. Over 19,496 troops and 7,441 short tons of cargo were carried to and from the exercise area. The employment phase accounted for over 800 C-130 flight hours in support of U.S. and ROK forces. These hours were used to support the scheduled tactical airlift route missions which carried personnel and high priority, low volume cargo. Joint airborne/air transportability training was also conducted during the field training exercise employment phase. A flight of 6 C-141Bs carried components of the 2nd Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company from Camp Pendleton, California, to Korea, utilizing the inflight refueling capability of the new C-141B for the first time in a PACOM exercise.[2]

(U) The original airlift cost estimate was reduced from $34.9 to $22.3 million by having exercise forces consolidate airlift requirements and dates, improve load planning, and maximize the use of the stretch model C-141B and contract wide-body aircraft. An analysis showed a savings of over $2.1 million by using the B-747s and the DC-10 from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to replace selected C-141A missions. Use of the C-141B, which increased the average usable space from 5,274 to 7,024 cubic feet per aircraft, allowed additional savings.[3]

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1. J436 HistSum Mar 81 (U); J433 Point Paper (U), 5 May 81, Subj: MSC Support of Team Spirit; J3513 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 3 Apr 81, Subj: TEAM SPIRIT 81 (U), DECL 21 Mar 84.
2. J436 HistSum Mar 81 (U).
3. Ibid.

Sealift

(U) Sealift costs for the exercise were $6 million. To airlift the equivalent amount of equipment and supplies would have cost $52 million, and with real world constraints on airframes and flying hours could not have been done in such a timely manner. Three RO/RO (USNS MERCURY and COMET, SS TYSON LYKES) and three breakbulk (SS DAWN, AMERICAN RELIANCE, and MALLORY LYKES) ships were used.[1]

~~(S)~~ The USNS MERCURY, after unloading its NTPS cargo at Okinawa during a scheduled 40-day off-station maintenance period, transported unit equipment to Korea for Okinawa-based Marines who participated in TEAM SPIRIT 81. This saved approximately $1.2 million.[2]

Korean Flag Shipping and Airlines

[redacted]

Shipping

[redacted]

Airlines

[redacted]

1. Op. Cit., J433 Point Paper.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 132206Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~(BOM), DECL 5 Jan 87.
3. J433 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 5 May 81, Subj: Korean Flag Shipping/Airlines (U), DECL 5 May 87; J434 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 31 Jul 81, Subj: Use of Korean Ships and Aircraft in Contingencies (U), DECL 31 Jul 87.
4. CINCPAC 010029Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 18 Feb 01; J433 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 13 Jan 88.

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

Korean Contingency Resupply and Redistribution System

(U) In order to support CINCCFC/COMUS Korea with a viable, rapid aerial resupply system, a Korean Logistic Concept was formulated by CINCPACAF and concurred in by CINCPAC and COMUS Korea in 1976. The concept significantly reduced the number of aerial resupply sorties required to land at the various TACAIR combat bases, thereby insuring the priority of combat fighter operations from those bases. The concept proposed the development of Kimhae Air Base near Pusan, Korea, as the primary strategic airlift port and distribution center for a Korean contingency. Kimhae was envisioned as the primary receiving point, processing center, and transportation mode interface hub to distribute incoming resupply cargo, personnel, and mail for U.S. and ROK contingency forces. In May 1980, with the concurrence of CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea, the CINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance assumed overall responsibility for development of what became the Korean Contingency Resupply/Redistribution System (KCRS).[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. I, pp. 258-259; J434 HistSums May, Jun 81 (U); CINCPAC 010207Z Jul 81 (~~S~~), DECL 29 Jun 87.
2. J434 HistSums Jun, Dec 81 (U); J434 Point Paper (~~S~~), 7 Oct 81, Subj: Korean Civil Airlift Support in a Contingency (U), DECL 7 Oct 87.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. I, pp. 259-260.

(U) In December 1980 PACAF submitted its space and manpower requirements to make Kimhae a viable part of the KCRS. Data included air transportation, on-base host facilities, POL, vehicles, medical facilities, manpower, security, distribution control center, ADP, and communications.[1]

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ On 21-22 May a meeting was held at CINCPAC headquarters with representatives from PACAF, COMUS Korea, MAC, and concerned subordinate commands to review, refine, and prioritize facility requirements and identify shortfalls. Functional areas of responsibility were assigned. The three parent commands were to provide additional basic input, clarification and redefinition of requirements, and recommended procedures to CINCPAC by the end of the year. In September CINCPAC forwarded guidance and milestones for the formulation of a U.S.-ROK MOA with a target conclusion date of September 1983.[3]

GAO Survey

(U) In March 1980 CINCPAC was advised of a forthcoming General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of tactical airlift needs and availability (Survey No. 943474). The GAO was the investigative arm of Congress. The survey would require information pertaining to intratheater tactical airlift (both organic and nonorganic aircraft) of personnel, equipment, and supplies under the most "probable" Pacific crisis scenario as defined by CINCPAC. CINCPAC expressed concern to the JCS regarding the survey parameters. Specifically, unlike strategic airlift in a contingency, tactical airlift requirements were not readily quantifiable due to the overwhelming volume of variable factors involved. Also, because the subject was to be studied simultaneously at the JCS and the U.S. European Command, there might be a radical difference in CINCPAC's assessment of capability versus requirements if USEUCOM were to select an OPLAN 4102 scenario and CINCPAC selected a limited contingency as the most "probable" crisis.[4]

~~(S)~~ The JCS response, after further coordination with the GAO, clarified the issue. The study would assume the most "demanding" PACOM scenario during a

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1. J437 HistSum Dec 80 (U).
2. J432 HistSum Dec 81 (U); COMUSK 060600Z Feb 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 6 Feb 87.
3. J432 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, ~~DECL~~ 13 Jan 88; CINCPAC 170342Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Sep 87.
4. CINCPAC 180229Z Mar 80 (U).

worldwide war with the Soviet Union focused in Europe [redacted] Requirements of the RDJTF should be considered under all circumstances. In July CINCPAC alerted COMUS Korea to the GAO visit by providing, as guidance, background information and CINCPAC staff responses to specific GAO questions based on [redacted][1]

(U) Commands and units visited by the GAO in PACOM were PACFLT, PACAF, FMFPAC, 834th Airlift Division, COMUS Korea, 314th Air Division, VRC-50, and 374th Tactical Airlift Wing. The GAO report (PLRD 81-42), published on 9 July 1981, criticized DOD and PACOM intratheater airlift planning and recommended that the Chairman of the JCS and the Military Airlift Command improve oversight and coordination of intratheater airlift by:[2]

- Improving methods to determine airlift requirements and relate those requirements to capability.

- Insuring consistent use of the most appropriate planning methods within MAC, theater commands, and the Services.

- Insuring plans more adequately reflect intratheater movement requirements and capability.

(U) In response to a request by the Chairman of the JCS, CINCMAC hosted a conference on 31 August-1 September to develop a DOD reply and a plan to correct these deficiencies. Each theater was to establish an intratheater airlift planning council, and CINCMAC was to act as the Chairman's executive agent for the intratheater airlift planning process. The CINCPAC channel for this action was the PACOM Joint Transportation Board which convened on 6 October and approved a PACOM plan of action and milestones to improve intratheater airlift planning under OPLAN 5027. Target for the first milestone, identifying four categories of intratheater airlift requirements, was 1 February 1982.[3]

MAC Users Conference

(U) The 1981 MAC Users Conference was held at Scott AFB, Illinois, from 28 to 30 April. Among forecast improvements in PACOM for passenger and cargo support operations were a new worldwide port call system to more closely coincide with customer's desires, computerization of passenger reservation centers, and availability of pallets and materials handling equipment. Also with prior arrangement, Service members could elect a port call for Category Y and shipment of their pets for the same category. The conferees also noted the increased

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1. JCS 072253Z Apr 80 (U); J432 HistSum Jun 80 (U); CINCPAC 011955Z Jul 80 (S), DECL 23 Jun 86.
2. J434 HistSum Sep 81 (U).
3. J434 HistSums Oct, Nov 81 (U).

use and effectiveness of the Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training program.[1]

Near Term Pre-positioning Ships



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1. J435 HistSum Apr 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC 032221Z Dec 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 26 Nov 86; J433 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 7 Apr 81, Subj: Bartender and Potential Augmentation of NTPS (U), DECL 26 Mar 87.

Loading of Marine unit equipment on USNS METEOR

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC NTPS/7th MAB concept, which had been forwarded to the JCS in September 1980, was approved in March 1981. CINCPAC was assigned OPCOM of the NTPS with OPCON to be exercised by CINCPACFLT via COMSEVENTHFLT. In July CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC authorization to take the three RO/ROs and the USMC (breakbulk) ammunition ship off station simultaneously for approximately two months beginning in January 1982 for equipment, ammunition, and ship maintenance. Since there would be no pre-positioned ammunition for NTPS/7th MAB while the ammunition ship was in maintenance, the overall readiness of the total force would be enhanced by having the three RO/ROs off-station concurrently instead of sequentially, he said. CINCPAC did not concur with this proposal.[1]

~~(S)~~ Also in July CINCPAC ascertained from the JCS the load mix which would be placed on the NTPS augmentation ships (also referred to as Expanded NTPS (ENTPS)). This augmentation would sustain the 7th MAB until D+30 days vice the original D+15. The first of the ships (SS SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, a POL tanker) arrived at Diego Garcia on 17 August. The remaining five arrived by 10 November (MV RANGER and MV ROVER (POL)), SS AMERICAN SPITFIRE (breakbulk with USN and USMC ammunition and other cargo), and SS AUSTRAL LIGHTNING and AUSTRAL RAINBOW

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1. J5621 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 25 Jul 81, Subj: Summary of Topics that JOO may discuss with CNO while ADM Hayward is in Hawaii (U), DECL 25 Jul 87; CINCPAC 110326Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 9 Jul 87; J433 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 10 Oct 81, Subj: NTPS (U), DECL 5 Oct 87.

(2 LASH (lighterage aboard ships) with USAF and Army ammunition respectively in support of RDJTF OPLANs 1003/4). With the expanded force structure of the ENTPS, including an increased number of Air Force units, it was more economical to load one POL tanker with the cheaper JP-4 dedicated for Air Force requirements. Therefore, the three POL tankers were loaded with JP-4 (70%), JP-5 (8%), and Diesel/MOGAS (22%).[1]



Three RO/ROs at Diego Garcia:
USNS MERCURY, JUPITER, and METEOR

Security and Basing

~~(S)~~ In early October Admiral Long expressed to Admiral Watkins (CINCPACFLT) his concern from a security standpoint of basing all 13 NTPS ships at Diego Garcia. The CINCPACFLT initial response suggested Singapore as a possible base for one water and four POL tankers and conventional cargo. In a more detailed study in November, CINCPACFLT recommended basing two ammunition ships at Guam and three POL tankers at Subic Bay. In addition, a program to have one-third of the NTPS/ENTPS underway from Diego Garcia at all times on a random basis and increased internal security measures were thought essential. CINCPAC concurred with the PACFLT recommendations and obtained a favorable endorsement from the American Embassy in Manila for basing three POL tankers at Subic. At the end of 1981 the proposal was being forwarded to the JCS for approval, and

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1. J433 Point Papers ~~(S)~~, 31 Aug and 6 Oct 81, Subj: Expanded NTPS (ENTPS)(U), DECL 31 Aug and 6 Oct 87; J433 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 23 Jan 82, Subj: Near Term Prepositioned Force (NTPF) Alternate Basing (U), DECL 23 Jan 88.

CINCPACFLT advised that the random underway operations for one-third of the NTPS/ENTPS would commence on 1 January 1982.[1]

Third NTPS Maintenance Cycle Conference

~~(S)~~ In order to conduct the necessary detailed coordination required in the third NTPS maintenance cycle scheduled for January-June 1982, FMFPAC hosted a conference at Subic Bay. Attending the 1-4 September conference were representatives from Marine Corps Headquarters, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACREP Philippines and 18 Navy and Marine Corps subordinate commands. The conferees worked under parameters set forth by CINCPAC concerning ship sequencing and load adjustments, including a staggered maintenance concept for NTPS RO/ROs to proceed off-station individually.[2]

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1. J433 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 17 Dec 87; CINCPAC 031452Z Oct 81, DECL 2 Oct 87; CINCPACFLT 040845Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 3 Oct 87; CINCPACFLT 292124Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 27 Nov 87; J433 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 13 Jan 88; J4 Memo/S-893 ~~(S)~~, 29 Dec 81, Subj: Basing of NTPS/ENTPS (U), DECL 29 Dec 87.
2. J432 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 Oct 87.


DIEGO GARCIA
Scale 1:135,000
0 1 2 kilometers
0 1 2 statute miles
Middle Island
East Island
Barton Point
Observatory Point
West Island
entrance channel marked by buoys
Eclipse Point
base area
tanks
Simpson Point
SUPPLY/POL AREA
turning basin
anchorage area
POL/SUPPLY PIER
Cust Point
causeway
runway
Marianne Point
East Point
EXPLOSIVE STORAGE
7° 24' 30"
thickly wooded
TRANSMITTER AREA
BRITISH SECTION
U.S. SECTION
Peros Banhos
Salomon Islands
Nelsons Island
Three Brothers
Eagle Islands
Danger Island
Egmont Islands
British Indian Ocean Territory
(Chagos Archipelago)
0 20 kilometers
0 20 miles
Diego Garcia

SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING

Military Construction Programs in PACOM

(U) The FY 81 Military Construction (MILCON) Authorization Act included PACOM projects totaling $424.4 million. This was a great increase over the FY 80 total of $87.1 million. Of the $563.8 million in the FY 82 MILCON Authorization Act, over $527 million was included in the FY 82 Defense Appropriation Act for PACOM installations. In addition, approximately $120 million was appropriated for Southwest Asia countries to provide facilities in support of the RDJTF. A broad summary by locale follows:[1]

	FY 81/ 82 ($ million)
Diego Garcia	131.9/237.7
Guam	19. / -
Hawaii	109.6/ 91.9
Japan	33.9/ 31.4
Korea	109.2/118.8
Kwajalein	5.4/ 3.2
New Zealand	- / 1.3
Philippines	15.4/ 29.1
Wake	- / 14.5
Total:	424.4/527.9

Diego Garcia

~~(C)~~ The U.S. Naval Support Facility at Diego Garcia was designed to provide limited logistic support, such as mooring, fueling, and loading/unloading, for ships of a small task group, as well as communications support for units operating in the Indian Ocean. By the beginning of 1981 it had a 12,000-foot runway capable of handling all U.S. aircraft (except B-52s); 110,000 square yards of aircraft parking apron; 640,000 barrels of JP-5 and 30,000 barrels of JP-7 fuel storage; a 550-foot single berth pier; 24 designated anchorages; and support facilities to house and feed 2,500 personnel (a permanent BEQ for 1,500 and seahuts for 1,000). As of 9 February 1981 there were 4 S-3As, 1 SH-2F, 5 P-3s, 2 EP-3s, 6 KC-135s, 1 C-141, and C-2A aircraft utilizing 89 percent of the aircraft parking area and 6 NTP ships in the lagoon. Personnel permanently assigned were naval construction forces numbering 2,341, and there were 224 visiting personnel.[2]

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1. J443 Point Paper (U), 6 Jan 81, Subj: FY81 Military Construction Program in PACOM; J44 HistSum Dec 81 (U); PL 97-362 (U).
2. J442 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 12 Feb 81, Subj: Diego Garcia Capabilities (U), DECL 12 Feb 87. For background, see the 1980 CINCPAC History, this subject.

(U) MAC airlift flights to Diego Garcia had increased to 80 per month. Approximately 1,700 to 3,000 passengers and 1,500 tons of cargo transited the island each month. Storage space was at a premium. With the continued influx, billeting remained the most critical issue, but there was mounting concern for the availability of potable water, communications, and other items. The climate, too, was extremely harsh on equipment, creating constant maintenance problems.[1]

Construction

~~(S)~~ The accompanying chart depicts the status of FY 81 and FY 82 MILCON programs at Diego Garcia at the end of 1981. Several initiatives, with considerable overlap between them, were being pursued during 1981 to support expanded operations at Diego Garcia. Fleet Support, the first initiative, was programmed in FY 81 and FY 82. Of the $143 million requested, $108 million was authorized for FY 81; $71.5 of the $89 million requested was authorized for FY 82. The second initiative was comprised of facilities required to support the throughput of a Heavy Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). These were programmed in FY 82-84 with a total estimated cost of $155 million; $110.3 million was authorized for FY 82.[2]

~~(S)~~ The third initiative was to make Diego Garcia capable of supporting B-52s. To accomplish this, it was proposed to widen and overlay the existing runway, as well as to make the new taxiway and parking apron (originally programmed by the Navy for support of a Heavy MAB throughput) capable of accommodating B-52s. If separate facilities were constructed, CINCPACFLT estimated costs at $220 million, whereas if joint use were made of upgraded existing facilities, the additional cost would be $81 million. The FY 82 budget request included $39 million to make the new taxiway and parking apron B-52 capable.[3]

~~(S)~~ The fourth initiative involved facilities requirements to support the full RDJTF and included facilities required for the above second and third intiatives. The CINCPAC $3.2 billion list, submitted on 22 February 1980, was unconstrained by political or budgetary restraints, but it was subsequently reduced by the JCS to $1.147 billion.[4]

Funding

~~(S)~~ The 150' x 12,000' runway at Diego Garcia could, in emergencies, accommodate B-52s. (The distance between their outrigger wheels was 148'.) During 1979 and 1980 concerned commands had studied the feasibility of upgrading the

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1. 834 ALD Ltr (U), 20 Mar 81, Subj: 834 ALD Conference Airlift Operations--Diego Garcia, 3-5 Mar 81, Hickam AFB, Hawaii.
2. J44 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 16 Feb 82, Subj: Diego Garcia Facilities Plans (U), DECL 16 Feb 88; J442 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

FY 81 MILCON (Facilities Expansion Program--$131.9 million)	Estimated Start/ Completion Dates
Dredging	Jan 81-Nov 82
MOGAS storage	Jan 81-Jul 82
Water improvement	Oct 81-Jun 82
Road/parking	Dec 81-Jul 82
Classic Wizard	Jan 81-Jul 82
Air cargo	Apr 82-Aug 82
Wharf	May 82-Aug 83
Small craft berthing repair	Aug 82-Jan 84
Power plan expansion	May 82-Feb 83
Electrical distribution	Apr 82-Feb 83
Potable water	Mar 82-Dec 92
Telephone upgrade	Apr 82-Oct 82
Sewage improvement	Mar 82-Oct 82
Ground support equipment shop	Apr 82-Sep 82
Dining facility	Apr 82-Apr 83
Vehicle maintenance shop	Jul 82-Oct 82
Boat shop	Apr 83-Jul 83
Flammable/hazard storage	Jun 82-Sep 82
Unaccompanied enlisted housing	Apr 82-Mar 83
P-3 wash rack	Jun 82-Jan 83
Runway approach lighting	Dec 82-Aug 83
Visual approach slope indicator	Jun 83-Oct 83
POL storage (AF)	Jul 82-Jul 83
FY 82 MILCON (Readiness Improvement--$237.7 million)	
Aircraft parking apron (Navy)	Aug 82-Jan 84
Aircraft parking Apron (AF)	Aug 82-Jan 84
Taxiway (Navy)	Oct 82-Jul 84
Taxiway (AF)	Oct 82-Jul 84
Wharf extension	Jun 83-Oct 84
Waterfront transit shed	May 83-Apr 84
Warehouse addition	Jun 82-Nov 82
Cold storage warehouse	Jul 82-Apr 83
High explosives magazine	Jun 83-Jan 84
Open storage	Nov 82-Jan 83
Roads and paving	Sep 83-Feb 84
Fleet landing	May 83-Jun 83
Medical facility	Apr 83-Sep 83
Boat ramp	May 83-Jun 83
Unaccompanied enlisted housing	Jan 83-Feb 84
Unaccompanied officer housing	Feb 83-Dec 83
Detention facility	Jun 83-Sep 83
Internal security and dog kennel	May 83-Jun 83
Satellite eating facility	Dec 83-Apr 84
Maintenance shop	Sep 83-Feb 84
Utilities (procurement)	Jul 83-Jul 83
Solid waste disposal facility	Nov 82-Apr 83
Telephone exchange addition and lines	Jul 83-Jul 83
Verticle replenishment pad	Dec 82-Feb 83
Aircraft refueling facilities	Dec 82-Apr 83
Cargo storage area	Apr 83-May 83
Hazardous cargo pad	Jun 83-Oct 83
Water plant	Apr 83-Jul 83
Operations and administration facilities	Jun 83-Mar 84
Airfield lighting	Jun 83-Aug 84

runway and associated facilities to support a Heavy MAB for the RDJTF. In March 1980 CINCSAC had also requested an evaluation of adding from six to nine inches of asphaltic concrete to the existing runway as an interim or alternate solution to providing a new parallel Portland Cement concrete runway to accommodate B-52 operations. Funding for the Heavy MAB upgrade was programmed, but at the end of 1980 the decision on the B-52 issue was pending in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.[1]

~~(S)~~ On 15 April 1981 the JCS advised all concerned that the FY 82 MILCON request for Diego Garcia of $237 million had included $39 million "to allow the airfield pavements in the program to be designed and constructed to B-52 specifications. . . ." Both the House and Senate Armed Services Sub-Committees approved the total amount requested, but the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) deleted the $39 million for widening the taxiway and an additional apron from the Air Force portion of the program. However, the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) approved the deleted items on 12 November. The $39 million survived HAC/SAC joint committee resolution, and the 1982 MILCON Authorization Act, passed by the Congress on 19 December, included $237 million for upgrade and construction at Diego Garcia. The Air Force received $114.9 million for construction and upgrade of RDJTF facilities and the Navy $122.7 million for Fleet Support and Readiness Improvement items.[2]

Aircraft Support

~~(S)~~ In the spring of 1981 it became apparent that a conflict existed between SAC and MAC plans for construction and use of existing and future aircraft parking areas on Diego Garcia. The existing north apron was sized to hold 41 KC-135s (SAC), plus 24 tactical aircraft and 2 C-130s. At a March conference on airlift operations at Diego Garcia sponsored by the 834th Airlift Division, CINCPACFLT representatives learned of an apparent change in MAC's concept of operations for support of the RDJTF. Instead of inflight refueling of C-130s, plans were being made for on-ground refueling of 7 C-141s and 4 wide-bodied 747s (CRAF). On 8 April, on behalf of CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC requested that the JCS review the operations scenario and provide recommendations to preclude overlapping or conflicting facilities initiatives. Another 15 April JCS message confirmed that the scenario and requirements upon which design of the taxiway and parking apron was based had not changed from those originally planned under a Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of 22 December 1980. It

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1. J442 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 13 Jan 81, Subj: Diego Garcia Capability to Support B-52s ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jan 87; CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol I, pp. 267-268.
2. JCS 151548Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 10 Apr 87; J442 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 8 Dec 81, Subj: Diego Garcia Facilities Expansion (U), DECL 7 Dec 87; J442 HistSums Dec 81 (U).

also asked Air Force Headquarters to provide CINCPACFLT a final Air Force position on apron and taxiway requirements at Diego Garcia by 30 April in order to minimize further design delays. The message further stated:[1]

> Simultaneous support of a heavy MAB and B-52 operations are not intended. Nevertheless, the exact scenario and precise manner in which airlift support and/or B-52 operations would be conducted cannot be determined in advance. Therefore, it is essential that maximum operational flexibility (albeit practical, economical, and within the present fiscal constraints) be designed into the planned parking apron and taxiway to accommodate variations in the number and types of aircraft. . . .

~~(S)~~ The Air Force supported construction of the south apron at the original planned size of 331,000 square yards with pavement size and configuration being changed to accommodate B-52s. Hydrant refueling schemes should incorporate requirements specified by MAC and SAC. The four additional link taxiways desired by MAC were to be considered as an additive bid item to the FY 82 MILCON package and would be contingent upon funding availability. On 2 May CINCPACFLT advised that PACAF had provided the necessary information and all issues were resolved satisfactorily.[2]

~~(S)~~ At an airfield facilities design conference held by PACNAVFACENGCOM on 20 May, representatives from MAC, SAC, and PACAF agreed that four additional link taxiways requested by MAC would only be used by medium load aircraft, and upgrading for these to B-52 standards was not required. The entire taxiway section (175' wide) would be designed as runway pavement. Pavement would be designed for two-year runway operations of projected MAC, SAC, and Navy aircraft loadings. Construction sequence would be upgrading of the existing taxiway for interim use as a runway; runway upgrading to accommodate B-52s; and a new parallel taxiway.[3]

(U) In March the State Department had alerted the American Embassy in London to what it termed an unauthorized and inaccurate story in the Baltimore Sun, tying the FY 82 budget amendment of $39 million to use of Diego Garcia runways (vice taxiways and aprons) by B-52s. Late in August the British Defence Ministry announced that the runway and airfield support facilities would be upgraded to allow use by B-52s.[4]

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1. J442 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 May 87; CINCPACFLT 020447Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 25 Jan 86; JCS 152009Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 14 Apr 87.
2. HQ USAF 241907Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 22 Apr 86.
3. J442 HistSum May 81 (U); PACNAVFACENGCOM 230303Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 15 May 87.
4. SECSTATE 060445Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, GDS 3/5/87; Honolulu Star Bulletin/Advertiser 30 Aug 81, p. A-27 (U).

Southwest Asia

~~(S)~~ During 1980 CINCPAC and USEUCOM had asked the JCS to designate a single unified command as coordinator for military construction in Southwest Asia. In a 2 January 1981 message the JCS stated the matter was "under consideration." In the meantime, oversight of the MILCON programs there would continue to be a JCS responsibility in collaboration with the Services, USCINCEUR, and CINCPAC. Projects would be submitted through appropriate Service channels with development responsibility assigned to CINCPACFLT for the Navy; CINCUSAFE for the Air Force; and CINCUSAREUR for the Army.[1]

(U) A supplemental FY 81 appropriation passed by the Congress in early 1981 included: Kenya (Mombasa)-$19.1 million for minor airfield improvements at Moi Airport, magazine construction at the Naval Base, and dredging in the port; Somalia (Berbera)-$.4 million for minor airfield and port improvements; Oman-$85.5 million for major facility upgrade at Masirah and runway realignment at Khasab. The FY 82 MILCON program provided $30.5 million for Kenya for an air cargo terminal, warehouse and administration facilities, and communications and navigational aids at Moi Airport; and a communications facility and harbor improvement at Mombasa Naval Base. It provided $78.5 million for Oman for aircraft shelters and paving of a secondary runway at Masirah; a refueling apron, hydrants, and arm/disarm/power check pad at Seeb; and various logistic support facilities at Thumrait, Masirah and Seeb. For Somalia, $24 million was provided for POL storage and a pump station, extension of a quay wall, a small boat landing at Berbera port, and general purpose buildings and utilities at both Berbera port and airfield.[2]

Korea

Combined Defense Improvement Projects

(U) Host nation facilities support for U.S. forces in Korea had been assimilated into a ROK-U.S. program of Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP) as a result of discussions at the 12th Security Consultative Meeting in October 1979. Projects were identified in four categories related to peacetime, contingency, readiness/training support, and enhancement of CFC's warfighting capability. Directly related to the latter were the top five priority facilities projects: USAF A-10 deployment at Suwon, 2d Infantry Division upgrade, beddown for USMC TACAIR at Pohang and Yechon, interoperable communications (CPICK), and contingency airfield upgrade. As of 30 July 1981 there were 49 projects either completed, under construction, or being negotiated with

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1. JCS 022034Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 19 Dec 86.
2. J443 HistSum Mar 81 (U); J442 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 15 Mar 82, Subj: Facilities Initiatives for Kenya, Oman and Somalia (U), DECL 15 Mar 88.

funding requirements totaling approximately $982 and $1,000 million, respectively, for U.S. and ROK needs programmed from 1980 through 1986.[1]

Aircraft Beddown

~~(S)~~ Although USAF and USMC beddown facilities were top priorities of the CDIP, construction at all three bases continued to slip in 1981 due to economic and political conditions. A target completion date of March 1982 had been established for the A-10 beddown at Suwon, however, by 1 November 1981 only 25 percent of the construction had been completed. Moreover, design was incomplete due to major errors and omissions. At Pohang and Yechon, construction was only 40 percent although completion was scheduled for the end of 1982. Design was being reviewed as construction progressed, but little or no work was being done because funds had been diverted to the Suwon project. To make matters worse, the interim facilities slated for use by the Marines at Taegu (pending completion of Pohang and Yechon) would be preempted by the A-10s because of the construction slippage at Suwon.[2]

Japan

Host Nation Funded Construction

(U) There were two major construction programs for U.S. Forces Japan totally funded by the Government of Japan (GOJ): the Integrated Relocation Construction Program (IRCP) and the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP). The IRCP resulted from the reduction and consolidation of facilities in Japan (including Okinawa) since 1972 and was based on a quid pro quo concept. Therefore, although new replacement facilities were received, there was no net gain of additional space. Most of the projects identified in this $1.1 billion program had been completed by 1981 through continued GOJ funding ranging from $100 to $130 million per year. The FIP was a Japanese initiative begun in 1977 as a means of sharing costs for maintaining U.S. forces in Japan. It was anticipated that as the IRCP diminished, the GOJ would increase FIP funding commensurately. The long-term U.S. objective was to encourage the Japanese to share costs of O&M, operational and support facilities construction, environmental improvements, joint use facilities, and housing and local national workforce costs.[3]

Integrated Relocation Construction Program

(U) COMUS Japan forwarded the proposed Integrated Relocation Construction Program for JFY 82 on 25 March 1981 for CINCPAC endorsement. It did not have

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1. J419 Point Paper ~~(S),~~ 30 Jul 81, Subj: Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP) (U), DECL 30 Jul 1987.
2. J441 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 13 Jan 88.
3. J441 HistSum Dec 81; CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 272-274.

an estimate of costs for individual line items for several reasons: the Diet had not yet approved the JFY 81 request and so some projects might be carried over into JFY 82; the fluctuation of the yen/dollar exchange rate; and many desired projects were in the early stages of program definition. The list of 17 projects was divided into four groups, and projects were predominantly those having the top priority which were to be initiated with JFY 81 funds. There was only one Group IV project (these did not have to compete with the other groups for general account funding). It was relocation of the Defense Communications System in the Kanto Plan to a new consolidated facility at Yokota. The total proposal was estimated at $100 million or about 125 percent of the anticipated JFY 82 budget. CINCPAC recommended approval on 22 April and ASD MRA&L concurrence followed on 7 May 1981.[1]

Facilities Improvement Program

JFY 81

(U) On 2 April 1981 the Japanese Diet approved the JFY 81 Facilities Improvement Program. The list of projects generally coincided with the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) program as derived from the approved USFJ integrated proposal. Some project scopes were changed, but they would still fall within the multi-year construction concept. The approved program included 26 construction items with an estimated cost of ¥32.7 billion. This was a 20 percent increase over the JFY 80 FIP. Ten of the line items were bachelor or family housing related, three were environmental, and the remainder were miscellaneous support and utilities. For the first time, operational support projects, such as hardened aircraft shelters at Kadena AB, and aircraft fuel hydrant systems were included but for site investigation and design only.[2]

JFY 82

~~(C)~~ On 8 May 1981 COMUS Japan, as the designated DOD single point of contact in Japan, forwarded the coordinated joint facilities requirements list for the JFY 82 FIP. Its formulation was based on Diet approval of the JFY 81 FIP. Other considerations were continued emphasis on troop and family housing, additional operational projects, and previous years' multi-year FIP projects. Also a 50 percent increase over the JFY 81 FIP was sought for additional projects.[3]

~~(C)~~ After receiving Service component concurrences, CINCPAC endorsed the COMUS Japan proposal to the ASD MRA&L on 22 May. The message incorporated CINCPACFLT's concern for more emphasis on the housing at Ikego Navy Ammunition

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1. J441 HistSum Mar 81 (U); COMUSJ 250155Z Mar 81 (U); CINCPAC 220509Z Apr 81 (U).
2. J441 Point Paper (U), 21 Oct 81, Subj: Host Nation Funded Construction - Japan; J442 HistSums Jan, Apr 81 (U).
3. J441 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 1 Jul 86.

Depot. (For two years, funding had only covered GOJ expenses to conduct project studies.) CINCPAC recommended that, in view of the critical need, the State and Defense Departments express concern to the GOJ, perhaps via the Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee XIII meeting, over the lack of tangible evidence that the GOJ was proceeding with providing family housing at Ikego. The JFY 82 proposal was approved by the ASD MRA&L on 11 June.[1]

~~(S)~~ For several years the Marine Corps had felt slighted in regard to provisions for adequate bachelor and family housing in Japan, particularly in Okinawa. In February 1980 the Commandant of the Marine Corps (General Barrow) had called Admiral Long's attention to the fact that 20,000 Marine Corps personnel were in Japan, representing half of the total U.S. military population in Japan, and 95 percent of them lived in substandard quarters.[2]

~~(S)~~ Again in October 1981 General Barrow wrote to Admiral Long requesting assistance in support of the Marines. In addition to expressing concern with a lack of progress in USMC TACAIR beddown in Korea, he noted that the same substandard housing conditions in Japan and Okinawa still pertained with only 13 percent of JFY 82 FIP funding slated for Marines. At the time, the housing deficit on Okinawa was 1,758 units with FIP plans for 200 new units to be added each year through 1992. The Commandant subsequently identified a requirement for 4,280 additional housing units on Okinawa and 421 at Iwakuni in Japan, due to planned increases in the number of accompanied billets. These requirements would add a minimum of 400 additional units per year to FIP planning.[3]

~~(S)~~ Admiral Long's response provided General Barrow with a copy of COMUS Japan's recent guidance for inputs to the JFY 83-85 multi-year FIP, which invited Service prioritization of desired projects. He further advised him of COMUS Japan efforts to coordinate development of plans with GOJ officials for the total housing requirement in Okinawa. It was hoped that the existing shortfall, plus about 500 units of the new requirement, could be satisfied by 1986 and that the remaining 2,500 units would be programmed for completion by 1992.[4]

Sanno Hotel

(U) In 1978 the GOJ had agreed to construct a replacement facility for the Sanno Hotel. During intervening years there had been problems with both the old hotel (funding and management) and the proposed replacement (location and design). Demolition and construction dates had been delayed, partially due to

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1. Ibid.
2. J442 HistSum Oct 81 (U); GEN R. H. Barrow Ltr (U), 27 Feb 80.
3. Ibid.; J44 HistSum Nov 81 (U); J441 HistSum Dec 81 (U); GEN R.H. Barrow Ltr ~~(S)~~, 1 Oct 81, Downgrade 851001; GEN R.H. Barrow Ltr (U), 31 Dec 81 to LT GEN C. L. Donnelly, Jr., COMUSJAPAN, undated; J44/Memo/10-82 (U), 1 Feb 82, Subj: Okinawa-Japan Trip Report.
4. CINCPAC Ltr of 9 Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 5 Nov 87.

demonstrations by neighbors at the new site. Finally, on 26 February 1981 a construction permit was approved and, after an injunction by the Tokyo District Court banning obstruction, construction commenced on 28 May. (It was important that construction begin prior to 1 June because otherwise further redesign would be mandatory in order to comply with recent, more stringent seismic building codes.)[1]

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ During the remainder of 1981 there were several attempts by splinter groups of the Japan Communist Party to stop construction of the Minami Azabu U.S. Military Facility--the Sanno replacement. The scheduled completion date was April 1983.[2]

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1. J441 HistSums Feb, May 81 (U).
2. Ibid.; J441 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C/NF)~~; DECL 13 Jan 88.

CHAPTER VI

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--GENERAL

Arms Transfer Funding, Policy, and Legislation

(U) Security assistance programs for FY 81 were funded under Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) until 5 June 1981. Funding for the remainder of the fiscal year was continued under the Supplemental Appropriations and Recision Act, 1981. Worldwide program authorizations were (in millions): Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits--$3,046.2; Military Assistance Program (MAP)--$170.4; International Military Education and Training (IMET)--$28.4; and Economic Support Fund (ESF)--$2,199.3.[1]

~~(C)~~ In a 3 December 1980 message to the JCS, Admiral Long had requested a "thorough high level review of security assistance policy and associated legislation." A reassessment of security assistance objectives, especially for Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, was required. There was a need for greater participation by Security Assistance Organization (SAO) personnel in offering advice and assistance to foreign military services. Recent trends in reduction of manning levels and fiscal resources should be reversed. Also needed were initiatives which could relieve certain cumbersome and unresponsive aspects of the administrative requirements of FMS. Among these were long procurement lead times and absorption of certain unanticipated, additional costs by purchasing nations. CINCPAC recommended the establishment of a stock fund to allow the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) or the Military Services to purchase selected end items, ammunition, and spare parts in anticipation of foreign sales in order to reduce lead times of several years. The CINCPAC initiative was supported by the Army Chief of Staff, CINCPACAF, and USCINCSO. The Chairman of the JCS shared these concerns and advised that steps toward a major review were underway.[2]

~~(C)~~ President Reagan's election and inauguration portended a major shift in U.S. security assistance policy and direction. In April 1981 Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology James Buckley announced the Administration was revising the arms transfer policy to make it more responsive to the new security challenges the United States was facing and to make it more supportive of military, political, and economic interests. Detailed guidance would follow. Meanwhile, provisions of a 31 August 1977 State

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1. PACOM Security Assistance Activities Bulletin (SAAB) No. 39 (U), 28 Jun 81; FY 83 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD), pp. 3-4 (U).
2. CINCPAC 032253Z Dec 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 3 Dec 86; JCS 112000Z Dec 80 (U); SSO DA 192200Z Dec 80 (U)(BOM); CINCPACAF 070410Z Jan 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 29 Dec 86; USCINCSO 021945Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 2 Feb 87.

Department message were rescinded. (This message had become known as the "Leprosy Letter." In his 19 May 1977 statement of conventional arms transfer policy, President Carter had directed that "U.S. Embassies and military elements will not promote or assist in the promotion of arms sales without specific authorization." State Department implementing guidance significantly curtailed Country Team assistance to and contact with U.S. commercial firms selling defense articles and services abroad. There were also significant changes to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations which required "policy level authorization by the Department of State for actions by agents of the U.S. or private manufacturers, which might promote the sale of arms." See CINCPAC Command History 1977, Vol. II, pp. 286-287.)[1]

(U) In presenting the FY 82 security assistance budget request to various Congressional subcommittees during March 1981, State Department officials described a sound strategic posture in East Asia and the Pacific as an essential element of U.S. global strength. The special needs in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Burma, and Korea were reflected by proposed increases in FMS and IMET funding, and for the first time in an East Asian country, Thailand was to be offered direct credits at a concessionary rate.[2]

~~(C)~~ As some of the new policies were being developed, in May CINCPAC again provided his specific recommendations on arms policy constraints which should be changed and those which should be retained. Among the former he listed incorporation of the Administration's view that security assistance was a component of a global security posture and a key foreign policy instrument (not an "exceptional foreign policy implement" as under President Carter). References to a ceiling on arms transfers should be eliminated in future policy and legislation. Development or modification of advanced weapons systems solely for export should be permitted. Coproduction of significant weapons, equipment, or major components should be allowed on a case-by-case basis, but restrictions on sale of such items to third countries should remain. The U.S. Government should be more forthcoming, through SAOs, in providing planning data to host nations, and the SAO advisory role should be expanded.[3]

(U) A Presidential statement signed on 8 July 1981 was in direct contrast to President Carter's arms transfer limitations set forth in Presidential Determination 13 of 13 May 1977. Henceforth, the transfer of conventional arms and other defense articles and services was to be an essential element of the U.S. global strategy of collective security and also an indispensable component of U.S. foreign policy. Significant extracts of the statement follow:[4]

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1. SECSTATE 84780/031259Z Apr 81 (U) and 207984/310241Z Aug 77 ~~(C)~~, GDS.
2. Dept of State Bulletin, Vol. 81, No. 2050, May 81, pp. 26-29 (U).
3. CINCPAC 090031Z & 090032Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 23 Apr & 31 Mar 87.
4. J453 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Sep 87; SECSTATE 180189/100002Z Jul 81(U).

> The United States cannot defend the Free World's interests alone. The United States must, in today's world, not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms and other forms of security assistance. Such transfers complement American security commitments and serve important United States objectives.
>
> The United States therefore views the transfer of conventional arms and other defense articles and services as an essential element of its global defense posture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy.
>
> This Administration will tailor its approach to arms transfer requests to specific situations and exercise sufficient flexibility to respond promptly to changes affecting the mutual interests of the United States and its allies and friends. All requests will be considered on a case-by-case basis . . . . The policy changes being initiated should not be seen as heralding a period of unrestrained military transfers.

~~(C)~~ Implementation guidance from the State Department followed. Embassy posts and [security assistance] agencies, including CINCPAC, were to:[1]

- Assist friendly governments, upon request, in the identification and analysis of security threats, military capabilities, and requirements.

- Encourage mid- and long-range projections (3 to 10 years) of military capabilities and requirements.

- With prior authorization from Washington, encourage consideration or acquisition of capabilities which would best support mutual defense cooperation objectives.

- Promote prompt U.S. response to inquiries and requests, as well as the timely and efficient execution of agreed programs.

~~(C)~~ The guidance allowed "evenhanded assistance to representatives of U.S. defense industries" and, with the consent of the Chiefs of Mission, the use of military-to-military channels to exchange information that could lead to requests for equipment by the host government. However, emphasis should be placed on the importance of respecting U.S. delivery schedules and reluctance to make diversions from its own forces to meet foreign government requests. The guidance also prescribed a request justification format, including (but not emphasizing) relevant human rights considerations that might bear on proposed transfers. It required that unified commands be information addressees on

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1. J453 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Sep 87; SECSTATE 206260/050218Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 7/23/87.

specific requests for planning and review (P&R), price and availability (P&A) data, letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs), as well as requests for coassembly or coproduction.[1]

~~(C)~~ Inasmuch as the State Department guidance did not delineate the role of the unified commander, the CINCPAC Security Assistance Policy Division confirmed with the OJCS that no change was anticipated in the recently promulgated Defense Department Directive 5132.3, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance. A revision of CINCPAC Instruction C5050.14C, Release of Advanced Technology and Weapons within PACOM, which incorporated portions of the new Administration guidelines, was published on 6 January 1982.[2]

(U) Two principal legislative actions late in 1981 which would effect a number of changes in security assistance policies and procedures in the Pacific Command, as well as worldwide, were the International Security and Development Cooperation Act (ISDCA) of 1981 (PL 97-113) and the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1982 (PL 97-121). Both acts were passed by the Congress on 16 December and signed by the President on 29 December 1981. Under the latter, FY 82 worldwide security assistance authorized program levels were (in $ millions): FMS credits--3,083.5; MAP--269.2; IMET--38.5; ESF--2,564. Direct credit for Thailand was not included.[3]

(U) Among the major changes in security assistance programs was an increase in the dollar thresholds on Foreign Military Sales, direct commercial sales, and third country transfers which had to be reported to Congress. The levels were raised from $7 to $14 million for major defense equipment sales, leases, and transfers, and from $25 to $50 million for overall sales, leases, and transfers. The formal notification period for FMS and third country transfers to NATO, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan was reduced from 30 to 15 days. A previous ceiling of $100 million on commercial sales of major defense equipment was eliminated. A special defense acquisition fund was authorized as a mechanism for procuring critical, long-lead-time articles and services. Authorization for this revolving fund was capitalized at $300 million for FY 82 and $600 million for FY 83; however, funding was not appropriated. Lease and loan of defense articles would be governed directly by the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act rather than under 22 U.S.C. Title 10, and full reimbursement would be required for all but specifically exempted cases. Members of NATO, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan would be exempt from Congressional review requirements.[4]

(U) There were also changes in overseas management policy. For FY 82 and FY 83, security assistance organizations (SAOs) in 12 countries, including 4 in

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1. Ibid.
2. J454 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 11 Jan 88.
3. Extract from Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Newsletter (U), 18 Jan 82; PL 97-113 (U); FY 83 CPD (U).
4. Ibid.

PACOM (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand), were authorized manning in excess of the standard level of 6 U.S. military personnel. Also, the number of military security assistance personnel who could be attached to a Defense Attache Office was expanded from 6 to 12. No longer would there be a requirement for a Presidential Determination, as in the case of Bangladesh, to permit defense attaches to perform security assistance functions, and previous legislative restrictions on such performance were eliminated. SAO personnel were prohibited from encouraging, promoting, or influencing the purchase by any foreign country of U.S. manufactured military equipment unless specifically so instructed by an appropriate official of the Executive Branch. However, the ISDCA expanded the functions SAOs were authorized to perform from four to seven as listed below. But the ISDCA retained the provision for detailing non-SAO personnel for limited periods to perform specific training. The seven functions were:[1]

- Equipment and services case management
- Training management
- Program monitoring
- Evaluation and planning of the host government's military capabilities and requirements
- Administrative support
- Promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability, and other defense cooperation measures with NATO, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan
- Liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance.

(U) Of particular interest to CINCPAC was a special provision of the ISDCA pertaining to Pakistan. Previously Pakistan could only purchase equipment and services on a cash basis. Further, as a country involved in nuclear reprocessing transfers under terms of the Symington amendment, it could not receive FMS credit. Under PL 97-113 the President could waive the restriction for Pakistan if "he determines that to do so is in the national interest of the United States." The waiver authority was limited to 6 years, expiring on 30 September 1987.[2]

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1. Ibid.; (See also CINCPAC Command History 1977, Vol II, p. 287, and 1978, Vol. II, p. 375.)
2. Ibid.

FY 1981 PACOM COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(in thousands of dollars)

	FMS Credit			MAP (Grant Materiel)			IMETP (Grant Training)		
Country	Proposed	Allocated	Expended[a]	Proposed	Allocated	Expended[a]	Proposed	Allocated	Expended[a]
Bangladesh							139	164	131
Burma							31	31	31
India							498	300	4
Indonesia	30,000	30,000	30,000	550	342[b]	417[b]	1,989	1,630	1,823
Korea	175,000	160,000	161,500		360[b]	141[b]	1,491	1,200	1,096
Malaysia	10,000	10,000	10,000				333	300	300
Nepal							40	50	63
Papua New Guinea									8
Philippines	50,000	50,000	50,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	694	580	591
Singapore									7
Sri Lanka							49	60	80
Taiwan					10[c]	10[c]			
Thailand	50,000	50,000	53,400	467	95[b]	359[b]	891	770	795
Totals	315,000	300,000	304,900	26,017	25,807	25,927	6,155	5,085	4,929

a. Continuing Resolution Authority levels.
b. Wind-up costs under Section 516(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act, including supply operations.
c. Supply operations only for delivery of previously MAP-funded materiel. The grant MAP for Taiwan ended in FY 75.

SOURCE: Proposed, FY 81 CPD; Allocation, FY 82 CPD; Expended, FY 83 CPD.

PACOM COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
(in thousands of dollars)

Country	FMS Credit			MAP (Grant Materiel)			IMETP (Grant Training)		
	Expended FY 81[a]	Allocated FY 82	Proposed FY 83	Expended FY 81[a]	Allocated FY 82	Proposed FY 83	Expended FY 81[a]	Allocated FY 82	Proposed FY 83
Bangladesh							131	175	225
Burma							31	150	200
Fiji									55
India							4	80	200
Indonesia	30,000	40,000	50,000	417[b]	123[b]	100	1,823	2,200	2,625
Korea	161,500	166,000	210,000	141[b]	60[b]	50	1,096	1,400	1,850
Malaysia	10,000	10,000	12,500				300	500	850
Nepal							63	75	75
Pakistan			275,000					600	800
Papua New Guinea							8	20	20
Philippines	50,000	50,000	50,000	25,000	456[b]	750	591	1,000	1,300
Singapore							7	50	50
Sri Lanka		2,000					80	100	150
Taiwan				10[c]	10[c]				
Thailand	53,400	62,500	91,000[d]	359[b]	4,536	50	795	1,450	2,200
Totals	304,900	330,500	688,500[d]	25,927	5,185	950	4,929	7,800	10,600

a. Continuing Resolution Authority levels.
b. Wind-up costs under Section 516(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act, including supply operations.
c. Supply operations only for delivery of previously MAP-funded materiel. The grant MAP for Taiwan ended in FY 75.
d. Includes $50 million in Direct FMS Credit for FY 83 authorized for Thailand.

SOURCE: FY 83 Congressional Presentation Document.

Reporting Requirements

(U) Under procedures instituted in July 1978, two security assistance reports were submitted by Country Teams to the State Department with information copies to OSD, the JCS, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and unified commanders. The first, an Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA), was a prioritized listing of MAP, FMS financing, and IMET funding and manning levels. The second was an annual Consolidated Data Report (CDR) for updating AIASA information in preparation for the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD). On 2 May 1981 CINCPAC was apprised of new State Department guidance for the preparation of the AIASA and that no country MAP programs were included in the FY 82 budget request.[1]

FY 83 Funding

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC comments to the JCS on 26 June on the FY 83 AIASA submissions gave prioritized listings for FMS credit, IMETP, and MAP for PACOM countries. Also included were the CINCPAC recommended program and manning levels. CINCPAC was generally supportive of Country Team recommendations, and additional dollar level figures were carefully developed for the Singapore and Nepal IMETPs to fill a void in the country submissions. Even though there were no legislative provisions for MAP after 1981, CINCPAC concurred with the Country Team in requesting at least $20 million in MAP funds for the Philippines. Pakistan was not included in the listing because sufficient information regarding the projected U.S.-Pakistan security relationship for the FY 82-83 time-frame was not available and the Pakistan SA package was under discussion in Washington.[2]

~~(C)~~ Significant among CINCPAC comments on FY 83 CDR submissions were support for: expedited action on a determination to allow the Defense Attache Office in Bangladesh to perform security assistance functions; minimal FMS financing for Burma and Fiji; $20 million in MAP and an increase in the IMET level to $2 million for the Philippines. Additionally, if redistribution in the FY 82 budget was not assured for Sri Lanka's acquistion of an ocean-going tug, then $2.2 million in FMS financing was recommended to assure its acquisition in FY 83; and for Thailand, an IMET level of $2.5 million and FMS credit of $100 million. Recommendations on manning levels varied little from those authorized for FY 82.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 377-378; SECSTATE 114026/021353Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 5/1/87.
2. J453 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 Jul 87; CINCPAC 260309Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Jun 87.
3. CINCPAC 020322Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 23 Nov 87.

PACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FY 1982 BUDGET--ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (IN THOUSANDS)
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1981

ORGANIZATION	CINCPAC MAE FUNDED	FOREIGN ASST ADMIN SERVICES	MILITARY DEPT SUPPORT	TOTAL U.S. COSTS	HOST COUNTRY COSTS		GRAND TOTAL
					ASSISTANCE IN KIND	CONTRIBUTED CURRENCY	
HQ CINCPAC	$ 575.0	$ 0	$ 1,072.3	$ 1,647.3	$ 0	$ 0	$ 1,647.3
DAO AFGHANISTAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DAO AUSTRALIA	19.2	5.9	66.0	91.1	0	0	91.1
DAO BANGLADESH	11.7	.2	0	11.9	0	0	11.9
DAO BURMA	13.8	1.2	0	15.0	0	0	15.0
ODC INDIA	154.9	31.4	79.1	265.4	0	0	265.4
OMADP INDONESIA	950.0	384.7	641.7	1,976.4	0	0	1,976.4
MDAO JAPAN	952.9	35.9	256.9	1,245.7	89.1	(441.8)*	1,334.8
JUSMAG KOREA	4,587.6	51.0	4,640.4	9,279.0	852.6	(3,301.0)*	10,131.6
DAO MALAYSIA	38.6	.5	40.9	80.0	0	0	80.0
DAO NEPAL	12.3	.2	0	12.5	0	0	12.5
DAO NEW ZEALAND	4.9	0	0	4.9	0	0	4.9
ODR PAKISTAN	281.0	93.6	277.0	651.6	0	0	651.6
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES	636.8	18.6	1,181.4	1,836.8	836.3	0	2,673.1
DAO SINGAPORE	29.8	15.0	21.7	66.5	0	0	66.5
DAO SRI LANKA	14.7	.2	0	14.9	0	0	14.9
JUSMAG THAILAND	1,287.6	83.8	1,471.7	2,843.1	1,572.8	0	4,415.9
TOTAL	$ 9,570.8	$ 722.2	$ 9,749.1	$ 20,042.1	$ 3,350.8	$ (3,742.8)*	$ 23,392.9

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 28, REVW 13 Feb 02.

* *Contributed currency is paid directly to the U.S. Government to offset U.S. costs and, therefore, is a non-add item.*

FY 81 Manning and C-12 Aircraft

(U) In March 1980 the Secretary of Defense had provided guidance concerning overseas SAOs and C-12 aircraft and requested development and submission of manning levels (JMPs) for FY 81. With the trend of reducing the U.S. presence overseas, the Carter Administration had decided upon a worldwide level of 646 U.S. military and civilian personnel--the lowest ever since the inception of the U.S. security assistance program. Additionally, SAOs and Defense Attache Offices were to be consolidated in 12 countries, and C-12 support aircraft would be reduced from 27 to 21 with most being placed under the single management control of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As a result, the only countries in PACOM which would have C-12s were Indonesia (2), Pakistan (1), the Philippines (1), and Thailand (2). Separate SAOs were proposed for 37 countries with only 12 of these being authorized more than 6 U.S. military personnel. In 43 additional countries it was proposed that the DAO perform SA functions (in 30 of these it was already being done). Defense attaches in Nepal, New Zealand, and Afghanistan were vested with SA responsibilities but were not augmented by U.S. military or civilian billets. Authorized manning levels for PACOM SAOs and SA augmentees to DAOs proposed in the FY 81 CPD were as shown below. Figures in parentheses reflect subsequent changes authorized by the Secretary of Defense.[1]

	Military	U.S.Civilians	Local Civilians	Total
Australia	2	0	0	2
India	2	1	4	7
Indonesia	26 (15)	3	16	45 (34)
Japan	6	6	5	17
Korea	102 (125)	28 (38)	50	180 (213)
Malaysia	1	0	0	1
Pakistan	6 (5)	1	7 (8)	14 (14)
Philippines	23 (27)	3 (5)	4	30 (36)
Singapore	1	1	0	2
Thailand	30 (32)	4 (5)	17	51 (54)

(U) In PACOM, DAOs would continue to perform security assistance functions in Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Although manning proposals might change as a result of Congressional action, unified commanders, in coordination with Chiefs of Mission, were to develop FY 81 JMPs in accordance with JCS Memorandum of Policy 173 for submission to the OJCS by 1 August 1980.[2]

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1. SECDEF 262249Z Mar 80 (U); J454 Point Paper (U), 11 Jan 82, Subj: PACOM Security Assistance Manpower Authorizations.
2. Ibid.

FY 82 Manpower Proposals

~~(C)~~ After receiving comments from his SAOs regarding FY 82 manpower proposals, on 23 July 1980 CINCPAC responded to a Defense message by stating that further reductions below the FY 81 levels would be "inimical to our national interests. The annual manpower reductions of PACOM SAOs have contributed to negative perceptions held by our regional allies and friends regarding the credibility of U.S. commitment to remain a Pacific power." On 29 July 1981 CINCPAC restated his position to the JCS on security assistance manning levels for inclusion in the FY 82 CPD. Four local wage rate (LWR) billets from Korea would be realigned within PACOM (2 to Indonesia, 1 to Bangladesh, and 1 to Malaysia). Seven additional LWR billets were also requested. The following chart reflects a comparison of the CINCPAC 29 July request with the manning authorized by the ISDCA of 1981 (PL 97-113) and forwarded to all concerned by the Secretary of Defense on 7 January 1982.[1]

Country/Type SAO	U.S.Military CINCPAC/Auth	U.S.Civilian CINCPAC/Auth	Local National CINCPAC/Auth	Total CINCPAC/Auth
Australia (FMS Sec.)	2/ 2	0/ 0	0/ 0	2/ 2
Bangladesh (DATT)			1	1
Burma (DATT)	0/ 0	0/ 0	1/ 1	1/ 1
India (ODC)	2/ 2	1/ 1	4/ 4	7/ 7
Indonesia (OMADP)	15/ 15	3/ 3	21/18	39/ 36
Japan (MDAO)	8/ 6	6/ 6	6/ 5	20/ 17
Korea (JUSMAG)	126/126	38/38	50/46	214/210
Malaysia (DATT)	1/ 1	1/ 1	0/ 1	2/ 3
Pakistan (ODR)	5/ 5	1/ 1	8/ 8	14/ 14
Philippines (JUSMAG)	27/ 27	5/ 5	4/ 4	36/ 36
Singapore (DATT)	1/ 1	1/ 1	0/ 0	2/ 2
Sri Lanka (DATT)	1/ 0	0/ 0	1/ 1	2/ 1
Thailand (JUSMAG)	33/ 32	5/ 5	17/17	55/ 54
Total	221/217	61/61	112/106	394/384

JUSMAG Korea Manning

(U) The JUSMAG Korea manning authorized by the Secretary of Defense for FY 81 resulted in reductions of 28 military and 10 civilian spaces from FY 80 levels. The JUSMAG outlined the directed reductions in the FY 81 JMP submission and began reducing strength through attrition of military members and a phased reduction of civilian employees. During February and March a CINCPAC manpower

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1. CINCPAC 230410Z Jul 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 17 Jul 86; J454 HistSum, Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 11 Jan 88; CINCPAC 292231Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 15 Jun 87; SECDEF 072217Z Jan 82 (U); J454 Point Paper (U), 11 Jan 82, Subj: PACOM Security Assistance Manpower Authorizations.

review team visited JUSMAG Korea and validated manning at 117 military and 30 civilian (U.S.) spaces. In July the JUSMAG, with Country Team support, sought reinstatement of manning authorizations to the FY 80 levels. A CINCPAC reevaluation in July supported increases to 126 military and 38 civilians. In September the JCS authorized 125 military and 38 civilian spaces. With the passage of the FY 82 security assistance legislation in December, the FY 82 authorized levels were 126 military, 38 U.S. civilians, and 46 local wage rate employees. Recommendations are outlined below:[1]

		U.S. Military	U.S. Civilian	Local Wage Rate
FY 80	Authorization	130	38	40
Mar 81	SECDEF/(DSAA)	102	28	40
Mar	CINCPAC J1 manpower survey	117	30	50
Mar	Chief JUSMAG request	130	38	50
Apr	State Department CPD	126	38	50
Jul	CINCPAC	130	38	50
Sep	OJCS	125	38	50
Dec	FY 82 authorization (PL 97-113)	126	38	46

PACOM Security Assistance Conference

(U) The annual PACOM Security Assistance Conference was held 27 to 29 October 1981 at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. Among the attendees were senior representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, Military Departments, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), U.S. European Command, Army War College, Air Force Institute of Technology, Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), Navy International Logistics Control Office, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), American Institute in Taiwan, CINCPAC staff, PACOM component commands and security assistance organizations. The conference chairman was LT GEN Robert W. Sennewald, USA, Deputy CINCPAC/Chief of Staff. The keynote speaker was Mr. Richard M. Ogden, State Department Director of Security Assistance/Sales, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Country perspectives were presented by the respective security assistance chiefs.[2]

(U) The pervading theme of the conference was implementation of the new Administration's arms transfer policy. While recognizing that further guidance and legislative direction would be forthcoming, the conferees discussed ways

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1. J462 HistSums Mar, Apr, Jul 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL Aug 87; J454 Point Paper (U), 11 Jan 82, Subj: PACOM Security Assistance Manpower Authorizations; CINCPAC PEG Report, Korea FY 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 87, p. II-2.
2. PACOM Security Assistance Activities Bulletin (SAAB), No. 41 (U), 19 Jan 82; J454 HistSums Oct, Dec 81 (U).

and means of achieving closer coordination among State, Defense, the JCS, Military Departments, and PACOM components on arms sales and necessary legislative changes to expand the SAO role in areas related to security assistance. Some of the specific needs expressed at the conference were:[1]

- Development of a security assistance strategy supportive of U.S. global, regional, and specific country objectives which would consider U.S. military, political, and economic realities.

- Improvement of interagency communication between the State and Defense Departments on policy and implementation in order to present a unified U.S. Government position to PACOM nations.

- Redefinition of the SAO role in relationships with host countries.

- A change to the State Department policy that release of P&R data constituted a U.S. commitment. This could expedite the release of pricing data and enhance host country budgetary planning processes.

- Development of a timely, advance notification system for IMET program levels or provide multi-year funding authorization to preclude embarrassment to the United States when CRA caused IMETP student cancellation and/or delay.

(U) Other conference recommendations included routine distribution to SAOs of lists of sales permits and licenses issued to commercial firms and when feasible, elimination of recovery costs on MAP items and asset use charges for FMS sales from stock.

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar

(U) The tenth Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS), sponsored by CINCPAC, was hosted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Manila from 4 to 8 May 1981. The conference theme was "Logistics Enhancement through Knowledge Shared." Participants included representatives from Australia, Bangladesh, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States and observers from Indonesia and Japan. Philippine Minister of Energy Geronimo Z. Velasco, Deputy Minister of National Defense Isabelo R. Castro, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Romeo C. Espino were among the host officials who addressed the seminar. Two other high-level officials who made presentations were Air Vice Marshal Ernest M. Carroll, RAAF, the Australian Department of Defence Chief of Supply, and General Bryce Poe, III, USAF, Commander, AFLC. In addition to CINCPAC staff members, other U.S. representation included the Defense Logistics Agency, OJCS, Air Force Systems Command, USASAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. J451 HistSums May, Jul 81 (U).

(U) In his summary of proceedings, the CINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance noted the accomplishments of the seminar, especially a major change in its direction. Whereas previous sessions had been successful in establishing communication links and the necessary working relationships among logisticians, this one produced substantive results. Feasibility of consolidated procurement could be studied with the exchange of budget cycle data, and there was an initiative for a consolidated shipment of ammunition. Participating nations would be provided a summary of changes to U.S. FMS legislation and policy and a better definition of technical data packages.[1]

Pacific Area Consolidated Ammunition Ship

(U) As noted above, one of the initiatives developed by PASOLS representatives was support for a consolidated shipment of ammunition procured from the United States under FMS to nine participating nations. It was believed that consolidation of shipments could reduce shipping costs and improve responsiveness. Trial of the concept was predicated upon several factors: availability of a Military Sealift Command vessel as early as January 1982 to test the concept; identification of a single manager to coordinate consolidation of ammunition shipments; establishment of an interim trans-shipment point for member nation pickup of ammunition in the Asia-Pacific region; and development and transmittal of a detailed proposal for the shipment to participating nations.[2]

(U) As an implementing step, on 30 May CINCPAC sent a message to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, Service headquarters and concerned security assistance and transportation agencies which outlined the concept, gave tentative milestones, and proposed a conference of interested agencies in July to effect final coordination. An 18 June response from the Secretary of Defense (DSAA) agreed in the merit of the proposal and asked the Department of the Army to confirm its feasibility and to address any exceptions to existing policy that might be required. This action deferred the proposed coordinating conference pending the Army response.[3]

(U) From 24 to 28 August a CINCPAC representative visited the U.S. Army Security Assistance Center to determine the status of the Army's feasibility study and to expedite its completion. Among reservations expressed by the USASAC were the possible appearance of competition by the Defense Transportation Service with commercial shipping and the difficulty of projecting ammunition procurement lead times. The CINCPAC representative also contacted a commercial freight forwarder who had experience in consolidated ammunition shipments to request estimated shipping costs. Indications were that costs would be comparable to those of a military shipment.[4]

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1. J451 HistSum Jul 81 (U); Final Report of Proceedings, Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (4-8 May 1981) (U).
2. J451 HistSum Jun 81 (U).
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 300301Z May 81 (U); SECDEF 182130Z Jun 81 (U).
4. J451 HistSum Oct 81 (U).

(U) In a 1 October letter to the Department of the Army, the USASAC attributed the delayed response to changes in tariff, ship per diem, and port handling rates. The letter requested acceptance, approval, and implementation of the study recommendations, including notification of the nine member nations of the provisions under which the test shipment could be made and the test results. Further, it requested waiver by the DSAA of the requirement for use of commercial ships to transport FMS purchases; detailed monitoring of costs and transit times; and that the U.S. Army attempt to expedite existing FMS ammunition requirements to generate additional tonnage for member nations on the proposed shipment. The status of the test shipment was conveyed to six of the member nations attending the November meeting of the PASOLS Project Development Group.[1]

(U) On 9 December CINCPAC requested a DSAA ruling on the USASAC recommendation for a test shipment. Even though it was too late for a January sailing date, CINCPAC noted that such a test would serve two valuable purposes--provide a baseline cost comparison for commercial consolidated shipments and reaffirm U.S. interest in working with friends and allies to meet their legitimate defense needs. A response was received from the Department of the Army on 28 December. The message directed the USASAC to expand the study to include Air Force and Navy ammunition, as well as Army ammunition, for all countries under consideration. In addition, the study should incorporate the view of all three Services and certain funding and production schedule considerations.[2]

PASOLS Project Development Group

(U) The fifth Project Development Group meeting sponsored by CINCPAC was conducted in Wellington, New Zealand, from 16 to 20 November 1981 and was chaired by Air Commodore Stuart McIntyre, RNZAF, Assistant Chief of the New Zealand Defence Staff. Representatives from Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States attended. Among the conference topics were U.S. presentations on changes in FMS legislation, the exchange of information on equipment declared as excess by member nations, and the consolidated ammunition test shipment. Additionally, the Australian and New Zealand representatives agreed to examine alternatives to combine ammunition shipments bilaterally without U.S. assistance, and other interested countries agreed to attempt consolidation of shipments by directing their freight forwarders to work through a common commercial shipper.[3]

Phase IV Security Assistance Training

(U) Three members of the CINCPAC Security Assistance Policy Division conducted Phase IV training for U.S. and host country personnel at security

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1. Ibid.; USASAC Ltr (U), 1 Oct 81, Subj: Pacific Area Consolidated Ammunition Ship; J454 HistSum Nov 81 (U).
2. J454 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 092230Z Dec 81 (U); DA 281505Z Dec 81 (U).
3. J454 HistSums Nov, Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 092230Z Dec 81 (U).

assistance offices in six PACOM countries during the period 11 January to 16 February 1981. The training consisted of both formal classes and deskside working sessions in 12 FMS, seven IMET, and other requested subject areas. While in Bangkok, a special briefing and discussion session was held for the Thai Supreme Headquarters Chief of Staff, the Thai Service commanders, the chiefs of logistics, and comptrollers, 20 senior officers from various military disciplines, and the Chief JUSMAG Thailand, plus eight of his staff officers.[1]

Country Visited	IMET		FMS		Total
	US/LWR	Observer	US/LWR	Observer	
Japan	0	0	4	27	31
Korea	2	7	7	26	42
Philippines	2	14	2	12	30
Malaysia	1	11	1	12	25
Pakistan	2	5	5	10	22
Thailand	3	9	7	9	28
Total:	10	46	26	96	178

PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop

(U) The annual Pacific Command Tri-Service Training Workshop was held at the U.S. Naval Reserve Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, from 16 to 20 March 1981. Attending were 68 training representatives from the Defense Security Assistance Agency, Military Departments, security assistance support agencies, component commands, and PACOM security assistance organizations. The workshop confirmed each PACOM country's fiscal year 1982-83 IMET and FMS training requirements. In addition, legislative changes to tuition pricing and training issues were clarified during briefings and panel sessions.[2]

Terms of Reference

~~(C)~~ Terms of Reference (TOR) for security assistance organizations in the PACOM had not been revised since 1976. In compliance with DOD Directive 5132.3, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance, CINCPAC on 26 February 1981 submitted current TORs, which had been coordinated with Country Teams, for SAOs in Australia, Burma, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. TORs for the remaining countries in PACOM would be forwarded later. On 28 August the JCS advised that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) had interpreted the directive as eliminating the requirement for specific terms of reference for SAOs. Further, that if additional instructions were found necessary, consideration should be given to inclusion as mission, functions, and organizational

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1. J455 HistSum Feb 81 (U).
2. J457 HistSums Mar, Apr 81 (U).

statements in the joint manpower programs for the countries concerned. Therefore, the TORs were not published as part of CINCPAC Instruction S3020.2 during 1981 even though a CINCPAC IG team had made such a recommendation.[1]

ASEAN Requests

Fighter Aircraft

~~(C)~~ On 11 September 1981 the State Department reported President Reagan had decided that the F-5G or the F-16/79 should be actively promoted in appropriate countries as "a capable alternative to first-line fighter aircraft." Posts were instructed to discuss these aircraft with host government officials and encourage consideration of them as possible future replacement aircraft. However, it was to be made clear that encouragement of the F-16/79 did not extend to the "advanced" F-16/100.[2]

~~(S)~~ Shortly thereafter Ambassador Masters, the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, made Admiral Long aware of GOI knowledge concerning recent approval of F-16/100 (also known as the F-16A) sales to Pakistan and Korea. He also advised that Indonesian officials had informally expressed serious interest in a high technology fighter. They had been impressed by the Israeli use of the F-16A during the raid on the Iraqi nuclear power plant on 7 June, and probably would formally request an LOA for the F-16/100. Further, referring to a recent CINCPAC Weapons Release Review Board action on the HARPOON missile, Ambassador Masters suggested that a similar review on the F-16/100 would be appropriate. He added that the Indonesians probably would elect to purchase advanced aircraft from a third country rather than buy the F-16/79 or the F-5G. CINCPAC concurred and solicited inputs for such a review from other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Country Teams. Meanwhile the State Department advised that the request from General Yogi Supardi, Chief of the HANKAM Administrative Staff, for a decision on the F-16A was under review but no P&R data could be released at that time.[3]

~~(S)~~ The Indonesia Country Team's response portrayed current relationships with the Government of Indonesia as extremely good, but key officials were watching to see if U.S. actions matched rhetoric. It was clearly in the U.S. national interest not to deny a request for the F-16A, and any effort to turn a

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1. J454 HistSum Feb 81 (U); CINCPAC Ltr ~~(C)~~, Ser C52, 26 Feb 81, Subj: Revised Terms of Reference (TOR) (U); J454 HistSum Dec 81 (U); DASD/ISA Memo (U), I-07815/81, 10 Jul 81, Subj: Terms of Reference for Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs); JCS 282213Z Aug 81 (U); IG HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Jun 87; IG/MEMO/51-81 ~~(C)~~, 10 Jun 81, Subj: CINCPAC Deputy Inspector General Staff Visit (U), DECL 10 Jun 87.
2. SECSTATE 242885/111530Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 9/9/87.
3. AMEMB Jakarta 16133/220945Z Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-1 10/22/01; CINCPAC 311953Z & 311957Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Oct 87; SECSTATE 294628/050221Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/3/87.

request away would create serious problems and result in purchase of MIRAGE 2000 or similar aircraft. By the time the F-16As would become available, the Indonesians should be able to handle them adequately, even as they were then assimilating the F-5E/Fs.[1]

~~(C)~~ The responses from Embassies in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand were in general agreement. Although there was no urgent desire to obtain the F-16A, the countries were or would begin the planning process for replacement fighters and in all likelihood would prefer the F-16A. If it were offered to one of the five, it should be available to all. Thailand had already requested P&R data but was mindful of cost and financing considerations.[2]

~~(S)~~ A CINCPAC Weapons Release Review Board, consisting of CINCPAC staff members and representatives from Service components, convened on 16 November to consider release of the F-16A to ASEAN countries. Concerns were expressed regarding the lack of an existing threat to ASEAN which would warrant such a sophisticated and expensive system, and the possible loss of a U.S. combat advantage. Ultimately the board agreed that refusal to allow ASEAN countries an opportunity to purchase the F-16/100, vis-a-vis the F-16/79, would imply relegation of these countries to second-class status, would be an obstacle to our long-range objectives, and be counterproductive to U.S. strategy considerations.[3]

~~(S)~~ On 25 December CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that a policy in principle be established to respond positively to ASEAN country requests for the F-16/100, as well as for the F-16/79 and F-5G aircraft. Any requesting country, however, should be made fully aware of the complexities and costs involved. Admiral Long viewed unimpeded passage for U.S. and allied countries in the South China Sea as vital to national security. Similarly, maintenance of a cooperative political and economic atmosphere with ASEAN countries was vital to continued access to strategic raw materials. Moreover, tangible U.S. encouragement of modernization and self-sufficiency would demonstrate U.S. confidence and help avert the external pressures of communist expansionism in the region.[4]

HARPOON

~~(S)~~ Somewhat similar circumstances and rationale pertained to release of the HARPOON (RGM-84) surface-to-surface anti-ship missile as to the F-16A.

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1. CHUSDLG Jakarta 070203Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87; AMEMB Jakarta 16983/100254Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, RDS-4 11/9/01.
2. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 7442/120056Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/9/87; AMEMB Manila 26381/090718Z Oct (sic) 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/9/81; AMEMB Singapore 070439Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/6/87; AMEMB Bangkok 52109/091217Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/7/87.
3. J4/Memo/S852 ~~(S)~~, 14 Dec 81, Subj: Release of Fighter Aircraft to ASEAN (U), DECL 14 Dec 87.
4. J472 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; CINCPAC 250032Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 24 Dec 87.

Although the Indonesian Country Team's support and justification were not received until 28 August, a CINCPAC release review group met on 21 August to consider release of the HARPOON weapon system to Indonesia in particular, to ASEAN countries in general, and to Pakistan. The consensus of the review group was that the current and projected naval threats to Indonesia and other ASEAN countries did not justify introduction of the HARPOON into the region in the near future. (In 1980 the State Department had denied Singapore's request for the HARPOON, and the Philippines had decided against procurement because of costs, even if approved.) Subsequently, CINCPACFLT pointed out that although installation and maintenance difficulties were minimal, launching controls and targeting systems were complex. Besides, without extremely accurate navigation systems, involvement of a third platform, such as an overhead aircraft to provide targeting information to the firing platform, and sophisticated data link and/or electronic support measures, the HARPOON would lose its over-the-horizon -targeting capability and essentially be a line-of-sight surface-to-surface missile comparable to the French EXOCET.[1]

~~(S)~~ Because no formal request had been received from Indonesia and there were indications that the Indonesian Navy could not afford the HARPOON and was not interested in acquiring it, in November CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that all actions on release of HARPOON to Indonesia be held in abeyance until a formal query was received. However, Admiral Long still held that "the strategic and political arguments which favor releasing HARPOON to ASEAN nations . . . are compelling" and requested that a preliminary U.S. policy be established to provide HARPOON to requesting ASEAN countries. In response, on 7 January 1982 the JCS advised that a JCS memorandum had been forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 21 December. Release of HARPOON to ASEAN countries was supported in principle, provided certain preconditions listed below were met by the proposed recipient. The memorandum also noted other concerns and that release should not be automatically assumed. The preconditions were:[2]

- Demonstrated targeting and C^3 capabilities to safely employ and support the system.

- Conclusion of a satisfactory general security of information agreement prior to delivery.

- Recognition of necessary training and associated systems required for effective employment.

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1. J472 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 11 Sep 87; CINCPACFLT 192217Z Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Aug 91; CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/ERD)~~, Vol.II, pp.450-459.
2. J472 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; CINCPAC 130140Z Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 2 Nov 87; JCS 070049Z Jan 82 ~~(S)~~, DECL 28 Dec 87.

Performance Evaluation Group

(U) The Department of Defense charged CINCPAC with specific responsibilities for the security assistance programs in the Pacific Command. Discharge of these responsibilities required a system for evaluating the SAO in each recipient nation on a scheduled basis. These evaluations provided CINCPAC, his subordinate unified and component commanders, the Ambassadors, and the SAO chiefs of the respective nations with information and guidance to assist them in the effective planning and efficient execution of the security assistance program. The Director for Logistics and Security Assistance (J4) had staff responsibility for this effort. Assisting the J4 in executing this responsibility was his Special Assistant for Peformance Evaluation (J48).[1]

(U) The DOD requirement was implemented through periodic evaluation of each Pacific Command supported country by the CINCPAC Security Assistance Performance Evaluation Group (PEG). Evaluations emphasized SAO management, administration, and program activities. The PEG, augmented by selected staff representatives, conducted evaluations during 1981 as indicated below.[2]

Dates	Country
15-17 January	Burma
19-29 January	Thailand
11-19 March	Indonesia
12-21 May	Philippines
14-25 September	Korea
28 September-1 October	Japan
2 November	New Zealand
4- 6 November	Australia
9-10 November	Singapore
11-12 November	Malaysia

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1. CINCPAC Instruction 5040.2J (U), 22 Mar 82, Subj: CINCPAC Evaluation of Security Assistance Organizations and Programs in the Pacific Command.
2. Ibid.

SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

AUSTRALIA

(U) All foreign military sales and training for Australia were on a cash basis. U.S. sales agreements for FY 81 amounted to $462 million. Management and administration of the program was accomplished primarily by Australian defense personnel assigned to the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C., however, the United States had maintained an FMS office in Canberra since 1975. Among its functions the office monitored all FMS programs, including reciprocal training agreements and technical assistance requests; interpreted security assistance policy for the Embassy and the Australian Department of Defence; conducted liaison visits; and assisted trainees (approximately 400 in FY 81). In addition, at CINCPAC request, the Chief, FMS Office made three visits during 1980-81 to the Defense Attache Office, Wellington, New Zealand, and the New Zealand Armed Forces to assist in FMS policies and procedures. A visit was also made to Papua New Guinea to assist the Embassy and the PNG defense establishment in setting up a recently authorized IMET program.[1]

Tactical Fighter Aircraft

(U) After a 10-year search to replace their 17-year old MIRAGE fighters, Australia announced its decision on 20 October 1981 to buy 75 U.S. McDonnell-Douglas F-18As instead of General Dynamics F-16s. Defence Minister Killen said the F-18 was chosen for its great versatility. The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) was signed on 1 December. The total program costs were estimated at $3.1 billion. The first two F-18s would be assembled in the United States and delivered to Australia in October 1984. The other 73 would be assembled in Australia starting in April 1985.[2]

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1. FY 83 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)(U), p. 55; CINCPAC PEG Report on Australia FY 82 (U), pp. 1-3; CINCPAC PEG Report on New Zealand FY 82 (U), p. 2.
2. J463 HistSum Dec 81 (U); Washington Post, 21 Oct 81, "Australia Picks F18 as Its Fighter Plane," p. 20 (U); J463 Point Paper (U), 14 Dec 81, Subj: Australian F-18 Program.

AUSTRALIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	7,692,300 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	3 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	14,476,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.62 Percent
LITERACY RATE	98.5 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	71 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	8.4 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 140 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 9,580
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 4.1 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	9.8 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Federal State within Commonwealth recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Sovereign or Head of State
GOVERNOR GENERAL	Sir Zelman COWEN
PRIME MINISTER	John Malcolm FRASER
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER	John D. ANTHONY
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Anthony A. STREET
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE	Denis James KILLEN
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE STAFF	ADM Sir Anthony M. SYNNOT
ARMY, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF	MAJ GEN D.B. DUNSTAN
CHIEF OF THE NAVY STAFF	VADM Guido J. WILLIS
CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF	ACM Neville P. McNAMARA*

* ACM McNamara scheduled to become Chief of the Defence Force Staff in April 1982

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Robert D. NESEN
DATT	COL Warwick H. GLASGOW, USAF
CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA	COL Gene E. TAFT, USAF



(U) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST POSSIBLE EXTERNAL THREATS AND CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE.

ASSIST IN MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.

MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN HOST COUNTRY AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FOSTERING FAVORABLE ATTITUTES TOWARD THE U.S. AND ENCOURAGING PURSUIT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS AND STRATEGY.

ENABLE DEFENSE OF CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA AREAS AND SEA/AIR ROUTES.

DEVELOP CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY FORCES OF OTHER ALLIED OR FRIENDLY NATIONS ENCOURAGING REGIONAL COOPERATION.

[redacted]

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 58, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

BANGLADESH

~~(C)~~ On 31 December 1980 President Carter signed an executive decision making Bangladesh eligible to purchase military equipment and services through the U.S. FMS mechanism on a cash-sale basis. The State Department had expressed the hope that Bangladesh would give priority to dual-purpose equipment (usable for nation-building projects and disaster relief as well as military applications) in utilizing the U.S. source of supply. In a January message to CINCPAC the U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh voiced his concerns that he wished to ". . . avoid actions which imply (or give the Bangladeshis reason to infer) a prospective military relationship with the U.S. which thus far is not envisaged by the USG." His reference was to Bangladesh participation in regional military relationships which involved U.S. participation or sponsorship such as the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar. Admiral Long agreed and assured the Ambassador that CINCPAC efforts would keep in mind the special circumstances prevailing in Bangladesh and keep him informed.[1]

~~(C)~~ The first request by Bangladesh for price and availability (P&A) data was made by a Bangladesh Embassy official in Washington on 4 February 1981. The inquiry concerned 12 F-5E/F aircraft and was turned down by the State Department. During April the Bangladesh Government delivered to the American Embassy in Dacca a coordinated request for P&A data on a variety of Army and Navy equipment. Listed were some Army non-lethal, dual-purpose equipment; a broad and general group of Navy items; and artillery, tanks, surface-to-air missiles and antitank weapons. The Embassy forwarded the request with a recommendation that U.S. policy should emphasize the primary importance of economic development and be responsive without allowing the United States to become a major military supplier to Bangladesh or encouraging a large arms buildup. Specifically, the Ambassador recommended that "we immediately agree to provide information on the dual-purpose items, that we turn down the request for information on tanks, surface-to-air missiles and most antitank weapons and that we agree to provide information on the artillery items and the recoilless rifles with jeeps."[2]

(U) Bangladesh President Ziaur (Zia) Rahman was assassinated on 30 May. In spite of many rumors and the fact that the assassination squad was led by a Bangladesh Army general, the military did not declare martial law, and allowed the political succession of Vice President Abdus Sattar, a political moderate. Sattar was reinstated in elections held on 15 November, but toward year's end Army Chief of Staff LT GEN Hossein Mohammad Ershad made demands regarding Army

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 395-397; AMEMB Dacca 40/050750Z Jan 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 1/5/87; CINCPAC 102017Z Jan 81 (U).
2. J471 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; AMEMB Dacca 2694/040950Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, RDS-1.

BANGLADESH (U)

FOIA(b)(1) E.O. 12958 Sec 1.5 (b)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	142,500 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	18 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	89,940,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE	25 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	45 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.3 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (FY 80)	$ 9.8 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 107
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 145 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	8.8 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Independent Republic under Martial Law

PRESIDENT, CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Abous SATTAR
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	LT GEN Hossain ERSHAD
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	RADM Mahboob Ali KHAN
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	AIR COMMODORE Sultan MAHMUD

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. Jane A. COON
DATT	LCOL H. M. BAKER, Jr., USA

[redacted]

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 59, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

participation in the administration purportedly in order to prevent further military coups.[1]

(C) After consideration, both before and after the assassination, of the Embassy recommendations, on 18 August the State Department approved release of P&A data on the non-lethal items, but deferred a decision on the lethal items until after the elections. Meanwhile, CINCPAC supported the release of information on lethal and non-lethal Army equipment to Bangladesh, provided the elected government retained a pro-West orientation and the equipment was compatible to the Army force structure. All efforts were expended to persuade the Bangladeshis not to request equipment considered beyond their ability to support logistically and economically. Regarding the Navy items, CINCPAC opined that, until the Talpatty Island (an island at the mouth of the Ganges River claimed by both India and Bangladesh) dispute was no longer an issue, sales should be restricted to equipment which would not be considered provocative by India. The State Department had made no decision on releasability of lethal equipment to Bangladesh at the end of 1981.[2]

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1. Time Magazine, June 8, 1981 (U); Current History, May 1982, Vol. 81, No. 475, pp. 207-208.
2. J471 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88.

BURMA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	678,600 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	24 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	34,842,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE	70 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	53 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.8 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 5.2 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 157
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 311.8 Million
OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	32 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Socialist Republic Headed by a President
PRESIDENT	U SAN YU
PRIME MINISTER	U MAUNG MAUNG KHA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	U CHIT HLAING
MINISTER OF DEFENSE, CHIEF OF STAFF	GEN KYAW HTIN
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY	MAJ GEN TUN YI
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, NAVY	RADM MAUNG MAUNG WIN
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE	MAJ GEN KO GYI

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.



[redacted]

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Patricia M. BYRNE
DATT	COL Charles A. SCHUH, USA

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 60, REVW 13 Feb 02.

BURMA

~~(C)~~ U.S.-Burmese relations were distant and proper from 1964 until the 1974 signature of a narcotics cooperation agreement. Since then relations had slowly expanded. Under Burma's small cash FMS program, FY 81 sales amounted to $754,000 for spare parts and ammunition for previously acquired U.S. equipment. For FY 81 the IMET program continued at $31,000 with AID at $3 million and International Narcotics Control at $4.6 million.[1]

~~(S)~~ After a year in Burma, the U.S. Ambassador submitted an assessment in March of U.S. policy and activity and stated the case for a fresh, positive look. She noted the positive trend away from Burma's self-imposed isolation and the need for more U.S. support and interest. While the U.S. policy of proceeding at a pace no faster than desired by the Burmese was still excellent in principle, the Ambassador felt that we were lagging behind Burma's pace. In addition to greater non-military assistance, she called for a larger IMET program and FMS credits to finance two C-130Hs. These were sought by the Burmese for use in narcotics interdiction as well as military transports, and requests for funding assistance through the International Narcotics Control Program had been unsuccessful.[2]

~~(C)~~ With the retirement of U Ne Win in October after 20 years as President, there were opportunities for broader relationships with Burma. Reporting to the JCS on his visit to Burma from 11 to 14 December, Admiral Long presented his perceptions and position:[3]

> Burmese policy and behavior remain fundamentally grounded in non-alignment. . . IMET should continue to be expanded in small increments as conditions permit. Burma would like to purchase surplus military equipment from us at low cost and with quick delivery. Transport aircraft remain at the top of their priority list. FMS credit is desired if it does not carry heavy interest and repayment terms. We should formulate a tight, well-justified proposed FMS credit program in the $2-3 million range over the next several months. We should also carefully explore prospects for small, low-key, short-duration Air Force, Navy or Army training teams to assist Burma in maintenance, aircraft safety or other areas of interest. [In closing he stated:] Burmese military and civilian officials went out of their way to demonstrate warmth and friendship, conveying a message the side door is ajar if we use it with discretion and sensitivity.

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1. SECSTATE 318598/020227Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, RDS-3 12/1/87; FY 83 CPD (U), pp. 54-55.
2. AMEMB Rangoon 849/030825Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, RDS-3 and 4, 4/26/01.
3. CINCPAC 152230Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Dec 87.

~~(S)~~ Embassy and CINCPAC efforts during 1980-81 to obtain $25 million in FMS credit for the two C-130s and greatly increased IMET were not successful. In November 1981 the Ambassador again recommended these two items in the FY 83-85 Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance. CINCPAC supported the Embassy's recommendations for FY 84 and 85, but asked that $26,000 be added to the $150,000 recommended for FY 83 IMET. CINCPAC realized that funding of the C-130s could not be expected, but asked that FMS financing in the $5-10 million range be approved as a signal of U.S. interest in improved U.S.-Burmese relations. Late in the year the Ambassador and CINCPAC again asked that the FY 82 IMET be funded at $150,000 for training of 24 Burmese students. This figure was supported by the State Department and was incorporated in the FY 82 Congressional Presentation Document. It was learned, however, that once again the C-130s would not be in the FY 83 budget request.[1]

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1. J474 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 13 Jan 88; AMEMB Rangoon 2191/171015Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 5/21/87; CINCPAC 020322Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 23 Nov 87; FY 82 CPD (U), p. 54; COS Rangoon 166/311014Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~ (BOM).

FIJI

Funding

~~(C)~~ Fiji was approved for U.S. military assistance but did not receive either grant aid or IMET. In the FY 83-85 Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance, the Ambassador noted that "the goal of this submission is to establish a modest IMET program that will allow Fiji to send one army officer to command and general staff college and one naval officer to surface warfare school during FY 1983." In June CINCPAC recommended $32,000 for this first year of IMET funding. CINCPAC's submission to the JCS in December for the FY 83 Congressional Presentation Document IMET levels raised the figure for Fiji to $55,000. In addition, CINCPAC commented that a small amount of guaranteed or direct credit might be necessary to support the U.S. equipment provided to the Fiji battalion for the Sinai peacekeeping mission.[1]

Peacekeeping Force Participation

Lebanon

(U) On 1 June 1978 Fiji provided a 500-man infantry battalion to the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States provided them with equipment and transportation assistance. Through July 1981, the Royal Fiji Military Force (RFMF) had suffered 14 combat deaths.[2]

~~(C)~~ In February 1981 the Prime Minister of Fiji, in discussions with the U.S. Ambassador, raised the subject of Fiji obtaining some M-72 light antitank weapons from the United States for use by the RFMF infantry battalion in Lebanon. CINCPAC endorsed a request from the Ambassador for assistance in obtaining approximately 100 M-72s for the RFMF. As was the case with a similar request in 1979, the Secretary of Defense advised that none were available, but the Army had determined that it was more economical to procure them from Norway where they were being coproduced. In supporting the Embassy efforts, CINCPAC then proposed providing M-67 90mm recoilless rifles as an alternative. P&A data on the M-67 system was furnished by the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command: ten weapons would cost $31,310; 200 rounds of ammunition would cost $14,800. In May the Ambassador advised that the RFMF would obtain 250 M-72s from Norway at $144 each. Even though this purchase would preclude the possibility of an order for the M-67s, the Ambassador believed that additional P&A

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1. AMEMB Suva 2062/080008Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~ GDS 6/5/87; CINCPAC 260309Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Jun 87; CINCPAC 020322Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 23 Nov 87.
2. J5124 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 9 Nov 79, Subj: Political-Military Situation in South Pacific Islands (U), DECL 30 Nov 85; J5614-2/PP11 Point Paper (U), 6 Apr 82, Subj: Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)-PACOM Allies Participation; SECSTATE 171690/300055Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 6/29/87.

FIJI (U)

FOIA(b)(1) E.O. 12958 sec 1.7 (c)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	18,272 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	18 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION (1981)	640,000
ANNUAL GROWTH (1971-79)	1.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE (1980)	80 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY (1980)	71 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	Unknown
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1980)	$ 1.1 Billion
PER CAPITA (1979)	$ 1,300
DEFENSE BUDGET (1980)	$ 9.8 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	Unknown
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Independent State within the Commonwealth, recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State.

GOVERNOR GENERAL	Ratu Sir George CAKOBAU
PRIME MINISTER	Ratu Sir Kamisese T. MARA
COMMANDER, ROYAL FIJI MILITARY FORCES	Brigadier Robert THORPE (NZA Ret)

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize Fiji's claim of archipelagic status.



[redacted]

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. William BODDE
CINCPACREP SOUTHWEST PACIFIC	CDR Dwayne O. NORRIS, USN

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 61, REVW 13 Feb 02.

data on the M-67s should be furnished to Fiji in case the Norway deal fell through.[1]

Sinai

~~(C)~~ During informal discussions with U.S. Ambassador Bodde on 24 April 1981, the Fiji Minister of Finance explored inclusion of an RFMF unit in any international peacekeeping operation in the Sinai as part of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. The proposal was formalized in a 12 June letter from Fiji's Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Subsequently, on behalf of Egypt and Israel, the United States welcomed Fiji's participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). It was agreed that the MFO would pay all reasonable costs associated with Fiji's participation. In a briefing on 25 June for visiting Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge, the RFMF Commander, Brigadier Ian Thorpe, outlined a detailed conceptual plan of operations which called for the formation of a new battalion. Plan highlights were:[1]

- Fiji was completely dependent on outside funding.
- Fiji preferred that logistic support be provided by the United States.
- Time was critical, particularly to accomplish training--the desired unit reporting date was 31 March 1982.
- One-time costs were estimated at $F11 million and annual costs at $F6 million.

~~(C)~~ During the week of 27 July, negotiations were conducted between a delegation from Fiji and one led by Ambassador Wat T. Cluverius, IV, Head of the U.S. MFO Delegation in the Sinai Peacekeeping Force. The negotiations resulted in a proposal for a 500-man RFMF infantry battalion to be stationed in the Sinai for a period of up to 5 years. On a non-reimbursable basis, the MFO would provide $972,100 in cash payments over 5 months, $314,500 worth of equipment, and costs of transporting the unit to the Sinai. On a reimbursable basis, the MFO would provide $1,314,390 in cash and $464,721 in equipment and training ammunition which would be purchased by Fiji through FMS. In November Ambassador Bodde reported that both the Government of Fiji and the RFMF were pleased with U.S. support. A U.S. mobile training team had arrived on 26 October and most of the ammunition, weapons, and equipment by 2 November. "The RFMF

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1. CINCPACREP Suva 080347Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 Jul 87; SECDEF 161934Z Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 13 Mar 87; J463 HistSum Dec 81 (U); AMEMB Suva 1735/112112Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 5/11/81.
1. AMEMB Suva 2263/260358Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, XDS-1; AMEMB Suva 1598/300853Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 4/28/87; AMEMB Suva 2262/260358Z Jun 81 which readdressed SECSTATE 166437/241819Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, XDS-1 6/24/01.

is truly impressed with the demonstrated U.S. logistics capability. The no-nonsense manner in which we got the necessary equipment to them has made a definite and positive impact on the Fijians. . . ."[1]

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1. AMEMB Suva 4085/040117Z Nov 81 ~~(C/LOU);~~ AMEMB Suva 2680/310344Z Jul 81 ~~(S),~~ GDS 7/31/87; CINCPACREP SWPAC Point Paper (U), 26 Sep 81, Subj: RFMF Participation in MFO Status Update.

INDIA

(U) U.S. relations with India throughout 1981 remained cool. Two contributing factors were the $3 billion U.S. arms and economic assistance package to Pakistan which included the sale of 40 F-16s, and India's refusal to accept the credentials of a U.S. diplomat posted to New Delhi who was portrayed by press reports as being a CIA agent.

Funding

~~(C)~~ Funding of security assistance for India reflected the tepid U.S.-Indian political relationships. In recent years FMS cash sales had been limited to logistics support for previously provided MAP equipment. Although there was a continuing IMET program, according to the U.S. Ambassador, a bureaucratic logjam resulting from a change in Indian policy was responsible for turning back $299,000 of $300,000 funded for FY 81. The Embassy and CINCPAC supported minimum and intermediate levels of $150,000 and $250,000 respectively, for FY 83 in the mid-year Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance. In preparation for the FY 83 Congressional Presentation Document, CINCPAC endorsed a level of $150,000 contingent upon India's utilization of at least $150,000 of FY 82 IMET funds.[1]

TOW Antitank Missile

~~(C)~~ India had been considering acquisition of the M71A TOW antitank missile since May 1978. On 2 November 1979 the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi had forwarded a request for a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) for 60 TOW ground launchers, 3,724 live and 630 inert missiles, associated items, and appropriate spares. The LOA was presented to Congress on 11 June 1980. At India's request, the LOA signature deadline was extended in order to allow a 10-man Indian delegation to visit the United States to bargain with U.S. officials on details of the LOA. By the end of 1980 the LOA had not been signed, and U.S. officials decided against further prodding.[2]

[redacted]

1. AMEMB New Delhi 9957/191201Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, GDS 5/15/87; CINCPAC 260309Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Jun 87; CINCPAC 020322Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 23 Nov 87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 378-379, and 1980, Vol. II, pp. 404-405.

INDIA (U)

Form (b)(1) E.O. 12958 sec. 1.5(c)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	3,136,500 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	683,900,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE	35 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	About 52 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.7 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$116 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 170
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 5 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	18.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Federal Republic headed by Prime Minister

PRESIDENT	Neelam S. REDDY
PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Indira GANDHI
FOREIGN MINISTER	P.V. Narashima RAO
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	GEN K.V.K. RAO
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAF	ADM R.L. PEREIRA
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	ACM Dilbock SINGH

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.



(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Harry G. BARNES
DATT	COL Robert A. FARR, USA

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~ p. 62, REVW 13 Feb 02.

toward India. The U.S. Government remained ready "in principle" to sell India the TOW. If India were to accept, however, the sale would have to be based on recomputed prices and delivery schedules.[1]

155mm Howitzers

~~(C)~~ Similar circumstances pertained to Indian interest in the 155mm towed howitzer (M-198). An informal request for information had been forwarded by the U.S. Defense Attache Office New Delhi on 17 April 1979. An in-country test of the equipment was performed from 14 April to 3 July 1980, and on 12 June an LOA was requested for 230 M-198 howitzers, 230 M-813 trucks, 240,000 rounds of 155mm HE ammunition, and 24,000 each of illumination and smoke rounds. Again, the LOA was not signed and was cancelled on 25 August 1981.[2]

J522 : See no reason

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1. J474 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; SECDEF 221926Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, 18 Sep 87.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 381-382, and 1980, Vol. II, pp. 402-403.

INDONESIA (U)

FOIA (b)(1) E.O. 12958 sec 1.5(b)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	1,906,240 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	Certain Areas
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	147,383,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.1 Percent
LITERACY RATE	60 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	48 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.24 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 66.8 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 439
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 2.39 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	21 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic, President, Cabinet, Unicameral Legislature
PRESIDENT	GEN SUHARTO
MINISTER FOR DEFENSE & SECURITY	GEN Mohammad JUSUF
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Dr. Kusumaatmadja MOCHTAR
CINC ARMED FORCES	GEN Mohammad JUSUF
DEPUTY CINC ARMED FORCES	ADM Madia SUDOMO
ARMY COMMANDER	GEN PONIMAN
NAVY COMMANDER	ADM Waluyo SUGITO
AIR FORCE COMMANDER	AIR MARSHAL Tjahjadi ASHADI
COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS	MAJ GEN KAHPI

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize Indonesia's claim of archipelagic status.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

U.S. CHIEF OF MISSION	MR. John C. MONJO
DATT	COL John KIZIRIAN, USA
MADP	COL Albert C. WALDACK, USA



[redacted]

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~; p. 63, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

INDONESIA

~~(S)~~ During the past few years the U.S. Government had perceived a deterioration in relationships with Indonesia. Contributing factors included a change in notification procedures for U.S. warships transiting straits in the Indonesian Archipelago and decreases in the Indonesian security assistance programs. Late in 1979 CINCPAC joined the U.S. Ambassador in expressing concern regarding proposed further cuts in various U.S. aid programs to Indonesia. Efforts in 1981 by CINCPAC, the Country Team, and State and Defense Department officials aimed at restoring the confidence of high-level Indonesian officials in U.S. interest and responsiveness to Indonesia's desires and needs. These efforts resulted in increased funding for the IMET and FMS credit programs in FY 82 and 83. Nevertheless, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) had made it clear that there should be a reduction of U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG) manning by the end of 1981 and that the U.S. security assistance organization should be renamed and placed under the U.S. Defense Attache.[1]

Reorganization

~~(S)~~ By June 1980 there were rumors that GOI military officials wanted a phase-down of USDLG staff and operations by the end of 1981. The reasons appeared to be a desire for self-reliance and non-alignment and disenchantment with the declining U.S. security assistance program. On 1 September the rumors were confirmed by Ambassador Masters, and it was learned that the phasedown was in fact linked to the straits passage notification issue. The formal GOI request was presented to the Chief USDLG on 3 September. As part of the requested reorganization, military strength was to be reduced to 15 spaces, or less, by 31 December; also Indonesia's Assistance-in-Kind funding would terminate no later than April 1982. By December 1980 a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was in preparation to define function and command relationships for the reorganized security assistance section of the DAO. The necessary actions had been taken to reduce manning from 26 to 15 military spaces. The billets of 3 U.S. civilians and 16 local national (direct hire) employees were not affected.[2]

(U) A draft MOU was forwarded to CINCPAC by the Chief USDLG on 14 April 1981. The proposed name of the new entity was Security Assistance Management Office headed by the Deputy Defense Attache for Security Assistance. The final MOU became effective on 1 December 1981, was signed by the Chief USDLG and the Defense Attache, Indonesia, and was endorsed by the Charge d'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy, CINCPAC, and the Director, DIA. The organization's name became Office of the Military Attache for Defense Programs (OMADP), and the title of Chief USDLG became Military Attache for Defense Programs (MADP). Under the final MOU, the Defense Attache was to be the MADP's rating official and CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II. pp. 407-411.
2. Ibid.

was to designate intermediate and senior raters. Key provisions of the MOU, as pertained to the security assistance program, stated that the MADP would:[1]

- Through the DATT, function as the primary representative of the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC to the GOI and HANKAM (the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Security) in matters pertaining to the security assistance program.

- Be responsible for development, implementation, and management of the program for Indonesia, and be the principal advisor (for security assistance matters) to the U.S. Ambassador and primary program manager.

- Be responsible for planning, programming, and administering funds allocated for program management.

- Function under the military control of CINCPAC. The MADP was to insure that the DATT was kept fully informed on all significant aspects of the program. All GOI requests for procurement of significant combat equipment would be jointly concurred in or non-concurrences noted prior to submission to the Ambassador.

(U) Prior to the reorganization, the USDLG was organized into Command, Personnel-Administration, Plans-Programs-Training, and three Service Division elements. Afterwards, and the OMADP was structured into Command, Administration, Operations, and three Service Program Coordination elements. Seven Indonesian contract employees were also added. Section 515 (C)(1) of PL 97-113, signed on 29 December 1981, removed the ceiling of six military security assistance personnel who could be assigned to a consolidated security assistance/defense attache organization for FY 82-83. Assistance-in-Kind was reduced, but not terminated.[2]

IMET Funding

(U) As a means of increasing the purchasing power of IMET funds, CINCPAC had developed a policy of encouraging host governments to share IMET costs. On 1 April 1981 the GOI began sharing IMET transportation expenses. Under this arrangement Indonesia contributed $550 toward the cost of transoceanic travel for each of approximately 200 students between Jakarta and the U.S. port of entry. This $110,000 per year would then be applied toward additional training opportunities.[3]

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1. CHUSDLG Jakarta 140141Z Apr 81 (U); J472 HistSum Jan 82 (U).
2. CHUSDLG/MADP, Indonesia, End of Tour Report, 17 Apr 82, p. 5-1, ~~(C)/NOFORN.~~
3. J472/3 HistSum Mar 81 (U).

A-4 Aircraft

~~(S)~~ In 1979 the GOI signed an LOA for 14 A-4E and 2 TA-4H SKYHAWK fighter-bombers which had been reconditioned by the previous owner--Israel. The primary use of the SKYHAWKS was an air-to-ground role in support of the Indonesian Army to fill the gap between the low-performance OV-10 observation aircraft and the supersonic F-5 interceptors. For details of the sale see the 1979 CINCPAC History. At that time CINCPAC had stressed the importance of a caveat in the LOA for a complete follow-on support package, especially in view of procurement from a third country and the obvious lack of study regarding beddown facilities.[1]

(C) On 22 January 1981 the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC and the Chief USDLG, among others, that 20-day advance notice was being given to the Congress for the sale of another 16 U.S. (Israeli-owned) A-4E SKYHAWKS. As in the previous case, the sale was on an "as is, where is" basis with no U.S. obligation for training or support. Four days later the USDLG advised CINCPAC and the Defense Department that the USDLG had not been asked to comment on the advisability of this sale. Further, that from a strictly military point of view, this was not a wise sale and besides, the Indonesian Air Force did not have the capability to adequately maintain the first 16 A-4Es. In December 1980 the Commander of the U.S. Navy Aviation Supply Office verified the DLG position and predicted that all A-4Es be grounded by the summer of 1981. CINCPAC again urged the Secretary of Defense to include a provision for adequate long-term logistics support in the terms of the new sale, if it was consumated.[2]

(U) Nevertheless, the LOA for the second 16 A-4Es was signed by the GOI in April at a price of $26.4 million. (An additional LOA was signed for the purchase of one replacement A-4.) In May the USDLG forwarded a GOI request for six Navy FMS cases in support of the A-4s but two of these were later declined. By the end of August, 20 of the aircraft had been delivered.[3]

Overhaul of Indonesian Ships

~~(C)~~ Two of four ex-U.S. Navy CLAUDE JONES-class destroyer escorts (DEs) had been repaired at the U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1977 with MAP funds. Repairs and overhaul for the other two DEs and 14 other ex-U.S. Navy ships had been a continuing discussion topic at various levels of the Indonesian Navy's hierarchy since 1978. Toward the end of 1980 the U.S. Navy had agreed to overhaul the other two DEs (using FMS funds)

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 391-393.
2. J472/3 HistSum Jan 81 (S), DECL 12 Feb 87; CHUSDLG 260619Z Jan 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87; CINCPAC 072252Z Feb 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 26 Jan 87.
3. J472 HistSum May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 10 Jun 87; J472 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; CHUSDLG Memorandum (U), 11 Sep 81, Subj: USDLG Briefing Update.

at Subic as an exception to general policy. The first was completed on 20 April and the second by the end of 1981. Meanwhile, with the appointment of a new Indonesian Fleet Commander, a plan to overhaul the other ships at the Indonesian Naval Shipyard (PAL) in Surabaya was resurrected.[1]

Howitzers

155mm

~~(C)~~ Discussions regarding GOI acquisition of 155mm towed howitzers commenced in December 1980 when LT GEN Yogi Supardi, Chief of the Administrative Staff, HANKAM, asked the Chief USDLG for the availability status of the XM-198. General Yogi said the Indonesians were considering the purchase of enough for four or five battalions. The SECDEF response indicated that six weapons could be provided in the First Quarter of FY 82 with the remaining 114 howitzers available in 1983 and 1984. The reply also noted delivery slippages could occur because of production problems and that Rapid Deployment Force requirements had priority over export. This estimate was later changed to offer four of the M-198s to Indonesia as early as Third Quarter FY 81, but on 15 April the USDLG advised that the Indonesians had decided against the purchase due to weight and cost factors.[2]

105mm

~~(C)~~ There was a parallel request for information on 105mm towed howitzers (M101A1) which had not received a prompt response, and on 7 April 1981 Ambassador Masters asked that this matter be given "urgent attention." On 5 June the GOI requested an LOA, and the U.S. Army Materiel and Readiness Command completed it on 5 August. Due to a Congressional recess, formal notification procedures were delayed until mid-September, and the LOA was not issued until October. The GOI signed the LOA on 18 November, and total program cost was $23 million. Delivery of 133 howitzers for 11 battalions would be between First Quarters FY 83-86. Separate LOAs for another 38 M101A1s, support equipment, ammunition, and training followed.[3]

Project INDOCOM

(U) Project INDOCOM (Indonesia Communications) was a nationwide electronic communications project provided to the Indonesian Armed Forces under the U.S. security assistance program. It began as an $18 million grant aid program and was officially launched in FY 71. Most equipment was commercial in origin,

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~); Vol. II, pp. 414-415; J472 HistSum Dec 81 (U); Op. Cit., CHUSDLG Memorandum.
2. J472 HistSums Jan, Apr 81 (C), DECL 7 Feb, 12 May 87.
3. AMEMB Jakarta 5286/071054Z Apr 81 (C), RDS-1 4/07/01; J472 HistSums Aug, Nov 81 (U); Op. Cit., CHUSDLG Memorandum; Op. Cit., CHUSDLG/MADP, Indonesia End of Tour Report, p. 8-1.

making maintenance and replacement a worldwide-market procurement operation. Major procurement included delivery and installation of four earth satellite terminals at Pontianak, Tanjung Pinang, Banda Aceh, and Natuna. The U.S. Communications Electronics Office provided engineering and installation technical assistance.[1]

(U) The program included both command and control nets, as well as administrative and logistics nets, and reached from HANKAM headquarters down to regional commands. On-board ship communications and air traffic control and avionics facilities were all provided. INDOCOM was composed of 33 subprojects which were completed on a phased basis. By 1977 three had been completed: a Navy headquarters net, a zonal net, and an Army net. During 1978 only the Navy broadcast net was completed, but program management was intensified to avoid loss of funds or equipment due to the termination of MAP funds. Twelve subprojects were completed in 1979, including maintenance support facilities and training upgrade. Also a comprehensive long-range INDOCOM logistics support plan was developed and published in order to provide detailed guidance when U.S. technical assistance was phased out.

(U) The radio cable switching and integration system was the last major subproject to be installed, and a closing ceremony was held on 3 June 1981. MAP funds were exhausted and any additional equipment or assistance would have to be funded by the GOI.[2]

Security Agreement

(U) In preparation for the release of classified military articles and associated documentation, the U.S. Government began efforts in early 1981 to conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement with the GOI. The initial negotiations were conducted by the U.S. Embassy through the Political Counselor with the GOI Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Negotiations stalled in June 1981. The Chief USDLG suggested and obtained the Ambassador's permission to negotiate through HANKAM, and negotiations were successfully concluded with the signing of the Agreement by the Chief of the Aministrative Staff, HANKAM on 1 July 1981.[3]

(U) Before implementation, however, there was a U.S. requirement for an on-site evaluation of the host country's ability to safeguard classified U.S. military equipment and information. In November a three-man DOD security survey team visited Indonesia but was unable to conduct the intended evaluation. At the end of the the year, documents promised by HANKAM's Assistant for International Cooperation on GOI security procedures had not been provided.[4]

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1. CHUSDLG End of Tour Report (U), 17 Jun 80, pp. IX-1-3; Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM, Winter 1979-80, pp. 34-36.
2. Ibid.; CHUSDLG 010654Z May 81 (U); J472 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. CINCPAC PEG Report, Indonesia FY 82 (FOUO), p. II-21.
4. Ibid.

JAPAN (U)

FOIA (b)(1) E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (b)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	371,900 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	117,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE	99 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	73 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.1 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 1.26 Trillion
PER CAPITA	$ 10,310
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 11.4 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	5.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Constitutional Parliamentary Monarchy
EMPEROR	HIROHITO
PRIME MINISTER	SUZUKI Zenko
DIRECTOR GENERAL, JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY	ITO Soichiro
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	SAKURAUCHI Yoshio
CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL	ADM YATA Tsugio
CHIEF OF GROUND (ARMY) STAFF	GEN MURAI Sumio
CHIEF OF MARITIME (NAVY) STAFF	ADM MAEDA Masaru
CHIEF OF AIR (AIR FORCE) STAFF	GEN NAMATAME Osamu

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea.



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(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Michael J. MANSFIELD
COMUSJAPAN	LT GEN Charles L. DONNELLY, USAF
CHMDAO	COL Johnny H. EDMUNDSON, USAF
DATT	CAPT Walter C. NIX, USN

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 64, REVW 13 Feb 02.

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JAPAN



M110A2 Howitzers

(U) In response to a request for a U.S. Government position on coproduction of the M110A2 8-inch howitzer (SP), the Commanding General, USA Armament Materiel Readiness Command, advised U.S. and GOJ representatives at a meeting on the subject in Tokyo on 24 March 1980 as follows:[3]

> I am delighted to be involved in this military cooperative project for coproduction of the M110A2 self-propelled howitzer. We understand and support the idea of coproducing military equipment with our allies and are prepared to develop coproduction agreements. Because we believe we must also maintain a solid

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1. FY 83 CPD (U), pp. 69-71; MDAO Japan Quarterly Activity Report ~~(C)~~, 14 Jan 82, REVW 14 Jan 12.
2. Op. Cit., MDAO Japan Report.
3. J464 HistSum Mar 80 (U); SECDEF 5024/212230Z Mar 80 (U).

> skill base in our own arsenals in order to support our allies and our own forces and because of difficulties in transferring the specific technology, we are not yet prepared to make a commitment on coproduction of some parts of the M110, specifically the [M201] cannon assembly and the [M174] gun mount.

(U) In October 1980 the Secretary of Defense provided release for coproduction of the M110A2 on the condition that U.S. production of the tube assembly be retained and sold as an FMS case. Throughout 1981 U.S. officials and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) continued negotiation of the MOU. The President's signature of the FY 82 Defense Appropriations Act on 29 December, with the Stratton amendment, clouded the issue of the M110A2 manufacture and delayed signature of the MOU. At this point efforts to resolve the matter escalated to high levels of both governments because important, relevant issues were at stake and time was of the essence. (The MOU needed to be signed prior to 10 January if continued funding was to be approved in the Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 82 budget.)[1]

~~(C)~~ Attempts to "grandfather" the MOU on the basis that the U.S. Government had approved the coproduction in principle prior to the amendment were unsuccessful. The Japanese Ambassador, in a telephone conversation with Representative Stratton, pointed out that the GOJ had just raised its defense (JFY 82) budget in response to U.S. requests and needed a compensating advantage. Also, the flow of defense technology was just beginning to be a two-way street and this had become a politically sensitive matter in Japan. (This was a reference to the U.S.-Japan Systems and Technology Forum which is covered in detail in the Plans Chapter. Although meetings were begun in 1980, the two sides had yet to establish firm forum objectives.) In an 8 January 1982 message to the State and Defense Departments, U.S. Ambassador Mansfield expressed his concerns, as well as those of GOJ officials, and urged resolution of the problem prior to the reconvening of Congress on 25 January. Japan had already accepted LOAs and paid a deposit of over $250,000 in program costs. Funding for the program in JFY 81, 82, and beyond could be jeopardized and this could be viewed as a U.S. act to cancel the whole program, thereby causing great embarrassment to the GOJ. Admiral Long seconded Ambassador Mansfield's reasoning and also urged expeditious signing of a modified MOU in a message on 15 January:[2]

> Too much delay could sacrifice the momentum we have gained in defense cooperation with Japan. It would be highly desirable to have U.S.-Japan interoperability, standardization, and warfighting capability enhanced with the U.S. designed M110A2 howitzer rather than have Japan develop its own weapon or purchase

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1. CHMDO Tokyo 150801Z Dec 80 (U); J464 HistSum Jan 82 ~~(C),~~ DECL 5 Feb 88.
2. SECSTATE 1699/051813Z Jan 82 ~~(C),~~ XGDS-1 1/4/02; J5311 Point Paper ~~(C),~~ 6 Apr 81, Subj: US-Japan Systems and Technology Forum (U), DECL 6 Apr 87; AMEMB Tokyo 233/080527Z Jan 82 ~~(C),~~ XGDS-1 1/8/02; CINCPAC 152139Z Jan 82 ~~(C),~~ DECL 11 Jan 88.

it elsewhere. Of even greater concern, however, is the possible total loss of the increase in their defense budget to fund howitzer procurement.

(U) The matter was finally resolved when Japan agreed to buy the gun tube assembly under FMS. An MOU and a side letter were signed by the Director, DSAA on 1 February and by the JDA on 9 February 1982.[1]

F-15

(U) In 1976 the GOJ selected the McDonnell-Douglas F-15 EAGLE as the next generation of fighter aircraft to replace the aging F-104s of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). In 1978 the Japanese Diet approved the purchase of 100 F-15s over a 10-year period. The F-15 purchase consisted of 88 F-15Js and 12 TF-15DJs. Twelve complete aircraft would be procured via FMS cash, and the remainding 88 through licensed production. Although strikes, shortages, and other problems in 1979 threatened to delay the scheduled delivery date of the first increment, 2 were delivered to the JASDF on time at Gifu AB on 27 March 1981, and 4 others were delivered in November. The first F-15J assembled by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was delivered to the JASDF on 11 December, and the JASDF activated its first F-15 squadron at Nyutabaru AB on 17 December. Towards the end of the year indications were that the GOJ would order additional F-15s.[2]

C-130

(U) In May 1980 the Chief MDAO advised that the GOJ wished to buy 12, later changed to 14, C-130H HERCULES transports. The first 2 were budgeted in JFY 81 with delivery scheduled for sometime in 1983. Because there were no excess USAF assets, acquisition had to be from production. The Congress was provided with 20-day advance notification on 1 June for the sale of two C-130H aircraft valued at $54 million.[3]

P-3C

(U) In 1977 the GOJ had decided to buy 45 Lockheed P-3C ORIONs over an 11-year period as the next generation of anti-submarine warfare aircraft. An MOU was signed in 1978 which included three by FMS cash, four knockdown, and 38 under licensed production. Eight were funded in 1978 and 10 more in FY 80. The three produced in the United States were ferried by Japanese crewmen to the

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1. J464 HistSum Feb 82 (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 421-422, 1979, Vol. II, p. 397; J464 HistSums Mar, Oct 81 (U); MDAO Japan Quarterly Report ~~(C),~~ 14 Jan 82, REVW 14 Jan 12.
3. J464 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 6 Jul 87; HQ USAF 022015Z Jun 80 (U).

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Atsugi Air Base on 25 December 1981. During three years of a training program at the NAS Jacksonville, Florida, approximately 60 software engineers, 50 pilots, 110 maintenance men, and 8 coordinators received training on the P-3C.[1]

AIM-9L

(U) On 28 April 1980 advance Congressional notification was given for an FMS case for coproduction of AIM-9L SIDEWINDER missiles valued at $11.5 million. This was followed on 22 May by the formal notice but the case value had jumped to $24.9 million. The SIDEWINDERs were to be used as armament for the F-15 EAGLEs.[2]

[redacted]

Disposal of MAP Excess Equipment

(U) During FY 81 $3.7 million worth of excess Military Assistance Program equipment was returned to the U.S. Navy, and small arms valued at $340,000 were transferred to Thailand. Additionally, $27.1 million worth of excess equipment was disposed of by the Defense Property Disposal Service. Also approximately $20 million of excess MAP property had been reported and screened during 1981 which was awaiting disposition. The bulk of this was aircraft (11 P2V-7s and 6 S-2Fs) and unserviceable 3.5 inch rockets (300 tons).[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1978 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 421-422; J464 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
2. SECDEF 3732/291736Z Apr 80 ~~(C);~~ SECDEF 7073/222142Z May 80 (U).
3. J464 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 5 May 87; Op. Cit., MDAO Report of 14 Jan 82; CHMDAO Japan Quarterly Activity Report ~~(C)~~, 27 Apr 82, REVW 26 Apr 12.
4. CINCPAC PEG Report, MDAO Japan FY 81 (FOUO), p. II-6.

KOREA

(U) During FY 81 the total active FMS case load monitored by JUSMAG Korea was 1,095 cases with an approximate dollar value of $1.6 billion. The JUSMAG administered a $1.09 million IMET and $.2 million FMS training program for 171 and 26 students, respectively. In addition to the FMS credit program, Republic of Korea (ROK) FMS cash sales amounted to $109 million and commercial sales to $116.7 million.[1]

FMS Credits

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC PEG Report, JUSMAG Korea FY 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 31 Dec 87, p. I-1.
2. J453 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 5 Oct 81, Subj: Security Assistance Programs in the PACOM Region (U), DECL 2 Oct 87; AMEMB Seoul 7785/292247Z May 79 ~~(S)~~, GDS 5/29/85; CINCPAC 262055Z May 79 ~~(S)~~, DECL 24 May 85; CINCPAC 010111Z Jun 79 (U); AMEMB Seoul 7507/120305Z Jun 80 ~~(S)~~, RDS-1, 5/11/87; CINCPAC 140300Z Jun 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 6 Jun 86.

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KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (U)

FOIA (b)(1) E.O. 13526

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	98,400 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	39,450,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.6 Percent
LITERACY RATE	90 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	70.4 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.2 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 57.6 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 1,508
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 4.8 Billion
OF GNP	6.0 Percent
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	34.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic with Power Centralized in a Strong Executive
PRESIDENT	CHUN Doo Hwan
PRIME MINISTER	YU Chang-sun
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	NO Sin-yong
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	CHU Young-bock
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	GEN YUN Song-min
CHIEF OF STAFF, Army	GEN HWANG Yong-si
CHIEF OF STAFF, Air Force	GEN YI Hui-kun
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS	ADM YI Un-su

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea.



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(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Richard L. WALKER
COMUSKOREA	GEN John A. WICKHAM, Jr., USA
CHIEF, JUSMAG-K	MAJ GEN Jere W. SHARP, USA
DATT	COL Harry R. TEAR, USA

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 (S/NF), p. 65, REVW 13 Feb 02.

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~~(C)~~ At the first plenary session of the SCM, Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced that the United States agreed to support a higher level of FMS credits for Korea in FY 83-86. Also, FMS credit repayment terms for the remainder of FY 81 and FY 82 would be 12 years, including a 3-year grace period on repayment of principal.[2]

~~(C)~~ The thrust of U.S. Embassy Seoul's June Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance for FY 83-85 was centered on FIP II. Expenditures were envisioned at $9.78 billion to be spread out from 1982-86. Of that amount, it was anticipated that $8.63 billion would be derived from the ROK defense budget. This was predicated on ROK budget projections of a 7.5 percent average Korean GNP increase during the period. It was hoped that the U.S. Government would provide $1.35 billion in FMS credits, and the Country Team recommended FMS credits of $296 million for FY 83 through FY 85. CINCPAC supported this figure for FY 83 and recommended continued 12-year repayment terms. Further, should ROK economic expectations not materialize, CINCPAC recommended the use of combined direct credits at a concessionary rate and guaranteed credits to minimize adverse debt servicing effects. Year-end submissions for the FY 83 Congressional Presentation Document by the Country Team, CINCPAC, and the JCS again recommended the $296 million figure, but the State Department supported only $210 million.[3]

Force Improvement Plan

~~(S)~~ With the termination of MAP Grant Aid scheduled for 1976, the ROK in 1975 unilaterally conceived a Force Improvement Plan (FIP) as a programming tool similar to the U.S. five-year defense program. Chief objectives of the FIP were development of ROK forces by 1980 capable of deterring and defending the ROK against North Korean aggression and development of ROK defense industries in support of the FIP programs. In 1980-81 the ROK maintained a defense expenditure level of six percent of the GNP, but the effects of won devaluation, massive rises in oil prices, decreased FMS credits, and FMS repayments caused further slippage of FIP I programs.[4]

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1. SSO Korea 301030Z Mar 81 ~~(S)(BOM)~~, REVW 30 Mar 87; SSO Korea 030700Z Apr 81 ~~(S)(BOM)~~, REVW 2 Apr 87; SSO Korea 040330Z Apr 81 ~~(S)(BOM)~~, DECL 2 Apr 85; OSD ISA/EAPR 91/81 062307Z Apr 81 ~~(S)(BOM)~~, DECL 6 Apr 87.
2. J462 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 7 May 87.
3. J462 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 Jul 87; CINCPAC 260309Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Jun 87; J462 HistSums Oct, Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL Jan 88.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 421-425; J462 HistSums Jan, Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 4 Feb, 7 Apr 87.

~~(S)~~ In 1981 total program costs of FIP I were projected at $7.1 billion, and 1981 costs represented 28 percent of the ROK defense budget, or $1.25 billion. In addition, a number of items costing approximately $1.5 billion, had to be carried over into FIP II. FIP II was aimed at the 1982-86 time period. By October 1981, however, there were indications that FIP II would not commence until 1983. Total planned cost was $9.78 billion with debt service projected at 15 percent of funding. Key programs proposed for FIP II were as follows. For the Army, improvements of artillery, armor, and anti-armor capabilities, capital defense posture, mobilization system, and WRM stockpiles. For the Navy, improved ASW and mine/counter-mine capabilities, reinforcement of missile boats and electronic warfare equipment, and procurement of additional small, high-speed ships. For the Air Force, acquisition of the F-16, coproduction of 68 F-5E/F aircraft, completion of beddown facilities for U.S. aircraft, and a Korean tactical air control system.[1]

Third Country Sale of Korean-made Defense Items

~~(C)~~ In the 1950s the United States began support for ROK production of munitions by providing MAP funds for the establishment of a ROK Army arsenal in Pusan, Korea. In 1965-68, following a COMUS Korea proposal, the arsenal was expanded to augment the ROK Armed Forces' contribution in Vietnam. There followed other U.S. steps to encourage self-sufficiency in host country defense posture--especially while U.S. troop withdrawal planning was in process during the late 1970s.

FOIA (b)(2)

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ As ROK manufacturing capability continued to increase during the late 1970s and where anticipated production levels were successfully achieved, the Koreans looked to foreign markets as a means of further capitalizing their plant and equipment investments. They planned on using their excess defense industrial capability to generate foreign exchange and reduce operating costs thereby easing budget deficiencies.[3]

(U) In 1980 it was U.S. Government policy to consider third country sales on a case-by-case basis by weighing the impact of the sale on: first, the U.S. arms transfer policy and the U.S. production base; second, U.S. relations with the proposed recipient; third, adequacy of ROK efforts to overcome war reserve inventory shortfalls; and fourth, stratification of items held in U.S. Military Department inventories. Also on a case-by-case basis, the United States would consider waiver of selected items which were no longer in U.S. production.

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1. J462 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 30 Oct 81, Subj: Status of ROK Force Improvement Plan (U), DECL 30 Oct 87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 426-431.
3. Ibid.; J462 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 27 Oct 81, Subj: Sale of Korean Made Defense Items (U), DECL 27 Oct 87.

Frequently processing of requests took inordinate time, and the policy had been especially confusing to the Koreans, the Country Team, and prospective buyers when there were U.S. calls for assistance to provide defense materials to third countries on an emergency basis. In December 1980 the State and Defense Departments revised guidelines to expedite request processing. Under these guidelines, an advisory opinion was to be sought prior to submission of a formal request for export approval of such items.[1]

~~(S)~~ During early 1981 as the Korean and U.S. economies continued to slump, the subject of third country sales became even more important. Requests for sales to El Salvador and Lebanon under the new guidelines were pending. Illustrative of the problems encountered was a request for an advisory opinion for sales to Jordan forwarded by the U.S. Embassy on 31 March. Stocks of some of the items were below desired ROK Army War Reserve requirements, and the Embassy stopped short of supporting the request by saying, "If export is acceptable in principle to the USG, Embassy would appreciate authorization to inform ROKG that they may continue sales effort on this case with understanding that the USG would not object to the eventual sale." The State Department advised the request was under consideration pending a determination of the purpose for the Jordanian purchases.[2]

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ At the 13th SCM, held 29-30 April, the Secretary of Defense announced approval in principle of the proposed ROK sale of six U.S.-origin defense items to Jordan, Lebanon, and El Salvador. He also announced that a Korean Sales Review Board would be formed to facilitate the expeditious review of ROK third country sales requests. The Secretary formally established this tri-Service board on 27 June with the Army as Executive Agent and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquistion) as Chairman. The 15 July State Department response to the 31 March request was as shown below.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. J462 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 May 87; AMEMB Seoul 3938/310228Z Mar 81 ~~(C)~~ GDS 3/30/87.
3. SSO Korea 301030Z Mar 81 ~~(S)(BOM)~~, REVW 30 Mar 87; SSO Korea 030700Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 2 Apr 87.
4. J462 HistSums Apr, Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL May, Aug 87.

Requested Item	U.S. Response
105mm howitzers)	ROK can market to Jordan provided ROK pur-
155mm howitzers)	chases quantity of U.S. cannon assemblies and recoil mechanisms.
106mm RR M40A2	First need customers for U.S. production.
8-inch M106 Projectile (HE)	Approval depends on quantity.
60mm M49A4 " "	Added by State--must still get approval.
81mm M374 " "	" " " " " " "

~~(C)~~ In September and October the Embassy forwarded quantitative ROK requests for approval to sell Jordan 105mm howitzers (20), 155mm howitzers (100), 8-inch projectiles (HE) (10,000), and 155mm projectiles (HE) (32,000). The Country Team and CINCPAC supported these sales. However, in December the State Department denied the transfer requests "based on indications over the past six months or so that Jordanians may be engaged in arranging unauthorized transfer to Iraq of U.S. controlled munitions." Jordan, however, disavowed any such connection.[1]

~~(C)~~ By mid-1981 the ROKG had submitted requests for advisory opinion on 31 items they proposed to sell to 24 countries. The State Department approved ROK marketing of 17 selected items to 21 countries, added two other items, and subsequently made some changes. The accompanying chart depicts the status of ROK requests through the end of 1981.[2]

F-16 (PEACE BRIDGE)

~~(C)~~ In early 1977 the ROKG had submitted a request covering 60 F-16 aircraft under an LOA named PEACE BRIDGE. The ROK Air Force planned to use them as partial replacements for aging F-86s and F-5As during the mid-1980s. At the 10th SCM in July 1977, Secretary of Defense Brown had indicated to ROK Defense Minister Suh that the U.S. Government agreed in principle to make the F-16 available, but he made no time commitment. After a full inter-agency review, a decision was rendered in June 1978 to decline to process the LOA at the time but reaffirm the commitment. However, in November President Carter was reported to have rejected an early sale of F-16s to Korea because it would mean the introduction of a high level of technology into a region of existing tension. The ROKG continued to press for a U.S. commitment, and in December 1979 Programming and Budget data (redesignated Planning and Review (P&R)) on 30 F-16As and 6 F-16Bs was forwarded. It was hoped that the total package estimate of

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1. J462 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C), DECL~~ 9 Oct 87; AMEMB Seoul 11872/230806Z Sep 81 ~~(C),~~ RDS-1, 9/23/91; CINCPAC 290052Z Sep 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 23 Sep 87; J462 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 8 Jan 88; CINCPAC 270334Z Oct 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 21 Oct 87; SECSTATE 329072/120203Z Dec 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~, RDS-1, 12/11/01, SECSTATE 339105/232207Z Dec 81 ~~(S)(EX)~~ which cited AMEMB Amman 9373, RDS-1, 12/23/01.
2. J462 HistSum Jul 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 10 Aug 87; CHJUSMAGK U.S.G. Advisory Opinion Matrix, May 82 ~~(C),~~ REVW May 86.

STATUS OF ROK REQUESTS TO MARKET U.S.-ORIGIN DEFENSE ITEMS

	INDONESIA	MALAYSIA	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	INDIA	BRAZIL	DOMINICAN REP.	ECUADOR	MEXICO	EL SALVADOR	PERU	LEBANON	PAKISTAN	SAUDIA ARABIA	VENEZUELA	TUNISIA	BOTSWANA	GABON	NIGERIA	SUDAN	JORDAN
Grenade launcher, M79	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mortar, 60mm, M19	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CTG, 106mm, M344A1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CTG, 105mm, M1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Recoil. rifle, 90mm, M67	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CTG, 90mm, M371A1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CTG, 90mm, M431A1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Rec. rifle, 106mm, M40A2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mine, AT, M19	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
Mine, AP, M18A2	X	X	X	X	X							X	X	X							
Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a					a
Howitzer, 155mm, M114A1	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a					a
Mortar, 81mm, M29A2	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
Projectile, 8-in. M106	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b					b
Projectile, 155mm, M107	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b					b
CTG, 105mm, M456A1	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b					b
Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
CTG, 4.2-inch, M329A1	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
Fuze, PD, M557	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
VULCAN ADS, 20mm, M60	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
Rifle, M16	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
Grenade launcher, M203	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
Machine gun, M60	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Telephone, TA312-PT	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c
Radio, AN/PRC-77	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Radio, AN/GRC-122/142	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Radio, AN/TVS-5	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Radio, AN/PVS-5	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Radio, AN/VRC-12	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Protective mask, M9A1	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d	d
Radio, AN/URC-87	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
CTG, 60mm, M49A4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CTG, 81mm, M374	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

X=Favorable advisory opinion and/or approved in principle.

a=Provided cannon assembly and recoil mechanism are procured from U.S.

b=Final approval depends upon quantity.

c=Disapproved--need to maintain U.S. production base.

d=Disapproved--U.S. firms still marketing.

e=ROK must negotiate with U.S. firm owning proprietary rights.

$1.1 billion would impress the Koreans with the impact such a purchase would have on FIP programming.[1]

~~(C)~~ In February 1980 the ROKG again requested an LOA--this time for the 36 F-16s with delivery to start in 1984 and with an option for an additional 24. Total estimated program cost was $821.7 million. During the ensuing months the ROKAF negotiated with USAF Headquarters on the proposed payment terms which had accompanied the LOA request. After Kim Dae-jung was sentenced to death on sedition charges on 17 September, action on the F-16 request, as well as a number of other ongoing actions, were held in abeyance pending the results of a plea by the U.S. Government in December to spare Kim's life. (President Park was assassinated in October 1979 and Kim was one of his longtime political foes.)[2]

~~(C)~~ Kim Dae-jung's sentence was commuted on 23 January 1981. During discussions with ROK President Chun and Minister of National Defense Choo in Washington on 2-3 February 1981, President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger confirmed U.S. willingness to sell F-16s to Korea if the Koreans still wished to proceed with the program. On 26 February the Country Team advised that, "The Vice Minister provided the official Korean Government response. He said the ROKG wants to proceed with the acquistion of 36 F-16s, but cannot commit itself firmly at this time for the additional 24 aircraft that have been discussed. . . ." The Country Team recommended, however, "that the Department proceed with the Congressional notification and issuance of an LOA for a firm commitment on 36 A/C with an option to acquire 24 more."[3]

~~(C)~~ In March the Chief JUSMAG Korea forwarded a ROK Air Force request to make the first PEACE BRIDGE payment on 1 January 1982 or later. This was because all FIP I funds had been committed to other projects and the later date would allow the use of ROK FIP II funds which would not become available until after December 1981. The Secretary of Defense advised that such slippage could increase program cost by $50 to $130 million and suggested that reallocation of funds from the ROKAF's FMS holding account would permit payments to start in September 1981. Advance Congressional notification was submitted on 25 March. Formal notice followed on 27 April, and a copy of the LOA was presented to the ROKAF on 28 May.[4]

(U) On 14 May USAF Headquarters forwarded delivery and payment schedules contained in the PEACE BRIDGE LOA. There followed another ROKAF request for an evaluation of the impact of slipping the delivery schedule and concentrating payments in the out years. On 23 July the Air Force provided nine options for

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 414-415.
2. J461 HistSums Feb-Aug 80 (C), DECL 86; CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 421; J462 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 27 Jan 81, Subj: F-16 Aircraft for Republic of Korea (ROK)(Peace Bridge)(U), DECL 27 Jan 87.
3. J462 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 4 Mar 87; AMEMB Seoul 2408/260852Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 2/26/87.
4. J462 HistSums Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 6 Apr 87; Apr, May 81 (U).

ROKAF consideration. A comparison between the May proposal and the option preferred by the ROKAF is shown below.[1]

		May - LOA	July - Option 7
Delivery Schedule:		One F-16B per month from February-July 1985; one F-16A per month April-July 1985; two F-16A per month August 1985-August 1986.	36 aircraft at a rate of one per month starting in February 1986.
Payment Schedule: (in $ million)	1981	6.9	1.2
	1982	46.5	-
	1983	178.2	38.
	1984	348.6	131.8
	1985	241.9	316.9
	1986	38.9	246.3
	1987	-	144.
	1988	-	50.1
	1989	-	2.7
	Total	861.	931.

~~(S)~~ Continued ROKAF requests resulted in further adjustments with regard to the payments. In a 20 November letter to Minister Choo, Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci stated:[2]

> We recognize that this program [FIP II] will make considerable demands on the economy of the Republic of Korea, and you can count on continued U.S. Government support for your efforts. With respect to the F-16 program, we have taken extraordinary measures to reduce prepayment of termination liability by $45.9 million. Together with previous deferrals of $71 million, the Air Force has now taken program initiatives which have resulted in the deferral of $115 million of payments in the 1982 through 1985 timeframe while maintaining the total estimated program cost at $931 million. . . .

(U) ROKAF desires were also accomodated by extending the LOA signature deadline date from 10 September to 10 December 1981. President Chun approved the F-16 acquisition on 25 November, and ROKG officials signed the LOA on 1 December. The first F-16 was to be delivered in February 1986 with one per month thereafter.[3]

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1. J462 HistSums May, Jul 81 (U).
2. J461 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 7 Dec 87; DEPSECDEF Ltr ~~(S)~~, 20 Nov 81, DECL 19 Nov 87.
3. J462 HistSums Aug, Dec 81 (U).

Modernization of ROK Tank Force

~~(S)~~ The ROK Ministry of National Defense notified JUSMAG Korea in June 1974 of plans to upgrade M48 tanks. Following an extensive analysis of the ROK tank force in 1976, a decision was made to replace, upgrade, and/or modernize M47 and early model M48 assets to M48A3/A5 configurations in three phases. Although the ROKA had acquired over 400 M48s for upgrade from the United States by 1980, the Koreans, with U.S. consent, sought additional assets from Germany, Egypt, and Jordan during 1980-81. Another part of the ROK tank improvement program, begun in 1977, was the development of an indigenous tank production capability. Initially the goal was to produce 260 ROKITs (ROK Indigenous Tanks) by 1986. Part of the upgrade, as well as the ROKIT, called for improved guns--105mm tank cannon. In September 1980 the Secretary of Defense denied the request for coproduction of the 105's M68 cannon and breech. In October the U.S. Embassy pointed out that these guns were an integral part of critical programs which the United States had made a previous commitment to support.[1]

~~(S)~~ In a message of 9 January 1981, U.S. Ambassador Gleysteen stated that "since April '80 we have been wrestling with the ROK request for coproduction authority for the . . . 105mm M68 tank gun." The message emphasized the need for a prompt and favorable decision because production was scheduled to begin in October 1981. While recognizing the need to protect the U.S. production base, the Ambassador cited the Country Team's ". . . prime concern for the much-needed and long-recognized improvement in US/ROK combat capability which these programs [M48 upgrade, ROKIT, and artillery coproduction] represent." Credibility was also a factor because of previous U.S. encouragement for heavy investment by the ROK defense industry in gun production.[2]

~~(C)~~ In February the State Department agreed to another review of the issue. When in June a decision was still pending, the Country Team by general service and back-channel messages forwarded a request from the ROK Assistant Minister of Logistics and Installations for ". . . extraordinary efforts to obtain US approval of the M68 indigenous production program." In July there was a nod from U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff Vessey saying he would recommend that Korea be permitted to produce the M68. In response, General Wickham, COMUS Korea, advised that "both UK and FRG [West Germany] firms are prepared to support a ROK coproduction program for 105mm tank gun if US bows out. (Note:

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. II, pp. 404-407, and 1980, Vol. II, pp. 427-428; J461 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 11 Jan 81, Subj: ROK Tank Upgrade (U), DECL 11 Jan 87; J461/2 HistSums Feb, Jul 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 86, and Aug (U).
2. J462 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 5 Feb 87; AMEMB Seoul 293/090840Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, GDS 1/8/87.

US obtained M68 technology from UK). Therefore it would serve no useful purpose for US to deny ROK production request."[1]

~~(C)~~ On 28 September the Secretary of Defense authorized Deputy Secretary Carlucci who was en route to Korea to relay the formal U.S. Government position to Korean officials regarding Korean manufacture of thick-walled cannons. The Koreans would be authorized to manufacture the M68 cannon for the M48 tank upgrade and ROKIT program with the stipulation that the forgings for each M68 be procured under FMS. The authorization was further limited to cannon for indigenous use only. The Department of the Army was asked to initiate immediate action to provide 70 forgings under FMS procedures.[2]

Howitzers

[redacted]

(C) The U.S. Ambassador again in January and June 1981 asked for reconsideration of coproduction of the 155mm gun tubes, and the State Department

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1. J462 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 4 Mar 87; J462 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 6 Jul 87; AMEMB Seoul 7607/170838Z Jun 81 ~~(C),~~ GDS 6/17/87; SSO Korea 170222Z Jun 81 ~~(S/NF)(BOM),~~ DECL 17 Jun 87; SSO DA 102300Z Jul 81 ~~(C)(BOM),~~ DECL 10 Jul 87; SSO Korea 160200Z Jul 81 ~~(S/NF)(BOM)~~, DECL 15 Jul 87.
2. J462 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 9 Oct 87; SECDEF 281848Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 23 Sep 87. Note: This transpired before passage on 29 December 1981 of the FY 82 Defense Appropriation Act with the Stratton amendment, but the matter was discussed with Congressman Stratton by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and a representative of the Secretary of the Army.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 427-428; 1980 Hq USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Review ~~(S/NF)~~, pp. 214, 238-239, REVW 31 DEC 87.

reaffirmed its denial in February and again in September when approval was given for the M68 cannon. The ROKG acquiesced to the U.S. position in December and initiated negotiation of an MOU to coproduce the 155mm howitzers (SP) with FMS procurement of the gun tubes.[1]

Tankers

~~(C)~~ Two Military Sealift Command T-1 gasoline tankers, USS RINCON (T-AOG-77) and USS PETALUMA (T-AOG-79), out of Japan, were being considered for in-service replacement in 1981. In view of contingency POL requirements in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 5027, Chief JUSMAG Korea on 3 December 1980 recommended that the ships be retained in an active status and that the ROK Navy man and operate the vessels. This would help fill a longstanding ROK requirement for oilers. CINCPAC agreed, provided appropriate provisions were made to insure that the tankers would be capable of loading a refined product if and when ordered back into U.S. service. The addition of these tankers to the ROK Navy would be highly beneficial because the ROK Navy had no oilers.[2]

~~(C)~~ In February 1981 JUSMAG Korea notified the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations of the official ROK Navy request to acquire the ships, and if possible, to have the transfer made in Korea. The CNO noted that the transfer, under a lease, would be contingent upon Congressional approval, on an "as is, where is" basis. Throughout the remainder of 1981, action proceeded toward the lease of the two tankers with turnover to the ROK Navy scheduled in February 1982.[3]

Destroyers

(U) Two U.S. destroyers, the USS NEWMAN K. PERRY (DD-883) and USS ROGERS (DD-876), were transfered to the ROK Navy during 1981. Transfer of PERRY had been held in abeyance for a number of months pending a Congressional decision regarding retention in the Naval Reserve Force. It was finally turned over to the Koreans at Newport, Rhode Island, on 27 February and was renamed the ROKS KYONG KI (DD-923). The ROGERS was transferred on 1 August at Puget Sound, Washington, and was redesignated ROKS JEON JU (DD-925).[4]

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1. J462 HistSums Feb, Jun, Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 87.
2. J462 HistSum Dec 80 (C), DECL 12 Jan 87.
3. J4222 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 9 Mar 87; J462 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 4 Mar 87; J462 HistSum Dec 81 (U); COMSC 302346Z Oct 81 (U).
4. J462 HistSums Dec 80, Jan, Apr, Jul 81 (U).

MALAYSIA

Training Support

~~(S)~~ In late 1980 CINCPAC had queried Service components and the U.S. Defense Attache (DATT) in Kuala Lumpur as to what types of training might be developed in order to improve relationships with the Malaysian Armed Forces. The response from the DATT related that the Malaysians were vitally interested in a closer working relationship with the U.S. Armed Forces. A wide spectrum of initiatives was suggested including more exchange visits, participation of U.S. military personnel in Malaysian exercises (initially as observers), an increased number of ship visits and passing exercises, special warfare training, and AWACS deployments.[1]

Administrative Staffing

(U) The Defense Attache Office was manned by two O-6s, 1 W-3, and 2 E-7s for the major part of 1981. The DATT advised in June that due to the preponderance of the security assistance workload, rotation of the security assistance operations coordinator (the W-3) in mid-year, and resignation of the part-time FMS secretary, the administrative backlog had become untenable and DIA requirements were suffering as a result. He therefore requested that CINCPAC provide TDY assistance for 60 days to train replacements in security assistance procedures. Beginning on 26 June a member of the CINCPAC Security Assistance staff performed 21 days TDY to alleviate the problem. Meanwhile, efforts were made to obtain authorization for one permanent local wage rate employee and to convert two temporary hire spaces to permanent GS-3 and GS-6 positions. With the filling of a Navy 05 security assistance billet at the end of 1981, plans were to establish a Foreign Military Sales Office in January 1982.[2]

Aircraft

~~(S)~~ In 1979 both the A-4 SKYHAWK attack/ground support aircraft and the A-7 CORSAIR ground attack fighter were being considered for acquisition by Malaysian defense officials. In assessing the merits of the two fighters, the U.S. Ambassador expressed some reservations regarding new technology which the A-7 might introduce into the area, but CINCPAC supported the Malaysian request for a suitable ground attack fighter. The GOM requested an LOA in September 1979 for 88 mothballed A-4s. With Malaysian signature of the LOA on 21 May 1980, it was believed that the A-7 subject had been put to rest.[3]

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1. USDAO 110800Z Dec 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 86. See Operations Chapter of this history for details of ship visits and exercises.
2. J472 HistSum Jun 81 (U); AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 8215/110507Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), GDS 12/9/87; CINCPAC PEG Report on Malaysia FY 82 (U).
3. CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, 426-427.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~SECRET~~

MALAYSIA (U)

FOIA (b)(1) EO 12958 Sec 1.5 (c)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	332,556 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	14,179,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4 Percent
LITERACY RATE	48 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	61 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.68 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 19.6 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 1,480
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 2.3 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	22 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Constitutional Monarchy Headed by Paramount Ruler (King); Bicameral Parliament
PARAMOUNT RULER	AHMAD SHAH ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Abu Bakar
PRIME MINISTER, ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER	Dr. MAHATHIR bin Mohamed
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	MuhammadGHAZALI bin Shafie
CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF	GEN Mohamed GHAZALI Seth
CHIEF OF ARMY	GEN ZAIN Mullmud Hashim
CHIEF OF NAVY	VADM Mohamed ZAIN bin Mohamed Salleh
CHIEF OF AIR FORCE	LT GEN Mohamed bin TAIB

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Ronald D. PALMER
DATT	COL Franklin W. COLLINS, USA



[redacted]

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 66, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~(S)~~ However, in June 1981 GOM Treasury officials wished to compare costs of overhaul ($400-$500 million) of the A-4s with direct acquisition of new A-7s, if they would be available to Malaysia. The A-4 program was placed in a hold status. The State Department advised that new A-7s were approved for sale to Malaysia. P&R data on 32 A-7E and 8 TA-7C (twin seat) aircraft, including spares, training, engineer services and other related items at approximately $655 million, was furnished on 15 September. In October the F-16/79 was also offered to Malaysia (see ASEAN Fighter Aircraft at the beginning of this chapter) and a request for P&R data followed. A decision was anticipated in February 1982.[1]

IMET Program

~~(C)~~ An increase from 53 to 225 students forecast for FY 82 was due to IMETP repricing and increased funding from $.315 to $.65 million in FY 81. Prior to FY 82, Malaysia funded all travel for IMET students. Due to budget constraints, the GOM would pay only the overseas portion of travel costs in FY 82. Also, under FY 81 legislation, Malaysia qualified for lower FMS training costs than other countries who were not IMET recipients.[2]

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1. J472 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; J472 Point Papers, 9 Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, Subjects: Malaysia Security Assistance Program and Malaysian Aircraft Purchase Decision (U), DECL 8 Dec 87.
2. J472 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 9 Nov 81, Subj: Malaysian IMET Program (U), DECL 9 Nov 87.

NEW ZEALAND (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	269,000 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	3,176,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE	98 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	67 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.64 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 21.4 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 6,899
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 312.4 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Federal State within Commonwealth recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Sovereign or Head of State
GOVERNOR GENERAL	SIR David BEATTIE
PRIME MINISTER	Robert D. MULDOON
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER & FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER	Warren E. COOPER
MINISTER OF DEFENCE	David S. THOMSON
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF	VADM Neil D. ANDERSON
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, ARMY	MAJ GEN Robin G. WILLIAMS
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	RADM Keith M. SAULL
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	AVM David E. JAMIESON

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. H. Monroe BROWNE
DATT	CAPT James F. CRUMMER, USN



(U) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES (U)

PROMOTE CONTINUED AND ENHANCED COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND NEW ZEALAND FORCES.

MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE OUR CONTINUED ACCESS TO NEW ZEALAND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

ASSIST IN DEVELOPING, MAINTAINING, AND STRENGTHENING MODERN SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

PROMOTE STANDARDIZATION OF METHODS, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES.

[redacted]

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 68, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

NEW ZEALAND

(U) New Zealand continued to purchase defense items on an FMS cash basis. During FY 81 supplies and equipment purchased from the United States amounted to over $12 million and equated to approximately 50 percent of New Zealand's total defense purchases: new equipment--$6 million; ammunition--$5 million; weapons support--$.7 million; miscellaneous items--$2.5 million. Twenty-four New Zealand students participated in U.S. training and attended 17 courses. Costs for training in 1981 amounted to $96,825.[1]

~~(C)~~ Since 1977 the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) had been studying the problem of replacing two aging frigates (out of a total of four). Two U.S. Coast Guard HAMILTON-class cutters were among possible candidates at that time. In 1980 when no decision had been reached, the fate of an RNZN "blue water" navy was dubious and could impact on its ability to meet ANZUS commitments. In October 1981 Minister of Defence Thompson announced that New Zealand would purchase two British LEANDER-class frigates, HMS DIDO and HMS BACCHANTE, plus three WASP helicopters, at a cost just under $100 million.[2]

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1. CINCPAC PEG Report FY 82 on New Zealand ~~(FOUO)~~, p. 1.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 ~~(TS/FRD),~~ Vol. II, p. 334; J5611 Point Paper ~~(C),~~ 15 Dec 81, Subj: New Zealand Decision on a Replacement Combatant Ship (RCS)(U), DECL 15 Dec 87.

PAKISTAN (U)

FOIA(b)(1) E.O. 12958 Sec 1.5 (b)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	830,000 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	24 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	87,720,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	24 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	About 40 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.1 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 23 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 290
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 1.42 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	24 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Islamic Federal Republic
PRESIDENT	GEN ZIA Ul-Haq
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	TALPUR Ali Ahmad
CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, AND CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	GEN ZIA Ul-Haq
MEMBER MILITARY COUNCIL AND ACTING CHAIRMAN JCS COMMITTEE	GEN Mohammad IQBAL Khan
MEMBER MILITARY COUNCIL AND CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	ADM Karamat Rahman NIAZI
MEMBER MILITARY COUNCIL AND CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	ACM Mohammad Anwar SHAMIN

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.



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(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Ronald I. SPIERS
USDRP	COL Harold A. MAUGER, Jr., USAF
DATT	COL William M. KELLER, USAF

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~; p. 69, REVW 13 Feb 02.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS — SECRET

PAKISTAN

(U) Pakistan's IMET program was cut off in April 1979 when intelligence reports revealed Pakistan was acquiring a nuclear arms capability, which violated U.S. nuclear non-proliferation laws [the Symington amendment]. This did not, however, affect FMS cash purchase of equipment and training. On 27 December 1979 the Soviet Union launched a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan. Two days later President Carter condemned the invasion and mentioned options the United States might take in response, including increased military aid to the Government of Pakistan (GOP). CINCPAC and the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) provided prioritized lists of military assistance items that might be provided to Pakistan with and without FMS credit and IMET. On 12 January 1980 Secretary of State Vance met with a Pakistani delegation in Washington led by GOP Foreign Adviser Agha Shahi and spelled out U.S. proposals for increased aid to Pakistan. He announced the President's intent to seek Congressional authorization for $100 million in FMS credit, $100 million in economic aid, and $600,000 in IMET funding for both FY 80 and FY 81. From 1-7 February a team, including National Security Adviser Brzezinski and high level U.S. officials, visited Pakistan for briefings and discussions on, among other things, equipment needs in the near, mid, and long-term.[1]

~~(C)~~ During the following months the United States tried to maintain a dialogue with the Pakistanis on security matters, but by August GOP officials indicated that all proposed actions resulting from the February DOD team visit were held in abeyance and that the only U.S. support desired was a U.S. fighter and help with improvements in defense production industries. This attitude was due in part to Pakistan's desire to maintain its non-aligned status and reluctance to appear pro-American to other Muslim nations--especially Iran.[2]

(U) Unrest continued in Pakistan during 1981 with various political parties demanding the lifting of martial law, the resignation of President Zia-ul Haq, and free elections. Also there was opposition led by family members of former President Ali Bhutto. The number of refugees from Afghanistan climbed to 2.5 million. High-ranking visitors to Pakistan included British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in March who pledged $10 million aid for Afghan refugees; in June Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, Indian Foreign Minister P. Narasimha Rao, and U.S. Under Secretary of State James Buckley; and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin in August. Twice during the year President Zia made overtures to India to negotiate a non-aggression pact.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. II, pp. 437-442; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 16 Jun 81, p. A-8 (U).
2. Op. Cit., Star-Bulletin.
3. Far Eastern Economic Review's Asia 1982 Yearbook, p. 276 (U).

Equipment Requests

~~(S)~~ At the end of 1980 U.S. Ambassador Hummel reported on what he termed a pre-planned, rehearsed meeting with MAJ GEN Aslam Beg, Chief of the General Staff. It was thought to have been directed by President Zia as a preview of future equipment requests by the Pakistan Army. After a briefing on the threat to Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan and India and perceived Soviet intentions in Iran, General Beg outlined Pakistan's defense capabilities. He mentioned a need to turn to the United States for long-term assistance and to enter into serious negotiations for military hardware, training, and other assistance. What the Pakistanis needed was a highly mobile force capable of reacting with speed. The highest priority was air defense systems, such as I-HAWK, CHAPPARAL, or ROLAND, to counter the Soviet air threat. Specifically listed were some type of electronic border surveillance system, a man-portable air defense weapon, armed helicopters, up to 600 additional M48 tanks for upgrade to M48A5 configuration, and an improved 105mm projectile. Resources were not available to completely fund the total effort, and FMS credits were badly needed; also resumption of an IMET program was desired as soon as possible. ODRP officers who attended the meeting pointed out that in view of the new administration [Reagan] and Congress, it would be some time before any action could be expected because new legislation would be required for FMS credit or grant aid arrangements.[1]

(U) In April Foreign Minister Agha Shahi met with Secretary of State Haig and Secretary Weinberger in Washington to resume the dialogue for U.S. assistance. This was followed by a 5-day visit to Pakistan by Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology James Buckley. Buckley met for 2 days of talks with senior Pakistan leaders, including President Zia, and also visited several refugee camps. Discussions focused on an overall framework for U.S. assistance to Pakistan over the next 6 years including cash military sales during 1981 and a 5-year program of economic support funds, development assistance, and FMS credits. The total value was expected to be approximately $3 billion and would be subject to annual Congressional approval. The United States also agreed to the sale of an unspecified number of F-16 aircraft to assist Pakistan's improvement of its air defense capabilities. Details of this and other purchases would be determined at a later meeting in Washington.[2]

~~(S)~~ Immediately afterwards, Ambassador Hummel forwarded two equipment requirements lists received from Pakistan's Defense Secretary-General. One was an Emergency List (6 months), and the other an Overall Requirements List (1 year). The "centerpiece" of both lists was the F-16. The Pakistanis were advised that most of the equipment would entail diversion from U.S. forces with concomitant significant adverse impact on U.S. readiness. Further, Presidential approval and certification to Congress that such diversions would be in

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1. AMEMB Islamabad 13555/311005Z Dec 80 ~~(S)(EX)~~, XDS-1, 12/31/00.
2. Department of State Bulletin, Aug 81, p. 83 (U).

the U.S. national interest would be required. The Ambassador asked that review of these lists begin immediately in preparation for forthcoming Washington discussions between U.S. and GOP officials.[1]

(S) The JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on the lists and, in addition, on the feasibility of exercises with Pakistan beginning around October. CINCPAC recommended a two-step sequence for upgrade of Pakistan's air defense capability and modernization of its ground forces with emphasis on mobility. He first recommended near-term delivery of equipment which the Pakistan Armed Forces could rapidly assimilate and use on their Western border. Many items on the Emergency List fitted this category, and necessary spares, repair parts, and training should be included. After satisfying immediate needs, CINCPAC suggested the substitution of more available, less sophisticated systems. If required, older, rather than newer, items should be diverted from U.S. forces because in all likelihood there would be less adverse impact on U.S. forces, and adapatability by the Pakistanis to older, familiar equipment would be quicker.[2]

(S) Second, training and the in-country logistics infrastructure required to deploy the other additional items should be assessed bilaterally, and then follow-up should be made to assure satisfactory assimilation. CINCPAC stressed that equipment should not be diverted from U.S. forces, especially no U.S. commissioned ships should be transferred because the the naval threat to Pakistan was not critical. CINCPAC supported exercises between U.S. and GOP units on an evolutionary basis. Passing exercises could be initiated in the immediate future if desired.[3]

(C) Beginning 5 July, eight Pakistan Air Force generals toured Nellis, Hill, and Edwards Air Force Bases for orientation and briefings on A-10 and F-16 training and operations and other aviation matters. On 12 July they joined a delegation led by Defense Secretary-General Rahim Khan in Washington, D.C., for meetings with U.S. Defense officials including Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) Director Graves, and Service counterparts. At a briefing given by the Pakistanis, U.S. officials were told of threatening messages from the Soviets to the effect that help given to Afghan refugees amounted to an undeclared state of war against the USSR.[4]

(S) In addition to reviewing equipment lists with Service counterparts, DOD officials provided the Pakistanis with a broad indoctrination in FMS procedures and the DSAA provided a notional table of options and funding for near-term deliveries. The F-16 offer was affirmed in principle, as were some other

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1. J474 HistSum Jul 81 (U); AMEMB Islamabad 7721/151338Z Jun 81 (S), RDS-1, 6/15/01.
2. JCS 061702Z Jul 81 (S), DECL 1 Jul 87; CINCPAC 140325Z Jul 81 (S), DECL 13 Jul 87.
3. CINCPAC 140325Z Jul 81 (S), DECL 13 Jul 87.
4. SECDEF 220127Z Jul 81 (S), DECL 10 Jul 87.

major defense items and equipment. Releasability for E-2C aircraft and missiles (HARPOON, SIDEWINDER (AIM-9L), COPPERHEAD, and STINGER), however, would have to await National Disclosure Policy (NDP) review; SEA SPARROW would also have to await approval by a NATO consortium. The Pakistanis were disappointed to learn of long lead-times, especially on the F-16 (the first six would not be delivered for 27 months), but realized they still needed to make the necessary financial arrangements.[1]

~~(C)~~ After another visit by Secretary Buckley early that month, on 21 September the U.S. Embassy forwarded another refinement of Pakistan's Emergency Requirements List. The list was further divided into two sections--immediate and future. The Embassy asked that LOAs for Immediate items be signed at the earliest possible date and that LOAs be prepared for those Future items awaiting NDP clearance and which would also have to await further Pakistani review. That same day the Secretary of Defense authorized the Army to prepare LOAs for the Immediate items with the exception of the COPPERHEAD, STINGER, and PRC-70 radio. Applicable Congressional notifications were to be provided by the Army to the DSAA by 30 September. The Air Force was to take similar action on F-16 aircraft, related ammunition and supporting equipment, and MK-82 laser-guided bomb kits. Excluded were those systems for which NDP exceptions were required or pending. (The 20-day advance Congressional notice on the F-16s was given on 16 September.)[2]

~~(C)~~ After another refinement conference in October, LOAs for F-16s and MK-82 kits were signed in November, and LOAs for most of the remaining Immediate items, as depicted on the accompanying chart, were signed by MAJ GEN Beg in December in Washington. Pakistan was also furnished P&R data for an additional 100 M48A5 tanks, 10 AH-1S helicopters, and 36 M109A2 155mm (SP) howitzers.[3]

~~(C)~~ With the signing of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act (PL 97-113) on 29 December by President Reagan, application of the Symington amendment to Pakistan was waived for 6 years. As a result, U.S. security assistance program funding for these purchases, plus appropriate training, was proposed as shown below.[4]

	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
FMS Cash	442.7	354.4	191.3		
FMS Credits		275.	300.	325.	325.
IMET	.6	.8			

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1. Ibid.
2. AMEMB Islamabad 12293/210700Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 9/21/87; SECDEF 212157Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 21 Sep 87; SECDEF 162029Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 23 Oct 81.
3. J474 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88.
4. Ibid.

Immediate Requirements

Quantity	Item	Cost in $ million
100	M48A5 Tank	71.7
35	M88A1 Recovery vehicle	33.8
75	M113A2 Armored personnel carrier	10.3
24	M901 Improved TOW vehicle	11.6
75	155mm Howitzer (towed), M198	40.5
40	8-in Howitzer (SP), M110A2	34.5
64	155mm Howitzer (SP), M109A2	49.3
270	STINGER missile	a
1,000	Improved TOW missile	8.8
10	AH-1S Attack helicopter	81.5
8	Mobile assault (ribbon) bridge	27.1
90	5-ton Cargo truck, M813	7.6
100	5-ton Wrecker truck, M816	17.0
Ammunition (rounds)		
1,500	COPPERHEAD/ 50 designator	a
20,000	155mm howitzer HE	b
5,000	8-in howitzer HE	3.6
6,000	155mm howitzer RAP	12.4
20,000	106mm HEAT RR	3.1
5,000	105mm APFSDS-T (tank)	10.2
5,000	105mm HEAT-T (tank)	c
5,000	105mm M490 TP-T training round	c
2,500	M724DS-TP-T (tank)	c
Signal Equipment		
70	AN/PRC-70 Radio	a
100	AN/VSC-2 Radio	10.9
100	AN/PVS-4 Night Sight	4.7
100	AN/TAS-4 Night Sight	10.0
100	AN/TVS-5 Night Sight	d
500	AN/PVS-5 Night Sight	d
100	AN/TAS-6 Night Sight	13.0
Navy		
	HARPOON missiles	a
Air Force		
6	F-16 aircraft (4 F-16B, 2 F-16A)	241.1
34	" " 30 "	818.6
1,000	MK-82 LGB kit (GBU-12)	1.5

a = Release denied.
b = Included in RAP ammunition LOA.
c = Included in M735 ammunition LOA.
d = Included in AN/PVS-4 LOA.

Ships

~~(C)~~ In 1980 the Pakistan Navy (PN) expressed interest in obtaining a destroyer tender, submarine rescue ship, fleet tug, an oiler, and an LST. In 1981 a yard tug and a water barge were also requested. No LSTs were available and the CNO offered to substitute a landing craft repair ship, the ex-USS SPHINX (ARL-24), which had been converted from an LST and which would be suitable to PN needs. No action was taken to acquire the SPHINX by the PN during 1981. On 5 April the ODRP received an LOA request from the PN for the destroyer tender ex-USS EVERGLADES (AD-24), and the Secretary of Defense approved the FMS sale, contingent upon anticipated Congressional approval of a ship transfer bill later in the year.[1]

~~(C)~~ In late June the ODRP had been informally requested by the PN to inquire about P&A data and "hot ship" (running condition) transfer of OLIVER HAZARD PERRY- and BROOKE-class guided missile frigates, GARCIA-class frigates, SH-3(H) helicopters, and SEA SPARROW missiles (P&A only). The ODRP was of the impression that the Pakistanis wished these items to be added to the Emergency Requirements List being worked by the Buckley team. On 1 July the Embassy forwarded a request for P&R data on three BARBEL-class submarines with basic loads of MK-48 torpedoes. Also 8 submarine chasers or GEARING-class destroyers had been in the Immediate section while 2 TANG-class submarines, and 1 each YTM, YO, YW, and ARS (salvage ship) were listed in the Future section.[2]

~~(C)~~ On 14-15 September the Pakistan Naval Attache in Washington, D.C., visited the U.S. Inactive Ship Detachment, Pearl Harbor and selected a yard tug (YTM-496), a yard oiler (YO-47), and a yard water barge (YW-86). Subsequently, the PN was advised that only YTM-496 was available for FMS purchase. At the end of 1981 discussions between the CNO and the PN concerning potential transfer or lease of these and other yard craft were continuing.[3]

Destroyers

~~(C)~~ Two of a planned total of six GEARING-class destroyers were transferred to Pakistan during 1977 and two others in 1980. In November 1981 there were indications that the last two would also be purchased. The U.S. Navy offered the ex-USS SOUTHERLAND (DD-743) which could be made available for "cold ship" (from inactive storage) transfer, subject to Congressional approval. The PN preferred to wait for hot ship transfer upon the retirement of USS CONE (DD-866) and HAROLD J. ELLISON (DD-864) in FY 82 and FY 83 respectively. Congressional notification and approval were expected in 1982. The PN decided to

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1. ODRP 7200/220958Z Jul 80 ~~(C)~~; J474 HistSum May 81 ~~(C)~~; DECL 10 Jun 87.
2. J474 HistSum Jul 81 (U); AMEMB Islamabad: 8359/291049Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~; RDS-1 6/29/01, 8507/010957Z Jul 81 (U), 12293/210700Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~; GDS 9/21/87.
3. CNO 040106Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~; DECL 31 Oct 87; J474 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~; DECL 12 Jan 88; ODRP 15943/010216Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~; DECL 11/29/87.

delay a final decision until after inspection of the ships nearer the time of their retirement.[1]

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1. J474 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88; CNO 040107Z Nov 81 ~~(D)~~, DECL 31 Oct 87.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (U)

~~E.O. 12958~~

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	475,369 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	3,204,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE	35 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	50 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	Unknown
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 2.67 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 480
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 30 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	3.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Independent State within the Commonwealth recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State
GOVERNOR GENERAL	Sir Tore LOKOLOKO
PRIME MINISTER	Sir Julius CHAN
DEFENSE MINISTER	Gerega PAPENA
COMMANDER PNG DEFENSE FORCE	BGEN Gaga M. MAMAE

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize Papua New Guinea's claim of archipelagic status.

[redacted]

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Virginia SCHAFER
DATT*	COL William H. HOLMES, III, USA

* No DATT permanently assigned. U.S. Army Attache Australia performs DATT duties (TDY) once a quarter.

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 70, REVW 13 Feb 02.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

(U) The Australian Armed Forces were the principal source of military assistance for Papua New Guinea (PNG) since it received its independence from Australia in 1975. Some U.S. military equipment, however, was supplied through third-party transfers from Australia.[1]

(U) As an outgrowth of requests in 1979-80 by the U.S. Embassy in Port Moresby and CINCPAC, the State Department allocated $12,000 in IMET funds for two members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force to attend a U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal course in July 1980. This and similar efforts resulted in a Presidential Determination in December 1980 whereby the PNG was declared eligible for FMS under Section 3(A)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.[2]

(U) In February 1981 the Embassy requested IMET funds for attendance by the PNG Chief Legal Officer at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General basic course the following July. With the reprogramming of FY 81 IMET funds by the State Department, the request was granted. Also in 1981 the Embassy and CINCPAC requested IMET funding of $20,000 for FY 82 and beyond. Funding for in that amount was approved for FY 82.[3]

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1. AMEMB Port Moresby 788/180415Z May 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD),~~ Vol. II, p. 445.
3. J462 HistSums Feb, Dec 81 (U).

PHILIPPINES (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	300,440 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	49,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	83 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	59 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.52 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 31 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 463
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 850 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	10 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic
PRESIDENT	Ferdinand E. MARCOS
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Carlos P. ROMULO
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	Juan P. ENRILE
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP	GEN Fabian C. VER
CG, ARMY	MAJ GEN Josephus Q. RAMAS
FOIC, NAVY	RADM Simeon M. ALEJANDRO
CG, AIR FORCE (ACTING)	BGEN Petronio M. LAPENA
CHIEF CONSTABULARY	LT GEN Fidel RAMOS

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize the Philippines claim of archipelagic status.



[redacted]

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR (Designate)	HON. Michael H. ARMACOST
CINCPACREP PHIL	RADM Richard M. DUNLEAVY, USN
CHIEF JUSMAGPHIL	BGEN John W. FOSS, USA
DATT	COL Richard G. WOODHULL, USAF

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 71, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

PHILIPPINES

(U) President Reagan's election presaged improved relationships with the Philippines. On 17 January 1981 President Marcos lifted martial law, and in March he expressed satisfaction with President Reagan's policies. (This was about the time the Administration's FY 82 Security Assistance budget was presented to the Congress, with special consideration for the Philippines and other Asian countries.) Although political and Muslim unrest continued during the year, U.S.-GOP relations were strengthened by Vice President Bush's attendance at President Marcos' inauguration on 30 June, a visit by Marcos to Hawaii in October, and an invitation for Marcos to visit Washington in 1982. Economic problems still plagued the Philippines. Maintenance of the $50 million FMS credit and an increase in IMET funding levels in FY 82 were sought to assuage the ending of MAP in FY 81, improve the climate for base negotiations in 1983-84, and increase Filipino self-reliance. Additionally, the U.S. Embassy and CINCPAC requested funding of a modest Grant Aid program of some $20 million for FY 83.[1]

Support for F-8H Aircraft

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In 1977 the Philippines had signed an LOA for 35 F-8H fighter aircraft but delivery was not completed until late 1979. Numerous problems had plagued the program, including training; acquistion of spare parts, support equipment, and ammunition; faulty refurbishing procedures; and computer problems. In addition, Philippine Air Force (PAF) development of support requirements for these and other items was on a piecemeal basis with commensurate delays. The operationally ready rate was low, as was morale. There was slow but correctable airframe corrosion, slow construction of support facilities, and questionable payments to agents of the manufacturer.[2]

~~(C)~~ At the end of 1980 the foremost concern of the PAF Commander was the procurement of triple ejector racks (TER) required for external ordnance to make the aircraft fully mission capable. An LOA of July 1978 requested 18 TERs with a projected lead-time of 24 months, but by November 1980 none had been received. Investigation by CINCPAC revealed that the contract had not yet been awarded and the lead-time, once awarded, would still be 24-30 months. Attempts to procure from U.S. Navy stocks and assets were unsuccessful due to critical shortages in the U.S. system. Plans were then made to borrow 12 similar TERs from the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing at Clark. On 12 January 1981 the Chief of

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1. Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1982 Yearbook, pp. 276-277 (U); J453 HistSum Jun 81 (U); CINCPAC 010836Z May 81 ~~(C/NF)~~, DECL 22 Apr 87; 190105Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 19 May 87; 260309Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Jun 87; 020322Z Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 23 Nov 87; AMEMB Manila 27305/180846Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/18/87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 455-456; J475 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C/NF)~~, DECL 7 Oct 87; USDLO Hong Kong 180310Z Sep 81 ~~(C/NF)~~, DECL 15 Sep 87.

Naval Operations (CNO) advised that a recent delivery to Navy inventory would enable issue of 18 TERS from U.S. Navy assets. Replacement would be from procurement under the FMS case.[1]

~~(C)~~ The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) signed LOAs in June 1980 for certain cartridge and propellant activated devices (CAD/PAD) used in aircrew escape systems. In March 1981 the AFP requested accelerated delivery of four CAD/PAD items because most F-8H aircraft would be grounded by late summer or early fall if not received. Coordination by CINCPAC and Chief JUSMAG Philippines with U.S. Navy and Air Force activities resulted in acquisition of three items by June. On 15 July the CNO advised that the fourth, an impulse cartridge gas generator, would be provided. Two other devices followed the same pattern. In September the Navy announced a program to improve support to customer countries for CAD/PAD and aircrew escape propulsion systems with a definitive 5-year case replacing 1-year cases.[2]

Engineer Equipment

(C/NOFORN) Philippine Army (PA) engineer units had been equipped by MAP in 1966-67 and most of their equipment was worn out. Over 25 percent of FY 80 and 81 MAP funds had been committed to engineer construction equipment. There was a serious internal defense problem in Northern Samar because the New People's Army had increased its activity there and caused the AFP to deploy several more PA and Philippine Constabulary (PC) battalions to the area. In conjunction with the increased combat deployments, the AFP also accelerated a civil action program and deployed an engineer construction battalion to the area. On 11 February JUSMAG was advised that the original estimated delivery dates (end of 1980) for most of the heavy construction MAP items had slipped to June 1982; delivery of the critically needed dump trucks had been delayed until December 1983. The desired equipment consisted of ten dump trucks, four scoop loaders, three road graders, eleven tractor dozers, two earth augers, and two road rollers. A few days later, the Philippine Deputy Minister of Defense in a letter to JUSMAG had requested that delivery of 1980 MAP engineer equipment be expedited. JUSMAG asked CINCPAC for all possible assistance to expedite delivery, to include diversion if possible. The difficulties encountered would be worth the results for both AFP and U.S. interests.[3]

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC supported this effort and endorsed the request for diversion to the Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). The urgency was underscored by the report of a logistics assistance visit made by a USASAC Customer Relations Team (Pacific) in January and February. Further importance of early delivery was added by President Marcos on 22 March. CINCPAC then urged special emphasis by the USASAC due to the new political significance attached

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1. J475 HistSums Dec 80 (U) and Jan 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Feb 87.
2. J475 HistSums May, Jun, Jul, Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL Jun, Jul, Aug, Oct 87, respectively, and Jun 80, Aug 81 (U).
3. J475 HistSum Apr 81 (U); JUSMAGPHIL 020815Z Mar 81 ~~(C/NF)~~, DECL 2 Mar 87.

to the issue. Ultimately the following items were incorporated into the FY 80-81 MAP requests for expedited delivery:[1]

22	2½ ton dump trucks	22	dozer tractors
8	scoop (4-wheel) loaders	6	road graders
2	earth augers	3	road rollers

(U) During the months following there were numerous messages exchanged between SECDEF, CINCPAC, JUSMAGPHIL, USASAC, the Army's Tank Automotive Command, and Military Traffic Management Command in efforts to obtain sole source contracting, expedited production and shipping, and waivers for the use of MAP funds for stevedore charges for off-loading in the Port of Manila. (Due to the size of equipment and distance from Subic Bay, off-load in Manila was desired to ease coordination with the AFP.) All the equipment except three road graders, twelve dozer tractors, the earth augers, and road rollers sailed aboard the SS BUTTON GWINNETT and arrived in the Port of Manila on 7 November. The remaining road graders and dozer tractors arrived aboard the SS SAM HOUSTON in late December. (Production of the augers and rollers would not be finished until late in 1982).[2]

(U) The off-load of the BUTTON GWINNETT was observed by three AFP generals and received wide TV and newspaper coverage in Manila. Presentation of the equipment was made to President Marcos on Philippine Armed Forces Day (21 December). High praise for the extra effort by all involved was extended by JUSMAG and the Philippine Government from Deputy Minister of Defense Crisol. He said, "The reduction in the delivery period is beyond my expectations. The expeditious delivery of the equipment cannot by any measure be considered small . . ." CINCPAC conveyed similar accolades, as did the U.S. Embassy in Manila by relaying remarks of President Marcos and other high GOP officials on this accomplishment "as a tangible benefit of our security assistance program and the US-RP security relationship." CINCPAC and the Embassy also asked for continued effort on the road rollers and earth augers.[3]

Disposal of Excess Small Arms

(U) Based on Section 505(A)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, U.S. Government policy for the disposal of excess MAP-furnished items required their return when profitable. If their return would incur a net loss, then the recipient country was to accept financial responsibility for demilitarization and disposal. If the recipient country were reluctant to accept the financial responsibility, arrangements could be made to offset such losses with proceeds (gains) from other approved disposal actions.[4]

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1. J475 HistSums Apr, Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC 270044Z Mar 81 (C), DECL 25 Mar 87.
2. J475 HistSums May-Dec 81 (U).
3. J475 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CHJUSMAGPHIL 020010Z Dec 81 (U); J475 HistSum Jan 82 (U); AMEMB Manila 1961/220159Z Jan 82 (U).
4. J475 HistSum Feb 81 (U); SECDEF 312012Z Mar 80 (U).

(U) In May 1980 Chief JUSGMAGPHIL advised CINCPAC that the AFP had approximately 30,000 small arms of various makes and condition which were available for turn-in. Many were of World War II vintage (M1903 Springfield Rifles, water-cooled machine guns, M-1 rifles, and carbines) and were considered worthless except as scrap. Neither the JUSMAG nor the AFP had the manpower to accomplish the required accountability, and a one-time waiver of normal disposal procedures was requested. CINCPAC replied that certification of demilitarization/destruction of the weapons by type and quantity was required but not by serial number. Later, when JUSMAG advised that the mix included some non-MAP weapons and that the AFP Logistics Command was still "unwilling or unable" to handle the disposal, CINCPAC requested SECDEF authorizaton to repudiate title to these weapons. The SECDEF approval was based on the "potential demilitarization costs to the USG and in view of the uncertain MAP origin of some of these small arms." Accordingly, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 7 October 1981 by the Chief JUSMAGPHIL and the Chief AFP which called for disposal/demilitarization by the AFP within 6 months in whatever manner the AFP desired so long as they were inventoried by number and type (with copy to JUSMAG) and a JUSMAG observer was present. Any cost or benefit derived would accrue to the AFP.[1]

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1. J475 HistSums Feb, Dec 81 (U).

SINGAPORE

Pilot Exchange Program

~~(C)~~ U.S. Ambassador Kneip forwarded a request on 30 May 1980 from Singapore's Minister of Defense for an F-5 TIGER 2 and A-4 SKYHAWK pilot exchange program. In June the U.S. Air Force approved an F-5 exchange and recommended a separate program for the A-4. CINCPAC provided three options in November to the U.S. Marine Corps which had received the tasking from the Chief of Naval Operations. The Marine Corps expressed "regret that all potential alternatives for exchange are infeasible because of the number of A-4 pilots available and their pending transition to AV-8Bs." In March Ambassador Kneip and Admiral Long asked General Barrow, Commandant of the Marine Corps, to reconsider the request. The General reaffirmed his regrets. Later in the year the U.S. Navy decided to fulfill the request with the exchange commencing by mid-1982.[1]

Training Costs

(U) Singapore was the only ASEAN country which did not receive IMET, FMS credit, or Grant Aid. Training was purchased under FMS and had extensive surcharges added that did not apply to IMET cases. In a September 1980 message to the Chairman of the JCS Admiral Long commented on the proposed FY 81 security assistance legislation which provided Japan, Australia, and New Zealand with NATO-like reduced training costs, and pointed out that Singapore "could be the only nation in the Pacific required to pay full FMS tuition costs for U.S. training." While realizing that it was too late for including Singapore in the FY 81 legislative package, Admiral Long asked the Chairman to assist in the development of and support for legislation which would provide Singapore with equitable tuition pricing.[2]

~~(C)~~ In a February 1981 message to the State Department, U.S. Ambassador Thayer recounted these points and indicated that passage of the legislation with the Glenn amendment had further accentuated the inequity. He asked that a small IMET program for Singapore be included in the FY 82 defense budget. Benefits from even a small token reduction in training costs would be twofold: additional trainees could be sent to the United States, and it would provide a positive sign of U.S. interest by removing a "moderately nettlesome factor" in relations with Singapore. The Ambassador also cited Singapore's cooperation in allowing U.S. use of Singapore's facilities and air space in support of Indian Ocean activities. (There had been an average of two planes and one ship per day transiting the Singapore area during in 1980).[3]

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1. J472 HistSums Apr, Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL May 87, Jan 88; CMC 231602Z Feb 80 (sic)~~(C)~~, DECL Feb 86.
2. CINCPAC 032140Z Sep 80 (U).
3. AMEMB Singapore 1268/090729Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 2/9/87.

SINGAPORE (U)

FOIA (b)(1) E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.4 (b)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	583 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE	12 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	2,406,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.2 Percent
LITERACY RATE	70 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	71 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.01 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 9.0 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 3,810
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 604.6 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	16.6 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic within Commonwealth
PRESIDENT	C.V. Devan NAIR
PRIME MINISTER	LEE Kuan Yew
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER	GOH Keng Swee
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Suppiah DHANABALAN
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	HOWE Yoon Chong
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF	MAJ GEN Winston CHOO Wee Leong
COMMANDER, ARMY	
3RD DIVISION	COL Mancharan singh GILL
COMMANDER, SINGAPORE NAVY	COL KHOO Eng Ang
ACTING COMMANDER AIR FORCE	LT COL TEO Eng Cheng

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea.

[redacted]

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Harry E.T. THAYER
DATT	CAPT Thomas DURANT, USN

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 72, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

(U) The State Department assented to these requests, established a $10,000 IMET program for Singapore for FY 81, and included a requests for $50,000 in its presentations to Congress for FY 82 and FY 83.[1]

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1. J472 HistSum May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 9 Jun 87; FY 83 CPD (U).

SRI LANKA (U)

FOIA (b)(1) E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 b

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	65,610 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	24 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	14,973,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	82 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	68 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.3 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 3.5 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 253
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 41.4 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	6.0 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Democratic Socialist Republic with French Style President

PRESIDENT & MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Mr. Junius R. JAYEWARDENE
PRIME MINISTER	MR. Ranasinghe PREMADASA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	MR. A.C.S. HAMEED
ARMY COMMANDER	MAJ GEN Tissa Indika WEERATUNGA
NAVY COMMANDER	RADM A.W.H. PERERA
AIR FORCE COMMANDER	AVM D.C. PERERA

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea and does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. Donald R. TOUSSAINT
DATT	CDR John L. MILLER, USN



[redacted]

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 73, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

SRI LANKA

Ship Transfer

~~(C)~~ During the October 1977 Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar, the Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) discussed with CINCPAC the possibility of acquiring a "training ship." He was informed that availability of destroyer/frigate type ships was not optimistic, but that acquisition of smaller type vessels could be explored. At the end of that year a letter request was being forwarded through diplomatic channels for a HAMILTON-class Coast Guard cutter either as a gift or at a nominal cost. The ship would be used primarily for training SLN personnel, with auxiliary fishing and petroleum research activities. In February 1978 the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) was advised that the U.S. Government was unable to fill the request. In March CINCPAC asked JCS support to seek a fleet ocean tug (ATF) as an alternative, but the JCS replied that none would be available until FY 83.[1]

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ In early 1981 the DATT advised that the GSL was considering a Soviet Union offer of a training ship. CINCPAC continued support for the transfer of an ATA which could be used for salvage, coastal patrolling, rescue, and training in gunnery techniques. The Ambassador formally offered the USS TUNICA (AT-178) for lease with preliminary estimated refurbishment costs of $1.54 million. He suggested that a U.S. Navy survey team could develop a detailed reactivation work package for $7,500. Once the reactivation was completed, the U.S. Navy would sail the ship to Sri Lanka.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 ~~(TS/FRD,~~ Vol. II, p. 350; 1978, Vol. II, p. 473.
2. J472 HistSum Oct 79 ~~(S),~~ DECL 9 Nov 85; CNO 160028Z Apr 80 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 86; USDAO Colombo 494/010900Z Oct 80 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 86; AMB Toussaint Ltr (U), 10 Nov 80 to Mr. W. T. Jayasinghe, Sec, MOFA; AMEMB Colombo 6068/150905Z Dec 80 ~~(C),~~ GDS 12/15/86.
3. USDAO Colombo 25/091115Z Jan 80 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 87; J478 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 10 Mar 87; USDAO Colombo 123/170500Z Feb 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 31 Dec 87.

~~(C)~~ The main thrust of activity in 1981 centered on determining the appropriate method of financing the ship transfer. CINCPAC suggested the possibility of seeking, on an extraordinary basis, FMS credit financing to help defer the impact of full refurbishment costs. In April Admiral Hayward, CNO, gave his personal support to the transfer by having the survey team costs incorporated in FMS pre-sale funding. By October 1981 efforts were directed towards obtaining $2 million in FMS credits. Failing inclusion in the State Department FY 82 or FY 83 budget proposals, personal pleas were made during November by the Ambassador, CINCPAC, the CNO, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Secretary of the Navy towards reprogramming for FY 83 or for reallocation of FY 82 FMS funds for the ship transfer. On 28 December the Secretary of Defense assured all concerned that the matter was continuing to receive priority attention and that a decision from the State Department was expected in the near future.[1]

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1. J474 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 13 Jan 88; CNO 101401Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 7 Apr 87; CNO 061505Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 30 Nov 87; SECDEF 281002Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 24 Dec 87.

THAILAND

(U) Sporadic border clashes between Vietnamese troops and members of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) continued during 1981. Internally there were still problems with communist insurgency along the Malaysian border areas, refugees, and inflation. There also was an attempted coup led by the RTARF Deputy Commander in Chief on 3 April.[1]

~~(C)~~ Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon made his first visit to Washington, D.C., in early October 1981 to meet with President Reagan and other senior Administration members. Achievements of the visit which, according to a State Department report, included a demonstration of the strength of U.S.-Thai relations, underscoring of the U.S. commitment to Thai security, explaining U.S. actions on refugees, U.S. determination on narcotics control, coordinating an approach to the Kampuchea problem, enhancing Prem's image as a world leader, and broadening the economic aspects of U.S.-Thai relations.[2]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand and the Chief JUSMAG Thailand also participated in some of the discussions. Among logistics and security assistance subjects discussed were a joint U.S.-Thai logistics CPX, FMS credit, a larger JUSMAG, REDEYE missiles, A-4 aircraft, and M-48A5 tanks.[3]

Funding

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC had supported enhanced levels of $2 million for IMET and $70 million for FMS credit for FY 82 in the June 1980 Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance input. In January 1981 the State Department also believed further increases were merited for FY 82 military and economic support to Thailand. The FY 82 Congressional Presentation Document request for $131 million was over three times the original FY 79 level and a 60 percent increase over FY 81. The actual allocation, however, reduced the proposed $80 million in FMS credit to $62.5 million for guaranty credit only, plus $4.5 in MAP investment funds as compensation for denial of $50 million in direct credit. Also, the $2 million IMET level was reduced to $1.45 million.[4]

~~(C)~~ Among equipment which was either delivered or on which procurement action had been consummated in 1981 were FMS cases for 14,483 M16A1 rifles, 56 106mm recoilless rifles, 14 UH-1H helicopters, 5,296 AN/PRC-68 radios, 400,000

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1. Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1982 Yearbook, p. 279 (U).
2. J473 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 10 Nov 87.
3. J473 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 22 Oct 81, Subj: Thai Prime Minister's Trip to Washington (U), DECL 22 Oct 87.
4. J473 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 17 Dec 81, Subj: Security Assistance Program-Thailand (U), DECL 17 Dec 87; SECSTATE 29229/050330Z Feb 81 ~~(S)~~(EX), GDS 2/4/87; FY 83 CPD (U).

THAILAND (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION (U)

LAND AREA	512,820 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	48,328,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.3 Percent
LITERACY RATE	70 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	61 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.7 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1981)	$ 32.9 Billion
PER CAPITA (1981)	$ 708
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 80)	$ 1.36 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	19.8 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Constitutional Monarchy

KING	PHUMIPHON Adunyadet
PRIME MINISTER & MINISTER OF DEFENSE	PREM Tinsulanon
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	ACM (Ret) SITTHI Savetsila
SUPREME COMMANDER, ARMED FORCES	GEN SAIYUD Koetphon
CINC ARMY	GEN PRAHUDY Charumani
CINC NAVY	ADM SOMBOON Chuaphibu
CINC AIR FORCE	ACM DAKLEOW Susilvorn

* The United States only recognizes a 3 nautical mile territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	HON. John Gunther DEAN
CHIEF JUSMAGTHAI	COL Richard L. WEAVER, USA
DATT	COL Jerry A. CRIST, USAF



[redacted]

SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 75, REVW 13 Feb 02.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ ~~SECRET~~

rounds of 76mm (M41) tank ammunition, 2 Bell 412 helicopters, and the MK-82 laser guided bomb system, as well as the REDEYE missile (see below).[1]

~~(S)~~ Other equipment requests which were under consideration during 1981 included additional M-48A5 tanks, 155mm towed (M-198) howitzers, the COPPERHEAD (XM712) cannon-launched guided projectile with its associated ground laser locator designator, nuclear-biological-chemical detector kits and decontamination equipment, 30mm gun systems, MK-84 LGB systems, and aircraft (see below).[2]

Aircraft

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ In December 1980 the U.S. Embassy advised that the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) had embarked on a rather ambitious 5-10 year upgrade and modernization program. The RTAF wished to increase quantities and capabilities of both interceptor and close-air-support type aircraft. Because the modernization program would compete for the same dollars, P&R requests were submitted for a wide array so that the RTAF could select the aircraft system(s) best suited to their needs and affordability. Included were requests for P&R data on OV-10, A-37B, A-4E, A-7A, F-5G, and 25 F-16/79 aircraft from active U.S. Air Force inventories, vice new production. In January 1981 the Secretary of Defense advised that assets for the first four types were not available from inventory. He also indicated that the production lines for the RF-5, A-10, and A-7 were still in operation while the F-16/79 and F-5G had not yet reached the production stage. Also, CINCPAC was to make assessments and recommendations on providing F-16/79, RF-5, F-5G, A-10, OV-1D, OV-1C, and/or A-7 aircraft to Thailand. The CINCPAC position did not recommend the A-7, except as a last resort, but supported, with qualifications, all the remaining aircraft. The DSAA provided P&R to Thailand on these seven aircraft on 15 April. On 20 April the RTAF requested P&R data on 25 F-16/100 (F-16A) aircraft to make additional comparisons. After receiving comments from PACAF and PACFLT, CINCPAC supported

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1. J473 Point Papers ~~(S)~~, 24 Jul & Nov 81, Subj: Thailand Security Assistance Program-High Visibility Items (U), DECL 30 Nov 87.
2. Ibid.; J473 HistSums Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Jan 88.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1978 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 475-479; J476 HistSum Sep 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 9 Oct 86; NCR THAI ~~(C)~~ 260425Z Apr 80 ~~(C)(BOM)~~; REVW 26 Apr 00; J472 HistSum Apr 80 (U).

release of F-16A P&R data to Thailand for purposes of cost comparison, but at the time did not support acquisition.[1]

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ As a result of a request from Indonesia, a CINCPAC Weapons Release Review Group was convened on 16 November to consider release of the F-16A to ASEAN members. The group ultimately agreed that refusal to allow ASEAN countries an opportunity to purchase the F-16/100 would imply relegation of these countries to second class status, be an obstacle to our long range objectives, and be counterproductive to U.S. strategy considerations. On 25 December CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that a policy in principle be established to respond positively to ASEAN country requests for the F-16/100, as well as for the F-16/79 and F-5G aircraft.[3]

MANPAD System

~~(C)~~ In January 1980 the JCS requested CINCPAC comments on the sale of the Basic STINGER (previously known as REDEYE II) man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) surface-to-air missile to certain countries, including three in the PACOM region: Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea. After soliciting component reviews, CINCPAC concurred with the tentative position proposed by the JCS that the Basic STINGER not be released to Thailand and Malaysia. At the time, CINCPAC opposition was based on uncertain security for the weapon and its technology, lack of an effective in-country command and control system, and absence of an existing military requirement.[4]

~~(C)~~ On 15 October 1980 the Chief JUSMAG Thailand forwarded a Thai request for P&A data on 10, 40, 60, and 100 REDEYE missiles. Noting that Royal Thai Army (RTA) officials were anxious to obtain the REDEYE even after being advised of certain technical difficulties with the missile, the Embassy supported the request on 29 January 1981. The Embassy also suggested, as an alternative if

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1. J473 HistSum May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 11 Jun 87.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 25315/010908Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, GDS 5/26/87 and 52109/091217Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/07/87.
3. J4/Memo/S852 ~~(S)~~, 14 Dec 81, Subj: Release of Fighter Aircraft to ASEAN (U), DECL 14 Dec 87; J472 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 12 Jan 88.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. II, p. 383; J472 Histsum Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 6 Apr 87.

the decision were made to deny release of the REDEYE to Thailand, that an RTA cadre receive REDEYE training and that a small number of REDEYEs be earmarked for a Thai emergency. CINCPAC concurred with this recommendation.[1]

~~(C)~~ On 18 March 1981 the JCS developed new release criteria for STINGER, and asked if CINCPAC would, in view of the June 1980 Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, continue to oppose release. After soliciting comments from component commands and JUSMAG, CINCPAC supported release of the Basic STINGER provided the new JCS criteria were met, there were satisfactory arrangements for command and control and long term security of weapons and technology, and PACOM forces were equipped before release to other nations.[2]

~~(C)~~ When Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon visited Washington, D.C., in early October, the REDEYE request was elevated to the political arena. As a result, on 5 November the Secretary of Defense authorized the sale of 20 weapons plus one field handling trainer and other materials with a case value of $598 thousand. The RTG signed the LOA on 4 December. A promise was also made for the furnishing of additional REDEYEs should a contingency arise. As 1981 closed, JCS action to add Thailand to the list of countries approved for release of STINGER was still under review, but in view of the REDEYE sale, the STINGER request was considered closed for the near term.[3]

(U) The 20 REDEYE missiles arrived in Bangkok on 27 February 1982 and were turned over by Ambassador Dean to RTARF Supreme Commander General Saiyud Kerdphol in an airport ceremony. According to the Embassy, media coverage was extensive and favorable.[4]

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1. J473 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S),~~ DECL 14 Jan 88.
2. J472 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(S),~~ DECL 12 May 87; CINCPAC 010837Z May 81 ~~(S),~~ DECL 30 Apr 87.
3. J473 HistSums Oct, Dec 81 ~~(S),~~ DECL Nov 87 and Jan 88; CDRUSASAC 061745Z Nov 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 5 Nov 87.
4. J473 HistSum Feb 82 (U); AMEMB Bangkok 13380/011058Z Mar 82 (LOU).

CHAPTER VII

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

SECTION I--COMMAND AND CONTROL

The PACOM Command and Control System

~~(C)~~ The major components of the PACOM command and control system were the CINCPAC Command Center, CINCPAC Alternate Command Post, CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), subordinate unified command centers (COMUS Korea and COMUS Japan), and component command centers (CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CDRWESTCOM). Other parts of the command and control system were command centers of joint task forces when deployed under the operational control of CINCPAC, and primary and alternate command centers of all U.S. headquarters down to the level required to execute necessary war plans (including nuclear) and fulfill the CINCPAC mission.[1]

(X1)
(G)

[redacted]

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1. C3SRD Ltr Ser S139 ~~(S/NF)~~, 26 Mar 81, Subj: PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (U), REVW 30 Jun 00.
2. C3SRD Ltr Ser T35 ~~(TS)~~, 26 Mar 81, Subj: Enclosure (4), Nuclear Operations to PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (PCCSMP) (U), REVW 30 Jun 00.



(U) CINCPAC's Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) automatic data processing facilities consisted of the PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center at Makalapa, the CINCPAC Command Center, and the Airborne Command Post Ground Facility. PACOM subunified command WWMCCS ADP facilities were at Camp Walker (Taegu), Headquarters U.S. Forces Korea, and Yokota AB. Component command facilities were at Makalapa, Hickam AFB, and Fort Shafter.[2]

Command and Control System Improvements

CINC C2 Initiative Funds

(U) The 1978 Defense Science Board Task Force on Command and Control Systems Management had concluded that the nation was failing to deploy command and control systems commensurate with the nature of likely future warfare, the use of modern weapon systems, or the available technological and industrial base. The task force determined that a stronger focus on command and control was needed. A number of initiatives were launched as a result of this study. First, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in mid-1979 established a Command, Control, and Communications Systems (C3S) Directorate which would cut across Service lines and insure the compatibility and operational effectiveness of all command and control systems. It was recognized that each major military command had to be able to adapt, modernize, and maintain its own command and control system to fit the needs of the command. At the same time, strengthening the capabilities of the Services and of the unified and specified commands

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1. C3SRD Ltr Ser S139 (~~S/NF~~), 26 Mar 81, Subj: Enclosure (5), Baseline PACOM Command and Control Facilities to PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (U), REVW 30 Jun 00.
2. Ibid.

for evaluating, operating, and identifying functions for command and control systems was found to be a valid requirement.[1]

(U) A general/flag officer steering group, in examining the means for increasing participation by field commanders, recommended the establishment of fixed CINC discretionary funds to meet near-term command and control needs. These came to be known as CINC C2 Initiative Funds. The steering group also recommended that CINCs be provided C2 engineering personnel to meet their support needs. Accordingly, a WWMCCS Systems Engineering-Pacific office was established at CINCPAC Headquarters in October 1980. In addition, there was increased CINCPAC participation in the planning, programming, and budgeting system cycle in Washington on matters concerning command, control, and communications in the PACOM.[2]

(U) CINCPAC determined that the emphasis of C2 Initiative Funds should be placed on low-cost, near-term fixes to existing systems that would promote interoperability among Services and allies and result in evolutionary upgrade to the system or greater adaptability to PACOM needs. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense stipulated that the funds were discretionary for the CINCs, and not for the JCS, the Services, or the OSD; however, funds could not be diverted without OSD approval. Further, CINCs had to obtain JCS approval for projects costing more than $300,000. The funds could not be used to purchase equipment or services for a specific project year after year, and the projects required completion within one year from fund obligation.[3]

(U) CINCPAC first received CINC C2 Initiative Funds of $1.269 million for FY 81. Projects for FY 81 included studies of the CINCPAC Command Center and the U.S.-Japan Coordination Center; digital voice protection radios for the CINC during his travels, for Korea, and for the CINCPAC Special Operations Division (J36); Project APACHE hardening on Oahu; millimeter wave radios for COMUS Korea; and terminals for the Missile Warning Display, Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) Conferencing Network, and APACHE. Largest cost items were $470,000 for research and development of the millimeter wave radios, and $300,000 for APACHE. For FY 82, CINCPAC was to be provided $1.884 million in C2 Initiative Funds. Projects tentatively identified were as follows:[4]

- Operations and maintenance of the Missile Warning Display and Project APACHE terminals procured in FY 81.

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1. C3SRD1 HistSum Nov 81 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC Instruction 2880.1 (U), 1 Sep 81, Subj: PACOM Command and Control (C2) Initiatives Program.
4. C3SRD1 HistSum Mar 81 (U); C3SRD1 Point Paper (U), 22 Sep 81, Subj: FY 82 CINC C2 Initiative Funds; CINCPAC 290323Z Aug 81 (U).

- Engineering, procurement, and installation of "barebones" hardware necessary to establish the U.S.-Japan Coordination Center, based on recommendations of the FY 81 MITRE Corporation study.

- APACHE electromagnetic pulse hardening and protection verification on Oahu by the Navy and by contractors.

- WWMCCS Continuity of Service facilities to provide alternate connectivity between Oahu WWMCCS computers to maintain network survivability.

- Crisis management training scenarios for personnel of the CINCPAC Command Center, Crisis Action Team, and ABNCP, to be developed by contractors.

- The MITRE Corporation effort to analyze the Crisis Action Team functions of the Logistics Readiness Center, Nuclear Operations Center, Operations Planning Group, and Alternate Command Post/Airborne Command Post.

- The MITRE Corporation study of ADP functions required in the Korea Intelligence Support System (providing matching funds of $150,000 was budgeted by the Army).

- Prototype secure facsimile equipment, pending receipt of the Defense Communications Agency's Secure Voice/Graphics Conferencing system capability.

- CINCPAC Voice Alert Network upgrading at Clark AB, to improve reliability and maintainability of the circuit. Cost to be shared by Hawaiian Telephone Company.

- WWMCCS Visual Information Processor terminals, to allow centralized training of CINCPAC personnel in Joint Operation Planning System III use.

- Magnetic tape cleaner/tester for CINCPAC to service magnetic computer tapes and identify faulty ones.

WWMCCS

(U) In November 1979 the JCS had validated the requirement for a second WWMCCS Interface Message Processor (IMP) in the PACOM. After a thorough evaluation of alternative locations, CINCPAC concluded in March 1980 that the second IMP should be located at Headquarters PACAF. It was also determined that the communication link from the Military Airlift Command to Hawaii should terminate at the PACAF IMP, and the communication link from PACAF to the PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center at Makalapa should be upgraded. All IMP equipment was on hand and communication links were in place by the end of December 1980. The IMP was installed in January 1981 and was considered to be an operational part of the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network as of 19 February. It was in

continuous operation by qualified personnel at that time. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network data link from the PACAF IMP to the MAC IMP was successfully activated on 3 March.[1]

(U) The ADP hardware that supported the WWMCCS Information System was the aging Honeywell 6060 computer system, which was scheduled for replacement in the FY 84-90 time period. The plan to modernize the hardware also included the information reporting systems, procedures, data bases and files, terminals and displays, and communications which supported the WWMCCS. All of these components made up the WWMCCS Information System. In September 1981 a group of analysts from the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, the WWMCCS System Engineering Organization, and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT to identify the functions supported by the WWMCCS hardware and to establish new requirements for the replacement system. The information obtained by the group was to be returned to CINCPAC for validation before being incorporated with all other WWMCCS sites requirements. These would then form the basis for design of the functional family capabilities of the future Worldwide Military Command and Control System.[2]

(U) On 4 August CINCPAC announced that the ownership of all Headquarters CINCPAC ADP equipment physically located at the PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center or connected to the equipment located there would be transferred to CINCPACFLT effective 1 October 1981. The Chief of Naval Operations concurred with the transfer, as well as the actions related to planning, programming, and budgeting. CINCPAC also informed the CNO on 22 December that $478,000 in FY 83 operations and maintenance funds would be transferred from CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT. An estimated $586,000 would be required for FY 84 maintenance costs. However, since no FY 84 O&M funds were included in the CINCPAC FY 84 Program Objectives Memorandum, no transfers to CINCPACFLT subsequent to FY 83 were anticipated.[3]

Realignment of Record Communications

(U) In June the CINCPAC Command and Control Record Communications Network was reconfigured from a dedicated systems concept to a common user system--the Defense Communications Agency AUTODIN. The PACOM Command and Control AUTODIN Terminals and AUTODIN Conferencing Network replaced the CINCPAC Teletype Alert Network and the All-source Information Center Communications Network. In 1967 CINCPAC had established a network of some 60 dedicated circuits throughout the PACOM to satisfy command and control requirements. This network was identified as the CINCPAC Joint Pacific Command and Control Teletype Network. With the drawdown after the Vietnam War, many of the circuits in Southeast Asia were discontinued. A major realignment of the network occurred and was subsequently

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1. C3SAS HistSum Mar 81 (U); CINCPAC 080102Z Mar 80 (U); HQ PACAF 232335Z Dec 80 (U); JCS 192239Z Feb 81 (U); DCA 042029Z Mar 81 (U).
2. C3SRD33 HistSum Sep 81 (U).
3. CINCPAC 220043Z Dec 81 (U).

redesignated as the CTAN, or CINCPAC Teletype Alert Net. The ASICOM, or All-Source Information Communications Net, had been established in 1969 to meet the demonstrated need for a Special Intelligence command and control conferencing network that could not be satisfied by the CTAN.[1]

(U) Because of the high cost for maintenance and operation of dedicated systems and the proven capabilities of the Automatic Digital Network, efforts had been initiated in 1973 to establish a general service command and control teletype network within the AUTODIN. This network included some 45 subscribers and was intended to replace the CTAN. This network was reduced to 30 subscribers and designated the PACCAT, or PACOM Command and Control AUTODIN Terminal system in 1976. After extensive testing, the PACCAT network was designated in 1978 as the primary command and control system for passing JCS/PACOM Emergency Action Messages. The CTAN was designated as the secondary network. At that time also the CTAN became the primary conferencing network for general service communications in support of crisis management.

(U) In 1975 a CINCPAC requirement was identified for secure voice and record conferencing in support of crisis command and control. On 1 June 1981 the AUTODIN Conferencing Network demonstrated its capability to assume secure record conferencing, and replaced the CTAN as the PACOM command and control record conferencing system for crisis management. Additionally, the AUTODIN Conferencing Network, as a Special Intelligence network, assumed the responsibility of the ASICOM on 31 May.[2]

Combined Ground Command Post Terminal



1. C3STM13 HistSum Jun 81 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. C3STM23 HistSum Aug 81 (S), REVW 1 Mar 93; C3STM23 HistSum Oct 81 (U).

Teletype Upgrade for Command Aircraft

(U) The CINCPAC Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems (C3S) stated an urgent requirement to Headquarters USAF in January to replace the obsolete teletype equipment aboard the CINCPAC C-135 Command Aircraft #61-2668 based at Hickam AFB. The high failure rate and general unserviceability of existing equipment on the aircraft made this out-of-cycle upgrade most important for command and control connectivity. Headquarters USAF recommended that PACAF coordinate the replacement action. PACAF processed the aircraft modification in March and the Air Force Logistics Command accomplished the engineering. Final approval was received in October, and PACAF installed the UGC-129 teletype equipment in November 1981. It was a vast improvement over the obsolete Navy teletype it replaced.[1]

UHF Satellite Communications Upgrade for Command Aircraft

~~(C)~~ A secure voice capability was installed aboard the CINCPAC command support aircraft by the Naval Communication Area Master Station Eastern Pacific on 12 February. After internal wiring problems were corrected at the master station, the system continued to function successfully.[2]

(U) CINCPAC also requested the installation of AFSATCOM Quick Reaction Terminals (QRTs) in his command support aircraft by October 1981. The QRT included a portable antenna, tripod, AN/ARC-171 radio group, MD-953/U modem, AN/UGC-129 teletype, system control, a communications security (COMSEC) switching unit, universal power supply, interconnecting cables, and a TSEC/KG-35 crypto device. Additionally, an MU-688 magnetic tape memory unit for the UGC-129 teletype was to be included. The QRTs would be located in either one of the two CINCPAC support aircraft and at the Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOMM) facility at Camp Smith. The terminals would provide direct satellite secure teletype and secure voice access via the AFSATCOM system between the CINCPAC SPINTCOMM and CINCPAC's aircraft when airborne.[3]

(U) The QRT was packaged in four portable transit cases and could operate with either 115-volt alternating current or 28-volt direct current power sources. The transit cases were designed for rapid deployment in the field. The transceiver provided 100 watts of UHF radio frequency power to the antenna. The terminal input/output section provided secure transmission and reception of 100 words per minute. The routing of clear or secure messages was accomplished by the COMSEC Switching Unit and the COMSEC Control. The switching unit was

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1. C3STM23 HistSums Aug and Dec 81 (U); HQ USAF 031426Z Feb 81 (U); Hq USAF 091316Z Mar 81 (U).
2. C3STM23 HistSums Feb and May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Jun 87.
3. Ibid; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 1378 (U), 6 Jul 81, Subj: Request for Engineering Support/Site Survey; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2237 (U), 16 Oct 81, Subj: Minutes of 30 Sep 81 Meeting, w/encl Draft Interservice Support Agreement.

designed to recognize UUU and SSS message headers and route the messages accordingly to either the KG-35 or the UGC-129 teletype.[1]

(U) CINCPAC asked the Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific (NAVSEEACTPAC) to provide a site survey and feasibility study to install a QRT in the SPINTCOMM facility and to design a paper tape interface for message transmission purposes. NAVSEEACTPAC was also requested to provide a "red" interface for the KY-3 secure voice path assembly to allow interconnection among various staff red telephone locations at CINCPAC headquarters and at the Pearl Harbor Automatic Secure Voice Communications switch.[2]

(U) After much discussion it was agreed that the Navy would procure the AFSATCOM terminals and the Air Force would provide intermediate-level maintenance support. The Navy would be responsible for all remaining support including organizational and depot-level maintenance and intermediate-level maintenance for non-common AFSAT equipment.[3]

(U) In November an Air Force Logistics Command engineer visited Hickam AFB to begin preliminary design for installation of the QRT in the command aircraft. However, the Naval Electronics Systems Command advised CINCPAC on 21 December that because of procurement lead time requirements, complete logistical support would not be available for 18 to 21 months from that date. The Navy said that as soon as contractor support services and spare parts were available it would expedite installation of the QRT in the SPINTCOMM facility.[4]

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2240 (U), 16 Oct 81, Subj: Aircraft Modification for CINCPAC Quick Reaction Terminal (QRT) Installation, w/encl QRT Description.
2. C3STM23 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 28 Aug 01.
3. C3STM23 HistSum Oct 81 (U)
4. C3STM23 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
5. C3STM21 HistSum Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Dec 85; CINCPACFLT 010031Z Apr 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 18 Dec 85.

[redacted]

(U) Accordingly, VQ-3 completed transferring its communications operations to NAS Barbers Point on 15 July 1981 and full flight operations commenced from there on 1 August.[3]

TACAMO Pacific Programming

[redacted]

1. Ibid.
2. CNO 211225Z Jun 80 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 Dec 85.
3. FAIRECONRON THREE 042257Z Aug 81 (U).

could be reduced to approximately seven if a new, long-range, high-speed aircraft, the ECX, was procured to replace the EC-130Q.[1]

Airborne Command Post

(U) Ultra high-frequency/frequency division multiplex (UHF/FDM) vans had been installed at Clark, Kadena, and Yokota Air Bases in 1965-1966 to support CINCPAC ABNCP operations in that area of the Pacific. Additionally, in 1974, Battle Staff Operations Centers had been installed at each of the bases to provide an alert facility.[2]

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ Accordingly, CINCPAC informed Headquarters PACAF that the requirement for the three UHF/FDM ground entry points was deleted as of 1 November, and actions could be taken to remove the circuits to both the entry points and alert facilities and dispose of the equipment and personnel. However, the modem, crypto, and teletype equipment at the sites also satisfied the high-frequency teletype requirements, which were not being deleted and had to be retained. Although future ABNCP deployments to those bases would be less frequent than in the past, normal ground support requirements would still remain.[4]

~~(C)~~ Headquarters PACAF informed Fifth Air Force, Thirteenth Air Force, and 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Yokota, Clark, and Kadena Air Bases, respectively, that effective 15 December 1981 the UHF/FDM ground entry points were deactivated. They were to be powered down at that time. The 18th was asked to reserve the space for new satellite terminal equipment. PACAF also cautioned the three headquarters that while the ground entry point needs no longer existed, the CINCPAC ABNCP requirement for voice and teletype would continue.[5]

(U) With the return of Airborne Command Post aircraft #8057 on 20 August 1981 from Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, PACOM received its first 616A low-frequency modem equipped aircraft. This system was expected to provide a significant

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1. CINCPAC 150424Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 15 May 87.
2. C3STM21 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 5 Jan 88.
3. Ibid; J3/Memo/S738-81 ~~(S)~~, 8 Oct 81, Subj: PACOM UHF/FDM Ground Entry Points (GEPs) (U), REVW 26 Aug 01.
4. CINCPAC 090043Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 26 Aug 01.
5. HQ PACAF 120220Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 26 Aug 01.

increase in low-frequency communications effectiveness in supporting CINCPAC's survivable strategic command, control, and communications responsibilities.[1]

Joint Crisis Management Capability Program

(U) Crisis response continued to be a matter of high level interest in the Pacific Command. CINCPAC Required Operational Capability (ROC) 14-78 clearly stated the urgent need for three levels of command, control, and communications capabilities to support Pacific area crisis response/contingency activity. The first was a single-channel secure voice capability, the second was an airborne C3 relay platform, and the third was a ground deployable element to support the C3 requirements of a joint task force headquarters. These requirements were validated and incorporated into the Joint Crisis Management Capability (JCMC) Program. The requirement for these crisis response capabilities continued to exist in the PACOM.[2]

(U) The JCMC Level 1 requirement for small, easily transportable, single-channel secure voice satellite links between the crisis scene and Headquarters CINCPAC would be satisfied with the procurement and delivery of equipment expected in late 1982. The second and third level requirements of ROC 14-78 were combined under the JCMC Level 2/3 program, which would satisfy the combined airborne platform and ground deployable needs. This effort had slipped one year because of funding withdrawal for FY 82; however, delivery to PACOM was expected during 1985.[3]

Theater Nuclear Forces C3

~~(S)~~ A contract study effort by the BDM Corporation was initiated in February 1981 to develop PACOM Theater Nuclear Forces Command, Control, and Communication (TNFC3) operational concepts and required operational capabilities. The study would assess nuclear C3 in PACOM and evaluate options for eliminating deficiencies which had been identified in the PACOM Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study of 1980. The PACOM operational concepts and requirements would be provided to the WWMCCS System Engineer for inclusion in the TNFC3 System Improvement Plan and to the JCS for validation.[4]

[redacted]

1. C3STM21 HistSum Aug 81 (U).
2. C3SRD11 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 242114Z Dec 81 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. C3SRD32 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 Mar 87.

execution process addressed in the document was kept strictly within the U.S. chain of command.[1]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. C3SRD31 HistSum Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser S375 (~~S/FRD~~), 27 Jul 81, Subj: PACOM TNFC3 Operational Concepts and Requirements, Vol. I (U).
2. Ibid.
3. C3SRD31 HistSum Nov 81 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser S580 (~~S/FRD~~), 30 Oct 81, Subj: PACOM TNFC3 Operational Concepts and Requirements, Vol. II (U).
4. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S375 (~~S/FRD~~), 27 Jul 81, Subj: PACOM TNFC3 Operational Concepts and Requirements, Vol. I (U).



Planning for Southwest Asia Communications

~~(C)~~ As a result of the seizure of U.S. hostages by Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent buildup of Indian Ocean forces, it became evident that the Navy was saturating its fleet communications capabilities in that area of the world. Additional capacity and would be required, particularly if a force such as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was to be inserted. The staffs of both CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT had conducted studies concerning communications requirements in the Southwest Asia region.[1]

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ USCINCEUR, however, recommended that a Service, rather than a CINC, be designated as executive agent. He said that planning and establishing a land-based communications package in SWA would require continuous close coordination with the Defense Communications Agency and with the Department of State, and could be accomplished more efficiently by a Service.[4]

~~(S)~~ On 27 May the JCS requested that USCINCEUR, in close coordination with CINCPAC and Commander RDJTF, assume the planning responsibilities for land-based theater communications in SWA. This meant acting as a single manager and planner, developing a plan, identifying solutions to shortfalls, and making improvements to reduce time to install the network.[5]

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1. C3SOE6 HistSum May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 3 Jun 87.
2. JCS 200128Z Mar 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 16 Mar 87.
3. CINCPAC 081902Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 30 Mar 87.
4. USCINCEUR 101448Z Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 8 Apr 87.
5. JCS 272242Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 19 May 87.

(S) After staffing by all concerned, an amemded Southwest Asia Theater Communications Support Concept plan was submitted on 28 August to the JCS for validation. No further action was taken by the end of the year.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 031951Z Jun 81 (S), DECL 3 Jun 87.
2. C3SOE6 HistSum Jul 81 (S), DECL 15 Jul 87; USCINCEUR 171422Z Jul 81 (S), DECL 15 Jul 87.
3. C3SOE6 HistSum Sep 81 (S), DECL 29 Jul 87.

SECTION II--INTEROPERABILITY WITH PACOM ALLIES

Joint/Combined Interoperability of Tactical C2 Systems

(U) The development of nuclear weapons, high performance aircraft, sophisticated missile systems, satellite communications, and computers contributed to drastic changes in tactics on the modern battlefield. These changes dictated that compatibility and interoperability be paramount considerations in developing new systems to support interservice operations. The Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program was a continuation and consolidation of previous efforts by DOD to achieve interoperability of tactical C2 systems in both joint and combined operations.[1]

(U) A significant predecessor of JINTACCS was the Southeast Asia Interface Program, which provided compatibility for the Air Force Backup Interceptor Control system and the Marine Corps Tactical Air Operations Center to exchange real-time air situation data with the SEVENTH Fleet. It was operational in 1969. Another was WESTPACNORTH, which grew from the requirement of the Japan Self-Defense Forces to obtain early warning of aircraft beyond the reach of radars based in Japan. A buffer was installed to provide air tracks from the U.S. Pacific Fleet to the Japanese Base Air Defense Ground Environment System. It became operational in late 1970 and provided Japan with an early warning capability. USAF was designated the JCS executive agent. A third example was the Tactical Air Control System/Tactical Air Defense System, initiated in February 1969 in Southeast Asia, with the Navy designated as executive agent. It provided for the exchange of near-real-time air control and air defense information, and was to be incorporated in the new JINTACCS program.

(U) In August 1977 the Secretary of Defense directed the JCS to establish a Joint Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Systems Council to oversee the program. The JINTACCS program was divided into the five functional segments of intelligence, fire support, amphibious operations, operations control, and air operations.[2]

~~(C)~~ In July 1981 a JCS/JINTACCS team visited Headquarters CINCPAC, Japan, and Korea to discuss the goals and objectives of the program and determine the general requirements for interoperability in the Pacific Command. The CINCPAC staff was briefed on how the JINTACCS methodology could be used to reach joint and combined command, control, and communications agreements. On completion of the visit the team laid out a 4-phase approach to expand PACOM involvement in the program. The proposed first phase was a concept study to identify the overall need, objectives, responsibilities, initiatives, organization, schedule, documentation, and method of work. This was expected to be completed by

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1. C3SRD22 Point Paper (U), 27 Aug 80, Subj: Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS).
2. Ibid.

the end of December 1981. The CINCPAC Chief of Staff apprised subunified and component deputies that it had become increasingly apparent that cooperative efforts among PACOM forces and major PACOM allies were essential to effective defense of the PACOM area. CINCPAC had enjoined the JCS to acknowledge global requirements in joint interoperability programs and stated that people in the PACOM needed to identify interoperability requirements to support envisioned combined operations. Accordingly, the CINCPAC Chief of Staff solicited the personal attention and comments of PACOM deputies regarding this program.[1]

(U) In October a JCS/JINTACCS/CINCPAC team again visited the component commands, Korea, and Japan to gather data necessary to arrive at a concept plan which would outline the type of organization necessary to negotiate joint and combined C3S interoperability agreements. Because the most vital part of C3S interoperability involved the allies, the term "Combined Interoperability Program" was felt to better describe the system necessary for PACOM, although the JINTACCS methodology would still be used. The concept plan was under development and was expected to be published in February 1982.[2]

Improving Communications in Korea (TPICK)

~~(S)~~ A vulnerability study of defense communications in the Republic of Korea revealed that the existing system could not survive attack and effectively support U.S. and ROK forces. Major problems included a highly vulnerable single-thread radio network and obsolete equipment incapable of meeting modern day command and control requirements. It was estimated that less than a third of minimum essential circuits could be sustained under combat conditions. Most communication sites were vulnerable to air, ground, or sea attack because of exposed antennas, thin-wall construction, and lack of physical security. Joint use of several communication nets was in effect whereby circuits were either shared, traded, or leased to provide diverse routing and connectivity into areas not served by other systems, but other key locations either had no connectivity or were linked to ROK-only systems.[3]

~~(S)~~ COMUS Korea recognized the need for upgrading the system, and developed the Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK). Its purpose was to provide a single integrated planning document which addressed the C3 requirements for COMUS Korea, CINCUNC, and CINCCFC. TPICK was designed to achieve total visibility of existing and long-range communications-electronics planning efforts for Korea which supported combined U.S./ROK needs. It was to remain a current document through the process of annual review, revision, and validation. TPICK 78 and 79 had been validated by

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1. C3SRD22 HistSum Jul 81 (U); C3SRD2 HistSum Aug 81 (U); CINCPAC 241939Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 20 Aug 87; CINCPAC 250252Z Aug 81 ~~(C)(CX)~~, DECL 20 Aug 87.
2. C3SRD2 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 321-325.

the JCS but not funded. TPICK 80 was forwarded to the JCS in December 1980, with CINCPAC's recommendation for approval.[1]

~~(C)~~ The total cost for completing TPICK 80 FY 83-87 requirements was estimated at $118.3 million. Two high priority requirements were validated by the JCS in April 1980 after TPICK 79 was submitted. One was the replacement of the microwave Defense Communications System backbone with buried cable, and the other was the construction of a hardened C3 bunker for the Combined Field Army at Camp Red Cloud. The first initiative proposed to establish a digital backbone cable system to replace the existing, more vulnerable microwave system. A new high-channel-density fiber optic cable system (12 non-metallic fibers capable of expansion to 1,344 voice channels) would be installed between Camp Red Cloud in the north and Pusan in the south. Additional fibers could expand capacity to 4,032 channels. A memorandum of agreement was concluded between the United States and the ROK for the hardened C3 bunker, under which the ROK would construct, operate, and maintain the facility, while the United States would install, operate, and maintain the telecommunications system. Construction began in July 1980, and initial operational capability was obtained in August 1981.[2]

~~(S)~~ TPICK 80 contained 64 initiatives, of which 42 were joint and 22 were Air Force only. There were no Navy-unique projects included. Eleven projects were being negotiated for ROK cost sharing. The FY 82 cost of $27 million was fully funded by the Army. All TPICK projects were on track at the end of the year. The top priority project was still the 341-mile fiber optic backbone cable. Planned in three phases, the first from Camp Red Cloud to Osan was to be completed in 1982. The last phase was expected to be operational in FY 85.[3]

COMSEC Plan for Korea (CPICK)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Prior to 1981, the communications security (COMSEC) loan program with the Republic of Korea had been based on a February 1977 memorandum of agreement involving 254 teletype and 38 voice COMSEC devices. This arrangement was judged inadequate for Combined Forces Command C3 interface. The result was the COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK), developed by COMUS Korea in 1979 and endorsed by CINCPAC in early 1980. CPICK called for the rent-free loan of 1,302 COMSEC devices to the ROK in a 3-phase program to be completed by mid-1982. There would be no permanent equipment turnover to the ROK, but there would be combined U.S.-ROK maintenance, security, and key distribution. Total U.S. investment was estimated at $23 million,

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1. Ibid.
2. C3SRD23 Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 26 Jan 81, Subj: Improvement of C3 in Korea (U), REVW 30 Jun 00; C3SRD2 Point Paper (S), 3 Nov 81, Subj: Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK) (U), DECL 3 Nov 87.
3. C3SRD2 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 3 Nov 81, Subj: Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK) (U), DECL 3 Nov 87.

with the ROK sharing a large portion of ancillary costs. COMSEC equipment would be provided by the U.S. Services to their ROK counterparts.[1]

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ An initial shipment of 54 SY-38 Nestor secure voice devices was sent to Korea as Phase 1 of the plan in early February 1981 (under the aegis of the existing memorandum of agreement) for use in TEAM SPIRIT 81. Meanwhile, COMUS Korea's revised CPICK Implementation Plan was received for review by CINCPAC on 15 January. It was staffed and forwarded to the OJCS on 30 January, with recommendations pertaining to the training of ROK personnel, the wording of certain politically sensitive items relating to U.S. COMSEC release policy, and joint emergency evacuation procedures. Phase 2 of CPICK implementation began on 1 April, and involved the fielding of 59 SY-65 Parkhill secure telephone units in support of USAF/ROKAF nets. The objective was to have the equipment installed prior to the command post exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81 in September.[2]

~~(C)~~ CPICK received final JCS approval on 22 June 1981. Phase 2 was completed on schedule. The last phase began on 1 October, and was scheduled to see an additional 1,189 COMSEC devices delivered to the ROK by June 1982. CPICK also proposed the establishment of five combined COMSEC support facilities to provide communications security assistance to ROK COMSEC accounts, and to distribute, service, and maintain this equipment. These facilities would also serve as centralized distribution points for the codes and keylists associated with the equipment.[3]

~~(C)~~ While the U.S. Army was designated as the lead agency in the CPICK program, the other Services were responsible for supporting ROK Air Force and Navy needs. COMUS Korea was to establish a main combined COMSEC support facility in the Seoul area to serve as the single in-country point of contact between the U.S. COMSEC central office of record, the U.S.-only COMSEC maintenance facility, four combined support facilities, and the ROK and combined commands involved in the CPICK program. The main facility would receive, distribute, account for, and control all equipment and material provided by the United States. In addition, this facility would perform authorized limited maintenance for all users in their designated support areas. While it would be manned jointly by U.S. and ROK personnel, primary responsibility for the operation and security of the facility would be that of assigned U.S. Army personnel.

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1. C3STM Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 27 Jan 81, Subj: COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK) (U), REVW 27 Jan 87.
2. C3STM42 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 12 Feb 87; C3STM4 Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 6 April 81, Subj: COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK) (U), REVW 3 Apr 87; COMUSK 080215Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 27 May 01.
3. C3STM41 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 5 Nov 87; CINCPAC Ltr Ser S489 ~~(S)~~, 15 Sep 81, Subj: FY 82-85 Joint Manpower Program for COMSEC Support Facility (U), REVW 31 Dec 87.

~~(C)~~ The four support facilities would operate as sub-accounts and perform the same functions as the main Seoul facility. All five were Service-oriented, and would be supported by counterparts as follows:

Location	Supporting Service	Equipment
Seoul	U.S. Army	200
Wonju	U.S. Army	230
Uijongbu	U.S. Army	215
Chinhae	U.S. Navy	435
Osan	U.S. Air Force	222
		1,302

~~(S)~~ To preclude compromise, the NSA directed that under no circumstances would U.S. COMSEC equipment be mixed or associated with CPICK equipment, which had been modified by the NSA specifically to meet the interoperability requirements peculiar to Korea. The CPICK program was placed directly under COMUS Korea because of the need to maintain strict control and ownership. Operational management (setting priorities for needs, determining command usage, and establishing which nets and circuits required secure means for interoperability) of the program was under the Combined Forces Command. The five facilities were to be manned by a total of 17 U.S. and 13 ROK personnel.

~~(C)~~ CPICK would be supported by a first-level combined but "limited" COMSEC equipment maintenance program and a second-level U.S.-only direct support/general support system. The "limited" maintenance authorized at the combined field facilities would be bench-testing and replacing plug-in elements. All higher level maintenance would be performed by the U.S. Army facility in Seoul and at CONUS depots. An out-of-cycle request to the JCS for the 17 U.S. billets needed for the COMSEC support facilities was submitted to the JCS on 15 September. Final approval was expected in early January 1982.[1]

U.S.-Japan Air Defense C2 (BADGE)

~~(C)~~ BADGE was the acronym for Base Air Defense Ground Environment, the air surveillance and air defense weapons control system of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). BADGE-X was an engineering project to fully automate the system and add new technology capable of supporting air defense operations through the 1990s. The JASDF was also procuring E-2C aircraft in a separate, but related, program to add early warning capability to BADGE. Interface with U.S. tactical air defense forces was a JASDF goal of the BADGE modernization program. A capability to cooperatively employ U.S. and Japanese air defenses was required by the terms of the bi-national Defense Plan 5098. This capability, in turn, would be conditional on the degree of interoperability between

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1. Ibid.

BADGE and the tactical systems of U.S. forces which could be committed to the defense of Japan.[1]

~~(C)~~ The senior air operations interface to be established for Defense Plan 5098 was designated as the Combined Air Operations Coordination Center (CAOCC). The CAOCC would be a combined command post for COMUS Japan and his Japanese counterpart. From this center the two air component commanders would coordinate defense planning and exercise operational direction of assigned forces. In order to do this, these commanders would require a continuous feed of information about the status of air mission forces and air operations progress. An existing source for this information was the BADGE Air Operations Control Center at Fuchu Air Station. The function of this center was to maintain a current, system-wide display of critical air defense information received from the four JASDF Sector Air Defense Forces, each consisting of BADGE and weapons elements. It was logical, therefore, to consider co-siting or integrating the CAOCC with this top-level element of the BADGE system at Fuchu. The United States had an air defense operations team at Fuchu for BADGE liaison. This team could also provide battle staff support to the U.S. air component commander for an interface of the CAOCC with the BADGE control center.

~~(C)~~ The key control element of BADGE in the field was the Direction Center in each sector, performing the classical air defense functions of air surveillance, identification friend or foe, and weapons control. Control of U.S. flying and defense operations within a sector had to be accomplished by a U.S. battle director, since the terms of Defense Plan 5098 required a separation of command and control along national lines. A U.S. tactical control operations team deployed to each BADGE Direction Center would fulfill this purpose. This team could control U.S. aircraft transiting sector airspace, disseminate threat information, allocate targets for engagement by U.S. surface-to-air missiles, direct U.S. land-based interceptors to targets, and guide the return of these aircraft to home base. U.S. operations teams would have to be integrated into the sector air defense activities of their Japanese counterparts to coordinate airspace management and targeting for the prevention of gaps or redundancy. The U.S. teams would require dedicated BADGE display and control consoles plus ground-to-air and ground-to-ground communications support to perform this mission.

~~(C)~~ U.S. and Japanese communications networks would eventually have to be interconnected to support the objective of interoperability. A combined USAF and JASDF secure, high-speed communications system was desirable for timely, coordinated transfer of air tasking orders and status reports. Contingency beddown of U.S. tactical fighter squadrons was planned for several Japanese air bases not served by the U.S. Defense Communications System. The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy would have similar requirements.[2]

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1. C3SRD21 HistSum Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC Briefing ~~(C)~~, 20 Jul 81, Subj: US/JA Air Defense C2 Interoperability (U), REVW 31 Dec 87.
2. Ibid.

[redacted]

U.S. Forces Japan Coordination Center

[redacted]

COMSEC Interoperability with Japan

[redacted]

1. C3SRD22 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 24 Nov 81, Subj: U.S.-Japan Air Defense Command and Control (C2) Interoperability (U), DECL 24 Nov 87.
2. C3SRD21 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 18 Nov 81, Subj: U.S. Forces Japan Coordination Center (U), DECL 18 Nov 87.
3. Ibid.

[redacted]

1. C3STM42 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 12 Feb 87; C3STM41 Point Paper ~~(C/NF)~~, 27 Jan 81, Subj: U.S./Japan COMSEC Policy (U), REVW 27 Jan 87.
2. Ibid.
3. COMUSJ 120845Z Jun 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 12 Jun 87.
4. CHMDO 060945Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 6 Nov 11.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ANZUS C3 Interoperability Planning

~~(C)~~ In February 1980 the JCS had tasked CINCPAC to coordinate planning requirements for secure, interoperable command, control, and communications with Australia and New Zealand. The subject was discussed by the ANZUS Military Representatives and at the ANZUS Staff Level Meeting, where it was referred to the ANZUS Seminar. The seminar met in Canberra in August 1980 and one of the topics addressed was interoperable C3 among the three countries. It was agreed that the operational aspect of C3 interoperability required more emphasis. Combined exercises provided the means for identifying interoperability problems and for testing possible solutions in an operational environment. Seminar members also agreed that these problems should be referred to appropriate multi-national forums instead of attempting to address them only as an ANZUS issue. When resolution was not possible within existing multi-national forums, the Staff Level Meetings recommended the formation of special working groups to address the problems. These procedures were subsequently ratified by the Military Representatives.[3]

~~(C)~~ As a result of these recommendations, CINCPAC requested that the components document interoperability problems in exercise after-action reports. They should forward the identified problems to appropriate multi-national forums for resolution and monitor their progress. Since these forums addressed many issues that might impact on ANZUS operations, CINCPAC encouraged increased communication and coordination between the component commands and these forums. A change to the ANZUS Planning Manual would also address this subject.[4]

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1. C3STM42 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 12 Feb 87; 5AF 020300Z Dec 80 ~~(S)~~, REVW 2 Dec 86; CINCPAC 271950Z Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 12 Jan 87.
2. C3STM42 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 6 Apr 87.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp.341-342; C3SRD21 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 6 Feb 81, Subj: Interoperability Issues Update (U), DECL 6 Feb 87.
4. CINCPAC 151930Z Dec 80 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Dec 86.

SECTION III--TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT

Frequency Management

(U) Effective 15 April 1981 CINCPAC/C3STM3 changed its designation to the "Joint Frequency Management Office Pacific." It was formerly known as the "Area Frequency Coordinator Hawaii." The change was implemented to standardize office names and better define the scope and function of radio frequency management responsibilities of the Pacific Command. The branch, under the Telecommunications Management Division (C3STM), was comprised of the Interoperability and Analysis Section (C3STM31), Frequency Management Section (C3STM32), and Records and Administration Section (C3STM35). Area offices in the PACOM also had their names changed to Joint Frequency Management Offices Korea, Philippines, Guam, and Japan. All concerned agencies were notified by message of these changes.[1]

(U) In November 1980 the U.S. Defense Attache Office Bangkok requested assistance on radio frequency management from CINCPAC. Because of a changeover of personnel at the Bangkok Embassy, the DAO was unable to coordinate frequencies with the host government, Thailand. In April 1981 a CINCPAC representative visited Bangkok to establish procedures and conduct training at the Embassy on frequency management. A memorandum of agreement on frequency coordination between USDAO Bangkok and CINCPAC was subsequently signed in August, completing action on this program.[2]

(U) The annual CINCPAC Spectrum Management Seminar was held at the Hale Koa Hotel, Honolulu, from 28 September through 2 October. Representatives from 62 separate agencies attended the seminar, which was hosted by the Joint Frequency Management Office Pacific. The purpose of the seminar was to convene personnel from the PACOM spectrum management community to discuss and find workable solutions to the increasing demands placed on spectrum requirements.[3]

(U) On 1 September the Joint Frequency Management Office Pacific began testing automatic data processing support to spectrum management, utilizing WWMCCS ADP equipment.[4]

(U) In November the Joint Frequency Management Office Pacific proposed to the Commander THIRD Fleet, via CINCPACFLT, certain coordination procedures for the control and use of sonobuoy/multichannel Jezebel repeater frequencies in the Hawaiian Operational Area. These procedures were placed into effect by the

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1. C3STM35 HistSum Apr 81 (U); CINCPAC 200240Z Mar 81 (U); CINCPAC 201913Z Mar 81 (U); CINCPAC 061952Z Apr 81 (U); CINCPAC 240136Z Apr 81 (U).
2. C3STM31 HistSum Aug 81 (U); Memorandum of Agreement on Frequency Coordination Between USDAO Bangkok and CINCPAC, 17 Aug 81 (U).
3. C3STM35 HistSum Oct 81 (U).
4. C3STM3 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

end of the year, providing positive management control of these operations in the Hawaiian area.[1]

Upgrading Telephone Systems on Oahu

(U) The Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) system on Oahu was a part of the worldwide AUTOVON system designed to provide command and control telephone communications for DOD users. The heart of the AUTOVON on Oahu was a single switch at Wahiawa, through which all AUTOVON calls had to be processed. The switch had been installed in 1969 and was operated and maintained by the Hawaiian Telephone Company. It was old, filled to capacity, and provided inadequate service. Hawaiian Telephone also provided the administrative telephone service for Oahu DOD users, under the terms of the Defense Administrative Telephone Systems contract which was negotiated in 1971 for a 10-year period, and extended in 1981. The switching and transmission equipment serving the DOD community on Oahu was mainly of the old analog variety and was in need of replacement by state-of-the-art digital systems.[2]

(U) There was an urgent need to upgrade both the AUTOVON and administrative telephone systems on Oahu, and at the same time to improve the survivability and security of the AUTOVON command and control system. Delays in finding a solution to this requirement were encountered because, while all concerned--the Services, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), and the CINCPAC staff--had agreed on the need for an upgrade, there was no accord on the best way to accomplish it. Actions initiated by CINCPAC in June 1981 resulted in increased emphasis on the effort. While considerable time was lost in selecting one solution over another, a mutually agreed position was finally achieved in December.[3]

(U) CINCPAC informed the DCA that the Request for Proposal/Quotation to Industry had to be derived with the full participation of the telephone users and managers on Oahu. The solution would have to meet their minimum military requirements and the technical interface standards for interconnecting systems, but could not be excessive in scope or design criteria. Basic considerations to be met were that the upgrade for both systems had to be digital; at least two separately sited AUTOVON switches were needed to improve survivability; and access to the administrative telephone system had to be provided to all military users, with access to the AUTOVON system to selected users. CINCPAC requested that the DCA develop the draft Request for Proposal/Quotation, in coordination with CINCPAC Headquarters and other Oahu telephone users.[4]

(U) The DCA concurred, saying the plans were in consonance with other DOD initiatives in Europe and the CONUS. Inherent in these schemes were the

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1. C3STM32 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
2. C3SRD11 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 050415Z Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 122045Z Dec 81 (U).

evolving concepts of integrated digital transmission and combined long-haul and local switching functions located at or near the user. Independent studies by American Telephone and Telegraph and General Telephone and Electronics strongly advocated the principle of a distributed switching architecture as a near-term network improvement. Analyses by the DCA, which were supported by independent contractual studies, all pointed to requiring the same basic architecture on a worldwide basis; namely, combined distributed switching and integrated transmission. The DCA felt that these points had to be prime considerations for the bid request, in addition to those listed by CINCPAC. The various DCA offices would begin working with the local users to develop a Request for Proposal/ Quotation.[1]

C3 for Near Term Pre-positioning Ships



~~(C)~~ The AMCC was a mobile communications unit configured in one transportable equipment shelter, with power provided by two organic 55KW diesel generators. Each AMCC unit had a nucleus crew of four Navy personnel assigned

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1. DCA 172011Z Dec 81 (U).
2. C3SOE6 Point Paper ~~(S),~~ 4 May 81, Subj: Near Term Pre-positioning Ships (NTPS) C3 (U), DECL 7 Jul 86.

to provide daily care, maintenance, and readiness, and who accompanied it during deployments. The supported command would be reponsible for providing operators (normally four radiomen) once the AMCC was deployed. The AMCC units would normally be deployed for periods of 30 days or less. Two units were normally located at Subic Bay, Philippines. An entire unit was transportable in one C-130 aircraft. CINCPAC fully supported this concept.[1]

Contingency Deployment of Satellite Terminal

[redacted]

1. Ibid.
2. C3STM23 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 7 Jun 01; HQ SAC 021800Z Jun 81 ~~(S/REL AUS),~~ REVW 2 Jun 01.
3. JCS 070556Z Jun 81 ~~(S/REL AUS),~~ REVW 7 Jun 01.
4. HQ SAC 182140Z Jun 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 17 Jun 01.



(U) The TSC-54 terminal was returned to Hawaii on 15 August and was re-sited at Fort Kamehameha instead of Wahiawa because of the Navy's major construction project to build the Defense Satellite Communications System Operations Control Facility at Wahiawa. The Army decided to site the terminal at Fort Kamehameha because of the availability of an enclosed compound, the immediate access to an airfield (Hickam AFB), and because the TSC-54 would be phased out in 1982. SAC expressed its appreciation to all concerned for a job well done during the deployment.[3]

Hardening to EMP (Project APACHE)

(U) Project APACHE (Analysis of the Pacific for Hardening to EMP--electromagnetic pulse), implemented in early 1975, was a joint CINCPAC/DNA (Defense Nuclear Agency) program funded by the DNA. Objectives of the program were to provide a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of PACOM command, control, communications, and computer (C4) networks to EMP caused by high-altitude (75-300 kilometers) nuclear detonations; and to develop hardening recommendations which, if implemented, would enhance network survivability. Gamma rays released by a high-altitude nuclear explosion would collide with air molecules or other material and in turn generate a high-voltage electromagnetic pulse of up to 60,000 volts per square meter. These pulses could either burn out or disrupt electronic equipment at great distances (up to 2,200 kilometers) from the center of the explosion.[4]

~~(S)~~ The APACHE methodology was to survey key sites for equipment type, electrical interconnects, and site construction characteristics. Also determined was the concurrent propagation impact of nuclear detonations on VLF, LF, HF, troposcatter, and satellite radio links. Analysis was made of end-to-end critical circuit path connectivity using computer models. Prior to 1981 most key facilities at Oahu, Guam, Australia's North West Cape, and a few sites in

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1. C3STM23 HistSum Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 1 Jul 01; JCS 241408Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 20 Jul 01; CINCPAC 300021Z Jul 81 (S), REVW 28 Jul 01.
2. C3STM23 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 1 Jul 01; HQ SAC 111730Z Aug 81 (U); JCS 122104Z Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 3 Aug 01.
3. C3STM23 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 1 Jul 01; HQ SAC 212030Z Aug 81 (U).
4. C3SRD11 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 9 Feb 81, Subj: Assessment of Pacific Communications for Hardening to EMP (Project APACHE) (U), DECL 9 Feb 87.

Japan and Korea were surveyed and assessments were completed. APACHE VLF, LF, and HF propagation analyses of PACOM C4 networks were completed and propagation problems were identified. A combined Australia Department of Defense/CINCPAC/DNA assessment of Australian facilities was also completed. Prototype hardening fixes were installed at Naval Communications Area Master Station Western Pacific (Guam) in August 1979. An APACHE data base was compiled and was in the GTE Sylvania computer at Needham, Massachusetts. The report, "CINCPAC Preliminary Program for Protection of PACOM C4 from EMP," was submitted to the JCS in April 1980. Preliminary APACHE findings indicated that PACOM command and control communications were highly vulnerable to high-altitude EMP. Just one detonation, in all probability, would render PACOM and National Pacific Basin systems inoperative.[1]

~~(C)~~ Subsequent tests on selected facilities demonstrated that PACOM C4 networks could be protected by either completely shielding a facility (at great difficulty and cost) or by selectively hardening electrical components. As a result, emphasis was directed toward a selective hardening program. The DNA was funding the Boeing Company and Rockwell International to protect by hardening from EMP two submarine cable heads (at Makaha and Hanauma) and two technical control facilities (Camp Smith and Hickam AFB) on Oahu. These were scheduled for completion in 1981.[2]

~~(C)~~ The CINCPAC Director for C3S in January 1981 ordered the establishment of a Hardness Control Agency in his directorate, and the transfer of the APACHE site data base from GTE Sylvania to the PACOM WWMCCS computer. He also requested the DNA to expedite the delivery of data required for CINCPAC to complete a Required Operational Capability statement for submission to the JCS. Also, CINCPAC was to discuss with Boeing representatives an unsolicited proposal to protect one communication path, end-to-end, on Oahu. This would allow CINCPAC to exercise an elementary EMP survival program and take advantage of three of the four sites being hardened by the DNA. The Director for C3S proposed using $300,000 of FY 81 CINC C2 Initiative Funds for this effort. He also asked the JCS to direct the Services to establish EMP protection and awareness training in their schools.[3]

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC C3S, MITRE Corporation, and DNA personnel met with GTE Sylvania in Boston in early April to discuss the transfer of the APACHE data base to CINCPAC. The schedule had originally called for the data base and related software to be transferred in early 1982, but contractual problems between GTE and the DNA caused it to be slipped indefinitely. To access the data base, CINCPAC was to procure a Tectronix graphics terminal for $37,000

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1. C3SRD11 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 22 Dec 80, Subj: Analysis of the Pacific for Hardening to High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HAEMP) (Project APACHE) (U), DECL 22 Dec 86.
2. C3SRD31 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 9 Feb 81, Subj: Assessment of Pacific Communications for Hardening to EMP (Project APACHE) (U), DECL 9 Feb 87.
3. Ibid.

with FY 81 CINC C2 Initiative Funds, for delivery in early 1982. The APACHE ROC 18-81 was submitted to the JCS for validation on 4 June. It identified the critical PACOM command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) networks that required EMP protection and provided the need and justification to obtain JCS approval of the ROC. Once approved, the JCS would task the appropriate Service or agency to fund the necessary EMP protection work.[1]

KIG



(U) The hardening project was initially delayed pending receipt of FY 81 CINC C2 funds. CINCPAC decided to ask the DNA to administer the contract with Boeing because of the limited time remaining in the fiscal year and also because of the size of the contract. The DNA evaluated the project when funds became available in July. The Scientific Assistant to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, DNA, became concerned about the direction that CINCPAC was taking on the hardening effort. He met with the CINCPAC Director for C3S and expressed his concern that while Project APACHE had indeed identified likely vulnerabilities in PACOM C4 assets, the results could be misinterpreted because only simulations could be employed. Tailored hardening would cost much less to accomplish than total shielding, but risk to the circuit would also be much higher. Nevertheless, CINCPAC decided to continue with the Oahu hardening project, realizing that there was no guarantee of absolute protection, but overall posture would be improved. It would also be a good learning experience for the entire community since Oahu could be viewed as a microcosm of the entire CONUS. A contract with Boeing for $300,000 was signed by the DNA on 1 September.[3]

KIG

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1. C3SRD1 HistSums May and Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 10 Oct 87.
2. C3SRD1 HistSum Jul 81 (U); CINCPAC Briefing ~~(S)~~, 23 Jul 81, Subj: APACHE (U), REVW 23 Jul 01.
3. C3SRD1 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 10 Oct 87; DNA/DDST Ltr (U), 12 Aug 81, Subj: EMP Hardening Efforts for PACOM.

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ The other scenario was the possibility that high-altitude nuclear bursts could be used in conjunction with a conventional or theater nuclear attack, possibly in Korea or the Middle East. ROC 18-81 identified two networks for EMP protection in this case--the CINCPAC Voice Alert Network which provided an operational link to the CINCPAC components and major subordinate commands, and the intelligence and warning net in PACOM. Operation of these two nets would be essential in a conventional or theater nuclear situation until the remaining long-haul communications could be restored.

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ It became apparent to all that the many EMP protection measures being undertaken by various commands and agencies had no real central direction. USEUCOM and CINCPAC had initiated action to obtain protection for critical C3I networks; the Air Force had a program to harden the Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (but not the connecting AUTODIN circuits); the Army Communications Command had a program to protect the Jam Resistant Secure Communications terminals and links to CINC command centers; and the Defense Communications Agency had programmed funds to protect certain AUTODIN switching centers and Defense Satellite Communications System baseline terminals All of this had been initiated without the establishment of military standards or a central agency to direct and coordinate the efforts. The DNA had developed a simulation routine and a cost-to-harden program to assist in the evaluation and selection of networks to be protected. As a result, CINCPAC on 26 August recommended to the JCS that a central agency be tasked to establish the EMP protection plan and coordinate all such efforts. The JCS replied that

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1. CINCPAC 151751Z Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 31 May 01.
2. Ibid.

continuing discussions were underway concerning DOD support, standards, and policy, and action was expected to resolve these problems in the near future.[1]

(U) On 5 November CINCPAC suggested to the DNA that because agreed-to military standards might take considerable time to prepare, perhaps the DNA could develop interim specifications which could be used by the entire C3 community. It was recognized that there was a lack of complete agreement on the best method to provide EMP protection, but there was sufficient data available to allow designers of new systems to significantly enhance the relative hardness of C3 equipment. CINCPAC also requested that the DNA provide the lead DOD agency (Naval Electronics Systems Command) with recommendations to expedite the development of EMP standards, and establish specifications which could be used pending receipt of those standards. The JCS on 1 December concurred with these CINCPAC suggestions, and advised the DNA that emphasis be placed on strategic connectivity, new systems (in order to preclude the need for extensive retrofitting), and military satellite systems.[2]

(U) Meanwhile, the CNO, who was given responsibility for CINCPAC ROC 18-81, took action resulting in the Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, being funded to accomplish a cost estimate for the electromagnetic pulse hardening effort.[3]

Jam Resistant Secure Communications

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC 260046Z Aug 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 20 Aug 87; JCS 151248Z Sep 81 (U).
2. C3SRD1 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 050052Z Nov 81 (U); JCS 011724Z Dec 81 ~~(C),~~ REVW 23 Nov 01.
3. C3SRD1 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
4. C3SRD11 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 1 Feb 01; DCA JRSC TIP Annex ~~(C),~~ Feb 81, REVW 1 Feb 01.

[redacted]

(U) The Jam Resistant Secure Communications terminal program would be implemented incrementally between an initial operational capability in 1983 and a full operational capability in 1985. Issues affecting the Pacific Command at the end of 1981 were obtaining JCS validation of the HEMP protection which would be required for communications paths. Requirements validation and definitions of protection levels were being acted upon by the JCS in coordination with the various CINCs.[2]

Hawaii Area Wideband System

(U) The transmission medium interconnecting the major military installations on Oahu was an old analog microwave system which had been a candidate for digital upgrade for many years. General programs for this upgrade were initiated in 1975 as part of the Defense Communications Agency's worldwide program to digitize the defense communication system. After numerous changes in direction, these general programs were turned into the specific Hawaii Area Wideband System (HAWS) project. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for C3I tasked the Defense Communications Agency to implement HAWS, and the Navy was designated the lead military department. The HAWS would provide several advantages to the DOD community on Oahu, including new equipment for the long-term reliability and increased capability necessary for secure voice and computer netting applications. In addition, the HAWS would provide the added advantage of increased security through bulk encryption and increased survivability through selected HEMP hardening procedures.[3]

(U) The HAWS was made up of two separate but closely related segments. First was the Digital Pipe Network, to be obtained through a request for proposal to industry. It would provide the actual transmission medium connecting the major military installations. Second was the User Distributions Facility segment. These were government-owned Digital Pipe Network termination facilities, technical controls, and multiplexes serving the major military installations.

(U) The HAWS program in general was progressing satisfactorily with the request for proposal expected out in March or April 1982, engineering and design of the User Distribution Facilities being finalized, and initial operational capability scheduled for FY 84. A specific issue of importance to

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1. C3SRD11 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 1 Feb 01.
2. Ibid.
3. C3SRD11 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

CINCPAC was hardening for HEMP. CINCPAC advised the Defense Communications Agency that the program should not be allowed to proceed without HEMP hardening, to preclude expensive and time-consuming retrofit to get HEMP protection in the years ahead. The increased survivability to be gained with HEMP protection designed into the project would be worth any delay in installation and increase in cost.[1]

(U) Although this requirement initially met with considerable resistance, a practical approach to HEMP hardening for the Hawaii Area Wideband System was defined by the Navy in September 1981. The JCS concurred with this approach, and plans for implementation were expected in early 1982.[2]

Communications Security

JCS COMSEC Master Plan

K1A

[redacted]

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1. Ibid; CINCPAC 080223Z Apr 81 (U).
2. C3SRD11 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. C3STM41 HistSums Mar and Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 5 Nov 87.

[redacted]

COMSEC Equipment Stockpile Proposal

[redacted]

Threat to PACOM Communications

[redacted]

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1. C3STM41 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 5 Nov 87; CINCPAC 282105Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 26 Oct 87.
2. C3STM42 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 8 Apr 87; CINCPAC 302326Z Mar 81 ~~(C/NF)~~, REVW 27 Mar 87.
3. C3STM41 HistSum May 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 8 Jun 87.



1. CINCPAC 132231Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 13 May 01.
2. CINCPAC 160142Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 15 May 87.
3. HQ ESC 222000Z May 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 21 May 01.
4. CINCPAC 182359Z Mar 81 ~~(S/NF)(BOM)~~, REVW 17 Mar 87; CINCPAC 200055Z Sep 81 ~~(S/NF)(BOM)~~, REVW 18 Sep 86.

[redacted]

Special COMSEC Monitoring

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) In June-July, the Army was asked to monitor the CINCPAC Mobile Radio Net on Oahu to determine whether sensitive or classified information was being transmitted, and to identify any vulnerabilities in the net. Although no classified information was revealed during this period, certain sensitive information relating to key personnel and their itineraries was divulged and analysts were able to easily reconstruct the net and subcriber identities.[4]

(U) In an effort to provide additional protection for the CINC and other senior officers on the island, the Deputy CINCPAC/Chief of Staff asked the C3S

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1. J2334 HistSum May 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 1 Jun 87; JO2/Memo/C-2-81 ~~(C)~~, 19 May 81, Subj: OPSEC and Soviet Ship Visits (U), REVW 18 May 87.
2. C3STM42 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 9 Jan 88; C3S/Memo/C-93-81 ~~(C)~~, 30 Dec 81, Subj: Special Telephone Monitoring Mission (U), DECL 29 Dec 87.
3. C3STM42 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 6 Nov 87.
4. C3STM41 HistSum Jul 81 (U).

Directorate in September to devise a changing brevity code to designate several common locations for use on the CINCPAC Mobile Radio Net. Previously, by monitoring the net, one could easily determine the CINC's location at any particular time. The codes would be changed monthly. The system was implemented on 15 November. The Deputy CINCPAC/Chief of Staff said that while the code would not thwart the determined terrorist, it would discourage the amateurs by making it more difficult to decipher. In the meantime, a study was underway for the procurement of new radios with a built-in privacy feature.[1]

Exercise COMSEC Monitoring

[redacted]

COMSEC Material System

(U) Throughout 1981 superseded COMSEC Material System (CMS) materials were turned in or destroyed and monthly destruction reports were sent by the CMS Section to the Director Communications Security Material System in Washington, D.C. Ready reserve material was received throughout the year from various

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1. C3STM4 HistSum Nov 81 (U); JO1/Memo/27-81 (U), 3 Nov 81, Subj: Brevity Code; C3STM/Memo/1068 (U), 5 Nov 81, Subj: CINCPAC Mobile Radio Net Brevity Code.
2. C3STM42 HistSums Feb and Mar 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 6 Apr 87; CINCPAC 132024Z Jan 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 9 Jan 87; JO2/Memo/13-81 (U), 19 Mar 81, Subj: Use of Unsecured Communications Circuits.
3. C3STM42 HistSum May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 Jun 87.
4. C3STM42 HistSum Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 9 Oct 87.

[redacted]

Sealed Authentication System Inspection

[redacted]

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1. C3STM43 HistSums Jan-Dec 81 (U).
2. C3STM42 HistSum Nov 81 ~~(C),~~ REVW 3 Dec 87.
3. C3STM42 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 5 Nov 01; CINCPAC Ltr, Ser C239 ~~(C)~~, 2 Nov 81, Subj: Sealed Authentication System (SAS) Inspection Visit; report of (U), REVW 30 Oct 01.



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 37, REVW 13 Feb 02.



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 38, REVW 13 Feb 02.



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF)~~, p. 39, REVW 13 Feb 02.



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF), p~~. 40, REVW 13 Feb 02.

PACOM WIN/ADP NETWORK



SOURCE: Pacific Command Digest, 16 Feb 82 ~~(S/NF),~~ p. 41, REVW 13 Feb 02.

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CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--MILITARY PERSONNEL

~~(S)~~ As 1981 began there was evidence of an increased impact of personnel shortages on readiness. There were 19 ships and 21 squadrons of the Pacific Fleet reporting "not combat ready" (C4) because of personnel shortages. These units represented 13 percent of the total Navy assets in PACOM. The number of officers assigned to PACOM line forces was generally satisfactory, but Navy shore installation manning had been reduced 24 percent below authorized levels in order to maintain line ships and squadrons at 95 to 100 percent of authorized officer strength. Also there were shortages of officers with specific skills, particularly aviators. The shortage of PACOM enlisted strengths was more serious. All Services suffered deficiencies of middle-level enlisted supervisors and the Navy's was most accute with a shortfall of 5,782 personnel in grades E-5 through E-9. Air Force security police strengths in air base defense in Korea equated to only 54 percent of that required. Although other forces in PACOM suffered less debilitating numerical shortages, there was a steady exodus of personnel with 8 to 12 years' experience in technical and specialized skills. Lack of career incentives was seen as the primary cause of these shortages.[1]

(U) During 1981 and previous years CINCPAC supported numerous initiatives and legislative actions which would improve the quality of life for personnel in overseas areas and thereby enhance career motivation and retention. Included among these were pay increases, a cost of living allowance for single military members, a post differential, funding assistance for emergency leave travel and environmental and morale leave for areas without access to MAC airlift, and dependent educational travel.[2]

Environmental and Morale Leave

(U) The Environmental and Morale Leave (EML) program was an expansion of space available travel to allow military personnel and their dependents relief from adverse environmental conditions via MAC flights to various destinations for rest and recuperation. Beginning in 1979 unaccompanied dependents were eligible for such flights. In March of that year the JCS had asked unified commanders to review the program because it was not meeting the travel needs of participants and there was too much competition for available seats, especially in heavily populated EML areas. In November the DOD proposed new rules to give higher priority for travel by sponsor/sponsor-accompanied-by-dependents and

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1. J132 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 7 Jan 81, Subj: Impact of Personnel Shortages on Readiness (U), DECL 31 Dec 89; J132 Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 13 Feb 81, Subj: PACOM Personnel (U), DECL 31 Dec 87.
2. J114 Point Paper (U), 1 May 81, Subj: Personnel Quality of Life; CINCPAC 190202Z Dec 80 (U).

authorized only one destination on an individual's EML travel orders. In May 1980 the program was revised again. An accompanied or unaccompanied DOD sponsor was given a higher priority for space-available travel. Sponsors and their families were authorized two EML trips a year. Unified commanders were to determine points of origin and destination and normally no more than two destinations would be authorized. Annual review would permit alteration of points of origin and destination by CINCPAC as the unified commander, and during 1981 a number of changes were made to accommodate unit and command desires compatible with available flights.[1]

(U) As a result of an ad hoc meeting convened to examine space available travel programs, the JCS proposed changes to DOD EML Directive 4515.13R in March 1981. CINCPAC non-concurred with a proposal to restrict EML to short tour areas (24 months for an accompanied tour; 15 months unaccompanied). Such a restriction ignored the special conditions in long tour areas which met the criteria for EML. It also removed the discretionary flexibility from the unified commander who could best determine EML points of origin based on an assessment of existing conditions in each country within his cognizance. Furthermore, the proposed EML criteria, based on short tour length, deprived members in long tour areas of an important incentive. Such a policy would not only be viewed as further erosion of benefits, but would detract from the desirability of a long-tour overseas assignment to reduce PCS costs and enhance stability.[2]

(U) Meanwhile CINCPAC had agreed to a moratorium on changes in destination sites and, during the following months, Air Force headquarters, as the DOD executive agent for air transportation eligibility, tried to coordinate major revisions to the DOD EML directive. When it became evident that the revision of the DOD instruction would not be forthcoming by its target date of 1 October or even the end of the year, CINCPAC approved a number of requests for changes in EML origination and destination sites. These were incorporated in a revision of CINCPAC Instruction 1700.2H published on 7 December 1981 and are shown on the accompanying chart.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD),~~ Vol. II, pp. 480-483.
2. J113 HistSum Mar 81 (U); CINCPAC 180310Z Feb 81 (U).
3. J113 HistSums Jun, Oct, Dec 81 (U).

ORIGINATION AREAS	DESTINATION SITES
Alaska - Adak, Shemya	Intra-Alaska, CONUS
American Samoa	Honolulu
Australia - Alice Springs, Exmouth, Woomera	Sydney, Honolulu, CONUS
Diego Garcia	Singapore, Philippines, CONUS
Guam/TTPI - Enewetak, Korob, Yap, Kwajalein, Truk, Ponape, Majuro, Saipan	Philippines, Honolulu, CONUS, Japan, Korea
Indonesia - Jakarta, Baudung, Malang, Surabaya	Honolulu, Japan, Philippines, CONUS (D-Singapore)
Japan - Kanto Plain, Sasebo, Akizuki, Misawa, Iwakuni, Okinawa, Mio Kobe, Hokkaido, Iwo Jima, Marcus Island	Intra-country, Alaska, CONUS, Philippines, Korea
Johnston Island	Honolulu, CONUS
Korea	Japan, Alaska, CONUS, Philippines
Midway - Kure	Honolulu, CONUS
Philippines - Clark AB, Cubi Point, Manila, Mindanao	Japan, Honolulu, CONUS, Korea
Thailand	Philippines, CONUS, Honolulu, Japan, Korea (D-Singapore)
Wake Island	Honolulu, CONUS
Singapore	Philippines, Honolulu, CONUS, Japan, Korea

NOTE: Underscore indicates added locations. D indicates deleted location.

Military Customs Program

(U) The objectives of the military customs program since establishment in 1973 by DOD Directive 5030.49 were to eliminate the flow of narcotics, drugs, and other contraband; assist the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), Agriculture Department (USDA), and Immigration and Naturalization Service; and minimize inconvenience and delays to DOD personnel, cargo, and mail. In addition, U.S. military customs inspectors (MCI) frequently assisted host nation customs officials where nation-to-nation agreements were in effect. The DOD directive was oriented toward entry into the Customs Territory of the United States (CTUS) while CINCPAC's implementing instruction (5840.3) expanded the program to include inter/intra-theater operations. (The program covered inspection/examination of all DOD cargo, passengers, aircraft, ships, crews, official and some personal mail.) The Department of the Army was the DOD executive agent and unified commands were tasked with program management. In the Pacific Command, the CINCPAC Personnel Directorate was the office of primary responsibility.[1]

Predeparture Clearance

(U) Late in 1977 CINCMAC suggested that predeparture inspections of DOD aircraft, which had been initiated in 1971, be terminated. MAC believed there was a duplication of effort because crews and passengers were reexamined once they reached a U.S. port of entry which then doubled the inconvenience. Efforts were initiated by USCS, DOD, MAC, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR to reduce U.S. Customs reexaminations. The results of a 1-year test of the military preclearance program involving MAC charter (Category B) flights from Europe in 1978 revealed that USCS reexamination of personnel who had been precleared by military customs inspectors at Rhein-Main AB in Germany and Mildenhall AB in England could be reduced to collection of customs duty only.[2]

(U) The preclearance program was established in PACOM in 1979. After appropriate training and resolution of problem areas, preclearance of MAC charter (Category B) flights began in October 1980 at air terminals at Yokota, Kadena, Clark, and Osan. Special preclearance requests for other aircraft/missions would continue on an individual basis, and all other military flights would continue to receive predeparture inspection/examination.[3]

(U) In March 1981 the Army, with the concurrence of USCS and USDA, clarified a long-standing question concerning the degree of inspection/examination required for preclearance of checked and hand-carried baggage. While there

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD),~~ Vol. II, p. 510; CINCPAC Instruction 5840.3D (U), 16 Apr 1979, Subj: Military Customs Inspection Within the PACOM.
2. J111 HistSum Apr 81 (U); J111 Point Paper (U), 4 Apr 79, Subj: Predeparture Military Customs Inspection of MAC Passengers.
3. J111 HistSum Apr 81 (U).

would be 100 percent examination of all crew and passenger hand-carried baggage, checked baggage would be examined only on a random basis. The random selection technique was to be developed by CINCPAC, but no minimum or maximum percentage or number of people or bags was to be established for a specific flight. Nor was the random selection to be construed as prohibiting or restricting the number of bags to be examined. Other applicable procedures, particularly pertaining to high risk travelers, were to continue.[1]

(U) In a 1 April message to concerned commands, CINCPAC directed the random selection procedure be implemented on 15 April. Each day a single digit number would be selected. Only those passengers whose last Social Security number digit matched the daily digit would have their baggage examined. A change was also made to CINCPAC Instruction 5840.3D.[2]

PACOM Military Customs Conference

(U) The fourth annual PACOM Military Customs Conference was held 17-20 November 1981 at Camp John Hay (Baguio), and was hosted by the CINCPACREP Philippines. There were 102 attendees representing USCS, USDA, Army and Air Force headquarters, PACOM component commands, MAC, COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, USEUCOM, and other subordinate commands. Highlights of discussions and seminars included the need for clarification and resolution by DOD and CINCPAC of U.S. Postal Service regulations vis-a-vis enforcement of USCS regulations; and the need for an MCI handbook, standardized instructor training, badge, and identification card system. There was a consensus was that the PACOM preclearance program was working well. Consideration was being given to expanding preclearance procedures to include military aircraft and more extensive use in exercises. "Double inspections" had decreased but more streamlining was possible; procedures for selection of the daily number in the random selection program would be revised, and more program publicity was needed. The latter was especially important because beginning 1 January 1982 the number of CONUS commercial gateways would be increased. Agricultural concerns with infestation of wood products and problems with importation of fruits, meats, and vegetables were also addressed.[3]

Customs Report

(U) CINCPAC Instruction 5840.3 required submission of quarterly reports. The following information was compiled from submissions by COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI, CINCPAC Philippines, and the Naval Support Facility, Diego Garcia. The accompanying chart depicts the actions of PACOM military customs inspectors during 1981. The manning figures are averages of quarterly submissions. The numbers for seizures and inspections/examinations are calendar year totals.[4]

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1. HQ DA 131635Z Mar 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC 010315Z Apr 81 (U).
3. J111 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
4. J111 HistSum Jan 82 (U).

PACOM MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTIONS/EXAMINATIONS

Category	M C I Part/ Full-time	Total	Inspected CTUS	Inspected Theater	Examined CTUS	Examined Theater	Total	Seizures Controlled Substance	Seizures Contraband Discoveries	Seizures Total
General	23/ 13	36								
PAX/Crew baggage (Accom. ")	150/ 88	238	88,502	297,919	153,394	125,678	665,493	127	3,219	3,346
Household goods	(155/466	621	13,652	1,084	19,618	692	35,046	5	2,752	2,757
Unaccompanied bag.			3,782	377	43,165	1,747	49,071	30	1,498	1,528
POV			-	-	5,243	1,152	6,395	-	-	-
Ships	(16/235	251		*99		*101	200	587	163	750
Aircraft				*21,783		*9,314	31,097	26	16	42
DOD Cargo	48/103	151	63,413	45,249	86,366	47,799	242,827	4	0	4
Combination	74/214	288								
	466/1,119	1,585	169,349	344,629	307,786	177,068		779	7,648	8,427
				*21,882		*9,415	1,030,129			

* No breakdown available between CTUS and Theater.

Alcohol and Drug Abuse

(U) One of the many critical problems facing the United States since the 1960s was the increasing use of addictive drugs by American youth, both in and out of uniform. On 23 October 1970 the Secretary of Defense issued a directive establishing worldwide policies for the prevention and elimination of drug abuse by Armed Forces personnel. Specific responsibilities were assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Directors of Defense agencies. Until late in 1970 CINCPAC's involvement in the drug abuse area had been limited to monitoring the overall Service programs. After that, CINCPAC became much more directly involved, and on 11 February 1971 established the PACOM Drug Abuse Control committee, consisting of representatives from USARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, and FMFPAC, under the chairmanship of the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel. On 26 June 1971 a special CINCPAC Staff Sub-committee for Drug Abuse Control comprised of staff-wide representatives was established to fulfill specific areas of responsibility, and one month later a separate Drug Abuse Control Branch was created in the Personnel Division. A CINCPAC Drug Abuse Survey Team conducted a detailed analysis of drug abuse detoxification, treatment, and rehabilitation facilities and procedure in the Republics of Vietnam and Korea, Okinawa, and Thailand.[1]

(U) In a 1973 staff reorganization, the Drug Abuse and Customs Control Branch was combined with the J1 Personnel Programs Branch under the Personnel Services Division where the function remained. Although PACOM emphasis on the suppression of the supply and demand for illicit drugs continued, in the years following the U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam, alcohol abuse became the major problem. CINCPAC initiated programs to discourage excessive consumption of alcohol at military clubs and to encourage education and rehabilitation programs and facilities.

(U) A DOD Directive of 25 August 1980 reestablished an alcohol and drug abuse prevention program as a Service responsibility while unified commanders were charged with an active monitorship role. The DOD's goal was to be free of the effects of alcohol and drug abuse; the possession of and trafficking in illicit drugs by DOD military and civilian members; and of the possession, use, sale, or promotion of drug abuse paraphernalia. The DOD Directive implemented the standards of legislation on drug and alcohol abuse and established a policy concerning drug abuse paraphernalia. It prescribed policy guidance for drug and alcohol detection and deterrence, treatment, counseling, discipline, and discharge as well as evaluation and reporting.[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. II, pp.451-477.
2. J111 HistSum Mar 81 (U); DOD Directive 1010.4 (U), 25 August 80, Subj: Alcohol and Drug Abuse by DOD personnel.

(U) As an initial step to implementing the DOD guidelines, members of the CINCPAC Personnel Directorate convened a meeting of component Service representatives on 28 October 1980 to discuss existing and projected programs and the degree of CINCPAC involvement in the individual Service programs. The committee reviewed the new DOD Directive and determined what type of information exchange and reporting would be mutually beneficial. At a meeting held on 8 April 1981 the CINCPAC Drug/Alcohol Abuse Committee was formally established. A discussion was held on the reported sale of drug paraphernalia in Honolulu record shops. The consensus was that it would not be appropriate for this committee to request that the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board place those establishments "off limits." A CINCPAC implementing instruction (5350.3) was published on 23 December 1981 which prescribed quarterly meetings of the Service component (CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC, and CDRWESTCOM) representatives. CINCPAC would provide overall coordination for alcohol and drug issues which affected operational readiness within the PACOM.[1]

Awards

ROK/US Combined Forces Command Service Badge

(U) On 14 April 1981 CINCPAC recommended approval to the Chairman, JCS, of a request from General Wickham, as the Commander in Chief Headquarters ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC), for permanent wear of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command Service Badge as permanent accouterment to the uniform for service in that headquarters. The JCS approved wearing of the badge for U.S. military personnel while serving in the headquarters, but advised that wear after successful completion of the tour would be governed by individual Service uniform regulations. On 15 May CINCPAC requested a determination on the matter by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps headquarters. All Services replied that permanent wear was not authorized--the badge could only be worn while assigned to CFC headquarters.[2]

DOD Awards for CFC Component Headquarters

(U) In June 1980 General Wickham, as COMUS Korea, requested CINCPAC support to the Chairman, JCS, for expansion of existing eligibility criteria for four DOD military awards. These awards, he felt, should encompass U.S. military personnel serving in major headquarters subordinate to the ROK/US CFC, i.e., Headquarters, Combined Field Army (ROK/US); Headquarters, Air Component Command; and Headquarters, Naval Component Command. On 15 July CINCPAC concurred with eligibility expansion for the Defense Superior Service Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Joint Service Commendation Medal, but not the Defense Distinguished Service Medal.[3]

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1. J111 HistSums Mar, Dec 81 (U).
2. J115 HistSum Aug 81 (U).
3. J115 HistSum Apr 81 (U).

(U) The JCS position in recommending approval was that inclusion of component commands was not an exception to existing policy, rather it was proper interpretation of the policy. Contrary to a favorable response which had been predicted in July 1980, a JCS message of 8 March 1981 advised of the position of the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics. "Your recommendation that eligibility for DOD military awards be expanded to include all U.S. military personnel serving in single-service components of combined commands cannot be favorably considered. DOD military awards were established to recognize deserving military personnel when they are assigned to joint activities. In this context, the term "joint" refers to activities composed of elements of more than one service of the same nation. Therefore, single-service, multi-national subordinate component commands of combined commands do not satisfy the joint-service requirements for assigned personnel to be eligible for Defense awards."[1]

Republic of Korea National Crisis Service Medal

(U) The President of the Republic of Korea had approved award of the ROK National Crisis Service Medal to all ROK and foreign military personnel who had served in the ROK between 26 October 1979 (the assassination of President Park Chung Hee) and 24 January 1981 (discontinuance of martial law in the ROK). On 24 April CINCPAC forwarded a COMUS Korea request for authority for all U.S. military personnel who had served in Korea during this period to accept and wear this medal. On 3 September CINCPAC forwarded a JCS memorandum to COMUS Korea which stated that the Secretary of Defense had disapproved the request. His decision was based on the grounds that the requirements of DOD Directive 1005.3 (Decorations and Gifts from Foreign Governments) for combat or outstanding or unusually meritorious service were not met during the period cited and, therefore, general award of the medal was not merited.[2]

PACOM Awards

(U) Of the 323 recommendations received and processed by the Personnel Directorate during 1981 for awards to PACOM military personnel, 286 were approved. For 1980 the figures were 350 and 336 respectively.[3]

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD),~~ Vol. II, p. 485; JCS 1378/311637Z Jul 80 (U); JCS 081552Z May 81 (U).
2. J115 HistSum Aug 81 (U); JCS SM-553-81 (U), 12 Aug 81, Subj: Republic of Korea National Crisis Service Medal.

SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Foreign National Personnel Administration

(U) As a result of GAO surveys in 1977-78 and a worldwide review in 1978-79 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics) (ASD/MRA&L)), revisions on compensation practices for foreign national employees were made to the Foreign Service Act under PL 96-465 (17 October 1980) and to DOD implementing instruction 1400.10, (Employment of Foreign Nationals in Foreign Areas, 5 December 1980). Under the 1980 Amendment to the Foreign Service Act, basic arrangements with host governments, in the form of treaties or agreements, remained a State Department responsibility, and the Defense Department retained authority to administer employment programs for DOD foreign national employees in foreign areas. The amendment also continued the policy for establishing foreign national employee compensation plans based upon prevailing wage rates and compensation practices for corresponding positions in various foreign localities to the extent consistent with the public interest.[1]

(U) In addition to a restatement of policy and consolidation of directives issued since 1972, the DOD instruction continued delegation of authority to each Military Department, through their subordinate components, to jointly establish compensation and other terms and conditions of foreign national employment by area, e.g., the PACOM. The instruction also called for referral by the cognizant unified commander to ASD/MRA&L of unresolved differences related to compensation matters and situations which, in the view of a Service component command, warranted deviation from prevailing practice. Previously there had been no guidelines on the latter, which were referred to as "public interest determinations," and decisions had been made by the PACOM component Services under their delegated wage fixing authority.[2]

(U) For the first time, procedures and instructions for uniform application of administration of foreign national employee compensation (direct/indirect hire and appropriated/non-appropriated fund) were prescribed in a supplementary manual to DOD Instruction 1416.8 (Compensation Program for Foreign Nationals, 5 December 1980). This included a provision for mandatory application of a Total Compensation Comparability (TCC) concept. Under TCC, compensation was to be based on a consideration of both wages and fringe benefits so that U.S. forces' average wages (including benefits) would be comparable to a average wages (including benefits) paid in the local economy. Mandatory implementation dates varied from country to country.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD),~~ Vol. II, pp. 489-490; J122 HistSum Aug 81 (U).
2. J122 HistSum Aug 81 (U).
3. Ibid.

(U) The CINCPAC implementing instruction (12200.3B) was published on 7 May 1981. The instruction iterated PACOM Service component authorities as exercised on a coordinated tri-Service basis through the CINCPAC-sponsored PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC). Service components continued to be designated as lead agencies for specific country areas as follows:

Philippines, Australia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	CINCPACFLT
Korea	CDRWESTCOM
Japan	CINCPACAF/COMUSJAPAN

Korea

(U) In Korea, the Total Comparability Compensation concept had been implemented with the July 1980 pay adjustment. Economic indicators in Korea continued an inflationary trend and the consumer price index for December 1980 showed an increase of 34.6 percent during the year with a reported increase of 15.3 percent in wages of salary earners. A U.S. forces locality wage change and benefits survey was conducted in Korea from March through May 1981 using a mix of 82 private and public sector organizations having an employee population of 189,998. The results supported average increases of 19.2 percent for non-manual and 14.8 percent for manual employees, or 16.5 percent overall. Benefit increases were in tuition assistance for each dependent student (middle school from 62,000 to 98,000 won; high school from 77,200 to 144,000 won) and in the remote area allowance (1,150 to 3,000 won per week). Revised wage schedules for the 21,000 U.S. forces' local national employees in Korea were approved jointly and issued by the PACOM Service component commands with an effective date of 1 July 1981. The Foreign Organizations Employees Union, representing all U.S. forces' Korean employees, accepted the adjustment following after-hours protest demonstrations.[1]

Philippines

Total Comparability Compensation and Pay Increases

(U) A plan for TCC implementation in the Philippines had been submitted to ASD/MRA&L by CINCPAC and was approved on 6 November 1980. A trial application of the concept was conducted in conjunction with the locality wage change and fringe benefits survey held during July and August 1981. Data from 30 private sector employers in the greater Manila area were surveyed with additional data on high grade positions being furnished from 22 other employers. Survey findings supported average wage increases of 18.8 percent for non-manual and 17.3 percent for manual employees. Emergency Allowances mandated under Philippine

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1. J121 HistSum Jun 81 (U).

Presidential Decrees 525 (1974) and 1123 (1977) totaling 110 pesos were integrated into the base pay of the revised pay schedules, plus the continuation of another 270 pesos per month in Emergency Allowances above base pay. In addition, Presidential Wage Order No. 1 of 1 April 1981 authorized another 60 pesos monthly for employees earning up to 1,500 pesos per month; U.S. forces application met that requirement and provided a declining scale to those earning 1,501 to 1,559 pesos per month. Revised schedules for the 20,000 Philippine employees were approved by the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee and issued by the Service component commands with a wage adjustment date of 1 October 1981.[1]

Severance Pay

(U) On 2 December 1981 the PACOM JLPC approved a proposal by CINCPACREP Philippines to increase severance pay effective 1 October 1981 for involuntary separation for local national employees in the Philippines from nine-tenths to 1 month's basic pay for each year of service. The proposed increase was based on findings of the U.S. forces' survey of local prevailing practices conducted in July and August 1981. The effective date was based on Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1979 Collective Bargaining Agreement. It stated that compensation improvements that result from an annual survey would be effective on 1 October.[2]

Sick Leave Benefits

(U) On 18 December the JLPC approved changes recommended by CINCPACREP Philippines to sick leave provisions for Philippine local nationals--an item also reviewed during the July-August wage survey. The changes were designed to bring compensation into line with prevailing practice and included increases in the maximum number of sick leave hours in an employee "carry-over" account from 120 to 810; in the payoff rate of sick leave accrued during the year, in excess of the carry-over account, from 50 to 60 percent of basic pay; and from 15 to 55 equivalent days worth of base pay payoff upon severance or retirement. The effective date was also 1 October, however, flexibility for a later date was permitted to allow for smoother transition and favorable employee reaction.[3]

American Express Labor Dispute

(U) A military banking facility (MBF) at Subic Bay was established in 1965 as a U.S. Treasury facility pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes. It was operated under contract in accordance with provisions of Article XVIII of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947. On 14 March 1966 the U.S. Treasury Department designated the American Express Company, Inc. as its agent in the Philippines. In 1968 another facility was established at

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1. J122 HistSum Sep 81 (U); CINCPACFLT Ltr Ser 74/7068 (U), 28 Sep 81, Subj: Wage Schedules for Non-U.S. Citizen Employees in the Republic of the Philippines.
2. J122 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. Ibid.

Clark Air Base under similar arrangements. In 1970 the American Express Military Banking Employees Association (AMEMBEA) was established as the exclusive bargaining representative of the MBF Filipino employees. Since that time American Express MBF had bargained on several occasions with the union and had entered into collective bargaining agreements with it.[1]

(U) A dispute arose late in 1980 between the American Express MBF management in the Philippines and the AMEMBEA union over wages and benefits which essentially were equivalent to those received by local nationals performing comparable functions at other U.S. activities covered by a U.S.-RP Base Labor Agreement (BLA) of 1968. The union asked for a 119 percent increase; American Express had countered with 65 percent. In January 1981 CINCPACREP Philippines notified CINCPAC of a possible strike and requested clarification that the MBF was in fact a U.S. Government agency under terms of the MBA. While the Philippine Labor Code authorized collective bargaining for pay, U.S. forces' policy did not. The U.S. forces in the Philippines had taken a stand, concurred in by the American Embassy Manila, that the MBF as a U.S. Government agency came under the U.S.-GOP 1968 BLA which required uniformity of pay and benefits within U.S. forces' (activities) and authorized only one bargaining unit (the Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Association (FFCEA)) for all U.S. forces employees. Therefore, a separate union, even though recognized for 11 years, was improper.

(U) CINCPACREP Philippines also pointed out that there were other ramifications to the dispute. The question of the MBF dealing directly with the GOP extended to their tax exempt status under Article XVIII of the MBA. It was feared that if American Express were permitted to bargain and if the Philippine Labor Law were allowed to control exclusively, then the GOP could use this incident as a precedent to apply all Philippine laws to the MBF. This, in turn, could also open up the whole question of U.S. forces invited contractors and their status under the MBA. Additionally, binding arbitration or any settlement under Philippine labor law, particularly in view of the exchange of diplomatic notes, would strengthen the position of the U.S. forces' union that "true collective bargaining up to, and including, binding arbitration" was permissible and should be carried out under the BLA. Then any settlement, which created working conditions or monetary benefits substantially higher than those of U.S. forces employees, could act as a catalyst for greater demands on the part of the U.S. forces' union.[2]

(U) During the ensuing months banking, union, GOP labor, and U.S. military officials attempted to resolve the issues. In August the DOD contracting officer confirmed to American Express Company headquarters that the MBF in the Philippines was indeed a U.S. Government agency within the terms of the Military Bases Agreement and as such was subject to the BLA. A wide range of alternatives for resolving the dispute was considered when it was elevated to the

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1. J122 HistSum Nov 81 (U); CINCPACREPPHIL 200707Z Jan 81 (U).
2. Ibid.

U.S.-RP Joint Labor Committee. After intensive meetings during the last days of September, agreement was reached on 1 October. The resultant interim collective bargaining agreement provided for wage and other monetary concessions by the MBF amounting to $46,700. In return, on 31 March 1982 the MBF employees were to be brought under labor relations provisions of the BLA, including the provision for exclusive bargaining representation by the FFCEA.[1]

Japan

(U) A Total Compensation Comparability (TCC) plan for Japan was approved by OASD/MRA&L on 6 November 1980. No separate steps were taken to implement the TCC in Japan, however, because pay and benefits paid by U.S. forces to local national employees paralleled those of Japanese National Public Service (NPS) employees which were based on a GOJ survey of prevailing practices in the private sector. Discussions had been held intermittently between representatives of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) since October 1980 on a Diet bill designed to reduce substantially NPS retirement allowance costs. In November 1981 the Japanese Diet enacted the proposed legislation. In response to USFJ proposals to the DFAA for a parallel reduction of the retirement allowance for local nationals, the Zenchuro Union (representing U.S.forces' employees) called for a 2-hour strike on 25 November and 24-hour strikes on 16, 22, and 23 December at all U.S. bases in Japan. The first two strikes were carried out with an estimated 15,000 workers participating on 16 December. The other two were called off after the DFAA assured the union that reductions in the retirement allowance would be no greater than those approved by the Diet for Japan NPS employees.[2]

(U) On 22 December the Diet enacted the annual wage revision for NPS personnel retroactive to 1 April 1981, including certain modifications designed to minimize the 5.23 percent increase recommended by the GOJ National Personnel Authority. Agreement between the USFJ and DFAA on both the 5.23 percent wage increase retroactive to 1 April 1981 and the retirement allowance issue was reached at meetings on 29 and 30 December. Modifications of the Master Labor and Marine Contracts (appropriated fund) and of the Indirect Hire Agreement (non-appropriated fund) were initiated to formalize these adjustments which were applicable to the approximately 20,000 Japanese nationals employed by U.S. forces in Japan on an indirect hire basis.[3]

Direct Hire

(U) Most Japanese nationals working for the U.S. forces in Japan were indirect hire employees under the direct supervision of U.S. forces (covered by terms of a master labor or marine contract for appropriated fund or an indirect

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1. Ibid.; SECDEF 062227Z Aug 81 (U); CINCPACREPPHIL 100107Z and 140807Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Sep 87.
2. J122 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. Ibid.

hire agreement for non-appropriated fund (NAF)) but they were hired and legally employed by the GOJ. In 1979 PACOM Service components became aware that there was a total of 251 NAF direct hire employees in Japan (110 at the Sanno Hotel, 48 at Camp Zama, 44 at MCAS Iwakuni, 36 at NAS Atsugi, and 13 at the Yokosuka Naval Base). (Note: These figures were revised in 1981 as follows: 110-Sanno, 63-Camp Zama, 275-Iwakuni, 35-Atsugi/Yokosuka; 483-total.) As a result of guidance from CINCPAC and coordination with concerned commands and the PACOM JPLC, efforts by COMUS Japan to assimilate these employees under the Indirect Hire Agreement (IHA) were made but without tangible results.[1]

(U) With the exception of two allowances, the PACOM Service components approved a uniform pay and benefits policy for Japanese direct hire personnel in November 1980. The exceptions were payments of commutation and meal allowances which were found to be prevailing practice in the non-U.S.forces' sector during a September 1980 USFJ survey of 47 service-oriented firms. A uniform direct hire employment policy was implemented on 27 April 1981 by COMUS Japan. It authorized 1-year appointments, that could be extended an additional year, covering temporary full-time and part-time and intermittent employees; IHA basic pay rates; and in conformance with Japanese law, night differential, overtime, duty connected illness or injury, discharge allowance, and pregnancy leave. Not authorized were those allowances not required by Japanese law and not found to be prevailing practice through the USFJ survey: language, family, housing, meals, seasonal and severance allowances, leave, and a U.S. forces' differential.[2]

(U) Meanwhile, the PACOM Service components could not agree on authorization of the commutation allowance, and in June CINCPAC referred the matter to the OASD/MRA&L for resolution as specified in paragraph 5.a. of DOD Instruction 1400.10. The response indicated that the commutation allowance should be included in the total compensation package. It also requested that a TCC analysis of the direct hire employees in Japan be conducted and forwarded for review prior to rendering a determination on the commutation allowance. The CINCPAC analysis was forwarded on 17 August and showed that U.S. forces in Japan lagged behind industrial practice in providing commutation allowance and meals-in-kind. On 4 September ASD MRA&L concluded that direct hires should be paid the commutation allowance. Further, the issue of a meal allowance or meals-in-kind should be addressed immediately. A review by the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee resulted in guidance being issued on 28 October by PACAF, as the lead agency for establishing direct hire personnel policies in Japan, that the 400+ NAF direct hire employees be paid a commutation allowance and be authorized meals-in-kind at activities having food service facilities.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/ERD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 494-495; J122 HistSum Nov 81 (U).
2. J122 HistSum Nov 81 (U); CINCPAC 030111Z Jun 81 (U).
3. J122 HistSum Nov 81 (U).

Australia

(U) Negotiations to amend the U.S. Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt (Australia) Industrial Agreement of 1967 (as amended) began on 15 June 1981 between representatives of the Communication Station and the Trades and Labor Council of Western Australia. An agreement was concluded on 18 August and covered approximately 100 direct hire local national employees. It would continue in effect for as long as the station remained in operation but could be renegotiated in June 1983 if changes were needed. Half of the agreement's 48 articles were modified. The workweek was maintained at 40 hours despite a strong push in all industries across Australia to adopt a 35-hour week. Changes favorable to the employees included a provision for payment of overtime when a worker's meal time was postponed for more than one-half hour; limitation on the employer's use of part-time employees; and addition of a 25 percent of a base-pay-special-duty-allowance for persons required to operate winches at the very low frequency complex.[1]

Compensation for Third Country Nationals

(U) The number of direct-hire third country nationals (TCNs) employed by U.S. forces in the PACOM had been reduced from over 1,000 in 1970 to 20 by late 1981. New wage schedules for Filipino TCNs, with an effective date of 1 October 1981, were issued by CINCPACFLT (the lead agency for developing TCN compensation plans) on 23 October. Base pay was taken from the U.S. forces' wage schedules for local national employees in the Philippines as of 1 October 1981 with peso rates converted to dollar amounts. Other compensation was derived as follows:[2]

- An overseas differential of 25 percent of base pay was carried forward from past schedules.

- A subsistence allowance of 14¢ per hour was carried forward from past schedules, based on the 1968 U.S.-GOP Offshore Labor Agreement.

- An additional subsistence allowance of 47¢ per hour was added based on the current daily charge for three meals in Navy mess facilities.

- A year-end bonus was increased from one-half month's pay to one and one-quarter month's pay, consistent with the home country wage schedule.

- An emergency allowance of 20¢ per hour was added, consistent with home country wage schedule.

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1. J121 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS~~/ERD), Vol. II, p. 505; J122 HistSum Nov 81 (U).

(U) A substantive change in compensation policy for TCN employees of U.S. forces in PACOM countries was approved by the PACOM Service components effective 1 November 1981. The long-established policy had been to base compensation (base pay and benefits) on home country (local national) rates, plus payment of a foreign area differential, which in most cases lagged behind host country local national rates. The revised policy provided for a comparison between host country total compensation (base pay and benefits) for a given job and the established TCN total compensation. Then the TCN employee was to be paid the higher of the two. In a trial application conducted in August 1981, all Filipino TCNs in Japan (16), Korea (1), and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (1) were raised to the higher host country compensation rates. The one Chinese and one Australian employed in Korea remained on the higher "old" home country TCN pay rates.[1]

Offshore Labor - Diego Garcia

~~(C)~~ Plans for expanded operations at and from Diego Garcia required considerable importation of non-indigenous labor. Major requirements were for multi-million dollar construction efforts as well as for additional personnel to operate facilities and provide administrative support. Under terms of a U.S.-U.K. exchange of notes on Indian Ocean Islands (30 December 1966), U.S. and U.K. authorities were to consult one another before introduction of workers from a third country into Diego Garcia. In 1981 the exchange of notes was interpreted to mean maximum use of labor from Mauritius, a nearby former British possession. There were, however, strong indications that a prospective contractor was planning to utilize primarily third country labor from the Philippines. Also, Navy direct hire of several Filipinos was indicated. In May CINCPAC concerns were raised to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the JCS, respectively, on the politically sensitive issue concerning the use of Mauritius labor at Diego Garcia. (Most facilities and administrative support billets were filled by U.S. military and civilians.)[2]

~~(C)~~ In June the CNO advised that the Naval Engineering Facilities Command was working toward contractor use of some 270 Mauritians, and the remainder of the 1,000-man contractor workforce would be mostly Filipino. Regarding political sensitivity to permanent duty, direct hire Filipino employees by the Navy, the JCS advised on 3 June that it was permissible without political level consultations. As a result, some 20 Filipinos were initially scheduled for employment but, based on conditions applicable to Diego Garcia, it was necessary to develop several special compensation measures additional to already established TCN pay schedules. In July the PACOM Service components authorized the

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1. J122 HistSum Nov 81 (U).
2. J12 HistSum Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 1 Jun 87.

following additional compensation for the Filipinos on Diego Garcia. (Basic pay was patterned after home country compensation practices.)[1]

- An additional 28¢ per hour during the first 40 workhours per week. This was the amount a U.S. forces' local national employee in the Philippines received as an emergency allowance.

- An increase in subsistence allowance from 14¢ to 61¢ per hour during the first 40 work hours per week. This was to provide parity with other workers at Digeo Garcia for meals and allowances.

- As a recruitment incentive to skilled workers for long-term temporary duty (TDY), a post differential comparable to the U.S. citizen rate of 20 percent which would start on the 42nd consecutive day of TDY and be retroactive to the first day of TDY at Diego Garcia.

Civilian Position Classification Control

(U) In October 1980 the Chief of Naval Operations restored high grade level (GS-13 to 15) classification authority to CINCPAC. This was further redelegated by CINCPAC on 7 November to civilian personnel offices in PACOM with qualified position classifiers. For CINCPAC staff, IPAC, and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, this was the Pearl Harbor Consolidated Civilian Personnel Office; for commands in Korea it was the Eighth Army's Civilian Personnel Office; for COMUS Japan, the 475th ABW Civilian Personnel Office, and for others it was the local Navy civilian personnel office.[2]

(U) As further implementation of CNO policy, a new civilian personnel position control procedure was established by CINCPAC for staff members and subordinate commands effective 3 September 1981. Under the new procedure, descriptions of all new, redescribed, and vacant GS/GM-13 to 15 positions were to be submitted to the Naval Civilian Personnel Command, Pacific Field Division (Pearl Harbor) for post audit classification review and validation. In addition, on-site audits would be conducted annually in conjunction with the maintenance review cycle of 15 percent of the GS/GM-13 to 15 positions and on 10 percent of all lower grade positions.[3]

Civilian Employee Cost of Living Allowance

(U) The Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA) paid to statutory-salaried Federal employees on the island of Oahu was increased from 15 to 17.5 percent effective 6 September 1981.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. J122 HistSum Aug 81 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. J144 HistSum Sep 81 (U).

Civilian Performance Appraisal

(U) The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 required the establishment of a performance appraisal system for all employees in General Schedule grades 1 through 12 and all Federal Wage System employees. In compliance, the Department of the Navy developed the Basic Performance Appraisal Program which required identification of critical performance elements for each employee. The program was implemented on the CINCPAC staff as of 1 September 1981. Performance standards for the highly satisfactory and marginal performance levels were written for each critical performance element identified. At the end of the rating period, each employee's performance would be measured against the established standards for each critical element.[1]

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1. J144 HistSum Sep 81 (U).

CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I--SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

PACOM Data Systems Center

(U) The PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC) internetted 13 minicomputers into a system which directly supported the intelligence data processing requirements of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, IPAC, and FICPAC. The PDSC also directly interfaced with intelligence-related activities worldwide through the Intelligence Data Handling Systems Communications (IDHSC) network. It was anticipated that the PDSC development would be expanded further to support the intelligence requirements of CDRWESTCOM and CINCPACAF. The CINCPAC PDSC program manager directed a staff which included a 4-man Program Management Office, a 5-man verification and validation contractor element (MITRE Corp.), and a 40-man prime contractor staff (CALSPAN Field Services, Inc.). Coordination of this program was required with the USAF Rome Air Development Center for engineering and procurement support, the Naval Intelligence Command for funding support, and the Defense Intelligence Agency for operational support.[1]

(U) Initial operational capability of the PDSC was attained on 29 January 1981. This provided both IDHSC II integration and a basic Data Base Management System (DBMS) capability and formed the basis for true PACOM Remote System (PRS) development, beginning with FICPAC. IDHSC II integration allowed communications interconnectivity of the FICPAC PRS with national-level intelligence support data bases. Additionally, analyst-to-analyst communications using dual-screen terminals became a functional reality. Finally, the DBMS gave PRS and IPAC analysts the ability to manipulate data in an integrated, all-source PDSC intelligence analysis support data base. Equipment available at this time was as follows:[2]

Equipment	Function
2 - PDP 11/70	Automated Communications Computer System
2 - PDP 11/70	Message Support System
2 - PDP 11/70	User Support System
2 - PDP 11/70	Host System
1 - PDP 11/70	PACOM Remote System
33 - OJ389(V)/G	Analyst Terminals

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1. CINCPAC Instruction 5400.6H of 1 Jun 81 (U), Subj: Organization and Functions Manual.
2. J212A HistSum Jan 81 (U).

(U) Thirty-one Sperry Univac 1652 dual-screen terminals were tested and accepted by the government during February. Twenty-eight of these had initially been acquired to support a PACOM Compact Automated Message Handling System (CAMHS). After the CAMHS project was cancelled, the PDSC Program Management Office arranged to use these terminals for the PDSC, significantly advancing availability dates for PDSC users. Systems software development had also been accelerated to accommodate the earlier addition of these terminals. Thirty-five OJ389(V)/G terminals were available by March to CINCPAC Watch and IPAC analysts, with supporting printer capabilities for hardcopy output. In addition a full complement of 13 Digital Equipment Corporation PDP 11/70-based AN/GYQ-21(V) computer systems had been acquired and installed. This included a two-processor development support system at IPAC. A major program review of the PDSC was held in mid-March, with contractor, component command, and DIA personnel in attendance, along with CINCPAC and IPAC users.[1]

(U) The PDSC Data Base Management System was turned over to IPAC for operational use on 17 July. At this time two significant DBMS features functioned successfully in the operational environment--the Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF) simple query and the AIF complex query. IPAC and FICPAC PDSC Remote System access to the DIA On-Line System (DIAOLS) and PRS access to the PDSC data base were tested by a DIA team in late July. The number of active terminals on the PDSC system supporting CINCPAC and IPAC users increased to 42. A total of 86 had been purchased for eventual installation, with the following programmed distribution:[2]

Equipment	Location
74 - OJ389(V)/G	CINCPAC/IPAC Analysts
3 - OJ389(V)/G	CINCPAC SPINTCOM
8 - OJ389(V)/G	FICPAC PRS
1 - OJ389(V)/G	CINCPACFLT FOSIC

(U) Another significant PDSC Data Base Management System capability, preliminary geographic search, was successfully tested by MITRE Corporation engineers in August. It was initially limited to polygon search, but coding was begun to expand the software to include such other geographic capabilities as circle search and route search. The contractor also obtained and loaded into the data base the most current version of the AIF. With 56 terminals in operation by October, IPAC analysts were able to go into a "paperless" environment, significantly reducing manpower and reproduction costs for two communications centers. Additionally, sections of the CINCPAC Intelligence staff were able to cut back on paper use, owing to terminal access to the PDSC. With the installation of a terminal and printer in December at the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC), it became the first PACFLT operational user.

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1. J212A HistSums Feb-Mar 81 (U).
2. J212A HistSums May-Jul 81 (U); J2/Memo/TS001-82, 25 Jun 82 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Command History 1981; Review of Draft.

FOSIC was connected directly to the PDSC PACOM Remote System at FICPAC, and had all the capabilities available to the system.[1]

(U) Baseline operational capability for the PDSC was achieved on 30 November 1981. At this time the following capabilities were available to the system:[2]

- User system capable of supporting 56 terminals with enhanced performance.
- Applications to incorporate ground order of battle for interactive access.
- AIF simple and complex query applications.
- A powerful Data Base Management System designed for working with hierarchical data base design on AN/GYQ-21(V) computer systems.
- A query language which allowed the analyst a wide range of potential questions to ask the data base.
- Polygon geographic search capability (with circle, elipse, and route search to be added later).
- Interactive update, allowing file update from analyst terminals.
- Backup and recovery, permitting recovery of lost or improperly updated data.
- Get all data, with sort capability, allowing very rapid sorting of data. Primarily used for production of publications.

(U) Access to the IDHSC II mail service from a PDSC terminal became operational in early December. This important capability allowed analyst-to-analyst communications between PDSC users, including those at remote WESTCOM terminals, and analysts and users at IDHSC II sites anywhere in the world. Software was also developed and tested late in the year to allow CINCPAC, IPAC, and FICPAC users query/response access to the Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System. The next significant milestone for the PACOM Data Systems Center was scheduled for September 1982, when enhanced baseline operational capability was expected to be achieved.[3]

(U) Training was an important activity during the year. In the first half of 1981 approximately 150 students from CINCPAC and component commands were

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1. J212A HistSums Aug-Dec 81 (U).
2. J212A HistSum Nov 81 (U).
3. J212A HistSums, Nov-Dec 81 (U).

trained as users, operators, and programmers for local computer operations and for the PACOM Data Systems Center. In July, 10 IPAC programmers were trained by the CALSPAN Applications Group to assume functions previously being performed by the contractor. Additionally, two instructors trained approximately 200 users in DIAOLS/COINS (Community On-Line Intelligence System of the NSA) operations. This training was conducted at the Fleet Intelligence Support Center and Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines; COMUS Japan, Fifth Air Force, and 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Japan; and COMUS Korea, 501st MIG, and 314th Air Division in Korea. The last quarter's most significant training effort was conducted by a visiting Air Training Command instructor at CINCPAC. Training was provided to 76 computer programmers and operators in PDP-11 computer operations, utilities, FORTRAN, and assembly language programming. Sixteen IPAC programmer/analysts were trained in use of the Digital Equipment Corporation's editor function for PDP-11/70 programming. A total of 452 CINCPAC, IPAC, and WESTPAC personnel trained as part of the J21/PDSC effort.[1]

Intelligence Data Handling System

(U) As noted above, the PACOM Data Systems Center was successfully interfaced with the Intelligence Data Handling System network on 29 January 1981. Major modifications in the PACOM IDHSC switch software were completed and successfully tested in a multi-terminal environment. The changes substantially reduced the lag time IDHSC users had experienced while accessing the DIAOLS. An Air Force team installed IDHS terminal equipment at both Fifth and Thirteenth Air Force headquarters, with activation in April. An IDHS terminal was also installed at the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Theater Intelligence Center Pacific (USAITIC-PAC) at Fort Shafter, to be activated by June when their sensitive compartmented information facility was to be accredited. Two COINS II terminals were activated at PACAF. Two additional terminals were installed, at USAITIC-PAC and IPAC, to be activated in April. IDHS mail service became operational on the PACOM switch in late April. Previously, PACOM intelligence analysts could forward unofficial messages or information only to other PACOM analysts. With the new capability, unofficial record communications could be accomplished worldwide between any two intelligence analysts or watch-standers who had access to the IDHS communications network. The interface between PDSC user terminals and mail service capability on the IDHSC switch had not yet been developed.[2]

(U) The Air Force provided two Intelligence Data Handling System Teletype Model 40 terminals in May in repayment for two loaner terminals provided by CINCPAC to Fifth Air Force/ COMUS Japan and Thirteenth Air Force. One of the terminals was moved to the 548th RTG at Hickam AFB where it replaced an old and slow Model 37 teletype. This completed the planned upgrade of PACOM Model 37 teletypes to higher speed Model 40 cathode ray tube terminals. The installa-

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1. J212A HistSum Dec 81 (U).
2. J211 HistSums Jan-Apr 81 (U).

tion of an IDHS terminal at the 501st MIG in Pyongtaek, Korea, was delayed to December 1981 or January 1982 because of construction delays in rebuilding the sensitive compartmented information facility. The IDHS Model 40 terminal and a COINS II Model 40 terminal became operational at USAITIC-PAC in early May. CODEX MX 2400 modems were received by new IDHS sites in WESTPAC in May. They were of commercial grade, however, and did not have the contracted-for options. The modems were being modified so that the IDHS sites could be activated.[1]

(U) A high-speed communications line (50 kilobits) between CINCPAC and PACAF was activated in June. This circuit supported a number of multiplexed intelligence communications channels. The major one was a computer-to-computer link between the IDHS node computer at PACAF and the IDHS switch computer at CINCPAC. The speed on this channel increased from 2.4 to 38.4 baud. This extra capacity greatly improved the bulk data transfer capability and increased the accessibility time to network intelligence files by PACAF and 548th RTG analysts. Also in June, the 9.6 baud communications link was activated at the 314th Air Division at Osan AB, Korea. Preliminary testing of the Korean Air Intelligence System (KAIS) computer software with the IDHS switch computer at IPAC was started, using a computer at PACAF. Accreditation of the KAIS computer system, which was part of the Air Force CONSTANT WATCH program in Korea, was scheduled to take place during July.[2]

(U) COMUS Japan and Fifth Air Force at Yokota AB reported that their shared IDHS Teletype Model 40 terminal had been completely installed, with line testing commencing in July. The IDHSC circuit between CINCPAC and Thirteenth Air Force at Clark AB, Philippines, was activated and the Model 40 terminal was operational by August. The 500th MIG also completed installation of a Model 40 terminal in September.[3]

(U) The first draft of the Pacific Theater Intelligence Data System plan for intelligence ADP support to the PACOM theater in the 1980s was distributed to the components and subunified commands for coordination on 5 October. The concept of the plan reflected the PACOM strategy for establishing a redundant, survivable linkage with the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) by means of a new command, control, and intelligence network. In addition, the plan placed emphasis on making maximum use of DODIIS-developed technology for intranode connectivity and maximum theater cooperation in the areas of standardization, expanded information exchange, and sharing of resources. Comments were received on the initial draft plan, and the final concept was expected to be forwarded to DIA in early 1982.[4]

(U) In summary, during 1981, new Intelligence Data Handling System terminals had been installed at USAITIC-PAC/WESTCOM in Hawaii, Thirteenth Air Force

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1. J211 HistSum May 81 (U).
2. J211 HistSum Jun 81 (U).
3. J211 HistSums Jul-Sep 81 (U).
4. J211 HistSums Oct-Nov 81 (U).

in the Philippines, and Fifth Air Force and 500th MIG in Japan. Terminal upgrades had been installed at 548th RTG/PACAF in Hawaii, Fleet Intelligence Support Center in the Philippines, and USFK/J2 in Korea. These upgrades included both new Model 40 teletype terminals and high-speed circuits. COINS II terminals had been installed at USAITIC-PAC, 548th RTG, and FOSIC/PACFLT. The Korean Air Intelligence System at Osan AB had been connected with the PACOM switch during the year, integrating it into the worldwide Department of Defense network. Finally, the concept for the Pacific Theater Intelligence Data System was initiated as a new approach in managing all intelligence data handling systems in the Pacific Command.[1]

Special Security

(U) CINCPAC Instruction C5510.15, providing security responsibilities for the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), was published in February. Upon promulgation, the Special Security Office (SSO) instituted a security training program for all Command Duty Officer and Duty Director for Intelligence teams about their responsibilities. Security manuals were prepared and given to the teams, explaining in detail the responsibilities for the numerous alarm zones assigned to each. The closed circuit television system which aided the Duty Director for Intelligence in controlling access to the Command Center was also installed and activated in February, significantly enhancing physical security.[2]

~~(S)~~ In accordance with national policy on the control of compromising emanations, the Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity conducted an instrumented Tempest survey of the CINCPAC Special Intelligence Communications (SPINTCOMM) facility (Building 4, Room 354). The survey showed that the IBM 100 Memory Typewriter did not meet national policy criteria. However, the Commander Naval Security Group said on 27 March that an exception to operate the typewriter was not required because the information processed on the unit was limited to unclassified material only.[3]

(U) Optical character reader (OCR) equipment was installed in the SPINTCOMM facility in April. Because of modifications in the software programming which was employed in the OCR equipment, changes were required in the existing message origination instructions. These changes were made, and a revised instruction was distributed to all SPINTCOMM subscribers. Incorporated in the revised edition were many new features to assist drafters and typists in the preparation of messages processed by the SPINTCOMM facility. Included were a listing of plain language addresses, more comprehensive examples of SPINTCOMM message formats, and a listing of terminology most commonly used by the facility.[4]

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1. J211 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
2. J24 HistSum Feb 81 (U).
3. J242 HistSum Mar 81 (S), REVW 2 Apr 87.
4. J242 HistSum Apr 81 (U).

(U) In September the SPINTCOMM facility completed a major renovation of the Message Center (Room 357), and relocation of the message distribution area to Room 355. Room 361 was also remodeled. The upgrading enhanced message processing workflow and handling times. The entire project spanned some 16 months because of scheduling problems and material delays. SPINTCOM operations were in Building 4, Rooms 355, 355A, 357, 361, 362, 367, and 378; administrative space was in Rooms 350 and 354. The supply area was in Room 2B2.[1]

(U) At the DIA's request, CINCPAC sent two members of the Special Security Division to Korea in May to assist in the inspection of facilities under DIA/CINCPAC cognizance. SCIF facilities inspected were SSO Korea, Detachment 1 314th Air Division, 2d Infantry Division, and Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.). The inspection covered SSO matters, physical security, and Tempest accreditations.[2]

(U) During 1981 the CINCPAC SPINTCOMM facility provided SSO message support to 17 VIP visitors, including the Vice President in June-July, the Secretary of State in June, and the Secretary of Defense in November. The facility also provided communications support for the CINC during his nine trips in 1981.[3]

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1. J242 HistSum Sep 81 (U).
2. J24 HistSum May 81 (U).
3. J24 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

Intelligence Deficiencies in PACOM

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC Director for Intelligence said in late 1981 that the effectiveness of using the Pacific Command's limited intelligence resources against an increasing threat to Third World countries in the theater was hampered by an unwieldy and complicated system for establishing intelligence priorities. He said this system had to be made more responsive to dynamic changes, and higher priorities needed to be placed on those Third World countries where threats to U.S interests existed.[1]

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1. J2/Memo/SO94-81, 27 November 1981 ~~(S)~~, Subj: Intelligence Issues (U), REVW 4 Aug 11.
2. Ibid.; J2334 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, Subj: Intelligence Deficiencies in PACOM (U), REVW 17 Sep 01.
3. Ibid.

Project SENIOR GAZE Demonstration

[redacted]

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1. J2311 Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 23 Mar 81, Subj: SENIOR GAZE (U), REVW 23 Mar 87; HQ PACAF/DO&I Ltr, 15 Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, Subj: HQ PACAF Project SENIOR GAZE (U), DECL 14 Jan 89.
2. J231 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 18 Feb 87; Hq USAF 162215Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 16 Jan 01.
3. J231 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 18 Feb 87; Hq PACAF 231931Z Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 21 Jan 01.

[redacted]

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1. J231 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 6 Mar 87.
2. SSO Korea 140500Z Mar 81 ~~(S/NF)(BOM)~~, REVW 13 Mar 01.
3. Ibid.

[redacted]

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1. J2311 Point Paper ~~(S/NF),~~ 23 Mar 81, Subj: SENIOR GAZE (U), REVW 23 Mar 81.
2. J231 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 10 Apr 87.
3. SSO Korea 171132Z Oct 81 ~~(S)(BOM),~~ DECL 17 Oct 87.
4. J231 HistSum Oct 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ REVW 10 Nov 87.

[redacted]

SENIOR RUBY Deployment to PACOM

[redacted]

COMFY LEVI Deployment Proposed

[redacted]

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1. J231 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 13 Jan 88.
2. J232 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 11 Jan 88.
3. Ibid.

[redacted]

Proposed TALLYMAN Korea Demonstration

~~(S)~~ TALLYMAN was a system designed to transfer and display sanitized, unique, time-critical signal intelligence information from the national SIGINT system directly to an on-scene commander in near-real time. It was an information management display and correlation system for over-the-horizon detection, classification, and targeting. It employed off-the-shelf hardware and existing communications links, with information being processed through AN/USQ-18(V) equipment. AN/USQ-18(V)-equipped platforms and sites could exchange targeting and background information from multiple reporting sources. First test of the system in the PACOM was TALLYMAN I, conducted in September-November 1980, using the carrier USS MIDWAY in the Indian Ocean as the on-scene command post. Navy AN/USQ-18(V) and Fleet satellite communications were accessed by the National SIGINT Operations Center Special Support Area. Sanitized data from multiple sensors on potential threat/target information was passed to the ship during the demonstration.[4]

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1. J232 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 18 Feb 87.
2. Ibid.
3. J232 HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S),~~ REVW 11 JAN 88.
4. J3142 Point Paper ~~(S),~~ 6 Apr 81, Subj: Project TALLYMAN (U), DECL 6 Apr 87.

~~(S)~~ Admiral Long told the NSA Director in May that while several systems having significant potential in the indications and warning and targeting areas were being developed, he believed that TALLYMAN was one that could effectively be applied in the Korean area of operation. CINCPAC talked with COMUS Korea about the project, and General Wickham expressed an interest in receiving more information to determine its suitability for Korea. The NSA was prepared to send representatives to brief General Wickham and his staff.[1]

~~(S)~~ A team from the NSA visited Korea in June to explain TALLYMAN and survey the potential for its use there. General Wickham agreed to a concept development effort which would lead to a system demonstration in Korea. He said that in his view, the system had solid potential for improving intelligence dissemination and information displays, although he was skeptical about the adaptability of TALLYMAN to the ground warfare problem during full hostilities. The limited data capacity of the system might also be a restrictive factor. However, this was an aspect which needed explanation and definition in the concept development phase. TALLYMAN also had the potential to provide means for exchanging, displaying, and manipulating Blue Force status information among major ROK and U.S. ground elements.[2]

~~(S)~~ TALLYMAN Korea was scheduled to be conducted from 1 April to 14 May 1982. Equipment setup and testing would be done by 12 April, training of operators, analysts, and managers between 12 and 30 April, and formal demonstration from 2 to 14 May 1982. Initially, USS MIDWAY was believed to be available for participation during May. The NSA would fund $2.4 million for the demonstration. Threat environment for the test would be actual North Korean ground, air, and naval activities. It would be augmented by scripted major past incidents and scripted replay of Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 81 to insure sufficient intelligence data. CINCPAC would not actively participate but would send observers to Korea at the time of the demonstration to determine utility of the system at the command level. Participants for TALLYMAN Korea would be CINCCFC in Seoul (with input converted to Hangul for the ROK); 314th Air Division at Osan AB; the NSA at Fort Meade, Maryland; USS MIDWAY at sea off Korea; Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility WESTPAC at Kamiseya, Japan; and FOSIC PAC at Pearl Harbor (for operator training only).[3]

~~(C)~~ COMUS Korea informed CINCPAC that a Washington team spent a week at his command in late December 1981, conducting a fact-finding visit for continued development of responsive intelligence support to military operations in Korea. He said the selection of Korea as a developmental bed would maximize the value of the scheduled TALLYMAN demonstration in 1982 and complement the overall intelligence support program. COMUS Korea said the concept had his

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1. CINCPAC 190209Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 31 May 87; DIRNSA DIR/CH-175-81/222310Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 20 May 11.
2. SSO Korea 240930Z Jun 81 ~~(S)(EX)(BOM)~~, REVW 24 Jun 87.
3. J330 Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 1 Dec 81, Subj: TALLYMAN Korea (TMK) Demonstration (U), REVW 1 Dec 87.

full support, because requirements for indications and warning, crisis management, and battle management needed such an initiative. He also viewed this as an opportunity to facilitate and improve intelligence sharing with the ROK.[1]

~~(C)~~ At the end of the year CINCPACFLT informed CINCPAC that because funding problems forced removal of equipment, USS MIDWAY regrettably would not be able to participate in the scheduled TALLYMAN Korea demonstration. Because of this, the naval ocean surveillance units would also not participate.[2]

Section 1.5 (c),(d)

HUMINT Collection Program in PACOM

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ In July 1980 the USAF Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence (AF/IN) had proposed a reorganization of the overall Air Force HUMINT program. The Chief of Staff approved the concept in December 1980 and directed that full implementation be completed by October 1981. Reorganization centralized direction of the USAF HUMINT program under AF/IN through a single field arm and Air Staff element. It also eliminated duplication, fragmentation, and overlap of operations and was more responsive to theater needs and requirements. Alignment actions included creation of a HUMINT Division on the Air Staff responsible for plans and policy, and amalgamation of Foreign Technology Division (FTD) and 7602d Air Intelligence Group (AINTELG) collection functions, with FTD retaining its foreign materiel exploitation mission. It also involved reduction of Headquarters 7602d AINTELG and transfer of billets to the Air Staff, theater centers, and field collection units. The 7602d was renamed Air Force Special Activity Center and given the function of directing the theater squadrons.[4]

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1. SSO Korea 300045Z Dec 81 ~~(C)(EX)(BOM)~~, REVW 18 Dec 87.
2. CINCPACFLT 302307Z Dec 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 15 Dec 87.
3. J2332 HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 18 Feb 01.
4. J2332 HistSum Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 6 Mar 87.

[redacted][1]

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Visitors to CINCPAC during the year included commanders of Dets 31 and 32 PSAA, Det 4 FTD, 500th MIG, and 501st MIG. Items of interest discussed with the commanders of Det 32 and 501st MIG were USAF access to, and the quality and value of Army reporting from, the Combined Military Interrogation Center in Seoul. Other subjects included working relationships among U.S. intelligence collectors in Korea, pre-publication review of intelligence reports by the COMUS Korea staff, and the fusion of intelligence data from the three major intelligence disciplines.[2] [redacted]

[redacted]

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1. Ibid.
2. J2334 HistSum Mar 81 ~~(C/NF)~~, REVW 8 Apr 87; J2332 HistSum Apr 81 ~~(C/NF)~~, REVW 11 May 87; J233 HistSums Aug-Dec 81 (U).
3. J2334 Point Paper ~~(S/NF)~~, 17 Sep 81, Subj: Need for HUMINT in PACOM (U), REVW 17 Sep 01.

[redacted]

Section 1.5(c)

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1. Ibid.

SECTION III--INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Targeting

PACOM Management

~~(C)~~ The PACOM Target Actions Group (TAG), chaired by the CINCPAC Targets Management Branch Chief, was comprised of members from CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CDRWESTCOM, and COMIPAC. Representatives from PACAF's Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff (PACOPS) and 548th RTG, and PACFLT's Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific attended as observers. Meetings of the TAG were generally held once a month, and minutes of the meetings were submitted by the TAG Chairman to the Chairman of the PACOM Intelligence Board. Nuclear target planning for the Pacific Command was guided by the PACOM Nuclear Planning Group, under the staff cognizance of the Director for Plans (see also Planning Chapter). The CINCPAC Director for Intelligence and Commander IPAC, however, were responsible for the detailed analysis and production aspects of nuclear targeting.[1]

Target Intelligence Production Plan

X4

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ The DIA published the first TIPP Quarterly Status Report on 4 November. It addressed DIA intelligence research and production activities that were directly related to targeting applications and provided the status of each ongoing production project. PACOM TAG members were requested by the Chairman

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 537; Minutes, PACOM Target Actions Group Meetings, Jan-Dec 81, hereinafter cited as TAG Minutes.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 537; TAG Minutes, Jan-May 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 8 Jun 11.

to review the document and determine how it reflected their targeting needs. The Chairman also urged all TAG members to reassess their intelligence production requirements and to submit them to the group at the earliest opportunity.[1]

Automated Tactical Target Graphics Production

[redacted]

1. TAG Minutes, Dec 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 3 Dec 87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 542.
3. TAG Minutes, Jan 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 29 Jan 11.
4. TAG Minutes, Sep 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 6 Oct 11.

[redacted]

(C) On another matter, owing to a reduction in experienced ATTG production personnel in PACOM, TAG members decided in December that ATTG would not be produced for all PACOM Contingency Installation List facilities. Only ATTG on significant installations nominated and approved through the TAG would be produced.

(C) Also in December, 548th RTG announced that virtually all of its experienced ATTG production personnel would have transferred out by June 1982, and most of the experienced graphics builders would be gone even earlier. This situation would have a serious impact on the quantity of ATTG produced. For example, while in 1981 the unit had produced an average of 65 ATTG a month, production in the first 6 months of 1982 was expected to be only about 24 per month. The manpower shortfall stemmed in part from the fact that several personnel expected to arrive in late 1981 were diverted from their Hickam assignments and no replacement personnel had been identified. In addition, some of the replacements expected to arrive in early 1982 might also be diverted, and some others might not be productive for several months because of security clearance delays.[2]

ATTG Release to the ROK

[redacted]

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1. TAG Minutes, Dec 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ REVW 3 Dec 87.
2. Ibid.

[redacted]

ATTG Format

(C) At the May TAG meeting the CINCPACFLT representative sponsored a proposal to amend FICPAC's ATTG format to include a statement reflecting production by subordinate Naval Reserve units. The statement would read: "Produced for FICPAC by . . . " and acknowledge the support provided by Reserve unit producers. TAG members discussed the possible conflicts that could arise from the lack of producer codes for Reserve units, the possibility of user questions being addressed directly to the units (bypassing FICPAC), and the "Prepared under the direction of" notation that appeared on all ATTG leaders.[4]

[redacted]

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1. TAG Minutes, Apr 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 30 Apr 11; CINCPAC 080326Z Apr 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 6 Apr 01.
2. TAG Minutes, May 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 8 Jun 11.
3. TAG Minutes, Dec 81 ~~(S/NF), REVW 3~~ Dec 87.
4. TAG Minutes, May 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~ REVW 8 Jun 11.
5. TAG Minutes, Jun 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 30 Jun 11.

(C) In June the PACAF representative briefed the TAG members on the standardization of ATTG formats among producers worldwide, except for USEUCOM. For this reason, PACAF would submit an agenda item for the 1981 TI/TM Conference for all producers to meet DIAM 57-24 standards. IPAC raised concerns over target statements in some ATTG which cited shortcomings in identifying the military significance of targets. The Target Analysis Pacific Area (TAPA) included many excellent examples of target significance statements, resulting from all-source target analysis. The Chairman said that with TAPA going on-line in the PACOM Data Systems Center, all components would be able to access target significance statments and make positive changes if needed.[1]

(C) IPAC circulated examples of good and bad target significance statements to the July TAG membership. In many instances the TDI categories gave significant information, which was unnecessarily repeated in the textual descriptions. Members discussed what constituted a good significance statement and noted that most tended to be terse and gave limited information. IPAC was conducting a review of PACOM OPLAN targets to check for adequacy of descriptions.[2]

ATTG Miniaturization

(U) FICPAC briefed the membership in June about a new vesicular microfiche process that gave much greater resolution in miniaturized ATTG than the existing aperture card diazo chips. The new process would also give the capability of 80 photos per microfiche sheet, thereby reducing storage requirements for ATTG. The Chairman suggested that FICPAC develop an agenda item for the 1981 TI/TM Conference to surface the production improvement suggestion.[3]

(U) FICPAC presented a draft briefing at the July TAG meeting on its proposed acquisition of microfiche equipment for producing higher quality Tactical Target Materials (TTM). PACAF and PACFLT were asked to survey TTM aperture card users and provide FICPAC with results which could be added to the briefing. PACOPS responded in October to FICPAC's request and provided additional user support for FICPAC's briefing. FICPAC showed the TAG members sample ATTG produced through both standard and vesicular microfiche processes.[4]

Target Folders

[redacted]

1. Ibid.
2. TAG Minutes, Jul 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, DECL 11 Aug 87.
3. TAG Minutes, Jun 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL),~~ REVW 30 Jun 11.
4. TAG Minutes, Aug-Oct 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL),~~ REVW 28 Oct 11.

necessary because of the Korean Air Support Management/Delta Point Program. Therefore, HARTS/Alpha Area folders would no longer be produced or updated. PACFLT units were also surveyed early in 1981, but because Indian Ocean operations had placed much of the fleet out of the area for an extended period, little response was received. Therefore, lacking objections, and in accordance with TAG recommendations, PACAF ceaseed HARTS/Alpha Area folder production.[1]

Hardened Artillery Sites File

Forward Area Neutralization Graphic

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1. TAG Minutes, Jan-Apr 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 30 Apr 11.
2. TAG Minutes, Apr 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 30 Apr 11; CINCPAC 260220Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 31 Dec 10.
3. TAG Minutes, Apr 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 30 Apr 11; CINCPAC 032256Z Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 31 Dec 10.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1980, ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 546; TAG Minutes, Jan 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 29 Jan 11.

Unconventional Warfare Targeting

[redacted]

[redacted]

(C) On a related matter, the TAG Chairman briefed the June membership on the results of a meeting called to discuss the UW Handbook development. Critical nodes of potential UW targets needed to be defined before the handbook could be developed. CINCPAC would prepare an Intelligence Production Request asking DIA to begin construction of the handbook. Organizations worldwide which were concerned with UW targeting would be informed of this. The final UW Handbook was sent to DIA as an action message, with information copies to all concerned commands. Near the end of the year DIA stated that a new TIPP-FY 83 objective would be developed to encompass the PACOM request. It was anticipated that extensive coordination with the unified and specified commands would be required for this new project.[3]

Target Nominations and Deletions

[redacted]

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1. TAG Minutes, Mar 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL), REVW~~ 21 Apr 11.
2. TAG Minutes, Apr-May 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 8 Jun 11; IPAC HistSum Jul 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL 13 Aug 87.
3. TAG Minutes, Jun-Dec 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL), REVW~~ 30 Jun 11.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Cruise Missile Planning

[redacted]

1. TAG Minutes, Mar 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL),~~ REVW 21 Apr 11.
2. TAG Minutes, Apr-Sep 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 30 Jun 11.
3. TAG Minutes, Apr 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 30 Apr 11; IPAC(PT)/Memo/S62-81, 15 Apr 81, ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL),~~ Subj: Change to North Korea Tactical Target List (NKTTL) (U), REVW 1 Jan 11.

[redacted]

Weaponeering

[redacted]

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1. TAG Minutes, May 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 8 Jun 11.
2. IPAC HistSum Feb 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 28 Feb 87.
3. IPAC HistSum Apr 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 18 May 87.
4. TAG Minutes, Sep-Oct ~~81 (S/NF)~~, DECL 28 Oct 11.
5. IPAC HistSum Jul 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 13 Aug 87.
6. IPAC HistSum Aug 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 22 Oct 87.

(U) IPAC's Weaponeering Branch prepared a 4-year plan in October for software development on a PACOM integrated weapons planning system. The major thrust of the software development would be the conversion and installation of the PACOM Nuclear Weapons Analysis System onto the IPAC IBM 4341 computer. Other developments would include making the Weaponeering Information Sheet (WIS) output from the Wang 2200 computer directly compatible for input to the IBM. This would insure more efficient production of the computer output microfiche tape necessary for microfiche WIS production. Budget officials in Washington were briefed on this project.[1]

[redacted]

Automated Installation Intelligence File

AIF Release

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. IPAC HistSum Oct 81 ~~(S/NF), DECL~~ 20 Nov 87.
2. TAG Minutes, Oct-Dec 81 ~~(S/NF), REVW~~ 3 Dec 87.
3. TAG Minutes, Jan-Mar 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, REVW 21 Apr 11.
4. TAG Minutes, Mar 81 (~~S/NF/WNINTEL~~), REVW 21 Apr 11.

[redacted]

AIF Executive Agent Transfer

(U) The issue of transferring AIF Executive Agent responsibility from FICPAC to IPAC was still clouded in October. CINCPAC data systems managers were trying to determine fiscal priorities and support capabilities, with AIF software development receiving little emphasis at the time. Financial problems were expected to result in further delay in the transfer of certain AIF maintenance responsibilities from FICPAC to IPAC. The TAG Chairman tasked members to thoroughly review the 1975 transfer agreement in light of existing computer support capabilities, and if there was no need to transfer the AIF Executive Agent responsibility, the components were told to so state that position in writing to the TAG.[3]

(U) Many facets of transferring AIF Executive Agent responsibility from FICPAC to IPAC were raised at the December TAG meeting. The Chairman directed that all concerned should send cognizant command representatives to discuss personnel issues, software/hardware problems, and milestones, to an ad hoc meeting to be called in January 1982. A PACOM Data Systems Center status report by CINCPAC advised that testing and evaluation of PDSC programs of AIF products commence on 18 December and continue through the end of the year. A working group at IPAC concluded on 16 December that further planning and establishment of milestones to effect the transfer should be postponed until after the testing results were completed. It was also determined that additional manning should be programmed in conjunction with the FY 84 Program Objective Memorandum, in lieu of pursuing the previous IPAC intention of obtaining personnel from FICPAC.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. IPAC HistSum Aug 81 ~~(S/NF), DECL~~ 22 Oct 87.
3. TAG Minutes, Sep-Oct 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 28 Oct 11.
4. TAG Minutes, Dec 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 3 Dec 87; IPAC HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S/NF), REVW~~ 14 Jan 02.

Other AIF Developments

(U) By January, Field AIF Automated Records Management quarterly status reports were being produced totally by machine processing. The resultant savings over the previous manual production method was estimated at approximately 160 manhours annually. The new format included quarterly and cumulative year-to-date percentages for inputs by the different TI/TM production agencies in the PACOM, as well as AIF priorities, additions, changes and deletions, general Target Data Inventory categories, and countries.[1]

[redacted]

(C) At the September TAG meeting the PACFLT representative reviewed FICPAC efforts to prepare for assumption of AIF maintenance responsibility for 17 naval categories. DIA was analyzing several sample FICPAC tapes. The target date for the start of FICPAC data base maintenance was 1 December 1981.[4]

Order of Battle Intelligence

[redacted]

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1. IPAC HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S/NF), REVW~~ 31 Jan 01.
2. IPAC HistSum May 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 28 Jul 87.
3. TAG Minutes, Jul 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL)~~, DECL 11 Aug 87.
4. TAG Minutes, Sep 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL 6 Oct 11.
5. IPAC HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ REVW 31 Jan 01.
6. IPAC HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 31 Mar 87.

[redacted]

Intelligence Support to the RDJTF

(S/NOFORN) The TAG membership in January expressed concern regarding intelligence production in areas where PACOM and USEUCOM support to the RDJTF overlapped. Possible options were to produce independently and not put it into the data base when in USEUCOM's area, or ask USEUCOM to produce for PACOM. Other options were to negotiate with USEUCOM (as CINCPAC did with CINCLANT) on a division of labor or raise the need, via the DIA, for a new command relationship as a result of establishment of the RDJTF. Additionally, it was necessary to coordinate with the CINCPAC Photo Intelligence Branch to insure that film coverage of Southwest Asia (SWA) was available for PACOM exploitation. The TAG Chairman would initially ask USEUCOM for production assistance. FICPAC continued to serve as the PACOM focal point for distribution of USEUCOM ATTGs of SWA.[5]

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1. IPAC HistSums May-Jun 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL 30 Jul 87.
2. IPAC HistSum May 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 28 Jul 87.
3. IPAC HistSums Jan-Feb 81 ~~(S/NF),~~ REVW REVW 31 Jan 81.
4. IPAC HistSum Feb 81 ~~(S/NF), DECL~~ 28 Feb 87.
5. TAG Minutes, Jan 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL),~~ REVW 29 Jan 11.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(S) Insofar as possible, it was advantageous to the PACOM and USEUCOM to provide as much intelligence support as possible to the RDJTF to preclude a reallocation or dedication of intelligence resources to exclusive RDJTF support. PACOM representatives, together with officers from USEUCOM and the DIA, were making concerted efforts early in the year to work out specific arrangements for support of either USEUCOM or RDJTF in the event of a commitment in SWA. Conferences were to be held in Washington and Florida toward that end.[2]

(C) An ad hoc meeting was held at the November TI/TM conference to discuss what automated intelligence support could be of help to USREDCOM/RDJTF. Subsequently, CINCPAC, IPAC, and FICPAC held a meeting to review PACOM target intelligence holdings and capabilities. As a result of these meetings, FICPAC and IPAC were tasked in December to provide specific information to CINCPAC on certain automated PACOM data bases.[3]

[redacted]

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1. J221 Point Paper (S), 10 Feb 81, Subj: Intelligence Support in Southwest Asia (U), REVW 10 Feb 87.
2. Ibid.
3. TAG Minutes, Dec 81 (S/NF), REVW 3 Dec 87.

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1. IPAC HistSum Jan 81 ~~(TS)~~, REVW 31 Jan 01; JCS 012218Z Apr 81 ~~(TS), REVW~~ 30 Mar 87.
2. Ibid.
3. IPAC HistSum Feb 81 ~~(TS),~~ REVW 28 Feb 87; JCS 012218Z Apr 81 ~~(TS),~~ REVW 30 Mar 87.
4. TAG Minutes, Aug 81 ~~(S/NF/WNINTEL),~~ DECL 11 Aug 87.

SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE

~~(C)~~ PACOM Intelligence exchange initiatives continued to expand in 1981, reinforcing U.S. intelligence ties with many Pacific area nations and, at the same time, fostering interoperability with friends and allies. [redacted]

[redacted]

Sharing with Australia and New Zealand

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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1. J221 Point Paper ~~(S), 4~~ Nov 81, Subj: Intelligence Initiatives/Support in PACOM (U), DECL 4 Nov 87.
2. J223B Point Paper ~~(S),~~ 6 Feb 81, Subj: Beach Intelligence Exchange (U), REVW 6 Feb 87.
3. CINCPAC 240319Z Jan 81 ~~(C),~~ REVW 19 Jan 87; CINCPACFLT/FF1-1/Memo/2OP/S003-81, 6 Feb 81, ~~(S/REL AUS/NZ),~~ Subj: Beach Intelligence Sharing Program (U), REVW 19 Jan 87.

[redacted]

(U) The Director of the Royal Australian Air Force Intelligence Service also visited CINCPAC and component command intelligence activities on 13 October. He visited with MAJ GEN Pfautz, COMIPAC, CINCPACFLT ACS/Intelligence, CO FICPAC, OIC FOSIC, CINCPACAF Asst DCS/Intelligence, and Cdr 548th RTG.[4]

[redacted]

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1. CINCPACFLT/FF1-1/Memo/2OP/SOO3-81, 6 Feb 81, ~~(S/REL AUS/NZ)~~, REVW 19 Jan 87.
2. Ibid.
3. J223C HistSum Apr 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 May 87; J223C Point Paper ~~(C)~~, 3 Jun 81, Subj: Establishment of an Intelligence Exchange Conference (IEC) with the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO), Canberra ~~(C)~~, REVW 3 Jun 87.
4. J223C HistSum Oct 81 (U).
5. USDAO Wellington 140329Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 14 Aug 82.

Sharing with Japan

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) At the end of the year IPAC prepared a speech for CINCPAC to deliver to the 18th meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee on 8 January 1982. The speech dealt with the threat to U.S. and Japanese interests in the Far East.[4]

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC 030306Z Feb 81 ~~(C/NF)~~(EX), REVW 30 Jan 87.
2. SSO DIA 221800Z Oct 81 ~~(S/NF)(EX)(BOM)~~, REVW 22 Oct 01.
3. Ibid.
4. IPAC HistSum Dec 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 14 Jan 02.

[redacted]

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1. IPAC HistSum Mar 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 31 Mar 87.
2. IPAC HistSum Jul 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL 13 Aug 87.
3. AMEMB Seoul 07332/110823Z Jun 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 11 Jun 88.
4. Ibid.

Intelligence Exchange with the Philippines

[redacted]

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1. J223C HistSum Jan 81 ~~(S/NF)~~, REVW 9 Feb 87.
2. J223C HistSum Aug 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 11 Sep 87.
3. CINCPACREPPHIL 060742Z Jul 81 (U); IPAC HistSum May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 28 Jul 87.
4. AMEMB Manila 02920/050725Z Feb 81 ~~(C)~~, REVW 5 Feb 11.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Singapore

[redacted]

Intelligence Support for Thailand

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. II, pp. 561-63; CINCPAC 271057Z May 81 (~~S~~)(~~EX~~), REVW 25 May 11; CINCPAC 290059Z May 81 (~~S/NF~~), REVW 28 May 87.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1980 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol. II, pp. 561-62; IPAC HistSum Dec 81 (~~S/NF~~), REVW 14 Jan 02.
3. J223C HistSum Feb 81 (~~S/NF~~), REVW 4 Mar 87.

[redacted]

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1. J221 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 6 Jun 01; CHJUSMAGTHAI 211325Z May 81 ~~(S)~~, DECL 21 May 87.
2. J221 HistSum Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 6 Jun 01; CINCPAC 062306Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 6 Jun 01; DIRNSA 152257Z Jun 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 15 Jun 11.

CHAPTER X

OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF[1]

Trips and Associated Speeches

(U) The trips and associated speeches made by CINCPAC are highlighted below and are listed chronologically. Also included are selected lists of distinguished visitors and meetings with news media personnel.

(U) Washington, D.C., and Europe Trip, 16 February-4 March: Admiral Long, accompanied by two principal staff members, departed Hawaii on 16 February for Washington, D.C., to present the annual PACOM Area Report (testimony) to members of the House Armed Services Committee on 20 February. General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea, traveled with the Admiral to Washington. While in Washington the Admiral also met with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the JCS, at the Pentagon on 17 February. That same day he also conferred with the following State Department officials: Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.; Ambassador Richard W. Murphy (Philippines); Assistant Secretary of State John H. Holdridge; Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.; and Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Richard R. Burt. On 18 February the Admiral met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, III; Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Francis J. West, Jr.; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Nicholas Platt (departing) and Richard L. Armitage (designate); Under Secretary of the Navy Robert J. Murray, and Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer. The following day the Admiral met with Vice President George H. Bush, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert H. Barrow, and Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz (Thailand). He also attended a State Department East Asia/Northeast Asia Policy Committee meeting. On 20 February he met with Secrtary of the Navy John Lehman.

(U) On 21 February Admiral Long flew to Stuttgart (Vaihingen), West Germany where on 23 February he received briefings by and held discussions with General James R. Allen, USAF, Deputy Commander in Chief U.S. European Command and other USEUCOM officers. Admiral Long flew to Brussels, Belgium, on 24 February where, at the invitation of General Richard L. Lawson, USAF, U.S. Delegate, NATO Military Commission, he addressed members of the NATO Military Committee/NATO Military Representatives on U.S. and allied interests in the

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1. Material for this section was taken from J00 trip files and daily calendars, Protocol itineraries, J03/LA Congressional visitors log, and J74 HistSums for 1981, all (U).

Indian Ocean and Pacific areas. The general focus of the classified address was on security issues in Southwest, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. It included a review of the Pacific Command force structure, current operations, and force projection initiatives in the PACOM area which set the stage for a question and answer session. The following day the Admiral addressed the North Atlantic Council (the first non-NATO military person to do so), met with NATO Secretary General Joseph Lunz, U.S. Ambassador to NATO W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and U.K. Military Representative Admiral Sir Anthony Morton. On 26 February he held briefings and discussions at SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and met with General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe/CINC U.S. European Command. The following day the Admiral flew to Naples, Italy, where he conferred with Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe. On 2 March he stopped briefly at Lajes AB in the Azores before proceeding back to Washington, D.C.

(U) On 3 March the Admiral met with Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins and Director of Net Assessment Andrew W. Marshall. That afternoon Admiral Long was awarded the Chilean Navy's Great Star for Military Merit at the Embassy by Chilean Ambassador to the United States Jose M. Barros. The next day he visited Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Admiral returned to Hawaii the following day.

(U) Maui Trip, 27-29 March: Admiral Long traveled to the Island of Maui by C-12 aircraft on 27 March. That evening he addressed the Maui Navy League at the Royal Lahaina Hotel. He returned to Hickam AFB on 29 March.

(U) Korea and Japan Trip, 11-20 April: Admrial Long traveled to Seoul, Korea 11-12 April for discussions on defense cooperation and strengthening of U.S.-ROK security relationships. On 13 April the Admiral met with the President of the Republic of Korea, Chun Doo Hwan, at the Blue House; ROK Minister of National Defense General Choo Young-bok; General Wickham, and General Lew Byong-hion, ROKA, Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, who held an honor guard ceremony for him. He also attended a meeting of the Country Team hosted by Ambassador William H. Gleysteen, Jr., and videotaped an interview with Pacific Stars and Stripes and American Forces Korea Network. The next day the Admiral, accompanied by General Wickham, traveled by helicopter to the third North Korean tunnel site, visited Headquarters of the Combined Field Army, 2nd Marine Brigade, and the Hardened Tactical Air Control Center at Osan Air Base. On 15 April he continued his visits to field activities including the U.S. Army's 19th Support Command at Taegu and a tour of Kwangju Air Base. That evening he was honored at a dinner by President Chun.

(U) During the morning of 16 April the Admiral flew from Seoul to Yokota AB in Japan for discussions on our mutual security relationship and the sharing of defense responsibilities with Japan. Activities that same day included calls on Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki; Minister of Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ito; LT GEN William H. Ginn, Jr. USAF, COMUS Japan; and a luncheon hosted by Ambassador Mike Mansfield and attended by 18 Japanese and American military and

civilian officials. At a meeting with Country Team members which followed, the Admiral made a presentation on the Western Pacific security environment. On 17 April there was an honors ceremony for Admiral Long at the Japan Defense Agency Headquarters. This was followed by calls on Minister of State for Defense Joji Omura and Chairman of the Joint Staff Council Admiral Tsugio Yata, JMSDF. He then proceeded to Fuchu Air Station for another honors ceremony held by the Commander of Japan's Air Defense Command. The Admiral traveled by JASDF helicopter and C-1 on Saturday, 18 April, to Iruma AB and Kumamoto for honors by the Commanding General, Western Army. On 19 April the Admiral flew from Kumamoto to Nagasaki and on to Sasebo. The following day he visited Japanese naval facilities before returning to Yokota. That evening he was honored at a dinner by the Prime Minister before departing for Hickam AFB.

(U) Kona, Hawaii, Trip, 23 April: Admiral Long flew via C-12 to Kona where he hosted a classified briefing on the Pacific Command at the King Kamehameha Hotel for a Congressional delegation led by House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D-Massachussets). The delegation of 16 representatives, their wives, 1 delegate from American Samoa, and 15 staff members was returning to CONUS from a trip to Australia and New Zealand. The Admiral returned to Hickam that same morning.

(U) San Francisco Trip (SCM), 27-30 April: Admiral Long, accompanied by five key members of his staff, and General Wickham and six members of the U.S. Forces Korea staff, traveled to San Francisco on 27 April as part of the U.S. delegation (led by Secretary of Defense Weinberger) to U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting XIII. SCM sessions were held on 28, 29, and 30 April at the Presidio of San Francisco. Among the issues discussed at the sessions were the regional security situation, the threat to the Republic of Korea, force modernization programs, security assistance, logistics, technology transfers, and the activities of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. The Admiral and his staff returned to Honolulu late on 30 April.

(U) Washington, D.C., and Atlanta Trip, 10-15 May: Departing Hickam AFB on 10 May, Admiral Long arrived in Washington the following morning. On 12 May he met with Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, the Chief and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admirals Hayward and Watkins, respectively, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage. On 13 May he attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to flying to Atlanta, Georgia. The next day he met with the joint editorial board of Atlanta's Journal Constitution and members of the Atlanta media, taped an interview on Cable News Network, and addressed approximately 2,400 persons at Atlanta's Chamber of Commerce Armed Forces Day Luncheon. Admiral Long returned to Hawaii on 15 May.

(U) Philippines, Hong Kong, and Malaysia Trip, 25 May-4 June: Admiral Long flew to Clark AB in the Philippines on 25 May. On 27 May the Admiral called on President Ferdinand E. Marcos and met with Country Team members. On 28 May an honors ceremony for him was held at Camp Aguinaldo and he met with Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and Armed Forces Chief General

Romeo C. Espino. In the afternoon he attended the 23rd Anniversary meeting of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board at the Philippine Plaza Hotel. On the 29th he was guest speaker at a breakfast meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce at the Mandarin Hotel in Manila. In addressing the 250 members and guests, the Admiral stressed the importance of U.S. use of bases in the Philippines and the sound relationships between the United States and Japan. He also visited Fort Magsaysay and Basa AB before departing from Clark AB for Hong Kong.

(U) On Saturday, 30 May, Admiral Long called on the British Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, and U.S. Consul General Thomas P. Shoesmith. He also toured the New Territories by helicopter and the RAF Base at Sek Kong. During the afternoon of the 31st the Admiral flew to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. On 1 June he called on Deputy Minister of Defense Abu Hassan Omar and Chief of of Malaysian Defense Forces General Ghazali Seth. Present at the latter call were the Malaysian Service chiefs. In addition, the Admiral inspected an honor guard and received a briefing at the headquarters of the Malaysian Army's 2nd Division. The next day he called on Minister of Home Affairs Ghazali Shafie, Defense Minister Hussein Onn, Navy Chief VADM Zain Salleh, and inspected an honor guard at Butterworth RMAF Base. On 3 June he attended a colors ceremony in honor of the King's birthday at Merdeka Stadium and was briefed at the Lumut RMN Base. On 4 June the Admiral departed Kuala Lumpur and returned to Hickam AFB.

(U) New Zealand Trip, 19-26 June: Admiral Long departed Hickam on 20 June and arrived in Wellington, New Zealand, on the 21st. The Admiral attended sessions of the 30th ANZUS Council Meeting on 22 and 23 June, and the ANZUS Military Representatives Meeting on the 24th. On 26 June he traveled to church where he toured Operation DEEP FREEZE facilities. He departed New Zealand early 27 June and arrived at Hickam AFB late on 26 June.

(U) Philippines Trip (Inauguration), 28 June-1 July: Admiral and Mrs. Long, as official members of the U.S. delegation, departed Hickam AFB early Sunday, 28 June, to attend the inauguration of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The Longs arrived at Clark AB in the Philippines on 29 June. In addition to the ceremony which occurred early on 30 June, the Longs attended many other inaugural festivities held at Malacanang Palace as well as the U.S. Ambassador's reception for Vice President and Mrs. Bush. The Admiral also accompanied the Vice President on a tour of USS BELLEAU WOOD (LHA-3) at Subic Bay. The Longs returned to Hawaii early the morning of 1 July in time to greet Vice President and Mrs. Bush upon their arrival.

(U) Washington, D.C., Trip, 5-12 August: Admiral Long flew to Washington on 5 August where on the following day he met with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Fred C. Ikle and his Deputy, General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret); Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) West and his Deputy for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard L. Armitage; and Admiral Hayward, CNO. On 7 August General Jones, Chairman of the JCS, met with Admiral

Long and the other unified commanders to review the framework of their presentations to the Defense Resources Board (DRB) that afternoon. The presentations covered threat assessments and the CINCs' capabilities to respond. The meeting of the DRB also afforded the CINCs an opportunity to participate in the POM 83 review of FY 83-87 Defense Programs. Later that afternoon the Admiral met with Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of the Navy Lehman, Under Secretary of State Stoessel, and Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge. The Admiral attended another meeting of the DRB which met with Under Secretary of Defense Carlucci on 10 August prior to returning to Hawaii.

(U) Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles Trip, 28 September-7 October: Admiral Long traveled to Washington the night of 28 September. On the 30th he conferred with Defense Secretary Weinberger, CNO Admiral Hayward, and Admiral Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. On 1 October he met with Navy Secretary Lehman, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of Defense West, and New York Times reporters Richard Halloran and Drew Middleton. In addition, the Admiral participated in discussions on current China issues led by Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge. The following day he flew via T-39 to Fort Bragg (Pope AFB), North Carolina, where he was provided Special Forces briefings and demonstrations.

(U) On Sunday, 4 October, he flew from Washington, D.C., to Los Angeles and on the 5th met with the Los Angeles Times editorial board to provide his views on the political, military, and economic situation in the Pacific. That day he also addressed the California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy on his views of the Asia-Pacific area. On 6-7 October the Admiral, along with approximately 75 high-level U.S. Government and industry officials, participated in a New Alternatives Workshop sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica. Admiral Long presented a strategic overview of the PACOM region to the workshop whose theme was "The PACOM Region in an Age of Multiple Contingencies." Return to Hawaii was the evening of 7 October.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 27 October-1 November: Admiral Long, accompanied by his Director for Plans and Political Adviser, traveled to Washington on 27 October to attend a JCS CINCs Conference. Attendees included Service chiefs, unified and specified commanders, and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Sessions of the CINCs' Conference were held on 28 and 29 October and covered a wide range of subjects including a review of the critical issues related to the Draft Defense Guidance for FY 84-88 from the JCS and CINCs' perspectives. The conferees exchanged ideas on substantive adjustments to the threat assessment, policy, and strategy. They also addressed the force planning guidance section of the Defense Guidance in order to develop relative priorities in a global context. At the DRB meeting on 30 October, each of the CINCs presented his priority considerations for FY 84-88. While in Washington the Admiral also called on Chief of Naval Operations on 28 October. On 30 October he visited with Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of the Navy

Lehman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ikle, Deputy CNO for Submarine Warfare VADM Nils R. Thunman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage, and Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. (Pakistan). The Admiral departed Washington on 31 October, returning to Hawaii via NAS Alameda, California, the next day.

(U) Philippines, Hong Kong, and Korea Trip, 15-24 November: On Saturday, 15 November, Admiral Long and two principal staff members departed Hickam AFB and arrived at NAS Cubi Point in the Philippines. While in the Philippines the Admiral met with President Marcos, the Country Team, National Defense Minister Enrile, and the new Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Fabian C. Ver, on 18 November. He also addressed a meeting of the Pacific Armies Management Seminar at the Century Park Sheraton Hotel. He attended a meeting of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board at Subic Bay and conferred with Under Secretary of State for Policy Affairs Stoessel on 19 November before flying to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the Admiral called on Governor Sir Murray MacLehose; the Commander of British Forces, MAJ GEN John L. Chapple, RA; and on 20 November addressed a joint luncheon meeting of the American and Hong Kong Chambers of Commerce. On 21 November the Admiral departed for Seoul, Korea. On the 23rd he called on President Chun Doo Hwan, Minister of National Defense Choo Young-bok, and U.S. Ambassador Richard L. Walker. That day and the one following he visited the Joint Security Area and other field activities in the DMZ, Kunsan AB, and the ROK Navy Headquarters and Naval Academy at Chinhae. The Admiral returned to Hawaii from Seoul on 24 November.

(U) Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma Trip, 3-14 December: Admiral Long's visit to strengthen relationships with these three countries included, among other things, discussions on current security assistance matters. He left Hickam on 3 December, stopped briefly on Guam on the 4th for a call on Governor Paul Calvo and an informal meeting with RADM Bruce DeMars, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI, before proceeding to Jakarta, Indonesia. On 5 December he met with the Minister for Defense/Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Mohammad Jusuf, who held an honors ceremony for him. That day the Admiral also visited the Indonesian National Monument for a wreath-laying ceremony and was the guest of LT GEN Wiyogo Atmodarminto, Commander of Defense Region II, at a dinner in Jogjakarta. On 7 December Admiral Long met with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Seogito, Chief of Military Intelligence LT GEN Murdani, and was guest of honor at a dinner hosted by Admiral Madia Sudomo, Deputy Commander in Chief of Indonesia's Armed Forces.

(U) The following morning the Admiral proceeded to Bangkok, where, during a visit with Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon, he was presented with Thailand's Knight Grand Cross of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant (First Class). In addition, he held discussions with Ambassdor John Gunther Dean and Country Team members. On 9 December Admiral Long flew via C-12 to the Thai 9th Division Headquarters at Watana Nakorn and then flew along the Thai-Kampuchean border, returning to Bangkok for a working lunch with JUSMAGTHAI staff officers. That afternoon the Admiral called on Supreme Commander of Thai

Armed Forces General Saiyut Koetphon and the Thai Service Chiefs, met with Minister of Foreign Affairs ACM (Ret) Sitthi Sawetsila, and was guest of honor at a formal dinner hosted by General and Mrs. Saiyut. The Admiral flew to the Royal Thai Air Force Base at Chiang Mai the next morning to visit the RTAF 41st Wing. On 11 December he proceeded via C-135 to Rangoon for his first visit to Burma. That afternoon he met with General Kyaw Htin, Burmese Minister of Defense, and met informally with Ambassador Patricia Byrne and Country Team members. On 12 December he was the luncheon guest of RADM Maung Maung Win, Vice Chief of Staff-Navy, and was subsequently piped aboard a Burmese ship for an inspection cruise. On Sunday morning, 13 December, the Admiral hosted a tour of his C-135 for Burmese officials. The Admiral returned to Hawaii on 14 December after a brief stop at Clark AB in the Philippines.

Distinguished Visitors to CINCPAC,
Meetings with News Media Personnel, and Local Speeches

6 January - LT GEN Harry A. Griffith, USA, Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, on an orientation trip to PACOM, accompanied by RADM Guy H.B. Shaffer, USN, Deputy Director, Operations/Administration.

9 January - VADM Bobby R. Inman, USN, Director, National Security Agency.

10 January - Admiral Long provided a classified briefing and a working luncheon for Representatives Stephen J. Solarz (D-New York) and Joel Pritchard (R-Washington). These two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were returning from a four-week trip to India, Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hanoi.

12 January - Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado), member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was briefed by Admiral Long.

12 January - Japan Defense Agency Parliamentary Vice Minister Taku Yamazaki, accompanied by JDA Defense Counselor Hisakatsu Ikeda plus four members of the Japanese Diet, who were en route to Washington, D.C., to discuss defense with U.S. officials, met with Admiral Long.

14 January - Admiral Long met with Representative Ralph S. Regula (R-Ohio) for briefings and discussions.

16 January - Representative Don Fuqua (D-Florida), nine other Representatives, and staff members (a House Science and Technology delegation) who were returning to CONUS from a trip to Tokyo, Shanghai, and Beijing, met with Admiral Long.

20 January - Address to the Club Managers Association at the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel.

21 January - General Richard H. Ellis, USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command/Director Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, VADM Kenneth M. Carr, USN, Vice Director, and RADM Paul D. Tomb, USN, Vice Director, Joint Service Connectivity Staff, presented the annual SIOP update briefing.

22 January - RADM Walter M. Locke, USN, Director, Joint Cruise Missiles Project, Naval Material Command, visited Admiral Long in connection with the installation of the operational software on the CINCPAC cruise missile theater mission planning system.

26 January - LT GEN James V. Hartinger, USAF, CINCNORAD/ADCOM.

4 February - Admiral Long held an honors ceremony at Bordelon Field, a briefing, and luncheon for President Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea.

President Chun and Admiral Long at honors ceremony

5 February - Admiral Long hosted a luncheon for Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) John H. Moxley, III; the Surgeons General of the Army, Air Force, Navy; and the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps.

6 February - Dr. Guy Pauker, RAND Corporation.

15 February - Admiral Long met informally with Ambassador to Japan Michael J. Mansfield.

9 March - Ambassador to Fiji William E. Bodde.

9 March - LT GEN Philip Gast, USAF, Director for Operations, OJCS.

10 March - Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN (Ret), former CINCPAC and Special Consultant to Northrop Corporation.

10 March - COL Richard Ian Thorpe, CINC Royal Fijian Military Forces, who was returning to Fiji after visiting Fijian troops assigned to the U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Lebanon.

11 March - Interview with Mr. Tomohisa Sakanaka, Asahi Shimbun, on U.S. defense measures in the Western Pacific.

12 March - Breakfast and discussions with Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence William B. Pritchett.

12 March - Mr. Robert G. Rich, State Department Country Director for Korea.

12 March - RADM Donald S. Jones, USN, Director, East Asia Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

16 March - Briefing and lunch for New Zealand Secretary of Defence Denis B.G. McLean.

18 March - Admiral Long presented the PACOM View briefing to 350 attendees at the National Association of Bank Directors at the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel.

19 March - General Robert M. Shoemaker, CG, U.S. Army Forces Command, was returning from a visit to Japan and Korea. His stop in Hawaii was to coordinate the deployment of forces and integration of planning with PACOM and WESTCOM elements.

26 March - Judge Albert B. Fletcher, U.S. Court of Military Appeals.

30 March - Meeting with RADM Charles F. Horne, III, USN, Commander Mine Warfare Command, on Allied mine warfare assessment.

30 March - General Bennie L. Davis, USAF, Commander Air Training Command.

2 April - Breakfast with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) Richard L. Armitage, who was on an orientation visit to Hawaii, Japan, and Korea.

2 April - Admiral Long met with LT GEN Evan W. Rosencrans, USAF, Deputy COMUS Korea (Departing), and on 3 April with LT GEN Winfield W. Scott, Jr., USAF, his successor.

7 April - Admiral John B. Hayes, Commandant U.S. Coast Guard, was returning from speaking engagements in Japan, Korea, and China.

10 April - General John R. Guthrie, USA, CG, U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command.

25 April - Admiral Long briefed Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie on the security situation in the PACOM. The Minister was returning from visits to New York City and Washington, D.C.

26 April - Informal meeting with General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, COMUS Korea.

4 May - VADM Kent J. Carroll, USN, Director for Logistics, OJCS.

6 May - Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics).

7 May - Mr. Scott Stone, the Pacific and Asia representative of Cox Newspapers, interviewed Admiral Long on his views of the U.S. future in Southeast Asia.

7 May - RADM Bruce Keener, III, Commander of the Military Sealift Command.

8 May - Dr. Thomas Julian, BDM Corporation, Project Manager for the Theater Nuclear Force C^3 study.

18 May - Brief by MAJ GEN Doyle E. Larson, USAF, Commander Electronic Security Command/Joint Electronic Warfare Center (USAF).

5 June - VADM Kinnaird R. McKee, USN, Director of Naval Warfare.

6 June - General Lew Allen, Air Force Chief of Staff.

8 June - Brief by Dr. Al Brandenstine, CNO Executive Panel on Peacetime rules of engagement of Seaborne Forces.

9 June - Admiral Long briefed two of the four principals of the Pacific Basin Development Council (Governors Ariyoshi of Hawaii and Coleman of American Samoa) and hosted a luncheon for them.

9 June - Admiral Long attended sessions of the U.S.-Japan Subcommittee of Security Consultative Committee Meeting XIII at the Ilikai Hotel. The U.S. delegation was led by ASD/ISA Francis W. West, Jr. and Ambassador Michael J. Mansfield. Ambassador Yoshio Okawara and Deputy Foreign Minister Yasue Katori led the Japanese delegation.

11 June - Ambassador to Australia Robert D. Nesen en route to his new post.

12 June - Briefing on Project TALLYMAN by Mr. Irving Kapos and Mr. George Deskin, consultants to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

13 June - Admiral Long met informally with with Prime Minister of Fiji Sir Ratu Kamisese Mara.

16 June - Lunch with New Zealand's Ambassador to the United States T. Frank Gill.

17 June - Debrief by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Northeast Asian Affairs Michael H. Armacost, on Secretary Haig's China visit.

18 June - MAJ GEN Kenneth D. Burns, USAF, Commander 13th Air Force (Designate).

27 June - Ambassador-at-Large Vernon A. Walters.

27 June - Admiral Long briefed Japanese Minister of State for Defense/ Director General, Japan Defense Agency Joji Omura. Omura, accompanied by 10 staff members, was en route to Washington, D.C., for discussions with Secretary of Defense Weinberger.

27 June - Admiral Long met informally with the State Department's Director for Chinese Affairs, Mr. William F. Rope.

1 July - Briefing for Vice President Bush who was en route back to Washington from the inauguration of President Marcos in the Philippines.



Admiral Long escorts Vice President Bush to a briefing on 1 July. The Vice President was returning from President Marcos inauguration in Manila.

2 July - RADM Keith M. Saull, Chief of New Zealand's Naval Staff.

6 July - Admiral Long met with the new ROK Ambassador to the United States, Lew Byong-hion. Ambassador Lew was formerly Chairman of the ROK JCS.

6 July - Interview by Mr. James Wallace, Asia Correspondent for U.S. News and World Report. The interview, which appeared in question-and-answer format in the magazine's 10 August edition, focused on the Soviet challenge to U.S. forces in the Pacific, Japan's defense role, and military relations with China and Taiwan.

6 July - Dr. N. Fred Wikner of Santa Fe Corporation briefed Admiral Long on Project SORAK.

9 July - Mr. Tadakatsu Seguro of NHK-TV Japan taped an interview with Admiral Long for subsequent feature presentation on one of Japan's most prestigious TV interview programs. The Admiral emphasized that the present Soviet military capacity far exceeds purely defensive needs. It is aggressive in nature and poses a threat to world peace, particularly in the Far East where one-third of the Soviet forces are now stationed. Although the United States is increasing its military potential, it will take time to reverse the current trend. Because the United States cannot meet world defense requirements alone, it is asking that Japan assume responsibility for its own immediate defense.

9 July - Admiral Long met with Australian Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser during his brief stopover in Hawaii.

10 July - Lunch with Ambassador to Australia Robert D. Nesen.

13 July - Professor Patrick J. Parker, Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey.

14 July - RADM Stephen J. Hostettler, COMNAVFOR Korea (Departing).

13 July - Mr. Motoharu Arima, Japan Diet Member and former JDA Parliamentary Vice Minister.

14 July - Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn of the Defense Nuclear Agency.

21 July - RADM John B. Hervey, RN, Commander British Navy Staff/Naval Attache, Washington D.C.

23 July - Lunch with Sir William McMahon, Member of Australian Parliament and former Prime Minister of Australia.

23 July - Dr. David Signori, Director for Systems Defense and Analysis, Defense Communications Agency, briefed Admiral Long on a proposal for PACOM TNF C^3 survivability.

24 July - Admiral Long hosted a CINCPAC briefing for 47 retired flag and general officers living in the Hawaiian Islands.

27 July - LT GEN Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

27 July - Admiral Long had lunch with Marshall Islands President Amata Kabua who was en route to CONUS as a guest of the Secretary of Defense.

30 July - Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Walker (Designate).

30 July - Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Ret.), former CINCPAC.

31 July - RADM Robert B. Fountain, USN, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI (Departing).

1 August - Ambassador Wat T. Cluverius, IV, Head of the U.S. Delegation, Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Peacekeeing Force.

1 August - Informal meeting with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations.

3 August - Ambassador to New Zealand/Western Samoa H. Monroe Browne en route to his new post.

3 August - Mr. Hiroshi Ohki and Mr. Masakuni Murakami, Japanese Diet members.

4 August - Sir David Stuart Beattie, Governor General and Commander in Chief of New Zealand, discussed matters of mutual defense concern with Admiral Long.

4 August - Ambassador to Thailand Morton I. Abramowitz (Departing).

4 August - MAJ GEN Jere W. Sharp, USA, Chief JUSMAG Korea (Designate).

4 August - RADM Richard M. Dunleavy, USN, CINCPACREP Philippines (Designate).

12 August - RADM Bruce DeMars, USN, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI (Designate).

13 August - MAJ GEN Winston W.L. Choo, Chief of the General Staff, Singapore Armed Forces.

14 August - LT GEN Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF, Director, National Security Agency/Chief Central Security Service.

14 August - Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-Oregon), Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee, and Senator Paula Hawkins (R-Florida) en route to New Zealand, Australia, China, and Japan.

14 August - LT GEN Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., USAF, COMUS Japan.

17 August - Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) Russell D. Hale was on his first trip to PACOM.

17 August - Representative Joseph P. Addabbo (D-New York) Chairman, Defense Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee.

24 August - Representative Robert W. Davis (R-Michigan), House Armed Services Committee.

26 August - Chinese Ambassador to the United States Chai Zemin en route to Washington, D.C.

27 August - Dr. David M. Abshire, Chairman, Center for Strategic and Intenational Studies, Georgetown University. Dr. Abshire was en route to Tokyo to meet with Diet members on security, energy, and trade matters.

28 August - Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker.

29 August - Mr. Ichiro Watanabe, Japanese Diet, House of Representatives.

29 August - Admiral Long hosted a briefing for Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and met with Mr. Charles Z. Wick, Director, U.S. International Communication Agency, who were en route to China .

31 August - Dr. Donald J. Devine, Director, Office of Personnel Management.

31 August - Mr. Kim Young Sun, Chairman of the Defense Committee, and four members of the ROK National Assembly.

1 September - Representative G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-Mississippi).

2 September - Admiral Long made the Keynote Address to approximately 5,000 attendees at the 63rd American Legion National Convention at the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel. He spoke on national security requirements in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

3 September - Meeting, briefings, and tours of military installations on Oahu with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Secretary Weinberger was

in Honolulu to address the American Legion convention.

Secretary Weinberger with Admiral Long
at Schofield Barracks

4 September - Admiral Long met with Representative Floyd D. Spence (R-South Carolina). As a member of the House Armed Services Committee and Seapower and Readiness Subcommittees, Spence was on a familiarization tour of fleet and base operations in Hawaii.

6 September - Admiral Long met informally with India's Ambassador to the United States K. R. Narayanan.

8 September - MAJ GEN Hussain Muzammel, Engineer in Chief of the Bangladesh Army.

9 September - Lunch with Ambassador to Fiji William E. Bodde.

12 September - Mr. Robert C. Katter, Member of the Australian Parliament and Chairman, Defence Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

13 September - Admiral Long hosted an Intelligence briefing for Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce.

14 September - Mr. Narimitsu Sasagawa, President, Nippon Times.

14 September - Mr. Koichi Matsuzaki, a producer for RKB-TV making a documentary on Hawaii-Japan "Sister State Relations," interviewed Admiral Long.

18 September - General Robert H. Barrow, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

19 September - Briefing for Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, III.

21 September - MAJ GEN Richard V. Secord, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs.

21 September - LT GEN William J. Hilsman, USA, Director Defense Communications Agency. General Hilsman was visiting DCA activities in Hawaii as part of his worldwide tour of DCA facilities.

22 September - LT GEN Robert C. Kingston, USA, Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

22 September - BGEN Bernard Loeffke, USA, Defense Attache to China (designate).

23 September - COL Gene E. Taft, USAF, CINCPACREP Australia.

24 September - Mr. Albert L. Seligmann, State Department Country Director for Japan.

25 September - Mr. Minoru Tamba, Japan's Director of Soviet Affairs (MOFA), and formerly Director of Security, North American Affairs. Mr. Tamba was returning from the opening meeting of the U.N. General Assembly and a meeting between the Soviet and Japanese Foreign Ministers.

28 September - At a luncheon with members of the Honolulu media, Admiral Long provided the group with his assessment of the situation in the PACOM.

8 October - General Robert C. Mathis, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

8 October - Neville Trotter, Esq., Member of British Parliament.

8 October - Mr. Stefan A. Halper, State Department Director of Regional Security Affairs, was in Hawaii to receive orientation briefings and tours of CINCPAC and component commands.

13 October - Ambassador to Thailand John Gunther Dean (Designate).

14 October - Mr. Artemio Tuquero, Philippine Chief State Prosecutor.

15 October - An interview with Admiral Long by Honolulu's KITV covered such topics as the assessment of the Soviet threat; the U.S.-Soviet balance of power in the Pacific; the introduction of new U.S. weapons, ships, and aircraft; and training and retention of U.S. forces. The interview was aired as a series on five consecutive nightly newscasts.

16 October - LT GEN John J. Murphy, USAF, Commander 15AF (SAC) was returning from an orientation trip of SAC units throughout the Pacific.

18 October - Admiral Long met with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos during his brief stopover in Hawaii en route to the International Meeting on Development and Cooperation at Cancun, Mexico.

22 October - LT GEN Choi Ki-duk, Commandant, ROK Marine Corps.

22 October - Mr. William W. Thomas, Jr., Chief of Mission Vientiane, Laos, en route to his new assignment.

22 October - Ambassador to Papua New Guinea Virginia Schafer en route to her new post.

1 November - Breakfast with Ambassador to India Harry J. Barnes, Jr. (Designate).

3 November - Admiral Long hosted a briefing for six Japanese businessmen sponsored by Noboru Gotoh, Chairman of the Pacific Basin Economic Council.

4 November - Mr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, State Department Policy Planning Director.

9 November - Admiral Long addressed the biennial convention of the Congressional Medal of Honor Society at the Hale Koa Hotel.

9 November - Malaysian Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Shamsuddin Dubi.

10 November - Debrief by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Noel Koch on his orientation trip to the Western Pacific.

12 November - Briefings for General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

12 November - LT GEN Himawan Soetanto, Commander, Third Indonesian Territorial Defense Command.

12 November - Admiral Tsugio Yata, JMSDF, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japan, met with Admiral Long on 12 and 14 November. He was returning from a visit to CONUS.

24 November - Mr. Leo J. Moser, Charge d'Affaires, Laos (Departing).

25 November - Under Secretary of the Army James R. Ambrose.

30 November - LT GEN Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF, Director of the National Security Agency.

15 December - Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Civilian Personnel Policy/Equal Employment Opportunity) Joseph K. Taussig, Jr. Secretary Taussig was the senior Defense representative attending the 40th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack and also gathered information on civilian personnel management and EEO problems.

16 December - SIOP Revision Briefing by General Bennie L. Davis, USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command/Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning and Joint Strategic Connectivity Staffs.

17 December - Ambassador to Malaysia Ronald D. Palmer (Designate).

18 December - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert A. Brand stopped in Hawaii after high level discussions sions in Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia, and Fiji.

21 December - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel A. O'Donohue.

21 December - Admiral Long addressed members of the CINCPAC Staff in the Pollock Theater on 21 and 22 December.

22 December - New Zealand Deputy Secretary of Defence Roger Green.

23 December - Mr. Ryozo Kato, new Director of Security Affairs Division, North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Mr. Kato was returning to Japan from meetings in Washington and Europe.

(U) In addition to the Admiral's personal appearances before local audiences in 1981, the CINCPAC View briefing team, which was constituted in 1977, made 35 presentations to headquarters visitors and civic and professional groups totaling over 1,139 people in the Honolulu area.

SECTION II--COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

(U) Funds for CINCPAC headquarters and subordinate activities were made available via the Navy funding chain. Fiscal Year 1981 obligations by activity for each type of funding follow:[1]

Operations and Maintenance, Navy

Organization	Program 2 (General Purpose Forces)	Program 3 (Intelligence & Communications)
CINCPAC headquarters	$ 7,817,805	$ 2,333,539
COMIPAC	-	6,222,756
COMUS Japan	1,709,902	166,340
COMUS Korea	-	1,608,649
Total	$ 9,527,707	$ 10,331,284

Military Assistance, Executive Funds

Organization	FY 1981 Obligations
T10 (Administrative Expenses)	
CINCPAC headquarters	$ 477,669
T20 (Security Assistance Activity Expenses)	
JUSMAG Korea	3,645,607
JUSMAG Philippines	511,599
JUSMAG Thailand	739,023
MDAO Japan	755,516
ODC India	116,691
OMADP Indonesia	537,529
ODR Pakistan	158,790
Australia	12,018
Bangladesh	9,727
Burma	3,059
Malaysia	21,912
Nepal	3,756
New Zealand	1,672
Singapore	24,040
Sri Lanka	7,247
Dependent Education	30,000
Total	$ 7,055,855

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1. J72 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

Organization	FY 1981 Obligations
Official Representation Funds	
CINCPAC headquarters	$ 23,700
CDRJCRC	-0-
COMUS Japan	10,800
CINCPACREP Australia	700
CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI	400
CINCPACREP Philippines	2,600
Total	$ 38,200
MAP Representation Funds	
JUSMAG Korea	$ 3,800
JUSMAG Philippines	3,000
JUSMAG Thailand	2,900
MDAO Japan	2,700
ODC India	700
OMADP Indonesia	2,500
ODR Pakistan	700
USDAO Bangladesh	300
USDAO Malaysia	200
USDAO Singapore	300
USDAO Sri Lanka	100
CH FMS Australia	200
Total	$ 17,400
Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds	
CINCPAC headquarters	$ 3,000
COMIPAC	1,100
COMUS Japan	1,500
CINCPACREP Philippines	400
Total	$ 6,000

Obligation of Consumer Funds for Expense-Type Material

(U) In prior years, requisitions for expense type material citing an annual appropriation which remained unfilled at the end of the fiscal year were accounted for as commitments, i.e., the requistions were not charged to the funds of the fiscal year in which the documents were issued. Instead, the amounts of the requisitions were charged to the funds of the fiscal year in which the orders were filled.[1]

(U) Navy Comptroller Notice 7302 of 1 July 1981 changed the accounting policy pertaining to the obligation of consumer requisitions for procurements from commercial sources, Military Departments, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other Government departments. This change required that beginning in FY 81, requisitions remaining unfilled at the end of the fiscal year be charged to the funds of the fiscal year in which the documents were issued. Further, the change required that outstanding requisitions issued prior to FY 81 also be charged to FY 81 funds. Coming so late in the fiscal year, this action necessitated revision of planned requisition actions and money programming to finance all outstanding and unfilled requistions by 30 September 1981. Implementing guidelines were furnished to CINCPAC subordinate commands and activities which were funded administratively by the Navy.

MAP Representation Funds

(U) During FY 81 CINCPAC provided initial authorization to U.S. Defense Attache Offices in Burma, Nepal, and Sri Lanka for the use of MAP Representation Funds in the performance of their security assistance functions. These funds were to finance costs of specific official entertainment and representation on behalf of the U.S. Government.[2]

O&M,Navy Funding for CINCPACREP Southwest Pacific

(U) With the establishment of the CINCPAC Representative Southwest Pacific position in 1981, Operations and Maintenance, Navy funds were provided by CINCPAC for travel and transportation costs and the procurement of household appliances.[3]

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1. J72/Memo/447-82 (U), 30 Aug 82, Subj: Historical Data.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

SECTION III--LEGAL AFFAIRS

Philippine Customs, Immigration, and Quarantine Negotiations

(U) For many years the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had indicated a desire to perform customs, immigration, and quarantine (CIQ) functions for U.S. military personnel traveling to and from the Philippines. In 1969 an exchange of diplomatic notes occurred which provided for transfer of these functions to GOP personnel, but provisions were never fully implemented because they were deemed oppressive by the U.S. military. During the 1979 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) negotiations, discussions were discontinued because negotiators were unable to resolve differences and it was believed that a consensus could be reached more easily once the amendments were in effect. Paragraph 9, Annex III of the MBA provided, "Base Commanders shall coordinate the activities of the Philippine civil agencies performing functions at the base or at the U.S. Facility. Appropriate administrative agreements for these officials at the United States Facility shall be agreed upon between the Base Commander and the United States Commanders."[1]

~~(C)~~ On 3 June 1981 General Espino, Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff, forwarded draft Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) on CIQ functions with a request that negotiations commence. During discussions with President Reagan at Cancun, Mexico, on 22-23 October, President Marcos had described the CIQ issues as "the only outstanding irritant" between the United States and the Philippines. On 30 October CINCPAC concurred with the American Embassy and CINCPACREP Philippines recommendation that negotiations for implementing the MBA provision on CIQ functions start immediately on a military-to-military basis. CINCPAC directed CINCPACREP Philippines to submit a request for negotiating authority in accordance with CINCPAC Instruction 5711.6A, Negotiation, Conclusion, and Reporting of International Agreements. The request was to include a draft U.S. position, highlighting any proposed changes to General Espino's 3 June MOUs. The State Department also agreed to the desirability of an "early and forthright response to the GOP." On 13 November CINCPACREP Philippines submitted the request to CINCPAC, with appropriate documentation attached. The request was being staffed through CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF at the end of the year prior to forwarding to the JCS and subsequent review by the State and Defense Departments.[2]

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1. J73 Point Paper (U), 21 Dec 81, Subj: Philippine Customs, Immigration, and Quarantine (CIQ) Negotiations.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 302350Z Oct 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 23 Oct 86; CINCPACREPPHIL Ltr Ser C38/81 ~~(C)~~, 13 Nov 81, Subj: Memorandums of Understanding on performance of customs, immigration and quarantine functions by Philippine authorities onboard U.S. Facilities, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay (U), DECL 13 Nov 87; SECSTATE 303209/140003Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 11/13/87.

Philippine Extradition Treaty

~~(C)~~ Preliminary talks on an extradition treaty with the Philippines were held in Manila in 1973, and informal discussions transpired during the following years. In 1981 formal negotiations between the U.S. State Department and the Philippine Solicitor General were scheduled for September. The chief aim of the treaty was more effective cooperation between the two countries in the repression of crime and terrorist activities.

~~(C)~~ During exchanges of messages with the State Department concerning the text of the draft treaty, the American Embassy in Manila expressed concern with the potential impact of Article 7 of the proposed treaty on U.S. servicemen. Article 7 stated "Neither contracting party may refuse to extradite its own nationals on the basis of nationality." The Embassy noted that the implications of this language for some 20,000 American servicemen stationed in the Philippines, as well as SEVENTH Fleet sailors on liberty, could generate substantial problems including a heavy additional work burden on the Embassy and U.S. courts. The Embassy urged that wording similar to that used in a 1980 extradition treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) be used. The pertinent provision of the FRG treaty read as follows:[1]

> Neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to extradite its own nationals. The competent Executive Authority of the requested state, however, shall have the power to grant the extradition of its own nationals if, in its discretion, this is deemed proper to do and provided the law of the requested state does not so preclude.

~~(C)~~ On 24 July CINCPAC supported the Embassy position to the JCS and asked for a full DOD-State Department review of the potential impact of the treaty on U.S. forces in the Philippines. CINCPAC emphasized the need to protect U.S. Service members, civilians, and dependents. CINCPAC pointed out that at any one time there were approximately 150 U.S. forces personnel on legal hold in the Philippines--some were legitimate, some involved collusion with Service members to extend their tour of duty, and some were simply harassment actions seeking the payment of money from departing personnel.[2]

~~(C)~~ A State Department response on 27 July advised that attempts to resolve the point between the State, Defense, and Justice Departments had been unsuccessful. The latter had adamantly opposed use of the FRG language in the draft treaty on the basis that it was seeking to adopt a model treaty which could be used with most Third World countries. Subsequently, the State Department proffered several options to accommodate the military concerns in some

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1. AMEMB Manila 16118/170513Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 7/17/87.
2. J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 240219Z Jul 81 ~~(S)~~, REVW 16 Jul 2001.

other fashion as fallback positions. The options included language whereby extradition could be refused "in the interests of justice" or "for national security reasons."[1]

~~(C)~~ The American Embassy carefully considered the options proposed, but they were not satisfactory. Ambassador Murphy stated that "the Philippines is not the appropriate country to use for establishing a model for the others." No other Third World country, he noted, still permitted the United States to maintain such large contingents of servicemen. This was the reason the Philippines had never been accepted as a full-fledged member of the non-aligned movement by other Third World countries.[2]

~~(C)~~ In commenting on the State Department options to the JCS on 31 July, CINCPAC pointed out the fallacies of the two viable fallback proposals. He noted that one would highlight to the GOP the issue of criminal jurisdiction and thereby have a deleterious effect on the MBA review scheduled for 1983. The other option was not broad enough to accord meaningful protection to U.S. personnel. CINCPAC again urged adoption of the FRG formulation. [CINCPACREP Philippines voiced similar feelings. He cited Navy experience in Olongapo City, where until recently there had been a history of a large number of spurious cases that were supported by multiple affidavits which required great effort to prove fictitious.][3]

~~(C)~~ Again on 11 August the Embassy urged reconsideration of the FRG formulation, pointing out the potential long-range public affairs and political pitfalls. The following day Admiral Long made a strong appeal for the JCS Chairman's "personal assistance to protect U.S. forces personnel without jeopardizing existing jurisdictional arrangements under the Military Bases Agreement." Simultaneously CINCPAC, with the concurrence of CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACREP Philippines, addressed his strong resolve to the Secretary of Defense. He pointed to the unique problems that existed for U.S. forces in the Philippines, the history of spurious charges being filed, and that national security considerations associated with the U.S. presence in the Philippines dictated the use of the FRG language.[4]

~~(C)~~ While continued interagency deliberations at the Washington level still failed to resolve the matter, the Embassy relented somewhat. Starting the negotiations for the treaty was of overriding importance--contents of the

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1. SECSTATE 197748/272147Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 7/25/87; J73/Memo/C325-81 ~~(C)~~, 10 Sep 81, Subj: Extradition Treaty with the Philippines (U), DECL 10 Sep 87.
2. AMEMB Manila 17304/300858Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 7/30/87.
3. CINCPAC 310142Z Jul 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 25 Jul 87; CINCPACREPPHIL 080346Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 8 Aug 1987.
4. AMEMB Manila 18367/110952Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, GDS 8/11/87; CINCPAC 121841Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Aug 86; CINCPAC 121840Z Aug 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Aug 87.

treaty were secondary. The Embassy asked for CINCPAC's support on compromising language which would rely on the good faith by both sides to the treaty.[1]

~~(C)~~ Meanwhile the Defense Department continued to support Admiral Long's position that the treaty should include the FRG language. Substantiating his position was a message of 18 August from the CINCPACREP Philippines, RADM Richard M. Dunleavy. Although it would initially benefit U.S.-RP relations, RADM Dunleavy questioned the long-range benefits of the treaty. Once approximately 50 Filipino criminals in the United States were returned, it was unlikely that any would take refuge there in the future. Then the focus would shift to U.S. forces personnel and cases would have to be worked on an individual basis unless adjudged in the U.S. national security interest or "in the interest of justice." If extradition requests were denied, each case would generate adverse publicity just as official duty cases did and would become another irritant. The good faith of the GOP, which the State Department and Embassy wished to presume, could not be counted upon because the GOP historically had attempted to reject most U.S. official duty and inter se assertions. Further, if the number of these cases were significant, all of the good will resulting from the extradition treaty passage would be eroded. If the extradition treaty were inevitable, RADM Dunleavy stated, the DOD should insist on protection of military personnel from extradition in most cases and a treaty which would draw minimum attention to the U.S. military presence in the Philippines.[2]

~~(C)~~ In addressing these two concerns in another personal message to the Chairman of the JCS on 19 August, Admiral Long reviewed extradition arrangements with other major PACOM countries. He noted that nationality clauses similar to the FRG formulation existed in treaties with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. Arrangements with Pakistan, India, and Singapore were silent on this point and there were no treaties with Indonesia or Korea. Additional review of non-PACOM countries where there was a significant U.S. military presence revealed that the only extradition treaties specifically requiring the United States to extradite its own nationals were with Israel, Italy, and Columbia.[3]

~~(C)~~ As a result of Admiral Long's strong resolve and Secretary of Defense Weinberger's personal intervention, the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice reached a last minute agreement to substitute the FRG type nationality language for the originally proposed Article 7. U.S. and Philippine officials initialed the draft treaty in Washington on 22 September. The United States asked that the complete text of the treaty not be made public until after signature by executive authorities of both countries. The treaty, with appendix,

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL 180536Z Aug 81 ~~(C)(EX);~~ AMEMB Manila 18875/171200Z and 18876/171206Z Aug 81 ~~(C)(EX)~~, GDS 8/17/87.
2. SECSTATE 127097/180550Z Aug 81 ~~(C),~~ GDS 8/14/87; CINCPACREPPHIL 180536Z Aug 81 ~~(C)(EX)~~, DECL 18 Aug 87.
3. CINCPAC 190342Z Aug 81 ~~(C),~~ DECL 10 Aug 87.

was signed in Washington on 27 November with a proviso that it would enter into force 30 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification.[1]

Rossi v. Brown

(U) The 1968 U.S.-RP Base Labor Agreement (BLA) provided, in part, for preferential hiring of Philippine nationals at U.S. facilities except where special circumstances required the employment of U.S. citizens. In practice only about four percent of the 20,500 civilian jobs in U.S. facilities in the Philippines were held by U.S. citizens. In Rossi v. Brown, a number of U.S. citizens, including dependents and permanent residents, challenged the preferential hiring provisions of the BLA in the U.S. Federal District Court. The plaintiffs alleged the hiring provisions violated Public Law 92-129, the Hughes-Schweiker Amendment.[2]

(U) On 29 March 1979 the U.S. District Court ruled against the plaintiffs, holding that the BLA, although an executive agreement, was in effect a "treaty" and, therefore, was excepted from the application of the Hughes-Schweiker Amendment. On 15 September 1980 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 3-0 that preferential hiring under Article I of the BLA was contrary to U.S. law, thus reversing the verdict of the District Court. A petition for a rehearing en banc by the Court of Appeals was filed by a U.S. Attorney on 29 October, and on 18 December 1980 the Court denied the request. In May 1981 the Department of Justice petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the decision of the lower court was not implemented pending the outcome of the appeal.[3]

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

PACOM Confinement Statistics

(U) As of 30 November 1981 U.S. personnel in post-trial confinement in foreign penal institutions in PACOM totaled 87. A break-out by country and Service follows:[4]

Country	Air Force	Army	Navy/Marine Corps	Total
Japan	20	3	61	84
Korea	1	0	0	1
New Zealand	0	0	1	1
Thailand	0	1	0	1
	21	4	62	87

1. J73/Memo/C325-81~~(C)~~, 10 Sep 81, Subj: Extradition Treaty with the Philippines (U), DECL 10 Sep 87; SECSTATE 253544/222155Z Sep 81~~(C)~~, GDS 9/22/87; Dept of State Bulletin, Vol 82, No. 2059, Feb 82, p. 84 (U).
2. CINCPAC COMMAND History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, pp. 501-504.
3. Ibid.; J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
4. J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

Philippines

(U) Although during 1981 there was no improvement in the time required to try cases in Philippine courts and the policy of the Philippine Government to deny all waiver requests continued, some general improvement in the criminal jurisdiction area was noted. The number of military personnel charged with criminal offenses by Philippine authorities continued to decline. Also there was a decrease of approximately 50 percent in the average number of personnel in an "international legal hold" status.[1]

(U) SA Michael J. Butler, USN, remained in confinement in the Navy brig at Subic Bay pending the outcome of his appeal to the Philippine Supreme Court. Butler had been convicted of murder by a Philippine court in 1976 and sentenced to death. (See CINCPAC Command History 1977 for case details.)[2]

(U) TSGT Jesse Hope, USAF, had been on administrative hold in the Philippines since his arrest on 10 February 1974 on charges of smuggling. The delay was occasioned by an appeal to the Philippine Supreme Court from the trial court's ruling that the evidence had been illegally seized. The Supreme Court ruled on 21 November 1980 that the evidence was admissible but had left the door open for the trial court to dismiss the case. The case was finally resolved on 27 January 1981 when the presiding judge dismissed the case and ordered cancellation of the custody receipt. Dismissal was based on the unavailability of witnesses.

(U) Pvt William Deal, USMC, was sentenced to confinement for a period of from 6 to 20 months for theft by a Philippine court in December 1980. In January 1981 Pvt Deal was convicted by a U.S. Navy court-martial and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for five months. In March the Philippine Ministry of Justice acquiesced in the U.S. proposal that the Philippine sentence begin to run while Pvt Deal was serving his court-martial sentence. In August Pvt Deal was granted parole by the Parole Board of the GOP Ministry of Justice.[3]

Korea

(U) From 27 October 1979 to 24 January 1981 martial law was in effect in the Republic of Korea. During this period the United States had exclusive right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all U.S. military and civilian personnel in Korea because provisions of Article XXII of the Status of Forces Agreement were suspended. When martial law was lifted on 24 January, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in Korea was again governed by the Status of Forces Agreement.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U).
3. Ibid.
4. J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

ANZUS Status of Forces Agreement

(U) In January 1981 the Australian Ambassador to the United States met with State and Defense Department officials in Washington to urge that negotiations begin on a reciprocal Status of Forces Agreement. In the protocol to the 1963 SOFA with Australia the United States had agreed to conduct negotiations on a reciprocal arrangement. To avoid the precedent of concluding a reciprocal SOFA with an individual country, and because we had no SOFA with New Zealand, the State Department and American Embassy Canberra proposed including New Zealand in a trilateral reciprocal SOFA under the ANZUS Treaty umbrella. During September the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate visited Canberra, Australia, and Wellington, New Zealand, to discuss this concept with U.S. Country Team members. In November CINCPAC recommended implementation of the trilateral concept to the Secretary of Defense, provided a U.S.-NZ Antarctic Support Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4151) remained intact. Discussions during December by Embassy personnel in Canberra and Wellington with host country officials were favorable, and at the end of 1981 the Defense Department was developing a reciprocal ANZUS SOFA which, when completed, would be forwarded to CINCPAC for comment.[1]

Exercises

POTENT PUNCH 81

(U) Participation by the Staff Judge Advocate's office in Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81 (a JCS command post exercise) was unprecedented. Prior to this exercise, participation by CINCPAC staff judge advocates had been limited to one or two officers being "on call" and responding when legal issues surfaced. During this exercise which was held 25-28 September 1981, the Staff Judge Advocate served as a key member of the Battle Staff while other members served with the Control Group or manned the legal desk with the Operations Action Group on a 24-hour basis. The many problems that involved both international and domestic law issues which surfaced during the exercise clearly demonstrated the need for the active participation of lawyers in CINCPAC exercises.[2]

ANZUS Exercises

(U) A CINCPAC proposal to include law of war (LOW) scenario problems in ANZUS exercises was approved by the JCS in June 1981. After discussions between the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate and representatives of the Australian and New Zealand armed forces in September, it was determined that additional LOW training would be needed by the forces of these two countries before proceeding with the initiative. In order to facilitate the training necessary for

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 200534Z Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 21 Oct 87; J732 Point Paper (U), 16 Dec 81, Subj: Australian/ANZUS SOFA.
2. J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

the introduction of LOW problems into future exercises, Admiral Long authorized his legal staff to plan and participate in an ANZUS LOW exercise seminar.[1]

Travel to Macau

(U) Since 1975 unofficial travel to Macau by DOD personnel had been restricted. In 1979 CINCPAC supported an Air Force recommendation to lift restrictions, and the U.S. Defense Liaison Office Hong Kong discussed procedures for such with Macau authorities. During 1980 a draft Memorandum of Agreement was developed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong and Macau officials. In March 1981 the Departments of State and Defense determined a formal agreement was not desired and proposed an informal visitation arrangement similar to that in effect for Hong Kong. In July Macau officials concurred and, as a special concession, agreed that SEVENTH Fleet personnel on ship visits to Hong Kong could use identification cards in lieu of passports when visiting Macau. However, they requested that the size of liberty parties be limited to not more than 60 persons per day.[2]

(U) On 16 December CINCPAC announced the opening of Macau to U.S. active duty personnel and DOD-sponsored civilians for leave or liberty. In addition to passports, military personnel would be required to have leave or travel papers authorizing the visit to Macau and sufficient funds for a round-trip boat ticket from Hong Kong. CINCPAC advised his component and subordinate unified commanders that while there would be no official U.S. resident representative in Macau and no Status of Forces Agreement existed, limited legal assistance would be available through the Macau police and the U.S. Defense Liaison Office Hong Kong. CINCPAC also presaged the substitution of identification cards for passports for SEVENTH Fleet personnel when special arrangements were completed.[3]

Environmental Laws and Regulations

~~(C)~~ On 6 April 1981 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a Government appeal of a Circuit Court of Appeals (Hawaii) ruling that would require the Navy (CINCPACFLT) to prepare a hypothetical environmental impact statement (EIS) in conjunction with the expansion of the West Loch ammunition storage facility at the Naval Magazine, Lualualei, Hawaii. The Court, among other things, was to assess the potential consequences of storage of nuclear weapons at that facility. In a 1 May message to the Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Long appealed to General Jones for consideration of measures to counter what he termed "a plethora of federal and state environmental regulations affecting virtually every aspect of the national defense." It was the Admiral's view

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1. Ibid.
2. J732 Point Paper (U), 6 Nov 81, Subj: Lifting of Travel Restriction to Macau.
3. J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U); CINCPAC 160407Z Dec 81 (U).

that the West Loch case was symptomatic of the broad problem of military operations being hampered, and in some cases, curtailed, by anti-military rather than pro-environment sentiments. He also pointed to the inordinate amount of time and money expended by commands and commanders to defend such actions and to comply with environmental standards.[1]

~~(C)~~ In this case, the Admiral cited the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 as an example of how special interest groups used the NEPA to cause the Government excessive delay and expense to achieve results that were unobtainable through the normal political process. He proposed that, "DOD seek legislation to amend NEPA to: (1) permit SECDEF to exempt military activities from the requirement to prepare an EIS where such preparation would not be in the national defense interest (e.g., West Loch), and (2) eliminate the right of action of private citizens and make the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency the sole authority to enforce NEPA in the courts. At a minimum the President should rescind Executive Order 12114 of 4 Jan 1979 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions) which extends the reach of NEPA overseas." (See also CINCPAC Command History 1978, Vol. III, pp. 657-658.)[2]

~~(C)~~ The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966 and Executive Order 11593 of 15 May 1971 (Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment), Admiral Long believed, had "imposed an untoward burden on our military operations." The latter had tasked Federal agencies to complete a survey of all property under their jurisdiction or control for historic sites, buildings, and objects by 1 July 1973. Among the DOD projects, only a fraction had been completed to date, and the Admiral cited the Kahoolawe Survey which had taken 5 years to complete and cost in excess of $1 million. He further stated, "Because the courts have ruled that private citizens have standing to seek judicial enforcement of E.O. 11593, activist groups, such as Kahoolawe Ohana, have been provided a vehicle to disrupt essential military operations. Because the surveys required by E.O. 11593 have seldom been completed, we enter such suits in the untenable position of being in non-compliance with the law. I propose that E.O. 11593 be rescinded as soon as possible and that a reasonable program be established pursuant to NHPA to inventory DOD property for significant historic sites."[3]

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1. CINCPAC 012335Z May 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 23 Apr 87.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; Kahoolawe is a small, uninhabited island off the coast of Maui in the Hawaiian Islands which had been used as a target area for many years. In 1977 certain Hawaiian groups had called for a halt to the bombing and restoration of the land to the Hawaiian people, and a number of lawsuits were filed against the Defense Department to enjoin the Navy's target use of the island. CINCPAC monitored the matter, aware that the outcome of this confrontation could affect other training sites, both in the United States and overseas. (See also CINCPAC Command History 1977 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. I, pp. 223-224.)

~~(C)~~ The Admiral also reviewed other environmental legislation which he believed placed undue restrictions on military commanders, such as the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970. On 40 occasions, he stated, Fleet units had paid penalties and fines to the States of California and Washington alone. He asked that the President be asked to exercise authority granted under the act to exempt military air pollution sources from such state and local regulations. Similar action would be desirable for the requirements of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 which, upon occasion, applied when live ordnance fired from ships and aircraft fell into waters under state jurisdiction.[1]

~~(C)~~ As a first step the Admiral recommended to the Chairman of the JCS that the President exercise available exemption authority and rescind those executive orders that go beyond what is required by statute. As a follow-on he recommended that environmental statutes be amended where necessary to rid them of the detrimental effects of excessive restrictions on operational readiness. He stated: "I am confident that these corrective actions can be accomplished without dimunition of our resolve to protect our environmental and cultural heritage. The benefits of environmental awareness are undeniable but not always paramount."[2]

~~(C)~~ CINCPACAF supported Admiral Long's position with a message to his Service Chief. The Chairman's response noted that these issues were extremely timely and of considerable concern. In recognition of the nation-wide regulatory burden, the Administration had established a Presidental task force on regulatory relief and a cabinet council on natural resources and environment. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense had taken an initiative to identify specific exemptions and amendments to legislation. At the end of 1981 CINCPAC was awaiting results of cabinet level efforts.[3]

PACOM Legal Conference

(U) In late March a decision was made to cancel the 1981 PACOM Legal Conference because limited travel funds would preclude most of the important Washington invitees from attending the session planned for April. As a result, the concept of an annual conference was completely revised. A meeting of key staff judge advocates within PACOM was held in Honolulu on 4 and 5 May to develop a new charter for the conference. Subsequently the PACOM Legal Conference was established as an ongoing forum to address legal problems that impact upon the operational readiness of the Pacific Command. The conference, consisting of an executive council and standing committees, was structured to be in year-long session to culminate each year in an annual meeting. The annual meeting would produce a formal report to CINCPAC to include specific recommendations for corrective actions to be taken by CINCPAC or higher authority. The conference would consist of a Core Group organized into standing and ad hoc committees and

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1. CINCPAC 012335Z May 81 ~~(C), DECL~~ 23 Apr 87.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPACAF 152355Z May 81 ~~(C), DECL~~ 23 Apr 87; JCS 191303Z May 81 (U).

an executive council. The first conference under the new concept commenced in August with publication of the governing directive, CINCPAC Instruction 5050.15, Pacific Command Legal Conference. Standing committees named in the directive were:[1]

International Politico-Military Relations
U.S.-Host Country Relations
OPLANs, CONPLANs, OPORDs, and Peacetime Rules of Engagement
Law of War
Military Justice and Discipline
Continuing Legal Education

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1. J73 HistSum Dec 81 (U).

SECTION IV--PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Tours and Visits

(U) Among the numerous tours, visits, and briefings in Hawaii and the PACOM which the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office arranged during 1981, several were of special significance. On 24 February, 20 international editors of the Reader's Digest, who were attending a conference in Honolulu, received a tour of the Arizona Memorial and an unclassified CINCPAC operations-intelligence briefing. Twelve members of Japan's National Press Club toured Pearl Harbor and received briefings and tours at Hickam AFB (PACAF and Hawaii Air National Guard), Camp Smith (CINCPAC), and Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station from 7 to 9 April. A visit to installations in the Pacific Command was made by 24 members of the prestigious Defense Orientation Conference Association from 26 April to 16 May 1981. Stops included Honolulu, Tokyo, Bangkok, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Beijing. In Hawaii the members received operational briefings at CINCPAC, PACAF, and PACFLT headquarters on 27 April. On 10 and 11 June seven East Asian journalists specializing in political and military affairs made a similar visit as part of a month-long tour of the United States. The tour was sponsored jointly by the Defense Department and the U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA). The group, which included editors and representatives from Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Taiwan also visited units of the the 25th Infantry Division at their Kahuku training site on Oahu.[1]

Vice President Bush Press Conference

(U) Vice President George H. Bush stopped in Honolulu 1-2 July on his return to Washington after attending the inauguration of Philippine President Marcos in Manila. On the morning of 1 July he held a press conference in the CINCPAC Flag Mess. Members of the Honolulu media, including Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters News Service, attended.[2]

40th Anniversary of Attack on Hawaii

(U) During the period August through early December 1981 there was substantial media interest in the 40th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Hawaii on 7 December 1941. Media approaches were broad and varied, ranging from historic representations of the events of December 7th, to the current state of the U.S. military in the Pacific, the strong bonds of friendship and

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1. J03/7422 HistSum Feb, Apr, Jun 81 (U); J03/7423 HistSum Jun 81 (U) CINCPAC Ltr Ser 695 (U), 5 Apr 81, Subj: Defense Orientation Conference Association visit to Hawaii.
2. J03/7422 HistSum Jul 81 (U).

trade between the former enemies, and the economic impact of Japan on the United States.[1]

(U) The CINCPAC Public Affairs Office took the lead in planning for the anticipated high volume of media requests by holding a planning meeting with component command representatives and their key subordinates. Procedures were established for coordinating all media requests. Data on historical locations were compiled, and historical narratives of the attack were assembled. Based on the results of the meeting, a media kit was developed. It contained historical data, memorial events scheduled for 1981, shooting locations, availability of historic photos and film, and procedures for using boats and helicopters. Over 140 of the kits were distributed to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Service information chiefs and their branch offices, USICA, COMUS Japan, and directly to media sources. The media kit, less the 1981 events list, became a standing source of information for future media requests to cover the attack story.[2]

(U) The Public Affairs Office coordinated over 50 media requests to cover the story. Most of these involved military Services on Oahu. The thrust was to share the coverage among the components and to focus away from the traditional focus on Pearl Harbor. Substantial media coverage was developed by the Air Force at Hickam and Wheeler AFBs and for the Marine Corps at Camp Smith and Kaneohe Bay. At the request of CDRWESTCOM, Army participation in the attack was played down. However, when specifically requested, some peripheral coverage at Schofield Barracks was arranged.[3]

(U) U.S. coverage included all three commercial network TV news programs, the Cable News Network, a special report by WLS-TV in Chicago; a number of major daily newspapers and news magazines; and live radio by WJR in Detroit. In Japan, the seven major TV stations and every major newspaper featured stories on the anniversary. The Svenska Dagbaldet, a leading Swedish newspaper, and ZDF-TV, the major TV station in Germany, developed presentations. Original clippings and video tapes of the coverage were requested from OASD/PA, USICA, and COMUS Japan for compilation of a master video tape for historic purposes and future use.[4]

Pacific Stars and Stripes

(U) For a number of years, delays in MAC flights or mission aborts from Tokyo, Japan, to Guam had caused late or non-delivery of Stars and Stripes to Guam. Acting on a Commander Pacific Stars and Stripes (PS&S) request, and

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1. JO374 HistSum Dec 81 (U); JO374/Memo/446-81 (U), 22 Dec 81, Subj: 40th Anniversary Attack on Hawaii.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

after receiving concurrence from the 834th Airlift Division (MAC), CINCPAC authorized a one-year test program for shipment of PS&S to Guam via foreign commercial air.[1]

(U) Based upon the favorable results of a 9-month evaluation (July 1980 to March 1981) reported by the Commander, Pacific Stars and Stripes, on 26 May CINCPAC approved continuation of foreign commercial service for another year. The provision that U.S. flag service would be used if compatible with shipping schedules still applied. The evaluation had shown an increase of $17,342 over the 9 previous months, which represented a 30 percent increase per day in overall circulation. In addition, on 1 May PS&S direct operations on Guam were discontinued and placed under a contractor.[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1979 ~~(TS/FRD)~~, Vol. II, p. 604.
2. J03/741 HistSum May 81 (U); PS&S Ltr (U), 5 May 81, Subj: Test of Foreign Flag Service To Guam.

SECTION V--SECURITY

Demonstration at CINCPAC Headquarters





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1. Op. Cit., Briefing Notes, 4 Mar 81 ~~(FOUO)~~.
2. JCS 161950Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 15 Sep 86; CINCPAC 190015Z Sep 81 ~~(C)~~, no DECL.
3. CINCPAC Instruction 5525.1 (U), 29 Dec 81, Subj: Safeguarding of Senior Official Travel Information; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2180 (U), 9 Oct 81, Subj: Vehicle Security.

SECTION VI--INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

Program Management

(U) The CINCPAC Inspector General (IG) office was established on 18 April 1973 as a result of a Secretary of Defense memorandum of 7 November 1972 and JCS SM-90-73. The position was held for a time by a specifically assigned general officer. In 1974, however, the responsibility was shifted to the Director for Personnel, and that officer functioned in a dual capacity as both the IG and the J1. This arrangement continued until 25 July 1980 when the responsibility was reassigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff as an additional duty.[1]

(U) Beginning in 1976, the four deputy IGs were not replaced as they were reassigned, and by February 1978 only one remained. The following August, the last officer was also reassigned. In 1979, as a result of renewed JCS emphasis and Congressional and GAO interest, the PACOM program was revitalized. By 1980 the staff consisted of two dual-hatted personnel and one full-time administrative assistant. In 1981 the CINCPAC IG revitalization program became a reality and staffing was increased to four full-time deputies (2 Air Force colonels, 1 Navy captain, and 1 Army lieutenant colonel), plus administrative support.[2]

(U) In October 1981 Admiral Long approved a revision in the concept of IG operations. The new "charter," which paralleled the JCS IG guidelines, provided for the IG to evaluate joint operational readiness, the adequacy of command and control (including both communications systems and command relationships), and operations security effectiveness. The primary medium for evaluation would be selected PACOM joint/combined military exercises. Additionally, the IG was to monitor, visit, and periodically inspect other mission essential areas such as security at special weapons storage areas. The Admiral further directed that the IG provide him with an informal, independent semi-annual assessment of command readiness (later changed to annual). The CINCPAC Instruction (5040.5 series) prescribing the CINCPAC IG mission, responsibilities, and concept of operation was also revised that same month.[3]

Exercises

(U) During the fall of 1980, members of the IG staff observed selected joint/combined exercises conducted in PACOM. (For exercise details, evaluation, and recommendations, see the Operations Chapter of this History.)

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1. CINCPAC COMMAND HISTORY 1973 (~~TS/FRD~~), Vol I, p. 23, 1975, Vol. I. pp. 15-16, 1979, Vol. II, p. 539; 1980, Vol. I, p. 15; CINCPAC Instruction 5040.5B (U), 27 Oct 81, Subj: Commander in Chief Pacific Inspector General (CINCPAC-IG).
2. Ibid.
3. IG/Memo/94-81 (U), 20 Oct 81, Subj: Commander in Chief Pacific Inspector General (CINCPAC-IG); CINCPAC 270431Z Oct 81 (U).

One such exercise was TEAM SPIRIT 80, a JCS-directecd air-sea-land field training exercise (FTX) held in Korea from 13 March to 10 April 1980. The overall objective was to examine joint actions between ROK-U.S. Service elements and transportation operating agencies in movement planning and deployment and redeployment of augmentation forces. Of special interest was the use of sealift as a significant means to deploy equipment--a first for PACOM exercises. Late resolution of funding for sealift, however, caused disruptions in efficient planning of lead times. Observation of a command post exercise (CPX), ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 80 held in Korea from 10-30 August, indicated improvement in all exercise phases, particularly in command and control and in operations and communications security. Another JCS-directed joint/combined FTX observed was FOAL EAGLE 81. This UNC/CFC exercise in unconventional warfare was conducted from 4-25 November 1980 and was rated as having the best safety record in the series thus far.[1]

~~(C)~~ Among the exercises observed by CINCPAC IG staff members in 1981 was TEAM SPIRIT 81 (21-31 March 1981). Held in Korea, the team noted that the redeployment phase was characterized by inadequate planning which resulted in, among other things, duplication of functions at Osan Air Base, inadequate handling equipment for loading of aircraft, and premature termination of communications with outlying bases. Two IG staff members were the only CINCPAC representatives at OPPORTUNE JOURNEY 81-4, a 25th Infantry Division JCS-coordinated FTX held on the Island of Hawaii. The exercise was observed in two phases--initial sealift deployment from Oahu (14 to 17 September) and the actual exercise from 10 to 14 October with airlift provided by PACAF's Exercise COPE ELITE 82-1. ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81 conducted in Korea from 14-23 September, was consolidated with POTENT PUNCH and included FTX functions as well as CPX play. Limiting factors noted by the IG team included a shortfall of in-country rations and lack of reference indicators on messages which necessitated complete translation before routing could be accomplished.[2]

(U) Although primary responsibility for exercise evaluation was transferred to the IG in October 1981, full implementation would not occur until TEAM SPIRIT 82. Coverage by the IG staff of the two remaining 1981 joint/combined exercises was limited to an observer role and then for U.S. forces only. One was KANGAROO 81 (12-31 October) in Australia, and the other was GONFALON 81 (13 November-15 December), an ANZUS triennial unconventional warfare FTX held in New Zealand with U.S./U.K./Australian/New Zealand/Malaysian participation. A second phase of GONFALON 81 incorporated the special warfare FTX Operation

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1. CINCPAC Instruction 5040.5B (U), 27 Oct 81, Subj: Commander in Chief Pacific Inspector General (CINCPAC IG); IG HistSums Nov 81 ~~(U & C)~~, DECL 8 Sep 86.
2. IG HistSum Nov 81 (U); IG/Memo/139-81 (U), 18 Dec 81, Subj: Exercise OPPORTUNE JOURNEY 81-4; IG/Memo C119-81 ~~(C)~~, 25 Nov 81, Subj: Report of IG Team Visit to Korea and Japan (14-30 Sep 81) (U), DECL 20 Nov 87.

LANCER. These exercises were informal test-beds to develop evaluation planning and procedures for the first formal evaluation effort in TEAM SPIRIT 82.[1]

Staff Visits

~~(C)~~ Two CINCPAC Deputy Inspectors General conducted staff visits with DOD members of U.S. Embassies in Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines from 10 to 22 March 1981. The primary purpose of the visits was discussion of communications security, command relationships, and quality of life issues. The IG report highlighted uniform evidence at each location that the senior DOD military member was unsure of his precise command relationship to CINCPAC. The team recommended that Terms of Reference for principal DOD elements/activities in all PACOM assigned countries be reviewed. Among other subjects which required remedial action were Noncombatant Emergency-Evacuation (NEMVAC) planning, reports on drug trafficking patterns, and commissary and personnel services support. The CINCPAC IG made additional visits to Manila, Jakarta, and Bangkok from 18 to 22 June for discussion of problems which had surfaced during previous visits.[2]

(U) An IG staff visit was made to Japan from 31 March to 2 April 1981. Calls and discussions were held with key members of the COMUS Japan staff, the Yokota Air Base commander, the U.S. Embassy Administrative Officer, and the Deputy Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan. Items of special interest were privately owned vehicle importation problems and shortage of FY 81 travel funds.[3]

(U) In conjunction with ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 81, IG staff visits were made to JUSMAG Korea and U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Army Japan, and U.S. Naval Forces Japan (23-30 September 1981) where discussions centered on personnel support services and quality of life complaints. These included family housing at Yongsan South Post (Korea) and lack of uniform tour lengths and PCS weight allowances among the Services (Japan).[4]

(U) A staff visit to the U.S. Defense Liaison Group in Jakarta, Indonesia, and DAO personnel in Singapore was made from 7 to 13 November. The former dealt primarily with personnel problems associated with the redesignation of the Group to the Office of the Military Attache for Defense Programs and its

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1. IG HistSum Nov 81 (U); IG/Memo/C143-81 ~~(C)~~, 31 Dec 81, Subj: Exercise GONFALON 81 (U), REVW 31 Dec 87.
2. IG HistSums Nov 81 ~~(C)~~, DECL 10 Jun 87; IG/MEMO/51-81 ~~(C)~~, 10 Jun 81, Subj: CINCPAC Deputy Inspector General Staff Visit (U), DECL 10 Jun 87.
3. IG HistSum Nov 81 (U).
4. Op. Cit., IG/Memo/C-119-81 ~~(C)~~, 25 Nov 81.

concomitant consolidation under the Defense Attache. The latter was concerned with dependent schools, housing, and medical treatment.[1]

Physical Security

[redacted]

(U) During the security survey at the Naval Station at Adak, the CINCPAC IG noted excessive amounts of disposable property on hand and inadequate surveillance of a classified maintenance facility. The team also found inordinate contract costs and procurement difficulties for repair of 4.3 miles of gravel road connecting classified magazine storage sites and for rehabilitation of concrete "ready service lockers." A follow-up staff visit from 2 to 6 April 1981 to Adak and Bremerton, Washington, indicated improvement in the overall supply support received from the Naval Supply Center at Bremerton and progress in overall facilities upgrade. Disposal of excess property and review of MILCON support contracts were still in need of command attention at Adak.[3]

[redacted]

1. Ibid.; (See also CINCPAC Command History 1980 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 407-411, and the Security Assistance Chapter of this History.)
2. IG HistSums Nov 81 (S/FRD) and (C/FRD).
3. Ibid.
4. IG HistSum Nov 81 (C/FRD).
5. IG/MEMO/C105 (C/FRD), 13 Nov 81, Subj: Report of Physical Security Survey, U.S. Naval Magazine, Lualualei, Hawaii (U).

Explosives Safety Surveys

(U) One member of the CINCPAC IG staff accompanied each of the Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board teams during Explosives Safety Surveys in PACOM during 1980 and 1981. From 30 May to 14 June 1980 a team visited facilities at MCAS Kaneohe; Naval Magazines at Lualualei, West Loch, and Waikele; the Pearl Harbor complex on Oahu; and the U.S. Navy Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai. Ammunition storage conditions were generally satisfactory but minor corrective recommendations were made for other functions at these installations. Another survey team visited Guam and Okinawa from 28 May to 13 June 1980. Some recommendations were made for correction of deficiencies at Andersen AFB and at U.S. Navy facilities (Apra Harbor and Naval Magazine) on Guam, but no unsafe or hazardous conditions were found at Kadena AB, Okinawa.[1]

(U) From 13 to 24 July 1981 seven members from the DOD Board, plus a CINCPAC representative, surveyed 6 air bases, 7 MAGNUM storage sites, 1 naval base, 1 naval ordnance depot, 8 ammunition depots, 17 ammunition supply points, 2 pre-stock supply points, 5 ammunition storage sites, 1 rail marshalling yard, and 1 port facility at U.S. and ROK facilities in Korea. Overall safety of the storage, maintenance, and transportation of U.S. titled ammunition by ROK Army units continued to improve over previously observed unsafe conditions. Navy and Marine Corps munitions storage and handling areas revealed good site planning, but in some instances, proper instructions for storage had not been provided to ROK forces.

(U) A CINCPAC IG representative joined a DOD Explosive Safety Board team to survey chemical storage on Johnston Island from 25 to 29 July 1981 and made 11 recommendations for improvements.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

CHAPTER XI

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY 1981

(U) This unclassified chronology was compiled from Department of State Bulletins, the periodical Current History, and various wire service reports for 1981. Although many of the events were outside of CINCPAC's acknowledged area of responsibility, all either directly or indirectly affected the U.S. military force posture and/or political relationships in the Pacific Command.

3 Jan - Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Deng Xiaoping became head of the party's Military Commission, replacing Hua Guofeng.

- The Korea Central Intelligence Agency was reorganized and renamed the Agency for National Security Planning. It would be prohibited from interfering in state affairs having no direct bearing on national security.

8 Jan - Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki left for the Philippines to begin a 12-day visit to five Southeast Asian nations.

12 Jan - The Republic of Korea martial law command lifted the 7-month ban on political activities in anticipation of the elections in February.

13 Jan - The Japanese budget for 1982 called for a 7.6 percent increase in military spending. The United States had hoped for an 11 percent increase.

- China warned the Netherlands that it would downgrade diplomatic relations unless the Dutch immediately cancelled the sale of two attack submarines to Taiwan. However, the Dutch government decided on 16 January to proceed with the sale.

14 Jan - The United States resumed military assistance to El Salvador which was temporarily suspended on 5 December 1980.

17 Jan - Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos ordered an end to martial law and the release of 341 political prisoners, but specified that all decrees and orders issued under martial law were to remain in effect.

20 Jan - Ronald W. Reagan was inaugurated as the 40th President of the United States. George H. Bush was sworn in as Vice President. The Senate confirmed Caspar W. Weinberger as

Secretary of Defense, and the next day confirmed Alexander M. Haig, Jr., as Secretary of State.

20 Jan - The 52 U.S. hostages held by Iran for 14 months were released and put aboard an Algerian airliner in Tehran after the United States agreed to release impounded Iranian assets.

23 Jan - ROK President Chun Doo Hwan commuted opposition leader Kim Dae-jung's death sentence to life imprisonment. The death penalty had come under strong criticism by foreign governments and the commutation was greeted with special approval by the United States and Japan. Kim had been abducted by Korean agents while in Japan and smuggled back to Korea to face trial for sedition.

24 Jan - President Chun lifted the state of martial law which was imposed after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee in October 1979. Lifting of martial law automatically reinstated normal criminal jurisdiction provisions under the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement.

27 Jan - COMUS Korea announced plans for the United States to deploy 48 F-16 fighter planes to the ROK during the year to replace most of PACAF's F-4Ds there.

1 Feb - President Chun made an official visit to Washington, D.C., 1-3 February. President Reagan told President Chun that U.S. troops in South Korea would not be withdrawn and the United States would sell weapons and technology necessary for Korea's defense, including F-16 fighter planes.

- Deployment for TEAM SPIRIT 81 began in Korea. This 7-week joint and combined exercise involved some 100,000 ROK troops as well as U.S. forces in-country and deployed from other PACOM and CONUS bases. This was the largest annual exercise in the Pacific Command, with the primary purpose of testing augmentation plans and ROK/U.S. combined operations for the defense of Korea.

2 Feb - A 3-ship battle group led by the carrier USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) left the Arabian Sea south of Iran, reflecting reduced tension in the area since the release of the American hostages. The United States had maintained two carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean since December 1979, a month after the hostages were seized at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

4 Feb - Jeane J. Kirkpatrick was sworn in as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

5 Feb - The United States announced it would deploy 18 A-10 ground attack aircraft to Suwon AB, Korea, in March 1982, and would add six more A-10s a year later to form a full squadron of 24 close air support aircraft at the forward base.

9 Feb - Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced that President Reagan would retain General David C. Jones, USAF, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

20 Feb - Admiral Robert L.J. Long, CINCPAC, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, said that countering the Soviet Union's expanded military might would require a substantial and permanent increase of American conventional forces in the Pacific.

- Also testifying before the committee, General John A. Wickham, Jr., COMUS Korea, said the North Korean Army outnumbered the ROK Army in almost every single arms category, and had nearly twice as many combat maneuver battalions as the south. However, he believed ROK forces and U.S. in-country and augmentation forces could defeat any North Korean attack.

26 Feb - A PACAF MC-130E transport crashed in the sea off Tabones, 20 miles northwest of Subic Bay, Philippines, during special warfare exercises, killing 23 of 24 persons aboard.

2 Mar - A Pakistani domestic airliner was hijacked and held at Kabul airport (Afghanistan) for 6 days, then flown to Damascus (Syria) with over 100 hostages, including 3 Americans. The three Pakistani hijackers demanded the release of political prisoners in Pakistan. Syria agreed to give asylum to 55 of the political prisoners, and the hostages were released on 14 March.

3 Mar - Chun Doo Hwan was sworn into office for a 7-year term as ROK President. Representing President Reagan at the inaugugura-ration was Senator Charles H. Percy, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman.

4 Mar - Nine persons protesting nuclear weapons marked Ash Wednesday by gaining access to an office at CINCPAC Headquarters where they spread ashes on the walls.

11 Mar - The United States and Australia agreed, by an exchange of notes at Canberra, to USAF use of RAAF Base Darwin for B-52 staging operations for sea surveillance in the Indian Ocean and for navigation training purposes.

12 Mar - A 7-ship battle group led by the carrier USS MIDWAY (CV-41) entered the Strait of Malacca heading toward the Indian Ocean to relieve another battle group led by the carrier USS RANGER (CV-61). The latter had just completed a 133-day tour in the Indian Ocean.

14 Mar - The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said there were 1.7 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

16 Mar - Kuwait formally rejected a U.S.-proposed Persian Gulf security strategy spearheaded by the Rapid Deployment Force and said the presence of one superpower in the region would simply be an invitation to the other to come in.

- More than 22,000 SEVENTH Fleet and USMC personnel and 11,000 ROK Navy and Marine personnel conducted a combined amphibious operation at Pohang, as part of TEAM SPIRIT 81.

19 Mar - The 8-day field maneuver phase of TEAM SPIRIT 81 ended. It featured night attacks, river crossings, and airmobile assaults, with USAF and ROKAF close air support. U.S. augmen- augmentation forces began redeploying the next day.

22 Mar - Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., former CINCPAC (1968-1972), died of a heart attack aboard a military aircraft returning from Europe to the United States.

23 Mar - Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito made an official visit to Washington, D.C., 23-24 March.

- Former President Gerald Ford met with Deputy Chairman Deng Xiaoping in Beijing and assured him that the Reagan administration continued to seek improved relations with China.

28 Mar - Terrorists hijacked a Garuda Indonesian Airways plane and forced it to land at Bangkok. Indonesian commandos assaulted the plane on 31 March, freeing 55 hostages and killing 4 of the 5 hijackers. A U.S. citizen was wounded in an escape attempt on the 29th.

30 Mar - President Reagan was wounded in a lung in an assassination attempt as he was leaving the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Three others were also wounded. John W. Hinckley, Jr., was arrested and charged with the attempted assassination.

1 Apr - The carrier USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) and seven escort ships departed San Diego for a 7-month routine deployment in the Western Pacific. More than 7,400 sailors were in the group.

2 Apr - LT GEN Arnold W. Braswell was named Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, succeeding LT GEN James D. Hughes who was nominated for retirement effective 1 July.

3 Apr - An attempted coup by the Thai Armed Forces Deputy Commander in Chief on 1 April against Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon failed.

8 Apr - The last U.S. 5-star general, Omar N. Bradley, died at the age of 88.

9 Apr - The POLARIS missile nuclear submarine USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) collided accidentally with the 2,350-ton Japanese freighter NISSHO MARU southwest of Kyushu in the East China Sea, sinking the freighter. There was no damage to the power plant or the missiles, and the submarine left the area after surfacing and spotting no ship in apparent distress. Visibility was poor because of fog and rain. Thirteen crewmen were rescued 18 hours later by a Japanese destroyer, but the captain and first mate were missing. Their bodies were recovered 12 days later.

11 Apr - President Reagan was released from the hospital after being treated for wounds received in the assassination attempt of 30 March.

12 Apr - The space shuttle COLUMBIA was launched on its first orbital flight from Cape Canaveral, FL, landing safely at Edwards AFB, CA, two days later. Kadena AB, Japan, and Hickam AFB, HI, had been designated as emergency landing sites in the Pacific.

16 Apr - Admiral Long, on a visit to Japan, personally expressed regrets to Prime Minister Suzuki over the accidental sinking of the Japanese freighter on 9 April, and said the United States was studying the matter of compensation.

- USS GEORGE WASHINGTON arrived at Apra Port, Guam, a week after its collision with the NISSHO MARU.

16 Apr - North Korean and ROK troops exchanged thousands of rounds of machinegun fire across the Military Demarcation Line after the communists fired at a North Korean defector dashing toward a ROK Army outpost in the Chorwon Valley.

20 Apr - The U.S. Navy accepted liability for the sinking of the NISSHO MARU. Japanese lawyers estimated that claims for loss of the ship and cargo and on behalf of the crew would total about $4.2 million.

- The Pentagon said it proposed to sell ship-to-ship missiles to Japan for the first time to arm four new warships being built for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

21 Apr - The United States announced its decision to sell to Saudi Arabia a multimillion-dollar arms package, including five AWACS radar warning planes.

24 Apr - The United States lifted its ban on the sale of agricultural goods and phosphates to the Soviet Union, imposed 15 months earlier when the USSR invaded Afghanistan.

27 Apr - The United States proposed to sell to the Republic of Korea 36 F-16 fighters for $1 billion.

29 Apr - The 13th annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting was held in San Francisco, 29-30 April, after having been postponed in 1980 by the Carter Administration. The United States promised to sell Korea the STINGER hand-held surface-to-air missile, as well as light tanks and tank retrievers on favorable terms.

5 May - The first American B-52 bomber to use Australia as a staging base for surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean arrived in Darwin.

6 May - USS AMERICA (CV-66) completed a successful transit of the Suez Canal, marking the first such trip through the strategic waterway by a U.S. aircraft carrier since 1967.

7 May - Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki made an official visit to Washington, D.C., 7-8 May. He reportedly agreed to maintain Japanese defense spending at a 7-percent annual growth rate and to increase Japan's contribution toward the maintenance of U.S. troops stationed in his country.

15 May - General Yun Song-min became chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, replacing General Lew Byong Hyon who retired from the army to become ambassador to the United States.

- A volcano erupted on the Northern Marianas island of Pagan, forcing the evacuation of all residents to Saipan by the Japanese merchant ship HOYO MARU, which was near Pagan at the time.

16 May - Japanese Foreign Minister Ito resigned over defense commitments made by Prime Minister Suzuki to President Reagan. Sunao Sonoda was appointed his successor.

- The PRC Foreign Ministry issued a formal protest against Vietnamese "intrusions and armed provocations" in Yunnan Province. Chinese troops reportedly killed more than 100 Vietnamese soldiers in recent fighting.

- The U.S. SEVENTH Fleet admitted that its warships might have damaged the trawling gear of 48 Japanese fishing boats during combined antisubmarine warfare exercises with the JMSDF on 14 May.

18 May - Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer revealed that there was a secret oral agreement between Japanese and U.S. officials in 1960 that permitted U.S. warships armed with nuclear weapons to enter Japanese waters and ports. Prime Minister Suzuki said there was no evidence that such an agreement ever existed.

21 May - U.S. officials said that Laotian exiles in Thailand had conducted excursions into Laos under U.S. guidance following reports that American POWs were still alive in Laos. No evidence was found to support these reports.

30 May - Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman was assassinated during an attempted coup led by a former army chief of staff.

2 Jun - The House of Representatives, in a unanimous vote, directed the Veterans Administration to give medical attention and hospital care to Vietnam veterans whose medical problems might be due to exposure to Agent Orange, a herbicide. On 16 June the Senate also unanimously approved this measure.

5 Jun - The carrier MIDWAY returned to its home port of Yokosuka after a 3-month tour of duty in the Indian Ocean. About 2,500 people demonstrated against the homeporting of the

ship, declaring it carried nuclear weapons in violation of Japanese policy.

7 Jun - Israeli jets attacked and completely destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad.

10 Jun - Secretary of State Haig departed Washington for an official visit to Hong Kong (12-14 June); Beijing (14-17 June), to discuss bilateral relations; Manila (17-20 June), to attend the ASEAN conference; and Wellington (21-23 June), to attend the ANZUS Council meeting.

- During meetings with Japanese defense officials in Honolulu, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Francis J. West, Jr., urged Japan to contribute more to defense spending. West and Admiral Long led the U.S. delegation at the conference, held 10-12 June.

11 Jun - A South Korean fishing boat with 21 aboard was seized by North Korean naval craft off the western coast when it lost its direction in dense fog but did not cross the sea border, according to ROK officials.

16 Jun - Secretary Haig said in Beijing the United States would lift restrictions on the sale of military hardware to China.

- Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew made an official visit to Washington, D.C., 16-19 June.

- Ferdinand E. Marcos received about 88 percent of the popular vote in the first presidential elections in the Philippines in 12 years.

17 Jun - Senior American officials announced that the United States and China were jointly operating an electronic intelligence-gathering station near the Chinese-Soviet border to monitor Soviet missile tests.

18 Jun - The ASEAN members called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea.

21 Jun - Secretary Haig, speaking in Wellington, said he saw "no urgency" on the sale of advanced U.S. fighter planes to Taiwan.

25 Jun - ROK President Chun arrived in Jakarta on the first leg of a 15-day tour of the five ASEAN capitals, the first by a South

Korean head of state. The visit was expected to boost ROK economic and political ties with ASEAN members.

29 Jun - Vice President Bush headed a U.S. delegation to the inauguration of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos in Manila.

- Australian Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser made an official visit to Washington, D.C., 29 June - 1 July.

- Hua Guofeng was replaced by Hu Yaobang as chairman of the Chinese communist party.

30 Jun - LT GEN John K. Davis assumed command of Fleet Marine Force Pacific from LT GEN Andrew W. ODonnell. Davis had been Director for Operations at Headquarters CINCPAC.

1 Jul - Submarine Base Bangor, WA, became operational under the command of CINCPACFLT. It would support the Navy's new fleet ballistic missile submarines of the TRIDENT class.

4 Jul - The DOD announced plans to initiate a $120-billion, 5-year plan to increase the size of the Navy, adding two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 14 attack submarines, and some 1,900 planes, plus other ships and equipment.

- ROK soldiers killed an armed North Korean infiltrator at a point about 4 miles across the southern boundary of the DMZ.

8 Jul - A U.S. military honor guard arrived in Honolulu with the remains of three Americans from Vietnam. A team from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, based in Hawaii, had been informed at a meeting in Hanoi on 29 May that these remains were recovered and would be returned to the United States.

9 Jul - The State Department announced that the United States, responding to appeals from international relief organizations and the Government of Pakistan, had committed an additional $21 million for humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, estimated to number about 2 million. Total U.S. Government contributions for Afghan relief in FY 81 were expected to reach $93 million. In FY 80 the U.S. Government gave $44 million to assist Afghan refugees.

10 Jul - Prime Minister Gandhi deplored the U.S. decision to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan. She confirmed reports that India was negotiating with France for the purchase of MIRAGE 2000 fighters to counter the F-16s.

12 Jul - The U.S. SEVENTH Fleet and the Royal Australian Air Force began a joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean off the west coast of Australia. The 2-day exercise, BEACON SOUTH 81-3, would test the effectiveness of USN and RAAF units in reconnaissance, maritime, and air operations.

13 Jul - A United Nations conference on Kampuchea was held in New York, 13-17 July. In its declaration the conference called for negotiations on a cease-fire by all parties and withdrawal of all foreign forces, under U.N. supervision.

15 Jul - The U.S. Eighth Army's 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade was inactivated in Korea, and the ROK Army assumed primary responsibility for ground-based air defense of the country.

16 Jul - The U.S. Administration said it should revise the regulations on international traffic in arms to permit commercial weapons sales to China on a case-by-case basis, reflecting China's role as a friendly, nonadversary state and clearly differentiating it from the Soviet bloc. However, China was not expected to come forward with large requests for arms purchases.

- Malaysia's new Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad assumed his office.

20 Jul - The Navy said Congress had been informed of the proposed sale to Japan, for an estimated $63 million, of four PHALANX rapid-fire weapon systems to be used on Japanese destroyers. The PHALANX was the Navy's first all-weather, automatic, controlled gun system to provide defense against close-in sea-skimming cruise missiles.

22 Jul - New Zealand Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon visited the United States, 22-25 July.

27 Jul - The battleship NEW JERSEY (BB-62) began its tow from Bremerton, WA, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA, where it was scheduled for major modification beginning 1 October 1981. Along with three sister ships, it would be fitted with cruise missiles and other modern systems and join the fleet in 1983.

30 Jul - CINCPAC congratulated the crew of USS PATRICK HENRY (SSBN-599) on completion of her last patrol as a fleet ballistic missile submarine with COMSUBPAC.

31 Jul - Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron THREE, transferred from Guam, officially began operations at Barbers Point Naval Air Station, HI, with its EC-130Q aircraft.

- The new U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Richard L. Walker, arrived in Seoul and said relations between the two countries had never been closer.

- President Marcos announced the appointment of MAJ GEN Fabian Ver, head of the Presidential Security Command and the National Intelligence and Security Authority, to succeed General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines. Ver would be promoted to four-star rank. MAJ GEN Fidel Ramos, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, would be promoted to lieutenant general and named Vice Chief of Staff. Formal change of command ceremonies were scheduled for 15 August.

2 Aug - Admiral Long, in a U.S. News and World Report interview, said Japan should take a larger role in defending itself in the Pacific without violating its legal limitations on armament. He said the United States would continue to provide a "nuclear umbrella" in the region and would not ask Japan to develop long-range bombers or amphibious task forces.

3 Aug - The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) began an illegal strike when negotiations for a new agreement with the government failed. President Reagan warned striking PATCO members they were violating the law would be dismissed if they failed to return to work within 48 hours. The airlines continued to fly 75 percent of their flights with supervisory, military, and non-striking controllers.

4 Aug - France carried out an underground nuclear test at its Pacific testing ground of Mururoa Atoll, ending its current series, according to the French Defense Ministry. Previous French governments had never publicly announced the tests, and most were detected and made public by Australia or New Zealand.

5 Aug - LT GEN Charles L. Donnelly, USAF, assumed command of U.S. Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force, replacing LT GEN William H. Ginn.

- President Reagan nominated John Gunther Dean to be Ambassador to Thailand. He had been the last U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, in 1975.

6 Aug - Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang arrived on a 4-day visit to Manila on a mission to bolster the position of Southeast Asian nations against Vietnam.

- A Taiwan Air Force pilot defected to China in his F-5F jet fighter.

- The Japan Defense Agency announced that the JMSDF destroyer TAKATSUKI and submarine UZUSHIO would conduct a combined naval exercise with the Australian destroyer SWAN in the Pacific south of Tokyo, 18-19 August, in the first operation ever of its kind.

10 Aug - Japan Defense Agency Director-General Joji Omura and a group of JDA officials and Diet members flew to the carrier USS MIDWAY off Japan to observe operations and hold talks with RADM Donald Felt, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan. The ship was engaged in combined exercises with the JASDF.

13 Aug - The navies of Malaysia and Thailand began a combined sea exercise off the Malaysian east coast as part of an effort to promote closer security cooperation between the two countries. The 5-day exercise involved four ships from each nation.

19 Aug - Two USN F-14s from the carrier USS NIMITZ (CVN-68) shot down two Libyan SU-22 fighter planes over international waters 60 nautical miles off the coast of Libya after being fired upon by one of the Libyan jets. The SIXTH Fleet Commander said that in the past week aircraft from NIMITZ had intercepted Libyan planes on 45 different occasions but did not fire on them until the Libyan jets attacked.

- The guided missile cruiser USS STERETT (CG-31) arrived at Subic Bay to become the only U.S. surface warship to be based in the Philippines. It would be the flagship of Task Force 75, the surface combatant force of the SEVENTH Fleet.

22 Aug - Typhoon THAD struck Japan just east of Tokyo, resulting in 17 dead, 22 missing, 82 injured, and more than 3,000 homes flooded.

24 Aug - The State Department released details of the proposed Royal Saudi Air Force enhancement package: 101 ship-sets of F-15 conformal fuel tanks, 1,177 AIM-9L SIDEWINDER missiles, 6 KC-707 aerial tankers (with an option for two more), and 5 E-3A airborne warning and control system aircraft. Total cost of the package was $8.5 billion.

25 Aug - Somalia severed diplomatic ties with Libya following Libya's signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with South Yemen and Ethiopia.

26 Aug - North Korea fired a missile at a USAF SR-71 flying a routine reconnaissance mission in South Korean and international air space, missing the aircraft by several miles.

31 Aug - The supply vessel USS SAN JOSE (AFS-7) arrived at Guam, and became the largest naval ship to be homeported there since World War II.

1 Sep - At the Military Armistice Commission Meeting, the UN Senior Member protested the premeditated and unprovoked act of aggression by North Korea on 26 August when it launched an SA-2 SAM at a USAF reconnaissance plane. The UNC warned it would take whatever measures were necessary to insure the safety of aircraft and crews in future operations.

2 Sep - Former Prime Minister (in the Pol Pot government) Khieu Samphan, former Prime Minister (in the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk) Son Sann, and former King and chief of state Sihanouk met in Singapore to form a coalition against the Vietnamese-controlled Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea.

5 Sep - Two Afghan MIG-17s reportedly crossed into Pakistani airspace and strafed a border post, wounding two civilians.

10 Sep - A task force of four Soviet naval vessels under close watch by the U.S. Navy headed away from Hawaiian waters after steaming through the 30-mile-wide channel separating the islands of Maui and Hawaii.

- North Korean troops opened fire across the eastern end of the DMZ in the fifth border flareup of the year.

14 Sep - The State Department said the United States had obtained physical evidence of the use in Kampuchea of at least three lethal mycotoxins of the trichothecene group. The possession and use of toxins would be a violation of both the 1925 Geneva protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The United States expressed its concern to the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Laotian governments.

- Kunsan AB, Korea, received its first contingent of F-16 fighters. By April 1982 a total of 48 of these new jets

were scheduled to replace an equal number of F-4D Phantoms at Kunsan and Taegu.

15 Sep - The new South Pacific island nation of Vanuatu became the 155th member of the United Nations. Formerly known as the Anglo-French condominium of New Hebrides, Vanuatu attained its independence on 30 July 1980.

16 Sep - Pakistan formally agreed to a U.S. plan of a 6-year $3.2 billion economic assistance and military sales package.

17 Sep - The new U.S. Ambassador to China, Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., assumed his post in Beijing. He was formerly the Ambassador to Pakistan.

20 Sep - The Philippine Navy frigate DATU KALANTIAO (former USS BOOTH (DE-170)) was forced aground and capsized during Typhoon CLARA on a shoal off Calayan Island, 300 miles north of Manila. USS MOUNT HOOD (AE-29) steamed from Subic Bay and USN helicopters from Cubi Point and USAF helicopters from Clark assisted in the rescue of 18 survivors. More than 40 Philippine Navy sailors were killed.

23 Sep - A fire broke out in the vertical passage of the carrier USS AMERICA (CV-66), operating in the Indian Ocean, but ship firefighters put out the flames before anyone was injured.

25 Sep - LT GEN James B. Vaught, USA, assumed command of the Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.), vice LT GEN Eugene P. Forrester, who became the Commander, U.S. Army Western Command.

29 Sep - The DOD released a 99-page report on the Soviet military buildup and the need for the United States and its NATO allies to modernize their defense forces to meet the Soviet challenge.

30 Sep - The International Olympic Committee selected Seoul, Korea, as the site for the 1988 Summer Olympics.

2 Oct - President Reagan announced a five-point program to revitalize U.S. strategic forces to include: improvement in communications and control systems; modernization of strategic bombers; deployment of new submarine-launched missiles; step-by-step plan to improve the strength and accuracy of new land-based missiles, and to lessen their vulnerability; and improvements in strategic defenses.

5 Oct - Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon visited Washington, 5-8 October.

- Japan and the United States began a 4-day combined air drill in southwestern Japan with nearly 1,700 personnel taking part. JASDF mobilized 1,600 members and 38 F-104J and 4 F-4EJ fighter planes at Nyutabaru AB in Kyushu, while about 80 Americans arrived from Okinawa and Tokyo with 6 F-15 fighters and a C-130 transport plane.

6 Oct - Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated while watching a military parade commemorating the 1973 war against Israel. Funeral services on 9 October were attended by a U.S. delegation including former Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter.

7 Oct - The Egyptian Parliament unanimously nominated Vice President Hosni Mubarak to succeed Sadat.

8 Oct - The DOD announced that President Reagan had approved the construction in Michigan and Wisconsin of a new system for communication with submerged submarines.

13 Oct - An explosion occurred in an underground jet fuel tank at the U.S. Forces' Koshiba oil depot in Yokohama, injuring at least two Japanese firefighters and forcing the evacuation of about 2,800 residents in the area.

- Marines of the SEVENTH Fleet stormed ashore at a beach in southeast Thailand in the first combined U.S.-Thai military exercise in 18 months. Some 800 Marines, 500 Navy personnel, and two gunships participated for the United States.

14 Oct - The House of Representatives voted not to approve President Reagan's proposed sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

- The United States sent two AWACS planes to Egypt to show U.S. commitment to Egyptian and Sudanese security. They began patrolling the Egyptian-Libyan border on the 15th.

20 Oct - Australian Defence Minister Denis J. Killen announced that over the next ten years his government would purchase 75 F-18A Hornet fighter planes worth $3 billion from the United States.

22 Oct - President Reagan and leaders from 21 other nations attended the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development in Cancun, Mexico, 22-23 October.

27 Oct - More than 1,000 Marines of the 31st MAU, SEVENTH Fleet Amphibious Force, engaged in maneuvers on the central Queensland coast on the third day of KANGAROO 81, a 2-week, 20,000-man combined exercise with Australia and New Zealand.

28 Oct - The DOD announced that the United States had cut its carrier force in the Indian Ocean to a single battle group for the first time in nearly two years.

- The Senate voted to approve the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

- The State Department announced that the two AWACS planes deployed to Egypt were being withdrawn.

- The U.S. Agency for International Development reported that Burma had signed an economic assistance agreement for $30 million in aid. This was the first time since 1966 that the Burmese government had accepted a significant amount of aid from the United States.

29 Oct - Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua made an official visit to Washington, D.C., 29-30 October.

2 Nov - The United States announced that it had agreed separately with Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman to hold a 3-week coordinated exercise in the Southwest Asia region. The operation, BRIGHT STAR 82, would be conducted in coordination with each host nation by elements deploying from Navy and Marine Corps units operating in the Indian Ocean.

9 Nov - The first U.S. troops arrived in Egypt for BRIGHT STAR 82.

- The Burmese Parliament selected U San Yu to succeed President Ne Win, who retired because of ill health. Ne Win remained as chairman of the Burma Socialist Program Party.

- A USN P-3C accidentally dropped flares near a 230,000-ton Liberian-registered tanker operated by a Japanese company in waters off Shikoku.

11 Nov - The first TRIDENT submarine, USS OHIO (SSBN-726), was commissioned at Groton, CT. OHIO was expected to arrive in the Pacific Command in 1982.

12 Nov - The space shuttle COLUMBIA was launched on its second flight from Cape Canaveral. Its planned mission was cut short because of the failure of a fuel cell, but a successful

landing was made on Rogers Dry Lake, Edwards AFB, on 14 November.

13 Nov - The U.S. Navy paid nearly $400,000 to the family of the captain of the sunken NISSHO MARU, killed when the Japanese freighter was rammed by the submarine GEORGE WASHINGTON in April. The Navy previously paid over $300,000 to the survivors of the first mate.

- Defense Secretary Weinberger told Hawaii's governor that the DOD could not allow joint military-civilian use of Wheeler AFB and that the state would have to look elsewhere for a new general aviation facility.

15 Nov - Acting Chief of State Abdus Sattar won the Presidential election in Bangladesh.

18 Nov - Addressing officers from 18 countries at the Fifth Pacific Armies Management Seminar in Manila, Admiral Long said the United States was strengthening its forces against steady Soviet expansionism in the Asia-Pacific region.

- The U.N. General Assembly renewed its demand in a resolution that Soviet troops leave Afghanistan--the third such vote since Moscow's intervention in December 1979.

20 Nov - Speaking in Hong Kong, Admiral Long urged friendly nations to join the United States in resisting Soviet economic, political, and military threats, saying recent events had demonstrated that the United States could not go it alone in this endeavor. Shared vital interests were at stake and had to be protected, he said.

21 Nov - The Navy said that a U.S. antisubmarine patrol plane accidentally dropped two smoke markers 12 days before in a busy sea lane off southern Japan, forcing a fully loaded oil tanker to take evasive action.

23 Nov - The city of Naha, capital of Okinawa Prefecture, filed a suit against the Japanese government seeking the immediate return of land being used as a U.S. military base there.

24 Nov - Typhoon IRMA struck the Philippines northeast of Manila with maximum winds of 95 knots, causing over 100 deaths and extensive property damage.

26 Nov - The Seychelles armed forces put down a coup attempt by more than 100 mercenaries, mostly from South Africa and (former)

Rhodesia. Some of the rebels hijacked an Air India jet to South Africa, where they were arrested. Most of them were later released.

3 Dec - Former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann met with State Department officials in Washington, seeking military and financial aid for his anti-communist campaign. The United States reaffirmed its position that it would not provide military aid to any insurgent group.

7 Dec - In Hawaii, a solemn, low-key ceremony marked the 40th anniversary of the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral James D. Watkins, CINCPACFLT, delivered the keynote address.

11 Dec - Admiral Long arrived in Rangoon for a 3-day private visit to Burma and to meet with defense officials in this rigidly neutralist state. Despite CINCPAC's position as the highest U.S. military commander in the Pacific, his visit was very low-keyed and Embassy officials said no special significance could be attached to the visit, which they described as a routine swing through the area.

12 Dec - The carrier USS MIDWAY and the cruiser USS REEVES (CG-24) called at the U.S. Naval Station at Sasebo in southern Japan, following a Navy statement that SEVENTH Fleet vessels would call more frequently at this port, which faces the Korea Strait. MIDWAY was homeported at Yokosuka, near Tokyo.

- Japanese defense officials said their officers, for the first time, would fly aboard American AWACS planes during a combined U.S.-Japan exercise scheduled to begin on 21 December around Okinawa and southern Japan. In addition to the AWACS, Japanese F-104 fighters and U.S. F-15 intercepters would participate in the 3-day exercise.

13 Dec - Poland's Prime Minister and Communist Party leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, announced the imposition of martial law in that country.

16 Dec - Chinese and Japanese officials signed a $1.6 billion agreement under which Japan would provide China with financial aid for key industrial projects.

16 Dec - The 2d Infantry Division in Korea received its final 8 of 38 M198, 155mm towed howitzers, the Army's newest long-range artillery, in a conversion program begun in 1979.

17 Dec - Japan's Air Self-Defense Force inaugurated its first F-15 interceptor squadron at Nyutabaru AB in southern Japan.

18 Dec - Conversion of the 2d Infantry Division's 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, from AH-1G attack helicopters to AH-1S TOW missile models was completed with delivery of the last of the 30 new aircraft.

- COMNAVFORJAPAN presented a settlement check to the Kobe Navigation Service Company, completing all claims against the U.S. Government resulting from the accidental sinking of the NISSHO MARU.

20 Dec - The Japanese government made public its FY 82 budget, which included $11.7 billion for military spending, an increase of 7.75 percent over 1981.

22 Dec - A Navy task force led by USS MIDWAY was sailing back to Japan after a brief operational sortie in Korean waters. This was ordered in response to unannounced major North Korean maneuvers which "seriously concerned" U.S. commanders in the ROK and also kept AWACS aircraft from Okinawa flying over the peninsula. The U.N. delegate to the Korean Armistice Commission proposed to the communists that prior notice be given in the future to preclude miscalculations.

25 Dec - The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force's first P-3C anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft arrived in Japan.

- Typhoon LEE hit the Philippines with maximum winds of 90 knots, resulting in 137 people killed, 782 injured, and some 500,000 made homeless.

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GLOSSARY

A

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAW	Antiair Warfare
AB	Air Base
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACC	Air Component Command
AD	Air Division; Destroyer Tender
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AE	Ammunition Ship
AF/IN	USAF Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFR	Air Force Regulation
AFRED	Air Force Readiness Command
AFS	Combat Store Ship
AFSAT	Air Force Satellite
AFSATCOM	Air Force Satellite Communications System
AGI	Intelligence Collection Ship (Soviet)
AGM	Air-to-Ground Missile
AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance
AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
AINTELG	Air Intelligence Group
AIT	Advanced Individual Training
AJFK	Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (U.S.)
AMCC	Ashore Mobility Contingency Communications
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMMC	Aviation Materiel Management Center
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)
AO	Oiler
AOR	Replenishment Oiler
AR	Repair Ship
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
AS	Submarine Tender
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD (ISA)	ASD (International Security Affairs)
ASD (MRA&L)	ASD (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics)
ASO	Air Staff Office
ASROC	Antisubmarine Rocket
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATTG	Automated Tactical Target Graphics
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System

B

BADGE	Base Air Defense Ground Environment (System, Japan)
BE	Basic Encyclopedia
BLA	Base Labor Agreement
BOM	By Other Means

C

C	Confidential
C3	Command, Control, and Communications
C3S	Command, Control, and Communications Systems
CACC	Combined Forces Command Air Component Commander
CAMHS	Compact Automated Message Handling System
CAOCC	Combined Combat Air Operations Coordination Center
CCOP/SOPAC	Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in the South Pacific
CDIP	Combined Defense Improvement Projects
CDR	Consolidated Data Report
CDRWESTCOM	Commander U.S. Army Western Command
CE	COPE ELITE
CFC	Combined Federal Campaign; Combined Forces Command (Korea)
CG	Civil Guard; Coast Guard; Commanding General
CGN	Guided Missile Cruiser (nuclear propulsion)
CHJUSMAG	Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHMDAO	Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office
CHODC	Chief Office of Defense Cooperation
CHUSDLG	Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group
CILHI	Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCADC	CINC Aerospace Defense Command
CINCCFC	CINC Combined Forces Command
CINCLANT	CINC Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT	CINC U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCPAC	CINC Pacific
CINCPACAF	CINC Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	CINC U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	CINCPAC Instruction
CINCPACNOTE	CINCPAC Notice
CINCPACREP	CINCPAC Representative
CINCPACREPPHIL	CINCPACREP Philippines
CINCSAC	CINC Strategic Air Command
CINCUNC	CINC United Nations Command
CIQ	Customs, Immigration and Quarantine
CMS	Communications Security Material System
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations

COINS	Community On-line Intelligence Systems
COM	Command(er)
COMAAC	Commander Alaskan Air Command
COMIDEASTFOR	Commander Middle East Force
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
COMNAVFOR	Commander Naval Forces
COMNAVFORJAPAN	Commander Naval Forces Japan
COMNAVFORKOREA	Commander Naval Forces Korea
COMNAVMARIANAS	Commander Naval Forces Marianas
COMRDJTF	Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMSUBPAC	Commander Submarine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
COMUNCAIRCOMP	UNC Air Component Commander
COMUS	Commander United States Forces
COMUSJAPAN	Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUSKOREA	Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSNAVPHIL	Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines
COMWESTPACNORTH	Commander Western Pacific North
CONPLAN	Concept Plan (operation plan in concept format)
CONUS	Continental United States
CPA	Closest Point of Approach
CPD	Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid)
CPFL	Contingency Planning Facilities List
CPIC	Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft
CPICK	COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea
CPM	Communist Party of Malaysia
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRT	Cathode Ray Tube
CTAN	CINCPAC Teletype Alert Network
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CVBG	Carrier Battle Group
CVW	Carrier Air Wing

D

DACT	Dissimilar Air Combat Training
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DATT	Defense Attache
DBMS	Data Base Management System
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DD	Destroyer
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer

DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEFPLAN	Defense Plan
DEFSMAC	Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center
DF	Direction Finding
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs; Designated Field Activity
DFAA	Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan)
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAOLS	Defense Intelligence Agency On-line System
DISAM	Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DP	Delegated Producer
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSMAC	Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation

E

EALG	East Asia Liaison Group
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
E&E	Emergency and Evacuation; Evasion and Escape
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EML	Environmental and Morale Leave
EMP	Electromagnetic Pulse
ENTPS	Expanded Near Term Pre-positioning Ship
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESC	Electronic Security Command
ESCAP	Economic and Scientific Commission on Asia and the Pacific
EUCOM	European Command
EUSA	Eighth U.S. Army
EW	Early Warning; Electronic Warfare
EX	Exclusive (for)

F

FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
F/AIF	Field/Automated Installation Intelligence File
FANG	Forward Area Neutralization Graphic
FDM	Frequency Division Multiplex
FFCEA	Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Association
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FIP	Facilities Improvement Plan; Force Improvement Plan
FISC	Fleet Intelligence Support Center
FLTSATCOM	Fleet Satellite Communication
FMS	Field Maintenance Squadron; Foreign Military Sales

FOSIC	Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center
FOSIF	Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility
FRD	Formerly Restricted Data
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
FTD	Field Training Detachment; Foreign Technology Division (AFSC)
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GAO	General Accounting Office
GDS	General Declassification Schedule
GLCM	Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
GNP	Gross National Product
GO	Government of, followed by initial of country concerned, e.g., GOP - Government of the Philippines
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Force (Japan)
GSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GSO	Ground Staff Office (Japan)

H

HANKAM	Indonesian Department of Defense and Security
HARTS	Hardened Artillery Site
HAWS	Hawaii Area Wideband System
HEMP	High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
HF	High Frequency
HNS	Host Nation Support
HST	Helicopter Support Team
HTACC	Hardened Tactical Air Control Center
HUMINT	Human Resources Intelligence

I

IBM	International Business Machines
IDHSC	Intelligence Data Handling System Communications
IEC	Intelligence Exchange Conference
IHA	Indirect-hire Agreement
IMETP	International Military Education and Training Program
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IMP	Interface Message Processor; Inventory Management Plan
INDOCOM	Indonesia Communications
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command (U.S. Army)
IPAC	Intelligence Center Pacific
IPR	Intelligence Production Request
IRCP	Integrated Relocation Construction Program
IRS	Internal Revenue Service

ISDCA	International Security and Development Cooperation Act
I&W	Indications and Warning

J

JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCMC	Joint Crisis Management Capability
JCMPO	Joint Cruise Missile Planning Office
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Japan Defense Agency; Joint Deployment Agency
JFY	Japan Fiscal Year (1 April-31 March)
JGSDF	Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force
JINTACCS	Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
JLPC	Joint Labor Policy Committee (PACOM)
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JRSC	Joint Resistant Secure Communications
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSO	Joint Staff Office (Japan)
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
JUSMAGK	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

K

KA	Kenya Army
KAIS	Korean Air Intelligence System
KCRS	Korean Contingency Resupply/Redistribution System
KN	Kenya Navy
KTACS	Korean Tactical Air Control System

L

LAMPS	Light Airborne Multi-purpose System
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LANTFLT	U.S. Atlantic Fleet
LCC	Amphibious Command Ship
LHA	Amphibious Assault Ship (general purpose)
LKA	Amphibious Cargo Ship
LOA	Letter of Offer/Acceptance
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LOW	Law of War
LP	Licensed Production; Liberal Party (Philippines)
LPD	Amphibious Transport Dock

LPDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LPH	Amphibious Assault Ship (helicopter)
LSD	Dock Landing Ship
LST	Tank Landing Ship

M

MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MABS	Marine Air Base Squadron
MAC	Military Airlift Command; Military Armistice Commission
MACCS	Marine Air Command and Control System
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAP	Maritime Air Patrol; Military Assistance Program
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MBA	Military Bases Agreement
MBF	Military Banking Facility
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCI	Meal, Combat Individual; Military Customs Inspector
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office (Japan)
MDB	Mutual Defense Board
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEECN	Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MERADCOM	Mobility Equipment Research and Development Command
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MFP	Major Force Program
MIA	Missing in Action
MIDEASTFOR	Middle East Force
MIG	Military Intelligence Group
MILCON	Military Construction
MJCS	Memorandum issued in the name of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MODLOC	Modified Location
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOGAS	Automotive Gasoline
MOMAG	Mine Operations Maintenance Advisory Group
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRL	Master Requirement List
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japan)
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MWWU	USMC Wing Weapons Unit

N

NAF	Nonappropriated Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVRESSO	Navy Resale and Services Support Office

NAVSEEACTPAC	Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific
NCA	National Command Authority
NCPS	Nuclear Contingency Planning System
NDP	National Disclosure Policy
NEMVAC	Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NF	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NHPA	National Historic Preservation Act
NKCP	Northern Kalimantan Communist Party (Malaysia)
NKTTL	North Korea Tactical Target List
NM	Nautical Mile
NOCONTRACT	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOG	National Security Agency Pacific Operations Group
NOK	Next of Kin
NPA	New People's Army
NPS	National Public Service (Japan)
NPW	Nuclear-powered Warship
NRT	Near-real Time
NSA	National Security Adviser; National Security Agency
NSO	Non-SIOP Option
NTDS	Navy Tactical Data System
NTPS	Near Term Pre-positioning Ship
NUWEP	Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy

O

OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/PA	OASD/Public Affairs
OCR	Optical Character Reader
ODR	Office of the Defense Representative
OJ	OPPORTUNE JOURNEY
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMADP	Office Military Attache for Defense Programs
OOD	Officer of the Deck
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation(s) Order
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

P

P&A	Price and Availability
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACCAT	PACOM Command and Control AUTODIN Terminal

PACFLT	United States Pacific Fleet
PACNAVFACENGCOM	Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACOPS	Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff
PACTIDS	Pacific Theater Intelligence Data System
PAF	Pakistan Air Force; Philippine Air Force
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PASOLS	Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar
PASSEX	Passing Exercise
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PCIL	PACOM Contingency Installation List
PCR	Program Change Request
PCS	Permanent Change of Station; Postal Courier Service
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PGF	Patrol Ships (North Korea)
PN	Pakistan Navy; Philippine Navy
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNPG	PACOM Nuclear Planning Group
POE	Port of Embarkation
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POMCUS	Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets
P&R	Planning and Review
PRC	People's Republic of China; Policy Review Committee
PRS	PACOM Remote System
PSAA	Pacific Special Activity Area
PTG	Guided Missile Patrol Boat (USSR)
PWR	Pre-positioned War Reserves
PWRM	Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel
PWRMR	Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel Requirements

Q

QRT	Quick Reaction Terminal

R

RAA	Royal Australian Army
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
REDCOM	U.S. Readiness Command
REVW	Review (for classification)
RMN	Royal Malaysian Navy
RNZA	Royal New Zealand Army
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy

ROC	Required Operational Capability
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKAF	ROK Air Force
ROKIT	ROK Indigenous Tank
RO/RO	Roll On/Roll Off
RT	Reconnaissance Team
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTG	Reconnaissance Technical Group; Royal Thai Government
RTN	Royal Thai Navy

S

S	Secret
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAGA	Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAO	Security Assistance Organization
SAS	Sealed Authentication System
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SCC	Security Consultative Committee (Japan)
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting (Korea)
SEAL	Sea, Air, Land (Team)
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SHF	Super High Frequency
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SITREP	Situation Report
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLOC	Sea Line(s) of Communication
SOAF	Sultanate of Oman Air Force
SON	Sultunate of Oman Navy
SOPAC	South Pacific
SOSUS	Sound Surveillance System
SP	Self-Propelled
SPINTCOMM	Special Intelligence Communications
SRF	Ship Repair Facility
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarine (nuclear-powered)
SSGN	Guided Missile Submarine (nuclear-powered)
SSC	Security Consultative Committee Subcommittee (Japan)
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSO	Special Security Office
Subj	Subject
SW	Special Weapons; Strategic Wing
SWA	Southwest Asia

T

TAC	Tactical; Tactical Air Command; Tactical Air Control
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACAMO	Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting
TAG	Target Action Group
TCC	Total Compensation Comparability
TCN	Third Country National
TDI	Target Data Inventory
TDY	Temporary Duty
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TIAS	Treaties and other International Acts Series
TI/TM	Target Intelligence/Target Material
TMPS	Theater Mission Planning System
TNF	Theater Nuclear Force
TNFIS	Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study
TOA	Transportation Operating Agency
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPICK	Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications Korea
TRAP	Tanks, Racks, Adapters, and Pylons; Tracker Analysis Program
TS	Top Secret
TSS	Traffic Separation Scheme
TTM	Tactical Target Materials
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TUCHA	Type, Unit, Characteristics

U

U	Unclassified
UDT	Underwater Demolition Team
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UNC	United Nations Command
UNCMAC	United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission
USA	United States of America; United States Army
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces, Europe
USAITIC-PAC	U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Theater Intelligence Center Pacific
USASA	U.S. Army Security Agency
USASAC	U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief U.S. European Command
USCS	U.S. Customs Service
USDAO	U.S. Defense Attache Office
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command

USFJ	U.S. Forces Japan
USFK	U.S. Forces Korea
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USN	U.S. Navy
USREDCOM	U.S. Readiness Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW	Unconventional Warfare

V

VHF	Very High Frequency
VIP	Very Important Person
VLF	Very Low Frequency
V/STOL	Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing
VTOL	Vertical Take-off and Landing

W

WESTCOM	Western Command
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WESTPACNORTH	Western Pacific North
WIS	Weaponeering Information Sheet
WNINTEL	Warning Notice-Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
WRSA	War Reserve Stocks for Allies
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

INDEX[1]

(U) Volumes I and II are integrated in this index. Annexes to the CINCPAC History are not included as each contains its own index. The volumes are paginated consecutively. Volume I contains Chapters I-IV, pages 1-318. Volume II contains Chapters V-XI, pages 319-636 and the glossary.

A

A-10 beddown in Korea, 367
Afghanistan, Soviets in, 101-103
Airborne Command Post. See CINCPAC Airborne Command Post
Airborne Warning and Control System. See AWACS
Air Component Command, Korea, 30-32
Air defense, Japan, 481-483
Alcohol and drug abuse, 515
Aleutians, 208-209
Alternate Command Post. See CINCPAC Alternate Command Post
American Institute in Taiwan, 335-336, 349-350
American Express labor dispute, 521-523
American Samoa, U.S. Navy port visit, 248
Ammunition, 329-335
Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance, 378, 398-399, 419, 455
ANZUS
  communications interoperability, 485
  exercises, 143-144, 599-600, 612
  meetings, 141-145
  SOFA, 599
APACHE, 491-495
Arms Transfer Policy, 371-375
Army. See U.S. Army
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 387-389
  status of, 82-83
  threat to, 60-61, 81-82
ASWEX, 303-304
Australia
  analyst exchange, 210
  ANZUS meetings, 141-145
  B-52 operations, 254-257
  exercises, 143-144
  Foreign Military Sales, 374, 391
  Foreign Military Sales Office, 391
  labor affairs, 525
AUTODIN, 465

---

1. All individual entries are unclassified. See Letter of Promulgation.

AUTOVON upgrade on Oahu, 488-489
Automated Installation Intelligence File, 556-558
Awards
  DOD, 516-517
  PACOM, 517
  Korean, 516-517

B

B-52
  capability, 210-211
  Diego Garcia, 257-258, 362-365
  operations, 253-261
BADGE, 481-483
Bangladesh
  FMS, 393-395
Base Labor Agreement, Philippines, 520-521
BEACON COMPASS, 311
BEACON FLASH, 314-314
BEACON SOUTH, 311-312
Bilateral plans. See CINCPAC plans
BLUE EAGLE. See CINCPAC Airborne Command Post
Budget, PACOM, 589-590
Burma
  IMET, 397
  insurgency, 93

C

Carrier Battle Groups, Indian Ocean, 221-226
Casualty Resolution. See Joint Casualty Resolution Center
Ceylon. See Sri Lanka
Chairman, JCS
  Posture Statement, 109-110
  Visitor's program, 212-213
Chemical munitions, 333
Chemical Warfare, 206
China, People's Republic of
  dispute with Soviet Union, 59, 60
  security relationship, 173-178
China, Republic of. See Taiwan
CINC C2 Initiative Funds, 462-464
CINCPAC
  Airborne Command Post, 272-273, 470-471
  Alternate Command Post, 461-462
  Augmentation of RDJTF, 136-140
  Command Center, 461
  distinguished visitors to, 577-588
  initiatives, 166, 173, 198, 202-204

Joint Manpower Program, 20
Key staff personnel, 15-16
Official Activities, 571-588
Plans, 121-139
5000/5001, 128-131, 322-325
5027, 131-132, 320-322, 329, 343, 352
5040, 132-133
5098
5099, 133-134
5122, 134-136
bilateral planning, 151-154
capability to execute, 217-219
list, 121-128
Report of major issues and activities, 181-182
Representative, Southwest Pacific, 24-25
speeches, 577-588
staff personnel changes, 15-16,
testimony before Congressional Armed Services Committee, 110-111
threat assessment, 55-61
trips, 571-577
Weapons Release Review Board, 387-398, 458-459
CPICK, 479-481
Civilian personnel. See personnel
Collision of U.S. submarine with Japanese freighter, 281-284
Combined Forces Command. See Korea, Republic of, Combined Forces Command
COMFY LEVI, 541-542
Command Centers, 461-462
Command and Control, 461-475
Command relationships, 23-25, 29-36
Communications
ANZUS interoperability, 485
Indian Ocean, 194
Intelligence Data Handling System, 532-534
interoperability, 477-485
Japan, 483-485
Korea, 478-481
monitoring, 500-501
Near Term Pre-positioning Ships, 489-490
networks
PACOM Data Systems Center, 529-532
radio frequency management, 487-488
security, 479-481, 483-485, 497-502
SPINTCOM, 534-535
Conferences
Customs, 513
Intelligence, 565-568
Legal, 602-603
PASOLS, 383-385

POL, 337-340
Security Assistance, 382-383
Confinement statistics, 597
Congressional Presentation Document, 378, 398-399, 419, 455
Construction
Diego Garcia, 362-365
Japan, 367-368
Contingency Fund for CINCPAC Initiatives, 202-204
Continuing Resolution Authority, 371
COPE ELITE, 315-316
COPE THUNDER, 304-305
Coproduction
Japan, 372, 413-416
Cost of Living Allowance, 527
Criminal Jurisdiction, U.S. Forces overseas, 597-598
Crisis Action System, 319
Cruise missiles, planning, 188-197, 554-555
Customs programs, 512-514, 593
military inspectors, 512-514
report, 514

D

Defense Guidance, 111-117
Deputy Commander in Chief Pacific/Chief of Staff, 20
Defense Nuclear Agency, Memorandum of Agreement, 25
Defense Resources Board, 112, 115, 343
Diego Garcia
billeting, 361
civilian pay at, 526-527
construction, 362-365
offshore labor, 134-136, 526-527
security, 134-136, 358-359
threat to, 96
Djibouti, 270-271
Drug abuse, 515

E

East Asia Liaison Group, 201-202
Electromagnetic pulse, hardening to, 491-495
Environmental laws, 600-602
Environmental and Morale Leave, 509-510
Exercise evaluation function transferred to IG, 318
Exercises, 293-318 See also individual names of exercises
Expanded Near Term Pre-positioning Ships, 357-358
Extradition Treaty, 594-597

F

F-16s, 387-388, 391, 422-425, 436-437, 457-458
Facilities
  Diego Garcia, 362
  Japan, 368
Fiji,
  Peacekeeping Force, 399-402
  security assistance, 399
FOAL EAGLE, 298
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 597-598
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) See also individual countries
FOREST BLADE, 301-302
FOREVER GONE, 316
FRESH THUNDER, 275-279

G

GAO Survey, 354
GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) collision with NISSHO MARU, 281-284
GLAD CUSTOMER, 254-257
Global Strategy, 117
GONFALON, 310-311
GOPHER BROKE, 301
GONZO, 314-315
Guam
  homeporting U.S. Navy ship, 250-251
  land use plan, 53-54

H

HARPOON, 388-9, 438
Hawaii Area Wideband System, 496-497
Heavy MAB, 356-357, 362
Homeporting, U.S. Navy ships, 250-251
Hong Kong, U.S. Navy port visit, 248
Hydrographic Survey Work, 145

I

IMET. See Security Assistance and individual countries
Immigration, 593
India
  dispute with Pakistan, 97-99
  military relations, 178-179
  nuclear developments, 99-100
  Security Assistance, 403-405
  Soviet aid to, 97

visits, 178-179
Indian Ocean
bases, 46
communications, 474-475
operations, 233-241
Soviet threat, 95-103
U.S. military presence, 221-225
Indonesia
Security Assistance, 407-412
aircraft, 409
ship overhaul, 409-410
training, 407-408
threat to, 90-91
Insurgency
Burma, 93
Malaysia, 90
Philippines, 92
Thailand, 87-88
Intelligence
Automated Installation Intelligence File, 556-558
beach, 144, 563-564
collection management, 537-546
cruise missile planning, 554-555
Data Handling System, 532-534
exchange conferences, 565-568
exchange, 563-569
HUMINT collection program, 544-546
order of battle, 558-559
PACOM Data Systems Center, 529-532
production, 547-561
SPINTCOM, 534-535
support for RDJTF, 559-561
systems management, 529-535
targeting, 547-554
weaponeering, 555-556
International Security and Development Cooperation Act, 374-375, 408, 438

J

Japan
air defense control, 481-483
B-52 operations, 259-261
bilateral planning with U.S., 148-156
communications security, 483-485
construction, 367-369
defense cooperation, 148-156
Defense Agency, 156-157
direct hire, 523-524

facilities improvement, 368
Indirect Hire Agreement, 523-524
JMSDF Annual Exercise, 302-303
labor affairs, 523-524
licensed production, 413-416
Northern Territories issue, 69-71
port visits, U.S. Navy, 247-248
Sanno Hotel, 369
security assistance, 374, 413-416
Self-Defense Force, 72-73
Staff Office visit, 157-158
Subcommittee of the SCC, 154-156
System and Technology Forum, 158-160, 414
threat to, 69-73
Total Compensation Comparability, 519-524
Joint Casualty Resolution Center, 284-289
Joint Crisis Management Capability Program, 471
Joint Deployment Agency, 319-325
Joint Manpower Program, 20, 197
Joint Operation Planning System, 319-325
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 117-120, 319-325, 329

K

Kahoolawe, 601-602
KANGAROO, 307-310
Kenya, 366
Korea, North
exercise activity, U.S. reaction to, 279-281
infiltration, 77
mine warfare capability, 76-77
SAM firing at SR-71, 78, 275-279
threat, 73-79
tunnels under the DMZ, 77-78
Korea, Republic of
A-10s
beddown, 367
airlines, 352-353
Combined Forces Command, 29-41
Air Component Command, 30-32
OPCON of forces, 32-36
communications, 478-479
communications security, 479-481
flag shipping, 352
Force Improvement Plan, 419-420, 424
forces and basing, 29-41
local national employees, 520
logistic concept, 353

political situation, 29
security assistance, 417-418
aircraft, 422-425
howitzers, 427-428
ships, 428
tanks, 426-427
Third Country Sales, 420-422
Security Consultative Meeting, 29, 34, 366, 421-422
SORAK, 39-41
threat to, 73-79
U.S. Forces and basing, 29-41
Kuril Islands, 69-71
Kwajalein Missile Range, 50

L

Laos
repatriation of remains from, 285-288
U.S. offer of ordnance removal, 288-289
Legal Conference, 602-603
Licensed production
Japan, 413-416
Logistics
readiness, 329
Lualualei, 600-601

M

Macau, 600
Madascar's economic problems, 179-180
Malaysia
PACOM initiatives, 166-169
security assistance, 429-431
aircraft, 429-430
manning, 429
threat to, 89-90
MAP, See also Security Assistance
Philippines, 378, 445, 446-447
Representation Funds, 590-591
Mariana Islands. See Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Master Requirements List, 199-201
MEKAR, 306
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Mid-East Force
Commander as USDR, 25-26
operational command of, 230-231
Military Assistance Program. See Security Assistance and individual countries
Philippines, 378, 445-447

Military Bases Agreement, Philippines, 169-172
Military Civil Action Teams, 52-53
Military Customs Program, 512-514
Military personnel. See Personnel
MINEX, 306
MINSK, Soviet aircraft carrier, 65-66
Munitions
  PACOM Storage, 337

N

National War College student visit, 212-213
Navigational freedom, 243-246
Near Term Pre-positioning Ships, 356-359
  ammunition, 334-345
  communications, 489-490
  maintenance, 345-346, 359
  POL, 344-347
New Zealand
  ANZUS meetings, 141-143
  nuclear-powered warship visits, 249-250
  security assistance, 374, 433
NIGHT BLUE, 318
NISSHO MARU collision with USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598), 281-284
North Korea. See Korea, North
Nuclear weapon
  allocations, 182-183
  doctrine, 183-187
  deployment, 183
  Force Improvement Study, 183-187
  recode, 221
  weaponeering, 555-556

O

Oceanographic Research in South Pacific, 146-148
Official Activities of the CINC, 571-588
Offshore Labor - Diego Garcia, 526-527
Oman, 47-48, 268-269, 366
Operational Control of Forces, 32-36
Operations. See also individual names of operations
  Indian Ocean, 233-241
OPLANS, CINCPAC. See CINCPAC Plans
OPPORTUNE JOURNEY, 315-316

P

P-3 maritime air patrol operations, 268-272

Pacific Area Senior Officers Logistics Seminar, 383-385
Pacific Command
  basing study, 53-54
  command and control system, 461-464
  Legal Conference, 602-603
  Master Requirements List, 199-201
  Military Customs Conference, 513
  personnel deficiencies, 509
  personnel strengths, 1
  Petroleum Logistics Conference, 344
  readiness, 215-220
  Security Assistance Conference, 382-383
  Service initiatives
  WRSA, 330
Pacific Stars and Stripes, 606-607
PACOM Data Systems Center, 529-532
Pakistan
  P-3 operations, 271-271
  security assistance, 374, 431-441
    equipment requirements, 436-441
    aircraft, 436-437
    ships, 440-441
  threat to, 97-99, 100-101
Papua New Guinea,
  security assistance, 443
  U.S. Navy port visits, 248-249
Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program, 261-266
Pearl Harbor, anniversary of 605-606
Personnel
  augmentation of RDJTF, 136-140
  awards, 516-517
  Cost of Living Allowance, 527
  deficiencies, 509
  Environmental and Morale Leave, 509-510
  local national employees, 519-526
    Japan, 523-524
    Korea, 520
    Philippines, 520-521
  manpower changes, Hq CINCPAC staff, 20, 197
  performance, civilian, 528
  position classification control, 527
  third country nationals, 525
  Total Compensation Comparability, 519-524
Petroleum, oil, lubricants, 321-322, 324
  Conference, 344-345
  deficiencies, 338
  issues in the PACOM, 337, 339
  standard bulk petroleum prices, 338

storage facilities 338, 341-344
Taiwan, 349-350
Thailand, 348-349
U-Tapao, 348-349
Philippines, Republic of
American Express Labor Dispute, 521-523
armed forces, 92-93
B-52 operations, 258-259
Base Labor Agreement, 520-522
Bases, U.S.
compensation for
customs, immigration, and quarantine, 593
Extradition Treaty, 594-597
homeporting U.S. Navy ship, 250
immigration, 593
internal security, 92-93
MAP, 378, 446-447
Military Bases Agreement, 169-172, 521
Mutual Defense Board, 172-173
quarantine, 593
Rossi v. Brown decision on preferential hiring, 597
severance pay, 521
security assistance, 445-447
aircraft, 445-446
sick leave benefits, 521
Total Compensation Comparability, 520
Planning. See CINCPAC Plans
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 111-117
POL. See Petroleum, oil, lubricants
Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning, 117-120
Political Adviser, 201
POLL STATION, 317-318
POLO HAT, 316-317
PONY EXPRESS, 266-267
Port visits, U.S. Navy, 233-243, 247-250
POTENT PUNCH, 298-300, 326-327, 599
Posture statement, CJCS; CINCPAC input to, 109-110
POW/MIA resolution efforts, 284-289
Pre-position War Reserve Materiel, 338
Public Affairs functions
CINCPAC official activities, 571-588
distinguished visitors, 577-588
Pacific Stars and Stripes, 606

Q

Quarantine, Philippines, 593
Quarterly Reports, 181-182

R

Radio frequency management, 487-488
Rapid Deployment Joint Tast Force, support for, 136-140, 559-561, 358, 361-365
Readiness of PACOM forces, 215-220,
  Logistics, 329
  Personnel, 509
Reconnaissance operations, 261-272
  PONY EXPRESS, 266-267
Refugees
  Rescue-at-sea operations, 251-253
  Indochinese, 88-89
Republic of China. See Taiwan
Republic of Korea. See Korea, Republic of
Republic of the Philippines. See Philippines, Republic of
Research and Analysis Office, 20-21
Rossi v. Brown decision on preferential hiring, 597
Russia. See Soviet Union

S

SAM firing at SR-71, 78-79, 275-279
Sanno Hotel, 369
Satellite terminal deployment to Woomera, 490-491
Sea of Japan operations, U.S. Navy, 246-247
SEA SIAM, 305-306
Security assistance. See also individual countries
  Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance, 378, 398-399, 419,455
  conference, 382-383
  triennial review of grade and Service of agency heads, 26-27
  training, 385-386
SENIOR GAZE, 538-541
SENIOR RUBY, 541
Seychelles, attempted coup, 95-96
Singapore
  security assistance, 449-450
SIOP
  commitment, 221
  revision, 221
SOAFPASSEX, 313-314
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. See Vietnam, Socialist Republic of
Somalia
  P-3 operations, 269-270
SORAK, 39-41
Southeast Asia refugees. See Refugees
Southwest Asia communications planning, 474-475
Southwest Pacific Representative, 24-25

Soviet Union
  armed forces, 56-59, 61-67
  bases and forces in Vietnam, 83-85
  communications intercept, 498-500
  in Afghanistan, 101-103
  presence in Indochina, 83-85
  threat to Japan, 69-71
  threat to Pakistan, 100-101
  threat to Southeast Asia
Spratly Islands, 85-86
Sri Lanka, 241-243
  security assistance, 449-450
Standardization and Interoperability, 204-205
Status of Forces Agreement, ANZUS, 599
Strategic Air Command
  B-52s in PACOM, 210-211
  PACOM Liaison Element, 25
Strait of Hormuz, 228-230
Studies and Analyses, 206-208
Subic Bay, homeporting U.S. Navy ship, 250
Submarine collision with Japanese freighter, 281-284
Submarine force, Soviet, 66-67
Sudan, 48
Suez Canal transits, 226-228
Sustainability, 331
Swing strategy, 110-117
System and Technology Forum, 158-160

T

TACAMO Pacific, 468-470
Taiwan
  commissary, 335-336
  POL 349-350
TALLYMAN Korea, 542-544
TANGENT FLASH/BALIKATAN, 305
Targeting. See Intelligence
TEAM SPIRIT, 293-298, 351, 612
Telecommunications management, 487-502
Telephone systems upgrade on Oahu, 488-489
Teletype upgrade for command aircraft, 467
TEMPO CAPER, 305
Terms of Reference
  CINCPACREP Southwest Pacific 24-25
  Commander U.S. Forces Japan, 23-24
  security assistance organizations, 386-387
Thailand
  bases 41-46

insurgency in, 87-88
logistics planning, 325-326
POL, 348-349
security assistance, 371, 455-459
threat to, 86-87
Theater Nuclear Force
Command, Control, and Communications, 471-474
Improvement Study, 183-187, 471-472
Threat, communist
North Korea, 73-79
Soviet Union, 56-72
Vietnam, 81-91
TIGER BALM, 307
TOMAHAWK missile, 188-197
TPFDD, 319-325
TPICK, 478-479
Total Compensation Comparability, 519-524
TRIAD, 312
Trincomalee, Sri Lanka
oil storage rehabilitation, 243
U.S. Navy ship visits, 241-243
Treaty, Philippine Extradition, 594-597
Tropical cyclones, 289-291
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Civil Action teams, 52-53
political status, 49-51
U.S. Navy port visits, 248-249
Typhoons. See Tropical cyclones and typhoons

U

UHF satellite communications upgrade for command aircraft, 467-468
ULCHI-FOCUS LENS, 298-300, 334, 612
United States
Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, 285-287
Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia, 407-408
forces and bases
Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea area, 46-48
Korea, 29-41
Forces Japan Coordination Center, 483
threat to, 55-67
U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union
U-Tapao. See Thailand

V

VALIANT FLEX, 297
VALIANT USHER, 312-313

Vanuatu, U.S. Navy port visits, 248-249
Vietnam, Socialist Republic of
  repatriation of remains from, 285-288
  Soviet bases in, 83-85
  threat, 86 -87
Visitors program, CJCS, 212
Visitors to CINCPAC, 577-588

W

War Reserve Materiel 329-331
  requirements, 329-331
War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA), 330-331
Weather. See Tropical Cyclones and Typhoons
West Loch, 600-601
WWMCCS, 464-465