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COMMAND HISTORY

1992

VOLUME I (U)

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USCINCPAC)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025

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5757
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29 October 1993

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I (U)

1992

Prepared by the Command History Division
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters USCINCPAC

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025
1993

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

ADMIRAL CHARLES R. LARSON
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

FOREWORD

The U.S. led victory in the Persian Gulf and the collapse of the Soviet Union were the defining events of 1991. They also set into motion a sea change in the strategic environment, a change that found shape and definition in 1992. During the past year, this strategic transformation was marked by events perhaps less dramatic than 1991's, but no less profound:

- The stand-up in January of USCINCPAC's Joint Task Force-Full Accounting signaled the intensification of our efforts to reach the fullest possible accounting for our servicemen still missing in Southeast Asia. In the most humane and compassionate manner possible, the Joint Task Force will write the final chapter to this legacy of the Vietnam War .

- The elections of Fidel Ramos in the Philippines, Chuan Likphai in Thailand, and Kim Young Sam in the Republic of Korea highlighted the growth of democratic pluralism in Asia. This strengthening and maturing of Asian democracies parallels the continued vibrancy of Asian economies. Together, they presage a future of political and economic stability in the Asia-Pacific region--an auspicious start to the "Century of the Pacific".

- Here at home, the election of President Clinton, the first Democrat elected to the Presidency in twelve years, was widely viewed as a mandate for change--the outgrowth of an intense national debate over the course of America's future. Questions surrounding the priority of our vital national interests and the role of the United States in world affairs aren't yet fully resolved, but are already having immediate, forceful impact on the American military--our size, our force structure, our missions, our very future.

- The departure of U.S. forces from Subic Bay in November closed the book on nearly a century of American military presence in the Philippines. The final turnover to the Philippine government of our bases there was done in a professional and unemotional manner; we left without rancor or bitterness, reaffirming our strong ties and long-standing friendships with the people, the military and the government of the Philippines. But our departure engendered a maelstrom of international debate: Was this the beginning of the end of American presence in Asia, a retrenchment to a "Fortress America" philosophy? And if so, who would fill the vacuum?

These questions and many others regarding America's future in the Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean region came faster than the answers in 1992. And, they were subsumed within the larger questions still outstanding in the national arena: America's responsibilities as the sole remaining superpower; the "rightsizing" of our armed forces to defend U.S. interests in a fractious world; and how best to balance domestic renewal with engagement beyond our borders--two competing yet also complementary priorities. The dramatic changes in the world order that provoked these questions required equally dramatic revisions to the USCINCPAC strategy. The transition from our role in a strategy of global containment to a more regionally focused strategy reached an endpoint in 1992 with the introduction of a new theater strategy: COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT.

In simple terms, this strategy is a process of using the **means** at our disposal, in three principal **ways**, to achieve our **ends**. The **means** include people, ships, tanks, aircraft, programs, funds and other assets available in USPACOM. The **ways** in which we employ those means are forward presence, strong alliances and friendships, and a visible, demonstrated capacity for crisis response. The **ends** are simply our strategic objectives:

- In peacetime: engagement and participation with friends and allies--we seek partnership in the evolution of a peaceful Pacific.

- In crisis: quick and decisive response, to deter aggression and to protect American lives and interests.

- And in conflict: swift victory, multilaterally if possible, but unilaterally if necessary, and a surviving global balance favoring America and her allies.

Along with the evolution of Cooperative Engagement, a fundamental shift in our approach to forward presence occurred in 1992. The concept of "places not bases" was largely an outgrowth of our departure from the Philippines. The loss of those bases and the logistics, training, and staging capabilities that went with them challenged our ability to maintain a credible presence in Southeast Asian waters. But the response from friends and allies was immediate and gratifying. Singapore offered facilities to house critical logistics and contracting functions, Malaysian and Indonesian shipyards contracted to repair our forward deployed ships, we reassigned small numbers of forces to other host nations in the region, and many nations offered us expanded access to training facilities throughout the region. The end results were almost uniformly positive: more evenly distributed presence throughout the region, expanded access to facilities, ports, airfields, and training ranges, and increased opportunities for engagement with many nations in the

region. Perhaps most gratifying was the clear consensus, echoed throughout the region, that our continued military presence was not only welcome, it was vital to regional stability.

The events and challenges of 1992 are behind us, but if history tells us anything, the years ahead will be equally eventful, and at least as challenging. Among the many hurdles we face, two are paramount:

- First, Americans must be persuaded that continued engagement abroad is essential to supporting our vital national interests. Our participation in the international arena can't be viewed as a Cold War anachronism, no longer relevant in a world freed from the threat of superpower conflict. Instead, our engagement--economic, diplomatic, and yes, military--must be seen as allowing us to share in the wealth of opportunities in an increasingly free and prosperous world.

- Second, and more specific to USPACOM, we must elevate America's interest and involvement in the Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean region. More than anywhere else in the world, and more than at any time in the past, our economic and security concerns converge here in this region. The abundant opportunities for trade and investment can fuel our economic recovery, creating both jobs and wealth. The security concerns of the region--and they are not insignificant--can be managed, to ensure the stability so essential to continued growth and prosperity. But neither stability nor opportunity come free; they aren't blessings of the "new world order." They are products of our partnership and our leadership in this vital part of the world. Our ability to shape, to influence, and of course, to benefit depend on our willingness to be present and engaged.

As America marches toward the 21st Century, USPACOM will continue to play an important role in the strategic calculus. In concert with the diplomatic and economic elements of our foreign policy, and in cooperation with our friends and allies throughout the region, we'll help to build the Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean region, and a world, in which security, prosperity, and democracy can flourish.

C. R. LARSON
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief

PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command to submit an annual historical report that will enable the Joint Staff to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters USCINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the U.S. Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the Commander in Chief. The report also preserves the history of the USPACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs, and the Joint Staff by recording the effects of major decisions and directives concerning the CINCs.

This history describes USCINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

Annex A of the 1972 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Annex B of the 1976 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Annex E of the 1978 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command. The designations of Annexes A, B, and E are reserved to facilitate future research and reference. The histories of U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Forces Korea, Alaskan Command, and Special Operations Command Pacific, will retain the designations of Annexes C, D, F, and G, respectively. The annexes are included only for those copies retained at USCINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is the prerogative of the subordinate unified commander.

The 1992 history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for these volumes at the end of Volume II.

All classified source citations throughout this history bear the reclassification guidance "Originating Agency's Determination Required" (OADR), unless otherwise noted.

Mr. Robert S. Stubbs wrote Chapters IV, VI, and a portion of Chapter II. Mrs. Laine Skiendiel wrote Chapter I and portions of Chapters II and VII. Chapters III, V, and VIII, and part of Chapter VII were written by the undersigned. The Glossary and Index were joint efforts.

The DOD Publishing and Printing Service Detachment Office, Pearl Harbor, printed and bound the volumes.

THOMAS F. GORDON
Command Historian

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CHAPTER I

COMMAND STATUS

SECTION I--THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Strength and Disposition of USPACOM Military Personnel

(U) Downsizing initiatives reduced the U. S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) overall military personnel strength in Fiscal Year (FY) 1992. As of 30 September 1991, 387,126 military personnel were assigned within the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR); a year later, there were 371,410, or 4.06% fewer, personnel were assigned to the AOR.[1]

(U) A comparison of FY-end military strength by Service of those forces assigned within the USPACOM AOR follows*:

	30 September 1991	30 September 1992
Army	60,495	56,877
Navy	196,163	189,580
Air Force	45,385	42,906
Marine Corps	85,083	82,047
Totals	387,126	371,410

*These totals include all stovepipe units assigned within the USPACOM AOR.

(U) Other than Navy personnel with the fleet or Marine Corps personnel ashore in the Continental United States (CONUS), major concentrations of military personnel in the USPACOM area were in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Japan/Okinawa, Korea, and the Philippines. During FY92, Guam and Hawaii experienced only slight gains, whereas Japan/Okinawa showed a marked gain of 5,884.

(U) Manpower in Alaska was reduced by 366. As part of planned reductions, PACOM forces in Korea were reduced by 13.55%,

[1]DOD Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information and Reports (U), DIOR/M05-91/04 and DIOR/M05-92/04, DOD Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area (M05 Reports), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 30 Sep 91 and 30 Sep 92.

or 5,601. Since the U.S. was obligated to complete its withdrawal from the Philippines by 31 December 1992, PACOM had completed withdrawal of 75%, or 5,832 of its forces by 30 September 1992. A comparison of FY-end USPACOM manpower statistics follows:[2]

	30 September 1991	30 September 1992	
Alaska	22,574	22,208	-366
Guam	7,147	7,844	+697
Hawaii	44,566	44,864	+298
Japan/Okinawa	40,062	45,946	+5884
Korea	41,344	35,743	-5601
Philippines	7,761	1,929	-5832

(U) The following charts depict the status of USPACOM at the end of 1992. Following these charts are photos of HQ CINCPAC key personnel and a table of authorized strengths of HQ CINCPAC staff directorates and direct reporting units (DRUs). A CINCPAC staff organization directory and personnel list is attached to the inside back cover of Volume II.

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[2]Ibid.

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INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITMENTS IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

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THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (U)



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN USPACOM



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nothing classified on this page 1 Page classified improperly.

COMMAND ORGANIZATION (U)

1. (U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USCINCPAC):
   a. (U) USCINCPAC is the commander of a unified combatant command whose mission is to support U.S. policies and security interests in the following area of responsibility (AOR): the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west longitude, Alaska (excluding air defense), the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east longitude (excluding the Gulfs of Aden and Oman), Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, Mongolia, the countries of Southeast Asia and the southern Asian landmass to the western border of India, and Madagascar and the other islands in all assigned water areas.
   b. (U) USCINCPAC exercises combatant command of Secretary of Defense-assigned or attached forces through the USPACOM Service component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces.
   c. (U) USCINCPAC exercises administrative control over military agencies, offices, organizations, and commands which administer security assistance programs within the USPACOM area. COMUSKOREA, however, exercises administrative control over Chief, Joint United States Military Affairs Group, Korea (CHJUSMAGK). Additionally, USCINCPAC coordinates activities within the USPACOM area through established coordinating authorities who are designated United States Defense Representatives (USDRs) and/or USCINCPAC Representatives (USCINCPACREPs).
   d. (U) USCINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. military adviser or representative to the following organizations:
      (1) (U) ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative.
      (2) (U) Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board: U.S. Military Representative and Co-Chairman.
      (3) (U) U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on Military Defense Matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.
      (4) (U) ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting: Delegate.
      (5) (U) ROK-U.S. Military Committee, Plenary Session: Member.
      (6) (U) FSM-U.S. Joint Committee Meeting: Senior U.S. Member.
      (7) (U) RMI-U.S. Joint Committee Meeting: Senior U.S. Member.
      (8) (C) Malaysia-U.S. Bilateral Training and Consultative Group: Co-chairman.
2. (U) USPACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
   a. (U) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
   b. (U) Commander, Pacific Air Forces (COMPACAF).
   c. (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific (CG USARPAC).
   d. (U) Commander, Marine Forces Pacific (COMMARFORPAC).
   e. (U) The USPACOM Service component commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by USCINCPAC. The USPACOM Service component commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under their command which have been assigned to USCINCPAC's combatant command. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the USPACOM Service component commander in his Service role. However, such missions and tasks must not detract from and should contribute to the overall mission of USCINCPAC.
   f. (U) The USPACOM Service component commanders' responsibilities for the Security Assistance Program are prescribed in the current version of DOD 5105.38 (Security Assistance Management Manual) and USCINCPAC Instruction 4900.8.
3. (U) COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS:
   a. (U) Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA)*, Seoul, Korea commanding U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
   b. (U) Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan (COMUSJAPAN)*, Yokota Air Base, Japan, commanding U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ).
   c. (U) Commander, Alaskan Command (COMALCOM), Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, commanding Alaskan Command (ALCOM).
   d. (U) Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific (COMSOCPAC) ,Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, commanding Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC).
4. (U) JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER (ACTIVE):
   a. Commander, Joint Task Force Five (CJTF 5), Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California, commanding Joint Task Force Five (JTF 5).
   b. Commander, Joint Task Force - Full accounting (CJTF-FA), Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, commanding Joint Task Force - Full Accounting (JTF-FA).@
5. (U) SUBORDINATE USCINCPAC DIRECT REPORTING ORGANIZATION CHIEFS/COMMANDERS:
   a. (U) Commander, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (CDRJICPAC), Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
   b. (U) Chief, Cruise Missile Support Activity (CHCMSA), Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.
   c. (U) Commander, Information Systems Support Group (CDRISSG), Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.
6. (U) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USCINCPACREPs): Generally, USCINCPACREPs are designated in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established.
   a. (U) USCINCPACREP Australia (includes Nauru) is the Defense Attache, American Embassy, Canberra, Australia..
   b. (U) USCINCPACREP Fiji (includes French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna) is the Defense Attache, American Embassy, Suva, Fiji.
   c. (U) USCINCPACREP Guam/Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands/Federated States of Micronesia/Palau (USCINCPACREP Guam/CNMI/FSM/Palau) is the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas (COMNAVMARIANAS), Agana, Guam.
   d. (U) USCINCPACREP Republic of the Marshall Islands (USCINCPACREP RMI) is the Commander, U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.
   e. (U) USCINCPACREP New Zealand (includes Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, and Western Samoa) is the Defense Attache, American Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand.
   f. (U) USCINCPACREP Papua New Guinea (includes Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) is the Defense Attache, American Embassy, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.
   g. (U) USCINCPACREP Philippines (USCINCPACREP PHIL) is the Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group Philippines (CHJUSMAGPHIL), Manila, Philippines.
   h. (U) USCINCPACREP Singapore is the commander, 497th Fighter Training Squadron, 13th Air Force, Singapore.
   i. (U) USCINCPACREP Southwest Indian Ocean (USCINCPACREP SWIO) (includes Madagascar, Comoros, Mauritius, and Seychelles) is the Defense Attache*, Antananarivo, Madagascar.
   j. (U) USCINCPACREP Sri Lanka/Maldives is the Defense Attache, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
   k. (U) USCINCPACREP Thailand (USCINCPACREP THAI) is the Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI), Bangkok, Thailand.
7. (U) USCINCPAC LIAISON ACTIVITIES: USCINCPAC Liaison Office, Washington, D.C.
8. (U) SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMANDERS: Security Assistance Programs, including Foreign Military Sales, are administered in the USPACOM under the following authorities:
   a. (U) Chief, Joint United States Military Affairs Group, Korea ..... Seoul, Korea
   b. (U) Chief, Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Philippines ..... Manila, Philippines
   c. (U) Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand* ..... Bangkok, Thailand
   d. (U) Chief, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan ..... Tokyo, Japan
   e. (U) Defense Supply Advisor, India ..... New Delhi, India
   f. (U) U.S. Defense Attaches in Australia*, Bangladesh*, Burma*, China*, Fiji* (also for Tonga), Indonesia*, Madagascar* (also for Mauritius, Seychelles, and Comoros), Malaysia*, Nepal*, New Zealand*, Papua New Guinea* (also for Solomon Islands and Vanuatu), Singapore* (ARMA Singapore responsible for Brunei), and Sri Lanka* (also for Maldives) are responsible for the Security Assistance function for their respective countries.

* Designated as U.S. Defense Representatives. Also serving in that capacity are the U.S. Defense Attache in India and the U.S. Defense Liaison Office Representative in Hong Kong.

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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND USCINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
KEY PERSONNEL

U.S. FORCES KOREA

Commander*	GEN	Robert W. RISCASSI	USA
Deputy Commander**	Lt Gen	Howell M. ESTES, III	USAF
Chief of Staff	LTG	William W. CROUCH	USA
Deputy Chief of Staff	Maj Gen	Nels RUNNING	USAF
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Calvin L. PETERSON	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J1	Col	Edward H. GOSSLING, III	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J2	Col	Richard M. HASBROUCK	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J3	MG	Stephen SILVASY, Jr.	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J4	BG	Frank F. HENDERSON	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J5	MajGen	James M. MYATT	USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff/J6	COL	William H. RUSS	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/Resource Management	COL	Dennis M. SAVAGE	USA
********			
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea	RADM	William W. MATHIS	USN
Commander, U.S. Air Forces Korea/ Seventh Air Force	Lt Gen	Howell M. ESTES	USAF
CofS, 8th Army	Col	William D. McGILL	USA

* Dual hatted as CINCUNC, CINCCFC, CGCC, CGEUSA and USDR
** Dual hatted as Deputy CINCUNC, CMDR 7th AF and CACC,CFC

U.S. FORCES JAPAN

Commander/Commander Fifth Air Force	Lt Gen	Richard E. HAWLEY	USAF
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff	MajGen	Arthur C. BLADES	USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff	CAPT	Anthony E. MITCHELL	USN
Secretary Joint Staff	LTC	Leon G. WELLS	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J1	COL	Donald E. HALVERSON	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J2	CAPT	Gary P. DAVISON	USN
Assistant Chief of Staff/J3	Col	William T. HOBBINS	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J4	Col	Joseph A. MARAPOTI	USMC
Assistant Chief of Staff/J5	COL	Edward O. WALSH	USA
Director Command, Control, and Communications Systems/J6	Col	Carl A. McINTIRE	USAF
Chief Okinawa Area Field Office	LTC	Paul D. PEYTON	USA
********			
Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan	LTG	Jerome GRANRUD	USA
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan	RADM	Jesse J. HERNANDEZ	USN
Commanding General, Marine Corps Bases, Japan	MajGen	Donald R. GARDNER	USMC

ALASKAN COMMAND

Commander*	Lt Gen	Joseph W. RALSTON	USAF
Deputy Commander**	MG	Samuel E. EBBESEN	USA
Chief of Staff	COL	Philemon A. St AMANT, II	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J1	LTC	Robert D. MOORE, Jr.	USA
Assistant Chief of Staff/J2	Col	James V. LINAM	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J3	Col	Donald L. SEXTON	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J4	Col	Dennis C. BECK	USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff/J5	CAPT	Robert E. BARATKO	USN
Assistant Chief of Staff/J6	Col	Ronald L. PAXSON	USAF
********			
Commander, Naval Forces Alaska	RADM	David E. CIANCAGLINI	USCG

* Dual hatted as Cmdr, U.S. Forces Alaska, Cmdr, 11th AF and Cmdr, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Region
** Dual hatted as Cmdr, U.S. Army Forces, Alaska, and Commander, 6th Infantry Division (light)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, PACIFIC

Commander	BG	George A. CROCKER	USA
Deputy Commander	CAPT	Michael S. McCRARY	USN
Chief Personnel Div/Admin/SOJ1	MAJ	Mark E. RAY	USA
Chief Intelligence Div/SOJ2	LTC	Harvey LATSON	USA
Chief Operations Div/SOJ3	COL	Vladimir SOBICHEVSKY	USA
Chief Logistics Div/SOJ4	Lt Col	Ronald L. BUTTS	USAF
Chief Plans Div/SOJ5	Lt Col	Paul E. NORWOOD	USAF
Chief Communications Div/SOJ6	Lt Col	Wayne HALL	USAF

**** USCINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES ****

Australia	Col	Max M. MAROSKO, Jr.	USAF
Fiji	LtCol	Kip J. NAUGLE	USMC
Guam/CNMI/FSM/Palau	RADM	Edward K. KRISTENSEN	USN
Republic of the Marshall Islands	COL	Eugene HAZEL	USA
New Zealand	CAPT	Richard L. NORWOOD	USN
Papua New Guinea	LTC	Mark SWARINGEN	USA
Philippines	COL	Richard H. TAYLOR	USA
Singapore	CAPT	William P. COOPER	USN
Southwest Indian Ocean	CDR	John W. LOGAN	USN
Sri Lanka/Maldives	CDR	Vaughn K. MARTIN	USN
Thailand	COL	Joshua L. KISER	USA

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

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U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS

DEFENSE SUPPLY ADVISOR, INDIA

DSA	Col	Walter T. EASTHAM	USAF
Assistant DSA	LTC	Terry R. LEE	USA

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, INDONESIA

Chief	COL	Karl F. EICKEMEYER	USA
Chief Army/MAP Div	LTC	Lloyd T. GREEN	USA
Chief Navy/Plans Div	CDR	Gregory E. COLE	USN
Chief Air Force Div	Lt Col	John C. STEVENS	USAF
Chief, Training and Admin Support Div	MAJ	James V. SCOTT	USA

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN

Chief	Col	Edwin A. HIND, Jr.	USAF
Deputy Chief	Mr.	George D. REASONOVER	CIV
Director Air Defense/Ground Forces Div	MAJ	Patrick W. OYABE	USA
Director Naval Aviation Programs	CDR	Gerhart K. MAAS	USN
Naval Sea Systems Programs Officer	CDR	David M. ALLAN, III	USN
Director Air Force Programs	Lt Col	David K. HOLMES	USAF
Director Defense Technology Office	Mr.	Rodney S. TANAKA	CIV

JOINT U.S. MILITARY AFFAIRS GROUP, KOREA

Chief	COL	Keith L. YOUNG	USA
Chief of Staff	Col	Eugene J. FAMULARE	USAF
Director International Cooperative Programs	COL	Jack M. PAUL	USA
Director Army Programs	COL	George INGERSOLL	USA
Director Air Force Programs	Col	Joseph E. EDWARDS	USAF
Director Navy/Marine Corps Programs	CAPT	Bernard G. HOLLENBECK, Jr.	USN

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP, PHILIPPINES

Chief	COL	Richard H. TAYLOR	USA
USCINCPACREP	CAPT	Francis J. McCAFFERY	USN
Chief Security Assistance Div	Col	Lewis E. STEWART	USAF
Chief Ground Forces Branch	COL	Kenneth W. RHYLANDER	USA
Chief Naval Forces Branch	CDR	Earl D. BRILEY	USN
Chief Air Force Branch	Lt Col	Terrance J. MALLON	USAF
Comptroller	LTC	Greg CONNERY	USA

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, THAILAND

Chief	COL	Joshua L. KISER	USA
Chief Joint Exercise and Training Div	Col	Eric P. VISSER	USMC
Chief Joint Ground Div	COL	Richard P. CASSIDY	USA
Chief Joint Navy Div	CAPT	Michael P. PUTNAM	USN
Chief Joint Air Force Div	Col	John S. HOUSEHOLDER	USAF
Marine Corps Rep	LtCol	Robert STRAHAN	USMC

****

OTHER OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

AUSTRALIA (Defense Attache)	Col	Max M. MAROSKO	USAF
Chief Foreign Military Sales Office	Lt Col	Donald L. JOHNSON	USAF
BANGLADESH (Defense Attache)	LTC	Steven R. ROBINSON	USA
BRUNEI (Army Attache Singapore)	COL	Richard D. WELKER	USA
BURMA (Defense Attache)	COL	David G. DOUGLASS	USA
CHINA (Defense Attache)	Brig Gen	John H. GARRISON	USAF
COMOROS (Defense Attache Madagascar)	LCDR	John W. LOGAN	USN
FIJI (Defense Attache)	LtCol	Kip L. NAUGLE	USMC
MADAGASCAR (Defense Attache)	LCDR	John W. LOGAN	USN
MALAYSIA (Defense Attache)	COL	Michael A. McDERMOTT	USA
Chief Security Assistance Office	LTC	Donald R. MORAN	USA
MALDIVES (Defense Attache Sri Lanka)	CDR	Vaughn K. MARTIN	USN
MAURITIUS (Defense Attache Madagascar)	LCDR	John W. LOGAN	USN
NEPAL (Defense Attache)	LTC	Roger CUNNINGHAM	USA
NEW ZEALAND (Defense Attache)	CAPT	Richard L. NORWOOD	USN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA (Defense Attache)	Maj	Mark A. SWARINGEN	USMC
SEYCHELLES (Defense Attache Madagascar)	LCDR	John W. LOGAN	USN
SINGAPORE (Defense Attache)	CAPT	William P. COOPER	USN
Chief Security Assistance Office	Lt Col	Dennis B. FOWLER	USAF
SOLOMON ISLANDS (Defense Attache Papua New Guinea)	Maj	Mark A. SWARINGEN	USMC
SRI LANKA (Defense Attache)	CDR	Vaughn K. MARTIN	USN
TONGA (Defense Attache Fiji)	LtCol	Kip L. NAUGLE	USMC
VANUATU (Defense Attache Papua New Guinea)	Maj	Mark A. SWARINGEN	USMC

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

AVAILABLE FORCES (U)

ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY/MARINES
ASSIGNED TO USCINCPAC *		
1 Army Headquarters 1 Aviation Brigade 1 Engineer Group 2 Signal Brigades 3 MI Brigades 1 MP Brigade 2 Support Commands 1 Medical Command 1 Personnel Command 1 Hq, Theater Finance Command 1 LANCE Battery 1 Corps Headquarters (-) 2d Infantry Division 2 Infantry Battalions 2 Armor Battalions 2 Mechanized Battalions 1 Cavalry Squadron 4 Artillery Battalions 1 Air Defense Battalion 1 Aviation Brigade 2 Engineer Battalions 1 Signal Battalion 1 MI Battalion 6th Infantry Division (Light) 4 Infantry Battalions 1 Cavalry Squadron 1 Helicopter Assault Battalion 2 Artillery Battalions 1 Engineer Battalion 1 Signal Battalion 1 MI Battalion 25th Infantry Division (Light) 9 Infantry Battalions 1 Cavalry Squadron 1 Helicopter Assault Battalion 1 Helicopter Attack Battalion 4 Artillery Battalions 1 Air Defense Battalion 1 Engineer Battalion 1 Signal Battalion 1 MI Battalion Division and non-divisional Combat Support/ Combat Service Support units including echelon above division support forces for deployment Special Operations Forces 1 Special Operations Support Command 1 USA Special Forces Battalion U.S. Army Reserve 1 Corps Headquarters (Reinforcement) 1 Infantry Battalion 1 Engineer Battalion 1 Civil Affairs Group Headquarters U.S. Army National Guard 1 Separate Infantry Brigade 1 Infantry Battalion 1 Infantry Group (Scouts)	1 Air Force Headquarters 4 Numbered Air Force Headquarters 6 Fighter Wings/Wings 12 Fighter Squadrons 1 Special Operations Group 3 Special Operations Squadrons 1 Airlift Wing 6 Airlift Squadrons 1 Airlift Flight 1 Air Refueling Squadron 1 Airborne Warning & Control Squadron 1 Aeromedical Airlift Squadron 3 Air Rescue Squadrons 2 Tactical Air Support Squadrons 2 Air Base Wings 1 Air Base Group 1 Air Control Wing 1 Air Control Group 2 Fighter Training Squadrons 1 Air Control Center Squadron 2 Air Control Squadrons 2 Air Defense Squadrons 1 Weather Squadron 1 Air Refueling Group (AKANG) 1 Airlift Squadron (AKANG) 1 Air Rescue Squadron (AKANG) 1 Air Refueling Squadron (AKANG) 2 Composite Groups (HIANG/AKANG) 1 Fighter Squadron (HIANG)	2 Numbered Fleets 7 Carriers** 27 Cruisers** 36 Destroyers/Frigates** 11 Submarines (SSBN) 34 Submarines (SSN)** 28 Amphibious Ships** 1 Command Ship (LCC) 1 Mine Warfare Ship 1 Hospital Ship 2 Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 11 Prepositioning Ships 26 Combat Logistics Force (AO, AOE, AOR, AE, AFS, TAO, TAFS, TAO, TAE) 8 Repair Ships (AD, AS, AR) 33 Miscellaneous Support Ships (ATS, ARS, AGSS, TATF, TAGOS, AGF, TAK, TAVB) 8 Carrier Wings* 29 Fighter/Attack Squadrons*** 6 Electronic Surveillance Squadrons*** 6 Early Warning Squadrons*** 12 Carrier ASW Squadrons (HS + VS)*** 5 LAMPS Squadrons*** 8 Patrol Squadrons*** 1 E-6A VLF Relay (TACAMO) Squadron 1 Naval Special Warfare Unit 16 Mobilization Forces (FFG, LST, ARS, MSO) Marine Forces Pacific Command Element 1st Radio Battalion 1st Air Navy Ground Liaison Company I Marine Expeditionary Force Command Element 1st Marine Division 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 1st Force Service Support Group III Marine Expeditionary Force Command Element 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 3d Force Service Support Group 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Element 3d Marine Regiment Marine Air Group 24 1st Brigade Service Support Group Fleet Marine Force Pacific Marine Corps Security Force Battalion, Pacific****
		* Includes air units which may be deployed at various times to USLANTCOM/USEUCOM. ** Does not include units which may be deployed at various times from USLANTCOM/USEUCOM. *** Does not include units with primary mission of training. **** ADCON to FMFPAC; OPCON to USCINCPACFLT.
IN USPACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO USCINCPAC		
	1 Tanker Task Force 1 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (ACC) 1 Strategic Reconnaissance Det (ACC)	2 Fleet Composite Readiness Squadrons Naval Oceanography Command Units

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

MAJOR USPACOM BASES AND COMPLEXES

ARMY	NAVY/MARINES CORPS*	AIR FORCE
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii Fort Shafter, Hawaii Fort Richardson, Alaska Fort Wainwright, Alaska Camp Zama, Japan Sagami Depot, Japan Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan Camp Henry, Taegu, Korea Camp Hovey, Tongduchon-ni, Korea Camp Howze, Kumchon, Korea Camp Humphreys, Pyong-taek, Korea Camp Red Cloud, Uijong-bu, Korea Camp Casey, Tongduchon-ni, Korea Camp Carroll, Waegwan, Korea U.S. Army Garrison, Yongson, Seoul, Korea Camp Walker, Taegu, Korea	Naval Complex Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe, Hawaii Naval Air Station Adak, Aleutian Islands, Alaska Naval Complex Apra Harbor, Guam Naval Air Station Agana, Guam Naval Complex Yokosuka, Japan Naval Complex Sasebo, Japan Naval Fleet Activities Okinawa/Naval Air Facility Kadena, Japan Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan Naval Air Facility Misawa, Japan Marine Corps Base Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Japan Naval Complex Chinhae, Korea Naval Complex Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory * Excludes U.S. West Coast bases.	Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska Shemya Air Force Base, Alaska Andersen Air Force Base, Guam Yokota Air Base, Japan Misawa Air Base, Japan Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan Osan Air Base, Korea Kunsan Air Base, Korea

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

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U.S. ARMY PACIFIC

PRINCIPAL MISSIONS AND TASKS

- Functions as Army component for USPACOM, less geographical area of Korea, and for matters of USCINCPAC concern beyond exclusive authority or transcending geographic areas of Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (CG EUSA).
- Commands and supports assigned and attached active and U.S. Army Reserve units, installations, and activities in Japan, Hawaii, Alaska, and in possessions and trust territories administered by the United States in the USPACOM.
- Organizes, equips, stations, and maintains the combat readiness of assigned units.
- Performs theater-wide functions for the Army in USPACOM less Korea as directed by Department of the Army.
- Exercises resource management functions and responsibilities of a Major Army Command (MACOM).
- Supervises the training and readiness of the Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam Army National Guard.
- Develops plans for ground offensive and defensive operations for USPACOM less those exclusively for Korea, Japan, or Alaska.
- Is USCINCPAC Executive Agent in the operations of the Pacific Topographic Center.
- Arranges and coordinates U.S. Army Security Assistance support to meet USCINCPAC requirements except in Korea.
- Exercises command responsibility for the U.S. Army Chemical Activity Pacific (USACAP) for the custody and security of the toxic chemical munitions and agents stored on Johnston Island, and provides safety oversight of the operations of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS).

DIRECTORY OF KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

Commanding General	LTG	Johnnie H. CORNS
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff	MG	Roger K. BEAN
Deputy Commander for Reserve Components	MG	Paul R. LISTER
Secretary General Staff	MAJ	Carl E. LEWIS, Jr.
DCofS for Personnel	COL	Richard W. DIXON
DCofS for Intelligence	COL	Charles E. KENT
DCofS for Operations and Plans	COL	Jimmie R. LACKEY
DCofS for Logistics	COL	Walter J. SHELTON
DCofS for Resource Management	COL	Martin M. BEACH
DCofS for Engineering	COL	Frank R. FINCH
DCofS for Information Management	COL	Gary P. CLUKEY
DCofS for Acquisition Management	Mr.	Richard O. YOUNG
Chief Surgeon*	BG	James HASTINGS
Chief Dental Surgeon	COL	Jeryl D. ENGLISH
Public Affairs Officer	COL	David R. KIERNAN
Inspector General	COL	Terry J. YOUNG
Staff Judge Advocate	COL	William H. LANTZ, Jr.
Chaplain	COL (CH)	Wilbur D. PARKER
Provost Marshal	COL	Ted W. HASHIMOTO
Protocol Officer	MAJ	James R. HICKEY

****

Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (Light)	MG	Robert ORD
Commanding General, 6th Infantry Division (Light)	MG	David A. BRAMLETT
Commander, Tripler Army Medical Center*	BG	James E. HASTINGS

* U.S. Army Health Services Command

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. ARMY
PACIFIC ORGANIZATION



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL:OADR.

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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS (U)



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

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U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

PRINCIPAL MISSIONS AND TASKS

Prepare to:

- Assist in defense of the United States against attack through the Pacific.
- Deny enemy control of island areas.
- Assist in the defense of friendly nations.
- Protect and control shipping and maintain sea lines of communications in the USPACOM and contiguous waters; integrate plans for antisubmarine warfare and mining operations.
- Coordinate the shipping surveillance program; operate shipping surveillance center.
- Provide defense of naval forces at sea against air attack.
- Assist in air defense of land areas.
- Provide for conduct of planning with friendly nations, as directed.
- Determine requirements for a strategic logistic sealift capability to support USCINCPAC plans.

ORGANIZATION

The United States Pacific Fleet is organized into a number of Type and Area Commands for purposes of administration, training, and logistic support and into Operational Commands for the pursuit of its assigned missions, as follows. . .



* FMFPAC is under the administrative control of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

** Also Naval Component Commander of USCINCPAC subordinate unified commander.

*** Commander, U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Pacific (USN-USCG).

DIRECTORY OF KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

HEADQUARTERS U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Commander in Chief	ADM	Robert J. KELLY
Dep CINC/Chief of Staff	RADM	David B. ROBINSON
Dep CofS Operations/Plans	RADM	Thomas D. PAULSEN
Dep CofS Resources/Logistics	RADM	Francis K. HOLIAN
ACofS Intelligence	CAPT	James G. PROUT, III
ACofS Operations	CAPT	Nelson H. LITSINGER
ACofS Logistics Planning	CAPT	VACANT
ACofS Communications	CAPT	Larry L. ERNST
ACofS Plans and Policy	CAPT	Ronald B. WEBER
ACofS Cryptology	CAPT	Darrell W. CAMPBELL
ACofS Manpower and Personnel	CAPT	William W. SPOTTS
ACofS Shore Activities	CAPT	Frank P. DIGEORGE, III
Fleet Comptroller Officer	CAPT	Hugh J. McCULLON
Fleet Public Affairs Officer	CAPT	Thomas J. JURKOWSKY
Fleet Inspector General	Ms.	June Gibbs BROWN
Fleet Surgeon	CAPT	James H. BLACK
COMPACNAVFACENGCOM/ Fleet Civil Engineer	RADM	G. Bryan ESTES
ACofS Fleet Supply Officer	RADM	Peter A. BONDI
ACofS Fleet Maintenance	RADM	Edward S. McGINLEY, II
Fleet Dental Officer	RADM	William H. SNELL
Fleet Chaplain	CAPT	A. Byron HOLDERBY
Fleet Judge Advocate	CAPT	Dennis L. MANDSAGER
**********		
Commander THIRD Fleet	VADM	Jerry UNRUH
Commander SEVENTH Fleet	VADM	Timothy WRIGHT
Commander U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Pacific (USN-USCG)	VADM	Martin DANIELL

FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC

Commanding General/ COMMARCORBASESPAC	LtGen	H. C. STACKPOLE, III
Dep CG/COMMARCORBASESPAC	BGen	Gary E. BROWN
Chief of Staff	Col	Anthony A. WOOD
ACofS, G-1	Col	Lynn W. WILSON
ACofS, G-2	Col	Keith L. MAXFIELD
ACofS, G-3	Col	Robert I. MacPHERSON
ACofS, G-4	Col	David M. WELLS
ACofS, G-5	LtCol	W. M. GIVEN, III
ACofS, G-6	Col	R. F. ROQUES, Jr.
ACofS, G-7	LtCol	J. D. ALEXANDER
AcofS, Comptroller	Col	G. E. HEAIVILIN
AcofS, Aviation Logistics	LtCol	P. A. GARRETT
Engineer Officer	Col	Harry G. RUDGE
Staff Judge Advocate	Maj	W. J. LUCAS
Force Medical Officer	CAPT, USN	John M. MATECZUN
Force Dental Officer	CAPT, USN	George H. GRAF
**********		
Commanding General I Marine Expeditionary Force	LtGen	Robert B. JOHNSTON
Commanding General III Marine Expeditionary Force	MajGen	Norman E. EHLERT

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF),~~ DECL:OADR.

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U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
COMMAND ORGANIZATION



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

DEPLOYMENT OF WESTPAC
NAVAL & MARINE AIR AND NAVAL SHIP UNITS (U)



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

PACIFIC AIR FORCES

PRINCIPAL MISSIONS AND TASKS

Prepare to:

- Conduct offensive and defensive air operations in accordance with USCINCPAC Operation Plans.
- Assist in the defense of the United States against attack through the Pacific.
- Assist in the defense of friendly nations in the Pacific.
- Conduct aerial reconnaissance and reconnaissance technical support.
- Conduct air search and rescue operations in the USPACOM area.
- Provide air support, both offensive and defensive, for other component commanders and subordinate unified commanders.

Provide tactical airlift for USPACOM forces.

Support other USAF forces operations in the USPACOM area.

Exercise general directive authority over other USAF forces operating in support of USCINCPAC.

Assist Air Force sections in all aspects of the Security Assistance Program for friendly air forces in the USPACOM.

Develop plans for USPACOM air offense and defense operations and act as the USCINCPAC principal adviser on employment of aerospace power.

Function as USPACOM coordinating authority for Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape, and Recovery (SERER) matters.



USAF
F-15

DIRECTORY OF KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

Commander Pacific Air Forces	Gen	Robert L. RUTHERFORD
Vice Commander	Maj Gen	VACANT
Chief of Staff	Col	Harry A. WHITE, III
Director for Personnel	Col	Brian A ERICKSON
Director for Operations	Maj Gen	Ronald W. IVERSON
Director for Intelligence	Col	Robert E. M. FRADY
Director for Plans	Maj Gen	Joseph J. REDDEN
Director for Logistics	Col	Richard M. MAY
Director for Financial Management Comptroller	Col	James F. DOUGHERTY, Jr.
Director for Civil Engineering	Col	Phillip STOWELL
Director for Communications-Computer Systems	Col	Alfred R. GARCIA
Director for Security Police	Col	Lawrence R. MAYS
Command Surgeon	Col	Pedro N. RIVERA
Staff Judge Advocate	Col	Olan G. WALDROP, Jr.
Command Chaplain	Col (CH)	Joseph C. MATTHEWS
Director of Public Affairs	Col	Roy A. CROCKETT
Director of Information Management	Col	James A. COZZA
Director of Safety	Col	Roger C. LOCHER
Inspector General	Col (P)	Thomas R. CASE

****

Commander Fifth Air Force	Lt Gen	Richard E. HAWLEY
Commander Seventh Air Force	Lt Gen	Howell M. ESTES, III
Commander Eleventh Air Force	Lt Gen	Joseph W. RALSTON
Commander Thirteenth Air Force	Maj Gen	H. Hale BURR, Jr.

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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

PACIFIC AIR FORCES
COMMAND ORGANIZATION



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

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The record

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS (U)



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

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Exempt (b)(1) Sec 1.3(a) # 1

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND RESOURCES (U)

LOCATION	ORGANIZATION	REMARKS
HAWAII (CAMP H.M. SMITH)	SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, PACIFIC (SOCPAC)	Plans and conducts theater-wide (less Korea) joint/combined special operations as a subordinate unified command. provides command and control for in-theater special operations forces. In contingencies, provides joint special operations task force nucleus and provides special operations expertise to joint task force(s).
HAWAII (FORT SHAFTER)	4TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND	Plans and coordinates sustainment of Army special operations forces in execution of special operations missions.
HAWAII (PEARL HARBOR)	SEAL DELIVERY VEHICLE (SDV) TEAM ONE (DET HI)	Under COCOM/OPCON of USCINCSOC until embarked on CINCPACFLT submarine configured to support dry deck shelter SDV/Mass Swimmer Lock-in/Lock-out as secondary mission.
GUAM (APRA HARBOR)	NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE UNIT ONE (NSWU-1) 4 SEAL PLATOONS (TAD) 1 SPECIAL BOAT UNIT DET WESTPAC (TAD) 1 MOBILE COMM TEAM DET 2 ARG SEAL PLATOONS WITH SPECIAL BOAT UNIT DET* EMBARKED WITH ARG ALFA AND ARG BRAVO (TAD)*	Plans and conducts Naval Special Warfare operations. Operational forces are TAD from USSOCOM and under OPCON of CINCPACFLT/COMSOCPAC. Forces under COMSOCPAC OPCON designated as NSWTU-PAC.
OKINAWA (TORII STATION)	1ST BATTALION, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN) (1/1 SFG)	Plans and conducts Army special operations.
OKINAWA (KADENA AB)	353D SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (353 SOG) 1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON (1 SOS) (MC-130E) 320TH SPECIAL TACTICS SQUADRON (320 STS) 17TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON (17 SOS) (HC-130)	Plans, coordinates, conducts, and provides command and control for Air Force Special Operations in USPACOM. Plans and conducts Air Force special operations using MC-130 COMBAT TALON. Plans and conducts special operations combat control and pararescue operations. Plans and conducts Air Force special operations using HC-130 COMBAT SHADOW.
KOREA (YONGSAN/SEONGNAM)	SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND-KOREA (SOC-K) SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENT-KOREA (USA-SFD-K)	Provides planning, coordination, and liaison with ROK Army Special Warfare Command for special operations forces in Korea. Forms nucleus of Joint/Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force. Plans, coordinates and conducts liaison with ROKA SWC and SWS and SF brigades. Conducts joint/combined training for special operations forces in Korea.
KOREA (OSAN)	31ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON (31 SOS) (MH-53J)	Plans and conducts Air Force special operations using MH-53J PAVE LOW.
CORONADO, CA	NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP ONE (NSWG-1) SEAL TEAM ONE SEAL TEAM THREE SEAL TEAM FIVE SEAL DELIVERY VEHICLE TEAM ONE SPECIAL BOAT SQUADRON ONE	Forces listed are available for planning and oriented for USCINCPAC but are COCOM/OPCON to USCINCSOC.
FORT LEWIS, WA	1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN) (-) (1SFG) HQ AND HQ COMPANY 2D BATTALION, 1 SFG 3D BATTALION, 1 SFG SERVICE COMPANY SIGNAL COMPANY COMBAT INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (-)	Forces listed are available for planning and oriented for USCINCPAC, but are COCOM/OPCON to USCINCPAC.

See Annex E to JSCP for Reserve Component Special Operations Forces with USPACOM area orientation and other forces capable of supporting special operations in the USPACOM.
* SEAL Platoons and Special Boat Unit Detachments under OPCON of Amphibious Squadron Commander.

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

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USPACOM AREA DOD PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1992

LOCATION	DATA SOURCE	GRAND TOTAL	MILITARY					U.S. CIVILIANS*					FOREIGN NATIONAL CIVILIANS*					DEPENDENTS MILITARY/CIVILIAN**					
			TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	ODA	TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	ODA	TOTAL	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	ODA
ALASKA	1	54,014	22,206	9,456	1,930	10,773	49	4,697	2,464	250	1,707	276	0	0	0	0	0	27,109	10,246	1,786	14,829	37	211
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	0
AUSTRALIA	1	1,166	518	8	227	272	11	8	2	6	0	0	81	0	77	0	4	561	46	215	282	12	6
BANGLADESH	1	17	15	3	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
BURMA	1	20	9	2	0	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	7	0	3	1	0
CHINA	1	54	32	6	2	4	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	10	4	2	6	0
DIEGO GARCIA	1	1,319	1,253	4	1,135	24	90	4	0	4	0	0	62	0	62	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GUAM	1	22,198	7,844	40	5,029	2,435	340	4,827	13	3,819	634	181	10	0	10	0	0	9,717	62	6,328	3,106	138	83
HAWAII	1	111,224	44,864	18,666	12,321	4,932	8,945	17,893	4,933	10,886	1,431	643	0	0	0	0	0	48,467	14,501	19,029	7,121	7,414	402
HONG KONG	1	76	43	18	13	4	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	12	10	11	0	0
INDIA	1	46	25	3	3	6	13	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	5	3	9	3	0
INDONESIA	1	158	42	6	16	10	11	1	0	0	1	0	84	0	84	0	0	31	6	9	8	6	2
JAPAN/OKINAWA	1	117,858	45,946	1,866	6,155	15,344	22,581	5,134	847	1,432	915	1,940	16,938	3,356	9,075	3,822	685	49,838	2,996	12,010	19,233	14,513	886
JOHNSTON ATOLL	1	289	238	228	1	11	0	40	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11	0	0	0	0
KOREA	1	58,584	35,743	26,402	338	8,945	58	2,045	1,470	40	174	361	9,461	8,085	0	1,030	346	11,335	8,932	374	1,725	83	241
MADAGASCAR/MAURITIUS	1	18	15	0	2	0	13	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0
MALAYSIA	1	58	22	5	1	9	7	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	9	0	14	5	7
MARSHALL ISLANDS	1	236	67	67	0	0	0	110	107	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	59	59	0	0	0	0
MICRONESIA	1	52	52	26	13	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIDWAY/WAKE ISLAND	1	14	13	0	6	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
NEPAL	1	12	6	2	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0
NEW ZEALAND	1	141	61	1	46	7	7	6	0	6	0	0	3	0	2	0	1	71	5	46	9	4	7
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PALAU	1	13	13	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PHILIPPINES	1	7,002	1,929	25	1,137	31	736	218	0	177	1	40	3,844	0	3,584	1	49	1,211	1	1,063	33	72	42
SEYCHELLES	1	11	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	7	0	0
SINGAPORE	1	299	145	5	93	39	8	21	0	20	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	133	1	57	50	7	18
SRI LANKA/MALDIVES	1	56	11	0	3	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	41	0	41	0	0	4	0	3	0	1	0
THAILAND	1	341	105	40	12	34	19	13	4	9	0	0	144	142	0	0	2	79	6	5	56	11	1
OTHER***	1	3	2	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SEVENTH FLEET (AFLOAT)	2	14,476	14,476	0	12,869	0	1,607	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
THIRD FLEET (AFLOAT)	2	100,461	100,461	0	100,461	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USPACOM CONUS ASHORE	2	95,244	95,244	0	47,753	0	47,491	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		585,272	371,410	56,877	189,580	42,908	82,047	34,821	9,882	16,851	4,863	3,425	30,488	11,583	12,945	4,853	1,087	148,573	36,931	40,943	46,497	22,296	1,906

* Appropriated fund employees only.
** Excludes dependents of US citizens civilians who are permanent residents and employed in the state or territory of their residence; i.e., Hawaii, Guam, etc.
*** Other - Fiji, Northern Marianna Islands, French Polynesia, Western Samoa & Brunei.

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

UNCLASSIFIED

HQ USCINCPAC, COMPONENT, AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

(AUTHORIZED AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1992)

STAFF	ARMY		287NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		U.S. CIVILIANS	FOREIGN NATIONAL CIVILIANS	TOTAL MIL/CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
USCINCPAC[1]	96	49	87	77	23	10	110	61	319	199	120		638
CG USARPAC	84	45							84	45	238		367
CINCPACFLT			151	157					151	157	102		410[a]
COMPACAF							301	280	301	280	245		826
CGFMFPAC			5	13	107	468			112	481	42		635
COMUSJAPAN	25	9	14	5	10	3	27	19	76	36	43	12	167
COMUSKOREA[2]	52	33	10	16	5	3	46	41	113	93	54	11	271
CINCUNC/CFC[3]	92	37	16	18	12	2	41	23	161	80	33	10	284
COMALCOM	13	5	8	3			18	11	39	19	21		79
COMSOCPAC	13	6	6	2	1	1	10	3	30	12	1		43
JTF 5	4	3	12	13	2	1	7	4	25	21	26		72
TOTAL	379	187	309	304	160	488	560	442	1,411	1,423	925	33	3,792

1. USCINCPAC - Cruise Missile Support Activity, Information Systems Support Group, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific, Joint Task Force - Full Accounting, and Pacific Stars and Stripes not included.
2. COMUSKOREA - Army figures do not include Headquarters Eighth U.S. Army.
3. Even though the organizations are not assigned to USCINCPAC, manpower documents for the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (HQ UNC/CFC) are submitted through USCINCPAC headquarters J1 for JCS approval.

a. CINCPACFLT figures only include UIC 000070.

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

UNCLASSIFIED

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL
AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE & CIVILIAN CATEGORY FY93

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		U.S. CIVILIANS	FOREIGN NATIONAL CIVILIANS
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL		
FMSO AUSTRALIA			1	1			1		2	1		
DAO BANGLADESH												1
DAO BURMA												1
DSA INDIA	1						1		2		1	3
OMADP INDONESIA	3	1	1	2			2	1	6	4	1	17
MDO JAPAN	1		2				2		5		4	5
JUSMAGKOREA	12	1	6	3	1		10	3	29	7	11	27
DAO MADAGASCAR		1								1		1
SAO MALAYSIA	1	1					1		2	1	1	2
JUSMAGPHIL	10	2	5	2	1		5		21	4	5	13
DAO SINGAPORE	1	1					1		2	1	1	
DAO SRI LANKA												1
JUSMAGTHAI	9	3	2	1	2		8	2	21	6	2	17
TOTAL	38	10	17	9	4	0	31	6	90	25	26	88

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

UNCLASSIFIED

KEY USCINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

LTG HAROLD T. FIELDS, JR. USA
Deputy Commander in Chief/
Chief of Staff
and Inspector General

AMBASSADOR M. JAMES WILKINSON CIV
Foreign Policy Advisor

FO1 KENNETH A. YATES CIV
U.S. Information Agency Advisor

Col JOHN F. REGNI USAF
Director for Manpower,
Personnel, and Support

Brig Gen BILLY J. BINGHAM USAF
Director for Intelligence

MajGen G. R. CHRISTMAS USMC
Director for Operations

Brig Gen W. THOMAS WEST USAF
Deputy Director for Operations

RADM JOHN R. RYAN USN
Director for Logistics
and Security Assistance

RADM LARRY G. VOGT USN
Director for Strategic
Planning and Policy



BG LARRY R. ELLIS USA
Deputy Director for
Strategic Planning and Policy

DAVID G. HAUT
SES-4 CIV
Chief, Research and Analysis Division
Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate

DON C. EDDINGTON
GS-15 CIV
Scientific Technical Advisor
(Navy Science Assistance Program)

LEO M. CHILDS
MG USA
Director for Command and Control and Communications Systems

CARL L. CRITCHLOW
Col USAF
Washington Liaison Office

ALFRED J. LYNN
GM-15 CIV
Director for Public and Governmental Affairs

PATRICIA L. PRIEST
Lt Col USAF
Joint Secretary

WILLIAM B. HASKETT
CAPT, SC USN
Comptroller



JOHN R. HENRIKSEN
CAPT, JAGC USN
Staff Judge Advocate

DAVID S. FROST
RADM (Sel) USN
Surgeon

AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF HQ USCINCPAC AND DIRECT REPORTING UNITS

		30 September 1992			
		OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
J00	Commander in Chief	8	13	1	22
J01	Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff	2	1	1	4
FPA/USIA	Foreign Policy and USIA Advisors	1	1	2	4
STA	Scientific and Technical Advisor	1	0	1	2
IG	Inspector General	3	1	1	5
J02	Washington Liaison Office	1	1	0	2
J03	Public & Governmental Affairs Directorate	12	8	8	28
J04	Joint Secretary	3	12	6	21
J05	Comptroller	3	2	8	13
J06	Staff Judge Advocate	5	3	1	9
J07	Surgeon	8	7	2	17
J08	Information Management Office	3	1	2	6
J1	Manpower, Personnel and Support Directorate	17	35	18	70
J2	Intelligence Directorate	37	116	12	165
J3	Operations Directorate	86	42	5	133
J4	Logistics & Security Assistance Directorate	47	17	10	74
J5	Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate	50	20	20	90
J6	Command and Control and Communications Systems Directorate	33	14	15	62
Sub-Total		320	294	113	727
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post	Disestablished FY92			
CMSA	Cruise Missile Support Activity	6	17	23	46
HSA	Headquarters Support Activity	Disestablished FY91 (manpower included in J1 totals above)			
JICPAC	Joint Intelligence Center Pacific	200	665	167	1,032
JTF-FA	Joint Task Force-Full Accounting	34	92	24	150
PS&S	Pacific Stars and Stripes	3	35	69	107
ISSG	USPACOM Information Systems Support Group	13	39	24	76
Sub-Total		256	848	307	1,411
GRAND TOTAL		576	1,142	420	2,138

Source: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1992 (S/NF), DECL:OADR

SECTION II-THE USCINCPAC STAFF

Key USCINCPAC Staff Personnel Changes

U.S. Information Agency Advisor

(U) Mrs. Virginia Loo Farris, U.S. Information Agency Advisor (USIA), departed USCINCPAC on 22 July 1992. Mr. Ken Yates, FO1, succeeded Mrs. Farris as the USIA Advisor on 16 November 1992.

Strategic Planning and Policy

(U) BG Larry R. Ellis, USA, succeeded BG Lawson W. Magruder, III, USA, as Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy (J5) on 17 July 1992.

USCINCPAC Liaison Office, Washington, D.C.

(U) Col Carl L. Critchlow, USAF, succeeded Col John W. Dalton, USAF, as the Chief of the USCINCPAC Liaison Office (JO2), in Washington, D.C. on 18 June 1992.

Joint Secretariat

(U) Lt Col Patricia L.C. Priest, USAF, succeeded Col Duncan Koller, USAF, on 8 July 1992, as the Joint Secretary (JO4).

Surgeon

(U) RADM David S. Frost, USN, succeeded RADM William J. McDaniel, USN, as the USCINCPAC Surgeon (JO7) on 3 August 1992.

Direct Reporting Units and Subordinate Unified Commands Key Personnel Changes

COMALCOM

(U) Lt Gen Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, succeeded Lt Gen Thomas I. McInerney, USAF, as the Commander, Alaskan Command (COMALCOM) in a change of command ceremony at Elmendorf AFB on 13 July 1992.[3]

Joint Casualty Resolution Center

(U) On 9 January 1992, BG Thomas Needham, USA, replaced LTC Joe B. Harvey, USA, as head of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). Consequently, when the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) superseded JCRC on 22 January, BG Needham assumed command of JTF-FA.[4]

Joint Intelligence Center Pacific

(U) On August 7, 1992, CAPT Lowell E. Jacoby, USN, succeeded CAPT William H. Walls, USN, as Commander, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC).

Component Commander Changes

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

(U) LtGen H. C. (Hank) Stackpole, USMC, assumed command of Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) on 3 July 1992. He succeeded LtGen Royal N. Moore, USMC, who had retired on 1 July.[5]

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[3]USCINCPAC Trip Report (U).
[4]USCINCPAC 241852Z Jan 92 (U).
[5]Honolulu Advertiser, 16 Jun 92, pg. A-3.

SECTION III-COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

Information Management Office

(U) On 24 July 1992, the FY 93 Manpower Reduction Working Group recommended that J6 absorb the Information Management Office (J08) in order to consolidate information management assets. On 28 July, Admiral Larson approved the change. J08 was disestablished on 1 August. J6 was scheduled to receive the J08 billets shortly thereafter.[6]

Activation of Joint Task Force-Full Accounting

(U) On 8 January 1992, Secretary of Defense Chaney approved USCINCPAC Operation Order 91-1, Expanded POW/MIA Operations in Southeast Asia-Operation Full Accounting. This order authorized a joint task force that would capitalize on the improved relationships between the U.S. and Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in resolving Southeast Asian POW/MIA cases. Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) was activated on 22 January 1992 and superseded the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). JTF-FA served as the operational nucleus for coordinating all U.S. investigative and recovery efforts for POW/MIA case resolution. The task force managed a program that was formerly the shared responsibility of three separate agencies: JCRC, the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Commensurate with the increase in complexity and scope, the Joint Staff designated an additional 74 billets to JTF-FA. When operating at full complement, JTF-FA would employ 150 military personnel. On 23 March 1992, JTF-FA moved to its newly renovated quarters in Bldg. 20, Camp Smith, from the JCRC office spaces it had occupied at NAS Barbers Point.[7]

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[6]J13/SSS/73-92 (U), 3 Aug 92, Subj: FY93 Joint Manpower Reduction Update.
[7]USCINCPAC 241852Z Jan 92 (U).

Establishment of PACOM U.S. Marine Corps Service Component Command

(U) Headquarters, Marine Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC), was established at Camp H. M. Smith on 31 July 1992. Commander MARFORPAC (COMMARFORPAC) was established to serve as the U.S. Marine Service component commander for USCINCPAC. COMMARFORPAC retained the title and responsibilities of Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Pacific (CG FMFPAC), and as such, functioned as a Marine type commander under the operational control of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) for naval operational control matters. COMMARFORPAC was also tasked with providing forces to CG FMFPAC, as required, and serving as the USMC service component commander (designate) for U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command (USCINCENT) and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA). Command relationships below the USPACOM component command level remained the same, i.e., operational control of embarked marine forces remained with the numbered fleet commanders.[8]

[8]COMMARFORPAC 091813Z Aug 92 (U).

SECTION IV--FOREIGN LABOR POLICY AND PROGRAMS

Employment of Japanese Nationals

(C) Throughout 1992, the Government of Japan (GOJ) continued to pay two-thirds of the cost for Japanese National employees of the U.S. Forces. Under terms of a January 1991 Special Measures Agreement (SMA), GOJ was expected to increase its share of these costs on an incremental basis, assuming over 99% of all JN costs in 1995. The remaining costs included moneys previously received by the U.S. Government (USG), as well as administrative costs and TDY expenses. GOJ had set the maximum number of JNs that COMUSJAPAN could employ at 22,637, based on the highest number of JNs employed during the three years prior to the signing of the SMA.[9]

(C) On 5 June 1992, COMNAVFORJAPAN stated it would be receiving additional work as a result of the home port shifts of USS BELLEAU WOOD and USS O'BRIEN, replacement of USS MIDWAY and air wing by USS INDEPENDENCE and a larger air wing, increased ordnance and supply operations, and transfer of a portion of the Subic and Cubi mission to Japan. COMNAVFORJAPAN conducted a manpower validation study which cited the need for an additional 983 JN billets. COMNAVFORJAPAN requested relief from the ceiling of 22,637 imposed by the 1991 SMA.[10]

(C) COMUSJAPAN then commissioned the Japan Joint Labor Affairs Committee (JLAC) to reassess JN requirements. JLAC indicated a need for 1,347 additional billets (Army 83, Navy 776, and Air Force 448).[11]

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[9] J12 HistSum Dec 92 (C).
[10] CINCPACFLT 052300Z Jun 92 (C).
[11] J12 HistSum Dec 92 (C).

(C) COMUSJAPAN also informed USCINCPAC it was not possible to persuade GOJ to increase the ceiling during the lifetime of the current SMA unless significant changes in the security environment warranted a greater U.S. presence in Japan. COMUSJAPAN recommended to USCINCPAC that the ceiling be renegotiated in 1995.[12]

(C) The GOJ Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA) told COMUSJAPAN that the GOJ would not even fund the maximum number of JNs in Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 92. They would fund only 21,938 JNs.[13] This decision greatly exacerbated the COMUSJAPAN manpower problem.

(C) USCINCPAC recognized the political sensitivities of the JN employment ceiling and addressed the issue at the USCINCPAC Component Commanders' Conference on 13 July. They examined the distribution of COMUSJAPAN employees across installation and functional areas and the distribution of the 22,637 billets across each service. USCINCPAC's objectives were to do everything within USCINCPAC authority to meet new mission requirements without raising the levels of U.S. presence in Japan, safeguard Japanese funding for the full 22,637 billets, and assess methods for satisfying new missions internally and/or across COMUSJAPAN.[14]

(C) Since the conference members were unable to resolve this very complex issue, USCINCPAC issued a message on 23 July to CINCPACAF, USARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CG FMFPAC directing them to examine their ability to hire more U.S. citizen civilians to accomplish their missions, to turn to personal services contracts where possible (especially in non-appropriated fund operations), and to critically review their present in-service distribution of JN resources. COMUSJAPAN also conducted an analysis of the JN

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[12]Ibid.
[13]COMUSJAPAN 260131Z Jun 92 (C).
[14]USCINCPAC 012222Z Jul 92 (C).

ceiling issue, including political perspectives, historical information, and pros and cons of the aforementioned options. While conference participants conducted in-depth discussions at the 3 September Mini-Component Commanders' Conference, they were still unable to resolve the issue.[15]

(S) On 14 September, USCINCPAC informed COMUSJAPAN that component commanders were doing their utmost to minimize the need for additional JN workers but nevertheless, they continued to state they lacked adequate JN manpower. USCINCPAC directed COMUSJAPAN to develop a system to evaluate the JN work force requirements for accomplishing new missions and to submit cross leveling recommendations resulting from the application of this system. Admiral Larson stated this would be an agenda item at the January 1993 Component Commander's Conference. At year's end, the controversial issue remained unresolved.[16]

Wage and Benefits Adjustment for U.S. Forces Korean Employees

(U) The 1992 Korea Wage and Benefits survey was conducted 1 May-23 June 1992 by the U.S. Forces in Korea under authority delegated by SECDEF in DOD instruction 1400.10 of 5 December 1980. Survey data was collected from 70 companies throughout the Republic of Korea (ROK) with 25,432 individual job matches made between U.S. forces jobs (both appropriated and non-appropriated) and those of Korean industry. Using the survey data, the USPACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) calculated the local prevailing wages and used this data to determine the wage increase adjustment for foreign national (FN) employees of the U.S. Forces.[17]

(U) Survey statistics indicated a weighted average pay-line increase of 15.7% over 1991 pay. However, Section 8002 of the

[15]COMUSJAPAN 270621Z Aug 92 (U), USCINCPAC 230330Z Jul 92 (S).
[16]USCINCPAC LTR J1 Ser 366 of 14 Sep 92 (S) DECL OADR.
[17]J1 Annual HistSum 92 (S).

FY92 Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriation Act (PL102-172) complicated adjusting wages and benefits since it limited the annual wage increase for FN employees to the rate of the U.S. general schedule increase (in CY92, 4.2%) or the rate of the host country public sector increase, whichever was greater. The increase granted by the ROK to its government employees was 13.9%, a rate less than the Korean industry job survey results but exceeding the U.S. general schedule increase. Wage schedules were developed to comply with the pay cap by increasing last year's pay-line by 13.9% at each grade level. The survey findings pay-line for the U.S. Forces FN grades 1-4 fell below 13.9% therefore grades 1-4 of the Korean wage grade schedule were not increased by 13.9%. The combined average pay-line increase for both schedules was 13.4%. Upon approval by the USPACOM Service Component Commands, the lead agency, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), issued the revised schedule of wages on 25 June, with an effective date of 1 July 1992. The wage adjustment covered 18,034 appropriated and non-appropriated U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) FN employees.[18]

(S) However, before the schedule of wages was finalized, COMUSKOREA requested USCINCPAC support in obtaining a "public interest determination" from Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for setting the pay raise at a rate much lower than that set through the survey process. COMUSKOREA stated it anticipated a severe Army funding shortfall in FY93 and projected that the combination of the shortfall plus the expense of applying the full pay adjustment would cause extensive reductions-in-force (RIF) of FN employees. USCINCPAC submitted the request for a public interest determination on 6 June. SECDEF denied the public interest determination request stating that "it is not in the public interest to grant increases less than the prevailing wages in

[18]Ibid.

this particular circumstance." The wage adjustment was set at 13.4%.[19]

(S) Despite USFK concerns, there were no additional RIFs in FY92. Mid-year and year-end funding increases offset the projected underfunding. However, COMUSKOREA stated Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) had to eliminate 457 positions in FY93 to reach Program Budget Guide (PBG) authorized levels. COMUSKOREA voiced concern that this reduction would not suffice. However, as of 31 December 1992, COMUSKOREA had not yet identified the RIFs which might be required due to the combination of applying the full wage increase and any Army funding constraints.[20]

Annual Leave System for USFK Foreign National Employees

(U) In 1979, the Republic of Korea government, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Treasury agreed, and Korean Employees Union (KEU) supported, a USFK proposal that USFK liquidate its severance pay obligation to all Korean employees who were then on the rolls. This eliminated an expensive severance pay program, the costs of which were projected to escalate even further in the future. In 1979, USFK paid KNs $117 million in accumulated severance accrual and deposited the money in individual employee bank accounts. The employees were given the option of withdrawing money from the account or leaving it on deposit in an interest bearing account, and in some instances, KNs spent the money instead of saving for their post separation futures.[21]

(U) In early 1992, the KEU held many rallies to protest continuing cutbacks in FN jobs and the low severance benefits paid. The KEU demanded a return to the pre-1979, more generous severance pay plan. Their requests could not

[19]COMUSKOREA 021446Z Jun 92 (S), USCINCPAC 060404Z Jun 92 (S), SECDEF 020125Z Jul 92
[20]COMUSKOREA 170331Z Nov 92 (S), J1 Annual HistSum 92 (S).
[21]USCINCPAC 010300Z Aug 92 (U), J12 HistSum Dec 92 (S).

be accommodated. As an alternative, the KEU proposed changes to the U.S. Forces annual leave system for KN employees as a means of enhancing the maximum cash payments made to employees who are separated from employment due to work force reductions or other reasons. The system they proposed to change granted employees ten days of annual leave per year for 100 percent attendance plus an additional day for each additional year of continual service. Employees also earned 12 days of monthly leave and 3.44 days of vacation leave. The KEU had become extremely concerned about the detrimental effects downsizing of USFK would have on the KNs, especially since the employees would not have a substantial severance payment upon separation.[22]

(U) In an attempt to provide an avenue by which KN employees could receive a higher lump sum annual leave payoff at time of separation, USFK made two proposals to the USPACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC). The first was to increase the annual leave carry over from 240 hours to 360 hours. The second was to establish an aggregate 360-hour limit on lump sum payments for unused annual leave. Accrued leave in excess of 360 hours would have to be used; if not, it would be forfeited. Low tenure employees with lower accrual rates would benefit from the change, whereas high tenure employees with higher accrual rates would not. The maximum average increase in lump sum leave payments for all employees was projected to be approximately $326.[23]

(U) The JLPC accepted the USFK proposals and introduced two other conditions:[24]

- The USFK would secure a commitment from the KEU that they would not exert any further pressure on USF for additional

[22]USCINCPAC 010300Z Aug 92 (U).
[23]SECDEF 270636Z Aug 92 (U), J12 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[24]USCINCPAC 010300Z Aug 92 (U).

severance pay as a quid pro quo for the increase in annual leave carry over hours.

• Instituting a 0.2% benefits allowance offset to cover the increased annual carry over costs. USCINCPAC calculated a 0.2% offset would save $437,500 in benefits allowance costs.

(U) On 1 August, USCINCPAC requested SECDEF approval of the proposed leave changes. On 27 August, SECDEF approved the changes and stated that the adjustments to the benefits allowance and annual leave accrual and lump sum payments must be cost neutral. The effective date for leave accrual, benefits allowance reduction, and lump sum payments was slated for 1 July 1993, but only if USCINCPAC secured a written agreement between the parties that this adjustment under total compensation comparability settled the outstanding severance pay issue with the U.S. Forces. An agreement covering these items was signed by USFK and the KEU on 18 November. On 23 November, COMUSKOREA announced the changes would become effective the first KN pay period on or after 1 January 1993. The 360 hour limitation on lump sum leave payments would go into effect at the beginning of the 1993 leave year.[25]

Termination of Filipino Foreign National Employees

(U) In consonance with the disestablishment of military bases in the Philippines, over 12,000 positions occupied by Filipino foreign nationals were terminated by September 30, 1992. However, 2,099 FNs were rehired on a temporary appointment basis to assist with the base closure. The employment of these FNs was terminated on 24 November 1992, the final withdrawal date of U.S. forces in the Philippines. In total, over 20,000 FNs were separated between May 1991 and November 1992.[26]

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[25]J12 HistSum Dec 92 (U), SECDEF 270636Z Aug 92.
[26]CINCPACFLT 060310Z Oct 92 (U), J12 HistSum Dec 92 (S).

(U) Most of the employees were involuntarily terminated and were therefore eligible for severance pay, but retirement eligibles received retirement benefits. Despite the huge layoff, there were no significant labor problems. The U.S. Forces management-Filipino Employees' Union agreements negotiated in early 1992 provided the vehicle for the smooth transition.

(U) The two special Memoranda of Agreement negotiated with the union amended the January 1990 Collective Bargaining Agreement. These agreements eased the job loss burden of FNs and concurrently saved time and money for the U.S. Forces. One agreement amended the U.S. forces policy to permit voluntary reductions-in-force for employees who obtained alternate, outside employment prior to their scheduled RIF date. In exchange, the union agreed not to submit any arbitration cases for adjudication to the U.S.-Republic of the Philippines Joint Labor Committee after 1 June 1992. (However, the Clark Air Base union petitioned the RP Department of Labor to submit the cases of 21 former employees of Clark Air Base for arbitration after the deadline. The cases were accepted by the RP co-chairman on the committee.)

(U) In the second memorandum, the traditional method for setting wages was discarded in favor of using the average of the pay increases over the past ten years. The ten-year average amounted to 15.72%.

(U) In addition, over 2,200 FNs were placed in new jobs, primarily overseas vacancies, through the extraordinary efforts of USCINCPACREPPHIL, the U.S. Embassy, the employees' union, and various Government of the Philippine agencies.[27]

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[27]J12 HistSum Dec 92 (S)

(U) Despite the complete withdrawal of U.S. Forces from the RP, unresolved arbitration cases, unresolved workers' compensation cases (on-the-job injury or death), and the issue of Philippine Social Security arrangements for Filipinos employed by the U.S. Forces outside the Philippines, e.g. Diego Garcia, prevented the U.S. Forces from completely terminating forieng national personnel management involvement in the RP.

Civilian Personnel Servicing for Remote Security Assistance Offices

(U) Servicing of U.S. Civil Service employees at remote USPACOM Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) was traditionally provided by a Navy Human Resource Office (HRO) from outside the country. Primary reasons were that the employees occupy Navy manpower billets and there are no U.S. government personnel offices in the country equipped to provide the necessary support.[28]

(U) Through October 1992, the HRO Naval Station Subic Bay provided U.S. citizens with personnel support for six SAO's in South and Southeast Asia. HRO Subic also provided FN personnel support to the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL). In preparation for the closure of Naval Station Subic, an intra-service support agreement to provide personnel services for U.S. citizens was established with HRO Atsugi, Japan. HRO Atsugi provides civilian personnel support to U.S. civilians and monitors FN employment programs at the following SAOs:

[28]Ibid.

	U.S. Civilian Employees	FN Employees
JUSMAGPHIL	5	13
JUSMAGTHAI	2	22
OMADP JAKARTA	1	17
DSA INDIA	1	3
DAO SINGAPORE	1	-
SAO KUALA LUMPUR	1	2
TOTALS:	11	57

(U) FNs with JUSMAGPHIL were transferred from the U.S. Forces employment to the U.S. Embassy mission plan in July 1992. Servicing for FNs at other remote SAOs will continue to be provided by their respective in-country U.S. embassy.

Elimination of Travel Restrictions to the Republic of the Philippines

(U) When the security situation in the RP became unstable in 1989, travel restrictions were imposed on U.S. military personnel and their families. These restrictions adversely affected many U.S. Armed Forces personnel and their families. Particularly affected were Filipino national U.S. Armed Forces personnel and their dependents who were denied the opportunity to take ordinary leave, and frequently emergency leave, in their homeland. In October 1992, with withdrawal of U.S. Forces imminent, USCINCPAC reassessed the threat to U.S. Forces personnel, determined that travel restrictions could be lifted after the withdrawal of U.S. forces on 24 November 1992, and requested CJCS concurrence in eliminating the travel restrictions. The Chairman concurred on 12 November and also stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense was updating the foreign area clearance guide accordingly. Four days later, USCINCPAC issued a travel advisory citing leave and TDY/TAD changes and advising that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would expire on 31 December following the withdrawal of U.S.

forces from the Philippines. The following travel conditions applied after 31 December: a passport would be required to enter the Philippines; a Philippine visa would be required for stays longer than 21 days for non-Philippine citizens; U.S. disbursing and check cashing facilities would be unavailable; travelers must pay tax on tickets purchased in the Philippines; personnel would not be exempt from import taxes, export taxes, and custom duties; and visitors might be required to pay immigration and alien registration fees. The U.S. Embassy would provide only those services provided in any other foreign country.[29]

Pacific Theater Education Council-40th Meeting

(U) There were 26 Department of Defense (DODDS) schools in Japan with a total enrollment of over 18,000. Command-sponsored dependents were authorized to attend these schools, but dependents without command sponsorship were allowed to attend DODDS schools on a space-available basis, or could seek private schooling.[30]

(U) The fortieth meeting of the Pacific Theater Education Council (PTEC) was conducted from 13-16 April in Okinawa, Japan. DODDS-Pacific Region (DODDS-PAC) and COMUSJAPAN/J1 co-hosted the meeting and representatives from USCINCPAC component commands (except (PACAF), USFJ, and U.S Forces Korea (USFK) participated. Co-chairs of the meeting were the Director, DODDS-PAC, and USCINCPAC/J1.

(U) The Director, DODDS-PAC began the meeting at the DODDS-PAC headquarters in Futenma, Japan, with an overview of education programs and initiatives. The group then proceeded to tour all twelve DODDS-PAC primary and secondary schools in Okinawa. The tours included meeting with school administrators,

[29]USCINCPAC 300350Z Oct 92 (U), CJCS 121500Z Nov 92 (U), USCINCPAC 161300Z Nov 92 (U).
[30]J114 Country Paper-Japan, 6 Aug 92 (U).

teachers, and students, receiving briefings, viewing facilities, and visiting classes. The group also conducted an open forum with school advisory committee members, interested parents and teachers. The DODDS-PAC staff issued information on DODDS Report Cards from parents' surveys, President's Education Goals/America 2000 Program, and the projected DODDS-PAC enrollment of 23,312 for the school year 1992-93.

(U) PTEC recommended further study of three issues: declining SAT scores in DODDS schools; frequency of DODDS physical education training; and the need for expanded AIDS, sex education, and teenage pregnancy awareness programs.[31]

DODDS Korea District Quality of Life and
Pacific Theater Education Council-41st Meeting

(U) In Korea, all command-sponsored dependents were allowed to attend DODDS Schools. Dependents who were not command-sponsored were allowed to attend on a space-available basis, or could seek private schooling.[32]

(U) The distance and traffic between Camp Humphreys and Osan AB and the high school at Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul posed a problem for students who wished to participate in school sponsored extra-curricular activities. Prior to the DODDS meeting, several programs were developed to foster participation in extra-curricular activities. They included:

- Giving students free bus tickets to ride home on contract Myungin buses which depart Yongsan Post every hour.

[31] J12 HistSum May 92 (U).
[32] J114 Country Paper-Korea, 6 Aug 92.

- Rescheduling several Seoul American High School activities to the noon hour so that more students could participate.

- Recognizing participation in activities sponsored by the Osan Booster Club on student transcripts. The Osan Booster club, established by the Osan community, sponsored a ski club, football team, drama club, teen council, and a community service club. These initiatives were developed under the auspices of Mr. Thomas R. Ellinger, District Superintendent. [33]

(U) During the forty-first meeting of the PTEC in Seoul, Korea from 5-9 October, participants reviewed these and other issues in DODDS-Korea. The meeting was co-hosted by DODDS-PAC and DODDS Korea District and representatives from USCINCPAC component commands (except USARPAC), USFJ, and USFK participated. Co-chairs of the meeting were the Director, DODDS-PAC and USCINCPAC/J1.

(U) The meeting began at the DODDS Korea District Headquarters in Seoul where USCINCPAC/J1 provided the participants with the objectives of the visit and proposals for improving the existing school system.

(U) The Director, DODDS-PAC gave a brief overview of the current status of education in the theater. The PTEC members received information packets containing the strategy to support the America 2000 initiatives and the National Education Goals, DODDS Pacific Schools Directory, and school enrollment statistics. Over the next four days, the members toured all six of the DODDS schools in the country, during which time they met with administrators, teachers, and students, received school briefings, viewed facilities, visited classrooms, reviewed ROTC programs, and met with school advisory councils. Upon conclusion

[33] Ibid.

of the visits, the co-chairmen briefed COMUSKOREA Chief of Staff, highlighting four areas of concern: DODDS homework policy; course offering in smaller schools; comparison of DODDS schools to exemplary school systems; and school lunch programs.

(U) PTEC also recommended that each school should provide PTEC with its demographics; student groups should be readily available for groups discussions with PTEC members; and PTEC hold open forums at all school locations for interested parents, teachers, and community members.[34]

Child Care

(U) In Japan, there were 1,575 children on waiting lists for child care or child development center enrollment and 190 children on waiting lists for the DOD approved quarters-based child care program. There were 11 additional child care projects planned through FY94. These included nine projects under the Japanese Facility Improvement Program (JFIP) and two unprogrammed projects. Upon completion of these projects, program capacity will be 1,850.

(U) The Air Force was planning an addition and alteration project to expand the Child Development Center at Osan AB so that the center could accommodate 20 more children. This project was scheduled to begin in FY93. The Preschool renovation was completed and the building accepted on 7 August. Osan AB did not provide Family Day Care services since employing maids was permissible. Maids who operate in the service member's home do not need certification.[35]

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[34]J12 HistSum Nov 92 (U).
[35]J114 HistSum Aug 92 (U).

SECTION V--MANPOWER, PERSONNEL PROGRAMS, AND PLANS

Manpower Reductions and Realignments

(U) On 30 May 1990, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the joint community to plan for a 15 percent reduction in five-percent increments (FYs 91-93). On 15 June 1992, CJCS directed USPACOM to begin the FY93 phase of joint manpower reductions on 1 October 1993. Additionally, Section 906 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 91 required reducing management headquarters billets by 20 percent in increments of four-percent-per-year for five years. These annual reductions were to be incorporated in each FY's overall reduction submissions, however, CJCS exempted fully dedicated counter narcotics billets and JTF-FA billets from inclusion in the baseline count. CJCS calculated that USPACOM's total billet reduction in FY 93 was 154.[36]

Personnel Hiring Freeze Extension

(U) The DOD-wide civilian personnel hiring freeze effective mid-January 1990 continued unabated throughout CY 1992. In addition, SECNAV imposed a freeze on all promotions and/or new appointments into GS/GM-13, -14, and -15 positions on 5 February 1992. The goal of the high grade freeze was to reduce the number of high grade positions to 30 September 1991 levels; however, requests for exemptions were permitted. Of the six high grade exemption requests USCINCPAC submitted in 1992, five highly specialized positions were approved: two in Japan, and one each in Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. At year's end, countermanding of the freeze policies did not appear imminent.[37]

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[36]USCINCPAC 191945Z Jun 92 (U), CJCS 151737Z Jun 92 (U), USCINCPAC 191945Z Jun 92 (U).
[37]SECNAV 052122Z Feb 92 (U);J12 HistSum Dec 92 (S).

USCINCPAC Civilian Drug Free Workplace Program

(U) CNO certified the USCINCPAC Civilian Drug Free Workplace Program (DFWP) on 1 September 1991. However, before USCINCPAC could implement the random urinalysis testing portion of the DFWP, USCINCPAC had to select an acceptable method by which to randomly select individuals for testing and complete the Navy required funding and requisition procedures. The contract specified that specimen collection be done in a rest room equipped to accommodate the handicapped. USCINCPAC had renovated a men's rest room to meet this requirement.[38]

(U) The renovation of the men's rest room on the upper level of Building 30 was completed in late September, enabling the contractor, Tracor Technology Resources, to conduct the first urinalysis test on 29 September. Using a computer generated random sample, fifteen civilian employees were selected. Numerous substitutions to the original list were made because individuals were unavailable due to TDY or shift work schedules. Ultimately, only fourteen individuals were tested. Two contractor personnel, one male and one female, conducted the unobserved collection process, prepared the chain of custody documentation, and mailed the samples to the Navy Drug Laboratory in Norfolk, VA. All test results were negative.

(U) On 6 November 1992, USCINCPAC ordered 152 random tests and 15 emergency tests for the period ending 24 July 1993. Emergency tests were conducted when there was a basis for reasonable suspicion, after an accident, and in testing of applicants. Only one emergency test was approved. According to the Contracting Officer, the other 14 requests were disapproved because the Navy allowed number of emergency tests had been exhausted. Disapproval of emergency testing has prevented USCINCPAC from fully implementing the DFWP.

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[38]J1 HistSum Dec 92 (S), Interview with Clark Cornell, J121, 17 Jul 93 (U).

(U) Between November 1989 and October 1992, 23,906 Department of Navy civilian employees were tested. Slightly more than 1% or 273 tested positive. All USCINCPAC employees test results were negative.

Prevention of Sexual Harassment

(U) The 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium was held at the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada, from 5-8 September 1991. In the weeks and months that followed, many women complained about the sexual harassment that occurred during the symposium. Tailhook, as the symposium became commonly known, became a subject of national interest. Although the Department of Navy investigated the events, allegations of cover-up were raised and the Navy was so severely criticized for its handling of the investigations that the Department of Defense Inspector General took charge of the investigation. Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett, III, resigned 26 June in recognition of the leadership problems which allowed the harassment to occur.[39]

(U) In the wake of the apparent cover-up and mishandling of the investigations, CNO required all Navy commands to conduct Prevention of Sexual Harassment (POSH) training for officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel (all hands). Although mandatory training for POSH was issued exclusively through Navy channels, USCINCPAC followed suit and issued a policy statement on sexual harassment which included mandatory POSH and Alcohol Abuse training for headquarters personnel. The mandatory training consisted of instruction in Navy core values, standards of behavior, and sexual harassment, as well as information on alcohol abuse as an aggravating factor in sexual harassment and other crimes. According to Naval Investigative Service

[39]CNO 241642Z Jul 92 (U), CNO 110016Z Jul 92 (U), J11 HistSum Aug 92 (U).

statistics, over 80% of fully documented rapes by or of Navy members involved alcohol, and national statistics indicated alcohol abuse as a causative factor in 68% of manslaughter cases, 52% of rapes/sexual assault, and 62% of other assaults. One half of the headquarters attended the training on 18 August and the other half on 19 August; over 900 military and civilian personnel received the training. As an on-going reminder, articles concerning the definition, recognition, and prevention of sexual harassment were posted on designated bulletin boards.

Equal Employment Opportunity Program

(U) In 1992, USCINCPAC's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program achieved several significant milestones. First, despite the restrictions of the civilian hiring freeze, USCINCPAC successfully recruited its first full-time permanent employee with a targeted disability, i.e., a disability targeted for emphasis in affirmative action program planning. The University of Hawaii and the State of Hawaii, Department of Human Services, Vocational Rehabilitation Division cooperated with USCINCPAC in this venture.[40]

(U) USCINCPAC also made physical accommodations for the handicapped by remodeling a rest room, lowering sidewalks, building ramps, and assigning escorts to assist employees with identified handicaps during fires or other emergencies.

(U) Additionally, USCINCPAC made gains in increasing the number of women in higher graded positions. The number of women employed in grade GS-9 through 12 increased from 19 to 22. Women employed in grades GS-13 through 15 increased from 6 to 8. The former group constituted 32.4% of the work force and the latter, 22.2%. USCINCPAC was in step with the Navy's goal of breaking through the "glass ceiling".

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[40]J1 Annual HistSum 92 (S).

Civilian Payroll Issues

(U) As discussed in the 1991 Command History, USCINCPAC had received its civilian pay processing services from Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center (FAADCPAC)-Pacific Detachment until October 1991 when the Naval Regional Finance Center (NRFC), Washington, D.C. became the servicing payroll office. The transfer was fraught with problems which greatly inconvenienced most USCINCPAC civilians. There were errors in base pay, cost-of-living allowances, leave accounts, and amount of tax withheld. Other employees suffered errors in U.S. savings bond deductions, incorrect military leave credit, non-receipt of leave and earnings statements, and problems with direct deposit allocations. However, the NRFC error with the most adverse consequences was the miscalculation of data on the 1991 W-2 forms. A number of employees received corrected W-2 forms and had to file amended tax returns. The Manpower, Personnel and Support Directorate, J1, asked the Staff Judge Advocate, J06, to determine whether the government was liable for payment of the additional tax preparation fees incurred by employees who had to file amended returns. J06 researched the issue and determined that the government was not liable for neither the extra fees nor taxes.[41]

(U) In September, Col John F. Regni, USAF, USCINCPAC/J1 wrote to NRFC pressing for resolution of problems which remained even after NRFC had attempted clean-up. On 18 December, he sent a letter to the Director of the Defense Accounting Office (DAO), Washington, D.C. requesting assistance in permanently solving USCINCPAC civilian pay problems. He described his staff's repeated attempts to work with NRFC in correcting its 791 individual payroll errors. NRFC's lack of expediency and

[41]USCINCPAC J1 Ltr Ser 367 (U), 14 Sep 92, Subj: Transfer of Civilian Pay From FAADCPAC to NRFC., USCINPAC J1 Ltr Ser 435 (U), Subj: Civilian Payroll Problems Continue, Interview with Gloria Uyehara, J122, 27 Oct 93.

efficiency evoked much frustration and aggravation at the headquarters. Although USCINCPAC expected NRFC to provide the command with an error-free payroll system, NRFC failed to do so, and the NRFC pay system continued to present a large problem throughout the year.

SECTION VI--PERSONNEL AND HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT

USCINCPAC Navy Reserve Conference

(U) The Headquarters USCINCPAC (HQ USCINCPAC) Naval Reserve Conference convened 20-22 April in the J1 Conference Room to determine the feasibility of realigning Navy Reserve billets within the Pacific Theater to cut costs and enhance mobilization readiness. The participants carefully examined the feasibility of realigning billets to establish a local reserve unit for USPACOM and one for Naval Forces Central Command Rear (NAVCENTREAR), and to find a sponsor for Commander U.S. Facility (COMUSFAC) Subic Bay Naval Reserve Detachment 119.[42]

(U) The members identified thirty-one Navy reserve billets from mainland reserve detachments which would be used to create USCINCPAC HQ Detachment 120. They also recommended COMSEVENTHFLT sponsor COMUSFAC Subic Bay Detachment 119.[43]

Spouse Orientation

(U) J1 sponsored the annual Spouse Orientation program which consisted of an update of unclassified information on the Pacific Area, a tour of the command center, and a reception. Admiral Larson hosted the 1 December session and RADM Larry G. Vogt, USN, J5, hosted the second session on 8 December. A total of 136 people attended.[44]

Enlisted Person of the Year

(U) On 12 March 1992, Admiral Charles R. Larson announced SK1 Paul J. Hoffman of the Headquarters Support Division, Manpower, Personnel, and Support Directorate, as the winner of

[42]USCINCPAC 190800Z Mar 92 (U).
[43]J1 HistSum May 92 (U).
[44]Interview with CMSgt Darwin Frank, USAF, J113, 25 Aug 93 (U).

the Enlisted Person of the Year (1991). The announcement was made at the Enlisted Person of the Year award ceremony and luncheon. SK1 Hoffman had been in the Navy for eight years and had been assigned to HQ USCINCPAC since January 1990.[45]

Combined Federal Campaign

(U) The 1993 Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) for HQ CINCPAC was conducted during from October through November 1992. LCDR James A. Hawthorne, USN, Navy/Marine Branch, Military Personnel Division, managed the drive. USCINCPAC's CFC goal was $112,402 but with contributions totaling $145,234.30, USCINCPAC exceeded its goal by $32,832.30 or 29.21%.[46]

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel Visit

(U) During 1-6 February, Mr. Robert S. Silberman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, visited Hawaii. On 3 February, he met with USCINCPAC staff and discussed exercise scheduling, training of Joint Task Forces (JTFs), planned force reductions, and related military personnel issues such as Voluntary Separation Incentives (VSI). In turn, component commands' staff briefed him on similar topics. In addition, Mr. Silberman toured military installations on Oahu, concentrating on observing unit training. He also visited Guam to visit Air Force and Navy Quality of Life (QOL) facilities.[47]

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[45]J10C HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[46]USCINCPAC Combined Federal Campaign Report (U) 24 Dec 92
[47]J12 HistSum Mar 92 (U).

Director, Office of Transportation and International Service, and Director, Military Postal Service Agency Visit

(U) During 23-24 February, Mr. James E. Orlando, Director, Office of Transportation and International Service, U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and BG Patricia Hickerson, USA, Director of Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) visited military commands on Oahu to review the military mail initiative and provide an update on the ZIP Code Realignment and Standardization Program. During meetings with LTG Harold T. Fields, Jr., USA, and senior leaders of component commands, they also discussed Guam mail issues, disestablishment of Philippines postal activities, and challenges to Pacific Mail delivery. USPS and other MPSA representatives met with component command staff to outline plans for using USPS' Origin-Destination Information System (ODIS) in sampling military mail delivery times.[48]

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Support, Families, and Education Visit

(U) Ms. Millicent W. Wood, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Support, Families, and Education visited Hawaii 22-24 January. She met with family focus groups, visited child development centers, and toured Morale, Welfare, and Recreation activities at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, Naval Station Pearl Harbor, and Schofield Barracks.[49]

[48]J12 HistSum Mar 92 (U).
[49]J1 HistSum Feb 92 (U).

SECTION VII--RECORDS MANAGEMENT

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Activities

(U) There were 87 new requests for information/documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) during the calendar year 1992. Of the 87 requests, 29 were granted in full, 12 were partially denied, 7 were totally denied, and 10 were in process. 29 were denied for other reasons; e.g., request canceled by the requester.

(U) The personnel, operating, and other case-related costs of executing the FOIA function in HQ CINCPAC in 1992 were $47,865.70. The program required an estimated 0.85 man-year of personnel assigned FOIA duties. A breakout of the costs of processing USCINCPAC's 1992 FOIA requests follows:

• Personnel Costs:		
• Direct Man-year Costs (.85)		$33,547.00
• Other Man-year Costs by Category:		
(1) Search time	539.00	
(2) Classification review/excising	2,244.00	
(3) Coordination/approval/denial	1,185.00	
(4) Correspondence/form preparation	540.00	
(5) Other activities	195.50	
Total Other Man-year Costs		4,704.00
• Overhead (25% of Other Man-year Costs)		9,562.75
Total Personnel Costs		47,813.75
• Other Case-Related Costs		
Computer search time	0.00	
Office copy reproduction	30.40	
Microfiche reproduction	0.00	
Printed records	11.16	
Computer copy	0.00	
Audiovisual materials	0.00	
Other	0.00	
Subtotal	41.56	
Overhead (25% of Other Costs)	10.39	
Total Other Case-Related Costs		51.95
• TOTAL COSTS TO PROCESS 1992 FOIA REQUESTS		47,865.70

CHAPTER II

THREAT AND INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I - THREAT

Overview:

(U) In regards to the threats facing the world after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, James Woolsey, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated: "We have slain a large dragon. But now we live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes." Admiral Larson stated some of the dangers which existed in USCPACOM were[1]:

- The racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kashmir, Papua New Guinea, Punjab, Timor, and the borders of China.
- The economic strife in the Spratly Islands, the South China Sea, parts of Southeast Asia, and southern China.
- Further advancements in the development of sophisticated weapons, especially by China and North Korea.

(U) The most severe threats in USPACOM are described in this section.

[1]ROA National Security Report (U), Jun 93, DECL: OADR

Northeast Asia

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

North Korean Nuclear Development

(S) A Non-Nuclearization Joint Declaration between Pyongyang and Seoul became effective 19 February. The declaration banned the testing, manufacture, production, possession, storage, deployment, receiving, and use of nuclear weapons. The declaration also mandated that the ROK and North Korea not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.[3]

(S) To confirm adherence to the declaration, the declaration also stated that Seoul and Pyongyang must conduct inspections, but that the process would be determined by a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). The JNCC was established on 18 March. At their next meeting on 1 April, the membership was still unable to agree on an inspection schedule. Attempts were made to schedule another meeting in April to set the inspections, but North Korea objected citing Supreme People's Assembly

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[2]JICPAC/ONK Information Paper (U), 10 Aug 92; Subj: Republic of Korea (ROK)/North Korea: Military Balance.

[3]JICPAC (ONK) Point Paper (~~S/NF~~), 22 May 92, Subj: North Korea: Nuclear Intentions.

(SPA) and Anniversary Celebrations, Kim Il Sung's 80th birthday (15 April), and the 60th Anniversary of the Korea People's Army. Consequently, in accordance with the basic Agreement on reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation (ARNE), a bilateral inspection regime was due two months later, on 18 May. However, bilateral inspections were never conducted.[4]

(~~S~~) Early in the year, [redacted] assessed the North Korean (NK) nuclear program as capable of fabricating its first nuclear weapon by late 1992 or early 1993, however, the reprocessing plant would have to become operational by early 1992 in order to meet this time table. Intelligence studies indicated North Korea possessed an adequate amount of plutonium from spent fuel to accomplish this. This facility was judged to be capable of readily processing all the spent fuel produced by North Korea's two plutonium production reactors.[5]



[4]J5111 Point Paper (U), Subj: Update on KN Nuclear Issues, 19 May 92; J2S HistSum (~~S~~) Dec 92.
[5]DIA 122200Z Feb 92 (~~S/NF~~), DECL: OADR, DIA 022200 Nov 92 (~~S/NF~~).

~~(S/NF)~~ As stated in the 1991 Command History, North Korea had two nuclear reactors operational by 1991, with a third possibly becoming operational in 1992. Intelligence sources re-assessed their evaluation in May 1992 and believed the third reactor could become operational by 1994.[6]

Exempt (b)(1), sec 1.3a;



[6]JICPAC (ONK)Point Paper ~~(S)~~, 22 May 92, Subj: North Korea: Nuclear Intentions; J2S HistSum ~~(S)~~ Dec 92.
[7]JICPAC (ONK) Information Paper ~~(S)~~, Subj: ROK/North Korea: Military Balance, 10 Aug 92.



THE MILITARY BALANCE[8]

Ground Forces	North Korea	South Korea
Personnel		
Infantry Divisions		
Reserve Infantry Divisions		
Mechanized Divisions		
Infantry Brigades		
Reserve Infantry Brigades		
Mechanized Brigades		
Armored Brigades		
Special Operations Brigades		
Tanks		
Armored Personnel Carriers		
Artillery		
Multiple Rocket Launchers		
Surface-to-Surface Rocket Launchers		
Air Forces		
Personnel		
Bombers		
Fighters		
Helicopters		
Transports		
Trainers		

[redacted]

[8]Ibid.

Naval Forces

Personnel
Major Surface Combatants
Attack Submarines
Other Submarines
Missile Attack Boats
Patrol Boats
Mine Warfare Type
Amphibious Craft



Russia

(C) With the USSR's disintegration, inter ethnic stresses erupted within several of the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and in the Caucasus region of Russia. In the absence of a strong Soviet hand to hold down accumulated grievances, national and ethnic groups vented their animosity in numerous dangerous regional conflicts. Weakened centralized military control and acquisition of weapons by conflicting groups expanded disputes from small altercations into bloody armed battles.[9]

(S) The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreements did not prohibit member-states from joining other political alliances, economic organizations, or military pacts. The FSU's western states pursued political and economic ties with former Warsaw Pact and NATO nations. The Transcaucasian and Central Asian states expanded relations with regional ethnically-Turkic and religiously-Islamic nations, especially Turkey and Iran.

(C) Russia shouldered the burden for providing a local security guarantee for the West, but other CIS members remained suspicious of Russia's intentions.

Nuclear Forces

(C) The status of Soviet nuclear weapons was the world's greatest concern connected with the FSU's disintegration. Russia's President and the Commander in Chief (CINC) of CIS Armed Forces retained launch authority for strategic nuclear weapons in 1992.[10]

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[9]JSR-ONS-31-92 (S), 20 Apr 92.
[10]CIS Update JSR-ONS-09-92, 20 Apr 92 (S).

(U) Ukrainian President Kravchuk stated that the 178 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos in the Ukraine would be dismantled by the end of 1994. He also stated that Ukraine's tactical nuclear weapons were to be destroyed in a special plant in the Russian Urals. Leonid Privalov, Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian Commission for Matters of National Security, stated that Belorussia would be "free of nuclear weapons in approximately 1996 or 1997."[11]

Military Posture

(S) CINC of CIS Armed Forces Shaposhnikov stated Russia had no potential enemies, and summed up Russia's defensive orientation as a "defense in all azimuths". Russia sought not only an increase in its global influence, but a corresponding decrease in US leverage. Russia's critical economic situation had left it unable to compete with the US even on a military basis. To limit the US prominence as the world's only remaining superpower, Russia supported increased United Nations' authority. In March, President Yeltsin announced the formation of the Russian Ministry of Defense.[12]

Ground Forces

[redacted]

[11]CIS Update JSR-ONS-09-92, 28 Jan 92 (S).
[12]JSR-ONS-12-92, 5 Feb 92 (CNF); J2S HistSum (S) Dec 92.

[redacted]

Air Forces

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Manpower and resource shortages were severe and adversely affected routine training operations and combat readiness. In an April interview, Air Defense Forces (PVO) Commander in Chief Prudnikov said the number of personnel in many units had dropped below 50 percent of authorized manning. [redacted] Shortages of fuel, lack of spare parts, and a shortage of other provisions contributed to their poor state of readiness. Morale was also a problem. In the Transcaucacus, officers collected and returned bottles to generate money because their pay had been delayed. They also questioned the objectives of their defense efforts and why their jobs were necessary.[15]

[redacted]

[13]JICPAC/ONS Information Paper (~~S/NF~~), Subj: Russian: Ground Force Structure in FETVD (U), 1 Aug 92; J2S HistSum (~~S~~) Dec 92.
[14]JICPAC/ONS Information Paper (~~S/NF/WN~~), Subj: Russian: Ground Force Hardware Upgrades (U), 1 Aug 92; J2S HistSum (~~S~~) Dec 92.
[15]JICPAC/ONS Information Paper (~~S/NF/WN~~), Subj: Russian Air Defense Forces: Condition and Outlook (U), 29 Jul 92.



Pacific Fleet Force Structure



[16]DIA Intelligence Memorandum (~~S/NF/WN~~), Subj: The Russian Submarine Force: Looking Ahead 20 Years (U), 7 Aug 92; JICPAC/ONS Information Paper (~~S~~), Subj: Russian: Pacific Fleet Hardware Upgrades in 1992 (U); J2S HistSum (~~S~~) Dec 92.

[redacted]

[17]DIA 040001Z Jun 92 (S).

SECTION II--INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Exchange Conference



SSO/SPINTCOM

(U) Due to the organization of Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC), and consolidation of intelligence functions to JICPAC facilities at Makalapa and Hickam AFB, Hawaii, as well as deactivation of the USPACOM Intelligence Information Computer System (PIICS), the Automated Message Handling (AMH) connectivity from Building 20, the former Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) building at Camp Smith, Hawaii, was severed permanently on 23 March 1992. Internal sensitive compartmented information (SCI) traffic delivery was being received via the Makalapa to

[18]J2234 HistSum Mar 92 (S/NF); Agenda and Briefings (S/Rel PHIL), 23rd USCINCPAC-AFP INTELEX, Mar 92.

Camp Smith communications support processor (CSP) connectivity. Installation of the CSP and completion of connectivity allowed greater flexibility between Special Intelligence Communications Handling Systems (SPINTCOMs) and realized a savings in money and manpower through elimination of unnecessary circuitry. In-house message distribution was being accomplished by the communications backside terminal (CBT). The CBT and Situational Awareness Terminal (SAT) eliminated USCINCPAC reliance upon PIICS. For internal distribution, General Services (GENSER) traffic was being processed by a link to the message distribution terminal (MDT) located in the SPINTCOM area.

(U) During the period 23-27 March 1992, SPINTCOM personnel removed all equipment and cabling from the second floor frame room in Building 20. All cryptographic equipment was turned in. The NSA Secure Telephone System (STS) switch and all phones were placed in the SPINTCOM storage room for future use. The remainder of the equipment bays were disposed of through the Defense Reutilization Office (DRU).[19]

USPACOM General Defense Intelligence Program, FY 94-99

(U) The Navy Resource Council (NRC) meeting was held in Washington, DC, 16-17 March 1992, and was hosted by the Director of Naval Intelligence, RADM E.D. Sheafer, Jr., USN. The meeting was attended by USCINCPAC Deputy Director for Intelligence (J20), JICPAC Commander, and other J2 and JICPAC personnel. The purpose of this annual meeting among national and theater principal players in the Navy's General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) was to discuss, evaluate, and prioritize all competing navy GDIP requirements for the period FY 94-99. The Navy was to submit its total Service GDIP proposed program on 31 March 1992, and needed

[19]J24 HistSum Feb 92 (U); J24 HistSum Mar 92 (U).

to review and justify specific intelligence requirements. The operative considerations were:[20]

- New requirements could only be addressed as trade-offs from existing resources.
- It was necessary to plan for as much as 10 percent additional reduction in FY 94 due to Congressional and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) guidance.
- Operation of the new GDIP process was not yet clear: GDIP Staff was disbanded and the functional managers were active players, but coordination procedures were not at all specific.

(U) The results of the NRC meeting were largely favorable to USPACOM, particularly to the new generation of systems being programmed under the USPACOM ADP Service Site (PASS) concept, which focused on centralized management of theater requirements.

[redacted]

[20] J2R2 HistSum Mar 92 (U).
[21] J2234 HistSum Mar 93 (S); Daybook Item (U), 6 Mar 92, Subj: Visit by Brigadier General Gary Yeo, Director, Joint Intelligence Division, Singapore; USCINCPAC 310015Z Mar 92 (S).

Targeting

USPACOM Management

(U) The USPACOM targeting program was coordinated through the Target Actions Group (TAG), one of several management groups reporting to the USPACOM Intelligence Board (PIB). The TAG was the primary forum for joint targeting and targeting materials production matters. The Chief, USCINCPAC Targets Branch (J222) served as office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the USPACOM targeting program and chaired the TAG.[22]

1.5(C)



[22]USCINCPACINST C3810.26F (S), J25 Ser C020, 23 Jan 89, Subj: USPACOM Targeting Program (U).
[23]Ibid.; Minutes (S/NF), USPACOM Target Actions Group Meetings, Jan-Dec 92, hereinafter cited as TAG Minutes.

Weaponeering Support Program

(U) The JICPAC-produced USPACOM Weaponeering Guide (PAWG) was considered for elimination as a recurring product, in part because it was considered as an operations rather than an intelligence responsibility. However, in many units weaponeering expertise rested with target intelligence personnel. If the product were eliminated, JICPAC estimated that retention of the PAWG would answer 80 percent of weaponeering assistance requests received by them on an individual basis from tactical units in the theater. As the PAWG lost currency, the number of man-hours associated with answering ad hoc weaponeering requests was expected to exceed the man-hours needed to maintain the PAWG.[24]

(U) Positive feedback was received from users of the PAWG in Operation DESERT STORM, and the PACAF/IN strongly supported continuation of the product. However, the PAWG was included on a tentative deletion list prepared by the theater's Senior Intelligence Officers (SIOs) in response to a review directed by the PIB on 29 May 1992. Fiscal and manpower limitations caused all the Service components to reevaluate their intelligence production needs, and as JICPAC could only satisfy essential production

[24]TAG Minutes 16 Jan 92 (~~S/NF~~).

the program was put on hold 11 June pending completion of a total study of the JICPAC product line.[25]

Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)

(U) A USCINCPAC representative attended the first meeting of the Military Target Intelligence Committee's BDA Working Group (MTIC/BDAWG) in February. As a result of the meeting, all commands were urged not to continue development of separate automated BDA system software in favor a methodical, standardized approach approved by the BDAWG and MTIC. There were no major BDA software development projects in USPACOM, but the need to develop a theater specific working group to develop a theater BDA CONOPS was identified in April, to be initiated after a national BDA CONOPS was available. The USCINCPAC BDA CONOPS was to be developed for different scenarios, and the RAAF was invited to take an active role in its development.[26]

(U) The scarcity of travel funds dictated that the second meeting of the BDAWG in May would be the last formal meeting of the group, but work continued on development of a Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) Manual for BDA using the USAF Rapid Application of Air Power (RAAP) system. Close coordination and information exchange continued using facsimile and telephone communications. The draft of the JTTP BDA document was completed by November 1992, and although originally designed as a separate document in the JTTP series, it was to be subsumed under Joint Publication 2-02.1, Intelligence Support to Targeting, which was due by September 1994. Meanwhile, the BDAWG continued to develop BDA training requirements, data base requirements, message formats, and reference documents.[27]

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[25]TAG Minutes 27 Feb 92 (~~S/NF~~) and 11 Jun 92 (~~S/NF~~).
[26]TAG Minutes 27 Feb 92 (~~S/NF~~), 23 Apr 92 (~~S/NF~~), and 23 Nov 92 (~~S/NF~~).
[27]TAG Minutes 11 Jun 92 (~~S/NF~~) and 23 Nov 92 (~~S/NF~~).

Basic Targeting Graphics

(~~C/Rel AUS~~) In September 1992, a new USCINCPAC policy on BTG revalidation and reaccomplishment was issued to better align needs and restraints. In order to ensure BTGs were current and usable, periodic review by the producer was necessary, including a comparison with current imagery, and a determination made if any significant changes had occurred to the installation which would reduce the accuracy of the BTG. If no significant changes were noted, the BTG was considered revalidated. If there had been significant changes, the new imagery was substituted and the BTG was republished as a reaccomplished BTG. Even if there were no significant changes, BTGs were reaccomplished at periodic intervals.[29]

(~~C/Rel AUS~~) Reaccomplishment required significantly less production time than initial production, but the same production resources were used for both initial production and revalidation/ reaccomplishment. The balance between acceptable levels of initial production and maintaining BTGs at reasonable levels of currency had to be carefully weighed. The previous policy concentrated on OPLAN targets and required annual review with revalidation or reaccomplishment, as necessary, and mandatory reaccomplishment every three years. Non-OPLAN BTGs were reviewed every two years with update action as appropriate, and reaccomplished every five years. This policy had proven to be neither

[28]USCINCPAC Command History 1990 (~~S/RD~~), Vol. II, pp. 530-531.
[29]TAG Minutes 28 Sep 92 (~~S/NF~~).

realistic nor achievable without reducing initial production output to almost nothing, and was not scalable to reflect the relative priorities of OPLAN versus non-OPLAN BTGs or the relative importance of various target categories.

~~(C/Rel AUS)~~ The new policy assumed that OPLAN targets were more important than non-OPLAN targets, that not all OPLAN targets were equal, and that some target types were more prone to change than others. It recognized that initial production and maintenance competed for the same resources, and that maintenance took less time than initial production, and allowed exceptions to the review schedule to accommodate critical targets.

[redacted]

[30] Ibid.

Target Materials Production

Production Priorities

(a)

(S) The allocation of production effort on CONPLANS was to be determined once the targeting requirement for each CONPLAN was clearly defined.

Armed Forces Korea Targets List

(a)



[31]TAG Minutes 11 Aug 92 ~~(S)~~.
[32]Ibid.; TAG Minutes 28 Sep 92 ~~(S/NF)~~.

USPACOM Conventional Target List



(U) A total of eight PCILs were developed. Maintained on a three-year publication cycle, they were the primary USPACOM contingency planning tool. At the end of 1992, an expanded format was implemented which transformed them from simple installation lists to genuine targeting aids which contained information on target systems for each country. When combined with the evolving imagery packages paired with each PCIL, operators had the tools to conduct contingency planning for strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), or humanitarian assistance.

[33]TAG Minutes 27 Feb 92 ~~(S/NF)~~.
[34]TAG Minutes 11 Aug 92 ~~(S)~~.



[35]TAG Minutes 11 Jun 92 (~~S/NF~~) and 28 Sep 92 (~~S/NF~~).
[36]TAG Minutes 28 Sep 92 (~~S/NF~~).



CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS

SECTION I—READINESS AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Readiness

CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report

(U) USCINCPAC readiness for FY 92 was fully covered in the USCINCPAC Command History 1991. The CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR) to JCS was prepared every two years, without updates, and the CSPAR submitted in September 1991 was intended to cover both FY 92 and FY 93. Therefore, readiness as reported in the CSPAR will be fully covered in the USCINCPAC Command History for the period January-December 1993.

Impact of Operation DESERT STORM

(U) Following Operation DESERT STORM, several scheduled training exercises, including PRIME DIRECTIVE 92, TEAM SPIRIT 92, GIANT WARRIOR 92, and GLOBAL SHIELD 92, were canceled, and others were significantly downgraded. CINC training events were designed to satisfy joint training requirements identified in the CINC's joint mission essential task lists (JMETL), as defined in CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 26. In February, the Joint Staff queried the CINCs on the effect of the cancellations and downgradings on their ability to carry out assigned missions and the impact on warfighting readiness and future training requirements. The assessments were needed to properly support the FY 93 budget process and the FY 94 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission, which in turn would help the Joint Staff support CINC training programs in a time of shrinking resources.[1]

[1]JS 132130Z Feb 92 (U).

(U) While specific exercises are discussed in a following section of this history, the impact of the canceled and downgraded exercises on USCINCPAC were assessed as follows:[2]

- Eight JMET supporting and enabling tasks were affected by cancellation of Exercise PRIME DIRECTIVE 92 (PD 92). PD 92 was scheduled for the period 20-26 February 1992, and was a CJCS-sponsored command post exercise (CPX). However, training in four of the tasks was received during Joint Staff staff assistance visits (SAV) and technical assistance visits (TAV), and training in two other tasks was conducted during Exercise ULCHI/FOCUS LENS (UFL). Training in the other two tasks, related to Enhanced Crisis Management Capability (ECMC), was not completed.
- The COPE THUNDER (CT) series was moved to Alaska from the Philippines following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo and loss of Clark AFB in 1991. The increased cost of the exercises caused by longer deployment and redeployment distances and higher TDY expenses associated with the Alaska location resulted in PACAF participation being cut in half compared to previous exercises. Training in a total of seven supporting/enabling tasks was not accomplished during CT exercises, but were planned for completion during Exercise COBRA GOLD 92 (CG 92) and TANDEM THRUST 92 (TT 92).
- Exercise FREQUENT STORM 91 (FS 91) was canceled, with four supporting/enabling tasks unaccomplished. Training in two of the tasks was planned for CG 92 and TT 92, and for the other two during Exercise ELLIPSE CHARLIE (EC).
- Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 91 (TS 91) was downgraded and TS 92 canceled, and although UFL was assigned many of the same JMETs, the exercises were supplementary and did not substitute for each other. TS was primarily a field training exercise (FTX) while UFL was a CPX, and a CPX did not provide the same levels of training as an FTX.

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[2]USCINCPAC 062120Z Mar 92 (U).

- Exercise ULCHI/FOCUS LENS 91 was not affected by DESERT STORM, as exercise deployment and redeployment was conducted by commercial air instead of MAC airlift. There was no measurable training loss.
- Other canceled exercises, including VALIANT USHER and several mining exercises (MINEX) and explosive ordnance disposal exercises (EODEX) focused on interoperability with allied countries. U.S. forces were fully trained units and managed to maintain proficiency in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) with no measurable training loss.

(U) USCINCPAC's assessment concluded that the theater's continued warfighting readiness was heavily leveraged on future exercises, and cancellation of upcoming exercises would adversely effect joint and combined readiness.





[3]J375 HistSum 1992 (~~S~~/FRD).
[4]USCINCPAC 120045Z Dec 92 (~~S~~/FRD).



Neither Confirm nor Deny

(U) After the drawdown of tactical nuclear weapons under the President's nuclear initiative of 27 September 1991 was completed, SECDEF announced a new policy regarding nuclear weapons. Commonly called the NCND policy, for "neither confirm nor deny," the newly stated policy did not change the normal statement but added a statement to be used in response to questions pertaining to nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft:[6]

[5]Ibid.
[6]CINCPACFLT 150915Z Aug 92 (U).

"It is general U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines, or aircraft."

Mission Transfer

(U) On 1 June 1992, the new U.S. Strategic Command stood up as a unified command and assumed combatant command (COCOM) of the country's strategic nuclear forces, resulting in several changes that affected USCINCPAC. Operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarine force and Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 3 (VQ-3), the Pacific Command TACAMO squadron based at Barbers Point NAS, transferred to USCINCSTRAT.[7]

(S) Commander Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), based at Pearl Harbor, was designated Commander Pacific SSBN Task Force under USSTRATCOM effective 1 June 1992. A new task force, Task Force 134 (CJTF 134), was formed to support the SSBN mission, and SSBNs performing normal patrol operations in open ocean operated under CJTF 134—under USCINCPAC, the SSBNs operated under Commander Task Group 14.4 (CTG 14.4). Operational control of SSBNs performing non-strategic operations in open ocean, such as fleet exercises, was changed to CTG 14.4 for the duration of the special operations. Change of operational control (CHOP) was effective at 011600Z June 1992. The eight boats that comprised the Pacific SSBN task force were assigned to Submarine Squadron Seventeen (SUBRON 17), homeported at Bangor, WA.[8]

(U) Operational control of VQ-3 changed to Commander Strategic Communications Wing ONE (COMSTRATCOMMWING ONE), the

[7]USCINCPAC 290010Z May 92 (U).
[8]COMSUBPAC 290406Z May 92 (S).

USCINCSTRAT TACAMO Task Force commander, on 1 June 1992. The wing was based at Tinker AFB, OK, and had both operational and administrative responsibilities. Operationally, the wing reported as a CTF to USSTRATCOM and coordinated all TACAMO operations. Administratively, the wing reported to CINCPACFLT via Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC) to organize, equip, maintain, and train subordinate commands and liaison with its host command at Tinker AFB. In addition to VQ-3, the wing's subordinate commands included VQ-4 (VQ-3's sister squadron formerly OPCON to USCINCLANT), associated alert detachments, and the E-6A fleet readiness squadron (FRS). Administrative control of VQ-4 shifted to STRATCOMMWING ONE and PACFLT on 1 October 1992.[9]

(U) There were no USAF strategic nuclear forces in USPACOM. The transfer of such forces from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to USSTRATCOM was only one aspect of an overall USAF reorganization. COCOM of all in-theater KC-135 tankers, formerly controlled by SAC, was transferred to USCINCPAC effective 1 June 1992, and at the same time SAC's 3d Air Division (3 AD) at Hickam AFB was inactivated and elements of the unit were combined with the PACAF staff. B-52s were transferred to the new Air Combat Command (ACC), and those that deployed to USPACOM were on conventional missions only. Also on 1 June 1992, and not connected in any way with strategic nuclear forces, PACAF gained OPCON of in-theater C-130 assets, and elements of Military Airlift Command's (MAC) 834th Airlift Division (834 ALD) combined with the PACAF staff.[10]

Cruise Missile Support Activity

(U) The USPACOM Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA) was the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for all USPACOM TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile (TLAM) matters. CMSA planned all

[9]USCINCPAC 300400Z May 92 (U); CNO 050149Z Mar 92 (U).
[10]HQ PACAF 171803Z Mar 92 (U).

USPACOM TLAM missions, and was responsible for inputs to hardware and software upgrades for the existing and future TLAM planning systems, weapon systems, and operational concepts. CMSA planned both nuclear and conventional TLAM missions against USPACOM OPLAN and CONPLAN targets, and in conjunction with other agencies planned operational test lauches (OTL) of TLAM variants.[11]

(U) On 10 November 1992, CMSA moved from Building 80 to renovated spaces on the first deck of Building 20, Camp H. M. Smith. Building 20 had formerly been home to Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC), and that organization vacated the building when combined with other on-island intelligence agencies to form Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC). Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) moved into the second deck.

[11]USCINCPACINST 3121.11A (U), 5 Oct 89, Subj: U.S. Pacific Command Cruise Missile Planning Group.

SECTION II—OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Post-War Naval Presence

(S) As reported in the USCINCPAC Command History 1991, SECDEF was to make modifications to the global Naval force presence in March 1992 which in particular would provide the scheduling flexibility for a reduced force of 12 aircraft carriers (CVs) while assuring, at some risk, a sustainable forward global presence within PERSTEMPO limits. However, in January 1992 CJCS directed that the long-term presence policy be held in abeyance until further notice, based on the regional situation in USCENTCOM's AOR. In practical terms, this meant that a 1.0 CVBG presence in USCENTCOM would be maintained, and the long-term policy was held in abeyance for the remainder of 1992.[12]

PACFLT CVBG Presence

(S) Deployments of aircraft carriers, TLAM platforms, and amphibious ready groups (ARG) were affected by the policy. Because of the limited number of assets, CVBG and ARG deployments were of most concern to USCINCPAC. In February, USCINCCENT proposed a schedule covering the period through 15 September 1992 which had USS INDEPENDENCE (CV 62) departing home port on 15 April, participating in Battle of the Coral Sea ceremonies enroute, with in-CHOP to USCENTCOM at the 48-hour arc on 23 May, relieving USS AMERICA (CV 66). This proposed schedule met with opposition from USCINCLANT, who strongly desired AMERICA transit the Suez Canal on 17 May in order to return to home port within the six-month deployment window. USCINCPAC concurred in a CINCPACFLT-proposed schedule submitted in February that called for extending the USCENTCOM CVBG arc to a maximum of eight days to allow for AMERICA to out-CHOP on 17 May when INDEPENDENCE was still six days sailing time from the 48-hour arc. TLAM coverage

[12]USCINCCENT 142156Z Feb 92 (S); VCJCS 112330Z Mar 92 (S); CINCPACFLT 032225Z Dec 92 (S).

was coordinated between PACFLT and LANTFLT, with no apparent problems.[13]

(S) CINCPACFLT's proposed schedule also provided for CVBG coverage through June 1993 with Pacific Fleet carrier battle groups. Specifically, USS RANGER (CV 61) would relieve INDEPENDENCE on 15 September, and be replaced in turn by USS KITTY HAWK (CV 63) on 18 December 1992. KITTY HAWK would be relieved by USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) on 18 March 1993, and remain on station in the Persian Gulf until 16 June 1993. RANGER and KITTY HAWK deployments were conducted as planned, and future developments and deployments will be covered in the next USCINCPAC Command History.

(S) The Vice Chairman's response to the proposed schedule and extension of the CHOP arc to eight days was unfavorable. He recognized the desire to meet U.S. Navy PERSTEMPO goals and the number of variables that had to be factored into the schedules, such as reasonable speed of advance, port visits for crews, exercise participation, and the Naval force presence policy. However, since the situation in Iraq had not changed, the requirement for continuous CVBG presence in the USCENTCOM AOR could not be relaxed. He promised to review the USCENTCOM CVBG presence requirement in April or May to see if the situation at that time would permit a gap in order to return AMERICA to home port within the six-month goal. In the event, AMERICA overstayed her tour and entered the Red Sea on 12 May, transited the Suez Canal on the 22d, and the CVBG left USCENTCOM operational control the same day. The INDEPENDENCE CVBG changed OPCON to USCENTCOM and Task Force (TF) 154 on the 22d, and arrived in the Arabian Sea on 23 May 1992.[14]

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[13]USCINCCENT 142156Z Feb 92 (S); USCINCLANT 200839Z Feb 92 (S); CINCPACFLT 070256Z Mar 92 (S).
[14]VCJCS 112330Z Mar 92 (S); Pacific Ops Daily Summaries (S), 13, 22, and 23 May 92.

PACFLT ARG Presence

(S) Meanwhile, ARG and embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) deployments created problems of their own. In February 1992, CINCPACFLT informed USCINCPAC that he no longer had the flexibility to routinely conduct small scale amphibious exercises in the Philippines with deploying ARG/MEU(SOC) at the midpoint of their 45-day transit to USCENTCOM. Regular access to training areas in a number of Southeast Asia (SEA) countries was being sought, but long lead times and host nation training were required. To allow adequate training, CINCPACFLT proposed that the response time to the USCENTCOM CHOP line (48-hour arc) be increased by 2 days, from 13 to 15 days. This would allow use of the USMC and USN infrastructure on Okinawa while maintaining the required deterrence for USCENTCOM. The 15-day response window would include Guam, which would allow ships on tether to receive shore-based support while on short steaming notice.[15]

(S) In June 1992, USCINCPAC proposed to the JS, with USCINCCENT concurrence, an interim modification to the amphibious deterrence tether arrangement. Citing the current limitations on maintenance and training caused by the withdrawal from Subic Bay and the loss of flexibility for the deploying ARG/MEU(SOC) to conduct small scale amphibious exercises or enroute routine training and maintenance in the Philippines, USCINCPAC noted that such enroute activities were critical to providing a fully ready ARG/MEU(SOC) upon arrival in the USCENTCOM AOR. He proposed that Guam and Okinawa be considered within the tether only for accomplishment of training and maintenance of the amphibious force transitioning to USCENTCOM. The proposal would allow those brief periods of time to count as part of the 182-day tether time while retaining the previously agreed upon 14-knot speed of advance (SOA). Under this proposal, both the TARAWA and TRIPOLI

[15]CINCPACFLT 201835Z Apr 92 (S).

ARGs would pause for five to seven days in Guam or Okinawa for training and maintenance before proceeding to the USCENTCOM AOR, but the scheduled ARG/MEU(SOC) in-CHOP and out-CHOP dates would not change. USCINCPAC desired to implement this policy change with inbound transit of the TARAWA ARG/MEU(SOC) in mid-June, with exceptions for follow-on ARGs considered on a case-by-case basis as agreed to between USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT. The Joint Staff quickly approved the request to modify the ARG deterrence tether, on condition that USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT agree prior to any gap.[16]

CVBG Contingency Response Posture

~~(S/NF)~~ In May 1992, Admiral Larson informed CJCS that CHOP of the INDEPENDENCE battle group to USCENTCOM on 23 May 1992 to fill post-DESERT STORM naval force presence requirements precluded meeting the C-Day plus three days (C+3) availability required by OPLAN 5027, Combined Defense of the Republic of Korea. The soonest INDEPENDENCE could respond to emerging OPLAN 5027 taskings was C+13 at 20 knots SOA, although the follow-on C+20 requirement could be met by USS RANGER, with other CVs available to respond as required from CONUS. He added that he and the USCINCPAC staff would monitor all available indications and warnings (I&W) and maintain close coordination with GEN Robert W. RisCassi, COMUSK. This situation existed until return of INDEPENDENCE to USCINCPAC control on 15 September 1992.[17]

Peacetime AWACS Mission Policy

Proposal Presented

~~(S)~~ In February, CJCS addressed concerns expressed by the CINCs over competing demands for airborne warning and control system (AWACS) support. At that time, the political situation in

[16]USCINCPAC 062330Z May 92 ~~(S)~~, 021610Z and 110256Z Jun 92 ~~(S)~~; USCINCCENT 182037Z May 92 ~~(S)~~.
[17]USCINCPAC 202000Z May 92 ~~(S/NF)~~; COMTHIRDFLT 270005Z May 92 ~~(S)~~.

Southwest Asia (SWA) required a higher than normal AWACS commitment that, coupled with counterdrug (CD) missions, exceeded available resources, which caused an unacceptably high TDY rate for AWACS crews. The need to maintain economic, political, and military pressure on Iraq and the dynamic and changing nature of the threats faced prompted a review of the worldwide allocation of AWACS assets, and the Chairman asked the CINCs for assistance in resolving the problems.[18]

(S) CJCS presented five possible courses of action (COA) that provided a basis for AWACS allocation to be evaluated. They were developed to give first priority to SWA for the foreseeable future, free up resources to cover the CD mission, address the air defense of Iceland and the North Atlantic, and provide support for exercises to maintain readiness. The courses of action were:

- Permanently reduce the Iceland commitment from two aircraft and three crews to one aircraft and two crews. The commitment would be filled by a U.S. AWACS on either a full-time basis or by sharing the mission with a NATO airborne early warning (NAEW) AWACS. Another possibility was to support the Iceland commitment using an air defense (AD) alert AWACS at Tinker AFB in combination with a NAEW AWACS in Europe without positioning an aircraft in Iceland.
- Reduce PACOM-assigned assets from three aircraft and six crews to one aircraft and two crews. The reduction would be a significant from the current force level, but CJCS believed that it provided a minimum threat-based level of AWACS support. Additional AWACS could and would be provided on a surge basis if required for support of training and exercises, and USCINCPAC would be provided whatever assets were needed to meet contingencies.

[18]CJCS 142020Z Feb 92 (S).

- Combine the AD and CD alert requirement at Tinker AFB with one aircraft and alert crew on one-hour alert for both missions, with reconstitution required within six hours if the alert AWACS was launched.
- Dedicate remaining AWACS assigned to Alaska to the CD mission on a TDY basis to free aircraft for the counterdrug mission in the near term. For the longer term, he asked for comments on inactivating the AWACS unit in Alaska and support the AD mission there with alert aircraft at Tinker (the same aircraft as in the previous COA). The two aircraft and four crews assigned to Alaska would move to Tinker AFB on permanent change of station (PCS), with enough equipment positioned in Alaska to support short-notice surge operations.
- Ultimately support the CD mission with a total of seven aircraft—four for USLANTCOM, two for NORAD, and one of USSOUTHCOM—and nine crews, with disposition under purview of the appropriate CINC as driven by the nature of the threat. Comments were requested on the creation of additional manning of surveillance-only crew positions to provide increased support for the CD mission without increasing TDY rates.

Responses from USPACOM

(U) Response to the Chairman's proposed COAs that affected USPACOM commanders was almost entirely negative. The concerns of USCINCPAC subordinate and component commanders, reflecting differing perspectives, are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

Alaska NORAD Region

(S) COMALCOM stressed the importance of maintaining a permanently assigned AWACS presence in Alaska. The proposed COA would lead to a severe degradation of capability not only on a daily operational basis but also impact the command's capability to comply with Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) guidance

on JTF planning, training, execution, and forward basing. Alaska-based AWACS provided the capability to conduct successful intercepts of probing CIS offensive aircraft that continued to conduct missions in the AOR, and supported such taskings as PONY EXPRESS, capabilities that would realistically disappear if a multi-tasked single AWACS based six or seven hours away in Oklahoma was depended on for support. He considered theater-based AWACS a necessary integral resource to the ALCOM mission, and felt that removing any of the assets would severely degrade ALCOM's present and future capability to support joint or defense of Alaska missions.[19]

(S) The commander of the Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) expressed deep concern to CINCNORAD regarding the proposed COA to remove AWACS from Alaska. If implemented, the Alaskan air defense mission would depend on a single AWACS based six or seven flying hours from the AOR, the same alert aircraft to be used to support Iceland intercept and detection operations as well as stand alert for possible use in the CD effort. The promise of a second AWACS to be made available in 6 hours if the alert aircraft were used would stretch the alert response time to Alaska to a minimum of 14 hours, a totally unacceptable situation. He noted that the Alaska AWACS squadron was activated there in 1986 after repeated attempts and failures to respond from Tinker and McChord AFBs, and that 107 Soviet/CIS intrusions into the Alaskan AOR had been made in the last 3 years. Although the Alaska AWACS had only been utilized successfully in 16 intercepts over the same 3-year period, it was largely due to the E-3s being unavailable for use in spite of being permanently based in Alaska. The commander concluded that the need for an AWACS presence in Alaska was greater now than ever before.[20]

(S) CINCNORAD echoed his regional commander's concerns, and recommended retention of at least one AWACS permanently assigned

[19]ALCOM 211430Z Feb 92 (S).
[20]HQ ANR 211800Z Feb 92 (S).

to Alaska. He also agreed with the proposal to combine the NORAD air defense/sovereignty and CD alert requirements at Tinker AFB, but did not address the Kadena-based AWACS issue.[21]

WESTPAC Commands

(S) COMUSKOREA stated that his minimum AWACS requirement was four dedicated aircraft based in theater. Without sufficient in-theater assets, augmenting AWACS support would arrive too late in a minimum warning scenario, and continuous coverage at a critical juncture of the denial phase of operations would be impossible. In addition, both the tactical control flight at Osan AB and the AWACS squadron at Kadena AB would be unable to meet minimum training requirements, and support for the Air Component Command (ACC) in theater level exercises would be lost.[22]

(S) COMUSJAPAN reported that he understood the importance of continued AWACS commitment in SWA and the requirements of the CD mission, and noted that one of the three Kadena-based E-3s with supporting crew and maintenance personnel had supported the CD mission since May 1990. With one aircraft off station, 20 exercises were not supportable and there was a 35 percent loss in training. Reduction of the squadron to one aircraft would limit the opportunities for WESTPAC air and naval forces to train with AWACS to less than one third of the former level. With no changes in real-world tasking, surveillance sorties in Korea and northern Japan would preclude participation in most JCS-directed exercises and limit interoperability training with allied forces. Deployed exercises would be supportable only with out-and-back sorties from Kadena, which would limit training and require extensive tanker support. He ended his comments by noting that the Kadena-based AWACS generated a disproportionate share of composite force tactical training for the USAF AWACS force, and

[21]CINCNORAD 271900Z Feb 92 (S).
[22]COMUSKOREA 240700Z Feb 92 (S).

while support of SWA, CD, and Iceland air defense were all priority missions, they did not generate the kind of tactical training needed by AWACS mission crews to prepare for a DESERT STORM-type contingency.[23]

Component Comments

(S) PACAF maintained that the current AWACS requirements defined and validated in December 1991 (four aircraft at Kadena AB and three at Elmendorf AFB) remained valid. They nonconcurred with the COAs to reduce the USPACOM AWACS fleet to a single aircraft and two crews and inactivate the Alaskan AWACS unit. Such actions would cripple operations, drop WESTPAC contingency response to an unacceptable level, and eliminate a viable air sovereignty presence in Alaska. AWACS had become a linchpin in regional military operations after 13 years of operating in the Pacific, and was a definite force multiplier in preparing for coalition warfare. The three AWACS were considered absolutely essential to continued USPACOM contingency response posture in WESTPAC.[24]

(S) Commander SEVENTH Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) viewed with concern any reduction in PACOM AWACS support. He considered present levels less than adequate to maintain joint interoperability training, and any further reduction of AWACS would only exacerbate the situation and send the wrong signal regarding U.S. commitment to regional allies—we would be reducing opportunities for joint, bilateral, and combined operations when we should be increasing them. In summary, he noted that the western portion of USPACOM faced the least diminished threat of any AOR yet had the smallest number of AWACS assigned, and that AWACS presence was one of the most visible and least threatening means of signaling U.S. commitment to PACOM nations.[25]

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[23]COMUSJAPAN 240813Z Feb 92 (S).
[24]HQ PACAF 260200Z Feb 92 (S).
[25]COMSEVENTHFLT 241040Z Feb 92 (S).

(~~S~~) CINCPACFLT concurred with all five COAs, and pointed out that Alaskan air defense requirements were no longer substantiated by a credible threat. However, regarding the AWACS at Kadena AB, he noted that OPLAN 5027 required three AWACS on Day 1 and three additional AWACS on Day 3 to support USPACOM units involved in the defense of Korea. If the surge capability could respond in an acceptable time period, reduction to one aircraft and two crews at Kadena AB should be considered, but, on a more routine basis, AWACS participation and interaction was required in PACFLT joint and combined exercises and fleet operations to ensure AWACS/battle group interoperability and readiness. AWACS assigned to Kadena provided that capability, and if they were moved outside of PACOM, AWACS availability would require sufficient TDY funds in lieu of permanent basing to meet USPACOM needs. He also noted that the assignment of seven AWACS to CD duties could be used to relieve the requirement for E-2 squadron deployments to Central America shared by Pacific and Atlantic fleets. This would minimize disruption to squadron and air wing interdeployment training cycles, ease TAD expenses, and improve PERSTEMPO.[26]

USCINCPAC Comments

(~~S/NF~~) USCINCPAC informed the Chairman that while he shared his concerns over worldwide allocation of AWACS, he considered PACOM requirements established in December 1991 still valid. Admiral Larson was uneasy with a proposal which would remove four of the five AWACS currently assigned and the potential impact on his ability to fulfill theater responsibilities. He feared that the proposed COAs would lead to a degradation of capability not only on a daily operational basis, but would also impact the command's capability to comply with current Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and JSCP guidance with regard to JTF planning, training, execution, forward stationing, and basing. AWACS was a

[26]CINCPACFLT 261806Z Feb 92 (~~S~~).

critical element of his warfighting arsenal, and was the primary long range command and control (C2) platform performing radar surveillance and communications connectivity roles. Reduction to one E-3 in the theater would severely affect the ability to respond to no-notice or short-notice contingencies, as follows:[27]

• Alaska: Although tensions with the CIS had eased, there was a total of 107 intrusion missions into the Alaskan AOR. Of those, 49 consisting of 98 Tu-95 BEAR variants, were bomber-type aircraft, the most recent being the intrusion of two BEAR G aircraft into the Aleutians on 14 January 1992. The demise of the West Coast over-the-horizon backscatter radar (OTH-B) and the relocatable over-the-horizon radar (ROTH-R) on Amchitka, and continued lack of funding for the Alaska radar project, made detection of CIS aircraft intruding into Alaskan airspace slim at best. With the proximity of the CIS to Alaska (only 50 nm at closest approach), immediate AWACS availability was mandated, and a Tinker-based alert aircraft would not be responsive.

• Counterdrug: The Golden Triangle in SEA was the world's leader in opium and heroin production. As CD efforts were refocused on this important area, source of 60 percent of the heroin reaching the United States, AWACS would be a valuable surveillance and cueing asset.

• Areas of tension: Several other areas continued to be cause for concern. U.S. citizens were still at risk in the Philippines, conflict for control of the Spratly Islands

[27]USCINCPAC 292000Z Feb 92 (S)

continued, and insurgencies in Kashmir and Punjab could spark another Indo-Pakistani confrontation.

(~~S/NF~~) In addition, AWACS was critical to USPACOM training. Extensive theater training, with over 100 joint and combined missions with Japanese and Korean forces, was a definite force multiplier in preparing for coalition warfare. The level of effort planned within the next year for USPACOM training required AWACS permanently assigned to the theater. In Alaska, COPE THUNDER exercises provided a unique type of realistic training currently unavailable anywhere else in the AOR, AWACS was a critical element of COPE THUNDER training, and the training could only be provided with permanently assigned, not TDY, crews. Admiral Larson shared General Powell's concern over high TDY rates for AWACS crews, but did not understand how the new proposals will both meet contingency response times and peacetime training requirements, and still reduce total TDY days for AWACS crews. Both AWACS and the CVBGs were important for demonstrating U.S. presence in the AOR, and were the first assets called upon in a crisis. AWACS was the most immediate and least provocative means of signaling U.S. commitment to our allies and foes alike. In summary, the CINC believed that the current AWACS allocation was adequate for his needs. Reductions would adversely impact operations, drop contingency response posture, restrict joint/combined exercises and training, and eliminate viable air sovereignty presence in Alaska. An adequate AWACS force, stationed in this theater, was key to his ability to accomplish his assigned missions.[28]

Decision Made

(~~S~~) CJCS announced the peacetime policy for the deployment of AWACS on 3 April 1992. The policy was designed to align the AWACS force with current priorities, reflect the realities of a

[28]Ibid.

changing geopolitical environment, and ease the burden on over-tasked AWACS aircraft and crews. He explained that in some theaters it represented a major departure from current posture, but any additional risk accepted was more than outweighed by the gains made in the CD effort. The adopted COAs adhered very closely to those proposed in February, but the AWACS allocaltion was subject to review as the commitment to SWA or other contingencies changed.[29]

(S) To support CD requirements in the short term, five AWACS were dedicated to the counterdrug effort. Of those, one was OPCON to USCINCSO for the CD mission effective 1 July 1992, three were to be OPCON to USCINCLANT not later than (NLT) 1 January 1993, and NORAD would have one AWACS for the CD mission on alert at Tinker AFB NLT 1 May 1992. As AWACS returned from SWA, a total of seven were to support the CD mission—four to USLANTCOM, two to NORAD, and one to USSOUTHCOM. A Commander Tactical Air Command (COMTAC) initiative to create additional surveillance-only crews would increas effectiveness while providing much needed relief to AWACS crews.

(S) The Iceland air defense requirement was to be supported by alert crews and aircraft, supplemented by periodic deployments and exercises. USCINCLANT was tasked to develop a detailed proposal to share the Iceland commitment with an NAEW AWACS. In the interim, a U.S. AWACS replaced the NATO AWACS on 1 April 1992. As mentioned above, the NORAD CD and AD alert requirements were combined and supported with a single AWACS on alert at Tinker AFB effective 1 May 1992. Alert readiness posture and reconstitution requirements were to be determined by CINCNORAD based on intelligence indicators.

(S) For USCINCPAC, the effects were indeed significant. USPACOM support was to be reduced to a single AWACS and necessary

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[29]CJCS 031610Z Apr 92 (S)

personnel NLT 1 January 1993, with the exact phasing of the withdrawal to be worked out by COMTAC and USCINCPAC. The requirement for a permanent Alaskan AWACS would end at the close of the fiscal year—NLT 1 October 1992—with the air defense mission supported by the alert aircraft at Tinker AFB.

(S) USCINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to develop a withdrawal plan in accordance with the CJCS policy. Their plan was based on personnel flow and exercise schedules, and called for two E-3s to be withdrawn from Kadena AB at October 1992. The reduction was seen by PACAF as only temporary, pending outcome of the SWA situation and disposition of AWACS assets. Unit flags were left in place, the 961st Airborne Warning and Control Squadron (961 AWACS) at Kadena AB and the 962 AWACS at Elmendorf AFB, with force levels to be restored when the Persian Gulf situation permitted.[30]

(S) In June 1992, arrangements were worked out with the Air Component Command (ACC), TAC's successor command, to leave two AWACS and three crews at Kadena AB. USCINCPAC and PACAF agreed to meet several commitments, but the agreement was not meant to restrict ACC from participating in Pacific training opportunities. The conditions agreed to by USCINCPAC and PACAF were:[31]

- USPACOM committed a single E-3 for a full 90-day rotation in the USCENTCOM AOR. Proposed period was November 1992 through February 1993.
- USPACOM committed to covering all COPE THUNDER exercises in Alaska without requesting additional AWACS support from ACC.
- USPACOM committed to covering all other Pacific exercise taskings without requesting additional E-3 support.
- USPACOM committed to accomplishing required periodic aircraft swap-outs at Tinker AFB vice Kadena AB.

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[30]USCINCPAC 020200Z May 92 (S); CINCPACAF 140315Z May 92 (S).
[31]HQ PACAF 032215Z May 92 (S).

(U) As of 31 December 1992, the 961 AWACS at Kadena AB had two E-3B SENTRY aircraft assigned. OPCON remained with NORAD pending the forces for agreement.

Reconnaissance Program Changes



(U) Transfer of responsibility for all reconnaissance missions in their AORs to the theater CINCs was directed by JCS to be effective on activation of USSTRATCOM on 1 July 1992. One day prior to implementation, 30 June 1992, USSTRATCOM notified USCINCPAC and the other CINCs that the directive had assumed the command arrangements agreements (CAA) delegating OPCON and the memorandums of agreement (MOA), if necessary, would be signed by 1 July. Despite the best efforts of all concerned, that had not

[32]USCINCPAC 060200Z Mar 92 ~~(S)~~.

occurred and OPCON of reconnaissance assets would not transfer to the theater CINCs until they were signed. In the meantime, mission management would be provided by the Commander, Task Force Battle Management in the Global Operations Center.[33]

(U) In the event, the MOA on Exercise of Operational Control of Strategic Reconnaissance Assets by USPACOM was signed by Admiral Larson on 19 August 1992, and became effective when signed by General Butler, CINCSTRATCOM, on 8 October. It was acknowledged by General Jon M. Loh, USAF, Commander, Task Force Battle Management, on 18 November 1992, and by General Jimmie V. Adams, USAF, CINCPACAF, on 6 January 1993. The MOA was to be reviewed biennially.

Exempt # (b)(1) Sec 1.3, # 4

Reconnaissance Commitment



[33]USSTRATCOM 302300Z Jun 92 (U).
[34]USCINCPAC 062305Z Apr 92 (S).



Airborne Command Post Operations

(S) On 10 January 1992, the USCINCPAC Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), nicknamed BLUE EAGLE, was released from its CJCS commitments in support of strategic nuclear requirements, and on 24 January USCINCPAC terminated its strategic alert and directed that inactivation of the ABNCP and the 9th Airborne Command and Control Squadron.(9 ACCS) begin. USCINCPAC remained tasked to maintain a survivable alternate command post, and until that facility—the Enhanced Crisis Management Center (ECMC)—became operational, the ABNCP continued to fly, train, and maintain proficiency in their strategic mission. The two units held a dining-out on 27 March and a formal inactivation ceremony at Hickam AFB on the 31st, closing out the unit's 27 year history. Remaining personnel were assigned to HQ USCINCPAC.[35]

(S) During the last three months of their existence, the ABNCP and 9 ACCS flew a total of 24 missions totaling 119.5 flight hours. During January 1992, battle staff personnel performed alert duties at Hickam AFB until 220001Z January, the date established by JCS for standdown from alert status. Flying activities are summed up below:[36]

- January—Two operational missions were flown during a WESTPAC deployment, seven training flights were flown in the Hawaiian working area, and one round-robin training deployment was made to March AFB. Maintenance-related schedule deviations included three late take-offs, including one sympathetic delay for a broken tanker, and one air abort for a 64 percent flown-as-scheduled rate. Total flight time logged was 52.6 hours.
- February—Six operational missions were flown during deployments to WESTPAC and EASTPAC, and four training flights were flown in the Hawaiian working area. Only one maintenance-related schedule deviation was experienced, a late takeoff on a

[35]HQ PACAF 050410Z Feb 92 (S); USCINCPAC 080010Z Feb 92 (S).
[36]ABNCP HistSums Jan-Mar 92 (S).

local area flight. The flown as scheduled rate was 90 percent, and total flight time logged in the month was 53.4 hours.

• March—Only three flights were flown, one training flight in the Hawaiian working area and one out-and-back mission (two flights) to Wake Island. Five scheduled missions were cancelled for lack of funds. There were no maintenance-related schedule deviations experienced, and total flight time logged was 13.5 hours. The final BLUE EAGLE ABNCP flight ended at 112300Z March 1992.

Alert Exercises

(S) The ABNCP conducted three types of alert exercises. They used SLBM threat timing criteria, which changed according to actual intelligence data. Survivable reaction time was the time interval the alert force had to attain a safe separation distance from the airfield. It was determined by subtracting two minutes from the SLBM threat time and comparing "time to safe separation" to "survival reaction time." If the former was less than the latter, the probability was that the alert force would have survived an attack. No alert exercises were held after the ABNCP came off alert on 22 January. Exercises conducted were:

• One BLUE EAGLE SIERRA exercise was conducted on 13 January. In a SIERRA exercise, alert personnel proceeded to the aircraft, started engines, and prepared to taxi. They were initiated by klaxon, and exercise timing stopped when the aircraft was ready to taxi.

• One BLUE EAGLE TANGO exercise was conducted on 21 January, the last day on alert. In a TANGO exercise, alert personnel proceeded to the aircraft, started engines, and taxied to the Emergency War Order (EWO) departure runway. TANGO exercises were also initiated by klaxon, and timing stopped when the aircraft reached the runway hold line.

• The third type of ABNCP exercise was BLUE EAGLE LIMA, which was like a TANGO carried to the next step, the actual

takeoff, with timing stopped at brake release. None was conducted in 1992 prior to inactivation.

Special Operations

Japanese Plutonium Shipment

~~(S/NF)~~ In September 1992, the Japanese vessel AKATSUKI MARU completed its voyage from France to Japan with approximately 1.7 tons of plutonium. USCINCPAC Special and Current Operations staffs, in conjunction with national agencies, conducted a pre-sail antiterrorism/security survey of the vessel and its nuclear safeguards. During the voyage, the vessel's progress was monitored to continually assess the risk from weather, piracy, or other hazards to navigation. National maritime counterterrorism forces were advised of the ship's progress throughout the voyage, and were prepared to respond under exigent circumstances. The trip was completed without incident, and only environmental activists protested the ship during its departure from and arrival in port.[37]

Exercise VAGABOND GUN 92

~~(S/NF)~~ In June 1992, personnel from Co C, 1st Bn, 1st SFGA, Naval Special Warfare Unit ONE, the 353d SOG, and the USMC Special Operations Training Group, participated in FTX VAGABOND GUN 92. The scenario postulated an opposed hostage rescue and NEO in a fictitious country. The actual site was an abandoned boy's reformatory on the island of Hawaii, with a remote marshalling base at Kaneohe MCAS and an intermediate staging base at Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), Hawaii. The hostages were rescued and all exercise objectives were met, to include explosive breaching, live fire sniping, and close quarters battle. It was challenging

[37]J32 HistSum, Jan-Dec 92 ~~(S/NF)~~.

in terms of assault coordination, adverse weather, and difficult flying conditions.[38]

Special Operations Study

(U) USARPAC carried out its SOF responsibilities through its Theater Army Special Operations Support Command (TASOSC), the 4th Special Operations Support Command (Theater Army)(Airborne) (4th SOSC(TA)(A)), which had been established to perform logistical support and sustainment functions, not command or operational missions. At USCINCPAC request, USCINCSOC conducted a TASOSC study in December 1991, the findings of which reinforced USARPAC's service support responsibilites and its inherent doctrinal role in providing support and sustainment to its forces. The study did not, however, endorse command or operational missions or a layering of the TASOSC between the theater SOC (SOCPAC) and theater ARSOF, but recommended OPCON for Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) be placed at the unified command level. Accordingly, USCINCPAC requested a USCINCSOC CA/PSYOP liaison cell and a 351st CA COM support cell be attached to USCINCPAC.[39]

(U) The command and control relationships and the operational and support functions performed by the 4th SOSC(TA)(A) in relation to the theater-apportioned Special Forces Group (1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1st SFG(A)), the 1st Battalion, 1st SFG(A), and the theater special operations command (SOCPAC). Over a period of several years, the role of the 4th SOSC(TA)(A) had evolved to that of a de facto Army component ARSOC, and the majority of its time, effort, and assets had been devoted to that role. Priority of its efforts had been to focus on the operational and command duties and functions appropriate to an ARSOC. Reasons for this situation were varied, and included both funding and manning issues. Neither USCINCPAC nor COMSOCPAC was suffi

[38]J32 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (S/NF).
[39]COMSOCPAC 290315Z Apr 92 (U).

ciently capable of adequately directing operational employment of theater ARSOF, and out of necessity the 4th SOSC assumed a more operational role than specified in Army doctrine.[40]

(U) In order for the 4th SOSC(TA)(A) to adhere to its doctrinal TASOSC role as the USCINCSOC study recommended, certain functions such as command, operational training, readiness, and intelligence, would have to be shifted to other organizations. CA and PSYOP proponency could remain with USARPAC, but because of unique CA/PSYOP roles and the heavy RC flavor of assigned units, proponency might be better addressed by separate criteria.

CA/PSYOP Command and Control Issues

(U) Prior to activation of the Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) in December 1989, USCINCPAC exercised COCOM of Service Special Operations Forces (SOF) through the Service components. After SOCPAC stood up, USCINCPAC delegated OPCON of SOF to COMSOCPAC, except for CA and PSYOP forces, which remained OPCON to Commander, Western Command (CDR WESTCOM) and later Commander, U.S. Army Pacific (CDR USARPAC). This command and control (C2) arrangement was driven by several considerations:[41]

- Neither USCINCPAC nor SOCPAC were adequately staffed to manage CA/PSYOP assets.
- The majority of CA/PSYOP forces, both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC), were Army forces.
- The Army budgeted for Army SOF.
- The Hawaii-based 322d CA Group (USAR) was assigned to the Army's IX Corps, and all other Active and Reserve CA and PSYOP forces were CONUS based, OPCON to USCINCSOC.

(U) In April, USCINCPAC recommended several changes in USPACOM C2 relationships to enhance effective employment of the

[40]Ibid.; USCINCPAC 290440Z May 92 (U).
[41]J32 HistSum, Jan-Dec 92 (S).

unique skills of CA and PSYOP forces in a joint environment. The proposed policy was in consonance with emerging joint doctrine, and provided for more efficient and effective employment of critical resources in support of the USPACOM strategy, and was still under study at the end of the year. The changes were:[42]

- Responsibility for theater CA/PSYOP planning, policy, and programs be exercised by HQ USCINCPAC. The Special Operations Division of J3 would have staff oversight responsibilities.
- Appoint the Commanding General, 351st CA Command (CG, 351st CA COM) as senior CA advisor to the CINC.
- USCINCPAC delegate OPCON of augmenting CA/PSYOP forces to subordinate commands in accordance with approved OPLANs and as required for contingency operations. Request for CA/PSYOP support to be directed to USCINCPAC.
- The 322d CA Group remain assigned to CG USARPAC/IX Corps.
- Budget requirements for USCINCPAC CA/PSYOP to be administered by CG USARPAC as the agent for Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11, Special Operations Forces).

Liaison Cell Established

(U) In March 1992, USCINCSOC agreed to provide an on-site PSYOP and CA Liaison Detachment to USCINCPAC. The detachment was defined as a planning and coordinating element consisting of one PSYOP cell of one officer and three enlisted persons, and one CA cell of two officers, attached to HQ USCINCPAC. They operated within the USCINCPAC Civil-Military Operations (CMO) staff for the purposes of coordinating actions in support of USCINCPAC CA/PSYOP requirements, including assisting in development of USPACOM PSYOP and CA plans and programs. OPCON of the detachment was in accordance with the USCINCSOC-USCINCPAC CAA.[43]

[42]USCINCPAC 080435Z Apr 92 (U).
[43]J32 HistSum, Jan-Dec 92 (S); LOA for USCINCSOC PSYOP/CA Liaison Support to USCINCPAC (U).

(U) With all four members on board, the Forward Liaison Element (FLE) PSYOP cell assumed responsibility in October 1992 for coordinating USPACOM PSYOP requirements under direct supervision of the USCINCPAC PSYOP Staff Officer/J323. One of the first actions of the PSYOP cell was to request to transfer management for USPACOM MFP-11 funds from the 4th SOSC(TA)(A) to the 4th PSYOP Group, based at Fort Bragg, NC. Beginning in FY 94, control of the funds was to reside with the Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (CDR USASOC), with management by the 4th PSYOP Gp Resource Management Officer (RMO). The FLE at HQ USCINCPAC would submit annual USPACOM PSYOP budget requirements directly to the 4th PSYOP Group RMO for inclusion in their budget submission report. This arrangement would facilitate the effective management of PSYOP MFP-11 funds in support of USPACOM PSYOP programs, would provide for a by-line accounting of expenditures, and ensure allocation was consistent with USCINCPAC priorities.

(U) Also beginning in October, to ensure effective PSYOP support to the CINC's two-tiered C2 concept for contingency operations, all four members of the PSYOP cell were identified for duty with the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The arrangement was first tested in Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS 91 in September 1991, and was regularized with deployment of one member to Exercise TEMPO BRAVE in December 1992.

Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3)

(U) With full manning of the PSYOP cell, the USCINCPAC PSYOP staff officer had time to concentrate on the long overdue review of the USCINCPAC OP3. The last OP3 approved by SECDEF covered FY 90, and was extended through January 1991. A proposed USCINCPAC OP3 for FY 91 had been submitted, but the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD/PA) had nonconcurred with approval of the program because it was titled "USCINCPAC

International Military Information Program," and no further action was taken by SECDEF. Between June 1991 and May 1992, the 8th PSYOP Battalion at Fort Bragg assigned several personnel TDY to USCINCPAC to assist the PSYOP staff officer in developing a new USPACOM OP3.[44]

(U) There were several problems involved in developing a meaningful and workable USPACOM OP3. The vast distances in the theater affected the timeliness and cost of operations, and numerous countries and diverse cultures increased the difficulty of maintaining language and area expertise. The nature of U.S. involvement with most countries made introduction of military PSYOP forces a sensitive issue, and the tactical orientation of the forces limited the scope of activity possible beyond participation in major scheduled exercises. Under the conditions prevailing in USPACOM, the primary need was to orient the PSYOP force to the region and, where the opportunity presented itself, to use the force to enhance other activities conducted under the Pacific Command Strategy.



[44]J323 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (S).
[45]Ibid.



[46]USCINCPAC 182000Z Dec 92 (~~S~~).



[47]Ibid.; J323 Information Paper (U), 14 Jul 92, Subj: International Military Information (IMI) Support to Pacific Island WWII 50th Anniversary Commemorative Events; AMEMB Port Moresby 02780/180520Z Nov 92 (U); AMEMB.Suva 03303/200122Z Nov 92 (U).

[redacted]

Civil-Military Operations Conference

(U) USCINCPAC conducted the 1992 Civil-Military Operations (CMO) conference at Camp H. M. Smith and Hickam AFB, HI, from 22 through 24 April 1992. The theme of the conference was "USCINCPAC Strategy in the Pacific: CMO in Transition," which sought to improve the effectiveness of CMO plans and execution, thereby enhancing USCINCPAC nation assistance capabilities in support of the command's mission and strategy. Issues addressed related to joint applications of CA and IMI (vice PSYOP) programs in a rapidly changing environment. Over 70 people attended, including representatives from throughout the USPACOM-oriented CA and PSYOP communities, both AC and RC. Conferees participated in four workshops which produced summaries of issues discussed:[48]

- Workshop 1—Joint CMO Strategic Planning. Addressed issues related to improving strategic CMO planning in support of the CINC's vision of his concept of employment for CA/PSYOP forces in the AOR through the turn of the century.
- Workshop 2—Improving CMO Efficiency. Addressed issues related to improving the efficiency of CMO activities, both now and in the future, to support the CINC's strategy in the AOR.
- Workshop 3—Joint IMI Operations. Addressed issues related to improving the quality of IMI/PSYOP support to the CINC's strategy in the PACOM AOR throughout the operational continuum.
- Workshop 4—Special Operations CMO. Addressed issues related to improving the special operations CMO support to the CINC's strategy in the PACOM AOR.

[48]J32 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (S); USCINCPAC 040140Z Feb 921 (U) and 210100Z Mar 92 (U).

Counterdrug Operations

Counterdrug Strategy

(U) USCINCPAC's plan for combatting production and trafficking of illegal drugs employed his two-tiered command and control concept, and on 12 March 1992, Admiral Larson revised his CD strategy to conform to that concept. The primary change in the revised strategy developed over the next few months by the Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate/J5 to transform the decision into doctrinal reality was the shift of responsibility for ground operations from CDR USARPAC to CJTF-5. Prior to that time, CDR USARPAC had been the CD ground supported commander, while CJTF-5 was the CD supported commander for air and maritime operations. The shift made CJTF-5 a true joint task force commander and shifted CDR USARPAC to the role of a supporting commander in parallel with the other component commands.[49]

(U) The revised CD strategy was signed by the CINC on 3 August 1992, and CJTF-5 became the single point of contact for Pacific CD operations. The added responsibility would enhance the task force's ability to coordinate law enforcement support with law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in the Pacific and strengthen their already established and excellent working relationship. The change would be transparent to the LEAs, would have no impact on current operations, and would allow CJTF-5 to participate more fully in developing USCINCPAC's regional CD concept. Components of the revised strategy included:

- Build consensus for a cooperative multi-agency/ regional approach.
- Deploy DOD analysts forward to support country team CD priorities.

[49]J33 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (S); USCINCPAC 230500Z Sep 92 (U).

- Build a responsive intelligence and operational structure in the rear to support forward presence.
- Provide automated analytic and communications capability to provide connectivity and support robust, theater-wide CD activities.
- Conduct coordinated CD activities in accordance with the National Counterdrug Strategy.

(U) With heroin the principal drug produced in USPACOM, the regional concept emphasized countering heroin trafficking from Southeast Asia (SEA), while recognizing and supporting the effort against cocaine, the primary U.S. drug threat. It was a phased approach, focused on developing an improved, integrated intelligence effort built on existing relationships, improved regional information sharing among the country teams, and coordinated responses against drug trafficking. USCINCPAC efforts toward the regional concept included the Asian Counternarcotics Elements (ACE), which were DOD intelligence analysts in Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Tokyo supporting the DEA attachés. Also included was the Counterdrug Analysis Team (CDAT) formed at JICPAC. CDAT operations supported activities against Western Pacific drug trafficking with a focus on heroin, and also supported CJTF-5 and the country teams through ACE—CDAT is discussed in more detail below. Plans were being made to deploy computer work-stations connected through the anti-drug data network (ADNET) to improve information exchange and coordinate CD activities to support the national CD strategy. To provide a framework to translate the new strategy into operational and tactical action against narcotics traffickers, USCINCPAC tasked CJTF-5 in October 1992 to develop a heroin campaign plan. By the end of the year, a draft had been prepared and staffing initiated, and completion was expected early in 1993.

(U) USCINCPAC's strategy would continue to guide the command in fulfilling its detection and monitoring mission against cocaine trafficking in the Eastern Pacific (EASTPAC). JTF FIVE

with its intelligence fusion center was increasingly successful in developing cases to support cued operations, and because of the vast size of USPACOM, would continue to rely heavily on intelligence. USCINCPAC support to USCINCLANT continued, with provision of maritime and aerial assets dedicated to improving CJTF-4's capability against Central American cocaine trafficking, and personnel and equipment in support of CINCFOR and NORAD CD operations along the southwest border of the United States.[50]

USPACOM Counterdrug Analysis Team

(U) On 10 March 1992, USCINCPAC approved the plan for the Counterdrug Analysis Team (CDAT) to be located at JICPAC. It was prompted by the fact that in 1991 an estimated 2,650 metric tons of illicit opium, 70 percent of the world supply, was produced in SEA. A March 1992 National Intelligence Estimate (8-92) estimated the supply of heroin in the United States had quadrupled since the 1980s, with 50 percent of the increase coming from SEA. The CDAT was a critical and pivotal component of USCINCPAC's cooperative DOD-LEA regional concept of counterdrug intelligence, and was the top priority new CD initiative. It was designed to complement and directly support the ACE initiative mentioned above, which established a cooperative presence with LEA field elements at key locations in Asia. ACE forward and CDAT in the rear together formed an intelligence sharing network in direct support of CJTF-5 and country team counterdrug operations.[51]

(~~S~~) Actually established at JICPAC on 15 June 1992, CDAT's mission was to support USCINCPAC's CD strategy and its D/M mission by conducting theater-level intelligence analysis against the SEA heroin threat. Its supported commander was CJTF-5, and was an integral part of JICPAC's counterdrug shop, the Special Projects Division (OTS). CDAT manning was somewhat fluid, and

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[50]See note above.

[51]USCINCPAC 240200Z Apr 92 (U); JICPAC Talking Paper (~~S/NF~~), 20 Oct 92, Subj: JICPAC Counter Drug Analysis Team (CDAT)(U).

was composed of a combination of JICPAC, National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific (NCPAC), and 500th and 703rd Military Intelligence Brigade (MI Bde) personnel. CDAT cooperated closely with other organizations working the heroin smuggling issue. Both DIA and NSA provided short-term temporary duty analyst support, and working relationships were established with DEA personnel on various American Embassy country teams and with the FBI in Honolulu.

~~(S/NF)~~ Analysis was conducted of heroin movement including storage, maritime shipment, and overland transport. Specific projects included analysis of southern Thailand narcotics trafficking; caravans and refineries in the Golden Triangle; Laos and the Mountainous Area Development Company; Thai fisheries and maritime heroin transportation; and the movement of narcotics from Southwest Asia (SWA). During the year, information was provided to designated consumers targeting the movement of opiates in the AOR:[52]

Exempt (b)(1) sec 1.5a #4

Rationale uses of imagery still in use

- A target package, [redacted] was provided to DEA Bangkok on the location of a large scale marijuana growing area in northern Laos. The crop was surrounding a Vietnam-era TACAN site to which JTF-FA was denied access, and located 50 km from a joint U.S. State Department-Government of Laos crop substitution program.

- SEA country teams and the national intelligence community received CDAT Special Reports on Lao marijuana cultivation and identification of probable cooperation between traffickers from Panghsang, Burma, and Chinese traffickers in Lung Hai, China, in the formation of narcotics caravans enroute to the Thai/Burma border.

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[52]See note above.

Operations

Poppy Yield Survey

(S) A poppy yield survey initiated on 6 December 1991 was concluded on 5 February. The project employed two personnel of the 1st Bn, 1st SFGA, deployed to Chiang Mai, Thailand. They supported the U.S. Consulate to maintain and troubleshoot a communications net for a controlled poppy yield survey.[53]

Operation OIL CAN

(U) Conducted early in 1992, this was the largest CD success in working with the Thai government. It was the first cued-intelligence operation for CJTF-5 in Thailand, and targeted a Thai trawler suspected of heroin trafficking. Although the drug run never took place and deployed DOD forces stood down in February, the cooperation and coordination with CJTF-5, the Country Team, and Thai law enforcement officials supported the regional concept and much was learned by all concerned.[54]

Operation BLUE LINE

(S) In a cued-intelligence operation, USS VINCENNES (CG 49) on 23 March 1992, located the U.S.-flagged sailing vessel (S/V) DRIVEN in international waters 45 nm north of Isla Cedros off the central Baja coast. The LEDET boarded her, and through a lengthy search located over 200 kilograms (kg) of marijuana in hidden compartments on board. The two crewmembers were arrested and the contraband and vessel were seized.[55]

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[53]J33 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (S).
[54]J333 Point Paper (S), 9 Oct 92, Subj: Counterdrug Update for CINC Trip to Thailand (U).
[55]J33 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (S).

Operation GOLDEN BLADE

(S) Also based on cued-intelligence, USS MERRILL (DD 976) and USCGC MORGANTHAU (WHEC 722) located the Colombian-flagged fishing vessel (F/V) DON JACINTO on 22 July 1992 approximately 400 nm south of Acapulco, Mexico. The crew of the DON JACINTO jettisoned cargo during the night of the 22nd, witnessed by the crews of MERRILL and MORGANTHAU. About 300 pounds of cocaine floating in the water were recovered by MORGANTHAU crewmembers, and with permission of the Colombian government, they boarded and seized the vessel and arrested the crew. An estimated two and one-third tons of cocaine had been aboard the vessel.

Operation LIQUID METAL

(S) On 26 October 1992, USS REASONER (FF 1063) assisted a DEA/USCS undercover operation targeted against a U.S. citizen operating a high-volume cocaine smuggling organization between Colombia and Southern California. REASONER stood over the horizon while a DEA-chartered undercover tug with barge received 3,960 kg of cocaine from a cocaine mothership. Once the transfer was complete, DEA transferred the cocaine via helicopter to REASONER for quick transport back to San Diego for sting operations. In addition to the cocaine, DEA and USCS collected $800,000 from the traffickers and arrested six individuals, including the U.S. citizen they lured back to the United States.

Operation GRASSHOPPER

(S) This operation was set up to transport a heroin broker from Bangkok to Guam. The broker, Lin Chien Pang, was in custody in Malaysia waiting an appeal of extradition to the United States. The DEA did not think the extradition appeal would be successful, but felt that Malaysia would expel Lin to Bangkok once the judge denied the appeal. Once in Thailand, Thai authorities agreed to release him into U.S. custody, provided he could

be immediately removed from Thailand. Arrangements were made for USTRANSCOM to provide a C-141 within approximately 20 hours to Bangkok, and CINCPACAF provided a captain to act as a military liaison with DEA Bangkok from 24 November to 30 December 1992. In the event the judge did not rule on the case through the end of December, and Lin remained in custody in Malaysia.

Operation WIPEOUT

(U) In its third year, this continued to be a model of marijuana eradication success. CDR USARPAC provided coordination with the DEA to provide helicopters and crews of the 25th ID(L) and the Hawaiian Air National Guard (HIANG) for marijuana plant spotting within the Hawaiian Islands. Once spotted, DEA or local LEA eradicated the plants. During Operation WIPEOUT 92, 474,000 marijuana plants were spotted and 464,500 plants eradicated. The estimated street value of the destroyed plants was $3.8 billion.

Support to Western Samoa

(U) During the period 2-13 April, 23 personnel from SOCPAC and USARPAC trained Western Samoa LE personnel in marijuana eradication techniques, including aerial observation techniques, video imagery interpretation, patrolling techniques, and manual eradication techniques based upon experience gained in Operation WIPEOUT. In addition, they conducted a survey of marijuana and coca production for the Government of Western Samoa.

Surface Action Group Operations

(~~C~~) CJTF conducted four CD SAG operations in EASTPAC during the year to counter the south-to-north cocaine threat. The first was initiated in March 1992, and the SAGs were generally composed of two surface combatants and an oiler. [redacted]

[redacted] The

SAG NAME	DATES OF OPERATION	SHIPS
Half Court	2 Mar-6 Apr	USS JOUETT, PRINCETON, WICHITA
Sea Witch	17 Apr-22 May	USS TRUXTUN, LOCKWOOD, ERICSSON
Salt Mine	18 Sep-22 Oct	USS ARKANSAS, HORNE, WICHITA
Wave Dancer	16 Nov-21 Dec	USS ELLIOT, CHANDLER, WILLAMETTE

Support to CJTF-4

(C) USCINCPAC supported CJTF-4 throughout 1992 by providing two surface combatants, three from 6 November to 7 December after enhanced CD operations were directed by the Joint Staff. [redacted]

Support to CINCFOR

(U) USCINCPAC provided support to CINCFOR ground missions along the southwest border using primarily I MEF Marines, but also Army troops from the 25th ID(L). USCINCPAC supported 42 ground missions which employed over 2,500 personnel, including listening post/observation post operations, engineer construction, photographic imagery development, high visibility operations, linguist/analyst support, and reconnaissance missions. In addition, I MEF and COMNAVAIRPAC supported over a dozen aerial missions including FLIR and aerial reconnaissance.[56]

[56]Ibid.

Monthly Operations Summaries

(C) Until the spring of 1990, the utilization of USN surface units assigned to counterdrug/law enforcement (CD/LE) patrol operations was centered around patrol periods of short duration. Patrol areas were based on ship type, endurance, and intelligence estimates of the best chance for success during a given calendar period. In June 1990, the first Eastern Pacific (EASTPAC) CD task group was organized and operated for two months in waters along the Mexican coastline. Primary mission was the detection and monitoring (D/M) of suspected narcotics trafficking aircraft moving cocaine from South and Central America into Mexico and CONUS. These operations were considered "continuing operations." Trends indicated that the narcotics smuggling threat in the USPACOM portion of the EASTPAC AOR was primarily maritime, and it was taking place well offshore from the Mexican and North American coastline. PACFLT units assigned to dedicated EASTPAC CD operations were assigned to CD D/M roles against the maritime threat in patrol areas 400 to 600 nm offshore—the CD SAGs described above.[57]

(U) USCINCPAC's extensive CD operations conducted on a day-to-day basis involved considerable effort and significant commitment of resources. USPACOM CD operations under the aegis of CJTF-5 during 1992 are summarized in the following paragraphs. Aircraft sorties/flight hours and ship steaming days represent operations in support of both CJTF-4 and CJTF-5 (and CJTF-6 where noted) by CINCPACFLT assets. Other support was provided by USARPAC, MARFORPAC, and PACAF units to federal, state, and local government agencies and law enforcement agencies (LEA).

(C) In January, U.S. Navy maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) dedicated to CD flew 51 sorties totaling 421 flight hours, while associated P-3Cs contributed an additional 14 sorties/121 flight

[57]CJTF FIVE 211600Z Dec 92 (C).

hours (4 sorties and 30 flight hours were flown by USNR aircraft). Navy E-2C HAWKEYE AEW aircraft flew 155 sorties/605.3 flight hours, and SH-2F LAMPS helicopters put in 51 sorties/130 hours. Four dedicated frigates racked up a total of 99 steaming days during the month, and associated USAF radar sites contributed 15-personnel-per-day, 24-hours-per-day in support of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS). A total of 3 air targets suspected of being drug traffickers was detected, but no attempts at interdiction were made. Other support to LEA included military working dog (MWD) teams to help the USCS in Honolulu and Alaska; intelligence analysts to support the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and USCS in Honolulu, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Tokyo, and Ft. Bliss, Texas; communications support to the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in Chiang Mai, Thailand; and engineer support to the Nolan County Sheriff, Nolan County, Texas. In the Pacific, Project COOK analysis and information exchange resulted in the location of two tons of hashish and seizure of a 50-foot yacht by the Fijian Customs Service.[58]

~~(S)~~ During the month of February, CD-dedicated P-3C MPA flew 43 sorties/415 hours, while associated MPA contributed an additional 27 sorties/176 hours (2/11 by Reserve aircraft). The HAWKEYEs flew 96 sorties/460.5 hours, and dedicated USN helicopters contributed 62 sorties/204.9 hours, about evenly divided between SH-2F and SH-60B SEAHAWKs. Associated SH-2Fs added 2 sorties/8.1 hours to the effort. Five dedicated surface vessels sailed a total of 91 steaming days in support of counterdrug operations. The USAF contributed full-time radar coverage with 15 people each day, and four air targets were detected and identified as suspected narcotics trafficking aircraft (SNTA). LEA interdictions were attempted on all, and three were successful. Other support to various agencies included: MWD teams in support of USCS in Honolulu and Alaska; intelligence analysts to

[58]USCINCPAC 032300Z Mar 92 ~~(S)~~

DEA, INS, and USCS in Honolulu, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Tokyo; engineer support to the Nolan County Sheriff; a total of 126 personnel to support the National Park Service (NPS), USCS, and DEA in Texas and California; and communications support to the DAO, Chiang Mai, Thailand.[59]

(S) March CD flight activities included 16 sorties/166.7 hours by dedicated P-3C aircraft, with another 18 sorties/126.0 flight hours contributed by associated MPA. Reserve P-3Cs flew one 5.0-hour sortie. Dedicated SH-2F LAMPS helicopters flew 60 sorties/142.4 hours, SH-60Bs flew 136.1 hours during 37 sorties, and an associated SH-2F added 1 sortie/2.7 hours to the effort. Other dedicated USN aircraft activities included 20 CH-46D SEA KNIGHT sorties, totaling 55.0 flight hours, and one 2.0-hour F-14 sortie, while in an associate role a single S-3A flew one sortie for 1.5 hours. USMC aircraft participation included 5 UH-1 helicopter sorties for 25.9 hours, and 7 OV-10D BRONCO sorties for a total of 66.8 hours. Seven dedicated ships steamed 98 days in CD operations, and 1 vessel was seized (S/V DRIVEN) with 206 kg of marijuana on board, and two arrests were made—the culmination of Operation BLUE LINE, a 7-month-long JTF FIVE-assisted FBI operation. Full-time associated USAF radar coverage was provided, involving 15 personnel. A total of five SNTA was detected, and 2 out of 4 attempted interdictions were successful. Other activities included MWD teams in support of the USCS in Honolulu and Alaska; intelligence analysts to the USCS and DEA in Honolulu, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Tokyo; engineer support to the Nolan County Sheriff; a total of 63 personnel supported the DEA in the Channel Islands, California; 69 personnel supported the NPS in Joshua Tree National Monument, California; a narco-enforcement team in Inyo, California, was supported by 43 personnel; and 6 personnel were assigned to help with Operation WIPEOUT in Hawaii.[60]

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[59]USCINCPAC 271850Z Mar 92 (S).
[60]USCINCPAC 290400Z Mar 92 (S).

(S) In April, dedicated P-3Cs flew 67 sorties totaling 496.5 flight hours, and associated active duty MPAs contributed another 138.1 hours during 18 sorties. A USNR P-3C flew one 10.0-hour sortie. The E-2C HAWKEYEs conducted 9 sorties for a total of 31.9 flight hours, and a single F-14 TOMCAT performed one sortie of 2.2 hours. The SH-2F LAMPS flew 114 dedicated sorties/212.9 hours, while the SEAHAWKs put in 161.3 flight hours during 43 sorties. A total of 11 dedicated ships sailed 170 steaming days during the month. In Hawaii, dedicated OH-58 support to Operation WIPEOUT consisted of 8 sorties/9.5 hours. The USAF provided their full-time radar support to the USCS throughout the month. Three suspected air targets were detected and interdictions were attempted on each, but none were successful. Other support to LEAs excluding air and maritime D/M included MWD teams in support of USCS in Honolulu; intelligence analysts to the USCS in Honolulu and the DEA in Bangkok and Tokyo; linquists support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Phoenix, Arizona; two helicopters and supporting personnel to the DEA in Hawaii for WIPEOUT; and training in marijuana eradication techniques for Western Samoa LE personnel in support of DOS and the Government of Western Samoa.[61]

(S) During May 1992, dedicated P-3C ORIONs conducted 66 sorties totaling 494.3 hours, while associated MPA flight time consisted of 231.0 hours flown during 31 sorties. (USNR units did not participate in CD operations during the month.) Flight time by CD-dedicated helicopters included 73 sorties/215.8 hours by SH-2F LAMPS aircraft, and 13 sorties/44.3 hours by SH-60Bs. The E-2Cs flew 8 sorties for a total of 34.0 flight hours, and there were 2 sorties for 3.5 hours by F-14A TOMCATs. The USAF took part for the first time this year with 2 B-52 sorties with a total flight time of 23.4 hours. The USMC provided helicopter support to JTF SIX to the extent of 6 sorties/4.0 hours by CH-46Es and 4 sorties/7.0 hours by CH-53D SEA STALLIONs, and the

[61]USCINCPAC 282301Z May 92 (S)

Army flew 12 OH-58 sorties of 31.1 hours in support of WIPEOUT. A total of 11 dedicated ships steamed 152 days on CD operations. The normal, full-time USAF radar support was provided as requested by the USCS, and 11 air targets were detected as SNTAs. Of those detected, 1 interdiction was successful, 7 others were attempted but failed, and no interdiction was attempted on the others. Other CD activities included MWD support to USCS in Honolulu and Anchorage; a linguist to the INS in Honolulu and intelligence analysts to the DEA in Bangkok, Tokyo, and Hong Kong; and Arab linguists to the FBI in Phoenix. Ground support included a total of 180 personnel split between the San Carlos and White Mountain Indian Reservations in Arizona supporting the tribal police; 152 personnel deployed to the Coronado National Forest, Arizona, in support of the Forest Service (FS); and smaller groups of personnel at Boot Hill and Artesia, New Mexico, Galveston, Texas, and NAS Lemoore, California. In Hawaii, support to Operation WIPEOUT continued, with 131,000 marijuana plants destroyed.[62]

(S) In June, dedicated AC P-3C MPAs flew a total of 409.8 flying hours during 42 sorties, and dedicated P-3Bs flew 2 sorties for 9.0 flight hours. They were assisted by associated P-3Cs and P-3Bs which flew 13 sorties/101.0 hours and 2 sorties/19 hours, respectively. SH-2F LAMPS helicopters conducted 18 sorties and flew 48.3 hours, and there were 2 F-14A sorties for 1.5 flight hours. No E-2C operations were recorded during June. A single USNR EA-6B PROWLER flew 1 sortie of 2.5 hours duration, and USMC CH-46 and UH-1N helicopters added 12 sorties/13.0 flight hours supporting JTF SIX. In Hawaii, Army OH-58s flew 128.5 hours during 42 sorties in support of WIPEOUT. Six dedicated PACFLT vessels steamed 80 days. USAF radar coverage was provided 24 hours per day for the entire month, and 18 air targets suspected as drug trafficers were detected. Of those, LEA interdiction was attempted on 6, 3 of which were successful. Other

[62]USCINCPAC 230225Z Jun 92 (S)

support included MWD teams to the USCS in Honolulu, and combat life saving training to local LEAs in Hawaii. One linguist helped the INS in Honolulu, and intelligence analysts assisted DEA in Bangkok, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Ground support was provided to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (USBP) at Boot Hill, New Mexico; 32 personnel to the Treasury Department at Artesia, New Mexico; 152 personnel to the FS at Coronado National Forest, Arizona; 50 personnel to the NPS at Santa Monica National Mountains, Los Angeles County, California; and 48 personnel to the USCG for construction in Galveston. The San Carlos and White Mountain Indian Reservations also received support, and as mentioned above, Operation WIPEOUT continued in Hawaii with another 75,000 marijuana plants eradicated in June.[63]

(C) Counterdrug operations conducted by dedicated MPA in July totaled 390.0 flight hours during 41 sorties (346.0/36 by P-3Cs, 44.0/5 by P-3Bs), and associated patrol aircraft contributed another 102.0 hours/14 sorties (all by P-3Cs except for one P-3B sortie of 9.0 hours). Dedicated USN helicopter flights included 41.3 flight hours by SH-2Fs during 12 sorties, and 17.6 SH-60B hours in 7 sorties. One associated SH-60B sortie of 2.5 hours was flown. The E-2C HAWKEYEs returned to CD operations in July with 4 sorties totaling 19.8 hours, and they were jointed by EP-3 aircraft which flew 2 sorties/17.6 hours. USMC CH-53D helicopters supported JTF SIX with 2 sorties/6.0 hours, and OV-10s flew 20 sorties with a total of 48.0 flight hours. In Hawaii, Army OH-58 helicopters flew 179.5 flight hours during 81 sorties in support of WIPEOUT. Four PACFLT vessels dedicated to CD steamed 84 days during the month, and in an intelligence-cued operation named GOLDEN BLADE assisted in the seizure of the 90-foot fishing vessel F/V DON JACINTO after the crew was observed jettisoning cargo. Six of approximately 100 bales of cocaine was recovered, and 9 persons were arrested. USAF radar provided full coverage during the month, and detected 12 SNTAs. Of those, LEA inter-

[63]USCINCPAC 240210Z Jul 92 (C).

diction was attempted on 3, with 1 successful. Other support included MWD teams to the USCS in Alaska, and intelligence analysts to the USCS in Honolulu and San Francisco, to DEA in Tokyo and Hong Kong, and to the INS in Guam. Ground support continued at Boot Hill and Artesia, New Mexico; Galveston, Texas; the Santa Monica National Mountains and the two Indian reservaions in Arizona. New ground support requirements consisted of a Spanish linguist to DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and photographic imagery support to the USCS at Alameda, California. Operation WIPEOUT continued in Hawaii, with 118,000 marijuana plants eradicated during the month.[64]

(S) August flight activities differed slightly from the norm, with dedicated P-3Cs contributing 311.0 flight hours during 34 sorties and associated P-3s flying 17 sorties of 132.0 hours (P-3Bs flew 3/22.0, the rest by P-3Cs). SH-60B helicopters conducted 79 sorties totaling 263.2 flight hours, the high point for SEA HAWK participation in CD operations to date, while the SH-2F LAMPS were absent for the first time. The HAWKEYEs flew 80 sorties for 340.0 hours, also a high. U.S. Coast Guard HC-130s took part for the first time with 3 sorties totaling 23.4 hours, and one HU-25 FALCON sortie of 3.0 hours. The California Air National Guard contributed one 1.5-hour RF-4C sortie, and the Canadian Defence Forces pitched in with a single CP-140 AURORA sortie of 10.0 hours. USMC C-130s flew 5.0 hours during 2 sorties for JTF FIVE, and Army OH-58 helicopters continued supporting Operation WIPEOUT with 34 sorties/110.0 flying hours. Five ships in direct support of CD operations contibuted 98 steaming days during the month, but no seizures were made. Normal USAF radar support continued, and 14 suspected drug traffickers were detected, and 2 interdictions of 2 attempted were made. Ground support included MWD teams to the USCS in Alaska and Guam, and intelligence analysts to the USCS in San Francisco; DEA in Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Bangkok; and INS in Guam. Construc-

[64]USCINCPAC 260200Z Aug 92 (S)

tion support for the Treasury continued at Artesia, New Mexico, and linguists remained at EPIC. Other ground operations included 50 personnel in the Santa Monica Mountains; 88 personnel to Sequoia National Forest; and 7 personnel provided tactics training to Angeles National Forest Park Rangers. Another 36,000 marijuana plants were eradicated in Hawaii.[65]

(S) In September, total USN P-3 sorties and flying hours totaled 85 and 886.2 respectively, a high for the year. Of the total, active component dedicated P-3Cs accounted for 50 sorties and 462.0 flying hours, and P-3Bs for 11 and 86.0, respectively. Reserve component MPA sorties and flying hours were 9 and 71.2 for P-3Cs, 3 and 25.0 for P-3Bs—this month marked the first participation by Reserve P-3C aircraft. E-2Cs flew a full schedule again with 316.1 flight hours in 78 sorties, and EP-3 aircraft doubled their July effort to 4 sorties and 38.3 hours. The SH-2F LAMPS helicopters returned to the CD effort with 16 sorties totaling 39.9 hours, and the SH-60Bs flew 120 sorties and 407.2 hours, another high for the SEA HAWKs. Two F-14A sorties were flown, with a total time of 7.6 hours, and USCG HU-25 FALCON activity totaled 9 sorties/31.0 hours. The California ANG RF-4C returned this month, and contributed 10.5 flight hours over 5 sorties, and a Canadian Defence Forces CP-140 flew one 10.0-hour sortie. The Army flew 17 OH-58 sorties during Operation WIPEOUT, with a total flight time of 44.6 hours. A total of 9 PACFLT ships contributed a total of 140 steaming days during the month and made 15 boardings with negative results. Full-time USAF radar coverage continued, and 13 suspected air targets were detected. Of those, interdiction was attempted on 9 and 1 was sucessful. Ground support to LEA CD efforts continued, with MWD teams to the USCS in Alaska, Honolulu, and Guam; an intelligence analyst to the USCS in San Francisco and other analysts to the DEA in Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Bangkok, one to the INS in Guam, and one to the USBP in Yuma, AZ, and the Spanish linguists at EPIC.

[65]USCINCPAC 290255Z Sep 92 (S)

Three analyst assisted the FBI in Los Angeles and one in San Diego, and a computer specialist worked with the USCS in San Francisco. Other ground support included assistance to the USBP at Tohono and 31 personnel repairing border fencing at Yuma City, AZ. A helicopter pad was under construction for the Pima County Sheriff's Department in Arizona by 13 personnel, and 59-person detachments were on duty in the two Indian reservations. Operation WIPEOUT continued in Hawaii, where another 67,000 marijuana plants were destroyed.[66]

(C) In October, the USN P-3 effort dropped considerably to a total of 592.0 flying hours during 79 sorties. Dedicated AC aircraft accounted for the bulk of the total, with 56 sorties and 498.7 hours (6 and 43.4 respectively by P-3B, the rest by P-3C), and associated MPA flew 18/53.6 and 4/33.7, respectively by type. A single USNR P-3B sortie was made of 6.0 hours duration. The E-2Cs dropped out of CD operations during October. SH-60B helicopters contributed 213.6 flight hours in 76 sorties, and the SH-2F LAMPS flew 47.1 hours over 21 sorties. USNR EA-6B PROWLERs flew 2 sorties for a total of 5.0 hours. USCG participation included a single HU-25 sortie of 3.5 hours, and 114 HC-130H sorties totaling 116.2 hours. A California ANG RF-4C made a single 1.2-hour sortie, and a Canadian CP-140 flew 5 sorties for 40.3 hours. USMC support to JTF SIX consisted of 4 CH-53D sorties/ 18.0 flying hours, and the Army made 18 sorties totaling 35.3 hours in support of WIPEOUT. Six PACFLT vessels, a USNR frigate, and a USCGC were dedicated to CD operations during the month, and steaming days totaled 173—the highest for the year—but no seizures were made. USAF radar provided full-time associated coverage, and 14 SNTA were detected. Seven interdictions were attempted, and all were successful. Support excluding air and maritime detection and monitoring (D/M) continued much as in the previous month, with intelligence analyst support to the USCS in San Francisco, the DEA in Bangkok, the FBI in Los Angeles, and

[66]USCINCPAC 310030Z Oct 92 (C)

the USBP in Yuma, while linguist supported the DEA in Hong Kong and Guam. Fence repair continued in Yuma County, with 31 personnel supporting that effort, and the helicopter pad in Pima County was still under construction for the Sheriff's Department. Support to the police at the San Carlos and While Mountain Indian Reservations in Arizona continued. New projects included 72 personnel in support of the USBP in El Paso; 101 persons in support of the NPS at the Organ Pipe National Monument; a force of 776 personnel in high visibility operations with the USBP along the New Mexico border; and 187 persons supporting the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in the Coronado National Forest. Twelve members of the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) received attended a life saver's course at Schofield Barracks, and WIPEOUT eradicated another 32,900 marijuana plants.[67]

(S) USN MPA flying time in CD support declined again in November to a total of 557.7 flying hours during 74 sorties, and all was conducted by P-3C aircraft. Dedicated effort amounted to 66 sorties totaling 512.2 hours, and associated flying was 4 sorties and 20.2 hours. USNR P-3Cs contributed another 25.3 hours in 4 sorties. The SH-60B helicopter effort reached a new high of 405.4 hours and 120 sorties, and the E-2Cs returned to CD operations with 6 sorties/27.5 hours. There was a lone, 6.4-hour EP-3 sortie, and S-3Bs flew 109.0 hours during 26 sorties. Coast Guard HC-130Hs conducted 10 sorties totaling 72.8 flying hours, Canadian Defence Forces CP-140 AURORAs flew 3 for 7.7 hours, and a USCS Cessna CITATION made a single sortie of 6.2 hours. The USAF returned to CD operations this month with 4 B-52 sorties with a total flight time of 47.0 hours, and the USMC flew 2 CH-53D sorties in support of JTF SIX for 10.0 hours. The Army effort in Hawaii continued, with 18 sorties/50.7 flight hours. A total of nine vessels—8 PACFLT ships and 1 USNR FFG—amassed 161 steaming days during the month, but no seizures were made. Associated full-time radar coverage was provided by the USAF, and

[67]USCINCPAC 010345Z Dec 92 (S)

only 4 suspect air targets were detected. Three interdictions were attempted but none were successful. Intelligence analyst support was provided to the USCS in San Francisco, the FBI in Los Angeles and San Diego, the DEA in Bangkok, and the USBP in Yuma. Korean linguists supported the FBI in Honolulu and Los Angeles, and another linguist worked with the INS in Guam. Other support rendered to the USBP included the small detachment at Tohona, the fence repair project in Yuma County, the large-scale high visibility operation along the New Mexico border, photographic imagery along the southwest Arizona border, and and a 6-person mobile training team (MTT) at Fort Bliss, Texas. The NPS had operations under way at Organ Pipe National Monument and Lake Mead. On Oahu, demand reduction operations were conducted at 1 elementary and 1 intermediate school. Operation WIPEOUT continued in Hawaii, with 7,500 more marijuana plants destroyed.[68]

(S) The year was closed out in December with only 57 active component MPA sorties in support of JTFs FOUR and FIVE, totaling 505.4 flying hours, and USNR P-3Cs provided 7 additional sorties and 113.9 flying hours. Associated P-3C flights totaled 26 sorties and 113.9 hours, while Reserve P-3Cs flew 3 sorties/18.2 hours. In Southeast Asia, active P-3B ORIONs flew 1 dedicated sortie for 5.9 hours, and 1 long 9.0-hour associated sortie. SH-60B SEA HAWK participation dropped to 70.5 hours during 21 sorties, with their effort aided by contributions by SH-2F LAMPS flights totaling 16 sorties/40.9 hours dedicated, 11 sorties/30.0 hours associated. The only other flight operations in support of CD in December were Hawaii OH-58 operations which totaled 15 sorties/44.9 hours. Seven PACFLT ships sailed a total of 95 steaming days during the month, with no seizures. Again, the Air Force provided associated radar coverage, and 5 SNTA were detected. Of 3 interdictions tried, all were successful. Support to LEA CD efforts other than air and maritime operations continued through the end of the year, but at a somewhat reduced

[68]USCINCPAC 241905Z Dec 92 (S)

level. Intelligence analysts supported the USCS in San Francisco, DEA in Bangkok, and the USBP in Yuma; one DOD liaison person in Bangkok with the DEA (Operation GRASSHOPPER); a Korean linguist was supporting the FBI in Honolulu; and 4-person photo-imagery teams were working with the USBP along the southwest Arizona border and in Marfa, Texas, and with the Las Cruces Drug Enforcement Council in Las Cruces, New Mexico. The two largest operations were 31 personnel working on border fence repair with the USBP in Yuma City, and 101 personnel deployed to Organ Pipe National Monument. A life saver's course was given to HPD and FBI members at Schofield Barracks, and as mentioned above, Operation WIPEOUT continued with the spotting of 6,600 marijuana plants. Since WIPEOUT began in March 1992, some 474,400 plants had been spotted and 464,500 plants eradicated.[69]

Regional Narcotics Meeting

(C) Held in Bangkok on 20 and 21 October 1992, the U.S. Government Regional Narcotics Meeting was attended by over 40 officers from DOS, DEA, DOD, USCS, and intelligence agencies to discuss regional narcotics matters. Presentations covered such topics as: Hong Kong-based triads saw China as a plum ripe for picking and did not fear 1997; Taiwan was still in the denial stage regarding the seriousness of its narcotics problems, but had begun to cooperate with the United States; the Washington were the dominant drug trafficking group in the Golden Triangle; cultivation of opium in Laos remained legal, but a market collapse had caused prices to fall; there had been a number of significant drug law enforcement successes in Thailand, but key supporters in the Thai government had left the scene.[70]

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[69]USCINCPAC 290025Z Jan 93 (C)

[70]AMEMB Bangkok 061056Z Nov 92 (C)

Operational Security

(S) In April 1992, RADM John L. Linnon, USCG, CJTF-5, informed the CINC that incidents of poor counterdrug operational security appeared to be on the rise. This was a matter of concern, as it was critical to the success of CD operations that LEA case specific information and DOD force allocations and tactics applied to each case be protected. Seasoned smugglers were skilled in operational deception, disinformation, and counter-detection tactics, and the slightest hint that someone was aware of their position, movements, or intentions could cause them to change or cancel their plans and reduce the probability of DOD tracking them to a location where a successful end game could be executed. Leaks of sensitive information also posed a danger to LEA operatives. Admiral Linnon specifically requested that USCINCPAC and CINCPACFLT remind USPACOM organizations that OPSEC was as critically important to CD operations as it was to othe military operations. USCINCPAC accordingly informed his subordinate commanders to take action to reinforce their OPSEC awareness in this critical area.[71]

Alternate Command Facility

(S) Admiral Larson established the USCINCPAC Alternate Command Facility (ACF) effective 15 February 1992. The new division was assigned to the Operations Directorate (J3) and designated J39. Mission of the ACF was to provide USCINCPAC the capability to effectively and rapidly respond with a tailored, survivable command and control center sized to meet mission requirements across the spectrum of conflict. The ACF was given three mission profiles and five primary responsibilities. Its mission profiles were: Enhanced Crisis Management Capability (ECMC); Alternate Command Post (ALCOP); and Airborne Command Post (ABNCP). The ECMC unit was assigned to the 15th Communications

[71]CJTF FIVE 281855Z Apr 92 (S); USCINCPAC 122100Z May 92 (S).

Squadron and housed in Hangar 7, Hickam AFB, and specifically supported SECDEF requirements for a CINC ACF and USCINCPAC C2 requirements for JTF, special operations, and other crisis and contingency missions. The former alert facility at Hickam AFB became the ALCOP, and activation procedures were developed by ACF and the USCINCPAC Command Center (CPCC—operated by J37). Prime responsibilities were:[72]

- Program management, equipment and software enhancements, training, day-to-day operations, exercises, and deployments of ECMC.
- Caretaker status of the ALCOP (Bldg 2155, Hickam AFB).
- Coordination and management of ABNCP assets from Air Combat Command (ACC) when deployed in support of USCINCPAC in the USPACOM AOR.
- Deployment as part of the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) with ECMC.
- Maintain SIOP and VOL IV advisor responsibilities.

Testing and Training

(~~S~~) In April, J39 participated in the second demonstration of the Joint Task Force Simulation (JTFS) Joint Conflict Model (JCM) to test C2 links with a deployed JTF and validate improvements to the JCM. ECMC equipment, including the Joint Area Information System-Pacific (JAIS-PAC), the Theater Analysis and Planning System (TAPS), and the Enhanced Interface Facility (EIF), was tested. Both DJTFAC members and staff personnel from SEVENTH Fleet received training, the first use of the ECMC equipment by the DJTFAC. At the same time, J39 also took part in Exercise POLO HAT 92-1, a SIOP CPX, operating in a core battle staff role Air Force satellite communications (AFSATCOM) equip-

[72]J392 HistSum Mar 92 (~~S~~)

ment from the inactivated ABNCP EC-135J aircraft was used to demonstrate an AFSAT receive mode capability.[73]

(U) In June, J39 conducted a road march from Hickam AFB to Wheeler Army Air Field (AAF). Purpose of the exercise was to conduct communications connectivity tests, train on TAPS and JAIS-PAC in the field, and identify and validate logistics support requirements for an ALCOP deployment to an austere environment.[74]

(U) In September, the USCINCPAC DJTFAC deployed to Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan, in support of Exercise TEMPO BRAVE 92. Purpose was to exercise COMSEVENTHFLT as commander of a JTF in accordance with USCINCPAC's two-tier concept. J39 deployed two officers and equipment—including JAIS-PAC and a briefing system—as prescribed in the draft ECMC CONOPS. Goal for the deployment included field test of newly acquired SATCOM equipment and evaluation of DJTFAC operating procedures, and led to approval and distribution of the ECMC CONOPS in October.[75]

(U) J39 and ECMC conducted a four-day mobilization exercise at Hickam AFB 5-8 October 1992. The exercise was the follow-on step to the June deployment to Wheeler Gulch, and involved personal equipment and deployment records checks, completion of cargo load lists, preparation of equipment for loading into C-130 aircraft, and loading and testing of communications equipment on a Hawaii Air National Guard (HIANG) C-130. On the fourth day of the exercise, communications equipment was actually loaded on the aircraft and successfully tested using hatch mount antennas. The exercise helped prepare the ECMC for an actual deployment.[76]

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[73]J39 HistSum Apr 92 (S).
[74]J39 HistSum Jun 92 (S).
[75]J39 HistSum Sep 92 (U) and Oct 92 (S); J395 SSS (U), 28 Sep 92, Subj: J39 Trip Report, TEMPO BRAVE 92.
[76]J39 HistSum Oct 92 (U).

(S) That event occurred 4 through 11 December 1992, when the ECMC deployed to the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, for Operation GARDEN HAT. Purpose of the deployment was to test ECMC deployment and employment capabilities, communications connectivity, and to participate in two JCS-directed exercises, POLO HAT 92-3 and Non-Strategic Nuclear Force (NSNF) 92-2. On 3 December, 22 major pieces of gear, including communications suites, prime movers, and ancillary equipment, and personnel were loaded aboard USS MOUNT VERNON (LSD 39) at pierside in Pearl Harbor, with the unit's 5-ton trucks ferried from Ford Island to MOUNT VERSON via LCAC. At first light the following morning, ship-to-shore operations via LCAC commenced, with three movements needed to get all the equipment ashore. On 5 December, the JAIS-PAC, World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), SIOP material, security police, and a portion of the battle staff was transported to Kauai via HIANG C-130. Although both the scheduled exercises were cancelled one hour prior to start time, the ECMC met connectivity objectives for both POLO HAT and NSNF. This exercise marked two firsts: the first movement of the ECMC by ship, and the first deployment of the Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter (DRASH) as part of the ECMC. The DRASH provided easily assembled, floored workspace for the battle staff and equipment, but was uncomfortably hot GARDEN HAT proved the ability of the ACF to deploy off-island, operate in an austere environment, and perform its mission.[77]

ABNCP Deployments

(S) During the period 10-24 June 1992, the 2 ACCS from Offutt AFB deployed an EC-135 aircraft to the USPACOM AOR to conduct ABNCP training with J39. Four missions were flown in support of J39 airborne battle staff training in both SIOP and conventional operations, and one mission was flown in the airborne command post role in support of JTF-510 for Exercise

[77]J39 HistSum Dec 92 (S); J39 SSS (U), 16 Dec 92, Subj: Deployment of the Enhanced Crisis Management Capability (ECMC) to Kauai.

ELLIPSE CHARLIE. JAIS-PAC was successfully integrated into the EC-135 for the first time to test the feasibility of using it to support a JTF commander while he was enroute to his AOR and pending deployment of the ECMC. Lessons learned from the deployment were used to develop a Theater ABNCP CONOPS.[78]

(S) ABNCP training was again conducted by J39 during 15-22 November 1992. 2 ACCS deployed an EC-135 aircraft and crew from Offutt AFB, and J39 provided the battle staff. The ABNCP visited Wake Island, Kadena AB, Japan, and Osan AB, Korea. Battle staff training covered all facets of the SIOP and theater nuclear C2, and site surveys were conducted at each location to determine the feasibility of using those locations during ACF operations. Although logistics support for the deployment at Kadena AB was considered outstanding, support at Osan AB was only marginally satisfactory and reflected a lack of concern on the part of Seventh AF. The battle staff commander noted that while the 2 ACCS aircrew and communications team were highly professional, they were not readily knowledgeable in USPACOM operations and communications requirements. The ECMC and 2 ACCS exchanged draft CONOPS for further coordination.[79]

Port Visits and Access

(U) USCINCPAC established policy for the control of port visits by ships in the USPACOM, and under his policy and overall direction, CINCPACFLT was delegated responsibility and authority for the administration of port visits. CINCPACFLT could further delegate that authority at is discretion. When such factors as timing and politico-military implications indicated that specific USCINCPAC approval was required for port visits to certain areas, CINCPACFLT would be informed.

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[78]J39 HistSum Jun 92 (S).
[79]J39 HistSum Nov 92 (S); J39 SSS (S), 22 Nov 92, Subj: Trip Report-Theater Airborne Command Post WESTPAC (U).

(U) With respect to port visits to foreign countries, USCINCPAC communicated directly with the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in USPACOM on matters of general policy and the status of diplomatic arrangements. CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, or other designated subordinate commanders communicated directly with the appropriate clearance agencies to notify, inform, and initiate requests for diplomatic clearance. For visits by U.S. Navy ships, including USNS vessels operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) or the Oceanographer of the Navy, to ports in areas which required specific USCINCPAC approval, CINCPACFLT would coordinate with and request approval of USCINCPAC prior to initiating diplomatic clearance requests. Port visits by nuclear powered warships (NPW) were more complicated, and while the USCINCPAC diplomatic clearance procedures were valid for NPW, additional requirements and limitations applied:[80]

- Nuclear powered aircraft carrier visits to Japan required USCINCPAC approval before obtaining diplomatic clearance.
- Visits to ports not previously visited by a NPW required USCINCPAC approval before initiating a request for clearance.
- Prior to visiting any foreign port, NPW were required to obtain a Reactor Safeguards Clearance (RSC) for the port or verify that a valid RSC had been granted by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for recurring visits to the port.
- Diplomatic clearance from the host nation for the visit was required.

(U) The following paragraphs contain brief sketches of selected port visits conducted during 1992.

[80]USCINCPACINST 3128.3C (U), 3 Dec 91, Subj: Port Visits within U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM); USCINCPACINST C3128.1F (S), 24 Apr 92, Subj: Foreign Port Clearance for U.S. Navy Nuclear Powered Warship Visits in the U.S. Pacific Command (U).

Russia

(C) During the year, visits were made to two Russian ports. During the period 20-23 September, USS McCLUSKY (FFG 41) and USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) visited Vladivostok to assist in opening the U.S. Consul General in that city. This visit was the first attempt at a "working" level ship visit to a Russian port. The Russian Navy understood the concept, and except for some unique events related to the consulate opening, directed the visit from the waterfront. They made every opportunity available to foster host-ship to visit-ship relationships, and, following the theme presented by Admiral Larson during his visit, counterparts interacted at all levels and the Russians provided unprecedented acces to their ships' spaces. Based on experience with student interpreters during this visit, the USDAO recommended that four or five Russian translators accompany visiting ships.[81]

(C) The distribution of Project HANDCLASP material carried by McCLUSKY was accomplished, although it proved to be difficult. Russian Navy and local civilian leaders could not comprehend the intent, and an inordinate amount of effort was required by the crew of McCLUSKY, the USDAO and Consul General representatives, and Peace Corps volunteers to make it work. The Russian Navy was forced to participate after the host admiral directly intervened, although he got interested in solving the distribution problems more because he did not want what he saw as a humanitarian aid effort to fail in his area of responsibility, than because of his concern for the people. As the Russians have no system for charity distribution, since the state controlled everything, they wanted the HANDCLASP goods turned over to a state administrator for distribution. The Moscow USDAO recommended that Project HANDCLASP continue in Russia, but on a smaller scale and with the packages carefully tailored fit specific visits.

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[81]USDAO Moscow 029368/290706Z Sep 92 (C)

(C) USCGC STORIS (WMEC 38) made a port visit to Petropavlovsk 17-20 October 1992. She was the first foreign "warship" to visit the port since World War II. (STORIS, incidentally, is the oldest serving Coast Guard cutter, commissioned on 30 September 1942.) Details of the port visit were not worked out before the ship's arrival in Petropavlovsk, and although Maritime Border Guard officials were amenable to minor changes in the schedule, the head of the Maritime Department for the Frontier Guard North-East Military District (NEMD), RADM Eduard A. Kachen'ko, did not expect the U.S. side to propose any major modifications to his schedule. A requested U.S.-hosted dinner and reception was absent from the schedule, substituted for by a Russian-hosted affair, but Admiral Kachen'ko finally conceded to a reception hosted by STORIS. A proposed joint training exercise almost did not happen, as the Russian admiral clearly did not want to carry it out, and meetings requested specifically to discuss the details of the exercise were overcome by other events. At the farewell dinner the night before sailing, however, the Frontier Guard NEMD commander, General-Lieutenant Beketov, made two points very clear to both his guests and his subordinates: First, he wanted direct communication between USCG assets and MBG assets to assist Russia in interdicting poachers in their waters; and second, the commander gets what he wants. Overnight, plans were made for more extensive exercises, and communications drills and a boarding exercise were conducted the following morning. Departure of STORIS was delayed an hour to accomodate the training. The USDAO repeated his earlier recommendation regarding interpreters, and also recommended that he be advised of any humanitarian aid efforts.[82]

Australia

(U) Enroute from the Arabian Gulf, TF 76 with the 11th MEU embarked visited West Australia (Washington) in October 1992, the

[82]USDAO Moscow 032039/222019Z Oct 92 (C)

first ARG to make the transit without benefit of a stop at Subic Bay. The three ships of the ARG—USS TARAWA (LHA 1), USS FORT FISHER (LSD 40), and USS GODEN (LPD 5)—and USS CURTS (FFG 38) from TF 75 tied up at Freemantle on 8 October for final pre-exercise planning for Exercise VALIANT USHER 92. The ARG was met by a small Greenpeace demonstration when they entered port. They took part in the joint exercise with the UK and Australian navies from the 14th through the 19th. The ARG then returned to Freemantle for post-exercise briefings and liberty, and departed on 26 October. The ships hosted several days of public visits, and enjoyed traditional Perth and Freemantle hospitality. Highlight of the visit was the ARG's collection and donation of approximately $18,000 to help pay for medical treatment for a 12-year-old American girl suffering from a rare and potentially fatal heart problem. A check was handed over to the family at a press conference on board TARAWA, and the generosity received extensive media coverage. The Consulate cautioned, however, that the media might cover a complaint filed by a Perth man with the Washington Equal Opportunity Commission. He was upset that a public invitation for ladies to attend a USN/USMC-hosted dance constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, and his request for a personal invitation to the dance was turned down. The Consulate considered the port visit very successful.[83]

(U) USS OMAHA (SSN 692) became the first NPW to visit Melourne in 13 years. Her port visit, 30 November to 5 December, came shortly a long-awaited nuclear safety plan for the city was completed, and incurred only two small and ineffectual protests that failed to mar the visit. OMAHA hosted tours of the boat, including visits by seven members of the Victorian parliament, the Lord Mayor of Melbourne, dozens of media representatives, and innumerable Consulate contacts. The Lord Mayor opined that large-scale anti-nuclear protests might be a thing of the past in Melbourne, and stated that the "Welcome to Melbourne, a Nuclear

[83] AMCONSUL Perth 0470/270100Z Oct 92 (U) and 0476/280400Z Oct 92 (U).

Free Zone" signs at the city's approaches would be taken down. The American Consulate considered the visit an unqualified success.[84]

(U) OMAHA conducted a port visit to Brisbane from 14 to 17 December. Compared to her earlier visit to Melbourne, handling of the visit and reaction of the populace was more low-key, but the welcome was warm. Tours of the boat were conducted, and visitors included the Governor of Queensland and leading political and business figures. Only one small protest was conducted, and that by Greenpeace in downtown Brisbane on 15 December. The Consulate noted the visit was well-received and such visits by U.S. Navy warships were more than welcome in the future.[85]

Japan

(U) USS BUNKER HILL (CG 52), conducted a port visit to Kagoshima from 12 to 15 December. BUNKER HILL was greeted by 11 demonstrators carrying protest banners upon arrival, but that proved to be the only such incident. It was the first visit under the "home stay" program to be conducted in the Kyushu region, which proved so successful that the local populace requested it be expanded for the next port visit. Other events were limited to ship tours, a ship-hosted reception, and courtesy calls by the Captain on local officials. Despite the warm reception by the media and citizens, the local prefectural government at all levels was generally unreceptive. They did not oppose the visit, but did not go beyond providing minimum approval for it. This attitude was unchanged from the last port visit to Kagoshima—USS SAN BERNARDINO (LST 1189) in 1991. The Consulate was unable to provide any substantial support because of distant and weak ties to local officials and organizations, and would require additional resources to expand opportunities

[84]AMCONSUL Melbourne 01416/100157Z Dec 92 (U).
[85]AMCONSUL Brisbane 0645/172145Z Dec 92 (U).

for exchanges between crew members and local residents for the next ship visit.[86]

Freedom of Navigation Program

(U) During 1992, nine freedom of navigation (FON) assertions were conducted, and all were completed without reaction:[87]

- February—USS INGERSOLL (DD 990) and USS CALLAGHAN (DDG 994) conducted FON of the Maldives.
- March—USS ANTIETAM (CG 54) conducted FON of Taiwan.
- May—USS ENGLAND (CG 22) and ANTIETAM conducted FON of Cambodia.
- June—USS ODGEN (LPD 5) conducted FON of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).
- August—USS JOUETT (CG 29) conducted FON of India.
- September—USS DAVID R. RAY (DD 971) conducted FON of Burma, and USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3) and USS SAN JOSE (AFS 7) conducted FON of the Maldives.
- December—USS PAUL F. FOSTER (DD 964) conducted FON of Cambodia and the PRC.

[86]AMCONSUL Fukuoka 0657/180220Z Dec 92 (U).
[87]J31 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (U).

SECTION III—EXERCISES

New Directives Promulgated

(U) In September 1992, USCINCPAC published a new edition of USCINCPAC Instruction 3550.1, USCINCPAC Military Exercises, which superseded the previous edition published in November 1988. Major changes included establishment of designated executive agent tasks and responsibilities of Service component commanders as USCINCPAC-designated executive agents supporting USCINCPAC exercises, and implementation of contingency JTF training with respect to USCINCPAC's two-tiered concept of operations. The primary purpose of conducting exercises in USPACOM was to maintain optimum joint and combined combat readiness, maintain access, fulfill treaty obligations, and build healthy alliances with allied and friendly nations. The USPACOM Military Exercise Schedule for CY 92 was published on 1 December 1991, and the CY 93 schedule was published on 16 November 1992.[86]

(U) In August 1992, USCINCPAC promulgated a revised Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) with supporting and enabling tasks which conformed to Joint Staff direction issued in March 1992. USCINCPAC's JMETL was derived from wartime missions and related tasks found in external directives, and emphasis was placed at the Joint Task Force level. Operations and contingency plans were clear statements of the CINC's intent, and were the most important input to JMETL development. Supporting operational tasks and activities for each JMET identified essential training objectives and served to help commanders select those tasks essential to mission accomplishment for specific training events.[87]

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[86]USCINCPACINST 3550.1N (U), 24 Sep 92, Subj: USCINCPAC Military Exercises.
[87]USCINCPAC 030810Z Aug 92 (U).

Significant Exercises

(S) The USPACOM Exercise Schedule for 1992 listed 17 Significant Part I exercises for the year. Part I exercises were planned for geographically sensitive areas, as determined by DOS, or were likely to receive prominent attention in the public information media. They required Presidential approval, and included such field training exercises (FTX) as TEAM SPIRIT, COBRA GOLD, and BALIKATAN, and command post exercises (CPX) such as KEEN EDGE, PRIME DIRECTIVE, and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS. Details of selected significant exercises are given below.[88]

Exercise TEAM SPIRIT

(S) Exercise TEAM SPIRIT (TS) was a joint and combined large scale air, sea, land CPX, command field exercise (CFX), and FTX designed to demonstrate United States resolve to support the ROK against external aggression and improve ROK/U.S. combat readiness and interoperability. COMUSKOREA sponsored TEAM SPIRIT, and it was scheduled by USCINCPAC. Conducted annually since 1976 (except in 1991), it supported the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the ROK and U.S. governments [redacted] Strictly a defensive exercise, it was conducted in an east-west direction on the peninsula to ensure that it was not provocative, [redacted] The North Koreans had been invited to observe the exercise on numerous occasions, but had always declined. [redacted] It provided valuable joint training at the operational level and in strategic force deployment, and had been a vehicle for test and evaluation of many new joint procedures and emerging technologies.

Exemption #(b)(1); Section 1.3, #5 & #2

[88]USCINCPAC/J3511 Ltr Ser S351-91 (S), 1 Dec 91, Subj: USPACOM Military Exercise Schedule (U).

(~~S~~) TS 92, originally scheduled for 22 January through 22 April 1992, was to be a relatively smaller exercise than previous TEAM SPIRITs in the alternating "big year-small year"

[redacted]

(C) For political reasons, TS 92 was cancelled at request of the ROK, with the formal announcement released on 7 January 1992. TS 91, a scheduled big exercise, had been down-sized due to Operation DESERT STORM requirements, and these two events had a significant impact on the USCINCPAC training program. A new biennial, odd-year, schedule for TS stretched the training interval for forces appointed to deploy to Korea, although the losses could be offset by enhancing other USCINCPAC exercises in even years. Following cancellation of TS 92, airlift and sealift was reallocated to other exercises as follows:[89]

- [redacted] to Exercise COBRA GOLD (CG) 92.
- [redacted] to Exercise TANDEM THRUST (TT) 92.
- [redacted] to Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS (UFL) 92.
- [redacted] to CG 92.

(U) Meanwhile, planning was underway for TS 93. An initial concept conference (ICC) was hosted by CINCCFC at Yongsan Garrison, 13-14 February 1992, and USCINCPAC's initial planning con

[89] J35 Point Paper (~~S~~), 31 Oct 91, Subj: TEAM SPIRIT 92 (TS 92)(U); J35 Point Paper (~~C~~), 31 Jul 92, Subj: TEAM SPIRIT (U); Pacific Ops Daily Summary (~~S~~), 7 Jan 92; USCINCPAC 311925Z Jan 92 (~~C~~).

ference (IPC) was held at Camp Smith, 2-5 June, with participants from all major players and supporting agencies. In conjunction with the TS 93 conference, an IPC for Exercise TANDEM THRUST was held on 4 June.[90]

(U) One important lesson learned from Operation DESERT STORM was the need to find ways to improve the movement and closure of U.S. forces, and containerships were seen as an area to evaluate and capitalize upon. The shipping industry was moving more and more to container ships, and fully 88 percent of U.S. shipping consisted of such vessels. A deployment without allied support fully dependent on U.S. shipping only would suffer severe constraints. An obvious need existed to verify the ability to move unit equipment (UE) by containership, and testing the concept in peacetime would pay dividends in improving closure of forces in wartime.

(U) Consideration of containership use in TEAM SPIRIT dated back to April 1991, when USCINCPAC/J3 expressed support in principle for a joint unit intermodal transportation (JUIT) initiative test in TS 93. Key elements of the initiative were that UE was to be deployed by container ship, and that test-generated costs would be funded by DOD. Subsequently, a number of significant concerns were raised during the TS 93 initial concept development workshop held in late 1991 and the February 1992 ICC mentioned above. USCINCPAC was interested in testing the ability to deploy from a CONUS depot to Korea and unstuff containers in the field using the container concept. The CINC felt that a demonstration would provide very useful lessons. His concerns regarding the concept of operations and funding for use of a containership were detailed to USCINCTRANS in March 1992.[91]

(U) Initial sealift plans for TS 93 included use of a single fast sealift ship (FSS) to make two voyages, one from

[90]J4 HistSum Feb 92 (U) and Jul 92 (U); USCINCPAC 142248Z Jul 92 (U).
[91]USCINCPAC 101600Z Mar 92 (U) and 262201Z Apr 92 (U).

Tacoma, Washington, to Pusan, Korea, and one from Long Beach, California, to Pusan via Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In addition, one RO/RO vessel would make three or four voyages, one from Oakland, California, to Pusan, and two or three from Naha, Okinawa, to Pohang, Korea. USCINCTRANS proposed that the containership replace the FSS for TS 93, based primarily on the need to use commercial facilities to handle the containers and a GOJ prohibition on use of commercial facilities to move war fighting materials, which ruled out use of Naha Port. Total requirements to load 150,000 square feet of UE were estimated at 135 40-foot containers, 505 flatracks, and 26 seasheds.* Funding for any excess cost resulting from use of a containership was of major concern to USCINCPAC, and additional funding was requested by USCINCTRANS from the Joint Staff.[92]

(U) By May, the USCINCPAC staff was beginning to reconsider the scope of the containership test. COMUSKOREA advised that a more modest approach than using a dedicated containership might be warranted because a large number of containers delivered by one ship might overtax the Korean inland transportation infrastructure. While still supporting the use of containerization during TS 93 deployment and redeployment, the staff considered substitution of a containership for the FSS too ambitious considering the limitations of Korea's land transportation capabilities. USCINCTRANS was asked to review the issue and design a limited test using containers, with the objective being to take advantage of the U.S. ocean carrier intermodal container fleet in deploying units and munitions and evaluate reception and onward movement capability in the theater.[93]

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* Flatracks were 35-foot-long platforms used for vehicles-folding ends allowed stacking; seasheds were 35 feet long, but approximately three times as wide as a flatrack, with fixed sides and ends, stackable, with a payload of 220,000 pounds.

[92]USCINCTRANS 102100Z Apr 92 (U).

[93]USCINCPAC 140010Z May 92 (U).

(U) A TS 93 in-progress review (IPR) was held at USTRANSCOM on 20 October 1992, attended by representatives of all major units and commands involved and industry representatives. The concept of operations (CONOPS) was revised to take greater advantage of intermodal systems—instead of convoying vehicles to the ports for loading on flatracks, the flatracks would be loaded at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Camp Humphries, Korea, respectively, and transported to the ports by rail for loading aboard ship.[94]

(U) In November, USCINCTRANS asked USCINCPAC to explore and nominate by 20 December 1992 an alternate exercise in USPACOM whose infrastructure would support the movement of a battalion-sized unit in an intermodal operation as part of a CJCS-sponsored exercise. Reason for this request was that negotiations between the two Koreas might jeopardize the actual execution of TS 93, and it was prudent to plan for an alternate exercise to test DOD's intermodal operations. USTRANSCOM asked that consideration be give to moving a unit from the Pacific Northwest if possible, and pointed out that by the time a decision on the status of TS 93 was known, some funds would have been expended to move flatracks in support of the 29th Signal Battalion (SC Bn), which was to participate in Exercise COBRA GOLD. At the same time, FORSCOM was asked to nominate a unit by 4 January 1993 to support the exercise nominated by USCINCPAC, and the Joint Staff J-7 was asked to confirm funding for an alternate exercise. FORSCOM's nomination was not known by the end of the year, but $575,000 for the TS 93 containerization demonstration was approved in December.[95]

Exempt # (b)(1), Sec 1.3, #1 & #5,

(S) According to the significant military exercise brief (SMEB) submitted to the Joint Staff by USCINCPAC in December 1992 TS 93 would be held from 21 January through 21 April 1993, with the employment phase scheduled for 9-18 March. Total participation was planned to be [redacted] from the

[94]USCINCTRANS 301342Z Oct 92 (U).
[95]USCINCTRANS 161925Z Nov 92 (U) and 051200Z Dec 92 (U); CINCFOR 182015Z Nov 92 (U).

United States. The Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) requested a public announcement on TEAM SPIRIT 93 be made on 7 January 1993.[96]

Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS

(S) FOCUS LENS was an annual joint and combined CPX conducted in conjunction with the ROK's national mobilization exercise ULCHI. The combined affair was known as ULCHI-FOCUS LENS (UFL). It was sponsored by COMUSKOREA, scheduled by USCINCPAC.

[redacted]

(U) The scope of ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 92 (UFL 92) was significantly expanded by the addition of 2,200 C-141 equivalent airlift hours transferred from TS 92. The expanded concept included warfighting modules and objectives previously scheduled for TS 92. Corps level was the lowest level of player in UFL 92, with divisions as gamer cells. The two U.S. corps which deployed player cells to Korea were I Corps, Fort Lewis, and XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

(S) The exercise was divided into four distinct parts.

[redacted]

[96]USCINCPAC 160120Z Dec 92 (S).
[97]USCINCPAC/J3511 Ltr Ser S351-91 (S), 1 Dec 91, Subj: USPACOM Military Exercise Schedule (U).



Exempt (b)(1) 1.3

(~~S/NF~~) Extensive use of simulation marked UFL 92. Six computer models from the Warrior Preparation Center (WPC) in Germany and the Battle Simulation Center (BSC) in Korea were imported to five simulation centers in Korea and Fort Lewis, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored an aggregate-level simulation protocol that interfaced ground, air, and sea models to create a seamless air-land-sea battle. Major simulation initiatives successfully applied during UFL 92 included:

[98]J3 Point Paper (~~S~~), 31 Jul 92, Subj: ULCHI FOCUS LENS 92 (U).
[99]USFK/SSO 080009Z Sep 92 (~~S/NF~~).

Exempt (b)(1), Sec 1.7 #2



[100]USFK/SSO 210523Z Sep 92 (S).

[redacted]

Exercise KEEN EDGE

(S) The Exercise KEEN EDGE (KE) program began in 1986 as a follow-on to a series of Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and USFJ CPX known as FOREST BLADE. It was sponsored by COMUSJAPAN, and scheduled by USCINCPAC. Initially, a KE CPX was held annually and an FTX every other year, and there was a time-phased integration of component-sponsored exercises under the KE banner to avoid duplication—integration was completed in FY 91. In March 1990, budget restraints beyond FY 91 caused KE to be reduced to a CPX in even fiscal years, and an FTX in odd. KE supported the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, [redacted]

(S) The KE CPX were joint, bilateral exercises to increase combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. forces for the defense of Japan, [redacted] ~~CPX~~ KE 92 was held 21-31 January 1992, and was marked by a new openness on the part of the JSDF. They were far more willing to discuss difficult operational issues, and defensive/offensive mining, rules of engagement, air space management, and SOF operations were worked in detail during the exercise. KE 92 was judged the best of the series to date.[103]

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[101]Ibid.

[102]USCINCPAC/J3511 Ltr Ser S351-91 (S), 1 Dec 91, Subj: USPACOM Military Exercise Schedule (U).

[103]J35 Point Paper (S), 6 Feb 92, Subj: KEEN EDGE (KE) Exercise Program (U).

Exempt IE (b)(1), Sec 1.3 # 1

(S) KE FTX were large scale joint and combined exercises to increase combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. forces in the defense of Japan, [redacted] KE 93, held 7-16 November 1992. According to COMUSJAPAN, KE 93 ". . . clearly represented a masterpiece in bilateral planning and execution at all echelons."[104]

(U) Highlights of ground operations included functional training, live fire, and small scale maneuvers conducted by the 2d Brigade, 6th ID(L), and 35th MEU with elements of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) 7th Armored Division (AD) and 5th ID. The exercise recorded several first-time events: use of the U.S. Army's multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) by the JGSDF; bilateral light/heavy operations by the 2d Bde and the JGSDF 73rd Tank Regiment; and joint/bilateral naval gunfire support (NGS) exercise by the 35th MEU, with JSDF spot teams directing simulated naval gunfire from USS MOBILE BAY (CG 53) and USMC teams directing for Self-Defense Ship (SDS) ASAKAZE (DD 169).

(U) Air operations provided low level training by F-15E and F-16C aircraft on Hokkaido with fewer than anticipated noise complaints, and naval, Marine, and air forces conducted large scale offensive/defensive counter air missions, CAS, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), large force employment, maritime operations, and composite strike packages. The consensus from all air forces was that KE afforded the best flying exercise since COPE THUNDER left Clark AB. Firsts of significance included: large scale joint and bilateral packages attacked a SEVENTH Fleet and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) tactical sea transportation group, which was itself jointly/bilaterally defended; daily secure transmission of an unrehearsed bilateral air tasking order (ATO) for JSDF breakout; bilateral engine test cell cross-

[104]COMUSJAPAN 220703Z Nov 92 (U).

training; and use of the largest training airspace ever for an exercise in Japan.

(U) Maritime highlights included a joint/bilateral combat air patrol (CAP) provided by USAF, USN, and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) aircraft for a USN/JMSDF flotilla attacked by USMC, USAF, and JASDF fighters. Key firsts for the exercise included: naval surface fire support; cross deck hot pump and helicopter inflight refueling; bilateral coordination of ASW operations, sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, and escort operations; and a naval emergency cargo air delivery to USN and JMSDF ships.

Exercise COBRA GOLD

(S) Exercise COBRA GOLD (CG) was an annual USCINCPAC-sponsored, combined/joint, air land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations FTX held in Thailand and designed to maintain United States access and influence in both Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in general through the development of strong military-to-military relationships with the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). It supported the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), and was not tied to any specific OPLANs. [redacted] which was upgraded significantly from CG 91—that exercise was reduced in scope because of Operation DESERT STORM. Actual employment dates were to be 4-28 May, although the overall exercise would run from 22 March through July 1992. [redacted][105]

Exempt # (b)(1), Sec 1.3 # 1 x # 5

(S) CG 92 was the eleventh in the series. It was designed to be conducted in four phases. Phase I, the deployment phase, ran from 22 March to 20 May. The cross-training phase, Phase II,

[105]USCINCPAC/J3511 Ltr Ser S351-91 (S), 1 Dec 91, Subj: USPACOM Military Exercise Schedule (U).

ran concurrently from 4 through 15 May, and a CPX was conducted 11-15 May. The FTX portion of the exercise was scheduled to start on the 18th, and included a planned amphibious assault and a combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX), both of which were cancelled. U.S. participants numbered 10,600, and included the headquarters of the 1st Bde, 6th ID(L), and the 1st Bn/17th Infantry; eleven Navy ships with III MEF elements and the 37th MEU embarked; and detachments from five USAF flying squadrons. Thai participation was approximately the same in numbers.[106]

(S) From the beginning, the exercise was marred by an unsettled domestic political situation that led the CG staff to consider measures to reduce the visibility of the exercise and appearance of U.S. military presence.* The opening ceremony was conducted as scheduled on 11 May, with U.S. Ambassador David F. Lambertson and Thai Supreme Commander Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rotchananin presiding. Events proceeded as planned until 19 May, when the deteriorating internal political situation reached the point of civil unrest and USCINCPAC decided to suspend the exercise. Civil affairs projects and military construction and medical activities continued. All other U.S. participants were directed to return to their barracks commencing at first light on 20 May 1992, and begin preparations to accelerate redeployment to home bases. The execute order for redeployment was issued via message on 20 May 1992.[107]

(U) The deployment airlift commenced on 23 May, with the departure of one C-5 and one KC-10 from Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB), although some aircraft had departed earlier with organic personnel and equipment. On 30 May, USCINCPAC submitted his final COBRA GOLD redeployment situation report (SITREP), and at that time there were only 765 U.S. troops

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[106]USCINCPAC 072330Z Feb 92 (S).

*The Thai domestic situation is discussed elsewhere in this history.

[107]AMEMB Bangkok 22939/090746Z May 92 (S); COMUSJTF COBRA GOLD 091000Z May 92 (S); USCINCPAC 190425Z and 200355Z May 92 (S).

remaining in Thailand, including CJTF and staff who departed on the 30th. Final redeployment flights departed Thailand on 3 June, just six days earlier than the original airlift schedule developed prior to the exercise.[108]

(U) Civic Action Program (CAP) activities continued after the exercise was cancelled. Medical CAP (MEDCAP) activities during CG 92 included 27 separate operations. A total of 11,243 medical patients were seen, along with 1,915 dental patients and 2,591 veterinarian cases. There were 12 Engineer CAP (ENCAP) projects undertaken, of which 10 were completed. The remaining two could not be finished before the 45th Support Group engineers departed, so on-hand materials were turned over to a local Thai military engineer unit in one case, and civilian contractors in the second, for project completion.[109]

[108]USCINCPAC 240200Z and 300200Z May 92 (~~S/NF~~) (information used was UNCLAS); USCINCTRANS 230700Z May 92 (U).
[109]COMUSJTF COBRA GOLD 240300Z and 280300Z May 92 (~~S~~)

SECTION IV—DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

Domestic Disaster Relief Planning Conference

(U) The Director of Military Support (DOMS) hosted the Domestic Disaster Relief Planning Conference at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, from 8 to 10 January 1992. Representatives from DOMS, OSD, JCS, CINCFOR, USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, the Corps of Engineers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Public Health Service (PHS) attended. Items of interest to USCINCPAC discussed included the need to clarify tasking procedures for CONUS-based support, which needed to be developed by CINCFOR and staffed with USCINCLANT and USCINCPAC for review and concurrence; standardization of the role and training of the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) was required for all three CINCs; and the need for improved reporting procedures with specific types of information to be reported in disaster relief operations. In addition, the December 1991 edition of the Federal Response Plan was distributed to the CINC's representatives for review.[110]

Tropical Cyclones

Planning Order Issued

(U) 1992 proved to be a bumper year for tropical cyclones in USPACOM, with several records set and unusual weather in several locations. At the start of the tropical cyclone season in June, the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) issued a planning order for DOD hurricane, cyclone, and typhoon response operations. Under the provisions of DOD Directive 3025.1, 23 May 1980, and the December 1991 draft Federal Response Plan, SECARMY was the DOD executive agent (EA) for domestic disaster relief, and DOMS was his action agent. Upon declaration of a major disaste or emergency by the President, the director of FEMA would

[110]DIRMILSPT 101230Z Feb 92 (U).

coordinate the activities of all Federal agencies, including DOD, and DOD's EA would respond to his requirements. Normally, DOMS would, at direction of the EA, activate a DOD crisis action team (CAT) to issue appropriate execution orders for DOD assistance to affected states or territories.[111]

(U) Authority for the conduct of specific disaster relief operations was delegated to the appropriate supported CINC—to USCINCPAC for operations in USPACOM, to CINCFOR for operations in CONUS—upon issuance of a Presidential declaration of a major disaster. The planning order tasked the supported CINC to designate a military representative as Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who was the single point of contact for the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), when landfall of a destructive storm was imminent. All costs incurred by USCINCPAC for support to FEMA were fully reimbursable.

Hurricanes, Typhoons, and Cyclones

(U) During 1992, the planning order proved prophetic as a record number of blustery visitors swept across the Pacific. The eastern Pacific had 35 tropical cyclones (called hurricanes in EASTPAC) during the year, compared to the annual average of 15. The most notable was Hurricane INIKI which passed through the Hawaiian Islands on 11 September with maximum sustained winds of 84 knots and gusts on the island of Kauai exceeding 100 knots. The western Pacific witnessed the birth of 33 tropical cyclones (typhoons) compared to a yearly average of 25. Five typhoons passed over or near Guam: Typhoons OMAR, BRIAN, and GAY made direct hits on the island; HUNT and ELSIE passed within 50 NM. Typhoon OMAR caused the most damage during its 28 August passage, with sustained winds of 106 knots and gusts exceeding 125 knots. The southern Pacific and Indian Oceans received 23 tropical cyclones, versus an average of 26, while the northern Indian

[111]SECARMY 181418Z Jun 92 (U).

Ocean had twice their average number of visitors, with 12 cyclones compared to 6. The two tropical cyclones that occasioned disaster relief operations are discussed below.[112]

Typhoon OMAR

(U) Tropical Cyclone Condition of Readiness (COR) 3 was set on Guam at 251500 Kilo August 1992 (Guam time—241900W in Hawaii) because of the approach of Typhoon OMAR. COR 2 was declared at 0900 hours, 26 August, at which point all Navy ships in harbor sortied except USS WHITE PLAINS (AFS 4) and USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3). COR 1 was set by USCINCPACREP Guam at 280200K, and all military installations and government facilities on Guam attained that condition within a few hours. Aircraft were hangared or evacuated, and NAS Agana closed the runways at 0930 hours on the morning of 28 August 1992.[113]

(U) The storm intensified dramatically in the last 12 hours before it squarely struck Guam, and underscored the fact that meteorology was still not a perfect science. OMAR's eye passed directly over the north end of Guam at approximately 1700 hours, and high winds from the back side of the eye commenced at 1815 local. Peak sustained winds during the storm were in excess of 110 knots with gusts to 135 knots (estimated —anemometers had failed at 115 knots). Extensive damage was suffered throughout the civilian and military communities on Guam, but only minor injuries were reported. Island-wide power distribution systems were severely damaged, and their loss resulted in power generation systems being shut down, which in turn affected water supply. The Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station (NCTAMS) was off the air due to the lack of cooling water to keep the electronic equipment cool, and its emergency genera-

[112]J316 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (U).
[113]CINCPACREP Guam 272133Z Aug 92 (U).

tors were flooded. The two ships in harbor both broke loose from their moorings and were blown aground with minor damage.[114]

(U) USCINCPAC activated JTF Marianas effective 282258Z August, with RADM Kristensen designated at CJTF Marianas. (JTF Marianas/Operation TENTMAKER was actually established effective 290443Z August.) At the same time (1258W, 28 August) the USCINCPAC CAT was activated at Camp Smith to support disaster relief efforts in Guam. Also on the 28th, President Bush determined that the damages in the Territory of Guam resulting from Typhoon OMAR were of sufficient severity to warrant a major disaster declaration under Public Law (PL) 92-288, as amended by PL 100-107, for public assistance. The following day, SECARMY issued an execute order for Typhoon OMAR disaster response operations. Under the Federal Response Plan, DOD was primary agency for Emergency Support Functions (ESF) #3 (Public Works and Engineering) and #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), and within DOD, the Army Corps of Engineers was the lead agency for ESF #3. USCINCPAC's tasking assignments were to provide support to FEMA as requested by the FCO; appoint a DCO to establish and maintain liaison with FEMA to coordinate military support to civil emergency relief operations in the AOR; and provide a medical expert to joint the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) assessment team.[115]

(U) USCINCPAC's initial report to the Joint Staff included the following summary of damage:[116]

- A small drydock in Apra Harbor was aground.
- Electrical power generation and distribution was down island-wide. Portable generators placed in service to regain critical services.

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[114]NAVWESTOCEANCEN Pearl Harbor 281245Z Aug 92 (U).
[115]USCINCPAC 282258Z and 282259Z Aug 92 (U); CJTF Marianas 290443Z Aug 92 (U); SECARMY 290202Z Aug 92 (U).
[116]USCINCPAC 290810Z Aug 92 (U).

- NCTAMS was off the air because of lack of power to provide cooling water for electronic equipment.
- NIAGARA FALLS had been refloated and moved pierside. She was providing communications until NCTAMS was restored. WHITE PLAINS remained aground by the stern but was stable and in no immediate danger.

(U) Relief efforts began at once with deployment of the DJTFAC to CJTF Marianas to assist in the development of a campaign plan that became the roadmap for recovery, a III MEF survey liaison party (SLRP), medical personnel from CINCPACFLT, generators and transformers from USARPAC, a PRIME BEEF team from Yokota AB, RED HORSE civil engineers from Osan AB, and Navy SEABEEs. PACAF requested deployment of a mobile radar to Andersen AFB, and USCINCPAC directed that the MPS vessel 1st LT JACK LUMMUS (TAK 3011) proceed to Apra Harbor in support of the relief operations—she arrived at Naval Station Guam mid-afternoon on 30 August, and was followed by three other vessels. The highest priority requirement for both military and civil government restoration efforts were bucket trucks and associated equipment such as telephone poles, transformers, crossarms, and wire, to restore the power distribution systems. High-voltage linemen and line crews were also vital to reduce the time required for restoration.[117]

(S) Admiral Larson conducted a damage assessment on the 29th when he stopped at Guam enroute back to Hawaii from Japan. He met with Governor Joseph Ada, Congressman Ben Blaz, and RADM Kristensen, USCINCPACREP Guam, to the discuss the general situation and requirements, and toured the island by helicopter. Both Governor Ada and Congressman Blaz praised RADM Kristensen for his timely response and excellent cooperation with the civilian com-

[117]NAVOCEANCOMCEN 301402Z Aug 92 (U).

munity, which later brought a "well done" from CJCS. The CINC's personal observations and findings were:[118]

- The biggest problem was the restoration of electrical power to water wells and sewage treatment plants.
- There were about 3,000 people homeless, all temporarily housed in schools and other shelters. According to the governor, several hundred houses were destroyed. Only one life was lost.
- Most military and civilian housing made of concrete block faired well during the storm. Structural damage to wooden structures was extensive.
- Roads were open, and traffic was flowing.
- Airfields were open, and efforts were underway to restore them to IFR/night capability.
- Additional electrical generators were needed immediately.
- At least 10 bucket trucks were needed to effect repairs to the distribution system.
- Portable sanitary units were required.
- Plastic sheeting to effect temporary roof repairs was needed.

(U) By mid-September, the worst was over and the first two phases—Phase I was immediate restoration of essential operations, Phase II was restoration of essential services and facilities and return of military components to full mission capable (FMC) status—of RADM Kristensen's three-phase recovery plan were substantially completed. Phase III was phase-out, retrograde and redeployment of equipment and the 711 military augmentees. As of 15 September, the harbor had been surveyed and re-bouyed and opened to traffic, both grounded vessels had been refloated, and load out of USS HALEAKALA (AE 25) with munitions from the Naval Magazine was on schedule. Both military airports and GIAT were

[118]USCINCPAC 312355Z Aug 92 (S).

fully operational. Most of the DOD power distribution system was restored, and NCTAMS was at full service but remained on generator power until stable island power was available. Some two-thirds of the island power grid had been repaired, and potable water and sewage systems had been restored island-wide. About 1,200 civilians were being sheltered in a tent city erected by the military but operated by GOVGUAM and the Guam Army and Air National Guards. Public schools reopened 14 September, and clean up was well underway. Remaining tasks could be handled through normal Service component lines and normal liaison channels.[119]

(U) JTF Marianas was disestablished effective 191400Z September 1992. USCINCPACREP Guam was designated as DCO until final tasks were complete.[120]

Hurricane INIKI

(U) With the approach of Hurricane INIKI, COR 4 was set on Oahu at 1100 hours, 9 September 1992. By Thursday afternoon, 10 September, weather forecasters had discounted INIKI as a threat to the Hawaiian Islands, but conditions changed rapidly and at 102300W, COR 2 was declared for Oahu and Kauai. At 0530 hours the next morning, the 11th, Civil Defense sirens warned residents of the turn to the north made by INIKI during the night, and that afternoon the strongest hurricane to hit the Hawaiian Islands this century made its presence felt on both Oahu and Kauai.

(U) INIKI's eye went ashore on the eastern shore of Kauai with maximum sustained winds of 115 knots gusting to 140 knots. Extensive and severe damage was inflicted on the island, with an estimated 21,000 homes damaged and most of the island's 70 hotels severely damaged. Some 2,000 tourists were temporarily stranded

[119]CINCPACFLT 152320Z Sep 92 (U); USCINCPAC 182311Z Sep 92 (U).
[120]CJTF-Marianas 190630Z Sep 92 (U).

on the island until air services could be restored to move them to Oahu. Two deaths were reported on the island, and between seven and eight thousand people were in Red Cross shelters. The Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) located at Barking Sands on Kauai's west coast, suffered only minor damage.

(U) On Oahu, the leeward Waianae coast was hardest hit, with substantial flooding, surf damage, and lost roofs. Storm waves sweep into hotel lobbies in Waikiki, and guests were relocated to rooms above the second floor. One death was reported, a 16-year-old boy who died in a fire. Oahu Civil Defense did not require active military support in the Waianae area.

(U) SECARMY issued the disaster response warning order for Hurricane INIKI on 11 September, designating USCINCPAC as the supporting CINC to provide military support to operations in the State of Hawaii, and to appoint a DCO to establish and maintain liaison with FEMA and the FCO. Admiral Larson appointed LTG Johnnie H. Corns, CDR USARPAC, as DCO shortly after INIKI went ashore on Kauai, and as CJTF Hawaii on 12 September 1992. In the meantime, President Bush declared the islands of Kauai and Oahu federal disaster areas and authorized assistance under PL 93-288, the Stafford Act.[121]

(U) Aid began flowing to Kauai on 12 September, and the following day TF GARDEN ISLE was established at Lihue under command of BG Frank Akers, USA, Deputy CG, 25th ID(L). The Army vehicle landing ship MG CHARLES P. GROSS (LSV 5) delivered dump trucks, tractors, generators, and members of the 84th Eng Bn to Lihue on the 13th, and USS BELLEAU WOOD (LHA 3) arrived off Nawiliwili Harbor that same day with a load of heavy vehicles, water desalinization units, generators, field kitchens, and diesel fuel tankers. The USCG used their three C-130s based at Barbers Point NAS to shuttle food and equipment to Kauai, and

[121]SECARMY 111745Z Sep 92 (U).

they were joined by the Hawaii ANG's C-130 and six C-130s from the California ANG. On 22 September, Operation CLEAN SWEEP, a massive, one-time cleanup of the island, began with deployment of a brigade of the 25th ID(L) and a battalion from MCAS Kaneohe Bay to Kauai. The number of federal and state military personnel on the island peaked on 26 September at 5,445, the largest complement of military personnel on Kauai since early in World War II. The military drawdown began on 27 September, and by 5 October all communications, electrical generation, and troop support had been withdrawn. JTF Hawaii was formally disestablished at 062000Z October 1992.[122]

(U) In an interview following Operation INIKI, LTG Corns noted several points about the operation worthy of note:[123]87

- JTF Hawaii was not a mission for which USARPAC was forewarned, nor was it anticipated. He had envisioned his responsibility being limited to designating a JTF commander and forming a JTF—in Operation INIKI he was designated the JTF commander and Headquarters USARPAC served as the JTF nucleus.
- The lack of practice as a JTF nucleus showed in the early period of the operation, and was compounded by the lack of USCINCPAC augmentation (the DJTFAC).
- The task force sent to Kauai (TF GARDEN ISLE) was not formally established as a JTF, and the operation on Kauai would have been smoother had it been clearly established that all the Service elements on the island were a JTF and under joint operational control and directive authority.
- Confusion over funding caused Kauai officials to tell every Federal representative (and some State officials) who arrived on the island that they were not sure what they wanted to ask for and were not sure what they were prepared to let Federal

[122]USCINCPAC 061955Z Oct 92 (U).
[123]Interview (U), LTG Johnnie H. Corns, CDR USARPAC, and MAJ Lincoln T. Higa, 30th MHD, 12 Jan 93.

people do, because they were concerned they would be left with the bill. This was a lesson-learned from Hurricane IWA in 1980.

SECTION V-POW/MIA RESOLUTION EFFORTS

(U) The U.S. efforts to resolve the issue of unaccounted for prisoner of war and missing-in-action (POW/MIA) cases continued through 1992. There were 2,266 Americans unaccounted for from the Southeast Asia war for whom the U.S. government had pledged to obtain the fullest possible accounting. Individuals were removed from the official tally only after their remains were positively identified. Included in the official tally of 2,266 were 525 unaccounted for individuals whose remains had been declared non-recoverable in 1976 by the Armed Services Graves Registration Office (ASGRO). Subsequently, in July 1990, the POW/MIA Inter-Agency Group (IAG) members approved the termination of active search efforts on 4 individuals based on assessment of the remains as non-recoverable. In addition, 12 others, among the 400 plus lost over water, were placed in a non-recoverable, no further active search effort category.[124]

Joint Task Force-Full Accounting

(U) On 22 January 1992, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) was disestablished and Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) was established. Purpose of the new organization was to expand and accelerate operations to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the war in Southeast Asia (SEA). Command was assumed by BG Thomas H. Needham, USA, the last commander of JCRC. The headquarters relocated from Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point to Camp H. M. Smith on 16 March 1992, and occupied Building 20, the former home of Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC).[125]

(U) Concurrent with the establishment of JTF-FA as a USCINCPAC unit, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/

[124]CJTF-FA 212230Z Jul 92 (U).
[125]J30/M Point Paper (U), 26 Oct 92, Subj: POW/MIA Update.

MIA Affairs was established within the Department of Defense (DOD), the POW/MIA staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was expanded, and the manpower assets at the Army's Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) nearly tripled. These developments markedly increased the amount of POW/MIA staff effort at Headquarters USCINCPAC, which included the establishment of a J30-M deputate as the principal advisor for POW/MIA matters to both the CINC and the Director for Operations.[126]

(U) When activated, JTF-FA had 57 military and 10 civilian personnel on board, out of an authorized strength of 150 (126 military, 24 civilian). The Services responded rapidly to the new requirements, and by 18 June the joint task force had reached nearly full operational strength, with 127 military and 15 civilians available for duty. Personnel strength remained fairly constant for the remainder of the year, and by year's end there were 138 personnel assigned (120 military, 18 civilians). On 28 December, JCS approved an additional 32 military billets to handle the additional workload incurred by the archival research program (see below), bringing the total authorized military strength to 159.[127]

JTF-FA Detachments

(U) Forward detachments of JTF-FA were established as follows: Det One in Bangkok, Thailand; Det Two in Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV); Det Three in Vientiane, Laos; and Det Four in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.[128]

(U) The mission of Det One in Bangkok was to provide forward support for JTF-FA joint field activities (JFA) and serve as the logistic, administrative, and financial hub for all JFA. The detachment was commanded by Lt Col David A. Geraldson, USAF, who

[126]USCINCPAC 282145Z Jul 92 (U).
[127]CJTF-FA 182301Z Jun 92 (U) and 290320Z Dec 92 (U); CJTF-FA SSS (U), 3 Feb 93, Subj: Staff History Submission.
[128]JTF-FA Point Paper (U), 26 Oct 92, Subj: JTF Full Accounting Detachments.

arrived in Bangkok on 25 March following orientation in Hawaii. He was accompanied by CJTF-FA, who introduced him to the American Ambassador and key members of the U.S. Country Team. There were ten personnel assigned, including three civilian casualty resolution specialists and three military analyst/linguists.

(U) Det Two in Hanoi coordinated all JFA and provided liaison with the SRV government. It also conducted an active archive research effort and an aggressive live sighting investigation (LSI) program. The detachment commander, LTC John V. Donovan, USA, arrived in Hanoi 30 March 1992 following orientation in Hawaii accompanied by CJTF-FA, who introduced him to his Vietnamese counterparts. (The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) approved curtailment of LTC Donovan from a battalion command to fill this billet.) He acted as the only official U.S. presence in the country. Det Two had eight JTF-FA personnel present for duty in October, three assigned and five on temporary duty, plus three DIA augmentees. Other personnel could be assigned to support increased tasks.[129]

(U) The mission of Det Three in Vientiane was to coordinate all JFA, and deal directly with Lao counterparts on POW/MIA matters. The detachment was also assigned the DOD humanitarian attaché duties, and coordinated through the American Embassy (AMEMB) on school building projects and medical exercises. The permanent detachment commander, LTC Edward A. Spohn, USA, arrived in Vientiane on 27 March following orientation in Hawaii. As with the Det One and Two commanders, he was accompanied by CJTF-FA who introduced him to his Lao counterparts. In October 1992, there were three personnel assigned to Det Three in addition to the commander—one civilian casualty resolution specialist and two military analyst/linguists. The detachment depended on support from the AMEMB to help establish objectives with the host government and accomplish its mission.

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[129]Ibid.; CJTF-FA 262301Z Mar 92 (U) and 040340Z Apr 92 (U); CDRPERSCOM 031356Z Feb 92 (U).

(U) Det Four in Phnom Penh was the newest of the detachments to be established, having stood up on 25 February 1992. Its mission was to coordinate all JFA, and deal directly with State of Cambodia (SOC) counterparts on POW/MIA matters. It also assisted the U.S. Mission with logistics and liaison issues as requested or required. Maj John Sovocol, USAF, assumed duties as interim commander on 25 February, later replaced by CPT James R. Rice, USA, and the permanent commander, Lt Col Charles P. Clayton, USAF, reported on 12 November 1992. In October, one civilian casualty resolution specialist and two military analyst/linguists were assigned. There was also one DIA LSI position filled full time on a rotating basis.[130]

Joint Field Activities

(U) JTF-FA conducted three distinct types of JFA—investigations, surveys, and excavations. These are discussed in detail under the country headings below, but they were defined as:[131]

- Investigation: Gathering information to obtain facts, material evidence, and testimony through interviews of witnesses and research of documents. A total of 217 investigations had been conducted by JTF-FA by 30 October 1992.
- Survey: Physical inspection of a crash or grave site and the surrounding area in an attempt to identify the aircraft and individuals involved in the incident. JTF-FA had conducted a total of 114 surveys as of 30 October 1992.
- Excavation: Digging at an aircraft crash site or grave in an attempt to recover material evidence and identifiable remains. Thirty excavations had been conducted by JTF-FA by 30 October 1992.

[130]See note above; CJTF-FA 272002Z Feb 92 (U).
[131]JTF-FA Information Paper (U), 27 Oct 92, Subj: JTF-FA Scorecard.

Communications Support

(U) The communications systems for JTF-FA and its detachments had evolved to meet their essential needs. A tactical satellite (TACSAT) net linked all detachments, except for the Det Two-to-JTF-FA headquarters link. Dets Three and Four each had two TACSAT terminals, one for the detachment office and one for field operations, while Det One received a single terminal in October 1992. Efforts to gain SRV permission to use TACSAT had been unsuccessful, and an attempt to loan the SRV a terminal to monitor the JTF-FA net was disapproved by JCS, although they had no objection to "over-the-shoulder" monitoring. Until the SRV granted permission to import a terminal, the detachment would do without the capability.[132]

(U) International telephone service and facsimile capability was available at all detachment locations, and while the service was acceptable in Thailand and Vietnam, telephone service was marginal in Laos and unacceptable in Cambodia. Det Four reported that after arrival in Cambodia of the United Nations forces, telephone access was nearly impossible. The problem in Laos was the need to go through several operators and unreliable service.

(U) High frequency (HF) radios provided communications from the detachments to field teams, and were capable of providing emergency communications to Thailand. Base stations were installed in Hanoi, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh, and twelve portable radios were available for field team use. Det Two also had a very high frequency (VHF) base station and three hand-held portable radios for use in Hanoi, and both Vientiane and Phnom Penh were to be similarly equipped.

[132]CJTF-FA Point Paper (U), 23 Oct 92, Subj: Communications Support of JTF-FA.

Warning Order Issued

(U) Shortly after JTF-FA was established, USCINCPAC issued a warning order for Operation FULL ACCOUNTING, the expanded FY 92 and FY 93 POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia (SEA). Planning factors outlined in the order included the following:[133]

- Extensive use of special assignment airlift mission (SAAM) aircraft for support to and from the area of operations (AO) was required, as was C-130 and C-12 support within the AO.
- No status of forces agreement (SOFA) existed between the U.S. and the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
- Each period of operations in Vietnam would include up to seven elements (five investigative and two recovery) with up to 60 personnel total, with a field operation anticipated every other month. A tentative schedule called for three operations in FY 92, and six in FY 93.
- Each period of operations in Laos would include up to two investigative/recovery elements, totaling up to 20 personnel, with eight operations anticipated during a 12-month period. Tentatively, four operations were scheduled for FY 92, and nine during FY 93.
- Each period of operations in Cambodia would include one element of up to 42 personnel, with operations anticipated about every other month. One operation was tentatively scheduled for FY 92, and seven for FY 93.

STONY BEACH Operations

(U) STONY BEACH (SB) was the name given to investigation activities conducted under DIA control, and a STONY BEACH joint service team first deployed to SEA in 1987. Per terms of reference agreed to by JTF-FA and DIA in May 1992, DIA conducted all live sighting investigations and assigned permanent LSIs to

[133]USCINCPAC 111515Z May 92 (U).

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. They also assigned LSIs to JTF-FA field teams to conduct last-known-alive (LKA) investigations during JFA, and in addition to live sighting investigations SB conducted overt debriefings of SEA refugees located in various camps. The SEA SB investigation team was headquartered in Thailand, with operating locations in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. In Hanoi, the LSI was collocated with JTF-FA's Det Two. As of 30 October 1992, there were 17 of 27 authorized STONY BEACH personnel on board.[134]

(U) In June, the newly appointed STONY BEACH LSI stationed in Hanoi, MAJ Charles Robertson, USA, reported experiencing access problems from VNOSMP officials as he was not being extended the necessary clearances required to accomplish his assigned mission. Problems began with a series of scheduled meetings between MAJ Robertson and his VNOSMP counterpart Mr. Pham Dung, which were successively scheduled, postponed, and then cancelled. The meetings were being sought to obtain VNOSMP cooperation in order to accomplish at least one short notice LSI per week. The Vietnamese insisted on being furnished a schedule of LSI cases that MAJ Robertson desired to investigate. Even though the U.S. position that to be credible and acceptable the investigations had to be conducted with little or no prior notice had been carefully explained to them, the VNOSMP stand was that no government locations were accessible without prior notification and permission. In addition, the Vietnamese still held MAJ Robertson's passport (with expired visa), and without the passport with a police-validated entry/exit permit the major would be unable to travel within Vietnam or stay at a local hotel. During an 11 June meeting with the VNOSMP Director, the Det Two commander learned that the Vietnamese had confused LSI with separate efforts to interview a certain individual and visit areas of interest in the Robert Garwood case, and in addition the increase in size and activity of the U.S. staff had overwhelmed the VNOSMP

[134]JTF-FA/J23 Point Paper (U), 26 Oct 92,subj: STONY BEACH Investigation Activities.

staff. Once that misunderstanding had been cleared the uncooperative conduct such as described above subsided and the Vietnamese more closely adhered to the LSI agreement reached in March with Assistant Secretary Solomon (described below).[135]

(U) In December, Lt Gen James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, DIA Director, proposed to reorient STONY BEACH in light of new realities. Since live sighting and last-known-alive investigations were completely open and conducted with the full knowledge and participation of the host governments, human intelligence (HUMINT) methodologies were no longer appropriate, and DIA sought to transfer these functions to JTF-FA. They agreed to continue to provide them through January 1993 to complete any in-progress activities and allow time for a smooth transition of responsibilities.[136]

(U) STONY BEACH would retain the refugee, displaced person (DP), and emigre debriefing mission as outlined in the existing DIA/USCINCPAC memorandum of understanding (MOU). However, in view of the reduced flow of potential sources in these categories, the number of personnel devoted to this effort would be adjusted to meet current needs. The STONY BEACH charter would be changed to allow debriefers to address other priority targets such as counterdrugs and support to military operations in addition to POW/MIA.

(~~S/NF~~) The STONY BEACH controlled operations element would be maintained at full current strength, but as in the case of the overt debriefing operation, the team's charter would be expanded to incorporate collection against other priority targets. With concurrence of USCINCPAC, DIA would begin implementation of the plan immediately, and plan to have all actions completed by 31 March 1993.

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[135]USDAO Bangkok 27914/101027Z Jun 92 (U); USCINCPAC 130440Z Jun 92 (U).
[136]DIA 120714Z Dec 92 (~~S/NF~~).

(~~S~~) Admiral Larson immediately responded to DIA's written proposal, and reminded Lt Gen Clapper that any proposal to accomplish the transfer of the live sighting portion of STONY BEACH to JTF-FA had to address the sourcing of personnel assets. He noted that during a recent visit to Washington, several individuals had discussed the issue as though it were a "done deal," yet Lt Gen Clapper's 12 December message was the first written proposal he had seen. The CINC had agreed to consider such a transfer, but was concerned that DIA's proposal did not address sourcing of personnel assets to accompany the LSI responsibility. In other words, the people had to come with the mission.[137]

(U) Following up on the DIA proposal, USCINCPAC proposed on 15 December that designated representatives from the Pacific Command and DIA meet at Camp Smith on 5 January to develop proposals to place before the Director of DIA and USCINCPAC concerning the appropriate organizational structure and division of responsibilities for LSI and LKA discrepancy case investigations. The results of this proposal will be reported in the 1993 USCINCPAC Command History.[138]

(U) Concurrently with USCINCPAC's meeting proposal to DIA, the Secretary of Defense announced a new live sighting investigation policy. The increasing number of foreign nationals traveling in and visiting the countries of Indochina made a change in current requirements for conducting LSIs necessary. Without some modification, an overwhelming number of contemporaneous live sighting reports referring to foreign nationals in the major metropolitan areas of Indochina was a real possibility, and the United States could not and should not expend the manpower and resources necessary to investigate such alleged sighting reports.[139]

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[137]USCINCPAC 132030Z Dec 92 (~~S~~).
[138]USCINCPAC 151300Z Dec 92 (U).
[139]SECDEF 152007Z Dec 92 (U).

(U) Under the new policy, live sighting investigations would no longer be conducted on reports involving unnamed foreign nationals observed in the metropolitan areas of Indochina in a noncaptive environment. The policy did not preclude the U.S. government from deciding to conduct an LSI if other information justified further investigation of the report. The policy concerning live sighting reports on possible missing Americans, individuals in a captive environment, and reports from remote locations remained unchanged—they would be thoroughly investigated, the reports fully analyzed, and the cases presented before the Live Sighting Review Board. The timely, accurate, and complete investigation of reports relating to possible live American POWs or MIAs in Indochina remained the highest priority in the effort to achieve the fullest possible accounting for the missing.

POWs held in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)

(S) In March 1992, the United States and Russia established a joint commission on POWs/MIAs. For the United States, the objectives of the commission were threefold:[140]

- To obtain information on and locate any American POWs or MIAs remaining in the FSU, and facilitate their return to the U.S. if they so wished.
- To obtain access to people, documents, and archival information in Russia which might shed light on the fate of American servicemen from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and incidents during the Cold War.
- To establish a mechanism by which remains identified as American could be returned to the United States.

[140]SECSTATE 079222/130646Z Mar 92 (S).

In return for Russian cooperation in meeting these objectives, the United States was prepared to address questions about Soviet/Russian POWs in Afghanistan.

(U) The first session of the U.S.-Russia POW/MIA Commission was held 26-28 March 1992 in Moscow, and was primarily a forum for the United States to specify what information was being sought and identify areas for cooperation. Working groups were formed to address each of the five wars listed above (WW II, Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War, and Afghanistan), and a number of specific cases were discussed. Both sides agreed in principle to a mechanism for continued interaction between the two delegations and took note of the complexity of the task ahead.

(U) At the first two sessions of the Vietnam Working Group on 26 and 27 March, the U.S. side pressed for information related to seven specific areas of interest:[141]

- General Soviet knowledge about American POWs during the Vietnam War.
- Reports that an American POW had been transported to Saryshagan in Kazakhstan.
- The movement of American deserters through Japan to Moscow.
- Reports that Soviet forces downed American aircraft.
- General Kalugin's statements that former KGB operative Nechiporenko interviewed American POWs after Operation HOMECOMING in 1973.
- Soviet access to American POWs in Indochina.
- Documentation for these areas of interest.

(U) In response, the Russians agreed to provide as much assistance as possible, but reminded the U.S. side that Moscow could no longer intervene as before in the newly independent

[141] AMEMB Moscow 09408/311425Z Mar 92 (U); SECSTATE 108325/070636Z and 121531/162258Z Apr 92 (U).

Commonwealth States, and that the agreements with Vietnam had been concluded by Soviet organizations that no longer existed. They also denied that Soviet intelligence had any contact with American POWs in Vietnam, other than Mr. Nechiporenko's meeting with a Mr. Weaver in January 1973. The chief of the Russian delegation also remarked that unless the two sides shared information and worked openly, the process would degenerate into a sterile cycle of American allegations followed by Russian denials. The U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-Russian Commission on POWs/MIAs, Ambassador Malcolm Toon, visited Moscow 21-26 June at the direction of President Bush for further talks. The Russians agreed to make a public statement on the presence or non-presence of live Americans in Russian-controlled facilities, and both sides agreed to increase staff continue cooperation. Meetings were also held in September, with little progress noted.[142]

Former Japanese POWs

(C) The United States was not the only country interested in accounting for its war dead. When Japan surrendered in August 1945, Japanese nationals in Manchukuo (Manchuria) were captured by Soviet forces. According to Russian data, a total of some 693,635 Japanese had been captured, and 546,086 had been taken to special detention camps in the USSR. Of the total captured, 62,068 persons had died, 46,082 of whom were in the special detention camps. Japanese estimates were somewhat lower, but were based on surveys conducted through questioning of repatriates. Some 473,000 detainees had returned to Japan, most by 1950 although some 1,000-odd were not returned until after December 1956. The Japanese estimated that some 15,000 detainees remained unaccounted for, and continued to press for resolution of the issue.[143]

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[142]See note above; AMEMB Moscow 291009Z Jun 92 (U).

[143]AMEMB Tokyo 21194/290823Z Dec 92 (C).

People's Republic of China

(U) In July, USCINCPAC forwarded to JCS an operational concept for search and recovery of crash sites located in People's Republic of China (PRC) coastal waters. There were four cases—all aircraft crash sites—involving eight unaccounted for Americans associated with PRC losses. The crash sites of two cases (Case 0072 and 1047) were believed to be in waters some 200 feet deep, while one (0299) was in a coastal marsh under less than 3 feet of water. The fourth (0800) was not an overwater loss but was probably located on the Chinese side of the border with Vietnam northwest of the town of Tung Chiao, but the exact site was unknown. JTF-FA felt that Chinese officials and citizens should have some knowledge of three of the cases, and possibly the fourth, and an attempt to locate and interview witnesses should occur prior to mounting any recovery operations.[144]

(U) The concept of operations recommended was divided into two distinct phases. Phase I, after approval and support was obtained from the PRC government, was the deployment of a task-organized team composed of JTF-FA linguists, analysts, wreckage analysts, and CILHI graves registration experts to the PRC to locate and interview officials and citizens with knowledge of the events, examine associated material evidence, and excavate the site if possible. Phase II, the search for and recovery of the underwater crash sites, would be conducted by CINCPACFLT assets using side-scan SONAR and divers. Phase I would be under the operational control (OPCON) of JTF-FA, while Phase II would be under OPCON of CINCPACFLT or a designated commander.

(U) Talking points for an anticipated January 1993 meeting with the Chinese to discuss POW/MIA matters were developed by JTF-FA in December 1992. The talking points outlined the two-

[144]USCINCPAC 240310Z Jul 92 (U).

phased operation described above, with specific suggested time periods and duration estimates. The northeast monsoon period offered the most favorable conditions for the Phase I investigations, and JTF-FA proposed starting in February or March. They estimated that the investigations would take 14 to 21 days. Phase II, the search for and possible recovery of the crash sites, would follow, and would require more detailed administrative and logistical planning. The talking points also addressed the issues of obtaining applicable records, locating witnesses, coordinating the transportation and itinerary for the investigation team, and interviews of former refugees from Vietnam now settled in China. Details of the discussions with the PRC will be covered in the next USCINCPAC Command History.[145]

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

(U) The U.S.-Vietnam joint field investigation effort begun in 1988 continued for its fifth year through 1992. The year was marked by two major developments in the POW/MIA resolution issue. These were, first, a March 1992 agreement by Vietnam to expand its cooperation in a five-point program, and an October agreement concerning joint research acitivities to be conducted in the SRV.

Five Agreements

(C) During a series of plenary sessions conducted in Hanoi 4-5 March 1992, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon received new Vietnamese commitments from Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam to address the step-by-step U.S. POW/MIA criteria for normalization of relations (known as the Roadmap) first presented to the Vietnamese by Mr. Solomon in April 1991. The five-point

[145]CJTF-FA 300131Z Dec 92 (U).

program had the potential to significantly enhance POW/MIA operations, and consisted of:[146]

- Agreement in principle to expand our access to Vietnamese archives and individuals with information on POW/MIA issues. Implementation would start with new U.S. access to a key Vietnamese official formerly in charge of POW affairs and to two military museums in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
- Implementation of a short-notice live sighting investigation mechanism effective immediately. A joint team conducted the first such investigation as Mr. Solomon departed Hanoi, but failed to locate any Americans.
- Acceptance of the U.S. two-year plan for accelerated joint investigations, starting with a ten-month, five-joint-activity-cycle program focused on the 135 remaining high priority discrepancy cases and addressing others as possible.
- Recommitment to rapid recovery and repatriation of American remains along with agreement to exchange information with U.S. experts on seventeen specific cases for which we had information indicating Hanoi should have recovered remains.
- Continued cooperation in trilateral efforts with Laos and Cambodia. The first trilateral meeting with Cambodia was held in Phnom Penh immediately after Mr. Solomon's visit (see below).

(C) Presenting the Vietnamese perspective of the issues, Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai pointed out that the U.S. linked resolution of the MIA question to the normalization process, yet both sides had agreed that MIA was a humanitarian question which should not be linked to political questions. He noted that the two countries were working together on humanitarian questions as confidence building measures, but hostilities remained, specifically the trade embargo against Vietnam, adding that it was difficult to explain to the Vietnamese people and the National

[146]AMEMB Bangkok 11851/090934Z Mar 92 (C).

Assembly why Vietnam should do all the things the U.S. required if the embargo continued. The MIA question impacted the government, and the trade embargo had an impact on the people, including women and children.

Joint Research Activities

(U) On 19 October 1992, MG Needham*, CJTF-FA, and Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, Deputy Director, Americas Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SRV, developed minutes of understanding (MOU) to implement a breakthrough agreement reached that day by Foreign Minister Nguyen Mahn Cam and Presidential Emissary for POW/MIA GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., (USA, Ret) concerning joint research activities to be conducted in the SRV. Details were clarified in additional meetings in Hanoi between MG Needham and Mr. Phong on 4 November, after joint research activities began. The Vietnamese agreed to permit three separate archival research teams (ARTs) in Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City, and concurred in supporting the on-going LSI program and completing initial investigations on the 135 discrepancy cases.[147]

(U) USCINCPAC's initial plan for joint research activities in the SRV was transmitted to the CJCS on 24 October, and a revised concept of operations was submitted on 13 November. The revised plan called for two phases. Phase I, consisting of the initial deployment of ARTs, sourcing previously identified research team equipment, and establishing procedures with SRV counterpart personnel ran from 23 October to 31 December. It began with the arrival in Hanoi of Mr. Robert J. Destatte, a DIA representative on one-year rotational assignment to JTF-FA, on 23 October. He assumed the role of over-all coordinator for all matters relating to the archival research effort under OPCON of the Commander, Det Two. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

* General Needham was frocked to Major General on 14 Oct 92, with permanent DOR of 1 Aug 93.
[147]USCINCPAC 240220Z Oct 92 (U); AMEMB Vientiane 02592/061017Z Nov 92 (U).

(OSD) representative to JTF-FA, Mr. Theodore Schweitzer, arrived in Hanoi on 29 October to assist in the research effort. Also assigned to Det Two, his role was to assist Mr. Destatte, the overall coordinator, in quickly establishing a material retrieval and analysis program based on his previous experience with SRV archives. ART One arrived in Hanoi on 30 October and commenced work at the Army Museum in Hanoi on 2 November. ART Two arrived in Hanoi on 2 December, and deployed to Da Nang on the 4th. Activities of both teams concentrated on archival research in military museums, tradition houses, and other SRV agencies that could contain wartime records with information concerning MIAs or POWs.[148]

(U) Phase II of the joint research activities plan would run from 1 January 1993 onward, and called for a third ART to deploy to Ho Chi Minh City after the Tet holidays. JTF-FA would be prepared to deploy additional teams to the Can Tho and Hai-phong areas, as required, and expand research activities to other areas of the SRV as jointly agreed to. The ARTs would concentrate their research efforts on specific cases for which it was believed critical information could be obtained, and would be on a four-month rotational deployment cycle. Additional equipment, material, and personnel would be identified and sourced based on experience gained during Phase I. The plan would be modified as the research teams developed procedures, learned more of the SRV archives and holdings, and experienced working closely with their researchers and analysts.

(U) Based on experience gained in the first two weeks of operations, Admiral Larson informed the CJCS of his revised concept of operations and intentions on 13 November and received concurrence on 1 December. On the same date, the CINC requested manpower support to implement the plan fully. JTF-FA required a total of eight ARTs to ensure a thorough, continuous, and com-

[148]USCINCPAC 240220Z and 310230Z Oct 92 (U); 070101Z Nov 92 (U); and 050215Z Dec 92 (U).

plete search of SRV museums and repositories for wartime records and artifacts pertaining to American MIAs and POWs. In addition, some modest increase in staff support was required to keep the teams rotating in and out of the field.[149]

(U) To field and support the six additional ARTs and simultaneously maintain the high OPTEMPO of scheduled JFAs in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, JTF-FA required an additional 32 personnel: 18 for the joint archival research teams (one officer team leader/analysts, two enlisted Vietnamese linquists per team); 5 additional intelligence analysts (approximately a one-to-one ratio to the additional teams) were needed to analyze and process the expected influx of a large volume of information; and the need for an assistant operations officer had become imperative. Support had intentionally been left lean when JTF-FA was formed, with the focus on operations and intelligence. The addition of the archival research mission and the required support clearly showed that the joint task force was much too lean in the essential supporting areas. Another eight billets were required to provide necessary support services such as public affairs, supply, medical supply, budget, loadmaster, personnel (two), and administration. As mentioned above, these 32 billets were approved by CJCS on 28 December.

(U) In addition, the CINC requested the USCINCPAC staff be augmented with five billets to provide effective liaison between JTF-FA, the headquarters, and several departments and agencies in Washington, and to provide an adequate monitoring and reporting capability. The additional billets would give USCINCPAC the capability to develop strategy recommendations for long range plans concerning future JTF-FA efforts, and coordination of component resources in support of JTF-FA excavation efforts. He sought to realign for this purpose manpower resources made available as the

[149]USCINCPAC 131600Z and 131615Z Nov 92 (U); CJCS 011337Z Dec 92 (U).

result of the earlier inactivation of the Pacific Airborne Command Post.

(U) An initial assessment of the joint archival research activities in Vietnam was conducted following the first month of operations in Hanoi. By 30 November, ART 1 had seen and photographed the following material at the Hanoi Military Museum:[150]

- 571 photographs—described as actual photographs held by the museum, in six categories.
- 187 envelopes—holding photographs annotated with data.
- 226 museum accession records—index records for each item in the museum's inventory.
- 2 museum accession record reports—which were histories of how, when, and where a particular item was acquired.
- 741 artifacts—actual items such as aircrew and survival gear, military equipment, or identification media.

(U) ART 1 provided JTF-FA a total of 2,040 photographs for analysis and possible correlation with a specific individual or case. All correlations reported by the ART were considered preliminary and extremely tentative. Of the total, 51 were correlated to resolved cases, eight to unaccounted for cases, and another five to individuals on the 135 list. None of the evidence related to the five cases on the list of 135 presented to the SRV by GEN Vessey permitted confirmation of the fate of the individual involved, but might ultimately provide additional leads to assist field investigations. Three of the eight related to unaccounted for cases were photographs of bodies, which was evidence that Vietnamese officials at some level had knowledge of the disposition of the remains.

[150]USCINCPAC 010400Z Dec 92 (U).

Information Management System

(U) In November 1992, a five-man team comprised of two USCINCPAC/J6 members and representatives from the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), DIA, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), visited the SRV. The team was tasked to conduct site surveys of three primary archival sites (Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City) and develop an implementation plan for an information management system (IMS) to be used in the joint archival research project. The IMS had to be capable of scanning large volumes of pictures and text, plus other multimedia products such as still and video film, into digital format and transmit data simultaneously to HQ JTF-FA and DIA for analysis.[151]

(U) Following their 10-day trip, the team briefed Admiral Larson, who approved in principle the IMS concept of operations and an implementation plan. The proposed system, which became known as Option 1, relied heavily on proven, state-of-the-art equipment, including high-volume Kodak scanners, intelligent work stations, and Excaliber software. Simultaneous transmission at moderate data rates would be handled by commercial U.S.-made equipment for the duration of the mission, with temporary use of military SHF SATCOM equipment while an Australian firm installed a new telecommunications network in the SRV. Phase I of the project included: permanent work stations at DIA, HQ JTF-FA, the Hanoi archive, and Det Two; a portable data scanning/entry unit at Da Nang and two other portable units for remote site investigation; and temporary communications. Phase II requirements would be determined once the volume of available data was assessed.

(U) Phase I was estimated to cost $3.0 million in FY 93 funds—$1.8 million in procurement funds for data scanning and

[151]USCINCPAC 031750Z Dec 92 (U).

entry equipment; $1.0 million in O&M funds for supplies, maintenance, labor, leases, and per diem; and another $200,000 in O&M to cover preliminary connectivity lease costs between Det Two in Hanoi, JTF-FA in Hawaii, and DIA in Washington. Phase II was estimated to cost another $4.4 million in FY 93 funds ($3.4 million for procurement, $1.0 million in O&M). FY 94 and FY 95 O&M costs were estimated at $2.0 million each year.

(U) On 3 December 1992, LTG Fields forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff (DJS) a request for support in resolving two key issues—funding and technology transfer. He stated that while the CINC had approved using JTF-FA O&M funds to start the effort, USCINCPAC had neither sufficient O&M funds nor any procurement funds to execute the program and was required to submit funding requirements to the Navy. He also noted the potential for trade embargo violations and the possibility that equipment taken into the SRV might be subject to nationalization, and stated the need for assurances from the U.S. government on the embargo and technology transfer issues. Also needed were assurances from the SRV government that telecommunications equipment used could be removed, as otherwise USCINCPAC would be forced to purchase instead of lease the commercial equipment or rely on courier or low data rate transfer over international telephone lines. An additional consideration was that GEN Vessey may have offered the Vietnamese retention of the data scanning equipment for their archival use in return for cooperation.[152]

(U) The DJS responded quickly, endorsed USCINCPAC seeking Navy funding for requirements which exceeded ability to resource, and noted that in view of the scarcity of dollars relooking at the communications requirements and data scanning and entry equipment needs might be in order. Technology transfer was not really an issue, however, as U.S. law and policy prohibited leaving equipment in country or transferring equipment to the

[152]Ibid.

SRV. The only option appeared to be procurement of commercial communications and data screening and entry equipment owned and operated by the U.S. Purchase of equipment that met normal export controls might ease any future transfer should the embargo be lifted. The director cautioned that as arrangements to bring equipment into the SRV were made, the need to remove the equipment from the country be kept in mind, and a security and safeguard program must be developed and implemented once the equipment had arrived in Vietnam.[153]

(U) After receipt of the Director's reply, Option 2, a less capable and less expensive option, was developed. This option eliminated the high data rate communications and relied on courier services to move compiled information from Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City to Hanoi, and then to courier all information out of Hanoi to HQ JTF-FA and DIA. Low speed, dialup data communications would be provided via international direct dial (DD) telephone between Hanoi, Hawaii, and Washington for only the most critical time-sensitive information. Equipment at Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City was scaled down to data capture only, while the systems at the Hanoi Museum and Det Two would retain some analytical capability. The number of mobile sets to support the Vietnamese teams was cut from nine to seven, and permanent contractor support in country was eliminated. Implementation of Option 2 would effect the flexibility and redundancy of the teams, prevent interactive analysis, and eliminate any surge capability to handle emerging data caches. However, Option 2 would save nearly $2 million annually in operating costs in FY 94 and FY 95, and approximately $1 million in procurement costs. In addition, DIA agreed to fund their portion of the IMS.[154]

(U) With DJS support for Option 2, USCINCPAC on 24 December asked the Navy Comptroller for $2.8 million in FY 93 funds ($2

[153]JCS/DJS 091850Z Dec 92 (U).
[154]USCINCPAC 182300Z Dec 92 (U).

million for procurement, $800 thousand in O&M) for JTF-FA IMS implementation and operations, and an additional $1.3 million O&M per year in FY 94 and FY 95. Phase I of Option 2 would include permanent work stations at JTF-FA in Hawaii, the Hanoi Archive, and Det Two; portable data scanning/entry units at Da Nang and two other remote sites; linked communications support capability over all processing sites; and courier services to move the information. Phase II involved centralized processing facilities at Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City and equipment for four additional mobile teams. The response to this request and other future developments will be reported in the next USCINCPAC Command History.[155]

Cooperation Evaluation

(U) In response to a Joint Staff request, USCINCPAC tasked JTF-FA to develop a plan to evaluate SRV cooperation and implementation of the five agreements. The initial plan was submitted in March and proposed steps and measures of effectiveness for evaluating cooperation during the April to June quarter. The measures of effectiveness were quantified as much as possible, but no attempt to establish a grading system of any kind was made. JTF-FA felt that despite the joint efforts conducted in country since September 1988, a full understanding of Hanoi's knowledge of our war losses necessary to establish a useful grading system was still lacking, and an attempt to impose a rigorous grading system could be counterproductive. Any quantitative standards developed would be based on estimates that contained a significant amount of uncertainty, and unilateral imposition of imprecise standards by the U.S. could justify the Vietnamese slowing, stopping, or reversing their position on increased co-operation.[156]

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[155]USCINCPAC 242100Z Dec 92 (U).
[156]CJTF-FA 262350Z Mar 92 (U); USCINCPAC 020030Z Apr 92 (U).

(U) USCINCPAC's initial assessment of overall SRV cooperation and implementation of the five agreements through the end of April 1992 was submitted to the Joint Staff on 11 May 1992. The remarks are keyed to the agreements:[157]

- Agreement 1: Increased access to records, archives, and museums. The Det Two staff was permitted to visit museums and tradition houses and brief curators on JTF-FA requirements, but activities had resulted in limited access to records on wartime POW/MIA. SRV responses to requests for information remained slow, but in a positive vein the Det Two staff was able to interview former cadre reported to have detailed knowledge of POW matters.
- Agreement 2: Implement a credible live sighting mechanism. Significant progress in LSI was accomplished. Prior to the agreement, LSIs were not timely because of the lengthly Vietnamese approval and coordination process. The first truly short-notice LSI was conducted during A/S Solomon's visit in March, and two others were conducted in April.
- Agreement 3: Implement a plan of expanded joint operations over the next two years, to include five investigations in the next ten months. CJTF-FA proposed and the Vietnamese approved a detailed workplan for investigating 117 of the 135 last known alive discrepancy cases and other cases in geographic proximity to the priority cases. The plan for expanded operations was on track, and included five operations before December 1992. SRV concerns over the number of personnel deployed for operations cast some doubt on whether they would allow JTF-FA to increase its scope of activity to the level specified in the operations order.
- Agreement 4: Continue trilateral efforts to resolve border cases. Despite Det Two efforts, the Vietnamese had not turned over any significant archival information on border cases, they did offer to allow technical specialists to cross directly

[157]USCINCPAC 111500Z May 92 (U).

into Laos to conduct investigations. They also agreed to allow Vietnamese officials to participate in trilateral operations with Cambodia, if that country agreed. Although Laos declined and Cambodia failed to respond, the offers were significant.

• Agreement 5: Renew unilateral efforts to recover and return remains of unaccounted for in Vietnam. There were three developments of note in this area. First, a team of Vietnamese forensic specialist visited CILHI 1-10 April. They provided no biological or material evidence to aid in identification, but agreed to follow-up on 20 cases. Second, they unilateraly repatriated remains allegedly associated with Case 0017 on 27 March. Finally, they agreed to have the DIA present a detailed briefing on the stored remains issue to appropriate officials in Hanoi in late May.

(U) In summary, the SRV had started implementation of all five agreements and had made progress in all areas. Much remained to be done, however, and particularly disappointing was their lack of response in wartime records disclosure.

(U) Similar assessments were made for the months of May, July, August, September, and November. Continued progress was noted in most areas, and in particular with Agreement 1. The Vietnamese agreed to a large scale archival research effort in October (discussed below) and ART 1 began work in Hanoi on 2 November. By the end of the month, the team had cataloged, photographed, and relayed to JTF-FA head-quarters and DIA information relating to 571 photographs, 228 assession records/reports, and 741 artifacts.[158]

(U) The year ended with a generally positive but mixed report. In summary, unprecedented co-operation and access was extended by the SRV in the field of archival research, and they fulfilled their commitment to permit increased LSI. In joint

[158]USCINCPAC 090450Z Dec 92 (U).

operations, the goal of completing a preliminary investigation of all cases on the list of 135 was attainable. Little headway was made with trilateral efforts to resolve border cases, in part because of Lao reluctance, and unilateral efforts to recover and return unaccounted remains was still a sensitive issue.

Bi-Monthly Technical Meetings

(U) The first technical meeting of the year was held in Hanoi, 26-28 February 1992. The U.S. side was led by BG Needham, CJTF-FA, and included COL John Cole, USA, DIA STONY BEACH; Mr. Destatte from DIA; LTC Johnie Webb, USA, Commander, CILHI; Mr. Garnett Bell and Lt Col Roger Gaebel, USAF, of JTF-FA; and MAJ Gary S. Patton, USA, USCINCPAC/J0322. The Vietnamese side was header by Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, Deputy Director, Americas Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Other MFA members present were Mr. Ho Xuan Dich, Director, Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP); Mr. Ngo Hoang, Deputy Director, VNOSMP; VNOSMP specialists Colonel Tran Bien and Colonel Luu Van Tho; and forensic specialist Colonel Vu Ngoc Thu. The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) was represented by Mr. Le Hoang.[159]

(U) The Vietnamese agreed to focus joint and unilateral search efforts on resolving discrepancy cases associated with the 135 MIA who were the subject of recent discussions between General Vessey and Minister Cam. They also agreed to permit teams to investigate other unresolved cases in geographical proximity as time and circumstances permitted, but cautioned the U.S. not to add names to the priority list. They did not agree to a U.S.-proposed workplan for five JFA for the remainder of 1992, stating that it was not realistic, and when pressed for a specific number they could support indicated that three more beyond the one in progress (the 16th iteration) would be feasible. A technical meeting would be held in April to assess the

[159]CJTF-FA Det One 290744Z Feb 92 (U).

results of the 16th iteration and plan activities for the April-June quarter.

(U) The Vietnamese did a complete turn-about on an earlier offer to allow the Hanoi POW/MIA office staff to lease, renovate, and occupy a modern, multi-story building in Hanoi formerly occupied by a French oil company. The building was one of several offered to the staff late last year with the full knowledge of Foreign Ministry officials, but was no longer available. Apparently, the Vietnamese wanted the U.S. to lease a government-owned building so that the payments would go directly to them, and they were concerned that the large building would be used to house other U.S. government agencies at some point in the future.

(U) They were receptive to a U.S. proposal to present two or three live sighting reports and conduct an immediate investiation thereafter providing the locations did not fall within national security areas. They took the occasion to ask why the U.S. did not prosecute Americans who fabricated live sighting reports, and were told that this was a complex legal matter. A number of other support issues were discussed, including shipment of vehicles, leasing of helicopters, an alternative to the practice of search teams carrying large amounts of cash to Vietnam in advance of scheduled field activities, and joint press releases.

(U) The second round of technical talks was held 28-29 May in Hanoi. BG Needham led the U.S. team, accompanied by COL Cole and Mr. DeStatte, STONY BEACH; LTC Webb, CILHI; LTC Donovan, Det 2; Mr. Bell, Maj Leslie J. MacRae, USAF, and Maj Roger L. Overturf,USAF, of JTF-FA; and MAJ Patton, USCINCPAC/J032. The Vietnamese side was led by Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, Deputy Director, Americas Department, MFA, who was accompanied by Mr. Ho Xuan Dich

and Mr. Ngo Hoang of the VNOSMP, four representatives of the MND, and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Tan from the MOI.[160]

(U) BG Needham discussed, inter alia, cooperation on the five agreements reached in March during the visit by Assistant Secretary Solomon and the Vietnamese government's need to follow through on their commitments; implementation of the joint research concept as proposed by General Vessey; the results of the 17th JFA and plans for the 18th. LTC Webb summarized the results of the Vietnamese visit to CILHI in April and presented an update on the remains identification effort, and the STONY BEACH personnel presented the approved U.S. government remains and records briefing in Vietnamese.

(U) Mr. Phong started with a discussion of the 17th JFA, and stressed Vietnamese cooperation at all levels. He explained that success should be measured by level of effort and cooperation rather than by numbers of remains recovered, and that the Vietnamese government had expended significant manpower and resources on resolving the U.S. MIA issue, much to the chagrin of the the Vietnamese populace and press. The Vietnamese agreed to provide greater access to wartime records when available, and agreed in principle to form joint research teams. They were still considering the U.S. proposal to use TACSAT terminals to support operations during the 18th JFA, but indicated they did not have the capability to monitor that type equipment. They accepted with reluctance a U.S. proposal to deposit a check in the amount of $10,000 into the VNOSMP account in the Bank of Ayudhya, Bangkok, to cover initial operation expenses for one of the five teams to deploy during the 18th JFA, and also agreed to provide multiple visas for up to three months for BG Needham and other selected U.S. personnel.

[160]AMEMB Vientiane 01230/301706Z May 92 (U).

(U) In response to the STONY BEACH briefing, Mr. Phong said he understood our briefing to imply that Vietnam was currently storing the remains of U.S. personnel. He questioned the logic of our argument, and considered it abstract. It was in the best interest of their country to build good relations with the United States, and it would be contrary to those interests to keep a few remains or a few POWs to block the betterment of those relations. He stated that they did not have any stored remains, although they had in the past stored remains for later return to the United States. Rationale for storage was:

- During wartime, there was no recovery of remains due to ongoing combat activity throughout the country. Deceased Americans were buried near where found, but there was no consideration of future accountability or burial conditions.
- Immediately following the war, officials were sent throughout the country to locate grave sites of U.S. person-nel, but no remains were recovered. As there were no rela-tions between the two countries, turnover of remains was not possible.
- There was an organized effort to recover U.S. remains conducted throughout the country, dates unknown, but problems encountered in the dissemination of instructions had resulted in varying procedures being followed in different localities. Remains collected during the early years were relatively fresh and had to be chemically treated to preserve them, while more recent recoveries were well aged and did not require preservation.

(U) The next bimonthly technical level POW/MIA meeting was held in Hanoi, 30-31 July 1992. BG Needham again headed the U.S. side, accompanied by COL Cole, STONY BEACH; Mr. Scearce, STONY BEACH Operations Officer; LTC Donovan and SMSgt Flanagan, JTF-FA Det Two; Mr. Helgesen, CILHI; and Mr. Bell, LTC Fredrikson, Maj Nowack, and LCDR Adams from JTF-FA. The Vietnamese side was led by Mr. Ho Xuan Dich, Director of the VNOSMP, and included five

others from MFA, three officers from the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the VNOSMP forensic chief, and two persons from MOI.[161]

(U) During a two-hour opening presentation, General Needham covered a number of issues. He began by noting that the U.S. government was encouraged by the increased cooperation noted since March, especially by the SRV's willingness to implement a credible live-sighting mechanism, but added that unilateral recovery and repatriation of remains needed progress. He also discussed, inter alia, the results of the 18th JFA, the proposal submitted for the 19th by the VNOSMP, a revised workplan for work on the 135 discrepancy cases, trilateral talks, vehicles, and transfer of payments.

(U) The Vietnamese side opened the second session with prepared remarks. Concerning the 18th JFA, they cited a number of difficulties experienced including preparations for the National Assembly elections, very adverse weather conditions created by Typhoon CHUCK, President Yeltsin's remarks about POWs in the Soviet Union, and the U.S. decision to accept a political refugee. Mr. Dich outlined the VNOSMP plan for the 19th JFA, and said that completion of the 135 cases was possible but that the U.S. was misdirecting its effort. Regarding the LSI program, he said that VNOSMP had unilaterally investigated a number of reports of live Americans since 1985, and noted that in all 33 cases investigated to date, the evidence had proved false. Among other areas discussed was the live-sighting program.

(U) CJTF-FA noted that negotiating with the Vietnamese was very difficult during these talks. They maintained a very hard line regarding both the size and dates of the 19th JFA and the live-sighting program, and it appeared that the VNOSMP members attending were not empowered to make key decisions. A perceived

[161]CJTF-FA Det One 022351Z Aug 92 (U).

lack of follow-up from the U.S. in implementing the Solomon-Le Mai humanitarian assistance agreement and recent statements by members of the Senate Select Committee, among other things, may have contributed to the hard stance taken by the Vietnamese.

(U) The fourth technical talks of the year were held in Hanoi on 30 September 1992. BG Needham again headed the U.S. team, accompanied by COL Cole, Mr. Scearce, and MAJ Robertson from DIA/STONY BEACH; LTC Webb, CILHI; and LTC Donovan, Mr. Bell, LCDR Adams, and SSgt Newell of JTF-FA. The Vietnamese side was headed by Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, MFA, who chaired the meeting, and included others from VNOSMP, MFA, MND, and MOI.[162]

(U) The U.S. side discussed in detail the live-sighting program and the proposed archival research program, assessed the 19th JFA and previewed the 20th, and emphasized the importance of investigating the 135 priority discrepancy cases. BG Needham noted that the number of unresolved live-sighting reports had been reduced from 119 in March 1992 to only 17, but remarked that it was important to adhere to the agreed upon live sighting mechanism. Among other issues, he also discussed CILHI activities, the need for TACSAT communications approval, and electronic transfer of payments to the Vietcom Bank for advance payments and host nation reimbursements.

(U) The Vietnamese side noted the encouraging results of the last JFA, particularly the improved performance compared with the previous two JFAs. Mr. Phong took exception to interview techniques displayed by some U.S. investigators, and likened them to criminal interrogation. He also objected to medical treatment given to local residents by the U.S. teams, and recommended the teams distribute medicine through the VNOSMP or local medical authorities. Mr. Phong stated categorically that there were no Americans left alive in Vietnam as a result of the war, either

[162]USCINCPAC 052255Z Oct 92 (U).

living freely in the country or in detention, but given U.S. suspicions, Vietnam wanted to clear the issue and would like to improve the methods used. He noted that the increasing numbers of foreigners in Vietnam might generate a never ending series of live sighting reports.

(U) General Needham reported that this negotiation proceeded in an orderly fashion, with no major unforeseen obstacles. As in the previous technical meeting, the live sighting investiation program and the size and composition of the 20th JFA drew the most attention, but the Vietnamese seemed especially sensitive to the perception that they had reduced or stopped cooperating with the U.S. Responding to the U.S. demands for increased unilateral remains recovery efforts by the Vietnamese, they reported on a mission conducted in Lai Chau Province during the 19th JFA. This may have represented an effort to learn the U.S. position on unilateral efforts as they probably wanted to know if we desired this kind of effort and if we were willing to pay for them absent U.S. representation. According to General Needham, they clearly understood the subtle meaning behind the U.S. request for increased unilateral recoveries (i.e., warehoused remains), but had chosen to respond in an equally subtle fashion. The Vietnamese also claimed that since the end of the war, remains traders from the south had operated extensively in the north, and that U.S. teams which reached remote crash sites in what was North Vietnam had to compete with these unscrupulous elements. This situation could possibly be used to explain why they could not be held accountable for certain remains located in territory under their perpetual control, and why the remains, if recovered, might show signs of preservation and storage.

(U) The final round of technical level talks was held in Hanoi 9-10 December 1992. MG Needham again headed the U.S. team, accompanied by COL Cole and Mr. Hutchinson from DIA/STONY BEACH; LTC Webb, CILHI; and LTC Donovan and SSgt Newell of Det 2; Mr.

Bell, LTC Frederikson, and MAJ MacRae of JTF-FA; and Capt Joseph W. Philipp, USAF, USCINCPAC/J66. The Vietnamese side was headed by Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, MFA, who chaired the meeting, and included five members of VNOSMP, the Director of the PAVN Forensic Institute, and representatives from MND and MOI.[163]

(U) General Needham opened the talks with a discussion of archival research. He told the Vietnamese that their decision to make documentary evidence from various repositories available to U.S. researchers was a dramatic development in the joint POW/MIA endeavor, and pointed out that it had received wide coverage and comment throughout the United States. He requested that joint field investigation teams also be given access to any records which might be of assistance in their investigations. The general then stressed the need to resolve live sighting reports, and expressed appreciation for Vietnamese cooperation in this regard. He explained that the U.S. wanted to achieve a thorough and credible investigation of every plausible case, an investigation which would bear the scrutiny of the American public. He also reviewed the 20th JFA, previewed the 21st JFA, scheduled for 2-16 January 1993, and discussed unilateral return of remains, CILHI activities, and trilateral and border operations. He concluded with discussion of other issues such as completion of work on the Hanoi office facility, status of the request for approval of TACSAT communications equipment,and arrangements for multiple-entry visas. He closed with an expression of appreciation for the efforts of the Vietnamese.

(U) Mr. Phong informed the U.S. side that Mr. Le Bang would be the new Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations, and that his government had started a mass media campaign on 5 December to recover remains from the local populace. Additional details on the Vietnamese plan to get their citizens to turn in remains were presented the following day, and they wanted to ensure the U.S.

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[163]CJTF-FA Det One 111243Z Dec 92 (U).

understood that their offers to reimburse their citizens for all reasonable expenses incurred while recovering remains did not constitute buying or paying reward money for them. They denied again that they were storing remains. The Vietnamese responded favorably to the live sighting issue, and agreed to Mr. Hutchison investi-gating four to five new live sighting cases before his departure from Vietnam on 20 December. Mr. Phong said that the archival research effort was on track with sound guidelines and procedures established. The Vietnamese government had not approved the U.S. plan to use satellite communications to support the research teams, but preferred to use their own commercial communications assets to provide communications links for the IMS project. In closing, Mr. Phong requested the U.S. conduct bilateral meetings first, then present its concerns to them, and requested some immediate medical help to battle malaria, specifically chemicals, sprayers, and small trucks to dispense the spray.

(U) General Needham commented that the meetings were conducted in a cordial and professional manner. Issues were quickly resolved and all requests concerning the 21st JFA were approved.

Joint Field Activities (JFA)

(U) The 16th iteration, the last to be known by that designation and the first of six planned for CY 92, was conducted from 20 February to 20 March. Two teams investigated discrepancy cases in Song Be Province and the Thu Duc District in Ho Chi Minh City, and a recovery team excavated a site in Cuu Long Province. No remains were found by the recovery team. One team member medically evacuated for blood pressure problems arrived in Hawaii on 7 March in stable condition.[164]

[164]USCINCPAC 140215Z Mar 92 (U).

(U) The 17th JFA took place in Vietnam from 20 April to 20 May, with a total of 58 U.S. personnel deployed. Three joint investigation teams investigated 70 cases, including 11 primary focus cases and 59 other losses in geographic proximity. Two recovery teams excavated eight sites, including six of nine planned primary focus recoveries and two opportune recoveries. In all, 12 sets of remains were recovered, eight of which showed potential for identification. Identification of the remaining four remains was unlikely.[165]

- Investigation Team One investigated 34 cases. Remains were recovered from three sites, and unidentified human remains were recovered from another site near the village of Thuong Trach. Material evidence was recovered from five sites and the Thuong Trach site.
- Investigation Team Two surveyed three aircraft crash sites and the site of a ground incident, and interviewed witnesses to the loss of a helicopter. In all, the team investigated 10 cases, and recovered material evidence concerning two cases.
- Investigation Team Three investigated a total of 27 cases. Remains were recovered from three sites, and material evidence from two others.
- Recovery Team One excavated four sites, and recovered a tooth and material evidence from one.
- Recovery Team Two excavated four sites, and recovered remains and material evidence from two.

(U) On 13 May, Investigation Team Three was involved in an incident in Tien Lanh village, Tien Phuoc District, approximately 100 kilometers (km) south of Danang. Four U.S. members of the team, accompanied by their Vietnamese counterparts, was led by a source to a crash site to retrieve remains allegedly stored there. After leaving their two jeeps at the end of a rough logging road, the team crossed the 300-meter-wide Thanh River via a

[165]CDR JTF-FA 212230Z May 92 (U).

fisherman's boat and traveled on foot for 16 km over mountains to reach the crash site. Once at the site, the source declared the remains were actually at the original starting point. As darkness was approaching, the team hastened to return to their vehicles, and upon reaching the Thanh River discovered that the fisherman had departed. They swam the river fighting a very fast current, and one Vietnamese team member was nearly swept away. While driving back down the same logging road, they were halted by large boulders which had been placed across the road. They removed the rocks and continued on, only to encounter a freshly felled tree blocking the road. The team cut the tree into sections with two machetes, pulled the sections aside, and proceeded on their way. A short time later, they encountered a second freshly felled tree, and as they stopped approximately 15 to 20 bandits appeared from the jungle. They were carrying knives and machetes, and one was armed with an SKS carbine. They demanded the team pay a fee of $1,000 for using the road and threatened to dynamite the road if the convoy attempted to drive through. After negotiations, the Vietnamese paid a large amount of Đong together with an IOU for the balance. One bandit on a motorcycle led the way back, and stopped three times to recover objects from beneath the surface of the road. The team arrived back at Tien Lanh at 2130 hours without further incident. The source went to retrieve the remains, but was informed that another villager had taken the remains and fled the area. The VNOSMP notified the local police, who reportedly arrested the bandit leader and several of his men.[166]

(U) The 18th JFA took place from 19 June to 19 July. A total of 50 U.S. personnel took part in investigations, surveys, and recoveries in Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Phu Yen, and Binh Dinh Provinces. Three joint teams investigated nine priority discrepancy cases and 28 other proximity cases. Two recovery teams

[166]CJTF-FA Det One 030827Z Jun 92 (U).

excavated five sites with negative results, and two sites required further work.[167]

- Investigation Team One did not recover or receive any remains, but the team was active in Quang Binh Province with witness interviews, site surveys, and site investigations. They recovered some aircraft from several crash sites, and crew-related articles from two sites.
- Investigation Team Two operated in Quang Tri Province, and recovered remains from four sites involving three aircraft crash sites and one ground loss. They also conducted witness interviews, and surveyed and investigated a number of sites.
- Investigation Team Three traveled to Phu Yen Province, and recovered or received remains associated with four specific cases and three remains not associated with any specific case.
- Both recovery teams deployed to sites in Quang Binh Province and excavated five aircraft crash sites, but failed to recover any remains. However, a witness turned over remains allegedly recovered from an F-4B crash site.

(U) During this JFA, two members of Investigation Team One were involved in an incident in a district headquarters in Quang Binh Province. One member took some photographs, the subject of one of which was another team member standing in front of a larger-than-life picture of Ho Chi Minh. A VNOSMP officer with the team took the camera and seized the film, informing the team members that they had done something inappropriate. Team One reported the incident to the commander of Det Two in Hanoi, and informed him they did not consider the incident serious and were continuing activities while working to resolve the misunderstanding. On 9 July, the VNOSMP Director formally informed the Det Two commander that the Vietnamese wanted the two team members

[167]USCINCPAC 250101Z Jul 92 (U).

to leave the country as soon as possible and not to return. They departed Danang via C-130 on 10 July. He also made it very evident the Vietnamese expected a formal apology. After clearing the text with USCINCPAC, General Needham wrote an appropriate letter, through Mr. Le Bang, Director of the Americas Department, MFA, to the governor of Quang Binh Province and expressed regret that the province officials were offended.[168]

(U) Conducted between 20 August and 18 September 1992, the 19th JFA included four U.S. investigation teams and one recovery team. A total of 72 cases were investigated, including 20 priority discrepancy cases.[169]

- Investigation Team One investigated eight aircraft crash sites in Nghe An Province without recovering any remains, and received one skull fragment allegedly related to the loss of an F-4C. The team then traveled to Ha Tinh Province and investigated another five cases, and received additonal information related to the loss of an A-1H.
- Investigation Team Two operated in Thua Thien-Hue Pro-vince, and investigated 12 cases—three ground incidents and nine aircraft losses. They also excavated a grave site allegedly related to the loss of AH-1G without results, and received remains possibly related to an F-4D loss.
- Investigation Team Three deployed to Quang Ngai Province. They investigated nine cases, including one boat loss, four ground incidents, and four aircraft crashes.
- Investigation Team Four in Dong Nai Province investigated 10 cases. Six of the cases were ground incidents, two involved motor vehicles, one a boat, and one aircraft loss. They recovered remains possibly correplated to an OV-10 loss, and during a related interview received a number of remains assessed as Mongoloid.

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[168]USCINCPAC 182000Z and 272125Z Jul 92 (U).
[169]USCINCPAC 0335Z Sep 92 (U).

• The Recovery Team began excavation of an A-6A crash site in Quang Binh Province, and after finding a partial anti-gravity suit zipper uncovered an unexploded Mk 82 500-pound bomb. They stopped the excavation, and rescheduled the site for further work after the Vietnamese EOD had the bomb removed. The VNOSMP reported the bomb exploded on 12 Sep-tember. The team then excavated two F-4C crash sites in Quang Binh, and recovered small bones and life support equipment.

(U) During the JFA, two investigation team members lost or had money stolen from them. In Binh Thuan Province, one team member lost $600 of his per diem and mission funds while sight-seeing, and in Ho Chi Minh City a second team member had his military identification card, a credit card, and $100 in cash stolen from a wrap-around pouch he was wearing when he stopped to speak briefly to a group of children. Of more operational concern, on 4 September Mr. Nguyen The Dang, the Vietnamese team chief, instructed Team Four not to use the global positioning system (GPS) at any province or district headquarters or military installation.[170]

(U) Conducted from 21 October to 18 November 1992, the 20th JFA investigated 25 priority discrepancy cases, 24 geographic proximity cases, and 7 unscheduled cases. The U.S. element consisted of 63 team members comprising four investigation and two recovery teams.[171]

• Investigation Team One started operations in Lang Son Province, where they investigated three cases, and then moved to Bac Thai Province. There, they investigated one case, visited the local museum and hospital, and interviewed four witnesses concerning another case. After finishing their work in Bac Thai, they moved to Hai Phong Province and conducted four investiga-

[170]USCINCPAC 260245Z Sep 92 (U).
[171]USCINCPAC 210530Z Nov 92 (U).

tions of aircraft loss cases. They completed the JFA in Hoa Binh Province, and investigated two additional cases, interviewed witnesses, and visited one crash site.

- Investigation Team Two deployed to Dac Lac Province, and investigated a total of seven cases. These included five ground incidents and two aircraft losses. Interview of six witnesses revealed additional information about one discrepancy loss, and an attempted aerial reconnaissance of the associated crash site was aborted because of poor weather. The team received five remains, but the CILHI anthropologist determined that four were Southeast Asian Mongoloid and returned them to the source. The fifth set was retained for examination by the Joint Forensic Team.

- Investigation Team Three operated in Song Be Province, and investigated 25 cases, including 14 ground incidents, 9 aircraft loss, and 2 boat incidents. The team found wreckage associated with the loss of an F-4C, and recommended the site for recovery. They also visited the Military Region 7 museum, but found no pertinent information.

- Investigation Team Four investigated 12 cases in Tay Ninh and Lam Dong Provinces and Ho Chi Minh City, including 10 ground incidents, one aircraft loss, and one boat incident. The team also visited the former site of the Headquarters Central Office for South Vietnam and the former site of the B-20 prison camp, and interviewed two witnesses who worked at the C-53 prison camp on the Cambodian border. They received three sets of remains from an individual who claimed he recovered them in Song Be Province in 1985 after burying them himself in 1972.

- Recovery Team One worked on two cases in Son La Province. During the attempted recovery of one case which involved the loss of a C-130E with 11 unaccounted for, villagers displayed eight sets of remains allegedly associated with the case. The team also excavated the site of an F-4C crash, and recovered human remains and personal effects.

• Recovery Team Two deployed to Tra Vinh Province, excavated an OV-1C crash site and one ground incident site, and assessed two ground incident sites.

Repatriation of Remains from Hanoi

(U) The VNOSMP released remains to JTF-FA's Det 2 in Hanoi on three occasions during 1992. On 27 March, remains alleged to be of three Americans associated with the 1963 loss of a B-26 were turned over to a joint JTF-FA/CILHI repatriation team in Hanoi and flown to Hickam AFB for delivery to CILHI. The remains had been received in Kontum Province on 17 March. An appropriate ceremony was held upon their arrival in Hawaii at 0900 hours, 30 March. On 3 August, the Vietnamese turned over six boxes containing remains thought to be associated with seven cases which the Joint Forensic Team had selected for further examination were turned over to a repatriation team and flown to Hickam. The aircraft was delayed one day for maintenance in Guam, and the arrival ceremony was conducted on 5 August. On 16 December, the remains of possibly as many as 10 Americans associated with six cases selected by the Joint Forensic Team for further examination arrived at Hickam AFB, and after arrival honors were delivered to CILHI for analysis and possible identification. Mr. Roger Munson, National Commander, American Legion, and his ADC attended the arrival ceremony.[172]

Identification of Remains

(U) Remains repatriated from SEA were received by CILHI at Ft. Kamehameha, where they were thoroughly examined. During 1992, USCINCPAC announced that two remains had been identified, as follows:[173]

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[172]USCINCPAC PAO releases, 1992, on dates indicated; CDR JTF-FA 262301Z Mar 92 (U) and 062230Z Aug 92 (U); USCINCPAC 190425Z Dec 92 (U).
[173]USCINCPAC PAO releases, 1992, on dates indicated.

1. 10 Mar: Lt Col Howard K. Williams, USAF; lost 18 Mar 68 in NVN.

2. 18 Nov: GySgt Joseph F. Trujillo, USMC; lost 13 Sep 66 in SVN.

Trilateral POW/MIA Talks

(U) Trilateral talks with the Laotians and Vietnamese were held in December 1992 in Vientiane, but trilateral talks with the Cambodians and Vietnamese had been twice postponed when the subject was again raised by the State Department in February 1992. Despite USCINCPAC's proposal to hold the talks in April in Honolulu, the U.S., Cambodian, and Vietnamese delegations met in Phnom Penh on 6 March to discuss ways to resolve POW/MIA cases in the Vietnam/Cambodia border area. BG Needham, CJTF-FA, was the senior U.S. DOD representative.[174]

(U) The three countries agreed to the following procedures for investigating border cases:

- Vietnam would make available information derived from unilateral research of their wartime records to the Cambodians and the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi.
- Cambodia would conduct advance, unilateral visits to loss locations to follow-up on information contained in the narratives and that provided by the Vietnamese.
- Once the Cambodians completed their unilateral follow-up, joint teams would conduct an investigation. Afterwards, Cambodia would publicize the locations were the joint teams operated.
- By 16 March, the United States would propose a start date and relay other operational details for investigating 10 cases.

[174]SECSTATE 072691/072220Z Mar 92 (U).

(U) Vietnam agreed to consider a trilateral approach on a case-by-case basis if the Cambodians thought it necessary and invited them. The Cambodians preferred a bilateral approach since the loss sites were on their side of the border, and the U.S. side pointed out that resolution of these cases would likely require investigation on both sides of the border, and teams of Cambodian, Vietnamese, and American experts would facilitate cross-border movement. The leader of the Cambodian delegation pointed out that the subject of Vietnamese experts accompanying search teams inside Cambodia was a sensitive one for them, and that some in the country claimed that Vietnamese forces remained in Cambodia and the presence of Vietnamese technical experts "could be misunderstood."

(U) The Cambodians agreed to review case narratives and operational details and then decide whether Vietnamese experts should be attached. All agreed that American experts would be able to pursue leads on both sides of the border, and the Vietnamese noted that Vietnam and Cambodia had an agreement that allowed for individuals with passports to cross the border without visas. If Vietnamese officials wanted to cross the border into Cambodia with American officials, it was up to the Vietnamese.

(S) The possibility of another round of trilateral talks was raised in December with a joint State/Defense proposal to sponsor a deputy assistant secretary policy level conference in Washington in mid-January, to which Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would be invited. While the reaction from Vietiane was favorable, Phnom Penh did not feel that a trilateral meeting was warranted. The March 1992 meeting set out a framework for cooperation that had worked well and required no modification, and the State of Cambodia (SOC) was extremely cooperative and conducted excellent liaison with the SRV prior to JTF-FA operations. The only problem faced in Cambodia was lack of access to

areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge, which was an interanl Cambodian problem with no bearing on her neighbors.[175]

Foreign Delegation Visits to Hawaii

(U) CJTF-FA proposed visits to Hawaii by delegations from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to provide technical orientations to the delegates, review results of recent joint operations, and preview 1993 work plans. All three countries accepted for different dates, but their visits followed the same general pattern. During their stay in Hawaii, the delegations visited Camp Smith, where they received orientation briefings on USCINCPAC and JTF-FA, and Hickam AFB, where they were briefing and orientated on CILHI. One full day was devoted to operational talks at JTF-FA.[176]

(U) A five-member delegation from Laos visited USCINCPAC from 8 to 12 September 1992. The delegation was led by Mr. Done Somvorachit, Acting Director, Department Two, MFA, and included Mr. Bounthom Manibod and Mr. Lattana Thavonsouk from the MFA and CPT Onchan Chanthongsy and LT Khamkong Inthilath from MND. Mr. Done stated that the Lao government desired to provide assistance to obtain a full accounting for POW/MIAs, but that the delays in implementing the program had been due to technical problems (such as weather and lack of equipment and vehicles) and not politically driven. He also agreed in principle to the next JFA, and to discuss the 1993 work plan at the November technical meeting. Mr. Done also told MajGen Christmas that he would recommend to his government further consideration of the inclusion of Lao Americans in JTF-FA field teams, although he thought it would be difficult for the GOL to change their position on this issue.[177]

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[175]SECDEF 031348Z Dec 92 (U); AMEMB Vietiane 02853/080335Z Dec 92 (C); USMISSION Phnom Penh 03324/100446Z Dec 92 (C).
[176]USCINCPAC 270145Z Aug 92 (U).
[177]CJTF-FA 142300Z Sep 92 (U).

(U) A six-member delegation from the SOC visited USCINCPAC during the period 16 to 20 September 1992. They were led by Mr. Hor Namhong, Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and included General Sin Song, Minister of National Security (MNS); LTG Noun Sareth, Vice MNS and Chairman of the Interministerial POW/MIA Committee; Mr. Long Visalo, Vice MFA and Vice Chairman of the POW/MIA committee; Mr. Mao Chantara, Director, Penal Offense Office, MNS; and Mr. Meas Kim Heng, Deputy Director of the Press Department, MFA. The Cambodian visitors were apparently charmed by the warmth of the American reception, and Hor Namhong promised all-out cooperation from the SOC.[178]

(U) From 4 to 8 October 1992, a seven-member delegation from Vietnam visited USCINCPAC. The delegation was led by Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, Deputy Director, Americas Department, MFA, and included Mr. Ho Xuan Dich, Director, VNOSMP; Senior Colonel Tran Bien and LTC Pham Cong Khoi, MOD; MAJ Pham Dung, MOI; Mr. Nguyen Ba Dang, Internal Political Ministry; and Mr. Vo Viet Dung, MFA. They confirmed their commitment to the goal of completing the investigation of the 135 priority discrepancy cases by mid-January 1993, and pointed out that the SRV had made continuous efforts in the area of unilateral return of remains. He again stated that Vietnam was not warehousing remains.[179]

Lao People's Democratic Republic

Technical and Consultative Meetings

(U) The first meeting of the year between Lao and U.S. technical delegations was held in Vientiane on 1 June 1992 to review the increasing cooperation between the two nations on POW/MIA issues. DCM Frederick J. Vogel led the U.S. side, which included BG Needham, CJTF-FA; Mr. Sheetz, DIA-PW/MIA; COL Cole,

[178]J30/M Information Paper (U), 21 Oct 92, Subj: Overview of Foreign Delegation Visits.
[179]Ibid.; USCINCPAC 131900Z Oct 92 (U).

STONY BEACH; LTC Webb, CILHI; LTC Spohn and Mr. Gadoury from Det Three; and Mr. Bell and Maj MacRae from JTF-FA. The Laotian side was led by LTC Syphai Muneduang, MND, and included the visiting Lao Chargé d'Affaires to the United States Linthong Phetsavan and representatives from the MFA.[180]

(U) The meeting included a review of the results of joint investigations, surveys, and excavations since the last meeting in December 1991, and a discussion of the plans for search operations during the remainder of 1992. General Needham also extended an invitation for a Lao delegation to visit Hawaii (see above) and proposed a trilateral meeting with Vietnam. Also discussed was the proposed 1993 work plan. The U.S. side expressed disappointment that not all the sites listed in the agreed workplan submitted at the last technical meeting could be investigated.

(U) The next meeting and final one for the year was held in Vientiane 20-21 November 1992. Purposes of the meeting were to review results of the past year of joint POW/MIA field activities, review the workplan for the remainder of the fiscal year, and address various issues of concern to the conduct of the joint efforts. Ambassador Charles Salmon led the U.S. delegation, assisted by DCM Vogel, while MG Needham and the usual cast of players attended. Mr. Done Somvorachit led the Lao side, which included LTC Meksouvanh Noiphieuphan, the Lao team chief, and others from MFA.[181]

(U) MG Needham presented the technical portion of the discussions for the U.S. side, and after reviewing the field events conducted in 1992 turned to U.S. concerns regarding the delays in getting the JFAs started as agreed upon, cutbacks in team personnel, and team chiefs' lack of authority to exploit targets of

[180]AMEMB Vientiane 01246/020711Z Jun 92 (U).
[181]AMEMB Vientiane 02735/211300Z Nov 92 (U).

opportunity. He also covered, inter alia, the adjusted 1993 work plan, the need for greater access to sites, the pending decision on a full-time LSI assigned to the JTF-FA office in Vientiane, and the proposal for a historical research project.

(U) Mr. Done began his response with a request for humanitarian assistance, specifically Admiral Larson's promise to build another school before the end of the year. He also had concerns in the areas of vehicle maintenance, computer training for the Lao team, communications between MFA and the field team, health checks and payment for Lao medical expenses, and field equipment matters. Mr. Done announced that the December JFA dates would not be a problem, and that the government had approved one Lao-American to join the field team.

(U) Ambassador Salmon believed that recent meetings with the Lao, including the November technical meeting, pointed to a continuing improvement in cooperation. He also emphasized the importance the Lao placed on Title Ten projects in Laos, and recommended full consideration be given to the small school buildings and a small irrigation project they had requested.

Lao-American Participation

(U) On the afternoon of 2 July 1992, LTC Spohn was informed that Vice Minister Soubanh had not approved three people with Laotian surnames for a pending operation, and asked that the U.S. reduce the size of its team to ten. When pressed for an explanation, the reason given was that he (Soubanh) felt it was not the appropriate time. USCINCPAC considered the Lao action to be totally unacceptable, noted that neither Vietnam nor Cambodia had placed restrictions on JTF-FA employment of Americans of Vietnamese or Cambodian origin, and requested the Joint Staff raise the issue with the appropriate Washington agencies. USCINCPAC's

initial comments were couched in terms of what the decision meant as an affront to U.S. democratic values.[182]

(C) After newly installed Ambassador Salmon protested the Lao position, the Lao showed no inclination to reconsider their ban on Southeast Asian Americans. USCINCPAC again requested a strong initiative from DOS to emphasize to the Laotians the critical operational impact of their decision. JTF-FA was authorized ten Lao linguists, eight of whom were Americans of Southeast Asian ancestry, the other two being nonethnic speakers. JTF-FA had recently gained approval to field two teams simultaneously for operations planned for October 1992 and beyond, and each team required a minimum of two Lao-speaking members. The National Security Agency (NSA) had one military and one civilian Lao-speaking cryptologic linquist assigned, working on mission essential tasks which contributed to the JTF-FA mission. If the ban was not lifted, JTF-FA was faced with a Hobson's choice of either diverting the total SIGINT Lao-speaking capability to JTF-FA or conducting operations sequentially rather than simultaneously. Either way, Lao policy was adversely affecting the ability of JTF-FA to conduct operations in Laos. As discussed above, the policy was eased in time for the December operation.[183]

Symbol Investigation

(U) On 24 April 1992, a delegation of the Senate Select Committee on the POW/MIA Issue arrived in Vientiane for a brief visit to Laos. The delegation consisted of four U.S. Senators—John F. Kerry (D-MA), Robert Smith (R-NH), Hank Brown (R-CO), and Charles Grassley (R-IA)—accompanied by a number of staffers and an escort officer, and was designated CODEL Kerry/Smith. They met with MFA Vice Minister Soubanh Srithirath on the 24th, and the following day were transported by helicopter to the villages

[182]AMEMB Vientiane 01517/021017Z Jul 92 (U); USCINCPAC 100135Z Jul 92 (U).
[183]AMEMB Vientiane 01835/060810Z Aug 92 (C); USCINCPAC 221200Z Aug 92 (C).

of Vieng Xai, the site of recent excavations, and Xam Nua. The delegation was accompanied on the trip by a member of JTF-FA's Det Three.[184]

(~~S/NF~~) While preparing to depart Vieng Xai, Senator Kerry requested and received permission from the governor of Xam Nua to overfly an area of interest on the way to Xam Nua. The area of interest was the location of symbols sculpted in a rice paddy in 1988, which had received considerable interest in the United States, but this was not made known to the Laotians. After locating the paddy site, the helicopter with Senator Kerry aboard landed, and the senator spent approximately 25 minutes on the ground talking to several villagers through the Det Three representative. None of the persons talked to professed any knowledge of the symbols. The party then reboarded their aircraft and flew to Xam Nua to rejoin the other two helicopters in the party.

(~~S~~) On 28 April, the GOL in the person of MFA Acting Director of Department Two Done Somvorachit registered its displeasure to Chargé Salmon over the diversion of the CODEL Kerry/Smith flight to the purported POW/MIA site near Xam Nua. Done emphasized that the flight had not been authorized in advance, and demonstrated arrogance and insincerity on the part of the United States. He considered the JTF-FA representative who had accompanied the two senators to be responsible, and suggested he be replaced by another "more suitable" representative.[185]

(~~S~~) The chargé responded that the CODEL visit had been a strong success, and that the Lao were taking a minor incident and twisting it out of context. He pointed out that the province governor had authorized the fly-over, and that a Lao Army major was copilot of the helicopter, and added that the Lao reaction

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[184]USDAO Bangkok 20375/281009Z Apr 92 (~~S~~).
[185]AMEMB Vientiane 00992/280852Z Apr 92 (~~C~~).

would be interpreted in Washington as an excuse by hard-liners in the GOL to raise obstacles to improving Lao-U.S. relations and cooperation. He also urged the GOL to reconsider their position and instruct their chargé in Washington to discuss the issue with the CODEL staff to obtain a more balanced understanding of what happened.

(C) In Washington, the Lao Chargé reiterated the GOL's displeasure with the unauthorized diversion of CODEL Kerry's flight, and repeated Mr. Done's comments that the diversion was dangerous and demonstrated a lack of respect for Lao sovereignty. He added that his government was surprised that the U.S. Chargé considered the incident minor, and that the Done-Salmon meeting was not helpful in resolving the matter. At the end of the discussion, the Lao Chargé stressed that the GOL would not let this incident affect POW/MIA cooperation or the overall bilateral relationship.[186]

(U) With permission and cooperation of the GOL, the 1988 symbols were investigated in November 1992. A joint investigation team composed of three Americans and two Laotians traveled via helicopter to Xam Nua, Houaphan Province, on 29 November. On arrival, they met with local officials and briefed them on their proposed activities. Accompanied by four district officials, the team traveled by school bus to a site near where the symbols had been photographed in 1988. They located the distinctive shaped rice paddy that once contained the symbol, photographed and video-taped the area, and talked to a Hmong passer-by, who told them the owner of the field lived in Ban Houei Hin Dam.[187]

(U) The following day, the team flew to the symbol site, photographing and video-taping the surrounding area enroute. Interviews of local villagers confirmed the name and residence of

[186]SECSTATE 137590/302225Z Apr 92 (C).
[187]CJTF-FA 021730Z Dec 92 (U).

the owner of the field. The team then flew to Ban Houei Hin Dam, where they met and interviewed Mr. Chong Ngia. After first denying any knowledge of strangers visiting his fields or a symbol in the paddy, he became animated when shown a copy of the USA symbol. He explained that about four years before, his sons had copied the letters "USA" from an envelope that he had received from the United States. An envelope with a Saint Paul, MN, return address similar to the one he had was produced. Mr. Chong Ngia's oldest son said that his younger brother had copied the letters from an envelope he had found, and he (the oldest son) had liked them and decided to make them large in the rice field. He gathered arm loads of rice straw into the shapes of the letters and burned them at dusk. He also made an airplane and a dragon's head the same way, all within a few days of each other. When asked to draw what he had done, he made a USA, a stick airplane, and another symbol he called a dragon's head. (The stick airplane could have been interpreted as a modified letter K, the other symbol photographed in 1988.) Mr. Chong Ngai produced two envelopes, with Wausau, WI, and Westminster, CO, return addresses, and photographs of the relatives who sent the letters now living in the United States. The results of the investigation were briefed to the Senate Select Committee in December 1992.[188]

Joint Field Activities

(U) JFA 92-2L was conducted under JCRC, and was highlighted by the excavation of two grave sites in Xiangkhoang Province 18-21 January. The joint team recovered minimal remains from one site, nothing from the second. Excavation of a third site was planned, but cancelled because no witness was available. The U.S. team redeployed to Bangkok on 25 January after being delayed one day due to aircraft maintenance.[189]

[188]Ibid.; DIA 212015Z Dec 92 (U).
[189]CJTF-FA 281800Z Jan 92 (U).

(U) The second JFA in Laos, JFA 92-3L, was conducted from 14 to 23 February 1992, in Savannakhet Province. During the eight days in the field, the team excavated one F-100D crash site and surveyed and investigated three other aircraft crash sites. Pieces of aircraft wreckage and unidentified personal items were recovered, but no remains. The 23 teams members arrived in Bangkok on the 23rd, and returned to Hickam AFB on 27 February.[190]

(U) A 16-person Investigation and Recovery Team (IRT) departed Hawaii on 21 March to conduct JFA 92-4L. They began work in Houaphan Province on the 28th, and completed operations on 6 April 1992. They discovered probable human remains associated with the 1966 loss of an A-1E (the excavation site visited in April by CODEL Kerry/Smith), excavated two graves and surveyed two additional grave sites and a crash site. They were not allowed to visit Phou Pha Thi, site of a 1968 ground incident involving 11 unaccounted for persons, because of lack of provincial government approval and time constraints. The physician on the team treated approximately 350 Lao villagers. The team returned to Bangkok on 10 April, and to Hawaii on the 12th.[191]

(U) JFA 92-5L was conducted in Savannakhet Province from 26 May to 15 June 1992. The starting date was nearly three weeks later than the proposed start date. Based on what appeared to be a firm start date of 20 May, the 19-member JTF-FA contingent departed Hawaii via commercial air on 16 May, and was quartered in Pattaya, Thailand, until the 26th. The team investigated one case, surveyed five crash sites, and accomplished the partial recovery of an OP-2E crash site involving nine unaccounted for persons. Adverse weather hampered the teams operations during the JFA. The team returned to Bankgok on 16 June, and to Hawaii on the 19th.[192]

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[190]CJTF-FA 272002Z Feb 92 (U).
[191]USCINCPAC 110220Z Apr 92 (U).
[192]USCINCPAC 262055Z Jun 92 (U).

(U) The fifth JFA under the 1992 work plan was designated 92-6L, and was conducted 10-20 July in Savannakhet Province. A total of 10 U.S. personnel were on the joint team. The IRT excavated one grave site, surveyed five crash sites, and investigated three cases. No remains or personal effects were found at the excavated site, but plans were made for an expanded team to return in October and excavate a larger area.[193]

(U) JFA 92-7L was also conducted in Savannakhet Province, 22-30 August 1992. The team departed Hawaii for Bangkok on 18 August, and arrived in Savannakhet on the 22d. They focused on investigation and survey of nine aircraft crash sites, including several associated with multiple unaccounted for persons. During the operation, the team encountered Claymore mines, grenades, 90mm recoilless rifle rounds, 40mm grenades, and 60mm mortar rounds. They also encountered adverse weather, with rain starting at night and continuing until mid-morning, with clear weather until about 1500 hours when thunderstorms began. The team physician, in cooperation with the Xepon District resident physician, treated approximately 150 patients. During the operation, the Vietnamese government filed a complaint with the Xepon District office that the Lao Army Mi-8 helicopter supporting the team had violated Vietnamese airspace.[194]

(U) Members of JFA 93-1L arrived in Bangkok on the night of 18/19 October, and traveled to Pattaya to make final preparations. They arrived in Savannakhet on 23 October, and continued the excavation of the OP-2E crash site begun during JFA 92-5L, but terminated excavation prior to completion. Between 24 October and 17 November, they recovered thousands of pieces of wreckage, 368 bone fragments, 4 teeth, 10 portions of teeth, and dozens of personal effects. Another two to three weeks of additional work was needed to complete excavation. They also

[193]USCINCPAC 250101Z Jul 92 (U).
[194]USCINCPAC 291945Z Aug 92 (U) and 050405Z Sep 92 (U).

investigated and surveyed another eight cases in the province, including six priority discrepancy cases (five aircraft losses and one ground incident), and one geographic proximity case. In Xekong Province the team surveyed one EC-47Q crash site associated with seven unaccounted for persons. The team redeployed to Thailand on 19 November, and returned to Hawaii on the 22nd.[195]

(U) The final JFA in Laos during 1992 was JFA 93-2L, which was conducted 4-17 December, and began with arrival of the U.S. team in Savannakhet Province on the 4th. The team continued excavation of the OP-2E crash site, and started investigation of a C-46 crash site associated with four unaccounted for persons. Bone fragments, personal effects, and aircraft wreckage was recovered from the OP-2E site, but no evidence or remains at the C-46 site. This operation was the first with an ethnic Laotian-American interpreter, and the team reported that Lao cooperation was the best to date.[196]

Cambodia

Meetings and Talks

(U) On 4 February 1992, U.S. representatives met with the Combodian Interministerial POW-MIA Committee in Phnom Penh. The U.S. delegation was led by MajGen G. R. Christmas, USCINCPAC/ J3, and included BG Needham, CJTF-FA, and the U.S. Chief of Mission (COM) Charles H. Twining. Major points of discussion were the establishment of a JTF-FA detachment in Phnom Penh, the use of U.S. helicopters during an investigation scheduled to begin on 20 February, and a U.S. proposal for trilateral meetings in late February. The POW-MIA Committee welcomed the establishment of the JTF detachment, had not received a response from the Council of Ministers on the use of helicopters, and felt that the timing

[195]USCINCPAC 070101Z and 210530Z Nov 92 (U)
[196]USCINCPAC 112340Z and 290320Z Dec 92 (U).

and location of the proposed trilateral meetings were inappropriate and the meetings should be postponed.[197]

(U) The Cambodians, represented by Vice Minister Long Visalo, expressed readiness to cooperate on a broad basis to accomplish whatever was necessary to solve the POW/MIA problem. He noted that the establishment of the U.S. Mission in Phnom Penh was a major factor in facilitating the close cooperation seen during late 1991 and early 1992, and welcomed the JTF-FA detachment. He added that the committee was comfortable with its American friends and eager to exchange views, and to that end had established a four-man working group with himself as chairman to deal on a day-to-day basis with the U.S. Mission on POW/MIA matters. He also noted three difficulties to be faced. First, that the committee was composed of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior, all of whom had other duties which prevented the POW-MIA Committee from dedicating sufficient time to working meetings. The second difficulty was the lack of technical expertise necessary to identify remains, which had led the committee to be deceived by unscrupulous persons who had presented bogus remains. The third difficulty was the presence of rewards pamphlets and posters originating from private American groups advertising rewards for either remains or live prisoners, and the belief of some Cambodians, perhaps created by a 1990 Voice of America broadcast, that the U.S. government might purchase remains. As a result of that belief, Cambodians aware of the locations of gravesites had excavated remains before the government could react.

(U) Technical talks between U.S. and Cambodian POW/MIA representatives were held in Phnom Penh on 3 August to address various issues bearing on the conduct of joint POW/MIA efforts. The meeting was chaired by MG Noun Sareth, Vice Minister of National Security, and the U.S. team was led by DCM James Bruno

[197]SECSTATE 043829/120605Z Feb 92 (U).

with BG Needham acting as the chief technical representative. The U.S. side discussed JFA proposed through June 1993 and technical issues, while the SOC side commented on the Robertson-Stevens-Lundy photograph and issues related to remains handling and identification.[198]

(U) Mr. Long Visalo expressed concern over doubt generated by the photograph which the SOC discovered in the Khmer edition of Soviet Union Magazine, and regretted the potential for misunderstanding between the American and Cambodian people caused by the controversy. As the Soviet Agency Novosti originally provided the materials, he suggested that researchers contact the U.S.-Russian MIA Commission for further information. SOC also accepted the idea of working with the Vietnamese to resolve cases in the border issue, but the U.S. side remained unclear whether they understood that Vietnam wanted Cambodia to initiate contact. As mentioned above, the trilateral talks were held in Phnom Penh on 6 and 7 March 1992.

(U) Technical issues discussed by BG Needham included, inter alia, the importance of advanced preparations, the need for site preservation, the issue of trilateral cooperation in border cases, and live sighting issues. He also discussed the forensic issues associated with Case 1626, a ground incident which involved an American and one French and three Japanese newsmen. Four remains were recovered in March, but by August only one had been identified—the remains of the French civilian—had been identified, but CILHI was confident it could identify two Mongolian remains recovered from the grave site. BG Needham offered to return the remains of the French reporter alone or, if desired, with the remains of the two Japanese when identified.

[198]USMISSION Phnom Penh 01910/040937Z Aug 92 (U).

Joint Field Activities

(U) The first JFA for the year and the second in Cambodia, JFA 92-2C, was conducted from 27 February to 23 March 1992. On 14 February, the Cambodian Interministerial Committee approved a U.S. request to use U.S. helicopters and crews to support the operation, although they only approved one helicopter instead of the two requested. As the Army Aviation unit tasked to provide the helicopters preferred to use two aircraft for reliability, security, and safety reasons, BG Needham sought and successfully coordinated SOC acceptance of two helicopters during a 25 February visit to Phnom Penh. The two UH-60 BLACKHAWK aircraft from the 25th Aviation Battalion (25 Avn Bn), 25th Infantry Division (Light) (25 ID(L)) were airlifted by C-5 to Phnom Penh on the 26th. Post-flight inspection revealed structural cracks in one helicopter which rendered it non-mission capable, and contingency coordination to provide an additional aircraft if required was accomplished. The beginning of the JFA on 27 February marked the first employment of U.S. helicopters in Southeast Asia POW/MIA operations since 1973.[199]

(U) The JRT deployed to Cambodia conducted investigations of three suspected grave sites in Kampong Speu Province, investigated alleged graves associated with the 1975 MAYAGUEZ incident on Tang Island (Koh Tang) and alleged graves in Kandal Province, and excavated a grave in Kompong Thum Province. Site preparation in Kampong Speu took longer than expected because of the large volume of water that had to be pumped, but no remains were found. However, three long bones were recovered from Tang Island. Joint operations concluded on 12 March, but resumed on 14 March at Case 1626, the one American newsman and four FN reporters/cameramen mentioned above. After a media representative informed Det Four on 13 March that local residents had found remains near the excavation site, an eight-person team deployed from Bangkok and

[199]CJTF-FA 202000Z and 272002Z Feb 92 (U); USCINCPAC 140215Z Mar 92 (U).

reopened the site. Four remains and a tooth were recovered, and the team concluded its work on the 24th.[200]

(U) JFA 92-3C was conducted in Kampong Cham Province near the Vietnam/Cambodia border in areas controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war. An 11-member search team arrived in Phnom Penh on 14 April, along with two UH-60 helicopters and a 24-person aviation support detachment from the 25 ID(L). Cambodian authorities permitted simultaneous employment of both helicopters. On 20 April, one UH-60 overflew Vietnamese airspace briefly, but no Vietnamese reaction was noted. The team investigated three cases in the province, and excavated a burial site. At least 20 remains, weighing approximately 100 pounds, were recovered from the site, but subsequent examination by the CILHI anthropologist identified them as Mongoloid. Excavation of an aircraft crash site was completed on 23 April, with negative results. The team completed operations on 27 April, and departed for Thailand on the 29th.[201]

(U) Conducted 10-26 June 1992, JFA 92-4C was the third JFA in Cambodia conducted during the year. An 18-member IRT departed Hawaii for Bangkok on 7 June via commercial air, and deployed from U'Tapao, Thailand, to Phnom Penh on 10 June. It was supported by a 30-man aviation support detachment from the 1st Marine Air Wing (1 MAW), stationed at Futenma MCAS, Okinawa, with two CH-46 helicopters. The detachment was airlifted to Thailand by C-5, and the helicopters self-deployed to Phnom Penh. Operations commenced on 10 June, and the team investigated two cases and excavated two others, recovering 53 bone fragments and numerous pieces of wreckage from an OH-6A crash site. The Khmer Rouge prevented access to five case sites. In conjunction with the OH-6A excavation, the team's flight surgeon treated a total of 320 local villagers. The team recovered to U'Tapao on 26 and

[200]USCINCPAC 210420Z Mar 92 (U); CJTF-FA 262301Z Mar 92 (U).
[201]CJTF-FA 162301Z Apr 92 (U) and 011900Z May 92 (U); USCINCPAC 250540Z Apr 92 (U).

27 June, and returned to Hawaii on 1 July. The aviation support detachment returned to Futenma MCAS via C-5 on 29 June.[202]

(U) JFA 93-1C was conducted in Kracheh and Kampong Cham Provinces, 3-24 October 1992. The IRT arrived in Bangkok from Hawaii on 29 September, while the USMC aviation support detachment arrived at U'Tapao on the 28th with two CH-46 helicopters. Deployment of the entire team to Phnom Penh took place on 2 and 3 October, and operations commenced on 7 October in Kampong Cham Province. The team investigated one priority discrepancy case and five geographic proximity cases in Kampong Cham Province, and attempted to investigate four others, but Khmer Rouge activity prevented access to the areas associated with those four cases. Operations in Kracheh Province began on 12 October, and three priority discrepancy cases and eight geographic proximity cases were investigated. Two additional cases could not be investigated because of Khmer Rouge activity, and a third because a suitable helicopter landing site could not be found.[203]

(U) During the investigation of an OH-58A crash site, LTG Noun Saret permitted the IRT to proceed despite the death of a witness. This was the first time he allowed an investigation to continue without witnesses, and the general commented that he was surprised at the accuracy of the information and added that perhaps he should be more flexible on similar cases in the future. On 20 and 21 October, the IRT helicopters landed within 200 meters of the border with Vietnam, but no incidents were noted. Operations concluded on 24 October, the USMC aviation detachment returned to Thailand on the 27th, and the IRT redeployed on 28 October.

(U) The final JFA in Cambodia during the year was 93-2C, conducted from 3 to 18 December 1992. The IRT departed Hawaii

[202]CJTF-FA 182301Z Jun 92 (U); USCINCPAC 262055Z Jun 92 (U).
[203]CJTF-FA 222230Z Oct 92 (U); USCINCPAC 170220Z (U) and 310230Z (U) Oct 92.

via C-5 on 28 November, and arrived at U'Tapao on the 30th. They traveled with the IRT for JFA 93-2L destined for Laos, and were accompanied by an aviation support element from the 25 ID(L) with two UH-60 helicopters. Upon arrival in Phnom Penh on 4 December, the team received human remains from UNTAC personnel, but could not correlate the remains or information received from interviews with any specific case. The team then traveled to Tang Island, investigated four cases, and recovered one long leg bone, one arm bone, and a jaw fragment with two teeth. Four other cases were investigated in Prey Veng, Kracheh, and Kampot Provinces, and three were surveyed in Kandal, Kracheh, and Svay Rieng Provinces.[204]

(U) While returning to Phnom Penh from investigation of a case in Kracheh Province on 12 December, one helicopter made a forced landing in response to a fire warning light illumination. The aircraft landed near a village apparently held by the Khmer Rouge, as an armed man from the village ordered the passengers to depart the area immediately. About a dozen armed men appeared in the area, and the helicopter departed with no further incident. A suspected bullet hole was discovered in the fuselage of the second aircraft which had hovered nearby to render assistance, but no serious damage resulted. The investigations in Kracheh Province that day had been limited to one case, as LTG Noun Saret could not guarantee adequate security for two other cases the team wanted to investigate. The team received three sets of alleged American remains collected from three different provinces on 16 December, and departed for Thailand on 17 and 18 December. They returned to Hawaii via C-5 on 20 December.[205]

[204]USCINCPAC 290320Z Dec 92 (U).
[205]Ibid.; USCINCPAC 190425Z Dec 92 (U).

Remains of Civilian Journalists Returned to Cambodia

(U) LTG Harold T. Fields, Jr., USA, Deputy USCINCPAC, presided over a departure ceremony at Hickam AFB on 2 November marking the return of remains of three foreign newsmen identified by CILHI to Cambodia. Japanese Consul General Kensaku Hogen and French Deputy Consul General Charles Leguern also attended the ceremony. The remains had been recovered during JFA 92-2C in March 1992, and the three identified were:[206]

- Kojiro Sakai, CBS News, Japan
- Yoshihiko Waku, NBC News, Japan
- Roger Colne, NBC News, France

(U) The United States and the State of Cambodia conducted a joint remains repatriation ceremony at Pochentong Airport, Phnom Penh, on 6 November 1992. Lt Col Geraldson, Det Four commander, represented the United States, and COL Chea Socheat, Ministry of National Security (MNS), represented SOC. SOC turned the remains over to representatives of the two countries in ceremonies held on 9 November.

Return of Korean War Remains

(U) After a series of meetings and discussions between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Korean People's Army (KPA) at Panmunjom drawn out over four months, the two sides reached a "hand shake" deal on 1 May 1992 to repatriate 30 UNC war remains. The first repatriation ceremony in which 15 caskets with the remains of UNC soldiers and effects were passed was conducted at 1000 hours, 13 May, at the Military Demarcation Line in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. The KPA reported that the remains had been discovered in Nom-Jong-Gu, Suan County, North Hwang-Hae Province in October 1991. For the first time, the KPA used

[206]USCINCPAC 070101Z, 140447Z, and 210530Z Nov 92 (U).

military pallbearers to pass the remains, as pallbearers dressed in civilian clothes were used in the 1990 and 1991 repatriations. A second group of 15 remains was passed during similar ceremonies conducted on 28 May. Joint ceremonies were conducted at Hickam AFB upon arrival of the remains, and they were subsequently transferred to CILHI for processing and identification.[207]

Background on Agreement



[207]USCINCPAC 062255Z and 231950Z May 92 (U); CINCUNC 010830Z and 140830Z May 92 (U).
[208]CINCUNC 280700Z Oct 92 (S).



[209]Ibid.; AMEMB Seoul 05940/030836Z Jun 92 (S).





[210]See note above.

[211]CINCUNC 031014Z Dec 92 (~~S~~), info used was Confidential.



[212]CINCUNC 280700Z Oct 92 (~~S~~).

[213]CINCUNC 031014Z Dec 92 (~~S~~), info used was Confidential.



[214]Ibid.; CINCUNC 152254Z Dec 92 (S).

CHAPTER IV

LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS

USCINCPAC Title 10

(U) There were four spending categories utilized by USCINCPAC under the "Unified Commanders Conduct of Cooperative Programs with Friendly Nations," commonly known as the "Commander in Chief's (CINC's) Title 10 Program." The USCINCPAC Title 10 Program was funded through the U.S. Navy. The four categories were: Title 10, Section 401, Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (H/CA); Title 10, Section 1051, Personnel Expenses Authority for Developing Countries; Title 10, Section 2010, Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP); and Title 10, Section 2547, Humanitarian Assistance Program for Excess Property. USCINCPAC's total Title 10 expenditures for the first three categories during FY 92 was $2,958,995.*[1]

Title 10 Humanitarian/Civic Assistance

(U) During FY 92, USCINCPAC completed numerous Title 10 (Section 401) H/CA projects in 14 countries throughout the Command's area of responsibility. The FY 92 total of all expenditures for this program was $1,346,216. H/CA contributed to USCINCPAC's peacetime objective of cooperative engagement, in addition to providing training for the military participants.[2]

(U) Independent State of Western Samoa. Only one Title 10 H/CA project was completed in Western Samoa during FY 92. In an engineering readiness training repair project known as BAKER SABRE, 62 members of the 1138th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy), Missouri National Guard completed repairs to a school

*All dollar amounts are provided in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
[1]USCINCPAC 210200Z Dec 92 (U); USCINCPAC 312340Z Dec 92 (U); USCINCPAC 042300Z Jan 93 (U); J4132 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[2]USCINCPAC 042300Z Jan 93 (U).

house in Siumu, a concrete culvert in Malemalu, and a wooden bridge at Latofaga during the period 8 June-5 July 1992. The total cost of consumables for these projects was $61,014. This engineering exercise provided valuable mission essential training while conveying the U.S. commitment and concern for the people of Western Samoa.

(U) Kingdom of Tonga. Three separate projects were completed in Tonga during FY 92. The first was a BAKER TANGO maintenance exercise to repair a reverse osmosis water purification system plant constructed during Exercise BAKER TANGO in FY 90. After the original installation, design faults were noted by both the U.S. government and the equipment manufacturer's representative. The manufacturer agreed to perform some design modifications without charge, but additional repairs were necessary and were incorporated into the FY 92 BAKER TANGO exercise to restore system integrity. The repairs were completed by four soldiers from Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion during the period 9-21 January 1992 at a total cost of consumables of $2,500.

(U) The second project was completed 3-8 July 1992 by an embarked USN/USMC team from USS RACINE (LST 1191) composed of Seabees from Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) Seven and Marine engineers from the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as part of the RACINE's South Pacific Cruise Projects. Building and road repairs were completed in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, at both the Tonga Side School and the Kilisi Tonga College at a cost of $18,700.

(U) The final project in Tonga was completed in conjunction with Exercise TAFAKULA 92 and consisted of medical and dental civic action programs on Tongatapu and Vavau islands. Three doctors, one dentist, and eleven corpsmen from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade provided care, in conjunction with local civilian health care providers, to approximately 1,200 civilians

throughout the duration of the exercise. The total cost of U.S. consumables was $20,000. U.S. medical and dental technicians accrued training benefits while providing much needed care to the local civilian populace. Interaction among organizations, with the Government of Tonga, and with the local civilians fostered goodwill and friendly bilateral relations.

(U) Democratic Republic of Madagascar. There were two H/CA projects in Madagascar during FY 92. The first project was engineering readiness training exercise BAKER MASON II, which began on 19 May and ended on 12 July 1992. This involved the construction of a rudimentary rural road in Antananarivo, and included the placement of 10,000 meters of aggregate, a bridge, and 18 drainage culverts The road was completed by 12 members of the 84th Engineer Battalion at a cost of $152,224 for consumables and equipment rental. The combined exercise improved the engineering skills of the participating U.S. soldiers, and the new road provided a critical route serving the needs of 29 villages to transport crops to market.

(U) The second project in Madagascar was a medical readiness training exercise (MEDRETE), BAKER MIFANILA II. A 25-member-team from the 25th Infantry Division (Light) (ID(L)), Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC), and Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU)-Cairo participated in this project during the period 10-27 July 1992. This deployed team serviced 3,000 medical patients and 175 dental patients of which 60 percent were children. Assistance was increased and treatment was targeted to provide famine disaster relief to the southern part of the country around Tulear and Avobombe. In addition to the $28,780 FY 92 funds, an additional $23,100 worth of consumables was utilized from the canceled FY 91 BAKER MIFANILA II exercise.* This deployment provided valuable and timely real world training in an austere environment struck by famine.

* See the USCINCPAC Command History 1991 (S/FRD/NF/WN/NC), pp. 204-205.

(U) Republic of Kiribati. On 4-10 August 1992, a MEDRETE to Christmas Island was completed by ten members of the 725th Main Support Battalion, a pediatrician from Fort Lewis, Washington, a pediatric nurse from Fort Meade, Maryland, and a general practitioner from the 25th ID(L). The mission focused on pediatric and dental care, and was conducted in cooperation with local medical personnel. Treatment techniques, sanitation issues, and dental care were emphasized. Approximately 1,100 medical patients were treated and numerous tooth extraction's were completed at a total cost of consumables of $25,000.

(U) Papua New Guinea. As part of the RACINE South Pacific cruise projects, an embarked USN/USMC team composed of SEABEES from NMCB Seven, Marine engineers from the I MEF, and a Medical/Dental cell completed an H/CA project in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, during the period 28-31 July 1992. Repairs and renovation to the Bavaroka Primary School and the Hohola Vocational School were completed at cost of $5,800.

(U) BAKER PALM, a World War II commemorative engineering readiness training exercise, as completed in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, during the period 16 September through 25 November 1992 by 29 soldiers of B Company, 84th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy), and a Special Forces medic. This team completed construction of a dormitory addition and repairs to the Morata Halfway House in conjunction with ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the arrival of General Douglas MacArthur in 1942. The cost of consumables for this project was $92,443. Invaluable training was gained by deploying an entire platoon as a team to perform mission essential tasks in an austere environment under abnormal conditions.

(U) Republic of Maldives. Eleven reserve personnel from the 176th Medical Group and one active duty member from TMAC completed a MEDRETE (BAKER MALDEMER) in Male during the period 11-29 April 1992. This mission provided basic medical care to

the Maldivians at a cost in consumables of $30,000. The medical team obtained knowledge and experience in a unique training environment while providing needed medical assistance.

(U) Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros. During the period 1-19 September 1992, 13 personnel from the Alaskan National Guard completed a MEDRETE (BAKER COMFORT) deployment to the three Comoro islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli. This exercise provided primary medical and dental care to over 3,000 patients at a total cost for consumables of $52,050. The medical personnel were able to obtain valuable experience and were also able to share medical knowledge with Comoro health officials.

(U) Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. BAKER BANNER was an engineering readiness training exercise to construct a six-room school, community center/cyclone shelter in Halishahar, Bangladesh. Twenty-four soldiers of C Company, 84th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) completed the project during the period 7 January through 20 April 1992 at a total cost of consumables of $84,365. The combined exercise provided the opportunity to practice sustainment engineering. Tasks were completed under harsh conditions using crude materials. The 5000-square-foot structure provided relief to an area hard hit by Tropical Cyclone MARION in April 1991.*

(U) Lao Peoples Democratic Republic. Three exercises were completed in Laos during 1992: the construction of two schoolhouses and one MEDRETE. BAKER LEADER THREE was the construction of a five room schoolhouse in Sam Neua, Houaphan Province, during the period 25 February-27 March 1992 at a cost of consumables of $46,250. BAKER LIFELINE TWO was a MEDRETE conducted in Sam Neua at a cost in consumables of $26,719 during the period 31 March-18 April 1992. BAKER LEADER FOUR was an exercise to construct a

*For additional information on Tropical Cyclone MARION see the USCINCPAC History 1991 (S/NF/FRD/WN/NC), "Operation PRODUCTIVE EFFORT/Operation SEA ANGEL (U)," pp. 168-173(S).

seven-room schoolhouse in Lathouang, Xian Gkhouang Province, 5 October-22 November 1992 at an FY 92 cost in consumables of $54,500. (FY 92 funds were used for long lead-time procurement for BAKER LEADER FOUR.) The total cost for these three projects was $127,469. (There was an additional $7,772 in FY 92 charges for BAKER LEADER TWO which was completed in the last calendar quarter of 1991.) The BAKER LEADER engineering readiness exercises were completed by two separate 12-man teams from the 84th Engineer Battalion. The MEDRETE team consisted 14 individuals (medical and veterinary) from the 176th Medical Group and the 73rd Medical Detachment. In addition to providing much needed assistance to an impoverished nation and training for U.S. personnel, the initiatives provided immediate and highly visible support for U.S. policy makers in the dealings with the Laotian Government.

(U) Republic of the Philippines. Numerous Title 10 H/CA projects were completed in the Philippines. Projects in conjunction with Exercise BALIKATAN 91 were competed during the period 2-13 December 1991. All the projects were conducted in evacuation/relocation camps set up for the displaced victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. Medical and dental assistance was rendered. Additionally, cluster latrines, deep wells, and multi-purpose buildings were constructed. Camp locations included San Clemente, Tarlac Province; Palayan City, Nueva Ecija Province; and Botolan and Palauig, Zambales Province. USAF, USA, and USMC units deployed for BALIKATAN conducted the various projects.

(U) Exercise BALIKATAN 92 was moved up so as not to interfere with the U.S. pullout from Subic Bay. H/CA projects were completed during the period 19-30 October 1992, employing both FY 92 (for long lead time items) and FY 93 Title 10 funds. In addition, multi-purpose concrete slabs were poured for social and recreational needs or rice drying purposes. Project locations were four separate sites in Nueva Ecija Province: Bagong Buhay, Pinaltakan, Dona Josefa, and Rizal. USAF, USA, and

USMC units deployed for BALIKATAN conducted the various combined projects. USCINCPACREP Philippines and USARPAC were the respective exercise directors for BALIKATAN 91 AND 92. The FY 92 portion of the expenditures for consumables for both BALIKATAN 91 and BALIKATAN 92 were $134,819. Both exercises promoted positive bilateral relations throughout the course of productive engineering and medical training operations.

(U) There were numerous medical, dental, and veterinary assistance projects conducted throughout FY 92 to care for the indigenous civilian populace around the Subic Bay naval facilities. A total of 32 medical assistance missions and eight dental assistance missions were conducted in multiple locations throughout Zambales and Bataan provinces during the period 1 October 1991 through 18 June 1992. Those participating were technicians from the Naval Hospital and Dental Clinic, Naval Station, Subic Bay. The total cost of consumables was $6,490.

(U) Various painting and repair of public facility projects were accomplished during the period 15 November 1991 through 15 May 1992, mostly in the Olongapo and Subic City areas adjacent to the Subic Bay Naval facilities. Forty-two painting projects (mostly schools and churches) and 16 Mt. Pinatubo rehabilitation projects at missions, schools, and care centers were completed by sailors and marines of visiting and home ported ships, and various Naval Station organizations at a total cost for consumables of $3,046. These projects provided improved quality of life for villagers as well as challenging and morale enhancing work for the U.S. technicians and volunteers involved.

(U) Kingdom of Thailand. During the period 24 April-31 May 1992, many combined Title 10 H/CA projects were completed in Thailand by U.S. Army, Navy, and Special Forces personnel deployed in support of Exercise COBRA GOLD 92 (JUSMAGTHAI). Projects completed included the following:

- Water distribution system construction, Ban Nong Laksila, Semg Sarng, Korat,
- Water storage tank construction, Ban Sap Ra Wing, Kornburi, Korat.
- Water tower construction, Ban Taku, Pakthong Chai, Korat.
- School Renovations, Ban Laem Ruak, Pakthong Chai, Korat.
- Community hall construction, Ban Suntisuk, Semg Sarong, Korat.
- Community hall construction, Ban So At Khan, Seem Sarong, Korat.
- School construction, Ban Bo Chum, Keen Hang Mao, Chantaburi.
- School renovation, Ban Khao Wong, Klaeng, Rayong.
- School renovation, Wat Ban Na School, Klaeng, Rayong.
- School renovation, Wat Krasea Bon School, Klaeng, Rayong.
- School renovation, Ban Pon Rum School, Muang, Lop Buri.
- School renovation, Ban Namjun School, Khao Samyod.
- Bridge repair, Sara Buri, Muang, Sara Buri.
- Medical/dental/veterinary medical readiness training exercises were conducted in 22 locations by Thai and U.S. personnel. A total of 12,162 medical patients, 2,092 dental patients, and 2,651 animals were treated. In addition, 565 individuals attended pesticide poisoning prevention lectures.

(U) The total cost of consumables for all these COBRA GOLD 92 H/CA projects was $296,802. Training for the participants was derived from the application of textbook skills. Interpersonal contact among the military, local government officials, and civilians enhanced community relations.

(U) There were several medical/dental readiness training exercises held in concert with BADGE TRAM 92 in Thailand 25 February-16 March 1992. The exercises were collocated with seven school renovations in the vicinity of Udorn Thani: Ban Chang, Ban Nong Hin, Ban Dua, Ban Lian Philuk, Ban Non Hua Mu, Ban Muang, and Ban Non Tum schools. A total of 1,570 medical and 376 dental patients were cared for by U.S. and Thai technicians. The U.S. participants were from the 3rd Battalion/1st Special Forces Group and the 353rd Special Operations Wing. The total cost of consumables for these projects was $125,012. Well-drilling projects in conjunction with other BADGE series exercises were postponed until FY 93.

(U) Solomon Islands. During a port call by USS PEARY in the Solomon Islands, an embarked nine-man team from NMCB One rehabilitated the White River Primary School and accomplished repairs to the Honiara Handicapped Center during the period 2-10 February 1992 in the capital of Honiara, Guadalcanal. The total cost for these projects was $4,000.

(U) On 3-9 August 1992, an embarked USN/USMC team from USS RACINE composed of SEABEES from NMCB Seven, Marine engineers from the I MEF, and a medical/dental cell completed several projects in Honiara, Solomon Islands, which were all part of World War II commemorative activities for the 50th anniversary of Guadalcanal. the completed projects were construction of a water catchment for the White River Primary School, repairs to the Women's Typing College, and repairs to Bloody Ridge Road. Medical/dental assistance was also rendered. Total cost of consumables was $13,640.

(U) Fiji Islands. An embarked team from USS RACINE composed of SEABEES from NMCB Seven, marine engineers from the I MEF, and a medical/dental cell completed repairs to the water catchment system and construction of a seahut (for quarters) at a nursing station in Galoa, Fiji; renovation and minor construction

to the Twomey Hospital in Suva; construction of a seahut (for quarters) and repairs to the nursing station at Verata; painting and repairs to the St. Christopher's Orphanage in Suva; construction of a seahut (for quarters) at the nursing station in Nayavu; and construction of a room addition at the Valelevu Health Center in Suva. These projects were completed 24 August-6 November 1992 at a total cost of consumables of $40,800. All materiel were FY 92 procurements. The projects were part of the USS RACINE South Pacific Cruise Projects.

(U) Niue Island (New Zealand). In conjunction with a port visit by USS RACINE, an embarked team completed renovations to the Niue High School in Alofi, Niue, on 24-27 August 1992. Medical/dental assistance was also rendered. The total cost of consumables for these projects was $13,490.[3]

Title 10 Personnel Expenses Authority for Developing Countries

(U) Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 1051, provides CINCs the authority to pay expenses of defense personnel from a developing country to attend bilateral or regional, cooperative seminars and conferences. The total of all USCINCPAC expenditures in this category for FY 92 was $880,995 for 26 participating countries. The conferences and seminars supported throughout FY 92 are as follows:[4]

- The **Mutual Defense Board** (MDB) meeting, sponsored by USCINCPAC Asia, Pacific, and Indian Ocean Policy Division (J51), convened 11-14 November 1991 in Hawaii. The objective of the MDB was to effect direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and U.S. authorities on military matters of mutual concern and to improve the common defense of the two countries. Personnel expenses were paid for 12 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officers to attend at a cost of $16,462.

[3]Ibid.
[4]USCINCPAC 210200Z Dec 92 (U).

• During FY 92, various **U.S./Malaysian military-to-military contact programs**, sponsored by USCINCPAC J51, were funded including the eighth BITAC in Hawaii, 13-17 January 1992, and adjunct activities scheduled and monitored under the purview of the BITAC; a visit to a light armored infantry battalion, 1-12 February 1992, at Camp Pendleton; a visit to Kadena Air Base and the III MEF, 10-14 February 1992; observation of Exercise SABRE SPIRIT, 2-9 May 1992, at Osan AB, Korea; LOGEX participation and logistics orientation, 16-29 July 1992, at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Fort Shafter, Hawaii; and observation of Exercise COPE THUNDER, 17-21 August 1992, at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. Personnel expenses totaling $36,037 were paid for 15 trips by 13 different Malaysian officers. Malaysian attendance at the BITAC and associated functions enhanced the ongoing three-year program promoting the U.S./Malaysian bilateral military relationship.

• The twenty-first **Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar** (PASOLS) in the annual series, sponsored by USCINCPAC International Logistics Division (J41), was held in Cairns, Australia, 27 April-2 May 1992. **Project Development Committee** (PDC) meetings were also held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, 21-24 September 1992. This seminar provided a forum for senior logisticians to share ideas of common interest and continue development of cooperative logistics arrangements among PASOLS member countries. The PASOLS was attended by over 130 delegates, including 44 flag/general officers, from 28 nations. Personnel expenses paid for the 20 developing countries in attendance at PASOLS and the PDC were $139,571. Countries supported were Bangladesh ($10,773), Comoros ($6,166), Fiji ($3,050), India ($1,796), Indonesia ($4,715), Kiribati ($6,501), Madagascar ($9,492), Malaysia ($6.998), Mauritius ($9,251), Mexico ($3,661), Mongolia ($14,831), Nepal ($4,212), Papua New Guinea ($3,763), Philippines ($7,070), Seychelles ($4,261), Solomon Islands ($4,206), Sri Lanka ($11,274), Thailand ($10,950), Tonga ($11,040), and Western Samoa (5,561).

• The **Symposium on East Asia Security** (SEAS), sponsored by USCINCPAC and United States Information Agency (USIA), was a symposium of security experts from USPACOM countries participating in on-site briefings and seminars in several countries: Japan, Korea, Singapore, and the U.S. The seminar helped participants to better understand the USCINCPAC mission, responsibilities, and capabilities in light of the changing security environment. SEAS exposed participants to U.S. installations, troop readiness, and modern equipment capabilities. The program was conducted 8-26 September 1992. Personnel expenses for six developing countries in attendance were $59,466, which included some FY 92 expenses incurred as a part of last years symposium which spanned across fiscal years. Countries supported were Bangladesh ($8,139), Malaysia ($12,601), Mongolia ($6,607), Papua New Guinea ($9,106), Philippines ($21,028), and Thailand ($1,985).

• The **Military Operations and Law Conference**, sponsored by the USCINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (J06), was held 21-24 September 1992 in Hawaii, and focused on counterdrug operations and environmental programs. The forum provided senior military legal advisors and operators a unique opportunity to raise issues of mutual interest and make vital personal contacts. Personnel expenses of $116,602 were paid for 17 developing countries in attendance. Countries supported included Bangladesh ($6,244), Comoros ($15,196), Fiji ($5,014), Indonesia ($6,449), Kiribati ($2,482), Madagascar ($12,371), Malaysia ($6,567), Maldives ($9,565), Mauritius ($11,824), Mexico ($3,354), Nepal ($6,553), Philippines ($4,018), Seychelles ($6,330), Sri Lanka ($5,512), Thailand ($4,622), Tonga ($4,685), and Tuvalu ($5,816).

• The **Pacific Armies Management Seminar XV** (PAMS XV), sponsored by USARPAC, was held 3-10 June 1992 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Representatives from 29 Asian-Pacific nations participated in the theater ground defense forces agenda. Personnel expenses were paid for participants from 19 developing countries at a cost of $154,131. Countries supported were Bangladesh ($7,839), Comoros ($12,474), India ($8,926), Indonesia

($5,692), Kiribati ($6,030), Madagascar ($8,126), Malaysia ($5,104), Maldives ($6,885), Mauritius ($11,322), Mongolia ($12,767), Nepal ($3,342), Papua New Guinea ($6,769), Philippines ($5,222), Seychelles ($4,621), Solomon Islands ($7,162), Sri Lanka ($5,970), Tonga ($24,278), Vanuatu ($5,303), and Western Samoa ($6,299).

- The **Pacific Armies Reserve Component Seminar**, sponsored by USARPAC, was conducted 24 April-2 May 1992, in Honolulu, Hawaii. The seminar stimulated interest in new approaches to reserve training, mobilization training, interoperability, and the changing reserve mission as active forces were drawn down. Personnel expenses for the five developing nations in attendance were $22,898. Countries supported included India ($3,161), Indonesia ($4,850), Malaysia ($5,719), Philippines ($4,059), and Sri Lanka ($5,109).

- The **Tropical Medicine Seminar**, sponsored by USARPAC, was conducted in Bangkok, Thailand, 8-13 March 1992. Country presentations and case studies addressed disease treatment options and their success rates. Most disease cases discussed were of significant military relevance, including drug resistant malaria, antibiotic resistant gonorrhea, Japanese encephalitis, and HIV/AIDS. Personnel expenses were paid for participants from eight developing nations in the amount of $19,752. Countries supported were Bangladesh ($2,508), India ($2,617), Indonesia ($2,662), Laos ($1,825), Malaysia ($2,068), Nepal ($2,570), Philippines ($2,982), and Sri Lanka ($2,520).

- The USARPAC sponsored **Pacific Area Military Police Expanded Relations Seminar** was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, 27-31 July 1992, to exchange information about Pacific region law enforcement and force protection issues. Total personnel expenses for the ten developing countries in attendance was $27,329. Countries supported were Bangladesh ($3,116), Indonesia ($3,007), Kiribati ($2,197), Marshall Islands ($1,747), Philippines ($2,162), Solomon Islands ($4,175), Sri Lanka ($3,369), Tuvalu ($2,561), and Western Samoa ($2,133).

• There were four **Malaysian Army/USARPAC exchange** activities during FY 92. These activities were an intelligence exchange in Hawaii, 26-27 May 1992; discussions convened at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 5-11 July 1992, to exchange ideas on training methods, airborne operations, and tactics; discussions convened at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 15-22 July 1992, to exchange ideas on battle simulations and staff functions; and discussion convened at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, 26 August-3 September 1992, to exchange ideas on training exercise simulations and brigade/division level staff exercising techniques. A total of 15 Malaysians attended the four separate meetings at a program cost of $36,805.

• An **Indonesian Army/USARPAC exchange** was conducted at Fort Lewis, Washington, 19-29 September 1992 to discuss training techniques, programs, opportunities, and priorities. The expenses for three Indonesian soldiers were $8,508.

• An **Indian Army/USARPAC exchange** was held in Hawaii, 25 April-1 May 1992 focusing on training techniques and doctrine, exercise planning procedures and execution, and a comparison of training management philosophies of both armies. Total expenses for two Indian Officers was $1,960.

• During the period 30 March-10 April 1992, one officer from each of four developing nations observed **Exercise EXPANDED SEA 92**, a worldwide control of shipping exercise, at PACFLT headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Sponsored by PACFLT, this observation program promoted interoperability and enhance bilateral relations by providing foreign naval officers the opportunity to observe U.S. Naval operations and interact extensively with U.S. counterparts. Personnel expenses totaling $6,079 was paid to support four officers from four developing countries: Indonesia ($723), Malaysia ($1,849), Philippines ($1,680), and Thailand ($1,827).

• A series of **PACFLT sponsored OPINTEL orientation visits**, one week per country on a one-on-one basis, on the methodology and philosophy employed by the U.S. Navy in conducting intelligence support of operating forces was completed

throughout August and September 1992 at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Personnel expenses of $21,341 were paid for a total of ten officers from three participating countries: Indonesia ($12,172), Malaysia ($3,441), and Philippines ($5,728).

- A **Conference on Helicopter Operations from Ships other than Aircraft Carriers** (HOSTAC), sponsored by PACFLT convened on 8-10 September 1992, at the Royal Australian Navy Maritime Headquarters in Sydney, Australia, to share information about ship and helicopter facilities. The conference ensured that invited nations were fully aware of the scope and advantages of participating in the HOSTAC Agreement. Discussions provided an exchange of valuable technical and operational interoperability data. The total personnel expenses paid for three developing countries in attendance as $11,306. Developing Countries participating were Indonesia ($3,042), Malaysia ($3,123), and Thailand ($5,141).

- The Title 10 program funded the personnel expenses for the **visit of the Seychelles Navy Chief**, Rear Admiral Paul Hodoul, Commander, Seychelles Peoples Navy, and Commodore Leonard LaBliache, Chief of Naval Staff, to Headquarters USCINCPAC during the period 6-10 April 1992. The purpose of the visit was to improve bilateral relations and reinforce USCINCPAC policy in the Southwest Indian Ocean. Personnel expenses for the two officers with billeting requirements was $14,786.

- The **Thai Logistics Exercise (LOGEX) Final Planning Conference** convened 17-25 May 1992, at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, to prepare for exercise operations and status related logistics initiatives. Thai representatives from the Supreme Command, Royal Thai Army, Navy, Air Force, and civilian defense sector were in attendance, including 11 flag or general officers. This seventh in the series of LOGEX planning conferences forged new communications channels with the Thai Supreme Command and service components. The Thais indicated a desire to broaden LOGEX into a regional logistics exercise, further serving security interests. Personnel expenses paid to subsidize the expenses of ten out of the total 16 Thais in attendance was $16,181.

• The **BADGE TRAM Final Planning Conference**, sponsored by JUSMAGTHAI, was held 9-13 December 1992, at Fort Lewis, Washington, to prepare for exercise scheduling of cross training and communications objectives. The conference provided the coordination between the Royal Thai Air Force Ground Security Forces and U.S. Special Forces necessary to ensure exercise effectiveness. Total personnel expenses paid to subsidize the expenses of five out of the total of 15 Thais in attendance was $12,502.

• Four members of the Papua New Guinea Defense Force Judicial System, sponsored by USCINCPAC J06 and J45, attended a **Naval Justice School Seminar** at the U.S. Naval Justice School, Newport, Rhode Island, 17-21 August 1992. The purpose of the seminar was to exchange information on military justice systems. Personnel expenses paid were $11,152 for the four officers.

• The **COBRA GOLD 92 Middle Planning Conference** convened in Honolulu, Hawaii, 13-24 January 1992, to develop combined U.S./Thai operation and administration plans. Thai participation was sponsored by USCINCPAC and JUSMAGTHAI. The total to subsidize the personnel expenses of 16 Thai officers in attendance was $41,199.

• **PACAF/Indian Air Force cooperation** and exchanges were integral to the emerging PACAF expanded relations program with the Indian Air Force. To that end, bilateral discussions with Air Marshall Singh of the Indian Air Force were conducted 9-12 January 1992, at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and two officers observed Exercise COPE THUNDER at Eielson AFB, Alaska, 11-20 July 1992. The total for lodging and per diem expenses accrued by the three travelers was $1,920.

• Travel and per diem subsidies were provided for two Mongolian officers to attend the **Pacific Air Chiefs Conference** (PACC) in Washington, D.C., in August 1992. Mongolian attendance, sponsored by PACAF and USDAO Beijing, at the PACC enhanced the bilateral initiatives begin pursued between the U.S. and the democratically evolving Mongolian Republic. The total

personnel expenses paid for the partial travel and per diem expenses was $2,900.

• The **Spectrum Management Conference**, sponsored by USCINCPAC J62, was held in Hawaii, 26-31 July 1992, and provided representatives of both the DOD and the Pacific Basin countries the opportunity to discuss issues, policies, and procedures regarding radio frequency management. Personnel expenses provided for eight developing countries in attendance were $40,913. Expenses paid included participation by several of the same delegates to attend the **Senior Communicators Meeting** held at the same facilities on 3-4 August 1992. Developing nations in attendance at one or both of these gatherings were Bangladesh ($6,499), Indonesia ($9,113), Malaysia ($5,241), Marshall Islands ($2,834), Micronesia ($4,432), Philippines ($4,493), Sri Lanka ($5,660), and Thailand ($2,641).

• The **Pacific Area Special Operations Conference**, sponsored by SOCPAC, was held 13-19 September 1992, and was preceded by an Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC) conference convened 10-11 September 1992, both at the same facilities in Honolulu, Hawaii, to help manage combined special operations in theater. Total personnel expenses paid for the 18 conferees from six developing nations in attendance was $61,195. Developing countries assisted were Bangladesh ($11,821), Indonesia ($7,961), Malaysia ($11,496), Philippines ($6,435), Sri Lanka ($9,908), and Thailand ($13,574).

(U) A summary of Title 10 Personnel Expenses paid for the 26 developing countries participating during 1992 is as follows:

COUNTRY	AMOUNT	COUNTRY	AMOUNT
Bangladesh	$56,939	Micronesia	$4,432
Comoros	33,836	Mongolia	37,105
Fiji	8,064	Nepal	16,677
India	20,380	Papua New Guinea	30,790
Indonesia	68,894	Philippines	81,339
Kiribati	17,875	Seychelles	29,998

Laos	1,825	Solomon Islands	15,543
Madagascar	29,989	Sri Lanka	49,322
Malaysia	139,246	Thailand	110,622
Maldives	16,450	Tonga	40,003
Marshall Islands	4,581	Tuvalu	8,377
Mauritius	32,397	Vanuatu	5,303
Mexico	7,015	Western Samoa	13,993
		TOTAL	$880,995

Title 10 Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program

(C) USCINCPAC obligated a total of $731,784 in FY 92 Title 10 (Section 2010) funds, Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP). These funds were provided to support foreign nation participation in combined exercises. The countries, exercises supported, and amounts obligated to support foreign participation are provided in the following table:[5]

COUNTRY	EXERCISE SUPPORTED	AMOUNT (U.S. $)
(U) Fiji	Operation REMEMBRANCE	$5,000
(C) India	Mountaineering Exercise	12,500
(C) Indonesia	BADGE IRON	12,208
(C) Indonesia	Engineer Exercise	12,319
(U) Madagascar	BAKER MASON	5,580
(C) Malaysia	TIGER EAGLE	6,891
(C) Malaysia	TEAK MINT	12,064
(U) Philippines	BALIKATAN	80,301
(U) Philippines	PALAH	46,102
(U) Philippines	SUBCOM	31,536
(U) Thailand	COBRA GOLD	352,271
(U) Thailand	BADGE Series	117,883
(U) Thailand	TEAK TORCH	7,129
(U) Tonga	TAFAKULA	30,000
Total FY 92 DCCEP		$731,784

[5]USCINCPAC 312340Z Dec 92 (C), DECL OADR.

Title 10 Humanitarian Assistance Program for Excess Property

(U) The Humanitarian Assistance Program for Excess Property (HAP-EP) was developed to established an institutionalized process which maximized the use of theater excess, non-lethal DOD property for donation to developing nations in support of peacetime objectives. Authority to donate excess non-lethal DOD property was through U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 2547, which authorized SECDEF to make excess property available to SECSTATE for donation to developing countries for humanitarian or nation building purposes. Approval of a recipient nation and subsequent donation was a joint SECDEF and SECSTATE decision. Worldwide program management was under the cognizance of the Office of Humanitarian Assistance (OHA)/International Security Affairs (ISA)/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and included the administration of transportation and repair funding. A few examples of HAP-EP follow.[6]

(U) **Mongolia**. There were two HAP-EP deliveries to Mongolia during 1992. The first donation was completed on 24 January, and consisted of 36 pallets weighing approximately 112,000 pounds of medical supplies and equipment from DOD and some privately donated pharmaceuticals. Transportation was provided by a 349th Military Airlift Wing (349 MAW) C-5 from Travis AFB, California. The air crew for this mission (MAC Mission 50121) was commanded by Lt Col Arnoldo Delucca of the 312th Military Airlift Squadron (312 MAS). The airlift crew successfully unloaded the shipment by hand in temperatures hovering at zero degrees Fahrenheit. This was the third flight of humanitarian assistance goods provided to Mongolia since that country was approved for HAP-EP assistance.[7]

(U) The second 1992 HAP-EP donation to Mongolia was delivered to the airport at Ulaanbaatar via a USAF C-5B on

[6]USCINCPAC Command History 1991 (S/FRD/NF/WN/NC), Vol. I, p. 208 (U).
[7]J4121 HistSum Jan 92 (U); USCINCPAC 191950Z Feb 92 (U).

17 September. The donation included four front-end scoop loaders built by J.I. Case Manufacturing, and two road graders from Caterpillar Tractor Company. The U.S. Army 10th Area Support Group at Torii Station, Okinawa, refurbished this excess equipment which was subsequently loaded by USAF and USMC personnel at Kadena AB, Okinawa. The air crew, commanded by Maj James T. Ruebor, USAFR, were members of the 301st Airlift Squadron (301 AS) based at Travis AFB, California. The HAP-EP mission director was LTC David Berczel, USA, who was assigned to HQ USCINCPAC. CW3 Johnny A. Boreham, USA, accompanied the flight from Okinawa, and conducted an orientation through interpreters on operations and maintenance of the equipment using the Operator's and Organizational Maintenance Manuals provided by the DOD Office of Global Affairs. There was a brief ceremony at the Ulaanbaatar airport passenger terminal, during which the equipment was officially transferred to the Government of Mongolia. USCINCPAC Admiral Larson, U.S. Chargé d' Affairs Dowling, USCINCPAC/J4 RADM Ryan, and Mongolian Minister of Energy Jigjid observed the unloading and participated in the turn-over ceremony. This equipment responded to the critical needs of the nearby Baganuur, Sharyn Gol, and Shivey Ovoo coal mines. The previous winter, increasing problems with coal delivery resulted in dangerously low coal reserves at major power plants and adversely affected the heating systems. With winter on the way and serious supply shortages looming again, the equipment would be used to improve coal production and distribution.[8]

(U) **Cambodia**. The HAP-EP Program was initiated in Cambodia by donating items to the Non-Communist Resistance (NCR) Program through Thailand. These donations occurred on a regular basis up through September 1991. In September 1992, a total of 160 van-loads or 1,500,000 meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) were donated to feed demobilizing Cambodian soldiers. The official ceremony for turning over the MREs to United Nations Transitional Authority,

[8]AMEMB Ulaanbaatar 000464/210427Z Feb 92 (U); J411 HistSum Sep 92 (U).

Cambodia (UNTAC), hosted by Mr. C. Twining, the Chargé d' Affairs, took place on 20 September. Additionally, in late 1992, four different shipments were prepared for movement and donation to Cambodia. The shipments were: four commercial design trucks from Iwakuni, Japan; three commercial ambulances with some medical supplies and equipment from the Sagami, Japan, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO); medical supplies and equipment from the Pusan, Korea, DRMO; and twenty pieces of equipment, vehicles, trailers, and construction equipment from the HAP-EP stockpile in Okinawa, Japan.[9]

(U) The HAP-EP summary for FY 90 through FY 92 is below:[10]

HAP-EP DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION PER COUNTRY FY 90-FY 92

COUNTRY	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92
Bangladesh	0	$179,028	0
Cambodia	0	0	$5,000,000
Laos	0	471,929	0
Madagascar	0	76,736	0
Maldives	0	0	126,453
Mongolia	0	151,864	1,352,826
Nepal	$32,270	0	0
Pakistan	43,984	0	0
Philippines	1,066,940	7,461,408	30,099,101
Papua New Guinea	0	0	500,000
Republic of the Marshall Islands	0	0	649,950
Sri Lanka	0	340,501	0
Thailand/NCR	1,738,211	754,484	0
Tonga	0	104,302	0
Tuvalu	0	0	31,358
Western Samoa	0	73,720	0
TOTAL	$2,881,405	$9,613,972	$37,759,688

[9]J413 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J4131 Point Paper (U), 23 Oct 92, Subj: Humanitarian Assistance Program for Excess Property (HAP-EP) for Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.
[10]J4131 Table, "HAP-EP Dollar Contribution Per Country FY90/3 (U), 2 Aug 93.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs Visit

(U) Dr. Robert Wolthuis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs, visited HQ USCINCPAC 26-28 April 1992. They met with the Deputy USCINCPAC (DCINC) and USCINCPAC Deputy Director, Logistics and Security Assistance (J40). The focus of his visit was Title 10 and HAP-EP. The four highlights of his visit were:[11]

- USCINCPAC was requested to submit a few Title 10 proposals for Russia so they could be approved prior to his trip to Russia.
- Another shipment of medical supplies and four front loaders for Mongolia were ready for offering. It was up to USCINCPAC as to when it should be announced and delivered. It was suggested the CINC combine this donation with his visit to Mongolia (see subject above).
- Dr. Wolthuis asked USCINCPAC to set up a Global Affairs conference for February 1993.
- Dr. Wolthuis also requested USCINCPAC screen those items being declared excess in the Philippines for possible movement to the HAP-EP stockpile.

HAP-EP Point of Contact in the Philippines

(U) The Community Relations (COMREL) office, Subic Naval Base, which was the point of contact (POC) for HAP-EP in the Philippines, closed officially on 15 August 1992 as part of the Subic closure. During a visit to Subic in August 1992, LTC Terry Steinhebel, USA, the USCINCPAC J4131, held a meeting with Embassy, USAID, JUSMAG, and COMREL personnel at which it was decided that the Embassy Political Military (POLMIL) officer would be the POC for emergency disaster relief, in the interim, and that a discussion paper would be drafted for the new

[11] J4131 HistSum Apr 92 (U).

Ambassador for the Philippines in order to obtain his input for the overall HAP-EP point of contact. The USCINCPAC recommendation was to generate a new position within the new configuration of USCINCPACREPPHIL at JUSMAG and fill it with the woman who had been the POC at COMREL, Ms. Betty Fielder. No official decision was made.[12]

Humanitarian Assistance for Russia

(U) Four humanitarian assistance shipments transited USPACOM's area of responsibility for delivery to Russia and other Newly Independent States (NIS) as part of Operation PROVIDE HOPE. These missions were organized under the auspices of a Virginia-based private organization, Provide Hope, which was under contract to the U.S. Government. Project Hope had ongoing projects in several Russian and NIS cities, where it identified requirements for emergency supplies. Project Hope then solicited donations from the U.S. corporate medical community and coordinated with DOD, Office of Global Affairs, for delivery. These missions were approved by Ambassador Armitage, the Deputy Coordinator for all U.S. Government humanitarian assistance to Russia and other NIS. The four shipments to Russia or NIS were:

ORIGIN	DESTINATION	CARGO	TYPE AIRCRAFT	DATE ARRIVED
Travis AFB	Khabarovsk	Infant Formula	C-141	28 Apr 92
Norton AFB	Magadan	Infant Formula	C-141	20 Jul 92
McChord AFB	Irkutsk	Medical Consumables	C-141	17 Aug 92
McChord AFB	Magadan	Medical Consumables	unknown	24 Aug 92

[12]J4131 HistSum Aug 92 (U).

Hurricane INIKI Relief Effort

(U) USCINCPAC provided a liaison officer (USAF) around-the-clock who each worked 12-hour shifts in the PACAF Crisis Action Team (CAT) at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, to facilitate the logistics effort of helping Kauai recover from Hurricane INIKI. This officer provided the Commanding General, Army Forces (COMAFOR) LTG Johnnie H. Corns a single point of contact representing USCINCPAC and providing immediate response in coordinating relief actions. The officer worked closely with the CAT transportation, supply, and airlift personnel in sourcing and delivering items to the island.[13]

TEMPEST EXPRESS 92-1

(U) Two J4 personnel, the primary and alternate Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) team members, deployed to Okinawa in November 1992 as members of the team to participate in TEMPEST EXPRESS 92-1. The exercise was structured in two parts: first a two-day training period and then a three-day command post exercise (CPX). The designated JTF (III MEF) was provided a broad overview of joint logistics operations during the two-day training period and more in-depth hands-on training during the three-day CPX. A humanitarian assistance/disaster relief scenario was exercised through the Crisis Action planning phases up to the execution order. Training included all phases of planning the operations, including logistics validation and determining the feasibility of the airlift and sealift logistics flow.[14]

Thai Logistics Exercise--LOGEX 35

(U) Following a highly successful planning phase, the Thai Supreme Command conducted LOGEX 35 as scheduled 19-30 July 1992,

[13]J413 HistSum Sep 92 (U).
[14]J412 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

in Sattahip, Thailand. Unfortunately, LOGEX 35 occurred without U.S. participation. U.S. involvement was canceled as a result of retaliatory diplomatic actions taken by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in reaction to military suppression of civil disturbances in Bangkok during May 1992. Official notification of U.S. cancellation was made on 17 July by Chief JUSMAG, two days before the exercise was to begin. Last minute notification to the Thais was unavoidable due to late notification of USCINCPAC by DOS on 16 July that U.S. involvement would not be allowed. As could be expected, Thai reaction to the cancellation and the late notification was cold. Regardless, the Thai Supreme Command later indicated a strong desire to reopen channels of communication and broaden the scope of LOGEX. For its part, USCINCPAC was also eager to resume its involvement. It was recommended that USCINCPAC take advantage of the Thai invitation to attend the Thai-only LOGEX in July 1993 and discuss other logistics issues, such as encouraging the Thais to sign an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), exploring the use of Thailand as a site to preposition a Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPSs) and to inspect and maintain prepositioned munitions, and encouraging the broadening of LOGEX into a regional exercise.[15]

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Refueling at Sea Memorandum of Understanding

(U) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) for the Provision of Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) by Replenishment at Sea, signed 24 May 1989, allowed JMSDF ships to refuel USN ships at sea during combined exercises, but did not address the replenishment of JMSDF vessels at sea by USN vessels. The MOU was to remain in effect for five years and may be renegotiated for further extensions. According to JMSDF

[15]J4121 HistSum May 92 (U); J411 HistSum Jul 92 (U); J4121 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J4121 Point Paper (U), 20 Oct 92, Subj: Thai Logistics Exercise (LOGEX).

officials, Japanese legal restrictions prohibited initiatives such as refueling capabilities, which could increase combatant range, and thus be deemed offensive in nature. This hindered training interoperability, particularly during annual Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises. The MOU, however, did allow for replacement-in-kind of fuel previously borrowed by U.S. vessels at sea through subsequent transfer from any appropriate U.S. fuel transfer system to JMSDF ships. The lack of reciprocal refueling-at-sea (RAS) authority greatly limited exercise flexibility, and prevented RIMPAC from being a truly combined exercise. Additionally, JMSDF normally allowed only token hook-ups rather than full refueling. Efforts were being made to resolve Japanese legal conflicts.[16]

(S) The Commander, Naval Forces Japan continued efforts to amend the MOU to allow reciprocal refueling at sea. On 22 June 1992, an expanded JMSDF-USN Refueling-at-Sea MOU was signed. The new MOU lifted previous geographic restrictions and added provisions for refueling U.S. helicopters at sea. The expanded MOU still restricted refueling to at-sea operations during combined exercises only. Further, it did not address refueling JMSDF vessels or helicopters by U.S. Naval vessels, did not permit in-port refueling, and did not relieve the U.S. from a two percent surcharge on fuel received. Although an improvement, the lack of authority to refuel Japanese vessels and aircraft limited exercise flexibility and hindered USN/JMSDF training interoperability. Lifting the exercise restriction, however, remained politically sensitive. Japan Defense Agency (JDA) officials indicated that refueling-at-sea for other than planned, combined exercises would require new legislation.[17]

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[16]J411 Information Paper (U), 6 Feb 92, Subj: Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Refueling at Sea (RAS).

[17]Ibid.; J411 Point Paper (S), 13 Aug 92, Subj: Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Refueling at Sea (RAS) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (U), DECL OADR.

(S) USCINCPAC continued efforts to further expanded the MOU to allow reciprocal refueling at sea and lift exercise-only restrictions. This had become very important to fleet operations due to the declining number of U.S. oiler assets in WESTPAC. The long-term solution would be a government-to-government ACSA under the NATO Mutual Support Act, as amended. An ACSA or a less restrictive refueling-at-sea MOU may appear more attractive when JDA begins planning for specific peacekeeping operations (PKO), now that the Japanese diet had approved PKO legislation.[18]

Transfer of the Trans-Korea Pipeline

(U) In January 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics (ASD(P&L)), in accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) memorandum on "Return of Facilities Abroad," dated 14 December 1991, recommended the transfer of facilities and equipment associated with the Trans-Korea Pipeline (TKP) to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The DEPSECDEF subsequently approved the transfer on 3 February 1992.

(U) This approval allowed negotiations with the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) to proceed on the memorandum of agreement (MOA) to transfer the TKP. The greatest hurdle remaining was the financial annex, which, as then written, granted U.S. access to records once the ROK assumed responsibility for TKP operations. ROK negotiators' position was that U.S. access to ROK records would infringe upon sovereignty and they requested a waiver of the provision on review of records. OASD(P&L) staffed a compromise that would allow the U.S. some review of cost and fee data to ensure the U.S. was paying a fair and reasonable fee for storage.[19]

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[18]J411 Point Paper (S), 13 Aug 92, Subj: Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Refueling at Sea (RAS) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (U), DECL OADR; J412 Information Paper (U), 6 Feb 92, Subj: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA); USCINCPAC 112100Z Feb 92 (S), DECL OADR;J412 Point Paper (U), 10 Aug 92, Subj: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) - Japan.
[19]J411 HistSum Jan 92 (U).

(U) On 9 February 1992, ASD(P&L) approved a Department of the Army (DA) request for authority to transfer all TKP equipment and spares identified as excess to DOD requirements to the ROK. A subsequent DA message elaborated that items that could not be transferred outright as excess could be leased through security assistance channels. This allowed negotiations with the Ministry of National Defense to proceed on the memorandum of agreement to transfer the TKP. A significant obstacle had been overcome by a letter from the Director for Energy Policy, ASD(P&L) to the ROK MND Logistics Bureau Chief addressing waivers to the audit clause in the MOA Financial Annex. The letter agreed to seek the waivers requested, but recommended leaving the clause that authorized an audit in the Annex. ROK negotiators subsequently advised they wanted to sign the transfer agreement by 20 March 1992. Additionally, the ASD for International Security Affairs ASD(ISA) wrote the MND Vice Minister on 26 February asking that the U.S. be included in discussions aimed at connecting U.S. military facilities to the new commercial pipeline the ROK would construct over the next two to five years.[20]

(U) During a ceremony at the Ministry of National Defense on 17 March 1992, Republic of Korea and U.S. negotiators signed the memorandum of agreement which would transfer operation of the Trans-Korea Pipeline to the ROK, closing the long history of negotiating the test of the MOA. The signed MOA cleared the joint Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Committee and the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Turnover of operations from U.S. to ROK supervision was accomplished in June 1992.[21]

Logistics Cooperation Committee

(U) USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance hosted the ROK-U.S. Logistics Cooperation Committee

[20]J411 HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[21]USCINCPAC 182235Z Mar 92 (U); CDRUSAEIGHT 230210Z Mar 92 (U); J411 Histsum Mar 92 (U).

(LCC) meeting of the 24th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) at Camp Smith, Hawaii, on 10 June 1992. Mr. James M. Compton, Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International Programs co-chaired the meeting with Major General Yoon Chong Ho, Director of the Logistics Bureau, ROK Ministry of National Defense. During the meeting discussion were conducted on the following topics:[22]

- Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Umbrella Agreement. MND agreed to identify individual ROK action officers to work on the 12 technical arrangements (transportation, medical, engineering, etc.) required to implement the WHNS Umbrella Agreement signed at the 23rd SCM. MND had been reluctant to proceed on the technical arrangements, pending ratification of the Umbrella Agreement by the ROK National Assembly. The U.S. also agreed to finalize the Combined Steering Committee Charter, to be used by the Combined Steering Committee to evaluate Host Nation Support effectiveness under OPLAN 5027, once the ROK National Assembly ratified the Umbrella Agreement.
- Ammunition issues. Five ammunition issues were discussed. First, the U.S. officially notified MND that, when authorized by the U.S. Congress, it would complete its final shipment to Korea under the current Modern Munitions Program (MMP) agreement. The agreement would not be further extended because funding was not available in the FY 93 budget. The next three ammunition issues discussed included the U.S. proposal to sell obsolete WRSA stocks to the ROK at reduced cost, the ROK proposal for the U.S. to dispose of WRSA stocks excess to ROK requirements, and the U.S. proposal to withdraw 155mm high explosive (HE) ammunition stocks for use in the U.S. training

[22]J411 HistSum Jun 92 (U).

base. The U.S. agreed to work a package solution that would be mutually beneficial. As a result, the U.S. was working with OSD, JCS/J4, and the DA to obtain legislation granting SECDEF authority to negotiate transfer of war reserve stocks to the ROK in return for substantial benefits. The final ammunition issue discussed concerned explosive storage safety, particularly ROK progress on correcting safety violations involved with U.S.-titled munitions stored in Korea. USFK/J4 would continue to work with MND to reduce safety violations through a combination of storage facility improvements, enforcement of banned encroachment by civilians on lands contiguous with storage bunkers, and the destruction or evacuation of obsolete or excess munitions currently in storage.

- Equipment transfers. U.S. Proposals to transfer M48A5 tanks, M110A2 howitzers, 8-inch ammunition and associated spare parts from U.S.-titled war reserves to the ROK for use in ROK active units was discussed informally. The U.S. agreed that this issue should be linked with the package being developed for the three ammunition issues discussed above, and that the results of discussions concerning this transfer be reported at the next SCM.

Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement

EXEMPT 6(1)

(~~S~~) A Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Agreement was signed on 11 November 1991 by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong Koo in Seoul at the Security Consultative Meetings, but required ratification.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) The ROK National Assembly ratified the WHNS Umbrella Agreement on 11 November 1992. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, dated 25 November 1992, informing the U.S. Government that all ROK legal procedures were fulfilled concerning the Agreement, and that the Agreement would enter into force on the date the MOFA was informed that the U.S. constitutional process was completed. ROK ratification of the Agreement allowed formal negotiations to proceed with the Ministry of National Defense on the 12 Technical Arrangements drafted by U.S. Forces Korea. These functional Technical Arrangements described how to implement the Agreement in wartime and included the following functional areas and types of support:[24]

FUNCTIONAL AREA	TYPE OF SUPPORT
Communications	Telecommunications
Engineering	Buildings and land, runway repair and installation, battle damage repair
Field Services	Laundry
Maintenance	Aviation general support (Air Force only), COMSEC repair, support for mobilized heavy equipment (trucks and buses)

[23]J411 Information Paper (S), 10 Aug 92, Subj: ROK Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) (U), DECL OADR; COMUSAEIGHT 131200Z Nov 92 (U); AMEMB Seoul 12693/030811Z Dec 92 (U).
[24]Ibid.; J411 HistSum Nov (U).

Medical	Medical supplies and facilities
Munitions	Storage, maintenance, and security
Biological, Chemical, and Special Weapons Services	Decontamination
Personnel and Labor Services	Korean national direct hire, Korean Service Corp (KSC) and Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army (KATUSA), command and control, and logistics coordination
Petroleum	Pipeline operations
Security	Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee (EPW/CI) internment, rear area defense, air defense, and installation security
Supply	Class IV only (construction material)
Transportation	Line haul trucking, stevedoring, rail service, commercial airlines and ships, mobilized heavy equipment (trucks and buses)

(U) Ratification also allowed formal approval of the General Officer WHNS Combined Steering Committee Charter by the committee co-chairpersons: Director, MND Logistics Bureau and Assistant Chief of Staff, J4, USFK. This committee would meet at

least annually to review WHNS plans, in-place U.S. Forces, and changes to the flow of units deploying to Korea to determine the adequacy of WHNS versus requirements.[25]

(U) The WHNS Agreement entered into force on 23 December 1992 when the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs was notified that the U.S. had completed its constitutional procedures.[26]

War Reserve Stocks for Allies Program

(U) Section 569 of the FY 93 Foreign Operations Bill, enacted in October 1992, authorized an increase of $189,000,000 in the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) ceiling for the ROK. This was the first movement on WRSA in the Pacific since the Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill for FY 92/93 was defeated by the House of Representatives on 30 October 1991. A Continuing Resolution (CR), signed into law on 1 April 1992, authorized the addition of $300,000,000 to WRSA in Israel, but failed to authorize additions to stockpiles in Korea or Thailand.[27]

(U) In May 1992, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) and the Joint Staff J4 submitted draft language to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Legislative Affairs which proposed additions of $189,000,000 to the ceilings in Korea and Thailand during FY 92. Due to political unrest in Thailand at the time, however, OSD decided not to include the request for Thailand. Subsequently, the House passed the total dollar authorization, $189,000,000, originally intended for both Korea and Thailand. OSD submitted legislative language to specify WRSA authorization for Thailand. The Senate, however, enacted the House version (H.R. 5368-49), which only mentioned Korea.

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[25]J411 HistSum Nov 92 (U).
[26]AMEMB Seoul 13348/240259Z Dec 92 (U).
[27]J411 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

(U) On 23 October 1992, the Vice Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, asked each Service to provide details on what contributions to the WRSA stockpile in the ROK were planned during FY 93. With data currently available, Service contributions to ROK WRSA alone in FY 93 were not expected to exceed the Congressional ceiling of $189,000,000, originally intended for both Korea and Thailand, authorized by the FY 93 Foreign Operations Bill.

(U) The Joint Staff also asked for Services' views on requesting legislation to enable the reallocation of $20,000,000 from the ROK ceiling to complete the fourth and fifth year of the WRSA stockpile in Thailand. Assets to complete to five-year, $50,000,000 program for the WRSA-Thai stockpile had already been identified, but could not be moved prior to obtaining Congressional approval for the increased WRSA ceiling. The first three of five planned deliveries were made to Thailand from FY 88 to FY 90.

Republic of Korea Operation DESERT STORM Funds

(U) Efforts were continuing to obligate the uncommitted balance of the Republic of Korea's contributions for the Gulf War. Approximately $81,500,000 of the $155,000,000 originally donated for transportation assistance was committed or obligated on airlift or sealift by January 1992. About $21,500,000 of the $50,000,000 originally donated for materiel assistance-in-kind was committed to purchases of Korea-produced items meeting U.S. specifications. These items were to replace losses to USFK inventories drawn-down to support DESERT STORM.[28]

(U) In February 1992, the ROK Ministry of National Defense and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) agreed upon categories and amounts to obligate the balance of the ROK Government's Gulf War

[28]J411 HistSum Jan 92 (U).

contribution. In late March, the President of the ROK, Roh Tae Woo, approved the obligation of the $103,500,000 in uncommitted ROK Operation DESERT STORM dollars against various logistics, construction, and training facility upgrades. Completion of these projects will significantly enhance wartime readiness and sustainability on the Korean Peninsula. The approved list of projects was:[29]

PROJECT	AMOUNT
War Reserve Stocks for Allies Ammunition	$12,000,000
Construction of Billeting at Osan Air Base	14,500,000
Trans-Korea Pipeline Storage	2,500,000
OA-10 Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement (LASTE) Modification	1,250,000
Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) Upgrade	750,000
Chinhae Ammo Pier Construction	40,000,000
Railroad Flatcars	6,400,000
Materiel and Equipment for USFK	19,100,000
Materiel Handling Equipment	7,000,000
TOTAL	$103,500,000

Bilateral Training and Consultative Group

(U) The eighth Bilateral Training and Consultative (BITAC) Group, composed of representatives of the U.S. and Malaysia, convened in January 1992 at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. The Combined Logistics Working Group (CLWG) agreed to several observation and site visits to U.S. bases in Japan and Korea throughout 1992. Further, plans for the 1992 program included pre-site and site surveys for navy-to-navy Integrated Logistics System (ILS) and satellite communications (SATCOM) assistance. The long-term goals of these initiatives was to provide assistance to develop and implement ILS and SATCOM in the Royal

[29]J411 HistSum Feb 92 (S), DECL OADR; J411 HistSum Mar 92 (U).

Malaysian Navy (RMN). USARPAC experts were to continue presentations on automated logistics, providing the Malaysian Army with an improvement survey and a follow-on improvement in progress review. Plans to discuss ILS for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) were also underway. Finally, U.S. logisticians introduced a draft Logistics Standard Operating Procedure to the BITAC forum which would be staffed in the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) with a counter draft due later. Bilateral agreement on the need for new Terms of Reference for the CLWG would result in a 1992 rewrite.[30]

(U) BITAC mid-term discussions were held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26-29 May 1992. The Logistics Terms of Reference were revised with administrative changes, but there was no significant change in scope from the original proposal. The Malaysian Logistics Delegation responded to the U.S. January 1992 proposed logistics standard operating procedures with a partial counter proposal. A cursory review of the document was done during the discussions and objections to the surcharges for fuel and transportation were raised. Although the Malaysians injected wording to effect surcharges in these areas, it was not allowed in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding (SOFA/MOU). A detailed review and comparison of the U.S. original proposal to the counterproposal was required. The counter proposal reflected extensive changes in terminology and format, although the impact was unclear at the time. Mutual agreement to exchange a complete counterproposal and work toward a February 1993 signature during the Ninth BITAC was noted in the official record of the discussions. Overall, the mid-term discussions were a positive step in the U.S.-Malaysia logistics relationship.[31]

[30]J412 Hist Sum Jan 92 (U).
[31]J412 HistSum May 92 (U).

Australia/U.S. Navy Pilot Repair Program

(U) The Navy Pilot Repair Program was initiated in 1985 to introduce Australian industry to the U.S. Navy's Pacific Rim industrial competitive process and to meet future U.S. strategic needs. The program operated under the auspices of the Australia/U.S. Cooperative Defense Logistics Support Agreement with CINCPACFLT as the office of primary responsibility. Both PACFLT and USPACOM supported the program. PACFLT representatives attended a Program Review Meeting held in Australia 9-13 November 1992 which resulted in formally extending the air component Pilot Repair Program through 1994 and a Letter of Arrangement to expand the program from strictly aviation parts to include surface ship parts. Chief of the USCINCPAC International Logistics Division (J41) also suggested using the Pilot Repair Program as part of the infrastructure for the newly proposed Pacific Area Maintenance and Supply Organization (PAMSO).[32]

Australia/U.S. Logistics Working Party and Staff Level Meeting

(U) The 1992 Australia/U.S. Logistics Working Party (LWP) meeting was held at HQ USCINCPAC, Camp Smith, Hawaii, 31 August-4 September 1992. The LWP exchanged organizational and functional briefings and participated in roundtable discussions individually with PACFLT, PACAF, and USARPAC. All three Services discussed logistical support lessons learned by recent bilateral combined exercises such as RIMPAC 92 (mainly Navy) and KANGAROO 92 (mainly Army). One common lesson learned was the need for more "user friendly" guidelines for the use of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. This required that certain aspects of the ANZUS Planning Manual (APM) dealing with administration and logistics be revised. To that end, the LWP developed guidelines for the separate military service components

[32]J413 HistSum Nov 92; J413 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

to use to develop implementing procedures. The guidelines would lead to component instructions for the use of ACSA, thereby deleting the need for separate negotiated implementing arrangements for every U.S.-Australia exercise. LWP was to provide a "strawman" of these guidelines to the Logistics Review Talks meeting to be held at HQ USCINCPAC.[33]

(U) The minutes of the LWP were reviewed at the Australia-U.S. Staff Level Meeting (SLM) 92-2 held in Darwin, Australia, 25-26 October. The SLM accepted the recommendations of the LWP minutes with some qualifications:[34]

- The proposed rewrite to Chapter X to the ANZUS Planning Manual (APM), which provided more specific guidance on logistics planning for exercises and contingencies and incorporated USCINCPAC's two-tiered command and control concept. The LWP proposed their rewrite replace Chapters X and XII (Logistics and Administration) of the current Planning Manual. The SLM accepted the proposed Chapter X, but agreed that it should be validated in conjunction with the remainder of the revised APM during SIMEX VI and that the LWP complete subsequent review action by the end of 1993.
- The SLM agreed that the current and projected workload of the LWP probably supported the need for biannual meetings in the short term. The SLM did not feel that a change to the LWP Terms of Reference was necessary and proposed that the requirements for biannual meeting would be reviewed at each SLM.

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar XXI

(U) The Twenty-first Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS XXI) was held in Cairns, Australia, 27 April-2 May 1992. All thirteen of the member nations attended, to include the Commonwealth of Australia, People's Republic of

[33]J413 HistSum Sep 92 (U);
[34]J413 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

Bangladesh, Canada, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Solomon Islands, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Kingdom of Thailand, Kingdom of Tonga, and the United States of America. Fiji was inducted as a new, fourteenth member. Observer nations in attendance were Chile, Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Kiribati, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, and Western Samoa, with first-time attendance by Comoros, India, Mongolia, and Seychelles. This was the largest seminar to date with 120 delegates from 28 nations attending.[35]

(U) This year's theme was "Logistics Cooperation: A Key to the Future." Admiral Larson, USCINCPAC, and the Chief of the Australian Defence Force, General Peter C. Gration, made special presentations. RADM Ryan, USCINCPAC/J4 and PASOLS Secretariat, co-hosted with Major General Gower, Assistance Chief of the Defence Force for Logistics.

(U) Delegates explored ways member countries could cooperate in emergency and environmental issues through logistics support arrangements and in responding to natural disasters. Panel discussions led to approval of the following initiatives:

- Energy and Environmental Panel: Develop and distribute a checklist of environmental concerns that should be addressed during all exercise planning. Additionally, develop an Environmental Protection Handbook to highlight standards and goals that had been established in some members' countries and the actions and technologies begin pursued to achieve those standards.
- Logistics Support Arrangement Panel: Develop an educational document to describe the purpose, function, benefit, principles, objectives, form, and language of cooperative arrangements.

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[35]J413 HistSum Apr 92 (U).

• Disaster Response Panel: Investigate use of regional organizations to provide a multi-lateral umbrella for planning and responding to natural disasters. Additionally, develop a disaster response handbook to synopsize the essential information necessary to coordinate what is available from different nations and relief organizations.

(U) The next PASOLS (PASOLS XXII) was to be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in early 1993. The midterm Project Development Committee (PDC) met in Colombo 24 September 1992 to organize the meeting. Eleven of 14 member nations were represented, with only Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and Solomon Islands unable to attend. The PDC membership voted unanimously to invite Russia as an observer nation to PASOLS XXII in Colombo. PASOLS members also unanimously approved Malaysia's request for membership.[36] Panel topics were selected and panel discussion guides were drafted. The selected topics were:[37]

• Sri Lanka Case Studies. To provide possible solutions to problems identified by the host country.

• Cooperative Acquisition and Logistics Support Arrangements. To improve international logistics cooperation in order to realize national resource savings.

• Supporting United Nations Peace Keeping Operations. Intended to educate delegates on UN organizational logistics capabilities and weaknesses.

• Coordinating and Controlling Disaster Relief Operations. To explore the possibility of developing regional disaster coordinating bodies.

(U) One of the significant accomplishments of the September PDC was the discussion of the PASOLS objectives and future. The PDC attendees recognized the need for a focused approach for PASOLS to produce long-range, tangible results.

[36]SAO Kuala Lumpur 08692/230819Z Oct 92 (U).
[37]Ibid.; J4121 HistSum Sep 92 (U).

Pacific Area Cooperation in Acquisition and Logistics

(U) One of the discussion topics planned for PASOLS XXII in 1993 was Pacific Area Cooperative Acquisition and Logistics (PACAL) support arrangements. Canada introduced the topic as a result of U.S.-Australia-Canada ministerial talks during the summer of 1992, which tasked the three countries to explore the concept of a cooperative logistics organization for Pacific nations. Representatives from all three countries met in Washington, D.C., on 17-18 December 1992 to discuss the best way to introduce the concept at PASOLS XXII. The December Working Group meeting proposed a concept titled "PACAL." The goals of PACAL were to:

- Improve operational capability and reduce acquisition and logistics costs.
- Increase economic access and development among Pacific countries.
- Encourage interoperability and sustainability with friends and allies.
- Increase production and technology cooperation.

(U) The concept was for PACAL to identify logistics acquisition and support areas which had a potential for cost savings resulting from consolidating requirements and forming cooperative arrangements. If sufficient countries chose to participate in a cooperative initiative, PACAL would provide the coordinating framework to bring the countries together. Canada, with U.S. and Australian support, would introduce the concept at PASOLS XXII. It was hoped that sufficient interest would be generated to form a multi-national work group to develop a charter for PACAL and propose pilot programs to test the concept.[38]

[38]J41 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

Visit of Mr. Raymond N. Sturgeon, Chief of Supply, Canadian Department of National Defence

(U) Mr. Raymond N. Sturgeon, Chief of Supply, Canadian Department of National Defence, accompanied by Major General Dick Oldford, Chief of Maintenance and Engineering, Brigadier General Bill Leach, Director, General Supply Systems, and Mr. Russ Butler, Special Assistant to Mr. Sturgeon, visited U.S. Pacific Command on 24 April 1992. Following an office call on the USCINCPAC Acting Director for Logistics and Security Assistance, the party received the Pacific Command Strategy Briefing. In turn, Brigadier General Leach spoke on the logistics organization of the Canadian Department of Defence, and its Integration of Single-Service Supply and Engineering Functions, which essentially, was one supply system for all three services at all levels. Afterwards, a roundtable discussion was held with representatives of USCINCPAC's Component commands. Highlights included the environment, economic interaction, AIDS, and the desirability of civilian or military exchange officers with USPACOM. The discussions continued lunch and proved useful to the Canadians as they prepared for the following week's PASOLS XXI in Australia.[39]

Visit of Brigadier General Ahn Kwang Nam

(U) Brigadier General Ahn Kwang Nam, Assistant Chief of Staff, C-4, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), visited HQ USCINCPAC and the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate on 13 November 1992. Following an office call on the Deputy CINCPAC, the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance hosted a Pacific Command Strategy Briefing and roundtable discussion with all the Service Component logistics chiefs. The objectives were to provide Brigadier General Ahn with an

[39]J411 HistSum Apr 92 (U)

orientation on USCINCPAC's role in providing wartime support to the Republic of Korea.[40]

(U) the visit also provided an opportunity to advise Brigadier General Ahn of USCINCPAC concerns over the effects of ROK defense acquisitions from non-U.S. sources on interoperability within CFC. Brigadier General Ahn was also briefed on the USTRANSCOM Containerization Initiative, and pledged his support for alternative planning in the event TEAM SPIRIT 93 was canceled.

(U) Brigadier General Ahn arrived following visits to the U.S. Army I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, the Defense District Region-West in Oakland, California, and the 311th Corps Support Command in Los Angeles, California. He departed Hawaii for Japan, where he would continue his orientation with visits to U.S. Army Japan, Sagami Supply Depot, and Akizuki Ammunition Depot.

[40]J411 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

SECTION II--LOGISTICS RESOURCES

USAF Prepositioned Ship Crossload in Thailand

(U) Chief, JUSMAGTHAI was granted permission to conduct USAF Prepositioned Ship Operations in Thailand by the Thai Ministry of Defense (MOD) on 27 April 1992. This culminated a nine-month USCINCPAC effort to locate a suitable port in which to load two USAF preposition ships with munitions for eventual stationing in the USPACOM area of responsibility.[41]

(U) A total of three ships were involved in the operation which began on 30 May and was completed on 8 August 1992. One ship, SS BUYER, functioned as a feeder ship to the two preposition ships. The U.S. Navy Mobile Ammunition Evaluation and Renovation Unit (MAERU) conducted the crossload of over 8,650 short tons of USAF munitions. The MAERU contracted with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) for the use of Thung Proung Pier in Sattahip, Thailand, with associated facilities and stevedores. The SS BUYER's munitions cargo was downloaded, inspected, and uploaded onto two Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) vessels, SS AUSTRAL RAINBOW and SS AMERICAN KESTRAL. These LASH vessels were part of the USAF segment of the Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF).[42]

(U) The successful crossload operation established a baseline for potential future ship-based munitions maintenance and inspection operations in Thailand. It also provided an opportunity to establish an alternate location and infrastructure for long-term maintenance operations that could expand beyond munitions.[43]

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41 J4231 HistSum Jan 92 (U); J4231 HistSum Apr 92 (U); MG Montri Eaimudom, Asst Director of Joint Logistics, Ltr (U) to Col William G. Lutz, Chief, Army Division, JUSMAGTHAI, 27 Apr 92; COMSC 251523Z Jun 92 (S), DECL OADR.

42 J4231 HistSum Jul 92 (U); J4232 HistSum Aug 92 (U); J4232 Point Paper (U), 19 Oct 92, Subj: USPACOM Munitions in Thailand.

43 J4232 Point Paper (U), 19 Oct 92, Subj: USPACOM Munitions in Thailand.

War Reserve Stockpile - Thailand

(S) The U.S. and Thailand signed a five-year war reserve stockpile agreement in January 1987, which was subsequently approved by Congress in December of the same year. Under the terms of the agreement both the U.S. and Thailand were to contribute equally to the stockpile $10,000,000 each per year for five years based on Thai military requirements. The U.S. portion was referred to as War Reserve Stockpile - Thailand (WRS-Thai), and the Thai contribution was known as Stock-Thai.[44]

(U) The first three years' contribution was delivered. The fourth-year WRS-Thai contribution was scheduled for delivery early in 1992, with the possibility of combining fourth and fifth year contributions which would complete the initial five-year, $50,000,000 program. The Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill for FY 92/93, however, was defeated by the U.S. House of Representatives on 30 October 1991. The authorized War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) ceilings expired on 30 October 1991 and were not continued under Continuing Resolutions. Proposed authorization language again was not included in a second Continuing Resolution. The next opportunity to renew funding for the WRS-Thai contributions was the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 93. The new plan was to deliver the fourth and fifth year contributions early in 1993.[45]

(U) On 7 April 1992, General Suchinda Kraprayoon resigned as army commander and became prime minister of Thailand. The ensuing demonstrations demanded constitutional amendments to increase the power of elected officials and to make the prime minister an elected member of the National Assembly. Then on 17-20 May 1992, Thai troops and police broke up a pro-democracy demonstration march in Bangkok and the government declared a

[44]USCINCPAC Command History 1991 (S/FRD/NF/WN/NC), Vol. I, pp. 220-222 (S), DECL OADR.
[45]USCINCPAC 150100Z Feb 92 (U); J4231 Point Paper (U), 29 Apr 92, Subj: U.S. Munitions Initiatives in Thailand.

state of emergency. The Thai Government acknowledged 40 deaths and 600 injuries from troops firing into the crowd of demonstrators. The reaction of the U.S. Congress was to drop Thailand from the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 93. The Bill only authorized continuation of the Korea and Israel WRSA programs. As of the end of 1992, the Joint Staff and DOD were attempting to insert the WRS-Thai program authorization language into one of the upcoming bills in order to obtain funding to execute the delivery of the fourth and fifth year contributions.[46]

Logistics Management Institute Feasibility Study

(U) USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance (J4) hosted a Logistics Management Institute (LMI) feasibility study briefing on 10 November 1992. Pursuant to a DA contract, LMI surveyed port facilities on mainland Japan, Okinawa, and Thailand to determine the feasibility of establishing a site in USPACOM's area of responsibility for pre-positioning ship asset maintenance. Even after their survey, LMI continued to favor the current East Coast site at Charleston, South Carolina, as opposed to adding a second site in the Pacific, which was the desire of USCINCPAC. A secondary purpose for the LMI visit was to prebrief USCINCPAC J4 and Component commands on the preliminary results of LMI's West Coast Container Port study. Again, LMI's recommendations opposed USCINCPAC's desires. USCINCPAC's position had always been that a containerized munitions distribution capability was imperative in the Pacific theater, particularly since breakbulk shipping worldwide was declining in favor of containerized shipping. USCINCPAC J4 reiterated USPACOM's position during the General Officer Steering Committee deliberations in November 1992.[47]

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[46]J4232 Point Paper (U), 19 Oct 92, Subj: USPACOM Munitions in Thailand.
[47]J4232 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board Survey

(U) The Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) conducted an Explosive Safety Survey of munitions storage sites in Korea 9 September through 30 October 1992. USCINCPAC J4 received DDESB's preliminary results outbrief on 2 November 1992. No major explosive safety problems were identified by the Board.[48]

U.S. Ship Repair in Southeast Asia

(U) U.S. efforts to obtain access to ship repair facilities in Southeast Asia were being shaped by the loss of Subic Naval Shipyard, Singapore's offer of facilities, desire for increased access, and the need to decrease the number of steaming days. The U.S. had increased the frequency and duration of ship visits to Singapore and was in the process of concluding Master Ship Repair Agreements with Lumut Naval Shipyard, Malaysia, and P.T. Pal Shipyard, Indonesia. COMLOG WESTPAC (formerly CTF-73) moved to Singapore during the Summer of 1992. Its mission was to provide logistics support to ships of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet. A ship repair unit was being established as a subordinate of COMLOG WESTPAC to support the influx of work in the region. The overall concept of ship maintenance in Southeast Asia was to accomplish "voyage repairs." Large scale maintenance activities were not planned.[49]

Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell Logistics Representation

(U) During the last fiscal quarter of 1992, the J4 logistics representative deployed in support of three joint task force (JTF) operations. The first deployment, 1-24 July 1992, was in support of Exercise TANDEM THRUST. During the deployment

[48] J4232 HistSum Nov 92 (U).
[49] J5121 Information Paper (S), 8 May 92, Subj: U.S. Ship Repair in Southeast Asia (U), DECL OADR.

aboard USS CORONADO (AGF 11), the logistics representative provided joint logistics expertise to the Commander, THIRD Fleet, who was designated JTF Commander. As a member of the JTF staff, the logistics representative aided in the development of the Commander's Estimate, the Operations Order, and the Campaign Plan, all of which were designed to meet the objectives of the TANDEM THRUST mission.[50]

(U) The second deployment, 29 August-13 September 1992, was in support of Typhoon OMAR disaster relief efforts. During this deployment to Guam, the logistics representative provided support to the Commander, Joint Task Force Marianas. In addition to the logistics expertise provided for the development of formal planning and execution documents, the logistics representative also oversaw the requirements identification, air and sea movement and subsequent receipt and distribution of disaster relief supplies and equipment, and the daily JTF logistics brief and situation report update.

(U) The third and final deployment of the quarter, 13-25 September 1992, was in support of Exercise TEMPO BRAVE. This deployment to Yokosuka, Japan, was in support of the Commander, SEVENTH Fleet in his designated role as JTF Commander. In addition to the accomplishment of all standard planning documentation, this marked the first time a time phased force deployment list (TPFDL) was used to plan the flow of forces in support of a regional contingency during a crisis action exercise.[51]

Annual Joint Mortuary Affairs Office, Pacific Conference

(U) The Joint Mortuary Affairs Office, Pacific (JMAO-PAC) conducted its annual conference and training workshop at HQ USCINCPAC 2-13 March 1992. It was attended by reservists assigned

[50] J4241 HistSum Sep 92 (U).
[51] Ibid.

to JMAO-PAC and representatives of component and subunified commands. Conferees reviewed and updated policy and instructional guidance, made on-site field visits to area installations affecting JMAO-PAC operations, and participated in discussions on DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM mortuary operations. a highlight of the conference as the teleconference between the Quartermaster School at Fort Lee, Virginia, and conference attendees. This event was conducted at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, utilizing their audio and video teleconferencing network. Through this medium, much information concerning DESERT STORM. activities was shared by LTC Rex Reed, commander of one of the two Theater Evacuation points during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.[52]

[52]J4241 HistSum Mar 92 (U).

USPACOM SUSTAINABILITY POSTURE
FOR SELECTED CLASSES OF SUPPLY
AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1992

CLASS OF SUPPLY	EUSA[1]			USARPAC[2]			PACFLT[3]			PACAF[4]			MARFORPAC			REMARKS
	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	*S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY [a]	PERCENT ON HAND [a]	*S-RATING [a]	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	*S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	*S-RATING	DAYS OF SUPPLY	PERCENT ON HAND	*S-RATING	
I SUBSISTENCE	30	100	1	15	100	1	72	96	1	39	65	3	60	100	1	a. TR-9 (25th ID). b. To be supplemented by USPACOM contingency acquisition program. c. S-rating driven by shortage of critical modern munitions. d. Tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons. Vehicles were S-1. e. War readiness spares kits/ base level self-sufficiency spares only, not part of sustainability 30-day objective. f. U.S. only. g. Ownership and distribution turned over to the Defense Logistics Agency.
II CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT	7	23	4	6	24	4	80	89	2	56	93	1	26	43	4	
IV BARRIER[b]	75	NA	1	15	100	1	NA	NA	NA	30	100	1[f]	44	73	3	
V AMMUNITION (Level of Effort / Threat)	33[f] / NA	75[f] / NA	3[f]	26 / NA	53 / NA	3[e]	57 / NA	126 / 72	2[e]	106 / NA	177 / 128	2[e]	47 / NA	86 / 100	2[e]	
VII SELECT END ITEMS	8	28	4	2	9	4	22	37	29	57	95	1[d]	27	45	4	
VIII MEDICAL	25	83	2	2	13	4	52	70	3	27	90	1	37	62	3	
IX REPAIR PARTS	28	93	1	10	66	3	85	95	1[g]	53	89	2[e]	56	95	1	

1. All data based on 30-day objective (Class V 45-day).
2. All data based on 15-day objective (Class V 45-day).
3. Supply classes I, II, IV, VIII, and IX include peacetime operating stocks, which are basis for S-ratings. Classes I, II, IV, VII, VIII, and IX, Navy prepositioned war reserve stock not designated by theater.
4. All data based on 60-day objective (except Class IV, based on 30-day objective).

* S-Rating (Percent of 60-day Defense Guidance objective except as noted):
S-1 Fully Combat Sustainable (90-100%)
S-2 Substantially Combat Sustainable (75-89%)
S-3 Marginally Combat Sustainable (50-74%)
S-4 Not Combat Sustainable (0-49%)

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (~~S/NF~~), DECL:OADR.

BULK PETROLEUM DATA-USPACOM
1992 ISSUES AND RECEIPTS

USPACOM CY 1992 BULK PETROLEUM STATISTICS
(IN THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)

RECEIPTS

LOCATION	JP4/JP8	JP5	DIESEL	MOGAS	TOTALS	Percent of Total Receipts
ALASKA/ALEUTIANS	1,716.1	314.5	1.7	21.4	2,056.7	14.8
HAWAII	1,171.0	184.2	126.4	0.0	1,481.6	10.4
MID-PAC ISLANDS	0.0	206.1	321.8	0.0	527.9	3.8
GUAM	360.6	0.0	650.3	0.0	1,010.9	7.3
JAPAN	3,072.2	733.0	2,127.2	430.4	6,362.8	45.8
KOREA	868.8	0.0	842.9	0.0	1,702.7	12.3
PHILIPPINES	0.0	121.0	126.5	0.0	247.5	1.8
SINGAPORE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DIEGO GARCIA	0.0	208.2	321.8	0.0	528.0	3.8
TOTALS	7,181.7	1,736.0	4,518.8	451.8	13,887.1	
% Total Receipts	51.7	12.5	32.5	3.3		

ISSUES

LOCATION	JP4/JP8	JP5	DIESEL	MOGAS	TOTALS	Percent of Total Issues
ALASKA/ALEUTIANS	2,712.4	882.0	15.7	42.4	3,452.5	17.4
HAWAII	1,490.8	936.4	1,300.8	0.0	3,727.0	18.7
MID-PAC ISLANDS	0.0	373.3	250.8	8.2	632.3	3.2
GUAM	326.3	81.1	662.2	17.3	1,086.9	5.5
JAPAN	3,303.5	713.9	2,086.6	307.1	6,411.1	32.3
KOREA	1,188.5	0.0	769.8	59.7	2,015.3	10.2
PHILIPPINES	0.0	316.2	836.8	37.4	1,226.4	6.2
SINGAPORE	0.0	87.5	684.5	0.0	771.5	3.9
DIEGO GARCIA	0.0	186.3	343.2	8.9	518.4	2.6
TOTALS	9,020.5	3,380.2	6,947.4	481.0	19,838.4	
% Total Issues	46.5	17.1	35.0	2.4		

1992 BULK FUEL RECEIPTS
(ALL PRODUCTS)



TOTAL RECEIPTS - 13,887.1 MBBLS

1992 BULK FUEL RECEIPTS
(ALL LOCATIONS)



TOTAL RECEIPTS - 13,887 MBBLS

1992 BULK FUEL ISSUES
(ALL PRODUCTS)



TOTAL ISSUES - 19,839 MBBLS

1992 BULK FUEL ISSUES
(ALL LOCATIONS)



TOTAL ISSUES - 19,839 MBBLS

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (S/NF), DECL:OADR.

UNCLASSIFIED

BULK PETROLEUM DATA-USPACOM
1992 INVENTORY AND STORAGE CAPACITY

USPACOM CY 1992 BULK PETROLEUM STATISTICS
(IN THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)

LOCATION	WEEKLY AVERAGE JP4/JP8	JP5	USABLE DIESEL	STORAGE MOGAS	CAPACITY TOTALS	Percent Total Avg. of Cap.
ALASKA/ALEUTIANS	1,496.0	718.0	75.0	75.0	2,366.0	7.9
HAWAII	585.4	2,177.3	3,569.9	0.0	6,332.6	21.3
MID-PAC ISLANDS	0.0	553.0	100.3	19.1	672.4	2.3
GUAM	2,135.5	843.4	685.0	53.0	3,716.9	12.5
JAPAN	4,319.5	2,357.3	3,775.5	275.5	10,727.8	36.1
KOREA	1,546.8	0.0	601.4	142.1	2,290.1	7.7
PHILIPPINES	0.0	794.0	884.6	101.0	1,779.6	6.0
SINGAPORE	58.3	526.0	392.0	0.0	974.3	3.2
DIEGO GARCIA	0.0	546.5	343.5	13.1	903.1	3.0
TOTALS	10,141.3	8,515.5	10,427.2	878.8	29,762.8	
% Total Avg. Cap.	33.9	28.7	35.1	2.3		

LOCATION	WEEKLY AVERAGE JP4/JP8	JP5	BULK DIESEL	FUEL MOGAS	INVENTORIES TOTALS	Percent Total Avg. of Inv.
ALASKA/ALEUTIANS	847.0	436.0	24.0	28.0	1,335.0	5.7
HAWAII	345.8	2,003.3	3,356.5	0.0	5,705.6	24.5
MID-PAC ISLANDS	0.0	375.8	62.9	10.3	449.0	1.9
GUAM	1,677.5	738.1	481.8	10.4	2,907.8	12.5
JAPAN	3,685.8	1,908.8	3,448.0	149.1	9,191.7	39.4
KOREA	1,218.8	0.0	388.4	90.5	1,697.7	7.3
PHILIPPINES	0.0	420.8	285.1	19.4	725.1	3.1
SINGAPORE	55.5	273.4	310.8	0.0	639.7	2.7
DIEGO GARCIA	0.0	446.1	221.0	9.5	676.6	2.9
TOTALS	7,830.4	6,602.1	8,578.5	317.2	23,328.2	
% Total Avg. Inv.	33.6	28.3	36.8	1.4		

1992 WEEKLY USABLE CAPACITY
(ALL PRODUCTS)



TOTAL WEEKLY AVG. CAP. - 29,762.8 MBBLS

1992 WEEKLY AVG. CAPACITY
(ALL LOCATIONS)



TOTAL WEEKLY AVG. CAP. - 29,762.8 MBBLS

1992 WEEKLY AVG. INVENTORY
(ALL PRODUCTS)



TOTAL WEEKLY AVG. INV. - 23,328.2 MBBLS

1992 WEEKLY AVG. INVENTORY
(ALL LOCATIONS)



TOTAL WEEKLY AVG. INV. - 23,328.2 MBBLS

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS PLANS

Cyclone FORREST and Typhoon GAY Disaster Relief

(U) The HQ USCINCPAC Mobility Operations and Logistics Plans Division (J43) was tasked to provide a transportation planner to the Disaster Response Team on 19 November 1992, and actively man the Deployment Management Team (DMT) within the Crisis Action Center (CAC) for 24-hour operations beginning on 20 November, in anticipation of disaster relief operations in Bangladesh (Cyclone FORREST) and Guam (Typhoon GAY). The III MEF at Okinawa was tasked to provide the CJTF for Bangladesh relief and began preparations to deploy. In the last hour before landfall, Cyclone FORREST weakened considerably and moved ashore in Burma rather than Bangladesh. The storm caused extensive squalls and rainfall, but little damage. Typhoon GAY passed over the northern tip of Guam, but caused no significant damage. The DMT was inactivated on 21 November 1992.[53]

Disaster Relief Operations

(U) The Deployment Management Team (DMT) continued to provide transportation coordination and support for Guam following Typhoon OMAR and Kauai following Hurricane INIKI. In November, the DMT was again activated to provide anticipated support in the wake of Tropical Cyclone FORREST as it bore down on Bangladesh. When that mission did not materialize, the DMT continued to be manned in anticipation of requirements arising out of Typhoon GAY's approach to Guam. Although Typhoon GAY did little damage to Guam, it did inflict significant damage to several atolls in the Marshall Islands. On 16 December 1992, President Bush declared that damage in certain areas of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), resulting from Typhoon GAY on 17-18 November 1992, warranted a major disaster

[53]J4311 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

declaration. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) procured 82 short tons of disaster relief supplies and requested the DMT coordinate military air support to move those supplies from Hawaii to Kwajalein and Majuro. Because the ongoing Somalia relief operations had drained most available airlift resources, the Air Mobility Command (AMC) 1B1 airlift priority allocated to FEMA would probably not have supported a special assignment airlift mission. The existing priority 1A3 Kwajalein channel was used to support the relief effort with a goal to have all the DOD-consigned cargo lifted by 22 December 1992. That target was met. In addition, FEMA elected to commercially charter an Air Marshall Islands aircraft to move cargo over and above channel capacity to Kwajalein.[54]

Exercise TEMPO BRAVE 92

(U) Exercise TEMPO BRAVE 92 (TB 92) was undertaken even as Hurricane INIKI disaster relief operations were ongoing. Logistics play was supported by the Master Scenario Events Lists (MSELs) previously developed for the exercise. TB 92 was unique in that it was supported by the Gaming and Simulation facilities as well as player cells such as the Operations Planning Team (OPT), the Deployment Management Team, and a liaison team from TRANSCOM, while the real-world relief effort to Kauai was being planned and executed.

(U) Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development, validation, and notional flow were major training activities for the USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance and DMT representatives involved in this exercise, both in the USCINCPAC CAT and deployed on the DJTFAC. TPFDD was constructed and related message traffic promulgated using Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems (WWMCCS). Some components, however, had no access, and others had limited or

54J431 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

remotely located access. This created problems with validation and correcting errors. Another problem continues to be a lack of qualified WWMCCS and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) operators with sufficient experience to make timely, accurate inputs and corrections.[55]

Exercise COBRA GOLD 92

(U) The Final Planning Conference for COBRA GOLD 92 (CG 92) was conducted in Bangkok, Thailand, 1-6 March 1992. Final adjustments were made to the airlift and sealift schedules for deployment and redeployment. Strategic lift allocations were 2,140 C-141 equivalent airlift hours and 110 sealift days.[56]

(U) Deployment began with the embarkation of U.S. Army assets at Tacoma, Washington, on 21 March 1992. CG 92 deployment continued with the first of 49 airlift missions commencing 19 April and was scheduled to run through 10 May. USNS MERCURY (T-AGM 21)uploaded at Pearl Harbor 4-6 April, and arrived at Sattahip, Thailand, and offloaded 25-26 April. USARPAC had arranged funding for Military Customs Inspection Program (MCIP) support; COMUSJAPAN was providing a joint MCIP team to perform pre-inspection and pre-clearance operations at redeployment aerial ports and Sattahip.[57]

(U) The CG 92 deployment was uneventful; however, as the political situation in Thailand became unsettled in mid-May, the decision was made to terminate the exercise and redeploy the force early. Because of the rescheduled airflow and the desire for timely information and coordination, the Deployment Management Team was activated. By 31 May 1992, only six redeployment missions remained to be flown.[58]

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[55]J4311 HistSum Sp 92 (U).
[56]J4314 HistSum Mar 92 (U).
[57]USCINCPAC 050130Z May 92 (U); J4314 HistSum May 92 (U).
[58]J4314 HistSum May 92 (U).

C-17 Aircraft Payload Reduction

(U) Revised performance specifications for the C-17 aircraft were presented by CJCS and Director Joint Staff (DJS) for USCINCPAC's comment. This change established the maximum payload at 160,000 pounds vice 172,000 pounds over 2,400 nautical miles. It was the third drop in payload since 1981. Feed-back from CINCPAC components indicated the aircraft was still viable. The CINC's message back to CJCS mirrored the responses from the other theater commanders, i.e., reduction in performance specifications did not reduce the military utility of the C-17 below the level needed. The reduction in payload, however, would require more aircraft be allocated to USPACOM OPLAN requirements to ensure force closure was not degraded.[59]

C-20s in USPACOM

(U) Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) requested that OSD provide $93,000,000 to purchase three Grumman GULFSTREAM C-20 aircraft. These aircraft were to be used for passenger travel (including VIP travel) and to ship small amounts of cargo. Originally, one aircraft was to be stationed at MCAS Futenma on Okinawa to replace the retired North American T-39 SABRELINER, while the other two would be assigned to Naval Air Facility (NAF) Washington, near Andrews AFB, Maryland, to be operated by the Reserves. The Reserves were to rotate the C-20 and a C-9 into WESTPAC detachments. The stationing plans for the three C-20s changed, however, to meet the language in the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report when the funding was approved.[60]

[59]USCINCPAC 242300Z Jun 92 (U); J4312 HistSum Jun 92 (U).
[60]J4312 HistSum Jun 92 (U); J432 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

(U) The SASC report stated that "...these aircraft are to be operated in the U.S. Pacific Command area, to include Alaska, in support of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and all Service components in his region. CINCPAC shall ensure that all organizations have access to and are supported by these aircraft." To satisfy Congress, Chief of Naval Operations decided to assign one C-20 aircraft to MCAS Futenma and two aircraft to Hawaii. A Navy team performed site surveys of Barbers Point and Hickam AFB during the week of 7-11 December 1992.[61]

USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027-95 Validation and Refinement Conferences

[redacted]

OPLAN 5027-95 Force Validation Conference

(U) The Director for Strategic Planning and Policy hosted the Force Validation Conference for OPLAN 5027-95 at HQ USCINCPAC 23-27 March 1992. Components reviewed and edited their TPFDL and reviewed their combat support and combat service support forces which had been developed by their respective Services. Component TPFDLs were merged and several analyses indicated the need to reorder some forces to eliminate transportation shortfalls and/or redirect forces to other ports of debarkation (PODs) to better balance availability of lift and capability of PODs. TPFDLs were networked through the WWMCCS to Services and DOD logistics agencies on 30-31 March 1992 to begin the logistics sourcing process. Resupply requirements, determined through the sourcing process, were expected to impact time-phasing of forces into the

[61] Ibid.

theater. The first assessment of this was expected during the July Forces and Logistics Refinement Conference at HQ USTRANSCOM. An "off-line" logistics meeting was conducted on 25 March, where logistics representatives from components, USFK/EIGHTH U.S. Army, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and USCINCPAC J4 discussed and coordinated the OPLAN logistics requirements for the July Forces and Logistics Requirements Conference, development of logistics portions of the OPLAN, and methodology for Logistics Sustainability Analysis. The DLA representative coordinated their input to the OPLAN and discussed sourcing issues with components.[62]

OPLAN 5027-95 Forces and Logistics Refinement Conference

(S) The OPLAN 5027-95 Forces and Logistics Refinement Conference was held at HQ USTRANSCOM 14-23 July 1992. The conference was co-chaired by USCINCPAC Chief of Mobility Operations and Logistics Plans Division (J43) and the USCINCPAC Chief of Strategic Plans Division (J54). The conference was attended by representatives from USCINCPAC and components, CINCUNC/CFC, Joint Staff, CINCFOR, COMUSKOREA, COMUSJAPAN, USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM and components, and logistics agencies. The purpose of the Forces and Logistics Refinement Conference for OPLAN 5027-95 was to confirm the forces and logistics infrastructure supporting the OPLAN, to assess the adequacy of combat support and Service support, and to review initial transportation feasibility for the OPLAN. Forces and logistics planners refined the sourcing of forces, coordinated and source non-unit logistics and personnel requirements, and developed a gross transportation feasible Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). No significant forces shortfalls were identified, although material shortfalls existed and would be further assessed to determine whether they were valid or could be resolved. [redacted]

[62]J4323 HistSum Mar 92 (U).



OPLAN 5027-95 Transportation Refinement Conference

(U) The Transportation Refinement Conference for OPLAN 5027-95 was conducted at USTRANSCOM at Scott AFB, Illinois, in December 1992, to refine transportation aspects for the TPFDD, verify transportation feasibility for the TPFDD, and prepare the TPFDD for submission to the Joint Staff for final review. Conference attendees included representatives from USCINCPAC and components, supporting CINCs, CINCUNC/CFC, JCS/J4 and J7, COMUSKOREA, Services, and USCINCTRANS and components. The conference successfully adjusted flow of forces, where possible, to improve closure times and validated transportation feasibility of the TPFDD using a variety of computer models (FLOGEN, SEASTRAT, and STRADS/MAPPS). Other significant conference accomplishments included the correction of TPFDD fatal errors and non-system logical errors, the increased use of available containerization capability, the shift of passenger (PAX) movement from sea to air, and adjustment to the AMC tanker flow

[63] J4322 HistSum Jun 92 (U); J4322 HistSum Jul 92 ~~(S)~~ DECL OADR; Joint Staff 211900Z Sep 92 (U).

to ensure on-time arrival of fighter aircraft during the first ten days. Significant issues arising from the conference included the need to explore further opportunities to improve closure times through increased use of available containerization, COMMARFORPAC's need to input elevated causeways into the TPFDD to meet new operational requirements, and CINCPACFLT's need to input 12 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportioned afloat pre-position ships into the TPFDD.[64]

(U) The conference developed a plan for a six-month TPFDD maintenance cycle beginning in January 1993. Components, would input changes to the new records for four months, then USCINCPAC, assisted by USTRANSCOM, would evaluate the updated TPFDD for the remaining two months of the cycle. A USCINCPAC-hosted TPFDD conference in June 1993 would determine if the new TPFDD met all requirements for entry into the JOPES database.[65]

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Conference

(U) The annual Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Conference was held in Atlanta, Georgia, 19-23 October 1992. The conference focused on several joint issues which were addressed in working groups, such as mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, engineering, systems, and procedures. The current status on various JOPES automated prototypes was presented. One key announcement was the official termination of the WWMCCS Automation Modernization (WAM) project. There would be no further funding for existing or new WAM prototypes. Among several conference issues and actions prioritized to be worked by the JOPES community during the following year were: fielding the Technology Insertion Project (TIP) as soon as possible to the CINCs (this was a group of

[64]J4324 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[65]Ibid.

automated prototypes that were near or at completion), and defining policy and procedures for rapid plan guide.[66]

Customs Inspection

DOD Military Customs Inspection Program Conference

(U) The USCINCPAC coordinator for the USPACOM Military Customs Inspection Program (MCIP) (J4311) attended the DOD MCIP Conference held in Washington, D.C., 23-25 June 1992. Areas of discussion included customs preclearance procedures, program certification, waivers, seizures, selective enforcement, U.S. Customs Service (USCS) threat analysis, lessons learned from Southwest Asia, and the revision of DOD Customs Regulation 5030.49-R. A number of issues were developed for further study and resolution, including funding support for multi-Service military customs inspectors in JCS exercises. A milestone of December 1992 was set for publication of the long overdue revision of DOD Customs Regulation 5030.49-R.[67]

USPACOM Military Customs Inspection Program Conference

(U) USCINCPAC Military Plans and Logistics Division (J43) hosted the USPACOM MCIP Conference at the Hickam AFB, Hawaii, Officers Club 26-30 October 1992. Approximately 60 participants representing all facets of the MCIP, to include military customs inspectors and coordinators from throughout the Pacific Theater, U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Department of Agriculture representatives, and representatives from other associated agencies and organizations were in attendance. Presentations included overviews and status reports from the field. Specialty presentations included: a briefing on the brown tree snake, the environmental and economic impact it has had in Guam and the dire

[66]J432 HistSum Oct 92 (U).
[67]J4311 HistSum Jun 92 (U).

prospects Hawaii faces should the snake become established in Hawaii; a presentation on POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia; presentations on counter-drug operations in USPACOM; and presentations on personal property and household goods shipments within USPACOM by Military Traffic Management Command. The USCS sponsored two days of the conference, offering a symposium covering such areas as passenger profiles, inspection and examination techniques, and general customs laws and regulations. The exchange of information and social interface between attendees was extremely useful. Several minor issues were taken for coordination and action by J43.

U.S. Customs Service Inspection and Clearance of Navy Vessels

(U) USCS announced their intent to revise the system of customs clearance employed for clearing U.S. Navy vessels in USPACOM. The revision would bring Pacific area procedures in line with procedures employed by USCS in the Atlantic area. Task forces or battle groups comprising a large number of vessels or an aircraft carrier had been cleared in USPACOM by sending USCS inspectors to board vessels at the last port of call and travel with the vessels back to Pearl Harbor. While en route, inspectors were ferried to other vessels in the group for customs clearance. This process had been determined by the Pacific Region of USCS to be too dangerous and costly in terms of manpower lost. The trips could take up to two weeks and occur two or three times a year. The revised procedures did not envision the actual boarding of vessels unless there were unusual circumstances, based on the assumption that navy vessels posed little risk for narcotics or merchandise smuggling. Military customs inspectors on board each vessel would assume responsibility for disseminating and then collecting completed customs declaration forms from crew members and coordinating with Customs officials upon arrival. Any duties would be collected by

the customs officials upon arrival. USCS intent was to implement the procedure in USPACOM in second quarter FY 93.[68]

Hawaii Department of Agriculture Alien Pest Species Meeting

(U) The Nature Conservancy of Hawaii completed an 18-month study on "The Alien Species Invasion in Hawaii," and released the study to the media in August 1992. Numerous agencies provided study input, including USCINCPAC J43 with specific information regarding the DOD Military Customs Inspection Program, personal property shipments, and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction over customs violations. A J43 representative attended a meeting in July where the focus was to alert applicable agencies to the imminent release of the study, provide advance copies, and gear everyone for the likely media and environmentalist lobby interest. All study references to DOD activities were forthright and positive.[69]

Brown Tree Snake Seminar

(U) A USCINCPAC representative (J4311) attended a Brown Tree Snake (BTS) seminar conducted by the Hawaii Department of Agriculture on 26 February 1992. The main presentation was made by Mr. M. McCoid, a wildlife biologist on Guam. His presentation had been addressed to the Hawaii State Legislature earlier in the day. He discussed the biology of BTS, the evolution of BTS establishment on Guam, and the threat of BTS spread to other Pacific Islands, noting that BTS was probably now established on Saipan and the current high-threat of BTS spread was to Pohnpei. Mr. McCoid praised the effort of military customs inspectors on Guam, citing their proactive screening of DOD cargoes and conveyances. He also noted that, although several dead and one live BTS had been found on the Hickam AFB tarmac in conjunction

[68]J4311 HistSum Nov 92 (U).
[69]J4311 HistSum Jul 92 (U).

with arrivals of military flights from Guam, none had survived overnight. Mr. McCoid surmised that their mortality lends credence to the improbability of a stowaway BTS readily surviving a six-to-eight-hour flight at a depressurized, sub-freezing 35,000 feet, in an aircraft wheel well. The consensus was that BTS was not currently established in the Hawaiian Islands, but a continuing awareness program to prevent its introduction via the transportation system was required.[70]

Guam Generators

(U) On 12 November 1992, the Governor of Guam requested military airlift of oversized electrical generating equipment from Guam to the Continental United States (CONUS) for repair. Guam agreed to fund the airlift and the Department of the Interior agreed to support an Economy Act request. Because a C-5 was available on Guam at the time, USCINCPAC obtained verbal approval from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense to move the equipment on that aircraft to Travis AFB, California. Since this was a channel mission, the cost to Guam was only $35,425, rather than $129,000 for a Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM). To save funds, Guam arranged for surface movement from Travis AFB to the factory in Miami, Florida.[71]

Transportation Support for Operation Deployment Experiment Simulator Propellant

(U) An Operation Deployment Experiment Simulator (ODES) Propellant Transportation meeting was held at Pearl Harbor 28 July 1992. The meeting was requested by U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC) to discuss issues associated with transportation of ODES propellant to the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Kauai. The meeting was hosted by PACFLT and

[70]J4311 HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[71]J431 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

attended by representatives from USCINCPAC, PACFLT, NAVBASE Pearl Harbor, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor, PMRF, and NASA. Concern was raised by the NAVBASE representative about beach landing via USN landing craft (LCU) at PMRF. The PACFLT representative stated that beach landings are feasible, but surf conditions at PMRF caused serious safety concerns. Because of this safety concern, discussions turned to other methods of transportation. USASDC was going to reconsider their request for waiver to the Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation that prohibited transportation of propellant oxidizer by air transportation. The Army would review the beach survey to see if a logistics support vessel (LSV) operated by the 45th Support Group could make a safe beach landing. PMRF officials informed attendees that a civilian landing craft operated between Kauai and Niihau, and recommended that USASDC contact the landing craft operator to determine the feasibility and cost of using commercial lift to deliver the propellant oxidizer. At the conclusion of the meeting, transportation of the ODES propellant was an unresolved issue. USASDC was to push hard for a DOT waiver, as air shipment appeared to be the safest and smartest way to transport the oxidizer.[72]

Use of Government Transportation at Subic Bay

(U) In response to a CINCPACFLT request for authorization to use government owned or leased transportation assets to expedite orderly withdrawal operations at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines (RP), J43 researched and coordinated authorization options. Withdrawal plans projected that all privately owned vehicles (POV) and Navy Exchange taxi and bus assets would be shipped or disposed of by 30 September 1992. No adequate commercial or municipal mass transit services were available. United States Code Title 10, Section 2637 provided that SECDEF may authorize the commander of a unified combatant

[72]USCINCPAC 040230Z Feb 92 (U); J4313 HistSum Jul 92 (U).

command to use government owned or leased vehicles to provide transportation in an area outside the United States for members of the uniformed Services and Federal civilian employees under the jurisdiction of that commander, and for the dependents of such members and employees if the commander determined that public or private transportation was unsafe or not available. SECDEF further delegated authority to the unified combatant commanders to implement Title 10, Section 2637 provisions as required. USCINCPAC granted the authorization to CINCPACFLT, effective 15 August 1992 for an initial 90-day period, expiring 13 November 1992.[73]

Delong Piers

(U) On 13 July 1992, HQ Department of the Army explained specific procedures for purchasing Delong piers by Services and foreign governments. Seven piers were offered for sale: four in Korea, one in Japan, and two in England. Army Troop Support Command (TROSCOM) was prepared to dispatch marine surveyors to conduct a joint inspection and survey of the piers with representatives from interested agencies. Upon determination and negotiation of a mutually agreed price, funds would be transferred to the Army. Direct coordination was authorized between interested Service components and the TROSCOM purchasing agent. Potential contingency use of the Delong Piers to support U.S. Marine forces for USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027-95 was discussed during the USCINCPAC Forces and Logistics Conference at USTRANSCOM The decision was made by FMFPAC and USCINCPAC planners that Delong piers were not the best option to support the OPLAN 5027-95 Concept of Operations. Navy and Marines, augmented by Army water craft assets, would provide flexibility and the best responsive option to discharge supplies and

[73] J4311 HistSum May 92 (U).

equipment. The Marine concept of operations was further developed during Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 92.[74]

[74]J4322 HistSum Jul 92 (U).

PACIFIC MILITARY SEALIFT ROUTES



NOTE: All routes shown are for purposes of distance, and not necessarily representative of specific routes regularly travelled.

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

PACIFIC AIRLIFT CHANNELS

AMC C-141/C-5



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (S/NF), DECL:OADR.

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PACIFIC AIRLIFT CHANNELS
AMC C-130



SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (S/NF), DECL:OADR.

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SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING

Republic of Korea Cost-Sharing

(U) In 1988, the ROK agreed to begin funding a three-year Combined Defense Improvement Project (CDIP) program in 1989. These funds were provided by the ROK to offset the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea. The total dollar amount for cost-sharing provided by Korea during calendar year 1992 totaled $180,000,000. The cost-sharing categories are Labor; HNFC, which includes CDIP and ROK Funded Construction (ROKFC); Logistics, which includes War Reserves (War Res.), Maintenance (Maint.), and Combined Capabilities (CC). The amounts in each category from 1989 through 1992 are listed below:[75]

CATEGORY	CY 89	CY 90	CY 91	CY 92
Labor	0	0	$43,000,000	$58,000,000
HNFC				
CDIP	$40,000,000	$40,000,000	40,000,000	50,000,000
ROKFC	0	0	30,000,000	25,000,000
Logistics				
War Res.	0	11,000,000	16,000,000	26,100,000
Maint.	5,000,000	12,000,000	14,000,000	12,250,000
CC	0	7,000,000	7,000,000	8,650,000
TOTAL	$45,000,000	$70,000,000	$150,000,000	$180,000,000

Japan Cost-Sharing

(U) The United States stationed forces in Japan for strategic reasons in support of U.S. national interests. The alliance with Japan was viewed as the "linchpin of [U.S.] strategy in the Pacific."[76] Japan was the United States' key Pacific ally and the cornerstone of U.S. forward deployed

[75]USCINCPAC 040300Z Apr 92 (U); J441 HistSum May 92 (U); USCINCPAC 012211Z Jun 92 (U); J411 Information Paper (U), 4 Feb 93, Subj: Cost Sharing Off-Sets by the Republic of Korea (ROK).
[76]J5112 Point Paper (U), 23 Mar 92, Subj: Japanese Burdensharing.

strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese provided indispensable access to substantial forward stations, which enhanced the deterrence posture and crisis response capability of the U.S.[77]

(U) Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan provided a stable, secure, and rent-free environment for U.S. military operations and training, and supplied by far the most generous host nation support of any of the United States' allies anywhere in the world. The Japanese archipelago afforded the U.S. forward-deployed forces geographically indispensable naval, air, and ground bases on the periphery of the Asian land mass. The high level of Government of Japan (GOJ) financial support made Japan the least expensive place in the world for the U.S. to station forces. Japan's financial support was provided through indirect cost offsets, such as free real estate and exemptions from customs, taxes, and duties, like most allied nations, and through offsetting direct U.S. stationing costs, such as facilities, schools, housing, gymnasiums, etc., as well as labor and utility costs. Japan and the Republic of Korea were the only two nations providing direct offsetting support. While the U.S. was stationed in Japan for strategic, not economic or cost savings reasons, it was in fact a bargain for USCINCPAC. For example, if the U.S. had to maintain that same forward presence of a carrier battle group (CVBG) with CONUS basing, it would require three battle groups rotating to maintain one forward. It was estimated that by 1995, only 27 percent of the cost of that forward based carrier battle group would be out of pocket. The Japanese would assume the other 73 percent of the cost. In other words, from a CONUS base, it would cost 12 times as much plus 3 times the people to maintain one CVBG forward.[78]

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[77]Ibid.; AMEMB Tokyo 03056/241028Z Feb 93 (S/NF), DECL OADR.
[78]Ibid.

(U) Total GOJ assistance for Japan Fiscal Year 1992 (JFY 92), April 1992 through March 1993, was $3,616,600,000 computed at 128 Yen (¥) per U.S. dollar.* This assistance included labor costs, facilities construction, land purchase and rental, utilities, and a range of other direct and indirect payments amounting to over 45 percent of the estimated total costs for deploying U.S. forces in Japan. A breakout of the Japanese contributions by category is provided below. For purposes of comparison with previous years the value of the assistance is provided at both the 1992 Yen rate as well as the comparison rate of ¥220. Also provided is the percentage of change from the value of the previous year's assistance.[79]

CATEGORY	1992 $ VALUE @ ¥128	1992 $ VALUE @ ¥220	% CHANGE FROM 1991
Facilities	$1,423,500,000	$828,200,000	+.4%
Land	1,283,000,000	746,500,000	+2.8%
Labor	730,800,000	425,200,000	+13.6%
Utilities	63,300,000	36,800,000	+199.0%
Misc.	116,000,000	64,600,000	-7.9%
TOTAL	$3,616,600,000	$2,101,300,000	

USCINCPAC Host Nation Funded Construction Conference

(U) USCINCPAC J4 sponsored two USCINCPAC Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) conferences during 1992: the first was on 10-12 February 1992, and the second was on 2-5 November 1992. Attendees included key representatives from OSD(P&L/I-FRR), Joint Staff/J4(IL&ED), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Staff, USCINCPAC, USFJ, USFK, Service components in Hawaii, Japan, and Korea, Japan Engineer District and Far East District of the Pacific Ocean Division of the Corps of Engineers, DOD Dependent Schools,

*¥220 to the U.S. dollar was the standard used for comparison year-to-year. ¥128 to the dollar was the 1992 average exchange rate computed by the U.S. Embassy.

[79]J54/SSS/no ser # (U), 11 Dec 92, Subj: Report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense; AMEMB Tokyo 03056/241028Z Feb 93 (S), DECL OADR.

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES). The conference provided a forum for USCINCPAC, USFJ, USFK, and Service components to review the health of HNFC programs in PACOM, analyze program successes and needs, and coordinate strategies for planning and executing the nearly $1,000,000,000 worth of HNFC in PACOM. Additionally, the successful conference served as an opportunity for members of the USCINCPAC staff and representatives from Washington to provide leadership and overall guidance for HNFC programs and other engineering initiatives in the USCINCPAC area of responsibility.[80]

Cash Contributions from Foreign Governments for Host Nation Support

(U) On 15 June 1992, the DOD Comptroller clarified the original DOD guidance on host nation support by including all cash contributions from foreign governments for processing HNFC projects through joint command channels to include "notice and wait" requirement to Congress. This ensured USCINCPAC would retain overall theater direction and control of PACOM HNFC. The USCINCPAC Facilities Engineering Division would continue to provide the annual HNFC programs (Japan Facilities Improvement Program and the Korean HNFC program) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations, Facility Requirements and Resources (OASD(I-FRR)) for review prior to submission to the host nations and prior to initiating "notice and wait" procedures. Deputy USCINCPAC/Chief of Staff released a message implementing the proposed "notice and wait" procedures and instructing USFK and USFJ to report all cash contributions through joint comptroller channels to OSD on 30 June 1992.[81]

80J441 HistSum Feb 92 (U); J441 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

81USCINCPAC 301710Z Jun 92 (U); J441 HistSum Jun 92 (U).

Seoul Area Relocation

(U) In 1990, USFK and the ROK Ministry of National Defense signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning relocation of U.S. forces from the Seoul Metropolitan Area. The move was to be completed by June 1996, but the date was subsequently revised to the end of 1997. About 92 separate organizations having about 13,000 military and civilian positions had to be relocated, reduced, or disbanded to accomplish the move. The relocation project was 18 months behind schedule by mid-1992. The causes of the delay were that the master planning was waiting on the ROK Government approval of the SOFA architectural and engineering firms, a lack of commitment by the ROK MND to fulfill existing agreements or engage in credible dialogue that was necessary to proceed, and the ROK MND's failure to fund U.S. planning and design expenses per the agreed upon schedule. The relocation was based on the following conditions:[82]

- The ROK Government must fund the entire cost of relocating USFK from Seoul. (There was disagreement. The ROK MND position was to fund design and construction of facilities only. The U.S. Congressional direction was all relocation cost.)
- All facilities must meet U.S. construction, safety, and space standards - quality of life.
- The existing operational capability must be maintained throughout the relocation process.

(U) As part of the relocation project the U.S. agreed to the priority return of part (in excess of 70 acres) of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) Golf Course. On 1 June 1991, the U.S. accepted the interim Sung Nam Golf Course and stopped playing golf on the old EUSA Golf Course. Construction of a wall separating Yongsan Army Garrison from the new city park replacing the golf course, which would allow for the release of the EUSA Golf Course

[82]Point Paper (U), 3 Aug 92, Subj: Seoul Area Relocation Status.

acreage, began in May 1992. Effective 5 November 1992, the area formerly known as the EUSA Golf Course was transferred to the ROK Government under the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).[83]

(U) Efforts were continuing to prepare the master plans, to include the exact forces to be relocated, and completion of appropriate paperwork for the required facilities.

Exercise Related Construction in Thailand

(U) Exercise Related Construction (ERC) is unspecified minor construction supporting in-progress or planned Joint Staff-directed or coordinated exercises outside the continental United States for facilities that remain, all or in part, after conclusion of the exercise. Thailand had almost always received favorable consideration when the USPACOM ERC program was developed. This was particularly true of the COBRA GOLD exercises. In the most recent years, this emphasis increased based on Thailand's remote location, austere living conditions, the lack of permanent U.S. military presence, and the growth and strategic importance of the COBRA GOLD exercise. The following chart shows the total USPACOM ERC program funding and Thailand's share of the funding from 1988 through 1992.[84]

FY	THAILAND ERC	NO. OF THAI PROJECTS	TOTAL USPACOM ERC	THAI % OF USPACOM ERC
88	$170,900	2	$211,900	80.65%
89	0	0	487,000	0
90	290,000	5	1,120,000	25.89%
91	698,400	16	1,716,000	40.69%
92	715,000	10	1,715,000	41.69%
TOTAL	$1,874,300	33	$5,249,900	35.70%

[83]Ibid.; COMUSKOREA 21220Z Jul 92 (U); SSO USFK 082338Z Sep 92 (U)(BOM); SSO USFK 040642Z Nov 92 (U)(BOM).
[84]J444 Point Paper (U), 16 Oct 92, Subj: Exercise Related Construction (ERC) in Thailand.

(U) The growth in Thailand's share of the USPACOM ERC program would continue for the foreseeable future. USPACOM anticipated that the Joint Staff would provide USCINCPAC $1,311,000 for FY 93 ERC and, of this amount, it was proposed that Thailand receive $1,126,000 in support of seven projects. This was nearly 86 percent of the total ERC funding available to USPACOM.[85]

Northwest Pacific LORAN-C Transfer

(U) With the fielding of the Global Positioning System (GPS), the U.S. Government was looking to end its involvement in the operation of the Northwest Pacific (NWPAC) LORAN-C Chain. The U.S. Coast Guard, operator of the LORAN system, was willing to make an arrangement allowing the GOJ to assume ownership and operation of the system after it was no longer needed by DOD. The Government of Japan wanted to ensure continuous LORAN-C system operation for use by its fishing fleet, a powerful lobby in Japan. USFJ had difficulty negotiating an agreement for transfer of the system to Japan that met the requirements of all parties. Because the GPS was being put in place faster than anticipated, the U.S. was anxious to come to an agreement on the date of transfer after it was no longer needed by the U.S. Japan, however, was not anxious to assume the responsibilities for the system before it was necessary. The U.S. was just as adamant that it could not afford to continue operating a system it did not need. In June 1992, the Joint Staff approved the USFJ proposed agreement for turnover of the NWPAC LORAN-C Chain to the GOJ subject to the completed implementation of the GPS as planned, and SECDEF approval of the return of land under overseas base and installation return policy.[86]

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[85]Ibid.

[86]J441 Information Paper (U), 4 Feb 92, Subj: Northwest Pacific (NWPAC) LORAN-C Transfer Negotiations; J441 HistSum Jun 92 (U).

Iwo Jima Field Carrier Landing Practice

(U) In 1983, in response to anti-noise pressures, the Government of Japan announced plans to move Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) from Atsugi to Miyake Jima. Strong local opposition developed at Miyake Jima and the Government of Japan suspended this planning in 1988.[87]

(U) As a presumably temporary fix until the Miyake Jima opposition faded, the GOJ asked the U.S. Navy to move some FCLP from Atsugi to Iwo Jima in May 1988. USCINCPAC approved and COMUSJAPAN accepted an Interim Use Agreement for Iwo Jima in March 1991. While not perfect, it was the best agreement USFJ could get from the Japanese government within the framework of Japanese law and the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement.

(U) The U.S. Navy conducted site survey flights to Iwo Jima in August and September 1991, and training detachments in December 1991 and February 1992. Based on experience through the February detachment, the Navy determined that the facility was not yet ready to fully support future training, although progress had been made in resolving some of the significant problems. The Navy provided a list of discrepancies to USFJ found during the December and February detachments. The discrepancies were related to the availability of ground support equipment, services, and maintenance facilities. USFJ was working solutions to the areas identified.

(U) As part of the FCLP facilities at Iwo Jima, the Government of Japan agreed to purchase and install two Automated Carrier Landing Systems (ACLSs) to support the U.S. Navy's FCLP operations. The purchase was to be made through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from the United States. The estimated cost of ACLS had tripled from the original estimate of $1,800,000 due to the

[87]J441 Information Paper (U), 4 Feb 92, Subj: Iwo Jima Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP); J411 Point Paper (U), 12 Aug 92, Subj: Iwo Jima Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP).

Navy canceling their portion of the ACLS buy. On 15 June 1992, a new case modification document was issued for the ACLS. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) agreed to buy two ACLSs for $6,300,000.

(U) Maintenance of the support facilities and equipment at Iwo Jima was a major issue. Maintenance and repair between training use was the GOJ's responsibility. Maintenance would be done by Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), DFAA personnel, Government of Japan funded contract, or a combination of the three. Maintenance and repair during the training use would be funded by the U.S. Government. Training at Iwo Jima would cost the U.S. no more than training at Atsugi. The costs would be greater, but the Incremental Cost Program (ICP) would reimburse the U.S. Government for the difference. This was not a direct monetary reimbursement, but took the form of Government of Japan funded maintenance and repair projects at Atsugi which were not allowed under the Japan Facilities Improvement Program. USFJ, the Japanese Joint Staff Office, and DFAA continued to negotiate and clarify requirements and procedures. The next U.S. Navy FCLP at Iwo Jima was not scheduled until January 1993.[88]

Future DOD Use of Kahoolawe

(U) In July 1992, Admiral Larson requested that the components in Hawaii identify options for the future training use of Kahoolawe. Each option was to fully consider and analyze accompanying responsibilities in complying with Executive Orders, environmental impact statements, laws, regulations, and the existing Consent Decree. Following the response, all, from the components to the CNO and Senator Daniel Inouye were in concurrence that without the ability to conduct live-fire exercises, Kahoolawe had no utility to the military. Alternative sites for live-fire exercises were available with some increased

[88]Ibid.

costs and decreased readiness for Hawaii-based units. CINCPACFLT described the relinquishing of Naval control of the island as "a political reality for which the time has come."[89] On 4 September 1993, Admiral Larson informed SECDEF and CJCS that he had met with Senator Inouye and discussed the long-term use of Kahoolawe. He informed Senator Inouye that "without the capability to conduct live firing, [the USCINCPAC] plan regarding Kahoolawe Island would be to relinquish Navy (DOD) control and return this ceded land to the State."[90] Senator Inouye agreed with the reasoning. As of the end of 1992, reversion options were being evaluated to determine the most economic avenue to extricate DOD from the island. CNO committed the Navy Staff to assist Senator Inouye in drafting special legislation to pay for the cleanup and associated reversion costs.[91]

Ritidian Point Public Access

(U) By August 1992, a strawman proposal was developed to resolve several issues regarding land use and access in Northwest Guam. The proposal was discussed with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), all concerned DOD entities, the Government of Guam (GOVGUAM) Lt. Governor Frank Blas, and Congressional Delegate Ben Blaz. The plan was amenable to all parties. This constituted and agreement in principle and a public announcement was made to the press.[92]

(U) The main feature of the proposal was to be a recreation facility funded and operated by GOVGUAM consisting of approximately 40-50 acres of Naval Facility (NAVFAC) Ritidian beachfront and adjacent already cleared ballfields and picnic

[89]CINCPACFLT 152251Z Aug 92 (U).
[90]USCINCPAC 040420Z Sep 92 (U).
[91]USCINCPAC 110500Z Jul 92 (U); CDRUSARPAC 051810Z Aug 92 (U); CINCPACFLT 152251Z Aug 92 (U); CINCPACFLT 030950Z Sep 92 (U); USCINCPAC 040420Z Sep 92 (U); CNO 162030Z Sep 92 (U).
[92]USCINCPACREPGUAM 110244Z Aug 92 (U); USCINCPAC 132220Z Aug 92 (U); COMNAVMARIANAS 20203Z Aug 92 (U).

shelters. GOVGUAM would be required to provide for maintenance and security of the facility, protection of surrounding wildlife habitat, and other Endangered Species Act (ESA) compliance measures determined by USFWS. The facility would be established and operated in accordance with a permit granting GOVGUAM use of Navy property. GOVGUAM could continue to operate the facility within a USFWS wildlife refuge until the NAVFAC property was ultimately transferred to the Department of the Interior. In conjunction with the permit, an access easement was to be granted GOVGUAM for public access along Route 3A from Potts Junction to the recreation facility. GOVGUAM would be required to maintain some portion of the route. Implementation of the arrangement by Navy issued permit and easement was the most expeditious means of GOVGUAM accomplishing its immediate objective of public access to Ritidian beaches and did not preclude pursuing their request for transfer of NAVFAC to GOVGUAM rather than to the Department of the Interior.[93]

(S) On 15 December 1992, it was learned that Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installation and Environment) Jacqueline E. Schafer decided to withdraw the 332-acre NAVFAC Ritidian parcel from the Excess Real Estate List. The reasons for this were not clear, but it apparently related to the Critical Habitat issue and the obsession of the USFWS to establish a wildlife refuge on the NAVFAC/Ritidian Point property. The same thing could be accomplished through the agreement in principle already in place among the Navy, USAF, USFWS, and GOVGUAM. NAVFAC Ritidian was considered "...an albatross to the Navy and DOD interests. It is excess to the military's operational, administrative and logistical requirements...."[94] This action by Secretary Schafer pulled the Navy and DOD back into what was considered to be a politically charged tug-of-war over land which no longer had any valid military mission. The Commander Naval Forces Marianas made the following comment:

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[93]Ibid.

[94]COMNAVMARIANAS 160200Z Dec 92 (S), DECL OADR.

> Withdrawing the NAVFAC property now from the Excess Lands process will seriously jeopardize DOD and Navy credibility on Guam. It would result in Navy's continued ownership of NAVFAC without any direct or tangible benefit to the Navy or DOD. It would be an administrative burden, a serious political liability and a large, continuing unfunded resource drain. It keeps the Navy front and center on the issues of access to private landlocked property; Route 3A access; and indigenous rights protests. It could jeopardize approval of our overall wildlife refuge plan and generate extraneous public scrutiny and negative comment on our upcoming Philippine rollback EIS. In a bigger sense, it implies that the Federal Government does not have confidence in GOVGUAM to protect its own resources and therefore must thwart the process to ensure GOVGUAM does not acquire ownership of NAVFAC property. Whether true or not, the perception of colonialism will jeopardize many of the improvements we have made in Federal/Territorial relations and could hamper our ability to operate.

(C) As of the end of 1992, a reclama to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy was being considered. The great concern was the political heat this decision would cause. The decision of the Assistant Secretary had placed the Navy and DOD into a no-win situation within the local context in Guam.[95]

High Priority MILCON Projects in USPACOM

(U) In February 1992, USCINCPAC submitted Military Construction (MILCON) projects to Joint Staff that were considered high priority in USPACOM. At that time, the Navy was continuing their master plan on requirements on Guam due to the Philippine withdrawal. In June, the Navy forwarded an amended budget request to SECDEF containing six key FY 93 MILCON projects on Guam. These projects were critical to the accommodation of personnel and activities from the Philippines. Accordingly, USCINCPAC added these six critical projects to the list of FY 93

[95]Ibid.

high priority MILCON projects. The final list of high priority MILCON projects in USPACOM are listed below.[96]

- Aircraft Maintenance Hangar, Apron, and Washrack ($29,000,000), Andersen AFB, Guam.
- Family Housing New Construction ($56,700,000), Public Works Center (PWC), Guam.
- Child Care Center Addition ($2,900,000), U.S. Naval Station, Guam.
- Hazardous Material Storage Facility ($14,820,000), U.S. Naval Supply Depot (NSD), Guam.
- Ships/Spares Storage Facility ($5,200,000), U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam.
- Missile Magazine ($8,210,000), U.S. Naval Magazine, Guam.
- Hydrant Refueling System Improvements ($11,400,000), Eielson AFB, Alaska.
- Fire Training Facility ($2,300,000), Andersen AFB, Guam.
- Fire Training Facility ($1,950,000), Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.
- Family Housing New Construction ($23,000,000), Oahu, Hawaii.
- Child Development Center ($5,800,000), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
- Wastewater Treatment Plan Expansion ($24,900,000), Public Works Center (PWC), Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
- Hazardous Waste Management Facility ($790,000), Andersen AFB, Guam.

[96]J411 HistSum Jun 92 (U); J442 Point Paper (U), 8 Jul 92, Subj: High Priority FY 93 MILCON in USPACOM.

SECTION V--SECURITY ASSISTANCE

(U) Security assistance was vital to the USCINCPAC mission. The key areas of interest were International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). For non-developing nations in the Pacific who did not qualify for FMS credit, IMET, or Grant Aid, there were also FMS cash sales and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). During FY 92, IMET funding was $7,671,000, for FMF was $25,000,000, and for ESF was $65,600,000. IMET security assistance to three countries was suspended for political reasons: Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand.[97]

1992 USPACOM Security Assistance Conference

(U) The twenty-fourth annual U.S. Pacific Command Security Assistance Conference (PACSAC) was held in 7-11 December 1992 in Honolulu, Hawaii. The theme for the conference was "Security Assistance--Unifying Theater Efforts," and focused on achieving a USCINCPAC and U.S. Security Assistance Office (SAO) chiefs' consensus on how to optimize military security assistance contributions. Participation included PACOM SAO chiefs along with representatives from Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), State Department, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Military Departments (MILDEPs), Joint Staff, and other Unified Commands. The conference served as a forum for discussing important security assistance issues for which proposed solutions would be examined and implemented throughout the following year. Some of the action items resulting from PACSAC 92 were:[98]

- Foreign Military Sales (FMS) vs Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). The need was recognized to educate host nations on

[97]U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 93, (~~S/NF/WN~~), pp. 29-30 (U).
[98]USCINCPAC 291500Z Dec 92 (U); J45S HistSum Dec 92 (U).

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (U)
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM		FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING		ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND	
COUNTRY	FY 91	FY 92	FY 91	FY 92	FY 91	FY 92
BANGLADESH	401	428				
BRUNEI						
BURMA (suspended)						
COMOROS	99	62				
FIJI					300	300
INDIA	290	352				
INDONESIA	2,094	2,275	25,000***		5,000	5,000
KOREA	1,000	800				
MADAGASCAR	94	150	255			
MALAYSIA (suspended)						
MALDIVES	56	95				
MAURITIUS		94				
MONGOLIA		62				12,000
NEPAL	192	180				
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	150	106				45,000
PHILIPPINES	2,835	2,665	200,000	25,000	95,000	
SEYCHELLES	82	90	340		3,300	3,300
SINGAPORE	20	15				
SOLOMON ISLANDS	46	13				
SRI LANKA	245	229				
THAILAND (suspended)	685				2,500	
TONGA	76	55				
VANUATU						
TOTAL	8,304	7,671	225,595	25,000	106,100*	65,600**

* Total includes $9.999 million for the South Pacific Tuna Treaty and $7 million for Cambodian Resistance.
** Total includes $10 million for the South Pacific Tuna Treaty and $5 million for Cambodian Resistance.
*** Congressional Rate Loan

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

USPACOM SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FY 1993 BUDGET -- ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (IN THOUSANDS)
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1992

ORGANIZATION	USCINCPAC SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDED	FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADMIN SUPPORT	TOTAL U.S. COSTS	HOST COUNTRY COSTS		GRAND TOTAL
				ASSISTANCE IN KIND	CONTRIBUTED CURRENCY	
HQ USCINCPAC	$ 606.0	$	$ 606.0	$	$	$ 606.0
CH FMS AUSTRALIA	62.5	16.3	78.8			78.8
DAO BANGLADESH	25.0	1.5	26.5			26.5
DAO BURMA	8.8		8.8			8.8
DAO CHINA	20.3		20.3			20.3
USCINCPACSWP FIJI	6.1		6.1			6.1
DSA INDIA	167.3	44.0	211.3			211.3
OMADP INDONESIA	615.8	105.6	721.4	358.3		1,079.7
MDO JAPAN	461.3	47.1	508.4	222.6	(1,147.1*)	731.0
JUSMAGKOREA	1,275.1		1,275.1	1,022.4	1711.2	4,008.7
DAO MADAGASCAR	85.0		85.0			85.0
DAO MALAYSIA	170.3	22.1	192.4			192.4
DAO NEPAL	8.8		8.8			8.8
DAO NEW ZEALAND	18.5		18.5			18.5
DAO PAPUA NEW GUINEA	16.8		16.8			16.8
JUSMAGPHIL	2,980.5	64.7	3,045.2	96.3		3,141.5
DAO SINGAPORE	89.7	3.7	93.4			93.4
DAO SRI LANKA	30.6		30.6			30.6
JUSMAGTHAI	942.5	46.7	989.2	1,748.8		2,738.0
TOTAL	$ 7,590.9	$ 351.7	$ 7,942.6	$ 3,448.4	$ 1,711.2	$ 13,102.2

* Contributed currency is paid directly to the U.S. Government to offset U.S. costs and, therefore, is a non-add item.

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (S/NF), DECL:OADR.

the advantages of purchasing defense articles and services via FMS versus DCS. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) agreed to re-publish their pamphlet "FMS vs DCS" for distribution.

- Security Assistance Office (SAO) support for Direct Commercial Sales. During conference discussions concerning SAO support of DCS activities, it was learned that the Office of Defense Cooperation in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, had a program that could be of interest to PACOM SAOs. USCINCPAC was to request details of the Bonn program and disseminate it to PACOM SAOs.

- Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program (ESEP). USCINCPAC requested and encouraged MILDEP support for increased U.S. participation in ESEP in view of the few U.S. personnel in PACOM countries under auspices of the program as compared to their foreign counterparts in the U.S.

- Augmentation. Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) with SAO responsibilities requested augmentation during major events and/or high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) periods. It was noted that PACOM could support, but the DAOs must identify requirements far enough in advance to facilitate augmentation.[99]

Japan Security Assistance

(U) Japanese security assistance participation has been continuous since enactment of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Assistance Agreement on 1 May 1954. That participation transitioned from a grant and loan-credit program ($1,200,000,000 through FY 67) to an FMS-Cash and direct commercial sale (including coproduction and codevelopment). The participation trend was away from FMS-Cash transactions to domestic production under license. This transition underscored the Japanese preference for minimizing their dependence on outside sources during crises.[100]

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[99] Ibid.

[100] J451 Information Paper (U), 6 Aug 92, Subj: Security Assistance (SA) Program Overview--Japan.

(U) A rolling five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) was the basis for all Japanese defense acquisitions. The Japan Security Assistance Program was comprised of 1,106 active FMS-Cash cases valued at $6,460,000,000. The value of ongoing DCS activity was approximately $1,900,000,000. This made Japan the United States' largest security assistance customer in the USPACOM theater. Japan's Security Assistance Program's primary focus was on improving logistics and support capabilities. Owing to the demise of the former Soviet Union, the MTDP was under went an out-of-cycle review that resulted in significant future spending reductions.[101]

Singapore Security Assistance

(U) Singapore was one of the largest FMS-Cash customers. The Singapore Security Assistance Program consisted primarily of FMS-Cash training and hardware purchases valued at over $1,500,000,000, and a small IMET program of $20,000 per year in grant funding. Singapore did not have an FMS-Credit program due to the amount of its defense spending as a percentage of its national budget. In addition to substantial cash equipment purchases, Singapore bought $4,700,000 of U.S. technical and professional military training yearly. Although Singapore bought over 85 percent of its arms from the U.S., only 30 percent of these purchases were under the DOD FMS program. Due to the fixed firm price which a commercial sale usually offered, Singapore's preference was for an initial hardware purchase directly from a U.S. contractor with follow-on support via DOD FMS. Among non-treaty nations, Singapore received technology second only to Israel.[102]

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[101] Ibid.

[102] J4514 Point Paper (U), 29 Apr 92, Subj: Singapore Security Assistance Program.

Thailand Security Assistance

(U) The principal objectives of the Security Assistance Program in Thailand were:.[103]

- Assist Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) in modernizing equipment, enhance defense capabilities, and protect refugees and displaced persons along the Cambodian and Lao borders, and
- Maintain U.S. influence in Thailand.

(U) Thailand's FMS cumulative sales total exceeded $2,000,000,000. As a result of funding cutbacks begun in FY 87, Thailand looked to foreign sources for equipment procurement, including the People's Republic of China (PRC). Funding levels for FY 91 zeroed out Thailand's Foreign Military Financing-Grant (FMF-G) money. Thailand's continued economic growth allowed Thailand to begin paying for its defense needs. Additionally, the February 1991 coup caused the loss of most of FY 91 and all of FY 92 IMET, amounting to $5,000,000. The Thai viewed the loss of FMF-G and IMET as an indication of declining U.S. interest in the bilateral relationship despite U.S. explanations to the contrary. Elections in late FY 92, however, were to result in the reinstatement of IMET.[104]

Status of IMET for Indonesia

[redacted]

[103] J451 Point Paper (U), 29 Apr 92, Subj: Thailand Security Assistance Program.
[104] Ibid.; J4513 Point Paper (U), 22 Oct 92, Subj: Thailand Security Assistance Program.

[redacted]

[105]AMEMB Jakarta 08480/070810Z Jul 92 (S), DECL OADR; J5121 Point Paper (U), 9 Sep 92, Subj: Status of IMET for Indonesia.

AUSTRALIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	7,617,930 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
CONTIGUOUS ZONE	24 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	17,288,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE	98-100 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	74 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 254.4 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 14,900
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 8.8 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	6.9 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Federal State within the Commonwealth recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Sovereign or Head of State
GOVERNOR GENERAL	William HAYDEN
PRIME MINISTER	Paul KEATING
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE	Gareth EVANS
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE	Robert RAY
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE	GEN Peter C. GRATION
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, ARMY	LTG John GREY
CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF	VADM Ian D. G. MacDOUGALL
CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF	AM Ian "Barry" GRATION

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Melvin F. SEMBLER
USCINCPACREP AUSTRALIA and DATT	Col Max M. MAROSKO, Jr., USAF
CHIEF, FOREIGN MILITARY SALES	Lt Col Donald L. JOHNSON, USAF



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

BANGLADESH (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

TOTAL AREA	144,000 Sq Km
LAND AREA	133,910 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	18 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
Straight baselines claimed	
POPULATION	119,411,711
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4 Percent
LITERACY RATE	35 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	53 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1992 est)	$ 23.1 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 200
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 339 Million
OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC BUDGET	1.5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic (British Commonwealth)
PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Begum Khaleda ZIA ur Rahman
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Anisul Islam MAHMUD
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	LTG Mohammed NOORUDDIN Khan
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	RADM Muhammad Muhalminul ISLAM
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	AIR COMO Altaf Hussain CHOWDHURY

* The United States recognizes neither the claimed requirement to obtain prior permission for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea, nor the claimed assertion of jurisdiction relating to security within the contiguous zone.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. William B. MILAM
DATT	LTC Steven R. ROBINSON, USA



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

BRUNEI (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	5,270 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE*	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE*	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA*	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	397,777
ANNUAL GROWTH	6.3 Percent
LITERACY RATE	77 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	75 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 3.3 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 9,600
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 233.1 Million
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	7.1 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Constitutional Sultanate controlled and governed by a Paramount Ruler (British Commonwealth)

SULTAN, PRIME MINISTER, AND DEFENCE MINISTER
H.H. Sir Muda HASSANAL Bolkiah Muizzaddin Waddaulah
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFFAIRS ..... Muda MOHAMED Bolkiah
COMMANDER, ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES
Pehin Datu Indera Setia MG Dato Paduka Haji SULAIMAN bin Haji Damit
COMMANDER, ROYAL BRUNEI LAND FORCES
Pehin Datu Hari Mau Padang Dato Seri Laila Jasa COL Haji HUSIN bin Ahmad
COMMANDER, ROYAL BRUNEI NAVY
LTC Abdul LATIF bin Awang Damit
COMMANDER, ROYAL BRUNEI AIR FORCES
LTC Dato Paduka IBRAHIM bin Haji Mohammad

* Maritime boundary agreed with Malaysia.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Donald Burnham ENSENAT
DATT*	COL Richard D. WELKER, USA

* Resides in Singapore, where he serves as ARMA Singapore.



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

BURMA (MYANMAR) (U)

SECRET

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	678,500 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	24 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
Straight baselines claimed (including range of up to 223.3 NM in the Gulf of Martaban)	
POPULATION	42,112,082
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.0 Percent
LITERACY RATE	81 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	55 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 11 Billion
PER CAPITA (1992)	$ 250
DEFENSE BUDGET (1991)	$ 800 Million
OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	3.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Military Junta - STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) headed by GEN THAN SHWE

PRIME MINISTER, SLORC CHAIRMAN	GEN THAN SHWE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	U OHN GYAW
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	GEN THAN SHWE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF ARMED FORCES	GEN THAN SHWE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF ARMY	GEN THAN SHWE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF NAVY	VADM THAN NYUNT
COMMANDER IN CHIEF AIR FORCE	Lt Gen THEIN WIN

* The United States recognizes neither the claimed requirement to obtain prior permission for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea, nor the claimed assertion of jurisdiction within the contiguous zone, nor the claimed straight baselines.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

CHARGE	Mr. Franklin P. HUDDLE, Jr.
DATT	COL David G. DOUGLASS, USA



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SECRET

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

CHINA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	9,600,000 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE	None Claimed
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
Straight baselines claimed	
POPULATION	1,151,486,981
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.6 Percent
LITERACY RATE	Over 75 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	About 66 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 413 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 370
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 12 Billion Estimated
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	5.7 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Communist State
PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY	JIANG Zemin
PRESIDENT	YANG Shangkun
CHAIRMAN NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS	WAN Li
PREMIER	LI Peng
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	QIAN Qichen
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	QIN Jiwei
CHAIRMAN OF CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION**	JIANG Zemin
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF	CHI Haotian
COMMANDER, PLA NAVY	ZHANG Lianzhong
COMMANDER, PLA AIR FORCE	CAO Shuangming

* The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement to obtain prior permission for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.
** DENG Xiaoping, although officially retired, remains the most powerful individual in both the government and Communist Party.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. H. Stapleton ROY
DATT	Brig Gen John H. GARRISON, USAF



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(U) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

See Communist and Former Communist Forces/Deployments.

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (~~S/NF~~), DECL:OADR.

COMOROS (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	2,170 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	493,853
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE	48 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	57 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 245 Million
PER CAPITA	$ 530
DEFENSE BUDGET	NA
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	NA
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Independent Republic
PRESIDENT AND	
PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT	Said Mohammed DJOHAR
PRIME MINISTER	Ibrahim HALIDI
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	
AND COOPERATION	Mtara MAECHA
DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL	
CABINET IN CHARGE OF DEFENSE	Commandant Ali MLANAILI



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(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR*	Hon. Kenneth PELTIER
USCINCPACREP SWIO and DATT*	LCDR John W. LOGAN, USN

* Resides in Antananarivo, Madagascar.

SECRET

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (~~S/NF~~), DECL:OADR.

FIJI (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	18,270 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
Straight baselines claimed	
POPULATION	744,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	86 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	65 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 1.36 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 1,840
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 25.8 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	8.2 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic
PRESIDENT	Ratu Sir Penaia GANILAU
PRIME MINISTER	Sitiveni RABUKA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Filipe BOLE
COMMANDER, ROYAL FIJI MILITARY FORCES	BG Ratu Epeli GANILAU

* Fiji's maritime claims are measured from straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands.



(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Evelyn I. H. TEEGEN
USCINCPACREP SWPAC and DATT	LtCol Kip J. NAUGLE, USMC

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

INDIA (U)

SECRET

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	3,287,590 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	24 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	Approx 866,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE	48 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	57 Male, 58 Female
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 328 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 380
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 9.2 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	3.5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Federal Republic (British Commonwealth based)

PRESIDENT	Shankar Dayal SHARMA
PRIME MINISTER	P. V. Narasimha RAO
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Sharad PAWAR
FOREIGN MINISTER	P. V. Narasimha RAO
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	GEN Sunith F. RODRIGUES
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	ADM Laxminaryan RAMDAS
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	ACM Nirmal Chandra SURI

* The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement to obtain prior permission for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL (U)

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Thomas R. PICKERING
DATT	COL Richard J. CRITES, USA
DSA	Col Walter T. EASTHAM, USAF



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (S/NF), DECL:OADR.

INDONESIA (U)

SECRET

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(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	1,826,440 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	Certain Areas
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	193,560,494
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	77 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	61 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 94 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 490
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 1.4 Billion
OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	2.1 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic, President, Cabinet, Unicameral Legislature
PRESIDENT	SUHARTO
MINISTER FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY	L. B. MURDANI
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS	ALI ALATAS
CINC ARMED FORCES	GEN TRY SUTRISNO
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF	GEN EDY SUDRAJAT
NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF	VADM MOHAMED ARIFIN
AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF	AM SIBOEN

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Robert L. BARRY
DATT	COL John B. HASEMAN, USA
OMADP	COL Karl F. EICKEMEYER, USA



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

JAPAN (U)

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(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	379,000 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	None Claimed
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	124,017,137
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.4 Percent
LITERACY RATE	99 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	80 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 3.06 Trillion
PER CAPITA	$ 22,000
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 30.8 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	6.2 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Parliamentary Democracy
EMPEROR	AKIHITO
PRIME MINISTER	MIYAZAWA Kiichi
DIRECTOR GENERAL, JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY	NAKAYAMA Toshio
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	WATANABE Michio
CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL	ADM SAKUMA Makoto
CHIEF OF GROUND (ARMY) STAFF	GEN NISHIMOTO Tetsuya
CHIEF OF MARITIME (NAVY) STAFF	ADM OKABE Fumio
CHIEF OF AIR (AIR FORCE) STAFF	Gen ISHIZUKA Isao

* Japan only claims a 3 nautical mile territorial sea in the Soya, Tsugaru, Osumi, and Tsushima Straits.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Michael H. ARMACOST
COMUSJAPAN	Lt Gen Richard E. Hawley, USAF
CHMDO	Col Edwin A. HIND, Jr., USAF
DATT	CAPT J. Stephen FITZGERALD, USN



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (S/~~NF~~), DECL:OADR.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (U)

SECRET

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	98,190 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	Agreed Boundaries
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	43,134,386
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	96 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	70 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 238 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 5,669
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 10.4 Billion
OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	4.5 Percent
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	27 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic

PRESIDENT	ROH Tae Woo
PRIME MINISTER	CHUNG Won Shik
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	LEE Sang Ok
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	CHOI Sae Chong
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	GEN YI Pil Sop
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY	GEN KIM Chin Young
CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE	Gen LEE Yang Ho
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS	ADM KIM Chul U

* The United States does not recognize the requirement for prior notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Donald P. GREGG
COMUSKOREA	GEN Robert W. RISCASSI, USA
CHIEF, JUSMAG-K	COL Keith L. YOUNG, USA
DATT	COL William R. McKINNEY, USA



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NOTE: When KIM Young Sam becomes president on 26 February 1993, all government officials will probably change.

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

MADAGASCAR (U)

SECRET

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	587,040 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	150 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
Straight baselines claimed	
POPULATION	12,596,263
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.2 Percent
LITERACY RATE	80 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	52 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1990 Est)	$ 2.4 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 200
DEFENSE BUDGET (1989 Est)	$ 37 Million
OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC BUDGET	2.2 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Democratic Republic
HIGH AUTHORITY OF STATE	Admiral Albert ZAFY
PRIME MINISTER	COL Guy RAZANAMASY
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	BG Phillipe RAMAKAVELO
FOREIGN MINISTER	Cesaire RABENORO

* The United States does not recognize territorial sea claims in excess of 12 nautical miles or claimed security zones beyond the limits of the territorial sea.



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(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Dennis P. BARRETT
USCINCPACREP SWIO and DATT	LCDR John W. LOGAN, USN

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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

MALAYSIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	328,550 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	17,981,696
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4 Percent
LITERACY RATE	78 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	68 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 48.1 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 2,460
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 1.7 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	3.9 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Constitutional Monarchy headed by Paramount Ruler (King); government conducted by a Prime Minister and bicameral parliament (British Commonwealth)
PARAMOUNT RULER	Paduka Seri Sultan AZLAN Muhibuddin Shah
PRIME MINISTER	Dato Seri Dr. MAHATHIR bin Mohamad
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Datuk Haji Abu HASSAN bin Haji Omar
MINISTER FOR DEFENSE	Datuk Seri Haji Mohamed NAJIB bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak
CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE FORCE	GEN Tan Sri Dato YAACOB bin Mohamed Zain
CHIEF OF ARMY	LTG Datu Abdul RAHMAN Hamid bin Haji Adul Hamid
CHIEF OF NAVY	VADM Dato Mohamed SHARIFF bin Ishak
CHIEF OF AIR FORCE	Lt Gen Dato Seri Mohamed YUNUS bin Mohamad Tasi

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. John S. WOLF
DATT	COL Michael A. McDERMOTT, USA
SAO	LTC Donald R. MORAN, USA



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

MALDIVES (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	300 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	Unique rectangular zone encompassing 780,000 Sq Km
FISHING ZONE	Unique rectangular zone encompassing 780,000 Sq Km
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	234,371
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE	92 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	63 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1988)	$ 174 Million
PER CAPITA	$ 770
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 1.8 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	3.6 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic (British Commonwealth)
PRESIDENT	Maumoon Abdul GAYOOM
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Maumoon Abdul GAYOOM
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Fathulla JAMEEL
MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIES	Ihmed MUJUTHABA

* The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement to obtain prior permission for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR*	Hon. Teresita C. SCHAFFER
USCINCPACREP SRI LANKA/MALDIVES and DATT*	CDR Vaughn K. MARTIN, USN

* Resides in Colombo, Sri Lanka.



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

MARSHALL ISLANDS (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

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(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	181 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	48,091
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE	93 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	62 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 63 Million
PER CAPITA	$ 1,500
DEFENSE BUDGET	Not Applicable
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	Not Applicable
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Sovereign, self-governing state in free association with the United States
PRESIDENT	Amata KABUA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Thomas D. KIJINER

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

U.S. AMBASSADOR	Hon. David C. FIELDS
USCINCPACREP RMI/COMMANDER, KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE	COL Crosby E. HAZEL, USA



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(U) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

Defense provided by the United States under the Compact of Free Association.

E.O. 12356

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

MAURITIUS (U)

(C) BASIC INFORMATION

(U) LAND AREA	1,860 Sq Km
(U) NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
Straight baselines claimed	
(U) POPULATION	1,092,130
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	82.8 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	69 Years
(U) GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (FY 1991)	$ 2.5 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 2,300
(C) DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 1987)	$ 5.0 Million
OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC BUDGET	0.2 Percent
(U) TYPE GOVERNMENT	Parliamentary Democracy (British Commonwealth)
(U) PRESIDENT	Cassem UTEEM
(U) PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Anerood JUGNAUTH
(U) MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS	Paul BERENGER
(U) NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR (Deputed Indian Officer)	LTG Jagdish TAIMNI
(U) COMMISSIONER OF POLICE	Cyril MORVAN
(U) COMMANDER, COAST GUARD (Deputed Indian Officer)	CDR K. N. RAO
(U) COMMANDER, SPECIAL MOBILE FORCES	COL Raj DAYAL

* The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

(U) AMBASSADOR	Hon. Penne P. KORTH
(U) USCINCPACREP SWIO and DATT*	LCDR John W. LOGAN, USN

* Resides in Antananarivo, Madagascar.





SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	702 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	100,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE	90 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	70 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 150 million
PER CAPITA	$ 1,500
DEFENSE BUDGET	Not Applicable
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	Not Applicable
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Sovereign, self-governing state in free association with the United States
PRESIDENT	Bailey OLTER
SECRETARY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS	Resio MOSES

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

U.S. AMBASSADOR	Hon. Aurelia E. BRAZEAL
USCINCPACREP GUAM/CNMI/FSM/ PALAU*	RADM James B. PERKINS, III, USN

* Resides in Guam.



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(U) MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

Defense provided by the United States under the Compact of Free Association.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 (S/NF), DECL:OADR.

MONGOLIA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	1,567,000 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	Land-locked Country
POPULATION	2,247,068
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE	90 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	63 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 2.2 Billion
PER CAPITA (Est)	$ 1,000
DEFENSE BUDGET	NA
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	NA
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Transition from Communist State to Republic
PRESIDENT	Punsalmaagiyn OCHIRBAT
PRIME MINISTER	Dashiyn BYAMBASUREM
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	LTG Shagalyn JADAMBAA
CHIEF OF DEFENSE FORCES	MG Rashmaagiyn GAVAA

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Joseph E. LAKE
DATT*	COL Michael BYRNES, USA

* Resides in Beijing, China, where he is ARMA to China.



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E.O. 12958

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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

NEPAL (U)

SECRET

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	140,800 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	Land-locked Country
POPULATION	20,086,455
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4 Percent
LITERACY RATE	26 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	51 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (FY 1990)	$ 3.2 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 165
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 34 Million
OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC BUDGET	2 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Parliamentary Democracy
KING AND CINC	BIRENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev
PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Girija Prasad KOIRALA
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	GEN Gabul Shumshere Jang Bahadur RANA

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Julia CHANG BLOCH
DATT	LTC Roger CUNNINGHAM, USA

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SECRET

SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

NEW ZEALAND (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	268,670 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	3,308,973
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.4 Percent
LITERACY RATE	99 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	75 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 40.2 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 12,200
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 832 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	4.73 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Independent State within the Commonwealth recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Sovereign or Head of State

GOVERNOR GENERAL	Dame Catherine TIZARD
PRIME MINISTER	Jim BOLGER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER	Don McKINNON
MINISTER OF DEFENCE	Warren COOPER
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF	VADM Somerford TEAGLE
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,	
ARMY	MG Bruce MELDRUM (D)
	BG Anthony L. BIRKS (R)
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	RADM Ian A. HUNTER
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	AVM John S. HOSIE

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

CHARGE d'AFFAIRES	David M. WALKER
DATT	CAPT Richard L. NORWOOD, USN



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PAPUA NEW GUINEA (U)

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(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	451,710 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	3,913,166
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.3 Percent
LITERACY RATE	52 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	55 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 2.7 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 725
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 42 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	4.6 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Independent State within the Commonwealth, recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State
GOVERNOR GENERAL	Sir Wiwa KOROWI
PRIME MINISTER	Paias WINGTI
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	John KAPUTIN
DEFENSE MINISTER	Paul TOHIAN
COMMANDER PNG DEFENSE FORCE	BG Robert DADEMO

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Robert W. FARRAND
DATT	MAJ Mark A. SWARINGEN, USA



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PHILIPPINES (U)

SECRET

350

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	298,170 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	0.5 to 285 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	66,117,284
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.0 Percent
LITERACY RATE	90 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	66 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 45.2 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 700
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 1.1 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	15.3 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic

PRESIDENT	Fidel V. RAMOS
VICE PRESIDENT	Joseph "Erap" ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Roberto ROMULO
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	Renato DE VILLA
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP	GEN Lisandro C. ABADIA
CG, ARMY	LTG Arturo T. ENRILE
FOIC, NAVY	VADM Mariano J. DUMANCAS
CG, AIR FORCE	BG Leopoldo S. ACOT
CHIEF, NATIONAL POLICE	Raul S. IMPERIAL

* The United States does not recognize the Philippines' claim of archipelagic status. The maritime claims of the Philippines are based in part upon geographic coordinates in the 1898 Treaty of Paris and the 1930 US-UK Treaty delimiting the boundary with Borneo.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Richard H. SOLOMON
USCINCPACREP PHIL	COL Richard TAYLOR, USA
CHIEF JUSMAGPHIL	COL Richard TAYLOR, USA
DATT	Col Todd R. STARBUCK, USA



(C) U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (U)

U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay was completed on 24 Nov 92.

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SEYCHELLES (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	455 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	69,519
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE	85 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	70 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1989)	$ 350 Million
PER CAPITA	$ 4,100
DEFENSE BUDGET (1990 Est.)	$ 12 Million
OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC BUDGET	6.0 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic (British Commonwealth)
PRESIDENT, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND FOREIGN MINISTER	France Albert RENE
CHIEF OF STAFF AND COMMANDER, PEOPLE'S MILITIA	COL James MICHEL
COMMANDER, NAVAL FORCES	COMO Leonard LABIACHE

* The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement for advance notification for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Richard W. CARLSON
USCINCPACREP SWIO and DATT*	LCDR John W. LOGAN, USN

* Resides in Antananarivo, Madagascar.



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SINGAPORE (U)

SECRET

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	623 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	Agreed Boundaries
FISHING ZONE	Agreed Boundaries
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	3 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	2,756,330
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.3 Percent
LITERACY RATE	88 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	74 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 34.6 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 12,700
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 1.7 Billion
OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	4 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic within Commonwealth
PRESIDENT	WEE Kim Wee
PRIME MINISTER	GOH Chok Tong
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	WONG Kan Seng
MINISTER OF DEFENCE	Dr. YEO Ning Hong
CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE	MG NG Jui Ping
CHIEF OF ARMY	BG LIM Neo Chian
CHIEF OF NAVY	COL Willie KWEK Siew Jin
CHIEF OF AIR FORCE	Brig Gen BEY Soo Khiang

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. John M. HUNTSMAN, Jr.
DATT	CAPT William P. COOPER, USN
CHIEF, SAO	Lt Col Dennis B. FOWLER, USAF



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SRI LANKA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

TOTAL AREA	65,610 Sq Km
LAND AREA	64,740 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	106 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	24 Nautical Miles
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	17,631,528
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.2 Percent
LITERACY RATE	86 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	71 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1990 Est.)	$ 7.2 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 380
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 432 Million
OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic (British Commonwealth)
PRESIDENT AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Ranasinghe PREMADASA
PRIME MINISTER	D. B. WIJETUNGE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Harold HERATH
ARMY COMMANDER	LTG Hamilton WANASINGHE
NAVY COMMANDER	COMO Mohan SAMARASEKERA
AIR FORCE COMMANDER	AVM M. J. T. GUNAWARDENE

* The United States does not recognize the claimed requirement to obtain prior permission for warship transit through the claimed territorial sea.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. Teresita C. SCHAFFER
USCINCPACREP SRI LANKA/MALDIVES and DATT	CDR Vaughn K. MARTIN, USN



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TAIWAN (U)

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(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	35,961 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	20,658,702
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.1 Percent
LITERACY RATE	91.2 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	72 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 150.8 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 7,380
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 9.1 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	30 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Multi-Party Presidential Regime
PRESIDENT	LEE Teng-hui
PREMIER	HAU Pei-tsun
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	CHEN Li-an
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Frederick CHIEN
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF	ADM LIU Ho-chien
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ARMY	GEN CHEN Ting-chung
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, NAVY	ADM CHUANG Ming-yao
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, AIR FORCE	GEN-2d Grade LIN Wen-li
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE	GEN-2d Grade LO Pen-li
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS	LtGen CHENG Kuo-nan

* * * * * *

Director, American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), (Taipei Office)	Mr. Thomas S. BROOKS
Chief, Technical Section	Mr. David R. BROWN



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THAILAND (U)

SECRET

356

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	511,770 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
Straight baselines claimed	
POPULATION	56,814,069
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE	93 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	69 Years
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$ 79 Billion
PER CAPITA	$ 1,605
DEFENSE BUDGET	$ 2.4 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	3 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Constitutional Monarchy
KING	BHUMIBOL Adulyadej
PRIME MINISTER	CHUAN Likphai
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	VICHIT Sookmak
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	PRASONG Soonsiri
SUPREME COMMANDER, ARMED FORCES	ACM WORANAT Apichari
CINC ARMY	GEN WIMOL Wongwanich
CINC NAVY	ADM VICHET Karunyavanij
CINC AIR FORCE	ACM GUN Pimantip

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR	Hon. David F. LAMBERTSON
USCINCPACREP and CHIEF JUSMAGTHAI	COL Joshua L. KISER, Jr., USA
DATT	COL Edward CORCORAN, USA



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SOURCE: U.S. Pacific Command Digest, 15 Feb 1993 ~~(S/NF)~~, DECL:OADR.

TONGA (U)

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	718 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:*	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	102,272
ANNUAL GROWTH	0.9 Percent
LITERACY RATE	95-100 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	67 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 86 Million
PER CAPITA	$ 850
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Constitutional Monarchy (British Commonwealth)
KING	Taufa'ahau TUPOU IV
PRIME MINISTER	Baron VAEA
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE	Crown Prince TUPOUTO'A

* Tonga's maritime claims are based upon geographical coordinates established by Royal Proclamation, Internal waters are defined as the area between 173° to 177°W and 15° to 23°30'S.

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR*	Hon. Evelyn I. H. TEEGEN
USCINCPACREP SWPAC and DATT*	LtCol Kip J. NAUGLE, USMC

* Resides in Suva, Fiji.



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VANUATU (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA	14,760 Sq Km
NATIONAL OCEAN CLAIMS:	
ECONOMIC ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE	200 Nautical Miles
SECURITY ZONE	None Claimed
TERRITORIAL SEA	12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION	170,319
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.1 Percent
LITERACY RATE	53 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY	69 Years
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT	$ 137 million
PER CAPITA	$ 860
DEFENSE BUDGET	Not Available
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET	Not Available
TYPE GOVERNMENT	Republic (British Commonwealth)
PRESIDENT	Fred TIMAKATA
PRIME MINISTER	Maxime CARLOT
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Maxime CARLOT

(U) U.S. KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

AMBASSADOR*	Hon. Robert W. FARRAND
DATT*	MAJ Mark A. SWARINGEN, USA

* Resides in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.



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

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1992

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME II (U)

1992

Prepared by the Command History Division
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters USCINCPAC

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025
1993

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CHAPTER V

PLANS

SECTION I—STRATEGY AND REQUIREMENTS

Pacific Command Strategy

Objectives

(U) USCINCPAC revised his strategy during the year, and the new Pacific Command Strategy (PCS) was promulgated on 3 August 1992. The USCINCPAC strategy supported the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the National Security Strategy, and the President's policy of Peacetime Engagement. The PCS was formally called Cooperative Engagement and sought to employ limited forces throughout the theater as a means of achieving our strategic objectives.

(U) Cooperative Engagement was the art of employing national instruments of power to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in the Pacific region. The PCS recognized that more than anywhere else in the world, our economic and security concerns converged in the region, and that military resources contributed both directly and indirectly to political and economic objectives. The PCS spanned the continuum of relations among nations in the region from conditions of forward presence operations to global conflict. The objectives of the strategy were clear: To seek to gain access and influence with nations of the region in order to further U.S. interests and maintain stability during peacetime; and in conflict to seek to react swiftly and decisively to protect American interests, bolster deterrence, and reduce the risk of conflict. Should that fail, rapid and decisive victory was the objective.[1]

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[1]USCINCPACINST S3050.6A (S/NF), Ser S034, 3 Aug 92, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U).

(U) The PCS had two basic and interrelated components to meet those broad objectives. The first specified how forces and resources were to be used in peacetime, while the second specified how forces were to be used during conflict. The core strategic concept was engagement, created through a combination of means that ranged from forward presence and deployments, to exercises.

(U) Forward deployed forces were the most important means to provide presence, as they indicated a clear commitment remaining engaged. The U.S. commitment became more evident and deterrence more enhanced when forward deployed forces conducted exercises or other combined operations with friends and allies. Because of the significant time/distance factors in the Pacific, forward deployed forces often provided the fastest and only practical military response option.

Regional Policies

(U) Alliances and friendships with other nations with whom important interests were shared contributed to Pacific security and stability. Allies and friends shared with us the responsibilities of deterring mutually perceived threats, added their capabilities to ours, and in many cases freed USPACOM forces for other missions. The tremendous diversity among Pacific nations required tailored approaches to meet the often unique needs and concerns of each. USCINCPAC supported multilateral approaches to common concerns, but diversity often meant that some nations had to be dealt with on a bilateral basis. Therefore, the USPACOM focus was on improving the network of bilateral security relationships, which in turn provided a framework for Pacific stability. USCINCPAC regional policies and goals for FY 92 are described below.

Northeast Asia



Southeast Asia

(U) U.S. interests in Southeast Asia (SEA) continued to focus on individual bilateral relationships with the six ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries. The collective strength of these relationships provided the basis for continued U.S. involvement and cooperation in the region, and U.S. presence contributed to regional stability, enhanced deterrence, reduced response time by U.S. forces in crises, and promoted regional prosperity. It was predicated on continued access and maintenance of viable military-to-military relationships with friends and allies. Despite the phase out of U.S. presence in the Philippines, the goal was to maintain the historic friendly

relations with the Philippine government. As the concept and tempo of operations was reoriented from substantial dependence on the Philippine bases, arrangements and opportunities for greater access and presence among other countries in the region were to be expanded.

South Pacific

(U) USCINCPAC's South Pacific policy was to continue to develop and maintain good will with the island nations to foster support for U.S. regional and international policies. Military-to-military interaction with Australian and other regional defense forces which conserved training resources and maintained and improved interoperability were increasingly important. U.S. regional strategic interests generally coincided with Australia's interests, and U.S. policy was to support their initiatives where possible. U.S. policy and assistance to island nations focused on improving indigenous capabilities, building sustainable national infrastructures, and fostering democratic beliefs and initiatives.

Indian Ocean

(U) The changing balance of power in the Indian Ocean (IO) impacted U.S. security interests. Regional views emphasizing self determination and nationalism were being fostered by rapid population growth, lagging economies, political instability, ethnic violence, and competition for strategic natural resources. The region had significant mineral and other natural resources, important sea lines of communications (SLOC), and economic markets of long term strategic importance to the United States. Creativity and flexibility in foreign policy and military strategy were needed to maintain regional stability and security and to guarantee U.S. access and influence. U.S. IO policies would

also require close coordination with allies and improved bilateral relations with key Third World nations.

Forward Presence Operations

(U) USCINCPAC planned and executed peacetime military operations and programs to support the Peacetime Component of the PCS. USCINCPAC and the Service components were also involved in coordination, planning, and sometimes assisting in the execution of programs sponsored by the Services, DOD, or other Federal agencies, and sometime non-governmental organizations (NGO). Major activities included:

- Peacetime search and rescue (SAR)
- Disaster relief and recovery operations
- Civic Action
- Ship visits
- Exercises
- Joint Task Force FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA)
- Security Assistance programs
- Armaments cooperation
- Army Logistics Improvement Program
- International Military Information (IMI) Program
- USIA Cooperative Programs
- Expanded Relations Program (ERP)
- Other (visits, staff talks, conferences, etc)



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[2]J5 Report (S), Ser S054-93, 23 Apr 93, Subj: USCINCPAC Plans Status (PLANSTAT) (U).











SECTION III - USPACOM FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS

Japan

U.S.—Japan Relationship



Tokyo Declaration

(U) On 9 January 1992, President Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa issued a joint declaration which established a global partnership into the 21st century. Points in the Tokyo Declaration of direct interest to USCINCPAC concerned security relations, and included:[4]

[3]J5112 Point Paper (S), 6 Feb 92, Subj: Future of the U.S.-Japan Relationship (U).
[4]Joint Declaration (U), Subj: The Tokyo Declaration on the U.S.-Japan Global Partnership, 10 Jan 92.

- Recognition of the continuing importance of the defense relationship to the peace and stability of the vast and diverse region.
- The U.S. would maintain the forward deployed forces in Japan necessary to preserve peace and stability in the region, and Japan would make available facilities and areas.
- Under the Host Nation Support Agreement, Japan would bear an increasing share of the costs of stationing forces in Japan.
- Both countries would take steps to increase cooperation between their defense forces and enhance the two-way flow of defense technologies.

Significance and Goals

(U) U.S. forces on Okinawa and mainland Japan were vital to USPACOM strategy in Northeast Asia (NEA), and were fundamental to the CINC's operational response capability and deterrent strategy. Approximately 55 percent of U.S. forces in Japan were based on Okinawa, and enjoyed freedom of operation in regional deterrence roles because of recognition by GOJ of their contribution to regional security.[5]

~~(S/NF)~~ The United States' goals for Japan, as expressed in USCINCPAC's Command Strategy, included:

- Increase defense capabilities for Japanese territory and air and sea lines of communication out to 1,000 NM.
- Enact legislation to provide greater wartime host nation support for U.S. forces.
- Increased flexibility in JFIP projects authorized, and formalize bilateral logistics mutual support arrangements.
- Increase sustainability of Japanese SDF.

[5]USCINCPACINST S3050.6A ~~(S/NF)~~, Ser S034, 3 Aug 92, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U).

- Increase technological standardization and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces through expanded bilateral coordination and cooperation.
- Grant early access to, and operation from, U.S. and JSDF facilities during periods of tension.
- Retain U.S. forward basing on Okinawa.
- Encourage JDA to make increasing use of the high technology potential of the civilian techno-industrial base, and make newly-developed technology available to the United States promptly and without hindrance.

USCINCPAC Visits

(U) Admiral Larson visited Japan twice during the year. His first trip, 17 through 23 February, included a visit to Okinawa, while on his second trip he spent only one day in Japan, 31 August 1992. A major purpose of the February visit was to preparation for Congressional testimony, and allowed the CINC to gain persuasive first-hand knowledge of the capability, quality, and value of the forward deployed SOF and Marine units. He was also able to build rapport and reaffirm the excellent security relationship with Japanese military and civilian government leaders. He considered the trip highly successful.[6]

~~(C)~~ The purpose of his one-day August visit was to brief Japanese leaders on his five-day visit to the Russian Far East. In addition, the Japanese sought his assessment of Russian views on the strategic impact of the Northern Territories, and had asked him to plug Russo-Japanese military exchanges as a way to overcome Russian military opposition to return of the islands. He reported his impression of deteriorating readiness and a failing infrastructure in the Russian Far East military forces, but noted that Russia retained a significant hardware capability and could regenerate military readiness if enough time and money

[6]USCINCPAC 140301Z Mar 92 (S) (Info used was UNCLAS).

were committed. The CINC advised that readiness should not be reduced, as a strong alliance was the best way to contribute to stability in the region. He also informed the Japanese that the Northern Territories elicited strong reactions from civilian and military leaders—the islands were had strategic importance because of the need to control the two deep-water straits through them so the Russian fleet could not be bottled up in the Sea of Okhotsk (SOO). Besides that, release of the islands would set difficult precedents and affect Russian border disputes with China and other countries. On the subject of Russo-Japanese military exchanges, Admiral Larson reported that he had encouraged such exchanges up but the response was unenthusiastic.[7]

Security Subcommittee Meetings

(S) A mini Security Subcommittee (SSC) meeting was conducted in Washington on 21-22 May 1992. The meeting was chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) William Pendley, and the Japanese delegation was led by Mr. Toshiro Ozawa, Director of the National Security Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). USCINCPAC was represented by RADM Larry Vogt, J5. Highlights of the meeting included substantive progress on AWACS; the introduction of the concept of operational assistance in kind as an extension of the HNS program in Japan; U.S. redefinition of goals concerning Okinawa land issues; military exchanges with Russia and the need for an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea; the Northern Territories; and North Korea's nuclear program. The Japanese reviewed the public perception of support for the security treaty, but pointed out the widespread expectation of a peace dividend. He noted that small accidents and incidents could reduce support for U.S. Forces, and that there was an expectation of reductions in training and exercises. OSD viewed the meeting as very productive, with the Japanese side forthcoming and straightforward

[7]AMEMB Tokyo 14765/040817Z Sep 92 (C); AMEMB 13859/210948Z Aug 92 (S).

during discussions of a broad range of bilateral and international issues.[8]

(S) The actual SSC meeting was held 16-17 July 1992 in Washington. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/IAS) James R. Lilley chaired the meeting, and the Japanese side was led by Mr. Yukio Sato, Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau, MOFA. This meeting was the first to follow a recent pattern of informal meetings at the DASD level, and was a contrast to earlier, scripted and formalized SSC meetings.[9]

(S) Goal of the meeting was to readjust the bilateral relationship to changing politico—military conditions while reconsolidating public support for the alliance. At the meeting, the Japanese agreed that uncertainties about developments in Russia, China, and Korea should replace the Soviet threat as justification for the alliance and Japan's defense build-up, but groped for a clearer conceptualization of the security impact of uncertainty as a persuasive rationale. They requested the United States to assess Russian Far East military capabilities vis-a-vis Japan when publicly commenting on threat perceptions of the FSU, lest opposition members of the Diet find embarrassing gaps between Japanese and U.S. perceptions. Other topics discussed included the need to forestall North Korean nuclear weapons development; the importance of U.S. forward deployment and Government of Japan (GOJ) promotion of a regional security dialogue through ASEAN and APEC; USFJ facilities and Okinawa base issues; and contingency planning for Korea. The subject of Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) was, at their request, to be discussed outside the SSC framework so as not to suggest a bilateral effort.

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[8]SECDEF 250305Z Jun 92 (S).

[9]SECDEF 120026Z Aug 92 (S); AMEMB Tokyo 10688/080055Z (C), 10761/080828Z (C), 10772/080917Z (C), 10831/090522Z (C), and 11070/130948Z Jul 92 (C).

Defense Planning

(C) On 1 April 1991, a new Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) began which allocated $172 billion for defense. This represented an average annual real growth rate of only 3 percent, and was considerably lower than the 5.4 percent annual growth rate of the previous MTDP. Emphasis shifted from acquisition of new front-line equipment toward improved logistics and support capabilities, with weapons procurement geared toward replacement and modernization.[10]

(C) Appropriations were increased by 5.9 percent, while funds allocated for military equipment increased only 2.1 percent above the previous plan. Stressed were enhancement of intelligence and C2 capabilities throughout the SDF, promotion of research and development, and improvement of living and working conditions for SDF personnel. Provisions of the MTDP clearly reflected Japanese recognition of the importance of maintaining close security ties with the United States, as they agreed to increase HNS for U.S. troops stationed in Japan to around 73 percent by 1995, up from the current estimated 50 percent share.

AWACS Purchase

(C) Japan had been considering purchase of AWACS aircraft for some time, and was discussed in the 1991 USCINCPAC Command History. In February 1992, the Boeing Company quoted a price of $3 billion for four AWACS based on the commercial 767 airframe. In July, the price had been reduced to a rough figure of $1.8-$2.0 billion, and by September DOD had brought the price down to $1.76 billion for the four aircraft. During a September visit to Japan by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) William Pendley, the Director General for Defense Policy of the JDA informed him that while Japan had not yet decided on the AWACS

[10]J2 Info Paper (C), 7 Aug 92, Subj: Japan: Five Year Mid-Term Defense Plan (U).

purchase, the price was too high for the GOJ to obtain public support for the purchase during a time of detente. The Japanese also asked how they could explain to the public why the 767 AWACS cost twice what the 707 AWACS had cost several years earlier. DASD Pendley explained that it might be possible to find a way to deal with the $34.4 million non-recurring recoupment costs, although there were legal questions with that option, but that did not approach the considerable reduction the Japanese sought.[11]

(S) In October 1992, Ambassador Armacost weighed in with the opinion that the JDA desperately wanted to procure AWACS, but at the 11th hour was in a box over price and needed to show the Prime Minister and Finance Ministry that it had struck the best deal possible. In his view, some movement on the non-recurring costs would be most helpful in resolving JDA's dilemma. The final offer of the year was made in December by SECDEF Cheney, who waived $27.6 million in non-recurring charges (the additional $6.8 million was due to NATO and Saudi Arabia and could not be waived). SECDEF based his decision on the fact that Japan's procurement of an AWACS capability would significantly advance the common interests in interoperability and complementary defense cooperation. He cautioned, however, that the Japanese government must fully understand the cost of AWACS, noting that price and availability (P&A) data was a best estimate of a viable program and subject to change because of the many unknowns in the areas of system integration, system testing, and the number of eventual buyers.[12]

(S) The problems faced by Japan caused by the doubling in price from what Japan originally expected AWACS to cost were many. Changes in the international environment had caused JDA to revise downward their defense budget plans, while the bursting of

[11]AMEMB Tokyo 15390/170649Z Sep 92 (S).
[12]AMEMB Tokyo 17942/281135Z Oct 92 (S); SECDEF 031835Z Dec 92 (S).

the bubble economy produced the possibility of negative growth, which made purchase of equipment at double the original cost very painful. During past heated debate on the AWACS issue with the E-2C airframe, JDA had gone on record as saying that from the standpoint of exclusive defense they did not need the E-3 AWACS system. JDA would be subject to great criticism if they procured an AWACS system at a time when the international situation was even more relaxed. In addition, Japan would be the first country to introduce the 767 version of AWACS, and that would represent a singular exception to Japan's policy of only buying equipment that the U.S. services operated. No decision on purchase was reached by year end, although JDA expressed confidence that the deal would go through.[13]

Contingency Planning

(C) During talks with Japanese officials in June, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Wolfowitz suggested the two sides think about the kinds of cooperation that would be needed in case of another Korean contingency. He acknowledged Japanese sensitivities to the subject, but commented that making a mistake in a crisis could turn out to be much more sensitive and informed the GOJ that the United States would like to start planning for such a contingency in whatever way was best. The Japanese pointed out that the constitution's prohibition on the right of collective security made planning for a Korean crisis very sensitive, but added that Japan would like to continue to consult on the forms that planning might take.[14]

(C) Japanese Defense and Foreign Ministry officials understood the need for crisis planning for a Korean contingency, but did not know how to break through the political constraints on undertaking such planning. Inter-ministerial planning for con-

[13]AMEMB Tokyo 20199/080948Z Dec 92 (C).
[14]AMEMB Tokyo 10686/080046Z Jul 92 (C).

tingencies outside Japan broke down in the early 1980s because of Japanese bureaucratic agglutination. While MOFA and JDA favored prior planning, other ministries frowned on any mention of crisis legislation and involvement in a Korean war scenario, and most other ministries and organs of the central government would have to be brought into the planning process. Although the other agencies did not have veto power over crisis planning, they could impede movement through bureaucratic red tape. The Japanese noted that bureaucrats had a natural tendency to impede creative solutions to constitutional and political constraints because enforcement of rules was their standard operating procedure, while the intent of crisis planning was to find ways around rules. Therefore, the whole exercise was counter to the bureaucracy's natural proclivities. In the absence of a crisis, it would be difficult to overcome that bureaucratic hurdle.[15]

(C) While MOFA had taken the lead in the former crisis planning exercise, it would now have to cede that authority to the Cabinet Secretariat, which had grown more powerful in recent years and would insist on implementing its mandate to coordinate inter-ministerial planning. The national mood was also less receptive to wartime planning scenarios, and while MOFA officials realized that the most serious potential threat to Japanese security today came from the Korean peninsula, they were in a small minority. The vast majority of the Japanese public blissfully considered war to be a thing of the past, and did not want to hear about Japanese involvement in a Korean.

(C) The effect on public opinion was the GOJ's biggest concern on the subject of crisis planning. If agencies besides MOFA and JDA were brought in, the probability of leaks would be expanded exponentially, and a leak would immediatley raise questions and concerns about why crisis planning was underway, which in turn could lead to speculation and conspiracy theories.

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[15]AMEMB Tokyo 10831/090522Z Jul 92 (C).

In summary, MOFA's position was "We're not against contingency planning, but don't have high expectations for much movement."

(S) In October, the subject was again discussed with MOFA and JDA officials by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy I. Lewis Libby. The Japanese recommended that only the core agencies—DOD, DOS, MOFA, JDA, and the respective militaries—meet to identify the problems and requirements in event of a crisis, and added that if the United States was ready to begin, they would nominate contact points to start the process of joint planning.[16]

Peacekeeping Operations

(U) On 15 June 1992, the Diet passsed the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Cooperation Law and the International Disaster Assistance Law, culminating a long effort by the government of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to pass legislation authorizing SDF participation in UN activities. A previous attempt in December 1991 to pass the bill was defeated by the opposition-controlled Upper House. Under the provisions of the new law, Japanese participation in PKO could not involve the threat or use of force, and also required the consent of parties involved in the conflict and the host country. Once dispatched, operations had to cease if there was danger of involvement in armed conflict. The law gave the Prime Minister authority to dispatch personnel for the activities listed below, with personnel for the first three categories recruited from Japanese local police and

[16]AMEMB Tokyo 17982/290314Z Oct 92 (S).

governmental agencies, and personnel for the other activities from the SDF and Maritime Safety Agency (MSA):[17]

- Election monitoring.
- Assisting and monitoring local police.
- Aid in civil administrative areas.
- Medical care.
- Search, rescue, and repatriation of refugees.
- Providing refugees with food, clothing, and medical care.
- Setting up shelters for refugees.
- Repairing and constructing basic life-support facilities.
- Removing contamination and repairing environmental damage.
- Providing transportation and communication facilities, storing materials, construction work, and providing machines and equipment.

(U) Because of a political compromise necessary in order to gain passage of the bill, enabling legislation was required in order for the Prime Minister (PM) to dispatch SDF units (but no other government personnel) for the activities listed below. Individual SDF officers dispatched to join military observer missions could also engage in these activities:

- Monitoring cease fire agreements and the relocation, withdrawal, and disarming of forces.
- Patrolling buffer zones to prevent armed conflict.
- Inspecting of incoming or outgoing weapons.
- Collecting and disposing of abandoned arms, including mines.
- Helping set up cease-fire lines.

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[17]J5112 Point Paper (U), 7 Jul 92, Subj: Japan's UN Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Law and the International Disaster Assistance Law; AMEMB Tokyo 09531/181023Z Jun 92 (S).

- Assisting in POW exhanges.

(U) The PM was required to seek Diet approval on each occasion in which SDF members were dispatched for the six purposes listed above. If the Diet were recessed or dissolved, the PM had to seek Diet approval at the first session convened after the dispatch. Diet approval was also required if the cooperation in these categories continued beyond two years.

(C) A unit of up to 2,000 personnel could participate in international peace cooperation work, but that figure included replacement personnel and those in training. This limited the number of personnel who could be dispatched abroad to about half that number, of approximately 1,000 personnel. If teams were sent to two locations at the same time, the government estimated that each team could be limited to 500-600 personnel. The limit did not apply to SDF personnel engaged in transport of PKO forces and material from Japan to the overseas territory of dispatch.

(C) SDF personnel could carry light weapons for self-defense and could use them to defend themselves or other members of their units. Under the Japanese penal code, SDF members acting as individuals had the right to take action to defend others in danger, even though the PKO Law had no provisions for using weapons to defend UN or host country personnel. Mine clearing was allowable without further Diet approval if in conjunction with other non-combat duties for the safety of Japanese personnel.

(C) The separate companion legislation allowed SDF participation in international disaster assistance efforts. The disaster assistance teams would neither be armed nor sent to hostile areas, and were limited to a maximum of 270 SDF personnel in medical assistance efforts, 140 personnel in water purification efforts, and 360 personnel and 10 helicopters (six UH-1H and

perhaps four CH-47) for helicopter airlift missions. As a tangible demonstration of the country's will to contribute personnel to overseas efforts, the SDF had contingency plans prepared to dispatch an international disaster relief assistance team as soon as a compatible request was received. Because only six of the JASDF's 15 C-130H aircraft could be devoted to international cooperation, planning focused on contingencies in Asia, as Africa and Latin America were considered too far away.

(U) The GOJ's new PKO headquarters was established in the Prime Minister's office, headed by a MOFA official with a 32-person staff seconded from various parts of the government. It was charged with coordinating the PKO and disaster relief related activities of 13 separate ministries.[18]

(~~C~~) On 3 September, the GOJ received a formal request from the UN asking for Japanese participation in the UN Cambodian peacekeeping operation, and a formal and favorable response was given on the 6th. Prime Minister Miyazawa approved an inter-agency plan to dispatch SDF units and policemen to Cambodia to meet the request for 683 personnel, including eight ceasefire observers, a 600-member engineer battalion, and 75 civilian policemen. The SDF ceasefire observers departed Japan on 19 September by commercial air, followed on 23 and 24 September by an advance team from the engineer battalion flown down in six JASDF C-130 aircraft. The bulk of the battalion departed on 13 October via commercial air, and the heavy equipment and vehicles were transported on two MSDF amphibious transport ships which sailed from Japan on 17 September. This was the first overseas deployment by Japanese ground forces since World War II, and was closely watched by her neighbors who held unpleasant memories of the last deployments.[19]

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[18]AMEMB Tokyo 13617/190826Z Aug 92 (~~C~~).
[19]AMEMB Tokyo 15346/160940Z Sep 92 (~~C~~).

Korea

Significance and Goals

(C) Korea had progressed to a newly industrialized nation with an increasing role in the world economic structure, and was linked to the United States by the long-standing Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. Korea continued to improve its defense posture relative to its immediate threat, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the ROK armed forces were considered capable of defending the country with U.S. support. The ROK had always considered the Soviet Union as a long term adversary, but steady movement toward normalization of relations had lessened Korean concerns about the FSU and Russia. In August 1992, Korea established diplomatic relations with the PRC.

[redacted]

[20]USCINCPACINST S3050.6A (~~SANE~~), Ser S034, 3 Aug 92, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U).

Security Consultative Meeting

(U) The 24th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the United States and the ROK was held in Washington on 7 and 8 October 1992. The U.S. side was led by SECDEF Richard B. Cheney and the Korean side by ROK Minister of National Defense Choi Sae Chang. Prior to the SCM, GEN Colin Powell and GEN Lee Pil Sup held the 14th U.S./ROK Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on 7 October. Topics discussed during the SCM ranged from North Korea's nuclear program to U.S. troop strength, and from U.S. transition to a supporting role to sharing defense costs. The next meeting of the SCM was to be held sometime in 1993, in the ROK.[21]



North-South Agreements

~~(S)~~ At a ceremony in the Blue House on 17 February, ROK President Roh Tae Woo signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (ARNE), and the Joint Non-Nuclear Declaration. ARNE was the first official North/South agreement specifically concerning basic inter-Korean relations, and it had three subcommittees to implement the agreement. The Joint Non-Nuclear Declaration was a ROK/DPRK bilateral agreement with the stated goal of achieving a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. It established the Joint Nuclear Control Committee

[21]SECSTATE 331165/090631Z Oct 92 (U)
[22]CJCS 302306Z Oct 92 ~~(S)~~

(JNCC) to implement the agreement and establish bilateral inspection procedures, and was formed on 19 March 1992.[23]

(C) There were several legal ramifications in the ROK created by the wording of the preamble to the agreement, which stated that the relationship between North and South was not one between countries, but rather a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards reunification. This statement made the relationship ill-defined under international law, and created a fundamental legal contradiction between ARNE and the ROK's National Security Law (NSL). Since North Korea was the "anti-state organization" at which the NSL was aimed, the law contravened the word and intent of ARNE, which called for each side to recognize and respect the other's system, and put the ROK in the awkward position of recognizing, respecting, and making agreements with an anti-state organization.[24]

Ministerial Meetings

(C) The sixth round of North/South Prime Ministerial talks was held 18-20 February 1992 in Pyongyang. During the meeting, the ARNE and Non-Nuclear agreements signed earlier were effectuated when the Prime Ministers exchanged documents. Differences were noted between the two sides on the issue of DPRK ratification of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement and establishment of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission. (North Korea signed the IAEA Safeguards Agreement on 30 January 1992 with the IAEA Board of Governors, ratified by the North Korea Supreme People's Assembly on 10 April.) In answer to a ROK proposal for trial inspections prior to agreement on an overall bilateral inspection regime, the DPRK stated that inspection of selected sites in the South was not enough; to verify the non-existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, inspections

[23]J5111 Talking Paper (C), 26 May 92, Subj: Korean Talks and Prognosis (U).
[24]AMEMB Seoul 01615/180842Z Feb 92 (C) and 03145/250751Z Mar 92 (C).

would have to be conducted at bases throughout the south. But at the same time, they insisted that their nuclear program was nothing for the ROK to worry about. The DPRK called for withdrawal of all foreign troops from the ROK and repeal of the NSL, and also suggested joint North/South talks on the "comfort girls" issue and a joint resolution on the Japanese nuclear weapons threat. The ROK refused both ideas, as Japan was already investigating the comfort girls and were in full compliance with IAEA safeguards.[25]

(S) The seventh round of Prime Ministerial talks was held in Seoul, 5-8 May 1992, with the DPRK delegation housed in the Shilla Hotel. The meeting revealed basic differences in interpretation of the three principles of unification contained in the 4 July 1972 North-South joint communique, i.e., that unification should be achieved independently, peacefully, and under the principle of "Grand National Unity." The three committees set up (Military, Political, and Exchanges/Cooperation) were to continue to work until the eighth round of meetings in September to resolve the differences. The most important result of the round was an agreement to establish the implementing bodies, three North/South joint commissions and liaison offices, by the 19 May deadline set in the North-South Basic Agreement. The three joint commissions were the Joint Military Commission, the Joint Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, and the Joint Social/Cultural Commission, and all were established on 18 May although they did not meet until November. Also on that date, the liaison offices were established at Panmunjom to handle all routine contacts between North and South Korea. They also agreed to establish a Joint Reconciliation Commission, which was actually formed in October and met for the first time in November. This fourth commission was not mandated by the Basic Agreement, but was a renamed version of the Political Commission proposed by the North earlier. A fifth commission

[25]AMEMB Seoul 01921/250923Z Feb 92 (S)

was the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), formed under the Non-Nuclear Declaration, discussed below in some detail to show the difficulties of negotiating with the North Koreans.[26]

(C) The eighth round of Prime Ministerial talks was conducted in Pyongyang, 16-18 September 1992. The negotiators were able to work out three supplementary accords to ARNE which spelled out terms for military, political, economic, and social cooperation and provided the guidelines for activities of the joint commissions. Agreement had only been reached by shifting unresolved issues out of the supplementary accords, leaving the two sides with fundamental and controversial differences still to be worked out. The distinction between the commissions and the older committees was not clear and further blurred by an overlap in personnel. Little or no progress was made on the nuclear issue or in scheduling family exchange visits, however, with the North insisting that the problem was ROK insistnece on symmetry and reciprocity. North Korea again proposed that both Koreas gang up on Japan, which ploy was seen as an attempt to drive a wedge between the ROK and Japan, on the one hand, and to gain the upper hand in the North's negotiations with Japan.[27]

(S) North Korea announced on 19 December 1992 that the ninth round of Prime Ministerial talks, scheduled to held 21-24 December in Seoul, could not be held because of the ROK's decision to hold Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 93.[28]

Joint Nuclear Control Commission

Exempt (b)(1), 1.5(d)

(S) Establishment of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) effectuated during the sixth round of Ministerial talks in February proved difficult. [redacted]

[26]AMEMB Seoul 04893/070939Z and 05042/111816Z May 92 (S).
[27]AMEMB Seoul 09982/181155Z Sep 92 (S).
[28]AMEMB Seoul 13234/210912Z Dec 92 (S).

[redacted]

(S) Finally, on 14 March the two sides initialled a charter for the JNCC, and the inaugural meeting was held on the 19th. Both sides presented draft inspection regimes, but were far apart and the only agreement was to meet again on 1 April. That proved to be a repeat performance, with the North still insistent that the purpose of the inspections was to dispell suspicions about nuclear weapons rather than to verify the conditions of the Non-Nuclear Declaration, and once more the only agreement was to meet again on 21 April.

Entry 1
(b)(1).5(a)

[redacted]

Unable to agree on the date of the next JNCC meeting, the two sides agreed that the timing for the next meeting would be determined at the seventh round of Prime Ministerial talks held in May. The ROKs had been unhappy that after each JNCC meeting the DPRK put out its version of the talks and criticized the ROK publicly, and after this meeting decided to go public also and give their side of the story.[30]

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[29]AMEMB Seoul 02222/030848Z Mar 92 (S) and 02496/100800Z Mar 92 (S).
[30]AMEMB Seoul 02974/190956Z (S), 03466/010936Z (S), and 04270/210927Z Apr 92 (S).

[redacted]

(~~S~~) The 12 May JNCC meeting finally realized some progress, with agreement to begin working-level meetings on the 15th to negotiate terms of an inspection regime. [redacted] It was apparent at this time that agreement would not be reached by the May deadline set by the Basic Agreement for a North/South agreement on bilateral inspections.[32]

(~~S~~) The next meeting was held on 27 May, and the talks remained stalemated with no agreed date to meet again. This represented the first missed deadline in the series of measures

[31] AMEMB Seoul 04936/050801Z May 92 (~~S~~).
[32] AMEMB Seoul 05129/130926Z May 92 (~~S~~).

taken since the December 1991 Non-Nuclear Declaration. The ROKG had decided to let it slip in the interest of pursuing an effective inspection regime, as they were in a good position to wait for the North to come around while fending off tactical negotiating maneuvers, and also decided to take an activist course in pressing North Korea to come to terms.

[redacted]

(S) In late June, the DPRK agreed to meet again, and the sixth JNCC meeting was held on 30 June 1992. The two sides failed to narrow their differences on a bilateral inspection protocol. As expected, the North claimed it had received a clean bill of health from the IAEA. The seventh JNCC meeting on 21 July again realized no progress, but the eighth meeting held on 31 August did, albeit modest.

[redacted]

(S) A series of unproductive working-level meetings were held, and on 16 October the DPRK proposed a full JNCC meeting on 23 October, promising a "very constructive consultation." However, at the meeting the North did not table a new constructive proposal but used the occasion to denounce at length Exer

[33] AMEMB Seoul 05727/282347Z May 92 (S) and 05890/02072Z Jun 92 (S).
[34] AMEMB Seoul 06968/301106Z Jun 92 (S) and 09383/311235Z Aug 92 (S).

cise TEAM SPIRIT 93. They demanded that the exercise, and any others which mobilized foreign nuclear weapons and related equipment, be cancelled by the end of November. In that event, they indicated constructive proposals to break the JNCC stalemate might be forthcoming. The second condition on exercises was new, and possibly represented DPRK preparation to object to any exercise which it perceived to be a substitute for TEAM SPIRIT.[35]

(S) The next JNCC meeting was scheduled for 10 November, but North Korea informed the ROK that military exercises in South Korea precluded their attending, so the meeting was rescheduled for 18 November, and later for 27 November. As usual, no progress was made as North Korea insisted that TEAM SPIRIT be cancelled before the bilateral nuclear inspection issue could be addressed, and they refused to agree on scheduling any further JNCC meetings. However, the DPRK intriguingly called for another full JNCC meeting on 10 December in lieu of more working-level meetings, but in the event remained intransigent on the bilateral inspection regime. They again demanded cancellation of TEAM SPIRIT 93, and also called for unconditional inspection of U.S. nuclear sites in the ROK and, using a new line, called on the ROK to disclose details of South Korea's continuing nuclear weapons program. They did not, however, threaten curtailment of cooperation with the IAEA or a break in North/South dialogue. The two sides did agree to a working level meeting and another plenary session on 17 December (two days after the deadline for cancelling TEAM SPIRIT).[36]

(S) Despite ROK belief that the DPRK would cancel the JNCC meeting after the deadline for cancellation of TEAM SPIRIT passed, the meeting was conducted as scheduled. South Korea's decision to hold the exercise was made on the 16th, and the

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[35]AMEMB Seoul 11268/221004Z Oct 92 (C).
[36]AMEMB Seoul 11908/090954Z and 12495/272209Z Nov 92 (C); 12608/010945Z and 12947/101028Z Dec 92 (C).

expected call to cancel the JNCC meeting failed to come. It was a repeat of the previous meeting, however, with the North again demanding cancellation of TEAM SPIRIT while refusing to address the nuclear inspection issue. The ROK rejected a call for another JNCC plenary meeting on grounds that the North would use it for propaganda purposes, and the DPRK in turn rejected a ROK offer of a working-level meeting to deal with substance instead of rhetoric. The meeting ended without agreement to meet again, although the North proposed a plenary session on 28 December and the South a working session on the 24th. The ROK later proposed a working-level meeting for 28 December, but it failed to take place.[37]

Peacetime Operational Control

(S) In August, the ROK government announced its intention to raise the subject of peacetime OPCON over ROK forces at the SCM. The ROKG saw a change in OPCON as helpful in countering North Korean propaganda and consistent with the U.S. shift to a supporting defense role. They desired to announce the change at the October SCM, and implement it sometime during 1993.

[redacted]

[37]AMEMB Seoul 13123/160947Z, 13171/170950Z, and 13235/211001Z Dec 92 (S)
[38]AMEMB Seoul 09241/270440Z Aug 92 (S)

[redacted]

(S/NF) Many positive changes on the peninsula in the past year indicated that the two Koreas were moving closer together [redacted] The most significant changes were:

- Both countries had been admitted to the UN.
- Seven meetings had been held at the ministerial level, and many other North/South meetings held with government officials.
- U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from the peninsula as a result of President Bush's policy.
- Two IAEA inspections were successfully completed.
- South Korean industrialists traveled to North Korea to discuss and plan mutual economic ventures.
- The two countries had issued a joint nuclear declaration.
- ARNE had been signed, and four major committees established to handle bilateral issues. Each had met several times.
- The DPRK had been more forthcoming in returning Korean War remains, and the UNMAC Secretaries were formulating an MOU to handle future remains transfers.
- A strong U.S.-Japan-ROK position regarding the DPRK nuclear issue was supported by the international community.
- Economic conditions continued to worsen in the DPRK, with food and energy shortages critical.
- Both Koreas were in leadership transition.

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[39]USCINCPAC 300400Z Aug 92 (S/NF); CJCS 101615Z Sep 92 (U).

- The ROK and PRC established formal diplomatic relations.
- The Armistice had continued for 39 years with no significant incidents in the last 10 years.

[redacted]





[redacted]

(S) Ambassador Gregg submitted his thoughts on the subject in September. He noted in particular the political ramifications associated with OPCON transfer, including the possibility that North Korea might misread the action as a diminution of U.S. and/or UNC commitment to the defense of South Korea. It could also be seen by some in the region as proof of U.S. intentions to draw back from forward deployment in Northeast Asia. He also pointed out that there were those in Congress who might argue that with transfer of OPCON, U.S. forces should no longer be stationed on the peninsula or at least could be greatly reduced.[41]

[redacted]

[40] Ibid.

[41] AMEMB Seoul 09671/090509Z Sep 92 (S).

(S) The official U.S. position on peacetime OPCON transfer developed was that, when asked, the U.S. would acknowledge that Armistice OPCON transfer would take place. There were, however, military implications in the changed command relationships that required certain measures to be worked out prior to the OPCON shift. Details were to be worked out on a military-to-military basis using JCS-approved guidelines, and a progress report made at the 25th SCM to help in determining the specific timing for a transfer. This was basically the position adopted at the SCM and implemented at the 14th Military Committee Meeting held in October 1992.[43]

Thailand

Significance and Goals

(S) The Kingdom of Thailand was one of the more advanced developing countries in SEA. Its defense budget represented about 16 percent of the government budget, and its armed forces were considered capable of providing a limited front-line defense of the country's borders against a conventional attack. It was unable to unilaterally repulse a determined attack by Vietnam, and was embarked on an aggressive modernization program. When

[42]Ibid.
[43]SECDEF 301220Z Sep 92 (S).

the year began, Thailand was operating under its 14th constitution since the absolute monarchy was ended in 1932, imposed by the perpetrators of the 27th coup d'etat conducted in February 1991. In May 1992, political turmoil which resulted in yet another government was experienced. The country pursued an independent foreign policy, but viewed the United States as the final guarantor of its security.[44]

~~(C)~~ The goals of the United States for Thailand included: Restoration of a democratically elected government; increased U.S. access to bases and strengthened Thai defense capabilities; improved Thai ability to interoperate with U.S. forces in a global war as well as regional conflict scenarios; and strategic denial of Thai bases to U.S. enemies. USCINCPAC's CD goals for Thailand were to encourage law enforcement and eradication programs and provide support and aid for Thai eradication efforts. Because of the 1991 coup, FMS, IMET, and ESF had been suspended, and an increase in IMET would be sought when the suspensions were lifted.

Political Crisis

~~(C/NF)~~ Following the bloodless coup in February 1991, the Thai military appointed an interim National Assembly, which drafted a new constitution which was ratified on 7 December 1991. New parliamentary elections were held on 22 March 1992, following which five political parties formed a coalition government led by Royal Thai Army (RTA) General Suchinda Kraprayoon, who had been instrumental in the 1991 coup. Suchinda had been the RTA CINC, and during that time solidified control of the Army by graduates of Class 5, Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy (CRMA). After the coup, members of Class 5 exerted power to orchestrate politico-military events to set the stage for Suchina to take

[44]USCINCPACINST S3050.6A (~~S/NF~~), Ser S034, 3 Aug 92, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U).

over as Prime Minister, and their strong and open moves to legislate and institutionalize military influence in government caused a pro-democracy backlash among the many opposition parties and the general population. Opposition to the Suchinda government swelled quickly in Bangkok and some other parts of the country, and Suchinda's appointment as unelected Prime Minister on 7 April 1992 proved unacceptable to many Thais and led to unrest, culminating in anti-government protests in May led by MG Chamlong Srimuang (head of the Phlang Dharma political party and former mayor of Bangkok). Although the demonstrations were peaceful at first, confrontation eventually broke out between protesters and police, first, then military, security forces.[45]

(C) Confrontations began on 17 May 1992, when a large group of demonstrators converged on Phan Fa Bridge on Ratchadamnoen Avenue and found their way blocked by razorwire and police units backed by soldiers on the other side of the bridge. At about 2200, a few protestors attempted to breach the barricade and move on to their objective, Government House. The police initially tried to stop the advancing group with water cannons, but their attempts proved more provocative than inhibitive, a melee ensued, and a number of demonstrators broke through the police lines. At the same time, parties unknown set fire to three government buildings—the investigating commission was unable to determine whether the persons starting the fires were genuine protestors, unknown persons following a government plan to provide justification for the use of armed force, or persons hired by unspecified "political groups" to foster further violence.[46]

(C) According to DAO observers on the ground at the time and the official report, the troops opened fire on the demonstrators sometime after midnight. Pandemonium ensued, and a mass of demonstrators fled westward away from the wire. Sporadic firing

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[45]JICPAC Fact Sheet (~~S/NF/WN~~), 26 Oct 92, Subj: Kingdom of Thailand (U).
[46]AMEMB Bangkok 46994/210459Z Oct 92 (C).

took place each time demonstrators moved back toward the barricade. Several other instances of troops firing directly and indiscrimately at demonstrators, at close range and in the back, occurred before peace was restored on 21 May. The official death toll cited in the October report was 52, and another 696 demonstrators were wounded. A total of 88 police officers received medical treatment, most for minor wounds, and 190 Army personnel were injured, four seriously. The number of missing persons whose disappearance could be traced directly to the events of 17-21 May stood at 69, but the total number of missing persons whose links to the events could not be established or confirmed stood at 217. Property damage was estimated at approximately $71.6 million, and losses to the economy through reduced tourism and foreign investment at $1.2 billion.[47]

(S) The violence was only halted by intervention of King Bhumibol Adunlayadej, which forced both sides to back down and dealt a severe blow to the pro-Class 5 forces, and Suchinda was pressured to resign on 24 May (but not before issuing a decree of general amnesty for those involved in the unrest). Suchinda's resignation resulted in the automatic dissolution of the cabinet, and the unelected deputy prime minister took over as acting head of the government until a new one could be formed. Moving quickly, the National Assembly on 25 May sped passage of four constitutional amendments proposed by the opposition parties, the most significant of which required that the prime minister be an elected member of the house. An interim government led by career diplomat Anand Panyarachun was sworn into office in June and immediately moved to curb the military's influence on politics and the affairs of state. A major military reshuffle was announced on 1 August 1992 which effectively sidelined the senior military officers most closely identified with the overreaction by the armed forces in May. The improved political environment led to parliamentary elections on 13 September 1992, which

[47]Ibid.; USDAO Bangkok 24414/19052Z May 92 (S).

resulted in a new government, led by Prime Minister Chuan Likphai, consisting of a loose coalition of pro-democracy/anti-military politicians. Suchinda departed the country on a self-imposed exile, a uniquely Thai solution to the problem of meting out punishment.[48]

Military Relations

(S) Ambassador Lambertson advised as early as 7 May that increased political tensions in Thailand made it necessary to consider the implications for Exercise COBRA GOLD and how to react to various contingencies. The use of violence by the Thai military on 18 May led to the early conclusion of participation by American forces, which was generally well-received by Thai opinion shapers and the public but not as favorably by the military. Also cancelled were scheduled visits by USCINCPAC and CDR USARPAC. Despite the actions of the RTA in Bangkok and the U.S. reaction to it, the operational character of the U.S.-Thai military-to-military relationship proved resilient. Except for a brief period when restrictions were placed on Thai airspace, the Thai military was cooperative in facilitating the redeployment of the 10,000-strong U.S. COBRA GOLD force, and U.S. aircraft flying in support of actual operations, including JTF-FA missions, continued to transit the country at all hours—sometimes on very short notice—and U.S. ships and crews were welcome visitors at Phuket and Pattaya. If it were left up to the Thai military leadership, they would continue the relationship unchanged.[49]

Relations Chilled

(S) However, the political climate had obviously changed significantly. The United States had to examine the security relationship against the background of the Ratchadamnoen Avenue

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[48]See note 43, above.
[49]AMEMB Bangkok 26367/010958Z Jun 92 (S).

events and the resultant uncertainties, and to do things in ways that strengthened prospects for democratic development and a greatly reduced political role for the military. Decisions concerning aspects of military cooperation had to consider divisions within the military and avoid fueling sentiment that could bolster the position of individuals who supported the violence. Ambassador Lambertson urged that we keep in mind our security interests and the important advantages we could derive from cooperation with the military, avoid blanket condemnation and sweeping decisions regarding interaction with it, and preserve what we could of the relationship. Specific areas to be looked at included the level of contacts with the Thai military, the exercise program, and the question of military sales.

~~(S)~~ Besides the lingering question of culpability of certain Thai military leaders in the May events, the utility of conducting business with senior officers whose tenure could be cut short at any time was questionable. The postponements of visits by Admiral Larson and LTG Corns in connection with COBRA GOLD served notice that business as usual was not possible, and visits by flag-rank officers (and DOD civilian equivalents) were reviewed on a case-by-case basis but not deferred across the board. Visits to the U.S. by senior Thai officers were also reviewed on a case-by-case basis.[50]

~~(S)~~ Although the Ambassador recommended that exercises continue with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and the Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) because of their lack of involvement in the violence, DOS questioned whether calling off exercises only with units or elements that suppressed the demonstrations could be put into practice, and postponed all exercises and all joint planning for exercises until 1 August 1992 or until the Thai political situation had clarified. FMS and commercial munitions sales were reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and licenses for direct sale of

[50]SECSTATE 179204/050349Z Jun 92 ~~(S)~~.

small arms, ammunition, and similar lethal items which could be used for urban crowd control were denied.

~~(S/NF)~~ On 24 July, Admiral Larson noted the progress of the interim Anand government since 5 June, and expressed concern with reports of plans emanating from Washington to further restrict U.S. military relations and bilateral military exercises with Thailand. He felt that such action would undoubtedly have an extremely adverse impact on our military-to-military relationship. If Thailand chose to deny U.S. access or become uncooperative, it could reduce USCINCPAC's ability to perform military operations in SEA and support operations in SWA. He was also concerned with reports from Thailand that indicated that the present policy of limiting U.S. military relations and suspending bilateral exercises until 1 August had resulted in alienation, frustration, and loss of confidence in the U.S. military as an ally. The overall Thai military perception was that we punished them (suspended IMET, limited relations, and cancelled exercises) and then we continually asked for more in the way of access and cooperation. However, in Admiral Larson's view we needed military relations with Thailand more than ever, especially since the beginning of withdrawal from the Philippines. Thailand had become the integral single focal point of military operations in SEA and was quickly becomming the stepping-off point for operations in the Indian Ocean and SWA. As examples of why the military-to-military relationship needed to be continued he offered the following:[51]

- As a surge point to the Indian Ocean and SWA, Thailand served as the most strategically important U.S. ally in the region, and routinely offered the U.S. military unlimited access to Thai airfields and ports for routine stops, refueling, repair, and resupply. If they withdrew this type of routine access to USPACOM forces, the ability to surge and sustain combat

[51]USCINCPAC 240630Z Jul 92 ~~(S)~~.

operations in SWA would become extremely difficult and much more costly.

- Thailand was an invaluable base of operations and staging area to support JTF-FA POW/MIA operations. The permanent JTF-FA detachment in Bangkok coordinated logistics efforts in support of the Hanoi, Vietiane, and Phnom Penh detachments considerably cheaper and more expeditiously than it could be done from a more distant location. Bangkok was the nearest sophisticated market center and provided modern hospitals and high technology communications, while the Thai allowed flexible employment of USAF cargo aircraft to move JTF-FA personnel and supplies within the region without onerous restrictions. Thailand also gave access to the large population of SEA refugees for interviews by U.S. collectors of POW/MIA information.

- It was becomming increasingly difficult for USPACOM forces to train in the Pacific Theater because of the loss of aviation, ground, and naval ranges in the Philippines and the uncertainty associated with the scheduling of Exercise TEAM SPIRIT in Korea. The USCINCPAC training program had evolved to replace the loss of the Philippine training and potential loss of Korean training with increased emphasis on the COBRA GOLD exercise series. From the CINC's perspective, training in Thailand was of more importance to us than to the Thai. The first planning conference for COBRA GOLD 93 occurred immediately following COBRA GOLD 92, and since planners did not have to travel, over $19,000 was saved. The next conference was scheduled for November 1992 in Hawaii, at a savings of about $200 thousand, with a critical decision date of early August.

- The logistics, communications, and staging advantages which accrued to support for the U.S. Mission Phnom Penh and monitoring of the UN PKO in Cambodia were similar to those outlined above, and the Thai government and military played a key role in support of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). They were also a primary channel of contact and influence with the Khmer Rouge.

- Two USAF ammunition preposition ships were cross-loading at Sattahip, with a final destination of Diego Garcia. Completion of the operation was scheduled for mid-August, and if it had to cease, the effort would be forced to move to CONUS. Because of loss of access to Philippine ports, Sattahip was the most feasible location for munitions cross-loading from the standpoint of facilities, cost, and explosives safety, and the operation was an excellent opportunity to establish an alternate location and infrastructure for long-term maintenance operations which could be expanded beyond munitions.

- The War Reserve Stockpile-Thailand (WRS-T) was a five-year, $50 million program whereby the U.S. made yearly contributions of ammunition into Thailand's war reserve. Ammunition was U.S.-titled and releasable to the Thai during crisis. It supported Pacific goals by providing forward deployed U.S. munitions using no-cost storage, transportation, and maintenance assets.

- Although there was no military-to-military counter-drug intelligence relationship, national level agency-third party relationships existed between the U.S. and Thailand which provided information of increasing benefit to the USPACOM CD effort. The 500th Military Intelligence Brigade (MI Bde) maintained a military-to-military relationship with the Thai Director of Joint Intelligence that provided targeted intelligence on Vietnam through document exploitation. This provided useful information in support of POW/MIA operations and potential Vietnamese activities in Laos and Cambodia. PACAF had a mutual cooperation program with the RTAF begun in 1979, with the purpose of supporting combined air operations and enhance allied intelligence capabilities. Information, including SCI material, could be exchanged under the agreement. PACFLT operated an intelligence exchange conference (IEC) with the RTN on a semi-annual basis from 1986 until the IEC agreement expired in March 1992. It served to improve RTN maritime surveillance and provide data to the U.S. Ocean Surveillance and Information (OSIS) on Communist

bloc naval and merchant ship contacts in Thai ports and adjacent waters. A new U.S. proposal had been staffed by the RTN and was scheduled to be signed at the next IEC, tentatively set in Honolulu for September 1992, if acceptable to both countries.

- PACFLT continued to conduct port visits to Phuket and Phattaya, and during the July-September period 23 port visits for a total of 92 ship-days were scheduled. Thailand was the third most visited country in SEA, after Hong Kong and Singapore. Loss of access would mean increasing the number of visits to other nations or eliminating already scarce quality port visits for units transiting to and from CENTCOM. Access to Thai ports and beaches provided the opportunity to exercise all phases of nuclear-powered warship (NPW) operations, and Phattaya was one of the few ports in the region cleared for NPW.

- P-3s conducted quarterly and no-notice surveillance exercises, allowing the U.S. Navy to survey the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, and Bay of Bengal, and Thai bases were an effective transit stop for P-3s transiting from Japan to Diego Garcia and other aircraft deploying to CENTCOM. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Thailand granted no-notice over-flight and short notice landing clearance, and proved responsive to short notice reconnaissance operations including deployment dates, number of aircraft and personnel, and lengths of stay. Singapore and Malaysia offered similar geographic coverage, but were politically more difficult to access. Reconnaissance support to SEA operations relied on U Tapao RTAFB, and Thai bases were the AMC hub for SEA POW/MIA support.

- CD operations planned with Thailand included Exercise BAKER TEPID II, and deployment of personnel from the 1st SFG(A) at Fort Lewis to Thailand was scheduled for August and September 1992 to provide training for U.S. forces and upgrade the skills of Thai forces. A follow on visit to Chiang Mai by an MTT would be conducted in the October-November period if security assistance funds were available. During Operation OIL CAN, the Thai supported a joint JTF FIVE/DEA effort, and although the

operation was not executed, a Thai law enforcement officer was available to embark on a U.S. warship to work the USCG LET. Should Thailand elect to react by being less helpful on these initiatives and programs, the loss of opportunity and momentum would be more injurious to our military goals than theirs.

First Signs of Thaw

(S) While agreeing that the actions of the Thai military leadership in the aftermath of the violent suppression of the May demonstrations could not be ignored, USCINCPAC argued that it did not make good sense to sever our bilateral exercise program or to overly restrict military-to-military relations. The exercise program had been of considerable benefit to U.S. operations, and should be managed in a reasonable way in light of developments. Likewise military-to-military relations should be managed to isolate those known to be culpable, while remaining engaged and actively attempting to influence positively those who were not, particularly lower-ranking officers. Alienation of those senior Thai military officers who were strong friends of the U.S. and were critical of their own military's actions should also be avoided.

(C) In that regard, Admiral Larson recommended a cautious, measured approach and review of each initiative on its own merits. He recommended the following activities continue as programmed to avoid a negative impact on continued Thai support:

- The COBRA GOLD 93 exercise-related construction project trip scheduled for the last week in August.
- The semi-annual PACAF-RTAF Mutual Cooperation Program of 2-7 August.
- The counterpart visit of the DA DCS/IN with General Teerawat Putamanonda.

~~(C)~~ In addition, he recommended that those actions by the Thai government which would serve as precursors for the full restoration of military-to-military relations including IMET be specifically identified. For example, bona fide elections of a new government, accompanied by investigations and disciplinary action against those military officials guilty of human rights abuses against the Thai people, appeared to be sufficient.[52]

~~(S)~~ Response from DOS came quickly, with approval of four of the scheduled exercises and the the COBRA GOLD 93 planning conference in Hawaii. However, the request for visit of MG Teerawat was disapproved with the caveat that it could be resubmitted.[53]

~~(S/NF)~~ CJCS concurred in USCINCPAC's analysis of recent events in Thailand, and considered the preparations for elections in September, investigations into military action against the demonstrators, and removal of senior military leaders responsible for the violence as positive signs of real progress toward democracy. He also agreed with the CINC's recommendations, and informed Admiral Larson that DOS had agreed to reexamine the restrictions previously proposed on exercises and visits.[54]

~~(C)~~ Next on the agenda was the Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC) scheduled for 14-24 August 1992. Air Chief Marshall Kaset Rotchananin, who served as both Commander, RTAF, and Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), had been invited by the CSAF, but he subsequently declined following the demonstrations. On 1 August, PM Anand took the bold step of removing ACM Kaset (and others) from his positions, predicated on the role Kaset played in the use of violence in May. The new RTAF commander was ACM Kan Pimantip, who was not implicated in

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[52]Ibid.
[53]SECSTATE 247437/010237Z Aug 92 ~~(S)~~.
[54]CJCS 071920Z Aug 92 ~~(S/NF)~~.

the violence and was known to favor an apolitical and professional role for the Thai military. Admiral Larson requested permission from CJCS to invite ACM Gun to the PACC, considering it particularly important to extend the invitation as a signal of support for the strong corrective action of PM Anand and in recognition of the excellent credentials ACM Gun brought to his new position. It would also serve to ease tensions of mid- and high-level Thai military leaders who continued to question the apparent diminshed benefits of the military-to-military relationship. Approval was received on 7 August to extend an invitation to ACM Kan.[55]

~~(S)~~ On 11 August, the Ambassador reported that in his opionion the time had come to move toward restoring a degree of normalcy to the bilateral military relationship. The overriding concern was to encourage genuine reform in the Thai military and a sharply reduced role for it in domestic politics, and that could be best achieved by engaging them and calling upon the reservoir of goodwill in the Armed Forces. He specifically recommended the two following steps:[56]

- Normalize military exchanges and visits, to include flag-rank visits both to and from Thailand.
- Resume military exercises and planning conferences at the earliest practicable date, no later than October 1992.

~~(S)~~ DOS approved the next series of military activities with the Thai on 19 August, and the events were: The USN-RTN Intelligence Exchange Conference in Honolulu, 9-11 September; the Pacific Area Special Operations Conference in Honolulu, 14-18 September; and the Third Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS III) in Honolulu, 2-3 November.[57]

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[55]USCINCPAC 042354Z Aug 92 ~~(C)~~; CJCS 072319Z Aug 92 ~~(C)~~.
[56]AMEMB Bangkok 36864/111059Z Aug 92 ~~(S)~~.
[57]SECSTATE 267200/190221Z Aug 92 ~~(S)~~.

Final Thaw

~~(S)~~ Immediately after Thailand's successful elections on 13 September, Ambassador Lambertson urged retoration of normal bilateral programs and activities as soon as the new government headed by Mr. Chuan Likphai was formed. This included resumption of economic assistance and military assistance and cooperation, and allocation of the $2.25 million in IMET requested. IMET was of particular concern, as since it had been frozen some 18 months previously, Thailand had lost at least 583 IMET training slots. The ambassador was concerned that this could result in a senior RTARF leadership some years hence with little U.S. exposure, and he recommended further that the Thai military be included in expanded IMET (E-IMET) training courses such as resource management, military justice, and human rights which promoted civilian control of the military.[58]

~~(S)~~ Restoration of previous levels of activity in the area of military exercises, contacts, and visits was important to reinforce the point that the United States had drawn back in these areas for good and understandable political reasons, and now that those circumstances had been overcome, we were as determined as they to resume a fully normal military relationship. As for economic aid, the ambassador felt that of absolutely fundamental importance in any consideration was the fact that cutting off aid was a major element in the response to the February 1991 coup, and the subsequent good faith emphasis that it would be restored when democracy was reestablished. Failure to follow through on that promise would be seen by the Thai as wholly cynical and undermine credibility.

[58]AMEMB Bangkok 42913/100018Z [sic] Sep 92 ~~(S)~~ (although this msg has a 10 Sep DTG, it was obviously written subsequent to the 13 Sep elections); USCINCPAC 252230Z Spe 92 ~~(S)~~

(C) On 2 October 1992, SECSTATE terminated the restrictions on U.S.-Thai high-level military visits, the joint exercise program, and military sales, and advised that routine procedures and review mechanisms in effect before the May violence in Bangkok should be resumed. This step was taken in recognition of the fact that a democratically elected government had been appointed in Thailand, and to indicate support for the growing understanding in the Thai miliary that it had to reduce its role in politics.[59]

Federated States of Micronesia

(U) On 30 September 1992, USCINCPAC/J5 co-chaired the 1993 Joint Committee Meeting (JCM) with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) held at USCINCPAC headquarters. The treaty-mandated bilateral conference addressed security and defense issues covered by the Compact of Free Association with the FSM. The U.S. delegation advised the FSM of the continuing U.S. determination to remain engaged in the Pacific region despite DOD budget reductions, and the FSM side raised the issue of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty and the possibility of the U.S. signing the protocols. The U.S. side noted that the policy was under review and that we had been in compliance with the treaty's provisions since it took effect.[60]

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[59]SECSTATE 322518/020429Z Oct 92 (C); USCINCPAC 092105Z Oct 92 (C).
[60]J5133 HistSum Sep 93 (U).

CHAPTER VI

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

SECTION I--SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

Pacific Command, Control and Communications Architecture Integration Committee

(U) MG Leo M. Childs hosted the tenth meeting of the Pacific Command, Control and Communications Architecture Integration Committee (PC3AIC) on 17-19 June 1992. This committee was formed in 1986 under an OSD/C3I approved charter. Membership of the PC3AIC was made up of the PACOM Senior Communicators, and representatives from Joint Staff J6, OSD/C3I, the Intelligence Communications Architecture (INCA) Project Office, and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). The PC3AIC is held twice each year. The issues covered at the June 1992 meeting included PACOM C3 Architectures, Joint Task Force Simulation, Joint Task Force Crisis/Contingency Concept of Operations, Joint Test and Evaluation Project, Secondary Imagery Dissemination System, and Video Teleconferencing.[1]

(U) The second PC3AIC Conference of 1992 was hosted by USCINCPAC J61 on 30 November at the Fort Shafter, Hawaii, Community Club. Representatives from national level agencies, subunified and combined commands, service component headquarters, and USCINCPAC J2 and J3 attended the conference. A number of discussions on several agenda items produced tasking. The most important issues discussed were video teleconferencing and the publication of standards by DISA.[2]

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[1]J612 HistSum Jun 92 (U).
[2]J61 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence Systems Master Plan

(U) The Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence Systems Master Plan (C4ISMP) was a document of current and midterm C4 capabilities needed to support national security objectives assigned to the CJCS and commanders of unified and specified commands. The C4ISMP assessed current and midterm C4 capabilities for mission areas in specific warfighting environments and presented comprehensive statements of C4 deficiencies, requirements, and priorities. Traditionally, master plans have been "shelfware" because they usually contained too much information, the information was outdated by the time it was published, and they did not address practical solutions for the warfighters. The Joint Staff was willing to work with USCINCPAC to tailor its C4ISMP to USPACOM needs and to make it a useful document. The approach was to follow the "C4I For The Warrior" effort, and to focus on implementing something the Pacific war fighters could use.[3]

(U) USCINCPAC J6 signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with DISA and the Joint Tactical C3 Agency (now the Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization (JIEO)) on 31 January 1992 which provided for JIEO to assist USCINCPAC with development of its C4ISMP. A JIEO team visited HQ USCINCPAC in September 1992 and compiled its initial data validation on the PACOM JTF Contingency Operations C4ISMP. The team met with various USCINCPAC staffs and with component forces staffs. The team focused primarily on the USCINCPAC Contingency Operations JTF two-tier concept of operations. The guidance given to the JIEO team was to produce a USCINCPAC C4ISMP with affordable quick-fix, near-term solutions commensurate with the USCINCPAC Roadmap and C4I for the Pacific Warrior.[4]

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[3]J611 HistSum Mar 92 (U); J61 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J61 HistSum Oct 92 (U).

[4]J612 HistSum Jan 92 (U); Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Pacific Command Joint Staff J62 and DISA, Joint Tactical C3 Agency, 31 Jan 92 (U); J611 HistSum Feb 92 (U); J61 HistSum Sep 92 (U).

Configuration Management Board

(U) The HQ USCINCPAC Configuration Management Board (CMB) met on 17 January 1992 to receive briefings from the Intelligence Directorate (J2) on the DOD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) and an overview of the Imagery Production and Dissemination System (IPDS) in the Pacific. There was a detailed discussion between J2, J3, and J6 and other key staff members on communications and imagery requirements for JTF commanders and their assigned forces. They also discussed the interoperability requirements for coalition and combined forces. J6 provided a brief update of the headquarters' local area network (LAN) project which is known as the Command and Control Support System (C2S2).[5]

Local Area Network Working Group

(U) The LAN Steering Group decided to centralize project management. J61 was to lead a LAN working group consisting of a representative from J61, J66, and J08 (Information Management Office) to plan and coordinate all aspects of the LAN. The LAN working group would report its recommendations to the steering group. The group's first meeting was held on 7 February 1992, at which they agreed upon their strategy and role.[6]

Visitors

(U) Paul Strassmann, DDI and OASD (C3I) visited USCINCPAC on 7 May 1992 for an orientation of USPACOM command and control. He received briefings on USCINCPAC Roadmap, Command Center Improvement Program, Enhanced Crisis Management Capability (ECMC), and a Pacific Command Strategy Brief and round table hosted by the Deputy USCINCPAC. He also spoke on recent C3I policies and initiatives to the Hawaii AFCEA Chapter at their

[5]J613 HistSum Jan 92 (U).
[6]J61 HistSum Jan 92 (U).

monthly luncheon meeting. He was particularly interested in ALCOM's Command Tactical Information System (CTIS).[7]

(U) Representatives from the General Accounting Office (GAO) visited during the period 27-31 July 1992. Their primary objective was to gather information on PACOM C4I initiatives for joint warfare. The GAO representatives met with Theater Configuration Panel members and visited the components. All the components had several key C4I initiatives aimed at improving joint interoperability. For example, PACFLT had several key C4I initiatives ongoing pertaining to the COPERNICUS program. PACAF was working on Contingency Tactical Air Control Automated Planning System (CTAPS) aimed at integrating the Air Tasking Order (ATO) into both joint and combined operations, and Air Force's Theater Battlefield Management System. USARPAC was involved with coordinating and implementing the Standard Theater Army Command and Control System (STACCS), and the Theater Command and Control Information Management System (TACCIMS) in Korea. FMFPAC was working on the Marine Corps' Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) and the C4I Architecture and Master Plan, a tag-on to the INCA project. During the outbrief, the GAO representatives seemed impressed with the ongoing C4I initiatives aimed at improving joint interoperability at USCINCPAC.[8]

(U) Ms Bunnie Smith, Deputy Director for Finance, Personnel, and Health Functional Information Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) Director of Defense Information visited USCINCPAC in September 1992. The focus of her trip was information management activities and functions within Tripler Army Medical Center and USARPAC. In addition, she made a brief. low-level visit to HQ USCINCPAC to learn about work to implement C4I For The Warrior (C4IFTW). Her focus was on the tactical and operational aspect of C4IFTW. Functional areas such as logistics, personnel, and medical would no longer be connected

[7]J612 HistSum Apr 92 (U).
[8]J61 HistSum Jul 92 (U).

to Service C3 systems due to consolidation and reorganization. She expressed concern in USCINCPAC's ability to pull information from those functional areas.[9]

[9]J61 HistSum Sep 92 (U).

SECTION II--TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT

CINC Trip Communications Upgrades

(U) A satellite communications capability was extended in the CINC's aircraft to permit the CINC and/or the Executive Assistant to talk over the UHF satellite system without leaving their positions. Previously they had to move to the communicator's position to take or receive calls. Installation was completed on the primary aircraft by NEEACTPAC on 15 January 1992 at a cost of $1,650. Communications upgrades for the backup aircraft, with the exception of crypto, was completed in March 1992. Secure Facsimile installation was completed in July 1992. Both aircraft were configured identically and installation and testing was completed by September 1992.[1]

(U) Four TEMPEST approved secure facsimile machines were purchased, providing secure facsimile capabilities over STU-III and UHF satellite systems. Also, SATTALK and Microsoft WORD software programs were upgraded to provide faster transmission and processing times. The software upgrades were completed during the period July-September 1992.[2]

USCINCPAC Command and Control Network

~~(S)~~ USCINCPAC had been involved in numerous military operations and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) that required rapid communications to support the JTF commander or the American Embassy in the affected area. Each of the military operations required obtaining and clearing frequencies and numerous hours to activate and troubleshoot the circuit before it was available for use. The areas that required a possible NEO did not have tactical satellite radio equipment, so equipment had to be couriered into these areas. Within PACOM, tactical

[1]J621 HistSum Feb 92 (U); J621 HistSum Mar 92 (U); J621 HistSum May 92 (U); J6218 HistSum Oct 92 (U).
[2]J6218 HistSum Oct 92 (U).

satellite networks were not readily available and had to be planned, engineered, and activated each time a crisis arose.[3]

(C) It was recommended in October 1991 that a full-time UHF tactical satellite communications network be established in the USPACOM area of responsibility to support JTF and NEO. This network would also allow the State Department facilities to access the network as needed or directed. Establishment of this network would allow the CINCPAC Command Center to immediately communicate with the affected area in the event of a crisis or contingency. A full-time network that was tested on a daily basis would soon become an accepted and reliable communications media. Under the then current procedures of activating a circuit each time a crisis occurred, the initial 12 to 24 hours was spent activating and troubleshooting the circuit and training key personnel to use the network.[4]

(S) The proposal was approved and, on 9 April 1992, the USCINCPAC Command and Control (CINC-1) Network became operational. It was used in several exercises and real-world contingencies during 1992. The network provided a full-time command and control network from the CINC to Service components, MAJCOMs, subunified commands, and tier 1/2 JTF Commanders. It eliminated the time lapse between the start of the crisis or contingency situation and establishment of reliable communications to the on-scene commander, CJTF, and State Department facilities in case of NEO. The transmission media was UHF SATCOM via FLTSAT 4 (172 E), AFSATCOM 500 KHz transponder.[5]

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[3]J621 HistSum Apr 92 (S), DECL OADR; J6216 SSS/2050/C-089-91 (C), 24 Oct 91, Subj: Pacific Contingency Communications Network (U), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 190532Z Jan 90 (S), DECL OADR; SECSTATE 042381/081920Z Feb 91 (S), DECL OADR; SSS J6216/2000/1/C-108-91 (S), 27 Dec 91, Subj: USCINCPAC Command and Control (CINC-1) Net (U), DECL OADR; 18CS 311555Z Mar 92 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 302300Z Mar 92 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 051814Z Mar 92 (S), DECL OADR.
[4]Ibid.
[5]J621 HistSum Dec 92 (S), DECL OADR.

Hurricane OMAR and INIKI Response and CAT Operations

(U) The 644th Communications Squadron on Guam was called on to assist with the recovery of communications after Typhoon OMAR. Their work was accomplished primarily by using on-island tactical equipment. Their efforts were greatly appreciated.[6]

(U) The 125th Signal Battalion provided essential state and county government communications on Kauai following Hurricane INIKI. Communications were provided to fire stations, hospitals, and some full service centers (FSCs) by employing their mobile subscriber equipment (MSE). Representatives of USCINCPAC's Telecommunications Branch (J62), USARPAC, 125th Signal Battalion, National Guard, GTE, and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) met every day at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, beginning one day after INIKI to establish priorities, develop courses of action, and identify action items for the FEMA communicator, Mr. Ray Sheehy, to take to the FEMA ESF coordination meetings, or to get a decision from the State's communicator, Mr. George Burnett. The group expanded during the second week to include DISA PAC and MARFORPAC representatives to do "what if" planning in the event Hurricane ROSLYN hit one or more of the other islands.[7]

(U) Valuable experience was gained and many lessons were learned from the OMAR and INIKI contingencies. A representative from TRADOC, MAJ Williamson, visited Oahu and Kauai for a week to view communications coordination and to record lessons learned. MAJ Williamson had also spent time in southern Florida gathering lessons learned from the Hurricane ANDREW relief effort. MSE was use extensively there, too. In the months following INIKI, it was planned to hold a series of meetings with the component headquarters to institutionalize the experience gained with the

[6]J621 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[7]Ibid.

ultimate objective of developing a generic civil disaster CONPLAN.[8]

(U) The J6 Crisis Action Team (CAT) was constituted for 70 days consecutively during the August through November 1992 quarter. This period was especially demanding as the CAT had to cope with Typhoon OMAR and Hurricane INIKI relief efforts as well as exercises ULCHI FOCUS LENS and TEMPO BRAVE.[9]

(U) In the aftermath of Hurricane INIKI, a USCINCPAC Inspector General Team was organized on 17 September 1992 to provide a "snapshot" assessment of Task Force GARDEN ISLE's disaster relief operations on Kauai. The austere team was augmented by a J62 representative to evaluate the overall effectiveness of emergency communications established for disaster relief support. Based upon two days of on-site observations, the IG team returned to Camp Smith, Hawaii, with a favorable report that noted an outstanding effort by the U.S. Army's 125th Signal Battalion, despite the absence of centralized communications which was directly related to complex federal, state, and county issues.[10]

POW/MIA Communications Support

(U) Communications support to the newly formed Joint Task Force-Full Accounting and its POW/MIA mission continued throughout 1992. The Vietnamese government granted import and use licenses for VHF and HF radios, desk top computers, modems, uninterrupted power supplies, and a generator for the JTF-FA detachment office in Hanoi. Equipment was shipped in February and installation was completed in April. Frequency licenses were approved and obtained upon importation of the equipment.[11]

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[8]Ibid.
[9]J2614 HistSum Oct 92 (U).
[10]J6222 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[11]J621 HistSum Jan 92 (U); J621 Histsum Feb 92 (U); J621 HistSum Mar 92 (S), DECL OADR; J621 HistSum Apr 92 (U); J621 HistSum May 92 (U); J621 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

(U) In March 1992, USCINCPAC J6 requested that the Joint Staff approve a waiver to allow use of UHF Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) equipment in a non-secure mode to support JTF-FA operations in Southeast Asia. The request was approved by ASD(C3I) on 27 March 1992. While UHF TACSAT terminals were available at Camp Smith, and each of the detachments in Laos and Cambodia, JTF-FA had to negotiate with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to obtain approval to operate UHF TACSAT in Vietnam. Approval of the SRV was obtained by providing equipment that allowed them to monitor communications. As of the end of the year, JTF-FA had a good multi-path network capable of supporting three field teams simultaneously in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.[12]

(U) J62 began planning for telephone installation in Building 20 at Camp Smith, Hawaii, prior to JTF-FA's relocation from Barbers Point, Hawaii. Telephone requirements were complicated by the fact that the previous tenants of the building were served by an AT&T System 75 telephone system which was uneconomical to continue leasing. JTF-FA would be served by the Oahu Telephone System (OTS). Telephone wiring from the previous tenants was removed by J62 personnel in February 1992, and workorders were submitted to Navy Public Works to provide OTS service with a required operational date of 16 March 1992. Installation of the telephones for the relocation of HQ JTF-FA to Camp Smith was completed ahead of schedule.[13]

Tactical Ballistic Missile Warning Network for PACOM

(U) Representatives from J62 attended meetings and workshops during the week of 3 February 1992 to lay foundations for a Tactical Ballistic Missile Warning Network (TBMWN) for the Pacific Command. The network would provide near real time voice and data alerting of tactical missile launches. Two Draft Annex

[12]J621 HistSum Mar 92 (S), DECL OADR; J621 HistSum Jul 92 (U); J621 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[13]J621 HistSum Jan 92 (U); J621 HistSum Feb 92 (U); J621 HistSum Mar 92 (S), DECL OADR;

Ns (Space Systems) were developed during the week, one for Korea and a generic Annex N for the PACOM AOR. Appropriate C3-related comments were included.[14]

U.S. Military Radio Frequency Assignment in the Philippines

(U) USCINCPAC Chief of the Joint Frequency Management Branch (J623) visited the Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO) Philippines, 22-27 March 1992, to schedule the deletion of U.S. military frequency assignments with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) of the Republic of the Philippines. Twenty-nine thousand frequency assignments had to be returned to the NTC by 31 December 1992. The NTC agreed to allow USCINCPAC to retain 180 frequency assignments to support future mutual defense requirements. JFMO Pacific and JFMO Philippines completed this action by mid-1992. NTC also expressed a desire to continue direct coordination with JFMO Pacific when JFMO Philippines was closed.[15]

Senior Level Spectrum Management Conference

(U) MG Leo M. Childs (J6) and the Chief, Joint Frequency Management Branch (J623) attended the Senior Level Spectrum Management Conference hosted by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Defense-wide C3) 22-23 January 1992 at Annapolis, Maryland. The purpose of the conference was to provide awareness at the senior level of national and international spectrum activities and policy issues that could have far reaching impact on Defense users. It also focused on a broad range of frequency spectrum management topics that had Defense-wide implications.[16]

[14]J622 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[15]J623 HistSum Mar 92 (U).
[16]J623 HistSum Jan 92 (U).

USCINCPAC Spectrum Management Conference

(U) The USCINCPAC Joint Frequency Management Office hosted the Spectrum Management Conference and Workshops during the period 27-31 July 1992 in Hawaii. The purpose of the conference was to provide a forum to discuss international as well as USPACOM and U.S. national level spectrum management policies, issues, and outstanding projects that had a potential to become controversial or political during frequency coordination. Participants from Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, OSD, JCS, USMCEB, CNO, HQ USAF, ECAC, and USCINCPAC frequency management offices were in attendance. Total attendance was 175.[17]

Joint Crisis Management Capability Level One Upgrade

(U) In March 1992, Joint Task Force Five (JTF-5) acquired LST-5 UHF satellite equipment which would relieve USCINCPAC's Joint Crisis Management Capability level one (JCMC-1) UHF terminals, which had been used on ships deployed on SOUTHCOM Counternarcotics Operations (SOUTHCOM CN OPS) for 18 months.[18]

(U) Several new UHF TACSAT systems and other JCMC-1 upgraded equipment arrived during the last quarter of calendar year 1992 (CY 92) which would greatly enhance USCINCPAC's ability to respond to crisis contingency operations. Additionally, JCS approved over $477,000 in CIF funding to procure JCMC-1 equipment for JTF-FA. Funds were received and obligated for this program. Equipment was to be ordered during the first quarter of CY 93.[19]

[17]J623 HistSum Jul 92 (U).
[18]J621 HistSum Mar 92 (U).
[19]J6217 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

Exercise Communications Support

Exercise ARCTIC WARRIOR

(U) Exercise ARCTIC WARRIOR 92 was conducted during the week of 10-14 February 1992. The exercise was used to identify space support requirements for Tactical Ballistic Missile Warning (TBMW) voice procedures and Tactical Event Reporting Systems (TERS) data procedures. A significant accomplishment was the distribution of Air Tasking Order (ATO) to Navy Afloat was completed within four minutes after transmission was initiated using two wideband and UHF TACSAT channels and computers as terminal equipment. Also, two simulation programs (Janus and ENWGS) were distributed to remote locations in support of a CJTF Headquarters.[20]

Exercises TANDEM THRUST 92 and CASCADE PINE 92

(U) Two exercises with different JTF Commanders were conducted concurrently during the month of July 1992: Exercise TANDEM THRUST 92 and Exercise CASCADE PINE 92.[21]

(U) TANDEM THRUST 92 was conducted during the period 5-24 July. The CJTF for this exercise was Commander THIRD Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT). Events of note during this exercise were:[22]

- The use of more than double the usual number of UHF TACSAT networks between the CJTF and the component-level units executing operations.
- The installation and execution of a new, developmental Navy Super High Frequency (SHF) project entitled COPERNICUS. Although this SHF project required more than twice the satellite bandwidth normally assigned a CJTF, it successfully

[20]J622 HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[21]J6223 HistSum Jul 92 (U)
[22]Ibid.

demonstrated the capacity to provide multiple terminations for secure voice and data, secondary imagery, and video teleconferencing between the JTF Commander afloat and USCINCPAC.

- Electronic message distribution was used in the Command Center for the first time. The capability provided for the electronic distribution of messages to and from AUTODIN via the Command Center Operations Support System (OSS) interfacing with the Naval Telecommunications Center main terminal via the Defense Information System Agency Category III certified Message Distribution Terminal. Messages were electronically routed to the appropriate CAT postions via the Command Center LAN. This new message distribution procedure resulted in an 80 percent decrease in the paper messages produced by the NTCC in suppport of the CAT.[23]

(U) CASCADE PINE 92 was conducted during the period 6-15 July. The CJTF for CASCADE PINE was I Corps. Events of note during this exercise were:[24]

- The connectivity between the I Corps Advanced Command Post Contingency Package (CPCP) and the USCINCPAC Command Center via a Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) SHF/SHF gateway "lash-up."
- The highly successful utilization of a USCINCPAC Deployable WWMCCS package in support of the CJTF.

(U) Not only were these two exercises conducted concurrently, but it was also the first time the role as CJTF was executed for both COMTHIRDFLT and Commander I Corps. This situation provided new training opportunities for the J6 staff, including:[25]

[23]J6211 HistSum Jul 92 (U).
[24]J6223 HistSum Jul 92 (U).
[25]Ibid.

- The planning and resourcing of two simultaneous JTFs.
- The management of theater communications assets during the execution phases of the exercises.

These opportunities were challenging but successfully met in concert with the two CJTF J6 staffs.

Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 92

(U) The USCINCPAC Telecommunications Management Branch provided support to the USCINCPAC-sponsored command post exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 92 (UFL 92) by manning the Crisis Action Team, Joint Exercise Control Group, Operations Planning Team, and the USCINCPAC IG. During UFL 92, USCINCPAC demonstrated its capability to provide U.S. support for combined operations on the Korean peninsula. Major issues worked by J62 included satellite access requests, plain language addresses, and routing indicators.[26]

Exercise TEMPO BRAVE 92

(U) TEMPO BRAVE 92 (TB 92) was a command post exercise conducted 16-30 September 1992 and designed to train the USCINCPAC and CJTF staffs in crisis operations under the USCINCPAC two-tier JTF concept. It was the first time that the two-tier concept was exercised using computer simulation models. J62 planned the communications and manned the Crisis Action Team, Operations Planning Team, and Joint Exercise Control Group (on-call) for TB 92. Communications support included UHF SATCOM, a Ground Mobile Forces gateway mission into the Defense Communications System (DCS), and existing real-world communications riding the DCS.[27]

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[26]J62 HistSum Sep 92 (U).
[27]J6221 HistSum Sep 92 (U).

Exercise BALIKATAN 92

(U) The joint-combined exercise BALIKATAN 92 (BK 92) was conducted 13-31 October 1992 at Fort Magsaysay, Republic of the Philippines. The exercise was composed of cross-training between Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF), civil-military operations (CMO) consisting of three medical and two engineer events, and command post exercise (CPX). Although tactical communications among subordinate commands was heavily reliant on single channel VHF-FM and UHF TACSAT, the primary emphasis for JTF C3 connectivity was HF. The only note of concern on C3 during BK 92 was the last minute cancellation of the CINC/JTF UHF TACSAT network by the USCINCPAC Operations Directorate Exercise Division (J35). This network was originally planned as USCINCPAC's main connectivity to U.S. exercise participants experiencing the degraded communications situation in the Philippines. In lieu of the UHF TACSAT network, J35 opted for using the poor quality commercial Philippines Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) system which was limited to three lines at Fort Magsaysay.[28]

Paperless Message Distribution

(U) Antiquated communications center optical scanning equipment required special Optical Character Reader (OCR) fonts and expensive, non-standard sized paper. In addition, these OCR scanners were increasingly difficult to maintain and have long standing reputation for misreading documents. As part of the Defense Message System (DMS) Phase I implementation, these older generation equipment were being replaced. As a result, a transition from the use of DD-173 message forms to floppy

[28]J6222 HistSum Oct 92 (U).

diskettes for the delivery of outgoing messages to USCINCPAC's servicing telecommunications facility was required.[29]

(U) The USCINCPAC staff initiated a cutover period beginning 1 March 1992 to transition from DD-173 message forms to Message Text Format (MTF) standard diskettes for outgoing GENSER message traffic. With completion of command-wide distribution and training on MTF Editor version 3.3 software the conversion went into effect on 1 April 1992.[30]

AT&T System 75 Disposition

(U) In FY 89 two AT&T System 75 telephone switches and ancillary equipment were installed at the IPAC Building, Building 20, at Camp Smith, Hawaii. The cost for installation, shipping, and equipment was all amortized over ten years. Yearly breakdown for lease of the equipment was $136,160, installation and shipping per year was $121,760, and maintenance per year was $150,048. Total yearly lease and 24-hour maintenance for both IPAC switches was approximately $407,000. Maintenance was discontinued effective 1 February 1992 due to the reorganization of Intelligence on Oahu and the consolidation of the Intelligence functions at JICPAC at Makalapa. The fact that Building 20 was vacated, the System 75s were excess to needs. Several options for the disposition of the telephone system were considered. It was decided to pursue a buyout of the switches to preclude paying the yearly lease charges through FY 97.[31]

(U) Legally, USCINCPAC terminated the contract effective 1 October 1992, for which a termination liability charge of

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[29]J621 HistSum Feb 92 (U); J6211/SSS/00139 (U), 19 Feb 92, Subj: Outgoing Message Format Change to Floppy Diskettes; CNO 062317Z Dec 91 (U); J6513/SSS/00864 (U), 18 Dec 91, Subj: United States Message Text Format (USMTF) Implementation and Use of New General Administrative Message (GENADMIN) Format.
[30]Ibid.; J6211 HistSum Apr 92 (U); J621 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[31]J621 HistSum Feb 92 (U); J621 HistSum Mar 92 (U); J6212 Point Paper (U), 20 Mar 92, Subj: AT&T System 75 Switches - JICPAC; Telephone interview (U), Robert S. Stubbs, Historian, with Mr. Mike Doolan, GM-13, J6212, 12 Oct 93.

SECTION III--C3 PROGRAMMING

MILSATCOM Requirements Revalidation and Integrated SATCOM Data Base

(U) USCINCPAC Transmission and Switched Systems Branch's (J641) final effort to completely review and revalidate all USCINCPAC Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) requirements culminated on 17 January 1992 with a briefing to the Joint MILSATCOM Review Panel in Washington, D.C. This capped nearly two years of activity by J641 and staffs of subordinate unified and component commands. The outcome of this effort would be an automated data base which provided expanded information on each requirement, and which would be accessible via electronic data base interface from selected USCINCPAC staff offices. Electronic access would simplify additions and updates to the data base. Full automation, including remote access to the Washington, D.C. data base was expected in mid-1992.[1]

(U) During a TDY to Joint Staff and DISA in April 1992, J641 received the draft Integrated SATCOM Data Base (ISDB) and software tools to generate reports, updates, etc. The Draft ISDB was forwarded to component and subordinate unified command for review and comment, and to finalize and update the USCINCPAC ISDB. With the new automated tool set, the updates were electronically transmitted via STU-III-secured data link. On 27 October 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I approved the ISDB which included the updates from all Pacific Command components and subunified commands. On 1 December 1992, the ISDB became the only approved source of SATCOM requirements. All non-emergency requests for satellite communications now had to contain a Joint Staff validated ISDB number.[2]

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[1]J641 HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[2]J641 HistSum Apr 92 (U); J641 HistSum Dec 92 (U); Joint Staff 201348Z Nov 92 (U).

U.S. Military Withdrawal from the Philippines

(FOUO) On 24 November 1992, the last U.S. Navy detachment departed NAS Cubi Point, Republic of the Philippines, thus ending nearly 100 years of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Since July 1991, following Mount Pinatubo's eruption, USCINCPAC J6 held ad hoc planning group meetings with component and DISA PAC representatives to resolve major USPACOM C3 issues. Noteworthy was the ongoing relocation of the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) earth terminal from Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines, to Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt, Australia; accelerated implementation of Defense Communications System (DCS) High Frequency (HF) entry stations at Andersen AFB, Guam, and Naval Communications Station Diego Garcia; rehoming of numerous telecommunications users, both in and out of country; and redistribution of excess DCS assets to Korea, Singapore, Alaska, and Guam.[3]

Defense Satellite Communications System

(S) USCINCPAC recommended to Joint Staff that a fixed AN/GSC-39 Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) earth terminal be installed at Naval Communications Station (NAVCOMMSTA) Harold E. Holt, Australia, to access the Western Pacific (WP) satellite. Together with the AN/GSC-39 already at NAVCOMMSTA H.E. Holt, which looked at the Indian Ocean (IO) satellite, the second terminal would provide a second WP-IO gateway. The system was then single-threaded through Fort Buckner, Okinawa. Additionally, USCINCPAC J641 recommended to Joint Staff that a third terminal be placed at Fort Buckner to provide the auxiliary satellite control mission. SECSTATE was asked for their thoughts and assistance in ensuring both DSCS earth terminals remained operational after Harold E. Holt became

[3]J641 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

an Australian Naval Communications Station with no subsequent negotiations required or political problems expected.[4]

Regency Net Terminals

(U) On 6 March 1992, USCINCPAC requested that Joint Staff and HQ Department of the Army (DA), validate a USCINCPAC J3 request to field Regency Net (RN) terminals in the Republic of Korea. HQ DA responded on 25 March 1992 that Regency Net was not cost effective for satisfying standard HF requirements, but urged COMUSKOREA to complete an operational needs statement detailing their requirement for an HF system. Joint Staff's response on 6 April 1992 supported the HQ DA position on the cost effectiveness of Regency Net for non-Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (non-NSNF) requirements, and recommended COMUSKOREA submit all valid requirements for long-haul HF to its supporting Service, i.e., Army, for validation and funding.[5]

Japan Reconfiguration and Digitization

(U) A submarine fiber optic cable was installed between Gesashi, Okinawa, and Sasebo, Japan, as part of the Japan Reconfiguration and Digitization (JRD III). Installation of the cable ducting through the city of Sasebo progressed well with minor route alterations requested by the city. Installation of the fiber optic cable was completed, but in August 1992, during acceptance testing for commissioning, the JRD cable sustained an outage suspected to be from a cable cut. At the time of the outage, no circuits had been transferred from the tropospheric scatter (tropo) system to the cable. HQ PACAF extended the tropo maintenance contract to 30 September and pursued another extension of 90 days through the end of December. Meetings with.

[4]J6413 HistSum Jan 92 (S), DECL OADR; USCINCPAC 032000Z Jan 92 (S), DECL OADR.
[5]J6411 HistSum Mar 92 (U).

the city of Sasebo and the Fishing Union resulted in approval for clearance for a cable repair ship to access the harbor. A cable ship was called out from the Philippines on 22 September to repair the cut. The repairs were made and the cable was activated on 15 October 1992.[6]

Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS 92-3 Team

(U) A USCINCPAC J6411 individual deployed to Okinawa, Japan, during the period 22-27 March 1992 to augment the III Marine Expeditionary Force, Communications (III MEF/G6) for Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS 92-3. The deployed personnel served as a member of the USCINCPAC Joint Exercise Control Group.[7]

Communications Participation on the DJTFAC

(U) USCINCPAC J6411 deployed LT M.P. Bellando, USN, as a member of the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) to Yokosuka, Japan, to participate in Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS 92-2 with COMSEVENTHFLT Staff onboard the USS BLUE RIDGE on 1-5 June 1992. The exercise provided valuable coordination and liaison with the SEVENTHFLT Staff highlighting Joint Task Force planning guidance and procedures. From a communications standpoint, the exercise was considered successful.[8]

(U) LT Bellando again deployed as a member of the DJTFAC to the USS CORONADO, homeported in San Diego, California, during the period 1-7 July 1992, and to Luke AFB, Phoenix, Arizona, during the period 7-25 July to participate in Exercise TANDEM THRUST 92 with elements of COMTHIRDFLT and Eleventh Air Force (11 AF). The exercise provided valuable coordination and liaison with both

[6]J6413 HistSum Jan 92 (U); J6413 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J6413 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[7]J6411 HistSum Mar 92 (U).
[8]J6411 HistSum May/Jun 92 (U).

staffs, highlighting Joint Task Force planning guidance and procedures.[9]

(U) Finally, LT Bellando was deployed as a member of the DJTFAC to COMNAVMARIANAS, Guam, from 29 August 1992 to 13 September 1992 in support of Typhoon OMAR disaster relief. The purpose of the deployment was to assist COMNAVMARIANAS in planning and coordination of relief efforts for DOD assets on Guam. During the period 13-25 September 1992, LT Bellando deployed with the DJTFAC to Yokosuka, Japan, to participate in Exercise TEMPO BRAVE 92 with COMSEVENTHFLT Staff. The exercise provided valuable coordination and liaison with SEVENTHFLT personnel, particularly in area of joint force planning, guidance, and overall procedures.[10]

AUTODIN Downsizing

(U) The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) proposed closing the Taegu, Korea, and Yokota, Japan, Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) Switching Centers (ASCs), and upgrading the remaining Pacific ASC at Finegayan, Guam, into a "super switch." HQ USCINCPAC expressed concerns about implementing this plan. Guam was susceptible to extended outages because of tropical storms, had unreliable commercial power, and a poorly designed power distribution system at NCTAMS WESTPAC. The HQ USCINCPAC Deputy Director for Command and Control and Communications Systems stated an alternative proposed by DISA to complete a partial upgrade of both the Yokota ASC and Finegayan ASC as a more viable option because it provided needed redundancy. Additionally, the Taegu ASC closure was predicated on communications enhancements, such as FASTBACK microwave upgrade, fiber optic cable upgrade, and the Pacific Consolidated Telecommunications Network. USAISC withdrew its support of a

[9]J6411 HistSum Jul 92 (U).
[10]J6431 HistSum Sep 92 (U).

proposed rehabilitation and installation project of Defense Communications System assets relocated from the Philippines for the Korea FASTBACK microwave upgrade. This necessitated that DISA further review the feasibility of their original closure proposal.[11]

USCINCPAC Red Switch Project

(U) The DOD Red Switch project was established by OSD in October 1984 to standardize secure telephone switching capabilities at the National Military Command Center and its alternate, as well as the Unified and Specified Command centers, for a total of 12 switches. The Air Force was the DOD executive agent for the project. Two contractors, ESI and GTE, were awarded contracts to manufacture these switches. GTE was HQ USCINCPAC's Red Switch contractor.[12]

(U) GTE installed the secure distribution system for the USCINCPAC Red Switch in March 1992. Telephone lines were run to the CINC, DCINC, J2, and J3 offices. After a one year delay, GTE Red Switch installation began on 15 September 1992, and was completed on 15 October at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Type II testing commenced on 16 October. Type II Testing and Evaluation of the Red Switch was completed in November. In addition, site training was conducted for various CINCPAC staff elements who would be using the Red Switch. Users commented that learning to use the switch was complicated. This difficulty was anticipated to disappear with more exposure to the switch's functions and capabilities. Stability and cutover of the Red Switch was achieved on 30 November.[13]

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[11]J6413 HistSum Nov 92 (U); DISA 271932Z Oct 92 (U); USCINCPAC 231800Z Nov 92 (U); CDRUSAISC 121535Z Nov 92 (U).
[12]J6411 HistSum Oct 92 (U).
[13]Ibid.; J6412 HistSum Mar 92 (U); CSC 091830Z Mar 92 (U); J6411 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J6411 HistSum Nov 92 (U).

(U) The GTE Red Switch underwent its System Interoperability Test from 30 November to 4 December 1992. This test demonstrated the Red Switch's ability to operate with any external network or system to which it was connected, under a full functional load. The test was successful except for three interface devices which were not tested: a functional Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal (ANDVT) interface had yet to be developed by GTE; a STU-II Mod 4 circuit card to test USCINCPAC's STU-II interface was not received; and USCINCPAC's Digital Secure Voice Terminal (DSVT) interface was not tested due to the lack of connectivity required to an AN/TTC-39 Tactical Switch. The STU-II and DSVT interface tests were being pursued by on-site personnel. It appeared that the ANDVT interface would not be developed by GTE due to contractual problems.[14]

(U) The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD/C3I), in a memorandum dated 11 December 1992, directed DISA to reconfigure the Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN) into a single switch type network. Therefore, it was planned for the USCINCPAC GTE Red Switch to be replaced by an Electrospace Systems Incorporated (ESI) Red Switch during the June 1994 period.

(U) The 30-day Performance Test of the GTE Red Switch began on 8 December 1992 and was scheduled for completion on 7 January 1993.[15]

JICPAC Communications

(U) As a General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) initiative to reduce manpower by 25 percent, USCINCPAC J2 established the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) on 3 July 1991. JICPAC was a consolidation of the three existing

[14] J6411 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[15] Ibid.

intelligence centers on Oahu, i.e., Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) at Camp Smith, Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) at Makalapa, and the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (548 RTG) at Hickam AFB. To meet JICPAC's large bandwidth requirements, DISA PAC reconfigured the Hawaii Area Wideband System (HAWS), the on-island transmission system leased from GTE-Hawaiian Telephone Company (HTC). The HAWS reconfiguration effort involved deactivating, activating, and relocating over 70 trunks and associated equipment.

(U) The trunks for the JICPAC TRIAD systems were required by February 1992 to avoid a contractor delay cost of $10,000 per day. The deadline for the TRIAD trunks was met one month ahead of schedule with constant team effort between DISA PAC, DECCO PAC, NISE West, HTC, DISA HQ, 1843 EIG, 1957 CG* , COMNAVCOMTELCOM, NCTAMS EASTPAC, NTCC Pearl Harbor, MITRE, JICPAC, and USCINCPAC J2, J65, and J64.[16]

DSN/STU-III Capability for ECMC

(U) For the Exercise TEMPO BRAVE demonstration in April 1992, the Enhanced Crisis Management Capability (ECMC) demonstrated the capability for the CJTF to communicate via STU-III voice and data on Super High Frequency (SHF) links. The initial capability was demonstrated by the Navy under their QUICKSAT program for their ships. The ECMC configuration, however, provided increased capability by using a tactical switch, SB-3614, to extend Defense Switched Network (DSN) access to other users, and multiplexers, AN/FCC-100, to maximize channel capacity. As a result of the successful demonstration, the Navy incorporated ECMC enhancements into future QUICKSAT installations.[17]

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* The 1957th Communications Group was inactivated at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, on 13 Apr 92 and, in its place, the 15th Communications Squadron was activated on the same date.

[16] J6421 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

[17] J6421 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

Bellows AFS Communications Site

(U) USCINCPAC had been involved in a volatile land use issue involving the state of Hawaii as well as government points of view addressing whether Bellows AFS, Hawaii, was still vital to the military or should be turned over to the State of Hawaii for its use. Part of the issue involved the communications facility and whether it should be retained and moved to another location on Oahu or completely shut down. The final opinion was that circuits at the facility were still vital and should be retained either at Bellows AFS or at another location. An alternate location had yet to be determined, but the Navy Transmitter Facility at Lualualei appeared to be the primary candidate.[18]

CINC C2 Initiative Program

(U) The Commander in Chief Command and Control Initiative Program (C2IP) for FY 92 amounted to approximately 15 percent of C2 Initiative Program funds worldwide. C2IP funds for FY 92 were as follows:[19]

TYPE	APPROPRIATED	COMMITTED (%)	OBLIGATED (%)
OP	$1,891,000	$1,887,881 (99.7)	$1,605,030 (84.7)
O&M	300,000	299,824 (99.9)	299,824 (99.9)
R&D	250,000	250,000 (100)	250,000 (100)
TOTAL	$2,441,000	$2,437,705 (99.8)	$2,154,854 (88.2)

[18]J6431 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[19]J6432 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J6432 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

SECTION IV--JOINT COMBINED INTEROPERABILITY

C3S Interoperability With Singapore

(U) In 1984, JCS approved a concept of operations document for Tactical Digital Information Links-A (TADIL-A)* and TADIL-C interoperability with Singapore E-2C aircraft and a Singapore Ground Entry Station (GES). A Configuration Management MOU was signed in Singapore in August 1986. A revised MOU was completed in February 1991 that included provisions for spread spectrum technology systems and U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF) standards. Five Command and Control Interoperability Board (CCIB) meetings were held since April 1988, alternately hosted by the U.S. and Singapore. The most recent was hosted at Camp Smith, Hawaii, 14-16 April 1992. TADIL testing for E-2Cs was completed and interoperability was confirmed.[1]

(U) GES interoperability testing with U.S. systems was the next step. Coordination was under way to accomplish the interoperability test with the Singapore GES. TADIL-A was also included in new HARPOON-equipped corvettes being fielded by the Singaporean Navy. Additional COMSEC items of equipment were requested from the U.S., and were approved and delivered in January 1992. Singapore had HAVE QUICK II (HQII) capability through FMS channels, and had requested preliminary data and documentation for HAVE QUICK IIA (HQIIA). The basic differences from HQII and HQIIA included a faster frequency-hopping rate, a greater number of frequencies, and improved electro-counter counter-measures. The increased cost of the improvements in HQIIA may preclude U.S. fielding of the system. Singapore was also interested in evaluating the Joint Tactical Information

* Tactical Digital Information Links are standardized communications links employing netted communications techniques and a standard message format for the exchange of digital information among airborne, land-based, or shipboard tactical data systems. The differences between TADIL-A and TADIL-C include parallel transmission frame characteristics for A, vice serial characteristics for C, and a faster bit transmission rate for TADIL-C.

[1]J6511 Point Paper (U), 29 Apr 92, Subj: C3S Interoperability With Singapore.

Distribution System (JTIDS), and requested documentation. The request was being processed, although current National Disclosure Policy provisions that may restrict what may be released were being taken into account.[2]

U.S./Singapore Command and Control Interoperability Board

(U) A U.S./Singapore CCIB was held at Camp Smith 14-16 April 1992. The Singapore delegation consisted of a party of five, headed by an 0-5. Two civilians from Singapore's Defence Science Organisation were also present. Various configuration management issues were discussed, to include the status of receipt of various spread spectrum system documents (i.e., HQIIA and JTIDS) and the identification of a time for conducting and testing the interoperability of LINK-11 between Singapore's GES and a U.S. aircraft carrier and E-2C aircraft. A previously scheduled exercise was postponed due to operational requirements diverting the U.S. ship involved. The new date for testing was being negotiated for early 1993.[3]

C3S Interoperability With Thailand

(U) The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) requested USAF technical support for automating their existing air defense system, to be renamed the Royal Thai Air Defense System (RTADS). Through USAF negotiations in July 1984, the RTAF requested interoperability with U.S. tactical data systems under a cost-sharing arrangement. In September 1987, a USCINCPAC team briefed Thailand on USMTF. It was agreed that a limited number would be utilized in future exercises as a test prior to adoption by Thailand. USMTF was demonstrated in Exercise COBRA GOLD 89, and was demonstrated in subsequent COBRA GOLD exercises.[4]

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[2]Ibid.
[3]J6511 HistSum Apr 92 (U).
[4]J65 Point Paper (U), 23 Oct 92, Subj: C3S Interoperability With Thailand.

(U) An MOU for configuration management and testing of TADIL interoperability was signed in Thailand on 15 June 1988. In December 1990, a revision to the MOU was concluded that incorporated USMTF into the agreement. In October 1992, Thailand was evaluating a list of recommended message text formats (MTFs) for implementation by their forces for U.S./Thai interoperability.[5]

(U) An interoperability validation exercise between U.S. and Thai forces during the period 27 September 1992 through 2 October 1992 tested the TADIL-A (LINK 11) operational connectivity between the RTADS and a U.S. carrier and E-2C aircraft. Criteria and procedures were as developed by the Joint Interoperability Test Center of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in coordination with COMSEVENTHFLT, Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization (JIEO), USCINCPAC Joint and Combined Interoperability Division (J65), CINCPACFLT, Navy Center for Tactical Systems Interoperability (NCTSI), and others. The test was previously scheduled for late March or early April 1992, but was postponed due to operational schedule changes affecting the designated carrier battle group. Initial results of the test proved excellent.[6]

U.S./Thailand Command and Control Interoperability Board

(U) Seven CCIB meetings occurred since the MOU for configuration management and testing of TADIL interoperability was signed in June 1988, alternately hosted by the respective governments of Thailand and the United States. The next CCIB was scheduled for March 1993 in Honolulu.[7]

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[5]Ibid.
[6]Ibid.
[7]Ibid.

(U) During 1992, two CCIB meetings were held. The U.S./Thailand CCIB 92-1 was held 4-7 February 1992 at Camp Smith in the J4 Conference Room. The meeting was chaired by USCINCPAC J65 and the head of the U.S. Government delegation was from JIEO in Washington, D.C. Thailand was represented by six Brigadier General officer equivalents from the RTAF. The meeting was successful and continued a long-standing C3 interoperability relationship. Issues discussed included MTF adoption, updates to Combined Interface Operations Procedures and Joint Publications documentation, and Combined Interoperability Validation Exercise conduct and scheduling.[8]

(U) The U.S./Thailand CCIB 92-2, hosted by the RTAF, was held in Phuket, Thailand, 18-25 August 1992. Group Captain Ubpatam, of the RTAF, chaired the meeting. USCINCPAC J65 was the senior U.S. representative. Significant meeting outcomes were the introduction of ADatP-11 to the RTAF for their review and the pre-test discussions for the September 1992 Combined Interoperability Test of the RTADS.[9]

U.S./ROK Command and Control Interoperability Board

(U) The U.S/Republic of Korea CCIB met twice each year, alternating between Korea and the United States. The U.S./ROK CCIB 92-1 was hosted by the ROK in Seoul, Korea, 1-5 June 1992. The meeting was chaired by the ROK representative. A significant outcome of the meeting was an agreement to review the TADIL baseline for the U.S. Message Processing Center and the combined Master Control and Reporting Center. This would advance U.S./ROK interoperability.[10]

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[8]J6511 HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[9]J6511 HistSum Aug 92 (U).
[10]J6512 HistSum Jun 92 (U).

(U) U.S./ROK CCIB 92-2 was held 6-8 October 1992 in San Diego, California, at the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC) Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Division. The meeting's focus was on the Korean Navy Tactical Data System (KNTDS), but a complete review of CCIB 92-1 action items was also conducted.[11]

(S) There were five areas of U.S./ROK C3 interoperability which were of primary concern as efforts were made to modernize:[12]

exemption #(b)(1) Sec. 1.5(d)

[redacted]

- (U) A C3 interoperability MOU was concluded in November 1989 for configuration management of Tactical Data Link and Message Text Format systems.
- (U) A multi-phased USAF/ROKAF effort designed to automate and upgrade selected portions of the Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS). The program included a hardened, automated master control and reporting center, and automation of the Air Tasking Order construction and dissemination process with intelligence support to combat units.
- (S) USN/ROKN tactical Data link interoperability. Exercises had identified naval combined interoperability problems. The Korean Tactical Data System (KTDS) would establish a U.S./ROK secure command and control link.
- (U) Theater Automated Command and Control Information Systems (TACCIMS), which was a Combined Forces

[11] J651 HistSum Oct 92 (U).
[12] J6512 Point Paper (S), 24 Jul 92, Subj: Summary of Command and Control and Communications (C3) Interoperability in Korea (U), DECL OADR.

Command effort to enhance, automate, and secure C3 capabilities at main war fighting combined command posts.

USCINCPAC C3 Joint and Combined Interoperability Working Group Meeting

(C) USCINCPAC J65 conducted the USCINCPAC C3 Joint and Combined Interoperability Working Group meeting on 31 July 1992 to address USPACOM C3 and COMSEC issues. Attendees included representatives from USCINCPAC component and subunified commands, NSA, Joint Staff, Joint Interoperability Test Center (JITC), NCPAC, CCGDFOURTEEN, and DISA PAC. Attendees received a Joint Interoperability Test Center briefing by JITC and a Revised Battlefield Electronic CEOI System (RBECS) briefing from NSA. The NSA representative indicated a desire to conduct an RBECS operational test during COBRA GOLD 93. This proposed test envisioned USCINCPAC using RBECS to generate a CEOI which would be transmitted as a computer file to U.S. Forces Thailand. U.S. Forces would use the RBECS file to produce and distribute CEOI to combined forces. Working group members were also briefed on prioritized C3 item status, 1992 COMSEC Conference action status, and Joint Key Management Working Group Meeting progress.[13]

(U) The second 1992 USCINCPAC C3 Joint and Combined Interoperability Working Group meeting was held on 1 December, to coincide with the AFCEA Hawaii Conference. This meeting was attended by representatives from Joint Staff, NSA, Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization (JIEO), NCPAC, and USCINCPAC component and subunified commands. The purpose of the meeting was to address communications, COMSEC, and multi-level security (MLS) interoperability issues. Discussion topics included Joint CEOI, COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea (CPICK), STU-III requirement for JTF tactical environment, C4I for the Pacific Warrior, Over-the-air

[13]J652B HistSum Jul 92 (C), DECL OADR.

Re-key(OTAR)/Over-the-air Transfer (OTAT) for tactical operations, Electronic Key Management System (EKMS), USCINCPAC MLS update, and USPACOM Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) conference planning.[14]

U.S./Australia Command and Control Interoperability Board

(U) The tenth meeting of the U.S./Australia CCIB occurred 6-10 April 1992 in Canberra, Australia. CCIB representatives resolved outstanding issues under consideration by the Staff Level Meeting (SLM). The group processed several Interface Change Proposals. The TADIL-A Combined Interoperability Operating Procedures (CIOP) implementation was agreed for 1 October 1992. The USCINCPAC representative presented a briefing on the status of the cooperative research and development program. This CCIB was unique in that working groups met the first day to resolve at action officer level items which had previously drawn out the official sessions.[15]

(U) The eleventh meeting of the U.S./Australia CCIB was held 19-23 October 1992 in Honolulu. CCIB representatives resolved outstanding issues under consideration by the SLM. The group processed several Interface Change Proposals. Adoption of the NATO TADIL-A standard operating procedure by Australia was discussed. The Australian representatives were briefed on the C4I for the Warrior concept. As initiated at the previous CCIB, working groups met the first day to resolve action officer level items which had previously been drawn out of the official sessions.[16]

[14]J652C HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[15]J651 HistSum Apr 92 (U).
[16]J6512 HistSum Oct 92 (U).

U.S./Australia Communications Forum

(U) USCINCPAC J6 sponsored the eighth annual U.S./Australia Communications Forum, held during the period 17-19 November 1992 at the Hickam AFB Officers' Club. USCINCPAC J6 and Headquarters, Australian Defence Force Director General, Joint Communications Electronics, were the principals. The forum provided a productive exchange of information for all participants. Topics discussed ranged from the future of C3 systems in both countries to updates on satellite communications systems, video teleconferencing standards, and communications exercises.[17]

Combined Communications Electronics Board

(U) A USCINCPAC representative attended the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB), held 8-17 June 1992, at Adelaide and Sydney, Australia. The principals were the Joint Staff J6 and his counterparts from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and United Kingdom. The meeting covered a wide range of topics, including migration to X.400 communications protocols, Allied Communications Publication (ACP) changes, C3 architectures, and combined interoperability. Several of the topics and decisions directly affected USPACOM programs and procedures.[18]

USCINCPAC COMSEC Review and Revalidation

(U) J65 requested that all USCINCPAC COMSEC holders submit a report listing their respective holdings and use of Joint PACOM COMSEC Material. This review and revalidation enabled USCINCPAC to more effectively and efficiently manage USCINCPAC COMSEC

[17]J6512 HistSum Nov 92 (U).
[18]J651 HistSum Jun 92 (U).

material. This periodic revalidation was directed by NSTISSI 4006 (DIRNSA) to ensure proper management of key material.[19]

USPACOM Multi-Level Security Working Group

(U) USPACOM held its initial Multi-Level Security (MLS) Working Group meeting in the USCINCPAC J6 conference room on 24 November 1992. Twenty-one personnel representing 15 USPACOM organizations attended. The purpose of the Working Group was to identify and prioritize potential theater-wide near-term (2-4 years) requirements for MLS solution, using the draft "USPACOM MLS Security Engineering Plan" as an initial reference. The Working Group recommended changes to requirements and the changes were coordinated through major USPACOM components, subunified commands, and directorates. Approved requirements were forwarded to the JCS and NSA for action. Additionally, USCINCPAC J6 forwarded for JCS action the theather's initial MLS requirement for a WWMCCS MLS guard.[20]

Pacific Senior Communicators Meeting

(U) The second Pacific Senior Communicators Meeting (PSCM) was held 3-4 August 1992 at the Turtle Bay Hilton on Oahu, Hawaii. The purpose of the PSCM was to build a forum through which the region's senior communicators could establish face-to-face relations, exchange communications concerns, and share plans for the future. Attendees from Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand were represented. In addition to USCINCPAC briefings, DISA and OSD made presentations during the meeting.[21]

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[19]J6522 HistSum Jun 92 (U).
[20]J6521 HistSum Nov 92 (U); DISA JIEO, USPACOM MLS Security Engineering Plan (Draft), Jul 92 (U); USCINCPAC 232200Z Oct 92 (U); USCINCPAC 252301Z Nov 92 (U).
[21]J6512 HistSum Aug 92 (U).

Seventh USPACOM Annual COMSEC Conference

(U) USCINCPAC J65 conducted the seventh annual USPACOM COMSEC Conference at the Kalani Center, Fort DeRussy, Hawaii, during the period 13-16 April 1992. The conference was conducted primarily to raise joint combined theater COMSEC issues and to develop strategies for resolution. A secondary purpose was to educate theater COMSEC managers about evolving technology, doctrine, and policy. The conference was attended by 85 representatives from NSA, JIEO, Joint Staff, the Services, NSA Pacific (NCPAC), DISA-PAC, subunified commands, components, and security assistance organizations who work with nations using U.S. COMSEC. Major briefing and discussion topics included: U.S./Allied COMSEC modernization; COMSEC support for combined operations; COMSEC international relations; NSA INFOSEC strategy; USPACOM EKMS planning; OTAR/OTAT COMSEC doctrine; and operations security. Twenty-six action items were assigned to conference attendees during the Allied COMSEC Modernization and U.S. COMSEC Modernization and Interoperability working group meetings.[22]

U.S./Japan C3 Configuration Management MOU

(U) The U.S. and Japan had been struggling to conclude a C3 Configuration Management (CM) MOU for over two years. The USPACOM Combined Interoperability Program (CIP) was a Joint Staff approved program furthering bilateral C3 interoperability through the use of MTFs, TADILs, and spread spectrum technical standards (HAVE QUICK, JTIDS). The Pacific CIP program encompassed Japan, ROK, Australia, Singapore, and Thailand. MOUs were signed with all but Japan. In September 1990, the Joint Staff J6 authorized USCINCPAC to negotiate and conclude the Japan CM MOU. The MOU was further delegated for in-country action to USFJ J6. The

[22]J652B HistSum Apr 92 (U).

Japan Defense Agency had negotiating responsibility and had been staffing and evaluating the document.[23]

(U) In an attempt to assist JDA with their CM MOU deliberations, a USCINCPAC-led team met in Tokyo during January 1992 to answer questions and provide clarification on the USPACOM CIP. Japan's intent with the CM MOU had always been driven by their desire to acquire advanced spread spectrum technology equipment. Future Japan programs like AWACS, AEGIS, and the FSX were all impacted by a CM MOU and would continue to keep the agreement in the forefront of U.S./Japan combined interoperability. In September 1992, at Japan Defense Agency request, the lead for the MOU was changed from USFJ J6 to the Mutual Defense Affairs Office. This change was to help expedite the MOU approval process with JDA.[24]

[23] J6512 Point Paper (U), 5 Feb 92, Subj: U.S./Japan C3 Configuration Management MOU; J6512 HistSum Jan 92 (U).
[24] J6512 HistSum May 92 (U); J6512 HistSum Sep 92 (U).

SECTION V--ADP SYSTEMS

WWMCCS ADP Modernization

(U) The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Modernization (WAM) program was terminated by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Donald J. Yockey. The termination was a direct result of the failure of Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) version 4.0 to satisfy the users, and was recommended in a memo to VCJCS by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) Duane P. Andrews on 15 July 1992.[1]

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

(U) Development of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) progressed through version 3.2. Version 3.3 was scheduled for early 1993. Version 4 would have had the most impact with a powerful workstation and many needed capabilities. It was canceled when the WAM program was terminated. Plans for JOPES were to field version 3.3, develop Scheduling and Movement for a workstation rather than a mainframe, continue using the Dynamic Analysis and Planning Tool (DART), and install the Technology Insertion Project (TIP) at 24 CINC and component sites. TIP included several working prototypes developed for JOPES currently being used in the field. As of the end of 1992, DISA planned to fund for operations and maintenance only. New capabilities were to be included in the WWMCCS follow-on system being planned. It was being called the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).[2]

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[1]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U); USCINCTRANS 170900Z Jul 92 (U); VCJCS 271622Z Jul 92 (U); USCINCCENT 302215Z Jul 92 (U); USCINCEUR 031003Z Aug 92 (U); USCINCSO 271500Z Aug 92 (U); CINCFOR 151932Z Sep 92 (U); USCINCPAC 160245Z Oct 92 (U); VCJCS 221555Z Oct 92 (U).
[2]J66 HistSum Dec 93 (U).

WWMCCS Information System Workstations

(U) USCINCPAC received a total of 39 WWMCCS Information System (WIS) workstations, including two TEMPEST workstations for the DJTFAC. The workstations were required under the WAM program to run the JOPES 4.0 software. Twenty-eight of the WIS workstations were installed in the WWMCCS terminal areas, replacing WIS Common User Contract (CUC) IBM XT and AT workstations. A EUCOM developed UNIX version of the Enhanced Terminal Capability (ETC) VIP 7705 emulator software was provided and installed for use with WWMCCS. This software provided the same functionality and ease of use as the IBM workstations and, as a result, the workstations gained wider acceptance by the staff for their WWMCCS data processing. Since JOPES 4.0 was canceled, no additional WIS workstations were ordered for the headquarters.[3]

WWMCCS Unmanned Operations

(U) An expanded ADP role prompted a change in operating hours for the HQ USCINCPAC WWMCCS Remote Network Processing (RNP) computer facility in the basement of Building 80. In March 1992, operations changed from three shifts covering 24-hours per day, seven days per week, to two shifts manning the computer facility from 0500 to 2100 hours seven days per week. During the 2100 to 0500 time period, the computer system was operational but unmanned. Operators were on-call, equipped with beepers, and could be reached through the Command Center. Beginning 24 July 1992, Sunday was designated as a day of unmanned operations. This was further extended on 20 November with the designation of Saturdays for unmanned operations. The facility was now manned between 0500 and 2100 Monday through Friday, with growing emphasis on Deployed Joint Task Force Support and installation of a Headquarters local area network. Saturdays, Sundays, and

[3]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

holidays were scheduled for unattended operations. Personnel were on 30-minute recall if required and 24-hour manning resumed when required. This allowed USCINCPAC personnel to provide complete service with reduced manpower.[4]

Navy WWMCCS Site-Unique Software Conversion

(U) Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWARS), who provides WWMCCS Navy software funding, contracted Andrulis Corporation in Bethesda, Maryland, to convert Navy site-unique WWMCCS software to mandated Ada language in the 1988-1989 timeframe. The purpose of the conversion was to bring systems in line with the new GCOS-8 operating system on the WWMCCS mainframe. The POL Message Slate (POLMSGS) system was converted to run on a microcomputer and delivered in early 1992. Work was on schedule for the PACOM Reconnaissance Mission Information System (PARMIS) and the PACOM Frequency Management ADP System (PFMAS). PARMIS and PFMAS were both scheduled for delivery in April 1993.[5]

WWMCCS LAN

(U) An existing Protected Distribution System (PDS) was extended for the installation of fiber optic cable for all WWMCCS terminal areas except J1 in the main headquarters building. The purpose of the extension was to accommodate the WWMCCS local area network (LAN) NAVELEXSECCEN approved the PDS for data up to Top Secret. The Command Center LAN was sharing the PDS to the J4 and J5 areas. NISE WEST (formerly NEEACTPAC) received the equipment for the WWMCCS LAN installation and prepared a statement of work (SOW) and design drawings. The Type System Development Notification (SDN) for the Navy WWMCCS LAN was approved and a LAN was installed and tested at CINCLANT. Four personnel attended

[4]J663 HistSum Oct 92 (U); J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[5]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

training in Boston, Massachusetts, on the Network Management System (NMS) software for the LAN.[6]

WWMCCS ADP Training

(U) WWMCCS ADP training for USPACOM was centralized at HQ USCINCPAC. During 1992, 489 students attended 46 ADP classes in Hawaii. Although on-island training was primarily for Hawaii-based personnel, students from Japan, Korea, Alaska, and CONUS were also accommodated. Most training was provided by mobile teams from Air Training Command, Keesler AFB, Mississippi. Responsibility for JOPES user training was passed back to J542. The WWMCCS Teleconference (WINTRNG) continued to be useful for communicating with training coordinators in PACOM.[7]

WWMCCS Consolidation

(U) In July 1990, JCS tasked USCINCPAC to look at consolidating WWMCCS ADP facilities and operations in USPACOM in accordance with ongoing Defense Management Review Directive (DMRD) 924 actions. In response, USCINCPAC developed an in-depth plan which, following Service concurrence, was approved by Joint Staff Director for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (J6) VADM Richard L. Macke, USN, for implementation. An integral part of the plan was up-front OSD funding to procure additional ADP and communications hardware to build up the remaining downsized Pacific WWMCCS architecture. When accomplished, the consolidation would save $2,100,000 annually and 47 billets, and significantly improve theater-wide C2 capability. Despite strong support, however, funding was not forthcoming. Funding was difficult to justify under the current

[6]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[7]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

significant budget reductions, fiscal constraints, and close scrutiny.[8]

(U) The System Development Notification (SDN) detailing all aspects of the WWMCCS consolidation project was signed by USCINCPAC J6 on 14 February 1992. A three-person team traveled to Washington, D.C., during the period 18-21 February and briefed the USPACOM plan to the Joint Staff J6 and Service headquarters. On 13 May, an addendum was signed by the USCINCPAC J6 that provided additional specificity in three key areas: personnel, executive agency, and budget. A 21 July memorandum from USCINCPAC J6 approved the SDN and, on 2 September a request for funding assistance was submitted to OASD(C3I). On 30 November, USCINCPAC sent a message VCJCS requesting support for the projects funding. On 14 December, VCJCS responded by saying all $6,000,000 needed to accomplish the consolidation was approved by OASD(C3I).[9]

USCINCPAC DATANET 8 and Communications Upgrade

(U) DATANET 8 installation was part of the WWMCCS ADP consolidation effort to reduce manning while improving support. Two DATANET 8 computers arrived in the Summer of 1992. Honeywell Federal Systems, Inc. assembled both computers, configured the switch settings, and successfully performed hardware tests by the end of September 1992. Naval Electronics Engineering Activity, Pacific (NEEACTPAC) personnel were on site on 6 October 1992 to conduct a site survey of the computer facility. The site survey was completed and successfully tested DATANET 8 software. It was determined that existing space, power, and air conditioning would support the cutover from Level 6 communications concentrators to DATANET 8s. Preliminary DATANET 8 testing showed positive

[8]USCINCPAC 301930Z Nov 92 (U).
[9]Ibid.; J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U); USCINCPAC 142200Z Jul 92 (U); DA 122005Z Aug 92 (U); CDRUSARPAC 230300Z Oct 92 (U); VCJCS 141600Z Dec 92 (U).

results in connecting to the host computer via workstations and printing with asynchronous printers. NISE WEST installed six DP2048 multiplexers in the Technical Control Facility (Naval Telecommunications Center (NTCC)) along with the associated patch panels. In addition to replacing USCINCPAC's two aging Level 6s for host computer connection, the DATANET 8s will provide connectivity to a LAN. NISE WEST projected 1 April 1993 as the operational date of USCINCPAC DATANET 8s.[10]

Status of Resources and Training System

(U) A Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) modernization effort had been ongoing for three years. The database would be moved from the WWMCCS mainframe computer to a workstation. It would be accessible via the USCINCPAC WWMCCS LAN. A successful Beta test was conducted in January 1992. Along with new hardware, SORTS release 6.0 included entirely new software and conversion to U.S. Message Text Format for reporting. The impact would be significant, especially in training. Installation and cutover was to occur in 1992, but was slipped. The installation team visited HQ USAF in December 1992, but had some difficulty with software approval on the Air Force WWMCCS LAN. Air Combat Command (ACC), formerly Tactical Air Command (TAC), was to be next. PACOM commands were scheduled for conversion during the April-May 1993 timeframe. Final cutover was tentatively scheduled for 1 July 1993.[11]

SIOP Monitoring/Nuclear Restrike Planning/ Residual Capabilities Assessment System

(U) During 1992, the Joint Staff National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP), USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), and USCINCLANT ABNCP battlestaffs successfully used

[10]J66 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J66 HistSum Oct 92 (U); J663 HistSum Oct 92 (U); J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[11]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

USCINCPAC J662-developed software for Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) monitoring (SIMON), Nuclear Restrike Planning (NRP), and Residual Capabilities Assessment (RECA) (SIMON/NRP/RECA). Local users were the Nuclear Operations Team (NOT) and the Enhanced Crisis Management Capability battlestaff. At the Joint Staff Nuclear Planning and Execution System (NPES) Working Group meeting on 25 June 1992, Joint Staff Strategic Operations (JS/STRATOPS), NEACP, and USSTRATCOM agreed to have USSTRATCOM J62/SSOB assume software maintenance responsibility from USCINCPAC. Subsequently, J662 implemented the agreed upon enhancements and did final turn over of the software and documentation in November 1992. USSTRATCOM took over maintenance for USCINCLANT's and their own ABNCPs and the NEACP on 1 January 1993. J662 maintained the software as a CINC unique for USCINCPAC users.[12]

Data General Hardware Upgrade

(U) Four DSSO staff members installed and configured version 9 and 9.1 of the Nuclear Planning and Execution System software, and trained battle staff users on changes to the NPES. Installation included a new operating system and required modification to standard operating procedures.

(U) Tape drives, disk drives, and an 8mm cartridge backup system were installed. Only $97,000 of the allocated $142,000 of CINC Initiative Funds (CIF) were used for the hardware projects. Savings were also realized with reduced annual maintenance cost from $63,000 to $46,000. The hardware upgrade reduced the time needed in database "saves" and "restores" and eliminated frequent malfunctions of aging disk drives. Additionally, it eliminated the need for a full time librarian because of the significant reduction in the number of required magnetic and disk storage

[12]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

media. The librarian's billet was given up as part of the PACOM WWMCCS Consolidation Project.[13]

Command and Control Support System LAN

(U) The headquarters Command and Control Support System (C2S2) LAN effort was funded with $2,000,000 in Productivity Investment Funds (PIF) in the FY 93 Defense Budget. Government assets would be used to oversee the installation. Computer operations would be centralized in the basement of Building 80 at Camp Smith, Hawaii, and operated by J663. During the months leading up to the delivery of funds, user spaces were surveyed by MITRE Corporation and cable plan was completed. Contracts were awarded to PRC, Inc. to provide integration support, to Systems Group, Inc. to provide network servers and communications hubs, and to Computer Sciences Corporation to install a fiber optic network to over 600 personal computer nodes. Installation of the LAN prototype began in 1992. Installation of the conduit and cable was scheduled to begin in January 1993.[14]

HQ USCINCPAC User Support System

(U) Command and Control Initiatives Program (C2IP) project 91/70 for $94,600 to upgrade the J662 User Support Center was approved and accomplished. The project provided upgrades to the User Support Center training system, including a VCR and monitor, Proxima Ovation LCD projection system, and a magnetic write board. It upgraded the Center's common user area with furniture and an Apple laser printer. It also provided hardware, software, and maintenance for the AT&T 3b2 LAN for buildings 35 and 20E at Camp Smith.[15]

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[13]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[14]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[15]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

Defense Data Network MILNET

(U) In September 1992, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II directed that all his flag officers. and those of other services as well, obtain Defense Data Network (DDN) accounts and communications capability so he could communicate with them informally via E-Mail. Within the next two months, the majority of flag officers were connected. It took longer for USCINCPAC J2 and J3 flag officers to be connected since their offices were located inside SCIFs and the DDN was unclassified. Alternate spaces for their computers were found.[16]

Cooperative Engagement Matrix

(U) During November and December 1992, J662 developed a microcomputer system which tracked theater-wide cooperative engagements between U.S. forces and the 44 Pacific theater countries. Statistical type data was stored in spread sheets and would be used for CINC planning and Congressional testimony. The system was scheduled for completion in January 1993.[17]

JTF-FA Information System Support

(U) J66 designed an information systems for JTF-FA in Vietnam. The Joint Staff approved the $2,800,000 information system. This system would allow JTF-FA to rapidly retrieve and analyze emerging data from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's archives that related to U.S. personnel listed as POW/MIA. The system and its technology would speed up the process and enhance USCINCPAC's capability to achieve the fullest accounting of POW/MIA cases being investigated by JTF-FA.[18]

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[16]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[17]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[18]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

CAT/DJTFAC ADP Support

(U) J66 provided round-the-clock ADP support to the Crisis Action Team in the USCINCPAC Command Center during several major exercises and disaster relief efforts. ADP support mainly involved use of the WWMCCS to monitor situations. JOPES was also used to plan and coordinate movement of personnel and materiel. JOPES, Automated Message Handling, and WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) Teleconferencing software were most heavily used. J66 personnel also provided a vital link for their personnel deployed with the DJTFAC. Operations supported during 1992 were exercises TEMPEST EXPRESS 92-1, COBRA GOLD 92, TEMPEST EXPRESS 92-2, TANDEM THRUST 92, CASCADE PINE 92, ULCHI FOCUS LENS 92, TEMPO BRAVE 92, and relief efforts for Typhoon OMAR and Hurricane INIKI.[19]

(U) The DJTFAC deployed with a WWMCCS ADP suite and assisted units with WIN connectivity several times during the year. WWMCCS was a requirement for most DJTFAC activities. J66 and component command WWMCCS-trained personnel deployed in support of exercises TEMPEST EXPRESS 91-1 and 92-2, COBRA GOLD 92, TANDEM THRUST 92, TEMPO BRAVE 92, and Operation OMAR Relief Response in Guam. The mission to Guam was very successful with JOPES being heavily used.[20]

(U) C2IP Project 92/18, Deployable ADP Remote Terminal, for $82,000 was approved. This would provide a ruggedized, TEMPEST-certified, deployable WWMCCS capability for the DJTFACs. The configuration and design were finalized in February 1992, computers were ordered in April, system construction was ordered in June, and construction commenced in November 1992. The scheduled shipment date was January 1993.[21]

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[19]J66 HistSum Sep 92 (U); J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[20]Ibid.
[21]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

Microcomputer Support

(U) J662 made major strides in upgrading automation at HQ USCINCPAC. Over 400 new microcomputers with headquarters-standard software was procured and installed in 1992. The total cost of all these upgrades was approximately $1,500,000. An extensive microcomputer training program was also started. J662 established a headquarters training center and conducted numerous classes on headquarters-standard software. They also developed a briefing for action officers at the New Action Officer Training class. This provided information on how to maximize the automation facilities at USCINCPAC.[22]

Software Standardization

(U) A $300,000 C2IP project 92/20 to standardize software throughout HQ USCINCPAC as an initial step toward installation of a headquarters LAN was initiated. In accordance with Configuration Control Panel specifications, sufficient quantities of HQ-standard software (MS Windows and MS Office) was purchased for all existing and projected USCINCPAC action officers. The remaining funds were used to purchase HQ-standard personal computers (80386 and 80486 processor, 4MB RAM, removable hard drive) to replace 37 aging Zenith 248s, and an additional 32 PCs to augment the existing USCINCPAC inventory.[23]

Computer Security

(U) As the designated approving authority, J66 accredited the following office computer systems for processing classified information: J03, J04, J044, J05, and J06. Also, Automated

[22] J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).
[23] J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

Information System (AIS) security training was conducted for the HQ USCINCPAC staff in February and October 1992.[24]

[24]J66 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

CHAPTER VII

OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I-OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Trips and Associated Activities

(U) The trips and associated activities of USCINCPAC in 1992 are summarized chronologically below. All times are local. The CINC was usually accompanied by appropriate staff members on trips throughout the USPACOM area. Limitations of time and space restrict coverage to only the official aspects of each trip: Identification of staff members who accompanied him and a complete description of official representational and social functions connected with his travels are omitted. Unless otherwise indicated, USCINCPAC traveled aboard a USAF C-135C aircraft operated by Detachment 1, 89th Military Airlift Wing, stationed at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. In addition, this section includes a list of distinguished visitors to Hawaii greeted by USCINCPAC or who called at his Camp H. M. Smith Headquarters, and also describes the CINC's activities in Hawaii such as speeches presented, meetings with local officials and media representatives, and participation in local ceremonies and media events. In general, the calls with foreign officials referred to throughout this chapter included an overview of current U.S. defense policies, discussion of current issues of mutual interest, and the discussion of specific U.S. concerns and desires. Calls with U.S. officials included reports on the status of USPACOM forces and an update on country-specific political-military issues within the USPACOM AOR.[1]

[1]Material for this section was taken from J00 trip files and daily calendars, Protocol itineraries, J031 Congressional visitors log, and J032 HistSums for 1992.

(U) Washington, D.C., Charleston AFB, Maxwell AFB, and NAS North Island, 28 January-11 February: The purpose of this trip was to conduct meetings, attend a conference, and make a presentation at the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting course at Maxwell AFB. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 2000 hours on 28 January 1992 and arrived at Andrews AFB at 0950 hours on 29 January. He conducted two meetings in the afternoon, one with Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), and another with Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO).

(U) On 30 January, Admiral Larson's first appointment was at 0815 hours and his last at 1700 hours. He first called upon Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA), James Lilley. Next, he had an hour long meeting with GEN Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). He then met with the Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), and J. Daniel Howard, Under Secretary of the Navy. After lunch, Admiral Larson called upon Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Richard B. Cheney. Then, between 1500-1700 hours, Admiral Larson met separately with Senator John Warner (R-VA), Senators John F. Kerry (D-MA) and Robert C. Smith (R-NH), and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA).

(U) Friday, 31 January, Admiral Larson first called upon Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter; and lastly, Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleberger.

(U) Admiral Larson spent Monday morning, 3 February, in a succession of short meetings: the first with ADM Frank B. Kelso II, USN, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the second with ADM Jerome L. Johnson, USN, Vice CNO, and the third with VADM Ronald J. Zlatoper, USN, Chief of Naval Personnel, at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. In the afternoon, Admiral Larson commenced

participation in a three day conference. Shortly after the conference closed on 5 February, Admiral Larson received a visit from VADM Zlatoper. Upon completion of the visit, Admiral Larson departed the Pentagon and proceeded to the CINC's suite. The remainder of the afternoon was spent meeting individually with Admiral Kelso, Admiral Johnson, and GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).

(U) On 6 February, Admiral Larson spent the morning at the Pentagon, where he met first with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P), Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, and then with Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett III. He departed Washington, D.C. from Andrews AFB at 1500 hours for Charleston AFB. Upon arrival at 1630 hours, he was met by RADM Karl Kaup, USN, Commander Naval Base (COMNAVBASE), Charleston.

(U) Admiral Larson departed his hotel at 0800 on 7 February to visit Commander Mine Warfare Command (COMINEWARCOM). Upon his arrival at 0830, he was met by RADM John D. Pearson, USN. Admiral Larson's schedule consisted of briefings on Persian Gulf lessons learned, Allied Capabilities, COMINEWARCOM reorganization, and the world-wide Mine Ordnance Magazine reorganization. He also saw a demonstration of the Self-Propelled Acoustic/Magnetic System at the Fleet Mine Warfare Training Center. Upon completion of the demonstration, Admiral Larson returned to his hotel.

(U) Admiral Larson flew from Charleston AFB to Maxwell AFB at 1140 hours on Monday, 10 February. He attended a PACOM session of the Flag Officer War Fighting Course from 1245 to 1500 hours. At 1530 hours, he departed Maxwell AFB and began his return trip to Honolulu. En route, Admiral Larson had an overnight layover at NAS North Island, hosted by VADM Edwin R. Kohn, Jr., USN, Commander Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC). The next morning, Admiral Larson departed NAS

North Island via VC-135 aircraft at 0900 hours for Hickam AFB. He arrived at Hickam AFB at 1130 hours, 11 February.

(U) Okinawa and Japan, 17-22 February: Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB on 17 February and arrived at Kadena AB on 18 February. Upon his arrival, he traveled to the 353d Special Operations Wing (353 SOW) Headquarters for briefings and equipment demonstrations. On Wednesday, 19 February, he was briefed by Col Robert M. Stankovich, USAF, Commander, 353 SOW. He proceeded by helicopter to Torii Station where he visited the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (1/1 SFG). Upon returning to Kadena, Admiral Larson participated in a working lunch with Brig Gen Joseph E. Hurd, USAF, Commander, 18th Wing; BGen Claude W. Reinke, USMC, Commander, Camp Butler; MajGen Norman E. Ehlert, USMC, Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF); and LTC Paul Payton, USA, Chief, Okinawa Area Field Office (OAFA). The officers briefed the Admiral on various issues, including the Okinawan political situation, JTF organization, and the land transfer issue. Upon completion of the briefing, Admiral Larson viewed the land transfer areas by helicopter. He departed Kadena at 1500 hours and arrived at Yokota AB, Japan at 1710 hours.

(U) The next morning, Admiral Larson breakfasted with Ambassador Michael H. Armacost and spent the remainder of the morning in briefings and discussions at the U.S. Embassy. During the afternoon, he called on ADM Makoto Sakuma, Chairman Joint Staff Council; Mr. Akira Hiyoshi, Administrative Vice Minister; and the Honorable Sohei Miyashita, Director General of the Defense Agency. On Friday, 21 February, Admiral Larson attended a breakfast hosted by the American Aerospace Industry in Japan and in the afternoon met with pro-defense members of the Diet. He also called upon Administrative Vice Minister, Hisashi Owada, and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kunihiko Saito, and later attended a dinner hosted by the Honorable Michio

Watanabe, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Admiral Larson departed Yokota AB at 0900 hours, Sunday, 23 February and arrived at 2055 hours, Saturday, 22 February at Hickam AFB.

(U) Washington, D.C., 25 February-6 March: Less than 72 hours after his return from Japan, Admiral Larson departed on his third trip of 1992. The purpose of this trip was to attend the National Defense University (NDU) Pacific Symposium and to testify before congress. He departed Hickam AFB at 2000 hours on 25 February, arrived at Andrews AFB at 0955 hours, 26 February, and proceeded to his quarters. He spent the afternoon discussing military construction (MILCON) issues with RADM Richard D. Milligan, USN, Director, Budget and Reports.

(U) On 27 February, Admiral Larson participated in the NDU Pacific symposium and was guest speaker at the evening banquet. The next day, he attended a briefing at the Pentagon on black programs, the NDU symposium luncheon at Fort McNair Officers' Club at which the guest speaker was Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), and received a Special Advisory Operations Group (SOPAG) presentation in the SECDEF Conference Room at the Pentagon in the afternoon.

(U) Admiral Larson spent 2 and 3 March preparing the testimony he was scheduled to present 4-6 March. He testified before the House Armed Services Committee-MILCON and the Senate Armed Services Committee on 4 March and before the Asian & Pacific Affairs Subcommittee on Thursday, 5 March. On Friday morning, 6 March, just prior to his departure from Washington, D.C., he testified before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Admiral Larson then departed Andrews AFB at 1200 and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1730 hours.

(U) NAS Pensacola and NAS North Island, 30 March-3 April: The purpose of this trip was to attend the Spring 1992

Fleet CINC's Conference at NAS Pensacola. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 0700 hours on 30 March and arrived at NAS Pensacola at 1930 hours. During the Conference, which began at 0800 hours on Tuesday, 31 March, and concluded at 1430 hours on 2 April, the participants discussed many topics such as the impact of down sizing on operations and infrastructure. An hour after the conclusion of the conference, Admiral Larson departed for NAS North Island. He was met by VADM David M. Bennett, USN, Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, when he arrived at NAS North Island. Admiral Larson rested overnight and departed on 3 April at 0915 hours and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1315 hours.

(U) Washington, D.C., 7-11 April: Four days after returning from the CINC's Conference, Admiral Larson departed for Washington, D.C. to testify before the HASC and to make official calls. He left Hickam AFB at 2000 hours on 7 April and arrived at Andrews AFB at 1200 hours on 8 April. On Thursday, 9 April, he testified before the HASC, had lunch with Senator John McCain (R-AZ), and in the afternoon called upon ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). Admiral Larson's calendar for 10 April was equally full: in the morning he was called upon by GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, CSA, then met with the Honorable James Lilley, ASD/ISA. In the afternoon, Admiral Larson called upon Secretary of Defense Cheney. Admiral Larson departed Andrews AFB at 0700 hours on Saturday, 11 April and arrived at 1330 hours at Hickam AFB.

(U) Guam and Australia, 26 April-9 May: This very extensive trip commenced early Sunday morning, 26 April, when Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 0905 hours for Cairns, Australia via NAS Agana, Guam. At NAS Agana, his official duties consisted of attending and providing remarks at the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Marianas (COMNAVMARIANAS) change of command at 1000 on Tuesday, 28 April. He departed at 1200 hours for

Cairns, Australia and arrived four-and-a-half hours later. Upon arrival, he was met by MG Steve Gower, AA, Chief of Logistics, Australian Defence Force (ADF), and proceeded to his room at the Cairns International Hotel. Later that evening, Admiral Larson was the dinner guest of General Peter Gration, AA, Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), Australia.

(U) Admiral Larson addressed the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) the next morning and then toured various local attractions in Cairns and in the tropical rain forest city of Kuranda. He departed Cairns by plane at 1300 hours for Sydney and arrived at 1600 hours. He was greeted by RADM Robert Walls, RAN, Commander Royal Australian Navy, Maritime Command, then proceeded to the Marriott Hotel.

(U) On Thursday, 30 April, Admiral Larson attended a breakfast hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce at the American Club. After breakfast, he provided informal remarks on future developments in the Pacific and entertained an informal question and answer period. Admiral Larson then returned to the hotel and spent the remainder of the day in staff time.

(U) 1 May was a whirlwind of official social functions, beginning with a breakfast hosted by Ambassador Melvin F. Sembler. Invitees included Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and the Honorable James Lilley, ASD/ISA. Following breakfast, Admiral Larson departed for Man O'War steps and embarked on HMAS PROTECTOR with a number of distinguished Australian and American guests to observe the combined fleet entry into Sydney Harbor. Admiral Larson then attended a luncheon hosted by the Coral Sea Commemoration Committee, the American Australian Association, and the American Chamber of Commerce, in the Governor Macquarie Room, Nikko Hotel. The Honorable Richard Cheney, guest speaker, discussed the topic "US/Australian Relations in a New and Changing Global Context". In the evening,

the Admiral attended the Commemoration Ball at the Marriott Hotel Convention Center.

(U) Saturday, 2 May, Admiral Larson and the SECDEF breakfasted aboard USS INDEPENDENCE with a small group of enlisted personnel and later spoke informally with various crew members. He returned to Sydney later that morning, and was met by the Lord Mayor and the Town Clerk. Admiral Larson then observed the Veteran's Street March, a parade which included a fly past of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, from the reviewing stand at Town Hall and participated in the post-March reception hosted by the Lord Mayor. He capped this eventful day by attending an evening reception aboard INDEPENDENCE.

(U) Admiral Larson participated in ecumenical services held at 1100 hours at St. Stephen's United Church on MacQuarie Street on Sunday, 3 May; the remainder of the day was free of official functions.

(U) Monday, 4 May, Admiral Larson departed for Cenotaph where he and Australian Deputy Secretary A. J. Principi performed the wreath laying ceremony at the Coral Sea Memorial. In the afternoon, he cruised Darling Harbor aboard the TRESCO II and later toured the Maritime Museum.

(U) The next day, Admiral Larson was guest speaker at a luncheon hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Association at the Sidney Club. He returned to his hotel and after a short rest, departed for the Parliament House where he was acknowledged on the floor of parliament. Following the proclamation, he was accompanied by the Premier of New South Wales, Nick Greiner, on the short walk to the State Office Block for a reception.

(U) At 0800 hours the next morning, Admiral Larson departed Sydney Airport for RAAF Fairbairn, Canberra. Upon arrival he was

met by GEN Peter Gration, AA, CDF. Admiral Larson spent the rest of the day at the Russell Offices in a Military Representatives meeting hosted by GEN Gration. In the evening, Admiral Larson dined with GEN Gration at the CDF's residence.

(U) At 0715 on Thursday, 7 May, Admiral Larson addressed a breakfast meeting of the National Press Club on the topic "Determinants in Future Security of Pacific." Participants included Naval Aviation Museum guests plus national military press personnel. He departed RAAF Fairbairn, Canberra, at 1100 hours for RAAF Townsville. Upon his arrival at 1330 hours, he was met by Group Captain Roxley McClennan, RAAF, Commanding Officer, RAAF Townsville, and Alderman Tony Mooney, Mayor of Townsville, and reviewed the Honor Guard, a 50-man RAAF contingent. Admiral Larson's official itinerary was clear the remainder of the day.

(U) Friday, 8 May marked the beginning of extensive ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea. Admiral Larson attended the Mayor's reception at 1300 hours, then in mid afternoon, attended the USS CORAL SEA Anchor Ceremony during which VADM Stan Arthur, Commander, U. S. Seventh Fleet, presented CORAL SEA's anchor to the Mayor of Townsville. That evening, Admiral Larson attended a reception hosted by Brigadier Keating, Commander, 3d Brigade, and the Coral Sea Ball held at Queen's Gardens, where he was the senior military leader in attendance.

(U) The next morning, Admiral Larson observed the Coral Sea Street Parade and shortly after noon, attended the unveiling of the National Coral Sea Monument, then departed Townsville for Cairns, Australia at 1400 hours. He rested overnight in Cairns and departed at 0900 hours, Sunday, 10 May and arrived at Hickam AFB at 2150 hours.

(U) Guam, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Republic of the Philippines, 18-29 May. Admiral Larson began the first leg of this trip at 0900 hours on 18 May, departing Hickam AFB for Guam. When he arrived at Andersen AFB, Guam, at 1300 hours on 19 May, he was greeted by Maj Gen H. Hale Burr, Jr., USAF, Thirteenth Air Force, U.S. Air Force Commander, and RADM Edward K. Kristensen, USN, COMNAVMARIANAS. Admiral Larson was briefed on the 13/AF mission and the Navy Beddown. He also viewed the VRC-50 beddown sites and toured the base. That evening, he was the dinner guest of Maj Gen Burr.

(U) At 0900 hours the next day, Admiral Larson departed Andersen AFB for Singapore. He arrived at Paya Lebar AB, Singapore, at 1325 and was met by Colonel Kwek Siew Jin, Navy Chief of Staff. Shortly thereafter, Admiral Larson attended an arrival reception hosted by Colonel Bey Soo Khiang, Commander, Paya Lebar Air Base. He then departed for the U.S. hangar to meet a detachment of VMFA(AW)-121 which was on deployment for Exercise COMMANDO SLING. Admiral Larson then proceeded to his accommodations at the Westin Stamford Hotel. At 1600 hours, he participated in a Country Team briefing held at the U. S. Embassy and led by the Honorable Robert D. Orr, U. S. Ambassador to Singapore. In the evening, Admiral Larson was the dinner guest of Major General Ng Jui Ping, Acting Chief of Defense Forces.

(U) Admiral Larson went to the Ministry of Defense the morning of 21 May and met with Major General Ng Jui Ping, Acting Chief of Defense Forces and then with Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, Minister of Defense. Admiral Larson then traveled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the Raffles City Tower for a meeting with Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng. Admiral Larson departed the MFA for the U. S. Embassy for lunch with Ambassador Orr. From there, Admiral Larson went to Sembawang Naval Facility and received an hour and a half tour the facility. The remainder of the evening was free of official activities.

(U) On Friday, 22 May, Admiral Larson participated from 0930 to 1100 in a roundtable discussion at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. At 1200 hours, he was guest at a pre-departure reception hosted by Commodore Teq Che Hean, Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Larson departed Singapore for Hong Kong at 1300 hours.

(U) When he arrived in Hong Kong at 1645 hours, he was met by CAPT Robert T. Sollenberger, USN, Defense Attaché. The following morning, Admiral Larson met with Mr. Richard Williams, American Consul General to Hong Kong, at the U. S. Consulate, and discussed 1997 issues, proposals for USN ship repair work, and status and future of the China Fleet Club. Admiral Larson departed Hong Kong at 1200 hours on Sunday, 24 May, for NAS Cubi Point.

(U) At NAS Cubi Point he was met by RADM Thomas A. Mercer, USN, Commander, U.S. Facility, Subic Bay (COMNAVPHIL)/USCINCPAC Representative Philippines (USCINCPACREPPHIL), then boarded a C-12 aircraft en route to Camp John Hay in Baguio. He arrived at 1430 hours and shortly thereafter participated in a mini-Country Team meeting, followed by a roundtable discussion on the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) at Ambassador Wisner's residence.

(U) The next day, Monday, 25 May, was a holiday and Admiral Larson spent much of the day preparing for the upcoming MDB meeting. Admiral Larson departed for NAS Cubi Point Tuesday via C-12 at 1100 hours. Upon arrival he proceeded to Headquarters for a withdrawal update briefing. Later that evening, he was dinner guest of RADM Mercer.

(U) Admiral Larson departed NAS Cubi Point for Villamor AB, Manila, via C-12 at 1400 hours, Wednesday, 27 May. He proceeded

to Ambassador Wisner's residence to prepare for the MDB dinner at the Westin Plaza Hotel that evening.

(U) At 0900 on 28 May, Admiral Larson and the other U.S. MDB members caucused prior to the board MDB meeting. Following the caucus, Admiral Larson called on GEN Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, then had lunch with the Council of Foreign Ministers. At 1345 hours, Admiral Larson attended the 34th anniversary meeting of the MDB. In the evening, he was guest of honor at a dinner at the Ambassador's residence, and presented a short speech of the U. S. role in the Pacific on regional security.

(U) The following morning, Admiral Larson made a farewell courtesy call on President Corey Aquino, Republic of the Philippines. At noon, he was guest speaker at the American Chamber of Commerce luncheon at the Manila Hotel. Admiral Larson departed the Republic of the Philippines from Ninoy Aquino IAP via VC-135 at 1750 hours 29 May. He arrived at Hickam AFB at 1000 hours, Friday, 29 May.

(U) Washington, D.C. and New London, CT, and Newport, RI, 4-16 June 1992. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 2000 hours on 4 June 1992 and arrived at Andrews AFB at 1110 hours on 5 June. That afternoon, he called on Mr. Dennis Nagy, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and was briefed on Live Sighting Investigations. Over the weekend, he attended several events which marked the fiftieth commemoration of the Battle of Midway. On Saturday, Admiral Larson went to Navy the Memorial at 1000 hours for the Midway Memorial Service, and that evening, attended a cocktail reception hosted by the Association of Naval Aviation at the Marriott Gateway Hotel, followed by the Midway Presidential Banquet. On Sunday, he participated in the Midway Memorial Service at Arlington National Cemetery.

(U) Monday, 8 June, Admiral Larson called on the Honorable James Lilley, ASD/ISA, then on a group consisting of Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett III, Under Secretary of the Navy, J. Daniel Howard, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment), Jacqueline Schafer,. Later in the afternoon, he called on the Honorable Donald Rice, Secretary of the Air Force. He also received a visit from RADM Michael L. Bowman, USN, Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs.

(U) The following morning Admiral Larson was called on by GEN Robert W. RisCassi, USA, Commander in Cheif, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea (CINC UNC/CFC/USFK), then attended the War Plan 5027 briefing GEN RisCassi presented to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. After the briefing, Admiral Larson briefly visited with ADM Frank B. Kelso II, USN, CNO. In the afternoon, Admiral Larson made three calls: the first on Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Arnold Kanter, second on Under Secretary of the Army, John W. Shannon, and third, on Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, Environment), Susan Livingstone, and lastly upon Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD)/POW-MIA, Mr. Alan C. Ptak. In the evening, Admiral Larson was the dinner guest of ADM Kelso at the Tingey House.

(U) On Wednesday, 10 June, Admiral Larson had lunch with the SECDEF, CJCS, and the CINCs, then participated in the CINC's conference. That evening, he had dinner at the White House with President and Mrs. George Bush. The following morning, Admiral Larson made a short speech at the Defense Writer's Group Breakfast meeting held in the Decatur room of the ANA Westin Hotel, then proceeded to the CINC's suite at the Pentagon. He spent the remainder of the day in meetings with Congressman Neil

Abercrombie (D-HI), Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI), and Senator John McCain (R-AZ).

(U) Admiral Larson spent the morning at the CINC's suite and also received a visit from Mrs. Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director, National League of Families POW/MIA. He then departed Washington, D.C. at 1115 hours for Quonset State Airport, Rhode Island, arriving at 1225 hours. He proceeded to the Radisson Hotel in New London, CT and arrived there at 1415 hours. In conjunction with the commissioning of USS MARYLAND, Admiral Larson toured the submarine in the afternoon and attended a reception and dinner in honor of the occasion. On 13 June, Admiral Larson traveled by tug from Commander Submarine Squadron 2, to USS MARYLAND and commissioned her at 1100 hours.

(U) The next day, 14 June, Admiral Larson left New London, CT and arrived in Newport, RI, in the early afternoon. Except for calls by Lt Col Raymond Gagnon, USAF, and LTC Hank Zimon, USA, on Monday morning, his official calendar was clear until Tuesday, 16 June when he participated in and spoke at the Current Strategy Forum. At 1230 hours, Admiral Larson departed Quonset State Airport for Hickam AFB with a stopover for refueling at Offutt AFB. He arrived at Hickam AFB at 1950 hours.

(U) Kilauea Military Camp, HI, 19-22 June. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB via C-12 aircraft for Hilo, Hawaii, at 1600 hours on 19 June. Upon arrival at 1700 hours, he traveled by car to Kilauea Military Camp. Admiral Larson's calendar was clear until Sunday, 21 June afternoon, when he flew to Kulani Boys' Home via UH-60 helicopter to observe Exercise ELLIPSE CHARLIE. He departed Hilo Airport via C-12 at 0830 hours Sunday and arrived at Hickam AFB at 0930 hours.

(U) Washington, D.C., 24-27 June. Two days after returning from Hilo, Admiral Larson departed for Washington, D.C. to make

official calls and to attend the retirement of ADM Jerome L. Johnson, USN, Vice CNO. He left Hickam AFB at 2000 hours on 24 June and arrived at Andrews AFB at 1110 hours on 25 June. That afternoon, he made two visits, first upon GEN Carl E. Mundy, USMC, Commandant USMC, then upon Deputy Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States, Richard Armitage. The next morning, he attended ADM Johnson's retirement ceremony and reception. In the afternoon, he participated in a War Plan 5020 meeting with members of CINCPAC and Joint Staffs, then made calls on GEN Colin L. Powell, USA, CJCS, on GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, CSA, and on ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN, VCJCS. Admiral Larson departed Andrews AFB at 1000 the next morning and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1410 hours.

(U) Maui, HI, 10-11 July: Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 1530 on Friday, 10 July, for Maui where he presented a speech to the Navy League on Saturday. He returned to Hickam AFB at 1400 hours Saturday afternoon.

(U) Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, 12-14 July: The purpose of this trip was to conduct the USCINCPAC Commander's Conference and to participate in the Alaskan Command (ALCOM) Change of Command ceremony. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 0900 hours on 12 July and arrived at Elmendorf AFB that afternoon at 1650 hours. That evening, he was guest of honor at a banquet hosted by the ALCOM commander, Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF. Monday, 13 July, Admiral Larson participated in the change of command ceremony in which Lt Gen Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, replaced Lt Gen McInerney, USAF, as the Commander, ALCOM. Later that afternoon, Admiral Larson opened both the USCINCPAC Commander's Conference and the USCINCPAC Commander's Wives Conference by presenting the opening remarks to the former and the welcoming remarks to the latter. He participated in the USCINCPAC Commander's Conference the remainder of the afternoon

and that evening, hosted a fish bake dinner at the Six Mile Lodge for selected conference members. Admiral Larson spent Tuesday, 14 July, participating in briefings and making presentations at the USCINCPAC Commander's Conference. He departed Elmendorf AFB at 1600 that afternoon and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1950 hours.

(U) Luke AFB, Camp Pendleton, NAS North Island, USS KITTY HAWK, Nellis AFB, and Bohemian Grove, CA, 17-26 July. During this trip, Admiral Larson observed operations in conjunction with Exercise TANDEM THRUST-92 and spoke at the Bohemian Grove. He departed Hickam AFB for Luke AFB at 0900 hours on Friday, 17 July and arrived at 1730 hours. The following morning he engaged in Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) discussions and in an ATO procedures briefing and facility walk-through before departing Luke AFB at 1015 hours. He flew to NAS North Island and transferred to a UH-1 for the trip to Camp Pendleton. Upon arrival at 1200 hours, he was met by LtGen Robert B. Johnston, USMC, Commanding General, 1st MEF and MCB Camp Pendleton. Admiral Larson then received the Joint Exercise Control Group Situation Summary and then spent the rest of the day observing the operations of the Media Center/Joint Combat Camera Imaging Center, marines and soldiers in the field, and Exercise FREEDOM BANNER. He returned to NAS North Island via UH-1, arriving at 1715 hours on 18 July.

(U) Sunday morning, Admiral Larson discussed RIMPAC with RADM Robert Walls, RAN, aboard USS VINCENNES, then flew via SH-3 to USS CORONADO where he was met by and conducted discussions with VADM Jerry L. Unruh, USN, CJTF TANDEM THRUST. Admiral Larson spent the rest of the afternoon aboard USS KITTY HAWK observing flight operations and discussing matters relative to TANDEM THRUST and RIMPAC. He dined that evening with CAPT James Maslowski, USN, Commanding Officer, USS KITTY HAWK.

(U) Admiral Larson departed NAS North Island at 0945, 20 July, en route Edwards AFB. BG George A. Crocker, USA, Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific/Joint Special Operations Task Force (COMSOCPAC/JSOTF) met Admiral Larson and gave him a briefing and tour of JSOTF Headquarters. In the afternoon, Admiral Larson received briefings and tours of the C-17 project and the AC-130U, and in the evening at 2030 hours, observed an AC-130U live fire exercise. Prior to his departure from Edwards AFB at 0900 hours on 21 July, Admiral Larson toured and received information on the B-2.

(U) Upon arrival at Nellis AFB, Admiral Larson proceeded to the USAF Weapons and Tactics Center (WTC) for an overview briefing. He also visited the 414th Composite Training Squadron (Red Flag) and was briefed on its mission. After lunch, Admiral Larson was taken on informative tours of the Blackjack and Red Forces Operations Center, the 547th Adversary Threat Squadron, and the flight line. The next morning, 22 July, he was briefed by Col Steven Ladd, USAF, Commander 549th Joint Training Squadron, on the Air Warrior Mission, then by Col Edward Land, USAF, Commandant, USAF Fighter Weapons School. At 1100 hours, Admiral Larson departed Nellis AFB for NAS Alameda. He arrived at 1220 hours and the following day gave a speech at the Bohemian Lakeside Talk. Admiral Larson departed NAS Alameda at 1400 hours on Sunday, 26 July, and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1615 hours.

(U) Washington, D.C., 8-14 August. Admiral Larson departed for Washington, D.C. at 2100 hours on Saturday, 8 August, to participate in the JCS CINC's Conference. He arrived at Andrews AFB at 1210 hours on 9 August. On Monday, he called on ADM Jeremiah, USN, VCJCS; Gen Merrill A. McPeak, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary of the Navy, Sean O'Keefe; he was also called upon by GEN Robert W. RisCassi, USA. The CINC's conference began at 0730 hours on Tuesday and ended at 1230 hours

on Wednesday, 12 August. Admiral Larson spent Wednesday afternoon calling on Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and on the Honorable James Lilley, ASD/ISA. Additionally, Mr. Alan C. Ptak, DSAD/POW-MIA, called upon Admiral Larson.

(U) Thursday, 13 August, Admiral Larson called upon GEN Colin L. Powell, CJCS, in the morning and then had a working lunch with ADM Frank B. Kelso II, CNO. In the afternoon, he departed for the State Department and called on Ambassador William Clark, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; on Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and lastly, on Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Robert Zoellick. Admiral Larson departed the next day at 0900 hours from Andrews AFB and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1310 hours.

(U) Korea, Russia, and Japan, 21-23 August. On this trip, Admiral Larson traveled to Korea to observe Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS, to Russia for a reciprocal meeting with Commander, Far East Military District (FEMD), and to Japan for meetings with military and government officials. He departed Hickam AFB at 1000 hours on Friday, 21 August, and upon arrival at Osan AB, Korea at 1430 hours, 22 August, was met by RADM William W. Mathis, USN, Commander, Naval Forces Korea. Admiral Larson departed Osan Base Operations for Yongsan via UH-1. From there, he traveled to the Hilltop House where he was the dinner guest of GEN Robert W. RisCassi, CINC CF/UNC/USFK.

(U) Admiral Larson's Sunday began with a breakfast hosted by Lt Gen Howell M. Estes III, USAF, Commander, 7th Air Force, followed by an on-site briefing of the Hardened Theater Air Control Center (HTACC). He then departed for Suwon Airfield via UH-1 for briefings at the Combined Joint Visitors Bureau, the First Republic of Korea Army Gaming Center, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force/Combined Marine Forces Command

(MEF/CMFC). Next, he traveled by UH-1 to the Hartell House for lunch with LtGen Henry C. Stackpole III, USMC. Following lunch, he traveled to the Command Center Seoul for discussions with LtGen Stackpole. He then flew via UH-1 to Command Post (CP) Tango and proceeded to CP Tango Boardwalk for conferences with GEN RisCassi and with GEN Kim Dong Jin, ROKA, DCINC CFC. He boarded the UH-1 again at 1720 hours for CJCS Bunker 1, where he conferred with GEN Lee Pil Sup, ROKA, Chairman, JCS ROK, and took a tour of the bunker. Admiral Larson finally returned to Osan AB late that evening after a dinner hosted by GEN Lee Pil Sup.

(U) The following morning, Admiral Larson departed Osan AB at 0730 on the two-and-a-half hour flight to Khabarovsk, Russia. This trip to Russia was a part of the US-CIS military-to- military contacts program which had been established by the JCS in 1989. In September 1991, Admiral Larson hosted his Russian counterpart, Gen-Col Aleksandr Kovtunov, Commander of the Far East Theater, and Gen-Col Kovtunov extended a reciprocal invitation. However, within the year, this high command was deactivated; of the remaining Russian commands, the Far East Military District (FEMD) was most comparable to PACOM. Therefore, upon arrival at 1200 hours, he was met by Gen-Col Vikto Stepanovich Chechevatov, Commander, FEMD. Admiral Larson also met with him later at the Military District Headquarters. Following the meeting, Admiral Larson toured Khabarovsk's historical sites, took a boat ride down the Amur River, and watched a cultural program.

(U) Tuesday, 25 August, Admiral Larson visited a military unit and observed a static display of equipment, soldiers' living conditions, and their daily routines, including training, close order drilling, and physical conditioning. In the evening, he was dinner guest of Gen-Col Vikto Stepanovich Chechevatov.

(U) Admiral Larson departed Khabarovsk via a FEMD aircraft at 0900 hours on 26 August and arrived at Airport Knevichi, Vladivostok, at 1000 hours. He was met by ADM Gennadiy Khvatov, Commander, Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). Admiral Larson then visited a military unit and viewed a static display of aircraft. He also toured Vladivostok and visited a PACFLT ship. He departed Vladivostok at 1900 hours via a Russian aircraft for the one hour flight to South Sakhalinsk where he was met by Gen-Lt Vyacheslav Zherebt, Commander, 51st Army.

(U) Thursday, 27 August, he visited another Russian military unit for further familiarization with combat training, life and living conditions of military personnel. This was followed by a historical tour of the city and a visit to the sanatorium "Blue Mountain Mineral Waters". After supper hosted by the Commander, 51st Army, Admiral Larson flew via Russian aircraft to Khabarovsk. The next morning, Admiral Larson had a two hour meeting with Commander, FEMD. Admiral Larson, via VC-135, departed Russia at 1400 hours for the approximately two-hour flight to Yokota AB. Upon arrival, Admiral Larson was met by, and later dined with, Lt Gen Richard E. Hawley, USAF, Commander, USFJ.

(U) Admiral Larson spent Saturday morning at the USFJ Headquarters in a meeting with the USFJ component commanders and staff discussing USFJ concerns and issues. After lunch, he departed Yokota AB for Tokyo, arriving at 1250 hours, with no official activities scheduled for the rest of the day. Similarly, on Sunday, Admiral Larson's calendar was free of official activities until dinner, when he was the guest of ADM Makoto Sakuma, Chairman, Joint Staff Council.

(U) Monday, 31 August, Admiral Larson was engaged in a Country Team meeting at the U. S. Embassy for most of the morning. He then departed the U. S. Embassy for the Japan

Defense Agency, where he called on Minister Sohei Miyashita, Minister of State for Defense, and ADM Makoto Sakuma. After attending a lunch held at Ambassador Armacost's residence, Admiral Larson made several visits: first he called on Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hisashi Owada, and lastly, Director, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yukio Sato. Admiral Larson departed Tokyo for Yokota AB via UH-1 at 1715 hours and arrived at 1745 hours, had dinner in Yokota, then departed for Hickam AFB via VC-135 at 2000 hours. Admiral Larson arrived at Hickam AFB at 0845 hours on 31 August.

(U) Okinawa, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Guam, 14-24 September. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 1130 hours on Monday, 14 September to conduct meetings with senior military and government representatives in Okinawa, Mongolia, Hong Kong, and Indonesia. Upon arrival at Kadena AB, Okinawa at 1600 hours on 15 September, he was met by MajGen Michael J. Byron, USMC, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, and Brig Gen Jeffrey G. Cliver, USAF, Commander, 18th Wing. Admiral Larson rested overnight and departed the next morning at 0930 hours for Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia. Upon arrival at 1250 hours, Admiral Larson was met by MG Rashmagiin Gavaa, Chief of General Staff, MG Shagdar, 1st Deputy Chief of General Staff, and a number of other military leaders. Admiral Larson, escorted by MG Gavaa, proceeded to DV Quarters at the Iktenger State House for a Country Team brief. Following the brief, he visited the Central Museum and then departed for the Ministry of Defense where he called on LTG Shagalyn Jadambaa, State Minister of Defense. Next, he was received in an honors ceremony at the Military College and was given a tour of the facility. Upon completion of the tour, he departed for the Officers' Palace where he attended a performance of the Army Song and Dance Ensemble. Later that evening, Admiral Larson was the dinner guest of MG Gavaa at the DV Quarters, Iktenger State House.

(U) Thursday, 17 September, Admiral Larson toured the Ganden Monastery, then called on Mr. Puntsagiin Jasrai, Prime Minister of Mongolia, at the Government House. Following the meeting, he traveled to the airport where he met with Mr. Jigjid, Minister of Energy, observed the unloading of property from a USAF C-5, and signed over the property to the Mongolians. Admiral Larson then spent the rest of the afternoon touring the countryside accompanied by an escort party which included MG Gavaa and LTG Jadambaa.

(U) The next morning, Admiral Larson traveled to the American Embassy to conduct a short meeting with Mr. Thomas Dowling, Deputy Chief of Mission. They both departed to the Government House and called on the President of Mongolia, Pusalmaagiin Porchibat, at 1100 hours. Admiral Larson concluded this historic visit with a tour of the Signal Regiment, escorted by COL Orchibal, Commander Mongolian Signal Regiment. Admiral Larson departed Mongolia for Hong Kong at 1245 hours, and arrived at Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong, four hours later.

(U) On Saturday, 19 September, after a casual call on Mr. Richard Williams, American Consul General to Hong Kong, and the Honorable James Lilley, ASD/ISA, at the Consulate General's residence, Admiral Larson had the remainder of his stay in Hong Kong at his disposal.

(U) Admiral Larson departed Hong Kong for Halim AB, Jakarta, Indonesia at 1200 hours on 20 September and arrived at 1525 hours. The next morning, he met with Ambassador Robert Barry at the American Embassy for a Country Team briefing. From there, he traveled to the Ministry of Defense and Security where he called on General (Ret) Benny Moerdani, Minister of Defense AFE Security, and then on General Try Sutrisno, Commander in Chief Indonesian Armed Forces. Upon completion of these visits, he departed for the Office of Coordinating Minister for Politics

and Security where he called on ADM (Ret) Sudomo, Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security. His next stop was a luncheon hosted by COL John B. Haseman, USA, Defense and Army Attaché, at COL Haseman's residence. After the luncheon, Admiral Larson proceeded to Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (Lemhannas), Indonesian War College where he called on Lieutenant General Soekarto, Governor of Lemhannas, and conducted discussions with the staff and students at Lemhannas.

(U) Admiral Larson departed Halim AB, Jakarta for Guam at 0800 hours on 22 September. Upon arrival at 1715 hours, he was met by RADM Edward K. Kristensen, USN, COMNAVMARIANAS, and CAPT Rickie G. Reynolds, USN, Commanding Officer, NAS Agana. Admiral Larson then proceeded to COMNAVMARIANAS HQ for a briefing on Typhoon OMAR relief efforts. That evening, he attended a dinner hosted by Governor Joseph Ada.

(U) Although he was scheduled for a very early departure from Guam on 23 September, Admiral Larson was able to conduct a short meeting with Governor Ada and Congressman Ben Blaz at 0730 hours at the COMNAVMARIANAS HQ. Admiral Larson then departed Guam at 0815 hours and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1955 hours on 22 September.

(u) Washington, D.C. and Annapolis, MD, 29 September-10 October. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 1900 hours on 29 September and arrived at Andrews AFB at 1105 hours, 30 September. That afternoon he called upon Gen Merrill A. McPeak, USAF, CSAF, then upon Secretary of the Air Force, Donald Rice. The next day, he participated in Australian Ministerial Talks and a working lunch hosted by Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, held at the State Department. Admiral Larson then returned to the Pentagon for a MILREPS meeting. In the evening, he dined with Acting Secretary Eagleburger and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Paul B. Wolfowitz.

(U) On Friday, 2 October, he called on Senators Ted Stevens (R-AK), John Kerry (D-MA), and Robert Smith (R-NH), and had a working lunch with Senator John McCain (R-AZ). He returned to the Pentagon and called on GEN Colin L. Powell, USA, CJCS, and departed Washington, D.C. for Dothan, Alabama to spend with weekend with relatives.

(U) Admiral Larson departed Dothan, Alabama on 4 October, and arrived at Washington National Airport at 1500 hours. The CINC's Conference was held 5-10 October at the U.S. Naval Academy. Admiral Larson attended the first two days and discussed topics such as: roles and missions, force structure, budget reductions, and Pacific, Atlantic, and European discussions. Admiral Larson departed the conference after the Executive Session at 1500 hours on 6 October and flew to Washington, D.C., late in the afternoon. He later dined with GEN Powell at Fort Myer.

(U) On Wednesday, 7 October, Admiral Larson attended an Honors Ceremony for General Lee Sang Hoon, ROK Minister of Defense, attended a luncheon hosted by GEN Colin L. Powell, called on Acting Secretary of the Navy, Sean O'Keefe, and was a guest at an evening reception hosted by Secretary of Defense, Richard B. Cheney. Admiral Larson spent Thursday at the Pentagon in various meetings and attended a luncheon hosted by the SECDEF. On Friday, he called upon a number of people, including ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN, VCJCS. Admiral Larson departed Washington, D.C., at 0900 hours, 10 October, and arrived at Hickam AFB at 1345 hours.

(U) Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Guam, 3-12 November. Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB at 1100 hours on Tuesday, 3 November, and arrived in Manila at 1540 hours on Wednesday, 4 November. He was met by RADM Thomas A. Mercer, USN,

and Maj Gen H. Hale Burr, USAF, Thirteenth AF Commander, then departed for Ambassador Richard Solomon's residence where he rested overnight. At the residence the next morning, Admiral Larson conducted a working breakfast with Ambassador Solomon, RADM Mercer, Maj Gen Burr, Mr. Sid Moats, PAO, and the USCINCPAC staff. This was followed by a Baguio group brief, then departure for the U.S. Embassy where he participated in a military only caucus. He then traveled to Camp Aguinaldo and called on GEN Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and on Secretary Renato DeVilla, Secretary of National Defense. The next stop was the Department of Foreign Affairs where he called on the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Roberto Romulo. Admiral Larson's day ended with a joint dinner at the Manila Hotel.

(U) On Friday morning, Admiral Larson engaged in the Mutual Defense Board Meeting and in the afternoon called on President Fidel Ramos at Malacanang Palace. After resting overnight at the Manila Hotel, he departed Manila for Bangkok at 0900 the next morning.

(U) Upon arrival at Don Muang Airport, Bangkok, at 1145 hours, Admiral Larson was met by COL Joshua L. Kiser, USA, Joint US Military Assistance Group, Thailand, and a Royal Thai Armed Forces Delegation. He was also given a police escort to his hotel, the Regent. Later in the afternoon, he called on Mr. Matthew Daley, Charge'de Affairs, (DCM), and also conducted a Country Team meeting at the U. S. Embassy. Sunday, 8 October, Admiral Larson went to the U. S. Embassy where he was given a JTF-FA brief by Lt Col David A. Geraldson, USAF, a brief on STONY BEACH by COL John Cole, USA, and a tour of JTF-FA/STONY BEACH facilities at the Embassy. Later, he also received briefs by MG Thomas H. Needham, JTF-FA Commander, and LTC John V. Donovan, JTF-FA DET 2 Commander. At 1700 hours, Admiral Larson was the guest of honor at a dinner hosted by Mr. Matthew Daley. Other

guests included ADM Vichet Karunyavanij, CINC Royal Thai Navy, General Wimol Wongwanich, CINC Royal Thai Army, and Air Chief Marshall (ACM) Gun Timantip, CINC Royal Thai Air Force.

(U) Monday, 9 November, Admiral Larson first called on ACM Woranat Aphichari, Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces, at the Supreme Command Headquarters and then on General Wichit Sookmak, Minister of Defense at the Ministry of Defense. He also called on His Excellency Chuan Likphai, Prime Minister of Thailand and on His Excellency Prasong, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Ministry.

(U) Admiral Larson departed Bangkok at 0900 on 10 November and arrived at Wattay Airport, Vientiane, Laos at 1010. He was driven to the U. S. Embassy and promptly called on Ambassador Charles B. Salmon, Jr., participated in a Country Team Brief, and received a JTF-FA DET 3 brief, followed by an inspection of the JTF-FA DET 3 facilities. Later in the afternoon, he called on senior Lao government officials and in the evening had a working dinner at the Ambassador's residence.

(U) After a working breakfast with Vientiane-based Chiefs of Mission, Admiral Larson departed for Phnom Penh, Cambodia and arrived at Pochentong Airport at 1055 after an hour-and-fifty-five-minute flight. At 1140 hours, he conducted a Country Team Brief in his hotel, the Cambodiana. He left the hotel and met at 1230 hours with the Core Group members, consisting of the Ambassadors of Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand, to review the current situation in Cambodia. This was followed by a visit to the JTF-FA office for a briefing by CPT James R. Rice, USA, Acting DET Commander. From there, he proceeded to United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC) Headquarters where he met with Special Representative Yasushi Akashi, then with LTG John Sanderson, AA, UNTAC Commander of the Military Component, and in both visits,

discussed current issues and the challenges facing the UNTAC, especially the upcoming election. In the very late afternoon, Admiral Larson visited the JTF-FA DET 4 house and the house of military observer personnel of UNTAC. He then had dinner at 1930 hours with the SOC POW/MIA committee.

(U) Admiral Larson departed Phnom Penh at 0700 hours, Thursday, 12 November. He arrived at Cubi Point at 1125 hours, was met by RADM Thomas A. Mercer, USN, and proceeded to the Cubi Point Officers' Club for a working lunch. At 1325, Admiral Larson departed on the approximately three-and-a-half-hour flight to Anderson AFB Guam. The next morning, Admiral Larson interviewed a Flag Lieutenant candidate, then departed Anderson AFB at 1000 hours for Hickam AFB. He arrived at Hickam AFB at 2135 hours on 12 November.

(U) Washington, DC and NAS North Island, 1-4 December. At 2030 hours on 1 December, Admiral Larson departed Hickam AFB for Andrews AFB. He arrived at Andrews AFB at 1025 hours on Wednesday, 2 December. During this trip, he had meetings with the SECDEF, key military officers, gave testimony on the POW/MIA issue, and conducted interviews for the Flag Lieutenant position. The afternoon of his arrival, he called on Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at 1300 hours, then on ADM Jeremiah, USN, VCJCS, at 1600. The next morning. he called on ADM Frank B. Kelso II, USN, CNO, and Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney. In the afternoon, Admiral Larson interviewed three officers for the Flag Lieutenant position, then met with GEN Colin L. Powell, USA, CJCS.

(U) Admiral Larson testified at the Hart Senate Office Building before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs at 0900 on Friday, 4 December. Admiral Larson departed Andrews AFB at 1125 hours and arrived at NAS North Island at 1400 hours. At the Sea Cabin, Admiral Larson interviewed three other candidates

for the Flag Lieutenant position, then departed NAS North Island at 1600 hours. He arrived that evening at Hickam AFB at 2000 hours.

Distinguished Visitors and Local Events

(U) A selected list of distinguished visitors to Hawaii received or greeted by USCINCPAC or Deputy USCINCPAC, attendance at local events, meetings with local news media personnel in Hawaii, and local speeches presented in 1992 is shown below.[1]

Visitor/Event	Title/Location	Date
LtGen Royal N. Moore, Jr., USMC	Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific	6 Jan
LTG Johnnie H. Corns, USA	Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific	7 Jan
Mr. Don Eddington	USCINCPAC Scientific and Technical Advisor	7 Jan
GEN Robert W. Riscassi, USA	CINC, United Nations Command/Commander, U.S. Forces Korea	8-11 Jan
Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF	Commander, Alaskan Command	8-15 Jan
Lt Gen Richard E. Hawley, USAF	Commander, U.S. Forces Japan	9-11 Jan
BG Thomas H. Needham, USA	Commander, Joint Task Force (POW/MIA)	10 Jan
Amb. Hong Choo Hyun and Amb. Sohn Jiang Nai	ROK Ambassador to the United States, and Consul General, Korean Consulate, Honolulu	10 Jan
Cong. Ben Blaz	U.S. Representative (R-GU)	11 Jan
LTG Dato Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Hamid, MA	Chief of Staff, Malaysian Armed Forces	14 Jan
Opening Remarks	U.S.-Malaysian Bilateral Training and Consultative (BITAC) Meeting, CCBR	14 Jan
Sen. Ted Stevens	U.S. Senator (R-AK)	14 Jan
LTG Carmen Cavezza, USA	Commanding General, I Corps	14 Jan

[1] USCINCPAC's daily schedules and visitor's schedules prepared by the USCINCPAC Protocol Office.

LTG Robert D. Hammond, USA	Commanding General, Strategic Defense Command	16 Jan
BG Robert G. Sausser, USA	Deputy CG, USARPAC	16 Jan
GEN Carl W. Stiner, USA	CINC, U.S. Special Operations Command	17-19 Jan
Dr. Michel Oksenberg	President, East-West Center	17 Jan
RADM Phillip Olson, USN	Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group ONE	23 Jan
GEN Charles McDonald, USAF	Commander, Air Force Logistics Command	23 Jan
Ms. Millicent Woods and MG Robert Joyce USA (Ret)	Dep Asst Scty of Defense for Personnel Support, Families and Education, and Director, Office of Personnel Support Policy and Services	22-25 Jan
Mr. Seth Cropsey	Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation	24 Jan
Mr. Hannibal Tavares	Chairman, Kahoolawe Commission	27 Jan
Mr. Gene Upshaw and Mr. Kal Weinstein	NFL Players Association	27 Jan
Maj Gen Alan V. Rogers, USAF	Director, Operational Plans and Ineroperability Directorate, JCS/J7	9-10 Feb
Brig Errold Pfitzner, AA	Director General, Joint Operations and Plans, Australian Defence Force	9-14 Feb
RADM Frank Bowman, USN	Joint Staff/J3	14 Feb
Dr. Enrique Mendez, Jr.	Asst Scty of Defense for Health Affairs	23-26 Feb
Amb. Jewel Lafontant-Mankarious	Ambassador-at-Large, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs	24-27 Feb
RADM Raymond M. Walsh, USN	Asst Vice Chief of Naval Operations, OP-09B	24-26 Feb

VADM Jerry Tuttle, USN	Director, Space and Electronic Warfare	25 Feb
MG Teruhisa Kuroyanagi, JGSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Staff Office, J5	1-3 Mar
Mr. John Helgerson	Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA	5-6 Mar
BG Ronald L. Lowe, USA	Commander, 351st Civil Affairs Command	8-11 Mar
MG Robert L. Ord, III, USA	Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (Light)	10 Mar
Mrs. Solita Aguirre	Consul General, Philippine Consulate, Honolulu	12 Mar
Dr. Harry Harding	Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution; Breakfast meeting at the Plaza Club.	13 Mar
LTG Wayne A. Downing, USA	Commander, USA Special Operations Command	13 Mar
ADM Bruce DeMars, USN	Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion	13 Mar
Lt Gen Billy J. Boles, USAF	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, USAF	16 Mar
Visit, CAPSTONE 92-1 Fellows	Vision Briefing and Discussion in J5 Conference Room	15-18 Mar
Maj Gen Hale Burr, Jr., USAF	Commander, Thirteenth Air Force	20 Mar
Visit by Air War College Students	Discussions in CCBR	24 Mar
Maj Gen David J. Pederson, USAF	Deputy Director for Operations NMCS, JS/J36	26-28 Mar
Amb. William Bodde, Jr.	U.S. Ambassador to Republic of the Marshall Islands	31 Mar
Mr. D'Wayne Gray	Under Secretary of Veterans Affairs	3 Apr
Visit by Advanced Operational Studies Fellows	Briefings and Discussions in J5 Conference Room	6 Apr

Gen Joseph P. Hoar, USMC	CINC, U.S. Central Command	6-7 Apr
RADM Paul Hodoul, Seychelles	Chief of Naval Operations, Seychelles	7 Apr
Remarks	Breakfast Meeting hosted by Pacific and Asian Affairs Council and Chamber of Commerce, Ilikai Hotel, Honolulu	14 Apr
Office Call	Meet with Governor John Waihee and MG Edward V. Richardson, State Adjutant General in Governor's Office	14 Apr
RADM John L. Linnon, USCG	Commander, Joint Task Force FIVE	15 Apr
Rep. Patricia Schroeder	U.S. Representative (D-CO)	16 Apr
Rep. John Kerry	U.S. Representative (D-MA)	17 Apr
RADM Edward Kristensen, USN	Prospective COMANMARIANNAS/USCINCPACREP Guam	17 Apr
MG Patrick J. Kelly, USA	Commander, USA Laboratory Command	17 Apr
GEN Kim Dong Jin, ROKA	Deputy CINC, Combined Forces Command	20 Apr
VADM Stanley R. Arthur, USN	Commander, 7th FLEET	20 Apr
Opening Remarks	Joint Civil Military Operations Conference, CCBR	22 Apr
Visit by Jefferson Fellows	Discussions in J5 Conference Room	22 Apr
RADM Thomas Mercer, USN	USCINCPACREP Philippines	23 Apr
Pearl Harbor Naval Station Change of Command	Remarks, Pearl Harbor	24 Apr
65th Airlift Squadron Change of Command	Remarks, Hickam AFB	24 Apr
ADM Makoto Sakuma, JMSDF	Chairman, Joint Staff Council, JSDF	26-28 Apr

Dr. Robert Wolthuis	Deputy Asst Scty of Defense for Global Affairs	26-28 Apr
LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret)	Diector, 50th Commemoration Committee	28 Apr
Ms. Sara Ratcliff	Deputy Asst Scty of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy/Equal Opportunity	28 Apr
Mr. Paul A. Strassmann	Director of Defense Information/Principal Deputy Asst Scty of Defense for C3I	6-7 May
Remarks	Opening Ceremony, Hawaii Military Week, Washington Place, Honolulu	11 May
Lt Gen James Clapper, USAF	Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	13 May
GEN Charan Kullavanijaya, RTA	Secretary General, Thai National Security Council	13-16 May
Guest Speaker	Chamber of Commerce Quarterly Luncheon, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu	14 May
Mr. Alan Ptek	Deputy Asst Scty of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs	15 May
LTG Winston Choo Wee Leong, Singapore	Chief of Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces	27 May
BrigGen Jeong Kook Bohn, ROKMC	Chief, Exercise and Doctrine Division, CFC	1 Jun
Visit, CAPSTONE 92-2 Fellows	Briefings and Discussions in J5 Conference Room	1-3 Jun
Lt Gen Joseph Ralston, USAF	Prospective Commander, ALCOM	3 Jun
MG Edward V. Richardson, USANG	State Adjutant General	3 Jun
Keynote Speaker	16th Pacific Armies Management Seminar, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu	4 Jun
Lt Gen Thomas G. McInerney, USAF	Commander, ALCOM	4 Jun
MajGen Norman Ehlert, USMC	Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force	4 Jun

LTG Kim Jae Chang, ROKA	Asst Minister for Policy, Ministry of National Defense, ROK	7-9 Jun
Mr. Paul D. Wolfowitz	Under Scty of Defense for Policy	17-18 Jun
VADM Richard C. Macke, USN	Joint Staff, J6	17-18 Jun
Amb. Robert W. Farrand	U.S. Ambassador to Papua New Guinea	24-26 Jun
RADM William Earner, USN	Commander, Naval Base Pearl Harbor (Outgoing)	30 Jun
Amb. William Bodde	U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Marshal Islands (Outgoing)	1 Jul
RADM Joseph W. Prueher, USN	Prospective Commander, 3rd FLEET	2 Jul
ADM Ronald Hays, USN (Ret)	Former USCINCPAC	2 Jul
LtGen H. C. Stackpole, USMC	Commanding General, FMFPAC	6 Jul
Gen Jimmie V. Adams, USAF	CINCPACAF	8 Jul
VADM Michael C. Colley, USN	Deputy CINC and Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command	8 Jul
Lt Gen Robert Rutherford, USAF	Vice CINCPACAF	9 Jul
Mr. Hirohide Uozumi	Parliamentary Vice Minister, Japan Defense Agency	10 Jul
Bastille Day Celebrations	McCoy Pavilion, Ala Moana Park, Honolulu, hosted by Acting Consul General of France Kamichetty	14 Jul
RADM John L. Linnon, USCG	Commander, JTF FIVE	14-15 Jul
LTG William Crouch, USA	Chief of Staff (Designate), U.S. Forces Korea	15-17 Jul
RADM Edward Kristensen, USN	USCINCPAC Representative, Guam	15-17 Jul

Amb. Aurelio E. Brazeal	U.S. Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia	16 Jul
Mr. Resio Moses	External Affairs Secretary, Federated States of Micronesia	16 Jul
Joint Committee Meeting Members, FSM	Office Call and PACOM Strategy Brief in J5 Conference Room	16 Jul
Amb. Paul M. Cleveland	U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia (Outgoing)	28 Jul
VP-17 Change of Command	Remarks, NAS Barbers Point	29 Jul
Amb. Thomas R. Pickering	U.S. Ambassador to China (Designate)	30 Jul
Amb. Charles B. Salmon, Jr.	U.S. Ambassador to Laos (Designate)	30-31 Jul
LTG Alonzo Short, USA	Director, Defense Information Systems Agency	2-4 Aug
Mr. Alan Ptak	Deputy Asst Scty of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs	2-4 Aug
GEN Jimmy D. Ross, USA	Commanding General, Army Materiel Command	6 Aug
JICPAC Change of Command	Remarks, Hickam AFB Parade Field	7 Aug
RADM Ronald Tucker, USN	COMLOGGRU WESTPAC	7 Aug
Visit, CAPSTONE 92-3 Fellows	Briefings and Discussions in J5 Conference Room	9-12 Aug
Amb. David C. Fields	U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (Designate)	12-16 Aug
Pacific Air Chiefs Conferees	Vision Brief, CCBR	17 Aug
Amb. Donald B. Ensenat	U.S. Ambassador to Brunei (Designate)	24-25 Aug
Amb. John Wolf	U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia (Designate)	1 Sep
Amb. Michael Cook	Australian Ambassador to the U.S.	3 Sep

Visit by the Consular Corps of Hawaii	Pacific Area Update Briefing in the CCBR	3 Sep
Dr. Jacquelyn Davis	Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.	4 Sep
Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr.	U.S. Ambassador to Singapore (Designate)	8 Sep
Interview	Far East Economic Review	10 Sep
Grand Opening	Remarks, Gaming and Simulation Facility	10 Sep
RADM William Retz, USN	Commander, Naval Base Pearl Harbor	10 Sep
Dr. Yeo Ning Hong	Minister of Defense, Singapore	12-15 Sep
ADM Robert J. Kelly, USN	CINCPACFLT	25 Sep
Amb. T. Schaffer	U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka (Designate)	25 Sep
CAPT Lowell E. Jacoby, USN	Commander, JICPAC	25 Sep
Gen Jimmie V. Adams, USAF	CINCPACAF	28 Sep
Visit by CNO Strategic Studies Group	Vision Brief and Discussions in CCBR	28 Sep
Lt Gen Gary H. Mears, USAF	Director for Logistics, Joint Staff/J4	7-9 Oct
GEN Lee Pil Sup, ROKA	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ROK	13 Oct
Mr. Byoung Tae Rhee	Consul General, Korean Consulate, Honolulu	15 Oct
Mr. Robert Prestel	Deputy Director, National Security Agency	15 Oct
Mr. R. B. Walker	Defense Intelligence Agency Representative to USCINCPAC	15 Oct
Lt Gen Richard E. Hawley, USAF	Commander, U.S. Forces Japan	16 Oct

Visit by Faculty Members & Students, Indonesian National Defense Institute	Welcoming remarks, CCBR	19 Oct
Amb. Evelyn H. Teegen	U.S. Ambassador to Fiji	19 Oct
Visit by Retired General Officers on Island	Briefing and Lunch	22 Oct
Mr. William Birch	Minister of Labor, New Zealand	23 Oct
Mr. Stephen M. Duncan	Asst Scty of Defense for Reserve Afffairs and Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support	23-24 Oct
Visit, CAPSTONE 92-4 Fellows	Briefings and Discussions in J5 Conference Room	25-26 Oct
ADM Ramdas, IN	Chief of Naval Operations, Indian Navy	27 Oct
VADM Kim Son Ik, ROKN	CINC, ROK Fleet	27 Oct
Mr. Matthew Maher	Dep Asst Administrator, Office of International Programs, Drug Enforcement Agency	27-28 Oct
Interview	KHET TV "Asia Now"	29 Oct
RADM Irve C. Lemoyne, USN	Director of Resources, U.S. Special Operations Command	29-30 Oct
Opening Remarks	Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board	30 Oct
RADM Richard C. Walker, RCN	Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific, Canada	30 Oct
Gen George L. Butler, USAF	CINC, U.S. Strategic Command	2 Nov
Mr. James R. Lilley	Asst Scty of Defense for International Security Affairs	2 Nov
LTC Charles Clayton, USA	Commander, Det 4, JTF-FA	2 Nov
RADM Edward D. Sheafer, USN	Director of Naval Intelligence	16 Nov

Mr. Kenneth Yates	U.S. Information Agency Advisor, USCINCPAC	17 Nov
Gen Ronald P. Fogelman, USAF	CINC, U.S. Transportation Command	17 Nov
Amb. David C. Fields	U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Marshall Islands	18-22 Nov
Mr. Thomas Kijiner	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Marshall Islands	18-22 Nov
Opening Remarks	Joint Committee Meeting, RMI, in J5 Conference Room	19 Nov
Guest Speaker	Associated Press Managing Editors Assn Convention, Pearl Harbor O'Club	20 Nov
Rep. Patricia Schroeder	U.S. Representative (D-CO)	23 Nov
ADM Thomas Hayward, USN (Ret) and Pacific Forum Members	Office Call	23 Nov
LTG Johnnie H. Corns, USA	Commanding General, USARPAC	24 Nov
ADM Saeid M. Khan, PN	Chief of Naval Operations, Pakistan Navy	30 Nov
Amb. David F. Lambertson	U.S. Ambassador to Thailand	30 Nov
Keynote Speaker	Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Assn (AFCEA) Conference, Sheraton Waikiki Hotel	1 Dec
BG John A. Hedrick, USA	Director, Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization, DISA	1-2 Dec
Dr. David Signori Jr.	Associate Director, Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization, DISA	1-2 Dec
Ms. Linda Boone	National President, American Legion Auxiliary	7 Dec
RADM William T. Pendley, USN (Ret)	DASD for International Security Affairs	7 Dec

LTG Teddy Allen, USA	Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency	7 Dec
Re-Christening Ceremony	USS Bowfin, Pearl Harbor	7 Dec
Dr. Albert J. Kelley	Deputy Under Scty of Defense for Acquisition (International Programs)	8 Dec
Remarks	1992 PACOM Security Assistance Conference, Sheraton Waikiki Hotel	8 Dec
Mr. Skip Boyce	Deputy Chief of Mission, Singapore	8 Dec
VADM Martin H. Daniell, USCG	Commander, Pacific Area, USCG	9 Dec
Mr. B. T. Rhee	Consul General, Korean Consulate, Honolulu	9 Dec
Brig Gen John H. Garrison, USAF	Defense Attache, Beijing	10 Dec
LTG Dhirender Krishen Khanna, IN	Director, General Military Intelligence, India	10-13 Dec
Mr. Roger Munson	National Commander, American Legion	14 Dec
Foreign Delegation	PACOM Strategy Brief	14 Dec
Testify before SAC Hearing	Federal Building, Honolulu	16 Dec
Amb. Morton I. Abramowitz	President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	18 Dec
Gen Carl Mundy, USMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps	28 Dec
Presentation Ceremony	Presentation of Hawaiian World War II Commemorative Community Flags to Governor John Waihee, Governor's Office	28 Dec
Mr. Gerald Czarnecki	Chamber of Commerce	30 Dec

SECTION II--COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

USCINCPAC FY 92 Operating Budget

(U) Funds for USCINCPAC activities were provided through U.S. Navy channels. FY 92 obligations for each category of funds were as follows:[2]

Organization	Program 2 General Purpose Forces	Program 3 Intell and Communica-tions	Program 9 External Public Affairs	Program 10 Support of Other Nations
Hq USCINCPAC	$15,193,000	$ 8,486,000	$ 55,000	$3,364,000
JICPAC		26,293,000		
COMUSJAPAN	$ 3,113,000	750,000		
COMUSKOREA		1,733,000		
COMALCOM	830,000	23,000		
COMSOCPAC	157,000			
MDO Japan	300,000			
JUSMAGTHAI	175,000			
JUSMAGKOREA	60,000			
JCRC/JTF-FA	6,580,000			
TOTAL	$26,408,000	$37,285,000	$ 55,000	$3,364,000

[2]J050 Report (U), 21 Oct 93.

Military Assistance Executive/Foreign Military Sales Trust Funds

T10 Administrative Expenses

Organization	FY 92 Obligations
Hq USCINCPAC	$562,300

T20 Security Assistance Organization Expenses

Organization	Flying Hours	For Affairs Admin Support	Direct Obligations	FY 92 Total
JUSMAG Korea		$153,400	$1,168,400	$1,321,800
JUSMAG Phil	$205,500	64,700	2,604,100	2,874,300
JUSMAG Thai	200,300	43,800	1,361,000	1,605,100
OMADP				
Indonesia		96,000	682,200	778,200
MDO Japan		57,000	670,800	727,800
Malaysia		21,400	167,000	188,400
India		42,600	161,800	204,400
Australia		15,800	74,500	90,300
Singapore		3,700	96,700	100,400
Madagascar			64,200	64,200
Burma			8,200	8,200
Bangladesh		1,500	21,200	22,700
China			12,200	12,200
Sri Lanka			26,500	26,500
Nepal			8,500	8,500
Papua NG			14,800	14,800
New Zealand			6,400	6,400
Fiji			7,300	7,300
Dep				
Education			23,500	23,500
Total	$405,800	$499,900	$7,793,000	$8,085,000

Official Representation Funds

Organization	FY 92 Obligations
Hq USCINCPAC	$31,500
JTF-FA	2,600
COMUSJAPAN	32,500
USCINCPACREP Australia	200
USCINCPACREP Guam	700
USCINCPACREP Philippines	2,100
USCINCPACREP RMI	700
JUSMAG Thailand	2,100
COMSOCPAC	900
COMALCOM	1,900
TOTAL	75,200

MAP Representation Allowance

Organization	FY 92 Obligations
JUSMAG Korea	$6,500
JUSMAG Philippines	4,700
MDO Japan	4,300
JUSMAG Thailand	4,500
OMADP Indonesia	3,400
India	1,000
Australia	700
Malaysia	700
Singapore	600
Sri Lanka	200
Madagascar	400
Bangladesh	200
China	0
Nepal	200
TOTAL	$27,400

Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses Funds

Organization	FY 92 Obligations
Hq USCINCPAC	$ 5,300
JICPAC	1,500
COMUSJAPAN	11,300
USCINCPACREP Philippines	700
TOTAL	$18,800

FY 92 Funding Adjustment

(U) For FY 92, the Navy provided additional funding in the amount of $6,580,000 to support the POW/MIA mission tasked to JTF-FA. Additionally, funding for Program 3, Intelligence and Communications, increased by $15,511,000 due to the consolidation of intelligence activities under the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific.

SECTION III--LEGAL AFFAIRS

Status of Forces Agreement Issues

Status Protection



[3]USCINCPAC 131930Z Nov 92 (U), SECDEF 210132Z Nov 92 (C), DECL OADR, CJCS 302035Z Nov 92 (U).



Status of Forces Protection in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam

(U) In 1988, attempts had been made to formalize a status arrangement with Thailand. However, four years later, a SOFA had

[4]SECSTATE 122125Z Dec 92 (U) DECL OADR.

yet to be finalized. The stand-up of Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) revived the issue of status protection for U.S. personnel assigned to Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia.[5]

(U) The only personnel in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam afforded any status protections were those assigned to the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUGMAGTHAI) and JTF-FA Detachments at American Embassy Bangkok, American Embassy Vientiane, and U.S. Mission Phnom Penh. These personnel were granted A&T status. Excluded from A&T protections were personnel on JTF-FA Joint Field Activity (JFA) teams and personnel temporarily on duty in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam for participation in exercises (e.g., COBRA GOLD) or for humanitarian and civic assistance projects. All personnel in Vietnam, including those assigned to the JTF-FA Detachment in Hanoi, were without status protections due to the absence of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Vietnam. In 1992, there was no significant progress towards formal status of forces agreements or expansion of A & T coverage to excluded personnel.

Legal Conferences

USPACOM Legal Conference

(U) The USCPACOM 1992 Legal Conference was held from 2-5 March in Honolulu, Hawaii. Attendees included RADM William L. Schachter, Jr., JAGC, USN, Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy, RADM Paul E. Versaw, USCG, Chief Counsel, U.S. Coast Guard, Brig Gen (Sel) Thomas E. Hemingway, USAF, Chief Counsel, U.S. Transportation Command, as well as senior Judge Advocate Generals from throughout the Pacific. The participants discussed practical solutions to operational legal issues such as new

[5]J064 Talking Paper Oct (2 (U).

counter-drug initiatives, disaster relief operations, environmental law impact, base closures, and new access agreements overseas. They also discussed military justice, litigation, and standards of conduct.[6]

USCINCPAC International Military Operations and Law Conference

(U) USCINCPAC hosted the sixth annual International Military Operations and Law Conference at the Sheraton Princess Kaiulani Hotel, Honolulu, from 21-24 September. Main topics for discussion were counterdrug operations and environmental programs. Title 10 funding was available for attendance of two foreign representatives from each eligible country. Countries ineligible for Title 10 funding were also invited to attend. About 75 participants, including lawyers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all service components, U.S. Central Command, and Strategic Command, and representatives from many foreign countries participated in the conference. Distinguished attendees included LtGen Martin L. Brandtner, USMC, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff/J3, RADM John L. Linnon, USCG, Commander, Joint Task Force Five, and flag and general officers from Mexico, Bangladesh, and Nepal.[7]

Mid-Year Review Meeting of U.S. Malaysia Bilateral Training and Consultative Group

(U) The Deputy Staff Judge Advocate accompanied other members of USCINCPAC to Kuala Lumpur to review the status of recommendations made at the Eighth Bilateral Training and Consultative Group (BITAC) meeting and to revise BITAC terms of reference. The participants developed a new structure and new terms of reference for annual BITAC meetings. The BITAC

[6]J06 Annual HistSum 92 (U).
[7]Ibid.

restructuring eliminated the combined standards operating procedures (CSOP) working group.[8]

[8]Ibid.

SECTION IV--PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(U) Because of space limitations, only selected activities of the Public Affairs Division are included in this section. The full range of reported affairs activities for this year and previous years is maintained in the USCINCPAC historical archives.

Media Operations

(U) Selected media operations during 1992 are described below in chronological order. Announcements concerning POW/MIA matters are covered in Operations, Chapter III. USCINCPAC visits and prominent visitors to the headquarters are listed in "Official Activities of the Commander in Chief", Section I of this Chapter.[9]

- On 9 March, the USCINCPAC Public Affairs Officer (PAO) issued a news release stating that Admiral Larson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 4 March about geopolitical trends and military strategies for stability in the Pacific region.

- On 28 July, a news release announced that Admiral Larson and Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) Secretary for External Affairs Resio Moses co-chaired the sixth joint Committee Meeting between their two nations at Camp H.M. Smith on 16 July.

- On 4 September, the PAO announced that USCINCPAC conducted a briefing detailing damage assessment, ongoing relief efforts, and the military's support in Typhoon OMAR relief operations.

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[9]J0323 HistSum Jan-Dec 92 (U).

• On 11 September, a news release announced the precautionary measures taken by the service components in preparation for the arrival of Hurricane INIKI.

• On 12 September, the PAO announced that Operation INIKI Response was organized to provide disaster relief assistance in the wake of the hurricane that devastated the island of Kauai.

• On 20 October, a news release announced that USCINCPAC was ready to provide Guam with disaster relief if it were damaged by Typhoon BRIAN.

Community Relations

(U) Selected community relations activities during 1992 are mentioned below chronologically.

• On 14 January at 1200, the fifth annual USCINCPAC/Legislators golf outing was held at the Navy/Marine Golf Course. There was one military officer in each of the ten foursomes. On 21 January, Admiral Larson, USCINCPAC, and Admiral Robert Kelly, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), attended the Governor's State of the State address to the Hawaii State Legislature at the State Capitol.[10]

• On Saturday, 1 February, various military officials attended the annual National Football League (NFL) awards banquet at the Hickam AFB Officers Club. The following day, a Joint Service Color Guard and the 25th Infantry Division Band performed in Pro Bowl ceremonies at the Aloha Stadium. On 8 February, 150 Pearl Harbor medals were presented at the USS

[10]J0324 HistSum Jan 92 (U).

Arizona Visitor Center, Pearl Harbor, in a program sponsored by the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association. The Carol Kai Great Aloha Run was held on 7 February and of the 30,000 people who ran, jogged, or walked in the event, 9,975 were military members. From 25 February through 1 March, USPACOM and component commands provided various static displays and demonstration aircraft, including F-15, F-16, AV-8B, A-10, UH-60, AH-64, E-2C, AH-1, and FA-18, at the Asian Aerospace '92 Exhibition at the Changi International Airport, Singapore.[11]

• On 5 March LTG Fields hosted a Pacific Command Strategy Briefing for the members of the USARPAC civilian advisory board. On 27 March, the Ladies Auxiliary to the Veterans of Foreign Wars held a memorial ceremony at the National Memorial of the Cemetery of the Pacific (Punchbowl). USCINCPAC Public Affairs Officer, Col H. Geoff Baker, USAF, attended as the Senior Military Representative.[12]

• On 2 April, the 13th annual Governor's/Mayor's Prayer Breakfast was held at the Coral Ballroom, Hilton Hawaiian Village. Over 500 hundred military, including Flag and General Officers, participated in prayer and fellowship. On 9 April, the Hawaii Region Office, Department of Veterans Affairs sponsored a National Former POW Day Ceremony at Punchbowl. The Deputy USCINCPAC, LTG Harold T. Fields, USA, represented USCINCPAC. On 22 April Admiral Larson hosted an Oahu Council dinner meeting at his quarters. Participants included Gen Jimmie V. Adams, USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Forces, LTG Johnnie H. Corns, USA, Commander, U.S. Army Pacific, ADM Robert J. Kelly, USN, CINCPACFLT, Governor John D. Waihee, Mayor Frank F. Fasi, and business representatives. They discussed major community and military issues such as the Ford Island Causeway, the Pohakuloa

[11]J0324 HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[12]J0324 HistSum Mar 92 (U).

Training Area, the Kahoolawe Commission, and the Transfer of Hawaii Public Schools to DOD. From 22-25 April, about 45 members of the Arizona Committee for Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve visited Hawaii for an indoctrination on activities of the military services. During their visit, they received a briefing at USCINCPAC, observed reservists in training, and observed them in their active reserve roles. On 25 April, 200 military personnel, including 25 rappellers from the 25th Infantry Division, and dependents volunteered their assistance in a Honolulu Chamber of Commerce clean up campaign. The volunteers cleaned litter from Diamond Head crater and slopes and the slopes of Hanauma Bay. From 25-30 April, 27 members of the San Diego Chamber of Commerce visited various military facilities in Hawaii, including USCINCPAC, and received political/military briefings on the major littoral countries in USPACOM, discussed issues relative to personnel reductions and realignment of military facilities.[13]

- Hawaii Military Week, a time during which the civilian community recognized the military and its contributions to Hawaii, was observed from 11-16 May. The week was kicked off on 11 May with an opening ceremony at Hemmeter Center supported by a Joint Service Color Guard, the Air Force Band of the Pacific, Force Four, the Hawaii National Guard, and the Royal Guard. The theme for Hawaii Military Week was "Stand Tall, Stand Proud". The military observed Armed Forces day on 16 May by sponsoring numerous events at various military installations throughout the island. Selected ships were open for tours, numerous events, exhibits, and static displays were available for public viewing. In conjunction, the seventh annual SOS Cook-off was held. SOS was judged by celebrity civilian and military judges. On 21 May, the Honolulu Police Department sponsored its second annual Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) rally at

[13]J0324 HistSum Apr 92 (U).

Honolulu Stadium. DARE espoused meaningful activities as a means of combating substance abuse. All state Department of Education primary schools located on military property participated. On 25 May the traditional Memorial Day ceremony was held on the USS Arizona memorial and was supported by a seven person U.S. Marine Corps firing detail, a Joint Service Color Guard, and the CINCPACFLT band. The Mayor's 44th Annual Memorial Day Service was also held on 25 May at Punchbowl. This ceremony was supported by a Joint Service Color Guard, rifle salute and taps by the U.S. Army, a 21-gun salute by the U.S. Marine Corps, and missing man flyover by the Hawaii Air National Guard.[14]

• On 2 June, a group of Republic of Singapore Armed Forces officers received a CINCPAC Public Affairs Update (PAU) and FMFPAC briefing in the G4 conference room. On 6 June, a Joint Service Color Guard, bands from the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, and platoon size marching units from each branch of the armed forces participated in the Kamehameha Floral Parade. On 25 June, Brig Gen W. Thomas West, USAF, designated CINCPAC representative, participated in a wreath laying and memorial ceremony which marked the 42nd anniversary of the start of the Korean War. The ceremony, held at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, was also supported by a Joint Service Color Guard, Pacific Fleet Band, and seven person USMC firing detail.[15]

• On 2 July, Admiral Larson hosted an office call for four members of the Military Affairs Council (MAC) of the Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii. The MAC had requested the meeting to discuss the CINC's position on military and community issues in preparation for their 19-23 July visit to Washington, D.C. On 29 July, USCINCPAC Public Affairs Officer, Col Baker, USAF, attended a Strategic Target System (STARS) meeting on the island

[14]J0324 HistSum May 92 (U), USCINCPAC 070052Z Apr 92 (U).
[15]J0324 HistSum Jun 92 (U).

of Kauai, Hawaii to discuss STARS' current status and ongoing problems.[16]

• From 15 August through 15 September, the State Department of Transportation conducted its annual public awareness campaign to reduce traffic congestion at the start of the new school year. USCINCPAC and components supported the campaign by distributing flyers to their personnel. On 22 August, USCINCPAC accommodated the Office of Hawaiian Affairs request for helicopter transportation to the island of Kahoolawe for a healing ceremony. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) supplied the helicopters which transported a congressional delegation and a large group of native Hawaiians, including Governor Waihee, to Kahoolawe. USCINCPAC supported the request out of concern for the safety and welfare of individuals conducting authorized visits to Kahoolawe. On 28 August, the Honorable Peter Coleman, Governor of American Samoa, visited Hawaii and met with military members of Samoan ancestry at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Kaneohe Bay, Schofield Barracks, and Hickam AFB.[17]

• USCINCPAC and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) sponsored a Symposium on East Asia Security which toured the Pacific Region from 8-26 September. The Symposium provided an avenue for communicating with key foreign government officials and scholars involved in molding policy and public opinion regarding regional security. Sixteen specialists from ten countries participated in the Symposium. On 9 September the members received a USCINCPAC PAU briefing in the Command Center Briefing Room (CCBR), followed by a Vision Brief hosted by Admiral Larson. On 18 September, a POW/MIA Day Remembrance and Commemoration Ceremony was held at Camp H.M. Smith's Bordelon Field. On 23 September, a Hong Kong television crew visited

[16]J0324 HistSum Jul 92 (U).
[17]J0324 HistSum Aug 92 (U), USCINCPAC 180152Z Aug 92 (U), USCINCPAC 260235Z Aug 92 (U).

Hawaii to film a segment of "Enjoy Yourself Tonight". Producers, accompanied by military escorts filmed the exterior of the USCINCPAC and CINCPACFLT headquarters buildings. They intended to highlight international business opportunities available in Hawaii, including those involved with the defense industry.[18]

• On 9 October, the Japan Defense Society (JDS) received a USCINCPAC PAU briefing hosted by LTG Fields. The JDS was composed of senior leaders of key Japanese defense industries. JDS played a very important role in COMUSJAPAN's community relations. Hawaii was the first stop on a two-week tour of the U.S. during which the JDS learned more about the relationships between the U.S. and Japan on bilateral mutual defense and on global issues. On 10-11 October, the 1992 Outrigger Top Gun Hydrofest, a hydroplane race, was held in Pearl Harbor. The event was supported by the Pacific Fleet Band and Joint Service Color Guard. On 20 October, Brig Gen W. Thomas West, USAF, provided a USCINCPAC PAU briefing to the Aiea-Pearl City Business Association (APCBA) in the CCBR. The APCBA consisted of 40 independent small businesses and financial institution managers who had actively supported the military. On 22 October, Brig Gen West, USAF, provided a USCINCPAC PAU briefing to the Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce.[19]

• On 10 November, LtCol Kenneth Gershaneck, USMC, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD), conducted meetings on preparing Public Affairs (PA) guidance, the Department of Defense (DOD) media pool, recent developments in PA doctrine, and the real-life requirements of DOD PA. Various ceremonies were conducted on 11 November in observation of Veterans Day. A Joint Service Color Guard supported the events at Punchbowl, the Hawaii State Veterans Cemetery, and the Wahiawa

[18]J0324 HistSum Sep 92 (U).
[19]J0324 HistSum Oct 92 (U).

Veterans Day parade. Between 18-21 November, 268 members of the Associated Press Managing editors held a convention in Honolulu. To increase their awareness of USCINCPAC, the editors were the guests of USCINCPAC for a "Day at Pearl Harbor" on 20 November. The day included a luncheon at which Admiral Larson was keynote speaker.[20]

• On 4 December, Mr. George Cramer, Senior Vice Commander in Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars, visited Hawaii and received at USCINCPAC PAU briefing in the CCBR. Beginning at 0730 on 7 December, the National Park Service conducted a ceremony at the USS Arizona Visitor Center to commemorate the 51st Anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Later that evening, the Aloha Chapter of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association held a Sunset Service at the USS Arizona Memorial. On 15 December, Professors Chris Roman and Robert Neilson of National Defense University received a USCINCPAC PAU briefing, with particular focus on Japan and Singapore issues, in the CCBR. On 28 December, the Hawaii WWII Commemorative Community Flag Presentation was held in the Public Chambers of the Governor's Office. Admiral Larson presented Governor Waihee with a number of items and documents designating Hawaii as the nation's first WWII Commemorative Community State.

[20]J0324 HistSum Dec 92 (U).

SECTION V-INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

Security Assistance Organization, Singapore

(FOUO) From 15-17 January 1992, the USCINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) assessed security assistance sales and training programs management as conducted by the Security Assistance Organization (SAO), Singapore. The investigators found that SAO Singapore was effective overall, and particularly active in resolving Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. However, they felt case management could be enhanced by encouraging the Government of Singapore to participate more frequently in Program Management Reviews. The PEG also found that SAO Singapore had attained an excellent 99.9% obligation rate in closing the FY91 T-20 budget. The PEG likewise found SAO Singapore had managed its training program superbly. The PEG emphasized the importance of maintaining the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program despite the small number of students who had received professional military training under IMET. The primary purpose of providing IMET was to allow Singapore to use the IMET rate when paying for its training needs rather than the full foreign military sales rate. This concession was a key element in securing Singapore's cooperation in accessing facilities and other matters of interest to the U.S. Government.[21]

U.S. Defense Attaché Office, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea

(FOUO) Between 16-18 March, the USCINCPAC PEG assessed the management of security assistance sales and training programs as conducted by the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO), Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (PNG). The PEG reported that although progress had been made, further improvements were necessary. The

[21]USCINCPAC IG Ltr Ser 008-92 (FOUO), 12 Feb 92, Subj: Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Report on the Security Assistance Organization (SAO), Singapore.

PEG found neither current nor imminent FMS purchases. They discovered a total of $2,500 available from a previous FMS order and suggested the fund might be used to start an FMS publications case in support of the PNG Defense Force training establishment.[22]

(FOUO) The PEG found USDAO PNG had a very low obligation rate through mid-year FY92. USDAO PNG had received an extra $16,500 in FY92 T-20 funds in November 1991 to hire a foreign national to administer the security assistance program. Since they had been unable to find a qualified employee, they were unable to obligate the funds. The PEG mentioned the possibility of obtaining a noncommissioned officer (NCO) billet with the caveat that housing costs for an NCO would cost approximately $56,000 more in T-20 funds.

(FOUO) The training management program was marginally effective but as in 1991, planning and program development remained unsatisfactory. Chief criticisms were lack of detail in the Two-Year Training Plans and lack of host-country input in identifying training needs. The PEG made many recommendations, but first and foremost, recommended the USDAO PNG formalize program development procedures with host-country personnel by writing an overview. The overview was to include a list of milestones requiring host-nation input. The PEG also recommended that USDAO's Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) and Two-Year Training Plan reflect host-country requirements.

Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

(FOUO) The PEG conducted an evaluation of the security assistance sales and training programs managed by the Joint U.S.

[22]USCINCPAC IG Ltr Ser 030-92 (FOUO), 7 Apr 92, Subj: Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Report of the United States Defense Attache Office Administration of Security Assistance Programs.

Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) from 23 April to 2 May 1992. The PEG rated JUSMAGTHAI effective in its administration of security assistance programs in Thailand.[23]

(FOUO) The PEG found the documents on the JUSMAGTHAI $2.5 billion FMS program management reflected excellent communication links between JUSMAGTHAI, the MILDEP international logistics agencies, and the Royal Thai Armed Forces. JUSMAGTHAI attained a 98% level in actual obligations of its T-20 funds by mid-FY92.

(FOUO) There had been no IMET funding for Thailand since the February 1991 coup. IMET program planning had continued with the expectation of reinstatement as a result of national elections in April 92. The PEG stated the Joint Training Branch needed to receive direct feedback from joint exercises conducted with U.S. Forces in order to identify training which will increase Thai operability with U.S. Forces.

(FOUO) The evaluators judged that JUSMAGTHAI had greatly improved its management of Military Assistance Program (MAP) materials since the FY90 PEG evaluation. JUSMAGTHAI had been especially successful in reducing the number of incidents of non-approved cannibalization of MAP material.

(FOUO) The PEG noted that JUSMAGTHAI was pursuing overall restructuring and in conjunction, USCINCPAC had conducted an extensive manpower survey which suggested a reorganization along functional lines.

Exercise TANDEM THRUST 92

(U) The IG team, led by the Deputy Inspector General, evaluated TANDEM THRUST 92 in progress, 1-24 July. The overall

[23]USCINCPAC IG Ltr Ser 043-92 (FOUO), 2 Jun 92, Subj: Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Report on the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI).

planning effort and coordination between the crisis action team, Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), and components exceeded past efforts, despite several complications.

(U) The exercise site presented some problems for the planners. The scope of the Los Angeles Traffic Control Area caused numerous difficulties in scheduling flights and preparing an air tasking order. Large over-water flight areas were available only to the south-west of San Diego and over-land areas were time sensitive due to altitude reservations. In addition, the environmental protection regulations in force at Camp Pendleton made exercise planning more difficult and the beach landing portion of the exercise less realistic. For instance, the Landing Craft Air Cushion could not use the beach. Instead, they had to land at the Assault Craft Landing Unit Five boat ramp.

(U) The IG pointed out that RIMPAC 92 was run concurrently with TANDEM THRUST 92. The IG felt there was effectively no reason to link RIMPAC to TANDEM THRUST and that combining the exercise caused USS KITTY HAWK to move unrealistically in both exercises. The IG also stated that use of notional forces in a Field Training exercise (FTX) presented problems in both force employment and safety and that experience had shown that notional play was not well understood below the CJTF level.

(U) Command, Control, and Communications systems were highly reliable. The addition of super high frequency was particularly beneficial since it spread the communications load among several systems and allowed near instantaneous communications.

(U) The IG recommended that USCINCPAC produce a written guide or instruction for the two-tiered concept, including the CINC's vision, command relationships, and the functions and

products required of each group. The IG also recommended development of an instruction on Joint Exercise Control Group procedures and establishment of a permanent core of people to set up exercise control groups.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)

(U) The USCINCPAC Deputy Inspector General conducted a Nuclear Command and Control Inspection of the CINCPACFLT Commander Center from 31 August through 4 September 1992. CINCPACFLT had improved its Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), two-person inventory control, emergency action team performance and Naval Telecommunications Center (NTCC) emergency destruction plan. Its COMSEC Account procedures for management, administration and storage of two-person control material were rated excellent. The combat reporting of serious incidents and events also received a high rating. The IG noted some problems in the area of Emergency Power Plant Uninterrupted Power Supply testing, NTCC emergency evacuation plan, PRP medical clinic notification, and the recurring training program. Overall, command center operations had improved.[24]

Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO), Japan

(FOUO) The IG and the PEG conducted an evaluation during 14-18 September of MDAO's security assistance programs. The PEG considered the organization "outstanding"; however, they did mention several items which they felt were cause for concern. Key items and their respective recommendations for improvement were:[25]

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[24]USCINCPAC IG Ltr Ser 35 (U), 17 Sep 92, Subj: Report of Nuclear Command and Control Inspection, Encl (1) Executive Summary.

[25]USCINCPAC IG Ltr Ser 087-92 (FOUO)., 30 Nov 92, Subj: Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO), Japan .

• In the Mission, Organization, and Manning area, the evaluators felt the imminent retirement of two local national service program managers was the most critical problem since their departure would create a great loss of expertise and corporate knowledge. The positions would be filled but it appeared that trained replacements were difficult to find. One of the PEG recommendations stated that MDAO should continue recruiting efforts but should reevaluate the qualifications of the position and possibly lower or eliminate some of them.

• In Service Division Programs, the PEG reported that MDAO officers felt the security assistance training they received prior to arrival in Japan was inadequate. The PEG also found that MDAO Japan was providing Pricing and Availability (P&A) data to the Government of Japan (GOJ) without the required disclaimer that such data does not constitute a promise or commitment on the part of the U.S. Government. The PEG recommended giving officers assigned to MDAO additional informal and off-line training. This training could be conducted during breaks or after the normal class day. The PEG also recommended that MDAO screen P&A data for the requisite disclaimer before forwarding to the GOJ. They also recommended that if the disclaimer is not included as part of the P&A data, MDAO should add it.

• In the Personnel Services/Quality of Life area, high housing and utilities costs remained a major concern for both military and DOD civilian employees. The rules governing Overseas Housing Allowances (OHA) and rental agreement rules enforced by Japanese landlords created a precarious financial situation for MDAO personnel. The PEG recommended MDAO ensure periodic surveys and reports of living expenses are correct and complete. A second recommendation was that MDAO conduct a market survey of rents for suitable housing within a 30-minute commute of the U.S. Embassy and submit the results to the Per Diem,

Travel, and Transportation Allowance Committee (PDTATAC) so that PDTATAC could reconsider raising the rent ceiling for Tokyo to allow MDAO personnel to live closer to their workplace. The PEG also recommended that whenever a lease is renewed or the second year's rent for a two-year lease is paid, MDAO coordinate with PDTATAC to ensure rental allowance ceilings are adjusted to accommodate fluctuating exchange rates.

(FOUO) Overall, the PEG found the MDAO was performing effectively and efficiently. The recommendations in their reports were intended to improve what was already an outstanding organization.

Exercise TEMPO BRAVE 92

(U) The PEG visited Yokosuka from 15-25 September to observe COMSEVENTHFLT and Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) participation in Exercise TEMPO BRAVE. The exercise was proved to be very realistic and challenging as the participants had to deal with miscommunications, operational control (OPCON) transfer, two-tiered C2 Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and preparation for noncombatant evacuation operations. By design, the DJTFAC members were used primarily in the future operations arena. TEMPO BRAVE 92 made full use of the cell.[26]

Exercise BALIKATAN 92

(U) The IG team was TDY in the Philippines from 12 October through 1 November to evaluate Exercise BALIKATAN 92 which was held 15-31 October. Exercise BALIKATAN implemented a combined task force (CTF) concept instead of a parallel command structure. The IG team found the CTF format produced positive

[26]IG/SSS/5040/100-92 (U), 8 Oct 92, Subj: PEG Japan Inspection and Observation of Exercise TEMPO BRAVE 92.

results overall, with one exception. There was minimal joint logistic cell (C4) integration with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) counterparts. C4 did not develop a logistics data base and leadership was not effectively exercised. With base closures in the Philippines imminent, War Reserve Material management procedures and other pending political were not discussed.[27]

(U) Intelligence, operations, air operations, marine operations, and civilian military operations (CMO) were successful in training efforts. During the five-day Medical/Dental Civic Action Program, the CMO segment treated 4,253 patients. In the cross-training area, the IG noted in their report that U.S. personnel felt they had received more knowledge and techniques than the AFP forces had received.

(U) Overall, the IG team found Exercise BALIKATAN 92 was successful in improving combined interoperability and U.S.-AFP combat readiness.

[27]IG/SSS/5000/132-92 (U), 17 Dec 92, Subj: Trip Report-Exercise BALIKATAN 92.

SECTION VI--MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and Army Surgeon General Visit.

(U) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. Enrique Mendez, and the Army Surgeon General, LTG Frank G. Ledford, Jr., USA, visited USPACOM medical facilities between 11-26 February. Dr. Mendez and LTG Ledford visited medical treatment facilities in Alaska, South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. At all sites, they were briefed on peacetime and medical readiness issues, such as medical construction needs and medical resource requirements. In Hawaii, Dr. Mendez presented the keynote address at the USCINCPAC Surgeon's Conference on 24 February.[28]

Pacific Command Joint Regulating Office and Defense Medical Regulating Information System

(U) On 21 August, the USPACOM Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO) ceased operating from Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. On Monday, 24 August, the JMRO began functioning from its new location at Yokota AB. The JMRO was linked with ten medical treatment facility (MTF) sites via the Defense Medical Regulating Information System (DMRIS).[29]

(U) DMRIS was installed at ten USPACOM MTFs during August and September. This system provided modern and effective communications technology that linked all the MTFs with the JMRO and the 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (9 AES), Yokota AB, Japan. The system permitted electronic transmission of essential, detailed medical information from the MTF to JMRO and

[28]J072 HistSum Feb 92 (U).
[29]J0712 HistSum Aug 92 (U), J07 Annual HistSum 92 (U).

9 AES. Prior to implementation of DMRIS, information was communicated via telephone, telefax, or message. Personnel from JMRO, J07, Defense Medical Systems Support Center, and the contractor, Electronic Data Services, worked for over a year to implement DMRIS. This new system ensured that patients were routinely channeled to the MTF best situated and equipped located to meet their medical needs. Using DMRIS, JMRO processed 850 patients monthly.

(U) On 1 October, 9 AES was reassigned from the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC) to Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). 9 AES was the sole aeromedical evacuation squadron in USPACOM and routinely conducted aeromedical evacuation missions in C-9A and C-141B aircraft. 9 AES had been assigned to Military Airlift Command (MAC) and its successor, AMC, since 1976.[30]

Family Advocacy

(U) From 24-26 August, the Surgeon's office sponsored a three day conference on Trauma Assessment in Child Sexual Abuse. Participants included military family advocacy therapists, as well as legal, medical, and criminal justice professionals. Tripler Army Medical Center's secondary prevention program, A Solid Parenting Experience Through Community Teaching and Support (ASPECTS), was cited as a model for assisting families in need.

Hurricane INIKI

(U) Hurricane INIKI devastated the Hawaiian island of Kauai on 11 September. The next day, USCINCPAC sent a representative to Kauai to assist Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) members in establishing post-Hurricane INIKI relief priorities. USCINCPAC then quickly established Joint Task Force

[30]J073 HistSum Aug 92 (U).

Hawaii and managed a number of joint medical support programs including deployment of military medical teams and providing medical supplies to the FEMA Disaster Medical Assistance Teams.[31]

Biological Safety Level 3 Laboratory

(U) The U.S. Army had planned to close and relocate the Biological Safety Level 3 Laboratory (BSL-3) in Seoul, Korea in spring 1993. BSL-3 was a unique modular lab facility in which military researchers worked with highly infectious diseases. In late November, the Indonesian Ministry of Health requested American Embassy assistance in securing approval for relocation of the BSL-3 to Jakarta, Indonesia. The Indonesian Ministry of Health wanted to add the BSL-3 to the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2) in Jakarta. They felt the laboratory would improve NAMRU-2's capability for studying dangerous communicable diseases. However, in mid-December, the U.S. Army announced that Korea was the best location for the laboratory and the BSL-3 would remain in Korea until at least 1995.[32]

HIV/AIDS Issues-Thailand

(U) Although statistics were available only for 1989 and 1990, the data showed alarming increases in the number of HIV positive test results among high risk groups, i.e., drug users, prostitutes, inmates, and homosexual men. Among prostitutes in Bangkok, the rate increased from 3.1 percent in June 1989 to 20.6 percent in December 1990. HIV positivity rates of 67 percent were reported in other parts of the country. The USCINCPAC Surgeon warned that U.S. military personnel in Thailand were at considerable risk of HIV infection through contacts with prostitutes. The U.S. Army was cooperating with the Royal Thai Army (RTA) in conducting a major serological survey in RTA

[31]J0711 HistSum Sep 92 (U).
[32]AMEMB JAKARTA 300942Z Nov 92 (U), USCINCPAC 081030Z Dec 92 (U), CJCS 182315Z Dec 92 (U).

recruits and soldiers which will provide more definitive and reliable statistics in the next one or two years. Thailand had also been selected to participate in World Health Organization (WHO) sponsored vaccine trials. The U.S. Army, WHO, U.S. Centers for Disease Control, and various Thai public health organizations were scheduled for involvement in these trials.[33]

Key Personnel Changes

(U) Col Ralph Elikan, USAF, Chief, Medical Plans and Programs Division, departed in June and was replaced by Col Ken J. Mackie, USAF, in July. MAJ Richard G. McAdam, USA, head of the Logistics Planning Branch, departed in June and was replaced by MAJ Walter H. Orthner, USA, in July. COL Scottie T. Hooker, USA, Deputy Surgeon, retired in December. His programmed replacement, COL Hal R. Blair, USA, was scheduled to arrive in April 1993 from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

[33]J071 Point Paper , 5 May 92 (U).

CHAPTER VIII

SELECTED CHRONOLOGY 1992

(U) This unclassified chronology was compiled primarily from Current History, Foreign Affairs, Department of State Dispatch, wire service clips, newspapers, and messages for 1992. Although many of the events were outside USCINCPAC's assigned area of responsibility, all either directly or indirectly affected the U.S. military force posture and/or political relationships in USPACOM and are therefore included. Important events from 1942 are also included in recognition of the 50th Anniversary commemorations.

JANUARY

01 The U.S. Pacific Command was activated on this date in 1947.

04 President Bush announced lifting of the 16-year-old trade embargo against Cambodia. It was imposed when the Khmer Rouge came to power in April 1975.

Singapore announced that it had agreed in principle to accept the relocation of the Navy's logistics command then located at Subic Bay. The announcement stirred suspicions in Malaysia and Indonesia.

06 President Bush visited U.S troops at Camp Casey, Korea, headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Division.

07 The government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) formally announced that Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 92 was canceled. All deployments, preparations, and execution of planned events ceased.

Imelda Marcos announced that she would run for president of the Philippines in elections scheduled for May.

08 Yasushi Akashi, a 61-year-old Japanese national, was named to head the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was to be the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping operation.

13 Mongolia, formerly known as the Mongolian People's Republic, adopted a new constitution and changed its name to the State of Mongolia.

16 A U-2R reconnaissance aircraft was lost during a flight over South Korea. The body of the pilot was recovered the next day about 15 miles off the eastern coast town of Kojin, well south of the seaward extension of the border between South and North Korea. The aircraft was operated by Det 2, 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, based at Osan AB.

17 Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa formally apologized to the Korean people for wrongdoings committed by the Japanese army during its colonial rule of Korea, including the army's forcing of Korean women into prostitution during World War II.

An American businessman, Michael Barnes, was kidnapped at gun point in Makiti, Manila.

Military banking activities located in Japan and Guam changed their name from Fort Sam Houston to NationsBank after a merger of the North Carolina National Bank Corporation and Citizens & Southern/Sovran banks.

22 An F-16C assigned to the 13 FS/432 FW, Misawa AB, Japan, crashed 550 NM east of Japan following a mid-air collision with a KC-135R tanker during refueling operations. The pilot was safely recovered by a Japan Maritime Safety Agency aircraft after almost five hours in the water.

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center was disestablished and Joint Task Force-Full Accounting was established. Its purpose was to expand and accelerate operations to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for in SEA.

25 Midway Island was first shelled by a Japanese submarine on this date in 1942.

The U.S. team that conducted Joint Field Activity 92-2L in Laos was redeployed to Bangkok after completing their activities. The team recovered remains from one grave site.

28 In his State of the Union message, President Bush proposed that the CIS and the U.S. eliminate all land-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles and that the U.S. reduce by about one-third the number of warheads on sea-based missiles.

30 At headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, North Korea signed the nuclear safeguards accord allowing international inspection of its nuclear complexes.

31 The Grumman Iron Works delivered the last production A-6E INTRUDER, ending over 31 years of production. A total of 708 A-6s were built for the Navy and Marines.

FEBRUARY

06 MG Robert L. Ord III assumed command of the 25th Infantry Division (Light), replacing MG Fred A. Gorden.

10 The first meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was held on this date in 1942. The meeting was held in the South Interior Building on Constitution Avenue, Washington, DC.

14-18 JFA 92-3L was conducted in Savannakhet Province, Laos.

15 Singapore surrendered to Japanese forces under General Tomoyuki Yamashita on this date in 1942. There were over 64,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops under British command in Singapore.

16 "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il, son of North Korea's "Great Leader" Kim Il-sung, marked his 50th birthday. The younger Kim had been named as eventual successor in what would be the communist world's first hereditary succession.

19 On this date in 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing the internment of Japanese aliens and Japanese-American citizens.

Japanese carrier-based aircraft attacked Darwin, Australia, on this date in 1942 in the greatest single Japanese air effort since the attack on Pearl Harbor. They inflicted heavy damage to shipping and aircraft, including the sinking of a U.S. destroyer.

20 Feb-20 Mar The 16th joint field activity (JFA) was conducted in Vietnam by JTF-FA and their Vietnamese counterparts.

21 USS BRUNSWICK (ATS 3) departed Subic Bay with ADEPT (AFDL 23), the first of three auxiliary floating drydocks located at Subic, in tow bound for Guam. Numerous media agencies were present for the departure of the dry dock. BRUNSWICK arrived in Guam on 6 March.

25 Det Four, JTF-FA, stood up in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Its first permanent commander arrived on 12 November 1992.

26 On this date in 1942, the seaplane tender USS LANGLEY (AV-3), was sunk by Japanese aircraft enroute to Java with a load of 32 P-40 fighters. LANGLEY served as the Navy's first aircraft carrier (CV-1) from 20 March 1922 to 26 February 1937.

27 Feb-23 Mar — The second JFA in Cambodia, first for 1992, was conducted with U.S. helicopter support—the first employment of U.S. helicopters in SEA POW/MIA operations since 1973.

28 — The UN Security Council unanimously authorized a $1.9-billion peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. Under the plan, a 22,000-member force was to be deployed by August to disarm the four fighting factions.

MARCH

01 USS HOUSTON (CA 30) was lost on this date in 1942. The cruiser and the British cruiser HMS PERTH were sunk during a night action with a superior Japanese surface force in the Battle of Sunda Strait.

02 San Marino and eight former Soviet republics were admitted to the UN, bringing the number of members to 175.

04-05 The Vietnamese government committed to a five-point program with the potential to enhance significantly POW/MIA operations and lead to improved relations.

06 A USMC AV-8B HARRIER crashed in a palm oil estate in southern Malaysia. The aircraft departed Singapore enroute home station at Iwakuni MCAS and reported engine trouble 10 minutes after takeoff. The pilot ejected safely and was recovered unharmed.

07 U.S. forces arrived in New Caledonia on this date in 1942.

08-13 The USARPAC-sponsored Tropical Medicine Seminar was held in Bangkok, Thailand.

10 CILHI announced the identification of the remains of Lt Col Howard K. Williams, USAF, lost on 18 Mar 68 in North Vietnam.

11 An SH-60B helicopter assigned to USS FLETCHER (DD 992) struck an uncharted copper wire during terrain flight training on Oahu. The aircraft was at 150 feet AGL on a nap-of-the-earth (NOE) route. Only minor damage was reported.

12 The first contingent of UNTAC peacekeeping troops, 230 Indonesian soldiers, arrived in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

14 The Soviet Communist party's official newspaper, Pravda, suspended publication. The paper resumed publication on 7 April.

15 UNTAC head Yasushi Akashi arrived in Phnom Penh to take charge of the massive operation to restore democracy in Cambodia.

16 Headquarters JTF-FA relocated from NAS Barbers Point to Bldg 20, Camp H. M. Smith.

17 In ceremonies in Korea, a memorandum of agreement was signed by the ROK and U.S. transferring operation of the Trans-Korea Pipeline to the ROK. Actual turnover took place in June 1992.

18 Philippine police rescued an American businessman, Michael Barnes, held captive by kidnappers since 17 January.

20 Fire destroyed the main MWR warehouse at Naval Station Subic Bay. The building and contents were a total loss.

28 Mar-6 Apr JFA 92-4L was conducted in Laos. Probable human remains associated with one case were recovered, and the team doctor treated approximately 350 Lao villagers.

24 The United States and 23 other countries signed the Treaty on Open Skies in Helsinki, Finland. Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia of the former Soviet Union were among the signatories. The treaty was expected to enter into force in July 1993.

President Bush decided to open diplomatic relations with Georgia, the last of the 12 new states of the FSU to be accorded such ties.

The Pacific Theater was established as an area of U.S. responsibility by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this date in 1942.

25 A group of Korean students demonstrating against election results and tuition increases turned violent and threw approximately 20 Molotov cocktails over the main gate of Hannam Village U.S. military housing area. One government quarters and a bus stop shelter were damaged, and the MP on duty received minor injuries from shattered glass.

26 The first group of 527 Cambodian refugees returned to their homeland in the UNHCR program to return all 375,000 people who fled the 13-year war in Cambodia.

Kuhio Day was celebrated in Hawaii. State, city, and county offices and schools were closed. Federal workers reported to work.

USS BRUNSWICK (ATS 3) departed Subic Bay with AFDB 8 (an unnamed large drydock) in tow enroute Pearl Harbor. After an interim stop at Kwajalein Atoll, she arrived in Hawaii on 23 May.

26 The Navy Act creating the U.S. Navy was passed on this date in 1794

26-28 The first session of the U.S.-Russia POW/MIA Commission was held in Moscow.

27 The Vietnamese government released remains alleged to be of three Americans to a joint JTF-FA/CILHI repatriation team in Hanoi.

28 A CH-46 helicopter from USS DULUTH (LPD 6) crashed in the Indian Ocean following an inflight explosion. Of the 18 personnel aboard the helicopter, 14 were recovered, 5 of whom suffered burns.

29 American Peace Corps volunteers returned to the Philippines to resume the program suspended in June 1990. All Peace Corps personnel were removed from the country after communist rebels planned to kidnap or kill Americans assigned to remote villages.

31 The 9th Airborne Command and Control Squadron and the USCINCPAC Airborne Command Post known as BLUE EAGLE were inactivated, ending 27 years of service with USCINCPAC.

APRIL

01 In ceremonies at Hickam AFB, the 9th Airborne Command and Control Squadron (9 ACCS) was inactivated. The squadron operated the CINC's airborne command post, which ceased operations the same date.

05 Narong Wongwan, prime ministerial choice of the five pro-military parties that won a majority in the 22 March elections, was dropped from consideration. The U.S. State Department refused him a visa last year because of suspicions he was involved in narcotics trafficking. He was named one of five deputy prime ministers later in the month.

06 The Russian Congress of People's Deputies opened its first session since the creation of the CIS in December 1991.

07 General Suchinda Kraprayoon resigned as army commander and became prime minister of Thailand two days after being named by the five pro-military political parties that garnered the most votes in 22 March elections.

09 On this date in 1942, over 70,000 men of the Luzon Force on Bataan surrendered to the Japanese, and the grim march of the prisoners from Balanga to San Fernando followed.

11 USS MIDWAY (CV 41) decommissioned at NAS North Island. The guest list included over 250 Japanese nationals. The carrier was built at Newport News, and commissioned on 10 September 1945. Homeported at Yokosuka, Japan, since 1973, she was replaced by INDEPENDENCE (CV 62).

14-27 JFA 92-3C was conducted in Cambodia, again with support of two U.S. helicopters from the 25th ID(L). No remains were located.

15 North Korea's "Great Leader" Kim Il-sung celebrated his 80th birthday.

Vietnam adopted a revised constitution that provided for private enterprise and less government control over the economy, and specifically allowed foreign investors to join with state and private enterprises. It also provided for increased rule by law instead of party policy.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet was established on this date in 1897.

18 USS BEAUFORT (ATS 2) departed Subic Bay towing RESOURCEFUL (AFDB 5), a medium auxiliary floating dry dock, bound for Yokosuka, Japan, with a brief stop at Okinawa enroute. BEAUFORT arrived Yokosuka on 00 May.

On this date in 1942, Lt Col James H. Doolittle led the attack on Tokyo and other cities in Japan by a force of 16 B-25 MITCHELL bombers launched from USS HORNET (CV 8). HORNET was lost at the Battle of Santa Cruz Island on 26 October 1942.

20 At a ceremony in Phnom Penh, the leaders of the four factions signed sections of the International Bill of Human Rights. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presided.

20 Apr-20 May JTF-FA conducted the 17th JFA in Vietnam. Twelve sets of remains were recovered. One team was stopped by bandits in Tien Phuoc District south of Da Nang, and released only after their Vietnamese counterparts paid ransom.

22-24 USCINCPAC hosted the 1992 Civil-Military Operations conference at Camp Smith and Hickam AFB. Over 70 people attended, representing the USPACOM-oriented CA and PSYOP communities.

23 The 100th voluntary UN repatriation flight to Vietnam flew to Ho Chi Minh City with 126 Vietnamese, bringing to more than 17,000 the number of voluntary returnees. The boat people had been housed in detention centers in Hong Kong.

24 Apr-2 May The Pacific Armies Reserve Component Seminar was conducted in Honolulu, Hawaii. The event was sponsored by USCINCPAC.

27 Apr-2 May The 21st Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS XXI) was held in Cairns, Australia. The annual conference was sponsored by USCINCPAC/J41. All 13 member nations attended.

29 The United States authorized commercial sales of food and other necessities to Vietnam, relaxing an embargo imposed on North Vietnam in 1964 and extended to the south in 1975.

MAY

01 $80,000 was stolen from the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base Exchange by an off-duty DOD police officer and an Exchange cashier. The police officer was indicted on 24 May by a federal grand jury on five counts, including theft of the money and kidnapping of the cashier, who remained missing.

Disestablishment of Fleet Composite Squadron (VC) 5 was marked in ceremonies at NAS Cubi Point. The squadron had moved to Cubi in January 1978, and was first formed as Utility Squadron (VU) 5 on 16 August 1950 at NAS Agana.

05 Russia announced the ruble would be fully convertible by 1 August at a single exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar.

Japanese forces landed on Corregidor on this date in 1942.

06 Transfer of all tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia was confirmed by CIS and Ukrainian military commanders. Russia was the only CIS member with battlefield nuclear weapons.

All U.S. forces in the Philippines surrendered to the Japanese on this date in 1942.

07 Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a Decree of Establishment for the Russian armed forces. They included all military units located in Russia, and retained the basic structure of the previous Soviet armed forces.

08 The Battle of the Coral Sea was fought on this date in 1942. This was the first major naval engagement conducted entirely by carrier aircraft, and turned back the Japanese from Port Moresby. USS LEXINGTON (CV-2) was lost in the battle, and USS YORKTOWN (CV 5) damaged. Coral Sea actions began with a raid on Tulagi by aircraft from YORKTOWN on 4 May.

11 National elections were held in the Philippines. Some 87,000 candidates vied for 17,000 positions.

Demonstrators in Bangkok suspended a week-long peaceful protest in return for support for constitutional amendments to increase the power of elected officials and requiring the prime minister be an elected member of the National Assembly.

Following State Department lifting of the ban on telephone service to Vietnam, GTE Hawaiian Telephone announced direct-dial international telephone service to that country.

USS NIMITZ (CVN 68), leadship of the class of the largest warships ever built, was launched at Newport News, VA, on this date in 1972. She was commissioned on 3 May 1975.

USCINCPAC issued a warning order for Operation FULL ACCOUNTING, the expanded FY 92 and FY 93 POW/MIA operations in SEA.

13 Fifteen caskets with the remains of UNC soldiers were passed to the UNC from the Korean People's Army at Panmunjom. A similar ceremony for another 15 remains was conducted on 28 May.

15 Administration of Okinawa reverted to Japan on this date in 1972.

Four ROK Army helicopters inadvertently crossed the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone. Warning shots were fired by guardpost on both sides of the DMZ, and one helicopter was hit by small arms fire. There were no injuries reported.

17-20 More than 150 people were reported injured when troops and police broke up a pro-democracy march in Bangkok, and the government declared a state of emergency. Over the next two days, troops fired indiscriminately into crowds, and the government acknowledged 40 deaths and 600 injuries. On 2the 20th, King Bhumibol Adulyadej summoned Suchinda and Chamlong Srimuang, the leader of the democracy movement, to Chitralada Palace, where they agreed to end the violence.

18 Exercise COBRA GOLD 92 was suspended except for civil affairs, military construction, and medical activities. The CPX portion of the exercise was completed prior to cancellation, and certain civil affairs, construction, and medical projects were continued.

20 President Bush declared a state of emergency in the Federated States of Micronesia as the result of a persistent drought. USCINCPAC was designated as the supported DOD agency to assist, and the relief mission lasted until 22 June.

22 An ROK Army patrol intercepted an armed North Korean patrol well south of the DMZ. Three of the North Korean infiltrators were killed and two ROK soldiers were wounded in the encounter. This was the first firefight along the border since March 1980.

Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ) 5 at NAS Agana, Guam, took delivery of its first ES-3A VIKING electronic reconnaissance aircraft, marking the types entry into operational service.

26-29 BITAC mid-term discussions were held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, between the United States and Malaysia.

26 May-15 Jun Conducted in Savannakhet Province, Laos, JFA 92-5L was hampered by adverse weather. No remains were recovered.

28 An MCAS Iwakuni FA-18 of VMFA(AW)-121 crashed in the Malaysian jungle approximately 30 NM northeast of Paya Labar, Singapore. The aircraft was damaged during inflight refueling from a KC-10 tanker, and was attempting to return to Paya Labar. Both crew members ejected, and the pilot was recovered in good condition. The body of the WSO was recovered the following day.

29 The Philippine Congress began the official count of ballots cast in the 11 May elections. The vote count was delayed by procedural delays and the laborious process of counting manually written ballots.

JUNE

01 Operational control of VQ 3, the TACAMO squadron based at NAS Barbers Point, shifted from USCINCPAC to Strategic Communications Wing (StratComWing) 1 at Tinker AFB, OK, coincident with the standup of the U.S. Strategic Command. The squadron was equipped with the E-6A MERCURY. At the same time, OPCON of PACFLT's fleet ballistic missile submarine force transferred to USCINCSTRAT.

Combatant command of all in-theater KC-135 tanker aircraft was transferred to USCINCPAC concurrent with the inactivation of the Strategic Air Command. Also, PACAF gained OPCON of all theater-based C-130 aircraft and elements of the Military Airlift Command's 834th Airlift Division was incorporated into the PACAF staff.

02 China was granted most favored nation trade status for another year by President Bush.

03 An F-15 based at Kadena AB, Okinawa, suffered extensive airframe damage after being over-stressed during a turn. The pilot apparently suffered G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC). The cockpit accelerometer recorded 12.5 G. The initial cost estimate for damages was $88,000.

03-04 On these dates in 1942, the Battle of Midway was fought. It was a decisive defeat for Japan and cost them the initiative in the Pacific. The Japanese lost four carriers--KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYU--while managing to sink one U.S. carrier, YORKTOWN.

03-10 Pacific Armies Management Seminar XV, sponsored by USARPAC, was held in Hawaii. Representatives from 29 Asian-Pacific nations participated in the event.

04 Vietnam announced the release of the last of 100,000 South Vietnamese officials held in reeducation camps since 1975. Most were released in the 1980s.

04 In the Philippines, President Aquino declared a state of calamity in the region near Mt. Pinatubo on Luzon. Heavy monsoon rains caused extensive damage from flooding and lahars.

07 On this date in 1942, Japanese forces invaded the western Aleutian Islands, landing on Attu and Kiska.

09 National elections were held in Indonesia. President Suharto's party won by a lopsided margin.

10 Anand Panyarachun was appointed interim prime minister of Thailand.

A $4.2-million contract for the Spark Matsunaga Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, to be built adjacent to Tripler AMC, was awarded to a Hawaii firm.

10-26 JFA 92-4C, the third for the year in Cambodia, was conducted. Helicopter support was provided by USMC CH-46s from Okinawa.
Bone fragments were recovered from an OH-6 crash site, and the team doctor treated 320 local villagers.

13 In accordance with the second phase of the UN peace plan, guerrillas from three of the antigovernment factions in Cambodia began reporting to UN Transitional Authority cantonments. The Khmer Rouge refused to take part as it claimed not all Vietnamese troops had left the country.

14 The first echelon of the 1st Marine Division arrived in New Zealand on this date in 1942.

The U.S. Army celebrated its 218th anniversary on this date. The Continental Congress voted to establish a national army, the Continental Army, on this date in 1775.

15 The Japanese Diet approved a bill allowing troop deployments abroad to participate in peacekeeping operations. The vote was 329 to 17, and came after two years of debate.

17-19 The tenth meeting of the Pacific Command, Control, and Communications Architecture Committee (PC3AIC) was hosted by USCINCPAC/J6.

19 Jun-19 Jul The 18th JFA in Vietnam was conducted. Two members of one team were asked to leave the country after taking a photograph of a picture of Ho Chi Minh in Quang Binh Province.

22 A joint session of the Philippine Congress declared General Fidel Ramos the winner of last month's presidential election with 23.5% of the vote.

23 Memorial Day was observed on Okinawa to honor all those killed during the fighting on the island in World War II. The Japanese forces on Okinawa surrendered on this date in 1945.

25 Eight acres at Ripsaw Range burned after an F-16 dropped practice ordnance short of the target but on range property. The range is located some 12 NM north of Misawa AB, Japan.

North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea on this date in 1950, beginning a war that was to last over three years.

26 The remains of a USAF pilot were recovered from a mountainous area in northern Japan. Most of the skeleton, the ejection seat, and personal effects were recovered. The remains were sent to the USA Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI).

Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III resigned to take responsibility for the alleged sexual assault of 26 at a convention of naval aviators held by the Tailhook Association.

27 The 18th Wing commander on Okinawa declared Tropical Cyclone COR 1 due to the approach of Typhoon BOBBIE. Large aircraft had already been evacuated. The storm brought maximum winds of 81 knots, but no significant damage was suffered by island military installations.

28 In parliamentary elections in Mongolia, members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary party, the former Communist party, won 70 of 76 seats in the unicameral legislature.

30 Fidel Ramos was sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines in ceremonies in Manila.

Arvey Duane Drown, an American citizen held captive by communist rebels in the Philippines since October 1990, was released unharmed in Cagayan Province. He was the last American held hostage by the rebels.

The Coast Guard LORAN-C station on Kure Island terminated operations. Kure, the westernmost of the Hawaiian Islands, was to be turned over to the state in 1993 as a wildlife refuge.

JULY

01 JCS directed the transfer of OPCON for reconnaissance missions in their AORs to the theater CINCs. Mission management was provided by the Commander, Task Force Battle Management in the Global Operations Center until the necessary agreements were signed.

02 President Bush announced that the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons announced in September 1991, was completed.

04 USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN-73) was commissioned at Norfolk, VA, sponsored by First Lady Barbara Bush. WASHINGTON was the sixth Nimitz-class nuclear powered aircraft carrier built.

06 Reversing previous denials, Japan stated that during World War II the government organized and ran brothels for soldiers.

07 Sean O'Keefe, formerly DOD Comptroller, became Acting Secretary of the Navy under a special 120-day Presidential appointment.

10-20 The fifth JFA in Laos for the year was JFA 92-6L, conducted in Savannakhet Province. No remains were located.

13 President Bush announced that the United States will no longer produce plutonium and enriched uranium for weapons.

15 The Democratic party selected Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton and Senator Albert Gore as the party's candidates for the 1992 presidential election.

20 At Camp Henry, Korea, the headquarters building of the 20th Support Group caught fire. It was a total loss.

21 The UN Security Council voted to halt all international aid to the Khmer Rouge, citing their repeated violations of the peace agreement in Cambodia.

A group of 236 Vietnamese refugees who returned to Hanoi from Hong Kong included the 20,000th boat person to return home voluntarily. Fewer than 50,000 boat people remained in Hong Kong refugee camps.

22 A disaster warranting U.S. assistance was declared in the Philippines in response to lahars caused by torrential rainfall along the slopes of Mt. Pinatubo. The situation began in June.

23 An airman was sentenced to death by a unanimous court-martial held at Andersen AFB, Guam, for the murder of another Air Force member in December 1991.

26 Vanuatu entered the television age with a live broadcast of the Barcelona Olympic games.

The National Security Act of 1947 created the U.S. Air Force as a separate service.

26-31 The Spectrum Management Conference, sponsored by USCINCPAC/J62, was held in Hawaii. Attendees discussed radio frequency management issues, policies, and procedures.

27 The armistice ending the fighting in Korea was signed on this date in 1953, ending over three years of war.

27-31 Held in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Pacific Area Military Police Expanded Relations Seminar was held to exchange information on Pacific region law enforcement and force protection issues. It was sponsored by USARPAC.

30 The Chemical Weapons Destruction Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Russia was signed and entered into force.

AUGUST

01 Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun dismissed Supreme Military Commander Kaset Rojananil and General Issarapong Noonpackdee, Army commander.

USS RANGER (CV 61) departed NAS North Island on her final WESTPAC deployment. She was scheduled for decommissioning in 1993.

02 Reversing U.S. policy, President Bush announced the intended sale of up to 150 F-16s to Taiwan. The announcement drew protests from China.

The last group of U.S. 167 dependents, along with 68 servicemen and 5 civilian employees, departed Subic Bay aboard a Hawaiian Airlines DC-8.

03 USCINCPAC's revised counterdrug strategy went into effect, with the Commander, JTF 5 the single point of contact for Pacific CD operations. The revised strategy shifted responsibility for ground CD operations from CDR USARPAC to CJTF 5, who was already the supported commander for air and maritime operations.

Remains alleged to be associated with seven cases of unaccounted for Americans were turned over to a repatriation team in Hanoi.

06 Okinawa went into Tropical Cyclone COR 1 for Typhoon JANIS. Large aircraft were evacuated on the 5th. Maximum winds of 50 knots were recorded, and no significant damage was experienced.

06-08 Typhoon JANIS continued north, and COR 1 was declared for the Kanto Plain on the 7th, and at Misawa AB on 8 August. JANIS passed with no significant impact on Japan.

07 The 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal on this date in 1942. They secured the beachhead and captured an airfield, later named Henderson Field.

08 Pakistan failed to obtain the release of 11 F-16s impounded by the U.S. under the Pressler amendment. Pakistan had already paid for the aircraft.

08-09 The Battle of Savo Island took place in 1942. A Japanese cruiser/ destroyer force attacked Allied warships off Savo Island in the Solomons and sank the U.S. cruisers ASTORIA (CA 34), QUINCY (CA 39), and VINCENNES (CA 44), and the Australian cruiser HMAS CANBERRA.

08-10 Wake Island was in Tropical Cyclone COR 1 for Typhoon SIBYL. Maximum sustained winds of 60 knots and gusts to 80 knots were experienced. Roofs were damaged, and water damage was inflicted by the six inches of rain received.

09 The 47th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki was commemorated. A crowd of 25,000 attended. Similar activities were held at Hiroshima on 6 August.

15 On this date in 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally, ending World War II.

18 Mt. Spurr, located some 70 NM west of Elmendorf AFB, erupted. The plume reached 35,000 feet, and Elmendorf was blanketed by a ¼-inch layer of ash.

18-29 The CPX portion of Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 92 was conducted in Korea. It was followed by a five-day FTX.

19 The Republican party selected President Bush and Vice President Quale as the party's candidates for the 1992 presidential election.

20 The first U.S. aircraft arrived for duty at Henderson Field on this date in 1942. The unit was MAG 23, with F4F-4 WILDCAT fighters and SBD-3 DAUGHTLESS dive bombers.

20 Aug-18 Sep The 19th JFA was conducted by JTF-FA in Vietnam

22 The 67th Fighter Squadron landed its P-400 fighters at Henderson Field on this date in 1942, the first Army Air Corps aircraft deployed to Guadalcanal.

22-30 JFA 92-7L was conducted in Savannakhet Province. The team encountered scattered munitions and adverse weather.

24 China and South Korea formally established diplomatic relations. At the same time, the ROK terminated relations with Taiwan. China maintained relations with North Korea.

Burma became the 170th country to accede to the 1949 Geneva war conventions.

27-28 Typhoon OMAR struck Guam straight on with maximum sustained winds of 110 knots, and gusts to 135. Extensive damage was inflicted throughout the island, including complete loss of electrical power and water supply. Two Navy vessels in Apra Harbor broke their moorings and went aground during the storm. USCINCPAC activated JTF Marianas under USCINCPACREP Guam, and a massive relief operation was conducted.

31 The 100,000th Cambodian refugee was repatriated from Thailand. A total of 1,332 Cambodians were repatriated on this date, bringing the total to 100,509 since the program began in March 1992.

SEPTEMBER

01-02 Okinawa was placed in Tropical Cyclone COR 2 due to the approach of Typhoon OMAR, which had devastated Guam a few days earlier. All large aircraft were evacuated. The storm turned away, and Okinawa resumed normal COR 4.

02 President Bush announced the sale of as many as 150 F-16A/B fighter aircraft to Taiwan, reversing almost 10 years of U.S. policy on arms sales to the island.

08-12 A five-member delegation from Laos visited USCINCPAC, JTF-FA, and CILHI for technical orientations.

08-26 The Symposium on East Asia Security (SEAS), sponsored by USCINCPAC and USIA, was a series of on-site briefings and seminars in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and the United States.

09 A planned visit to Japan and South Korea by Russian President Boris Yeltsin was postponed, evidently the result of a failure to negotiate a settlement of the dispute over the Northern Territories, a group of islands in the Kuril chain seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

The former DOD police officer accused of stealing $80,000 from the Navy Exchange on 1 May 1992 pleaded "no contest." A murder investigation was still pending.

In 1942 on this date, a Japanese aircraft launched from a submarine dropped an incendiary bomb on a mountain slope near Brookings, OR. This was the sole bombing of the continental United States during the war.

11 Hurricane INIKI roared through the Hawaiian Islands, causing extensive destruction on Kauai. Damages on Oahu was much less severe. USCINCPAC activated JTF Hawaii under LTG Johnnie H. Corns, CG, USARPAC, with overall responsibility for coordinating military support of relief efforts within the state. TF Garden Isle, commanded by BG Frank Akers, ADC, 25th ID(L), was responsible for relief efforts on Kauai.

13-19 The SOCPAC-sponsored Pacific Area Special Operations Conference was conducted in Honolulu, Hawaii. It was preceded by an Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC) conference at the same facilities.

16-20 A six-member delegation from the State of Cambodia visited USCINCPAC, JTF-FA, and CILHI for technical orientations.

17 For the first time in three months, the Khmer Rouge attended a UN military meeting in Cambodia.

20-23 USS McCLUSKY (FFG 41) and USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) conducted a port visit to Vladivostok to assist in opening the U.S. Consul General in that city.

21-24 Sponsored by the USCINCPAC/J06, the Military Operations and Law Conference was held in Honolulu, Hawaii. Focus of the conference was on counterdrug operations and environmental programs.

23 Chuan Leekpai accepted the post of prime minister of Thailand as leader of a coalition government. He took over from the interim appointed prime minister, Anan Panyarachun.

25 In the first deployment of Japanese ground troops outside the country since World War II, 600 soldiers of a planned contingent of 2,000 arrived in Cambodia to join the UN peacekeeping mission.

26 The last of 67,000 troops of the former Soviet Union were withdrawn from Mongolia.

In Myanmar (Burma), the ruling junta ended martial law throughout the country, imposed in September 1988.

28 "...From the Sea," a new Navy-Marine Corps strategy, was signed by the Acting SECNAV, CNO, and CMC. The document marked a sea change in naval strategic thinking.

30 The Navy transferred most of Subic Bay Naval Base to the Philippines. The remaining U.S. personnel withdrew into NAS Cubi Point. The base had been a U.S. military reservation since 1904. No Philippine government officials attended the rain-drenched, somber ceremonies.

VC 1 was disestablished at NAS Barbers Point. It was first established at Barbers Point as VU 1 on 20 July 1951, and was an aviation institution in Hawaii.

OCTOBER

01 The Senate approved the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in July 1991.

The Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station at North West Cape, Australia, was formally turned over to the Australian government.

03-24 JFA 93-1C was conducted in Cambodia, with USMC helicopter support. Khmer Rouge activity prevented access to areas associated with several cases.

04-08 A seven-member delegation from Vietnam visited USCINCPAC, JTF-FA, and CILHI for technical orientation.

08 The United States and South Korea announced extension of the year-old moratorium on the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea because of concern that North Korea was developing a nuclear weapons program.

8-26 Task Force 76 with the 11th MEU embarked visited Western Australia enroute from the Arabian Gulf, the first ARG to make the transit without benefit of a stop at Subic Bay. The ARG took part in Exercise VALIANT USHER 92 and enjoyed several days of liberty at Perth and Freemantle.

10 In Mondolkiri Province, Cambodia, 398 Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) guerrillas and their families handed over their weapons to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. FULRO, the last Indochinese insurgent group, fought against the Communists from 1964.

13 The UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution demanding the Khmer Rouge follow the disarmament procedures it agreed to in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement and allow UN officials to enter Khmer Rouge-occupied areas to register voters.

The Environmental Protection Agency added Pearl Harbor and Andersen AFB to the Superfund National Priorities List of installations with possibly serious hazardous waste problems.

13-14 On these dates in 1942, the Japanese launched heavy attacks against Henderson Field on Guadalcanal by aircraft, artillery, and naval gunfire from a task force which included two battleships. The field was temporarily out of action.

14 Russian President Boris Yeltsin released copies of a transcript, documents, and recordings pertaining to the Soviet shooting down of a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 on 1 September 1983. The Soviet government had claimed that the airliner was on a spy mission, and denied finding flight data and cockpit recorders, although they were found 49 days after the aircraft went down.

On this date in 1942, the first U.S. Army ground troops landed on Guadalcanal. The unit was the 164th Infantry.

Super Typhoon YVETTE caused Tropical Cyclone COR 3 to declared by the 18th Wing commander on Okinawa, and all large aircraft were evacuated. The storm changed direction, and COR 4 was resumed about four hours after the aircraft departed.

17-20 USCGC STORIS (WMEC 38) made a port visit to Petropavlovsk, the first foreign "warship" to visit the port since World War II.

19 Representatives of the United States and Vietnamese governments reached a breakthrough agreement concerning joint research activities to conducted in the SRV.

21 Oct-18 Nov JTF-FA conducted the 20th JFA in Vietnam. Four investigation and two recovery teams were deployed.

23 Oct-17 Nov JFA 93-1L was conducted in Savannakhet, Laos. The team recovered thousands of pieces of aircraft wreckage, 368 bone fragments, 4 teeth, 10 portions of teeth, and dozens of personal effects from the crash site of an OP-2E.

25 USCINCPACREP Philippines set Tropical Cyclone COR 1 for the northern Philippine islands including Subic Bay due to the approach of Typhoon COLLEEN. The storm passed with no serious damage.

26-30 The USPACOM Military Customs Inspection Program Conference was held at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. USCINCPAC/J43 hosted the affair, which was attended by approximately 60 participants.

27 The disaster declaration issued in July by the American Embassy in Manila in response to lahars from Mt. Pinatubo was extended. During August and September, up to one million people were affected, with over 365,000 receiving assistance of some kind.

30 The Continental Congress established the Continental Navy on this date in 1775.

The first archival research team, ART One, established under the agreement reached on 19 October, arrived in Hanoi. The team commenced work on 2 November.

31 Low-key ceremonies marked the closing of NAS Cubi Point, the last U.S. base in the Philippines. The last U.S. troops were scheduled to leave the Islands on 24 November.

NOVEMBER

01-02 Tropical Cyclone COR 1 was set on Guam for Typhoon ELSIE. The storm passed 30 NM south of the island, and winds of 30 to 50 knots were experienced. Damage was limited to temporary power outages.

02 The remains of three foreign newsmen identified by CILHI, two Japanese and one Frenchman, were returned to Cambodia. The remains had been recovered during JFA 92-2C in March 1992,

03 Governor Bill Clinton won the presidency with 43% of the popular vote. President Bush received 38%, and independent candidate Ross Perot captured 19%.

04 The Russian Parliament approved the START, signed with the United States in July 1991.

07-16 Exercise KEEN EDGE 93, a joint and combined FTX, was conducted in Japan

09 The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE) Treaty entered into force. The treaty was signed on 19 November 1990 by 30 signatories.

10 A marine corps of two battalions was established by the Con-tinental Congress on this date in 1775.

13 On this date in 1942, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal took place. The Japanese lost two destroyers, while U.S. losses included the cruisers USS ATLANTA (CL 51) and JUNEAU (CL 52) and four destroyers. The five Sullivan brothers were lost with JUNEAU.

Also in 1942, the first squadron of P-38 LIGHTNING fighters arrived at Henderson Field, flown by the 339th Fighter Squadron.

16 In Colombo, Sri Lanka Navy chief Vice Admiral Clancey Fernando and three aides were killed by a suicide bomber.

17 Taiwan announced the purchase from France of 60 MIRAGE 2000-5 multi-role fighters and at least 1,000 short- and medium-range missiles. First deliveries were scheduled for 1995.

The approach of Tropical Storm HUNT caused COR 2 to be set on Guam, but the storm, updated to a full-scale typhoon, passed 12 NM north of the island. No significant damage was inflicted by winds of 30 to 50 knots, but temporary power outages were noted.

18 CILHI announced the identification of the remains of GySgt Joseph F. Trujillo, USMC, lost on 13 Sep 66 in South Vietnam.

21 Close on the heels of HUNT, the eye of Typhoon GAY passed directly over Guam. Maximum sustained winds 0f 65 knots with gusts to 95 knots were recorded. Slight to moderate damage was suffered by the island-wide power distribution system.

24 The United States flag was lowered for the last time at Cubi Point in a brief ceremony. The last remaining U.S. personnel sailed away later in the afternoon, leaving the base in Philippine hands.

25 Nouhak Phoumsavan, a hard-line Communist, was elected president of Laos following the death of President Kaysone Phomvihane on 21 November.

DECEMBER

01 China's Premier Li Peng met with Vietnamese Premier Vo Van Kiet in Hanoi for talks. This was the first visit to Vietnam by a Chinese leader since China broke off relations in 1979 following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

During ceremonies held at Yongsan Garrison, Seoul, Korea, command of the Ground Component Command of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) was transferred from GEN Robert W. RisCassi, USA, to GEN Kim Dong Jin, ROKA, the former Deputy CINC of CFC. During the same ceremonies, LtGen Lim Jong Rin, KMC, assumed control of the Combined Marine Forces Command (CFMC), a newly activated theater-level command of CFC. Also on this date, GEN RisCassi transferred command of Eighth U.S. Army to LTG W. W. Crouch, USA, who was also Chief of Staff, UNC/CFC/USFK. GEN RisCassi remained as CINC CFC/UNC.

02 A local weather system with winds of 40 to 50 knots struck Elmendorf AFB in Alaska. Approximately 20 buildings sustained significant damage, but there were no personnel injuries or damage to aircraft. Estimated damages totaled $622,000.

ART Two, the second archival research team to be deployed to Vietnam, arrived in Hanoi. The team deployed to Da Nang on the 4th.

03-18 The final JFA of the year in Cambodia, JFA 93-2C was supported by two UH-60 helicopters from the 25th ID(L). Some remains were recovered from Tang Island (Koh Tang).

04-17 The final JFA of the year in Laos was 93-2L, which continued the work begun by the previous JFA. Additional bone fragments, personal effects, and wreckage was recovered from the OP-2E site.

07 Thousands of Hindu militants stormed and demolished the Mosque of Babur in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh state, in northeastern India. In Pakistan, Muslims attacked more than 30 Hindu temples, setting fire to 25 in southern Sind Province.

USS Bowfin, moored at the Submarine Museum and Park adjacent to the USS Arizona Memorial, was launched on this date in 1942. Dockside ceremonies marking the occasion were attended by Admiral Larson.

07-11 The 24th annual USPACOM Security Assistance Conference (PACSAC) was held in Honolulu, Hawaii.

09 The Army's Americal Division began relief of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal on this date in 1942.

09-13 Religious violence raged throughout India, halted only in a nationwide crackdown. The official casualty toll was 1,210 dead and 4,000 wounded in violence over the week.

12 An earthquake measured at 6.8 on the Richter scale occurred near Flores Island, 110 NM east of the Indonesian island of Bali. A massive tsunami was generated which devastated much of the city of Maumere, with about 17,000 houses destroyed or damaged. Casualties were estimated at 2,080 dead, 550 injured. The island's electrical distribution grid was damaged, and power and water supply were off.

13-14 Typhoon GAY, which passed directly over Guam in November, swept through the Republic of the Marshall Islands. USCINCPAC was designated as the supporting DOD agency for relief, and disaster relief operations commenced on the 14th. Some operations continued through the end of the year and into 1993.

16 Arrival honors were conducted at Hickam AFB for the remains of possibly as many as 10 Americans turned over by the Vietnamese government.

19 Kim Young Sam, a former dissident, won 42% of the votes in Presidential elections held in South Korea on 18 December. The elections were considered the cleanest and smoothest in Korea's history.

In Taiwan's first fully democratic national legislative elections, the ruling Kuomintang party won 53% of the vote.

22 The ROK and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam established diplomatic relations. Vietnam maintained relations with the DPRK.

23 The Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement between the ROK and the U.S. entered into force. The agreement was signed in November 1991.

29 China announced that North Korea must pay for all Chinese imports in cash rather than through barter beginning 1 January 1993.

31 By the close of the year, 464,500 marijuana plants had been eradicated in Hawaii during Operation WIPEOUT 92. CDR USARPAC coordinated with the DEA to provide helicopters and crews for marijuana plant spotting.

GLOSSARY

A

AAF	Army Air Field
AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange System
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
AC	Active Component
ACC	Air Component Command; Air Combat Command
ACE	Asian Counternarcotics Element
ACF	Alternate Command Facility
ACLS	Automated Carrier Landing Systems
ACM	Air Chief Marshall
ACMI	Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation
ACP	Allied Communications Publication
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
AD	air defense
ADNET	anti-drug data network
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AF	Air Force
AFKTL	Armed Forces Korea Targets List
AFOE	Marine Amphibious Follow-on Echelon
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFSATCOM	Air Force satellite communications
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AIS	Automated Information System
ALCOM	Alaskan Command
ALCOP	Alternate Command Post
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMH	Automated Message Handling
ANDVT	Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal
ANR	Alaska NORAD Region
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
APF	Afloat Prepositioning Force
APM	ANZUS Planning Manual
ARG	amphibious ready group
ARNE	Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation
ARSOC	Army Special Operations Command
ART	archival research team
AS	Airlift Squadron
ASC	AUTODIN Switching Center
ASD(C3I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)

ASD(I-FRR) ---------- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations, Facility Requirements and Resources
ASD(P&L) ---------- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics
ASD/ISA ---------- Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ASEAN ---------- Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASGRO ---------- Armed Services Graves Registration Office
ATM ---------- air target materials
ATO ---------- Air Tasking Order
ATTG ---------- Automated Tactical Target Graphic
AUTODIN ---------- Automatic Digital Network
AWACS ---------- airborne warning and control system

B

BAI ---------- battlefield air interdiction
BDA ---------- battle damage assessment
BDAWG ---------- BDA Working Group
BITAC ---------- Bilateral Training and Consultative Group
BK ---------- BALIKATAN
BSC ---------- Battle Simulation Center
BSL-3 ---------- Biological Safety Level 3 Laboratory
BTG ---------- Basic Targeting Graphic
BTS ---------- Brown Tree Snake

C

C-E ---------- Communications-Electronics
C2 ---------- command and control
C2IP ---------- Command and Control Initiatives Program
C2S2 ---------- Command and Control Support System
C4IFTW ---------- C4I For The Warrior
C4ISMP ---------- Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence Systems Master Plan
CA ---------- Civil Affairs
CAA ---------- command arrangements agreement
CAC ---------- Crisis Action Center
CALFEX ---------- combined arms live fire exercise
CAP ---------- Civic Action Program; combat air patrol
CAS ---------- close air support
CAT ---------- Crisis Action Team
CBS ---------- corps battle simulation
CBT ---------- communications backside terminal
CCBR ---------- Command Center Briefing Room
CCEB ---------- Combined Communications Electronics Board
CCGDFOURTEEN ---------- Coast Guard District FOURTEEN

CCIB	Command and Control Interoperability Board
CD	counterdrug
CD/LE	counterdrug/law enforcement
CDAT	Counterdrug Analysis Team
CDIP	Combined Defense Improvement Project
CEOI	Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CFMC	Combined Marine Force Corps
CFX	command field exercise
CG	COBRA GOLD
CHOP	change of operational control
CIF	CINC Initiative Funds
CILHI	Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINC-1	USCINCPAC Command and Control Network
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CIOP	Combined Interoperability Operating Procedures
CIP	Contingency Intelligence Package; Combined Interoperability Program
CLWG	Combined Logistics Working Group
CM	Configuration Management
CMB	Configuration Management Board
CMO	civil-military operations
CMSA	Cruise Missile Support Activity
CN	counternarcotics
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNWDI	Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command
COM	Chief of Mission
COMAFOR	Commanding General, Army Forces
COMINEWARCOM	Commander Mine Warfare Command
COMNAVAIRPAC	Commander Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
COMNAVBASE	Commander Naval Base
COMNAVFORJAPAN	Commander Naval Forces Japan
COMNAVMARIANAS	Commander Naval Forces Marianas
COMREL	Community Relations
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMSOCPAC	Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific
COMTAC	Commander Tactical Air Command
COMTHIRDFLT	Commander THIRD Fleet
COMUSFAC	Commander U.S. Facility
COMUSKOREA	Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
CONOPS	concept of operations

CONUS ---------- Continental United States
COR ---------- condition of readiness
CPCC ---------- USCINCPAC Command Center
CPCP ---------- Command Post Contingency Package
CPICK ---------- COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea
CPX ---------- command post exercise
CR ---------- Continuing Resolution
CRMA ---------- Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy
CSOP ---------- combined standards operating procedures
CSP ---------- communications support processor
CSPAR ---------- CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report
CSS ---------- combat service support
CT ---------- COPE THUNDER
CTAPS ---------- Contingency Tactical Air Control Automated Planning System
CTIS ---------- Command Tactical Information System
CUC ---------- Common User Contract
CVBG ---------- carrier battle group
CY ---------- calendar year

D

D/M ---------- detection and monitoring
DA ---------- Department of the Army
DAO ---------- Defense Attaché Office
DARPA ---------- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DART ---------- Dynamic Analysis and Planning Tool
DASD ---------- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCCEP ---------- Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program
DCI ---------- Director of Central Intelligence
DCINC ---------- Deputy USCINCPAC
DCO ---------- Defense Coordinating Officer
DCS ---------- Direct Commercial Sales; Defense Communications System
DD ---------- direct dial
DDESB ---------- Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board
DDN ---------- Defense Data Network
DEA ---------- Drug Enforcement Administration
DEFCON ---------- defense condition
DEPSECDEF ---------- Deputy Secretary of Defense
DFAA ---------- Defense Facilities Administration Agency
DHHS ---------- Department of Health and Human Services
DIA ---------- Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA ---------- Defense Information Systems Agency
DISAM ---------- Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DJS ---------- Director Joint Staff

DJTFAC ---------- Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell
DLA ---------- Defense Logistics Agency
DMA ---------- Defense Mapping Agency
DMRD ---------- Defense Management Review Directive
DMRIS ---------- Defense Medical Regulating Information System
DMS ---------- Defense Message System
DMT ---------- Deployment Management Team
DODIIS ---------- DOD Intelligence Information System
DOMS ---------- Director of Military Support
DOS ---------- U.S. Department of State
DOT ---------- Department of Transportation
DPG ---------- Defense Planning Guidance
DPRK ---------- Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
DRASH ---------- Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter
DRMO ---------- Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
DRO ---------- Defense Reutilization Office
DRSN ---------- Defense Red Switch Network
DSAA ---------- Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCS ---------- Defense Satellite Communications System
DSN ---------- Defense Switched Network
DSVT ---------- Digital Secure Voice Terminal

E

E-Mail ---------- Electronic Mail
EA ---------- executive agent
EASI ---------- East Asia Strategic Initiative
EC ---------- ELLIPSE CHARLIE
ECMC ---------- Enhanced Crisis Management Capability
EIF ---------- Enhanced Interface Facility
EKMS ---------- Electronic Key Management System
ENCAP ---------- Engineer CAP
EODEX ---------- explosive ordnance disposal exercise
EPIC ---------- El Paso Intelligence Center
EPW/CI ---------- Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee
ERC ---------- Exercise Related Construction
ERP ---------- Expanded Relations Program
ESA ---------- Endangered Species Act
ESEP ---------- Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program
ESF ---------- Emergency Support Functions; Economic Support Fund
ESI ---------- Electrospace Systems Incorporated
ETC ---------- Enhanced Terminal Capability
EUSA ---------- Eighth U.S. Army
EWO ---------- Emergency War Order

F

FBI ---------- Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBM ---------- fleet ballistic missile
FCLP ---------- Field Carrier Landing Practice
FCO ---------- Federal Coordinating Officer
FDO ---------- flexible deterrent option
FEMA ---------- Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMD ---------- Far East Military District
FICPAC ---------- Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FLE ---------- Forward Liaison Element
FMF ---------- Foreign Military Financing
FMF-G ---------- Foreign Military Financing-Grant
FMFPAC ---------- Fleet Marine Force Pacific ()
FMS ---------- Foreign Military Sales
FN ---------- foreign national
FON ---------- freedom of navigation
FRD ---------- Formerly Restricted Data
FS ---------- Forest Service; FREQUENT STORM
FSC ---------- full service center
FSS ---------- fast sealift ship
FSU ---------- Former Soviet Union
FTX ---------- field training exercises

G

GAO ---------- General Accounting Office
GCCS ---------- Global Command and Control System
GCI ---------- ground controlled intercept
GDIP ---------- General Defense Intelligence Program
GENSER ---------- general service
GES ---------- Ground Entry Station
GMF ---------- Ground Mobile Forces
GOJ ---------- Government of Japan
GOVGUAM ---------- Government of Guam
GPS ---------- Global Positioning System

H

H/CA ---------- Humanitarian/Civic Assistance
HAP-EP ---------- Humanitarian Assistance Program for Excess Property
HAWS ---------- Hawaii Area Wideband System
HE ---------- high explosive
HF ---------- High Frequency
HIANG ---------- Hawaiian Air National Guard
HIV ---------- Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HNFC ---------- Host Nation Funded Construction
HOSTAC ---------- Conference on Helicopter Operations from Ships other than Aircraft Carriers
HPD ---------- Honolulu Police Department
HQII ---------- HAVE QUICK II
HQIIA ---------- HAVE QUICK IIA

HRO ---------- Human Resource Office
HTC ---------- Hawaiian Telephone Company (GTE)
HUMINT ---------- human intelligence

I

I&W ---------- indications and warnings
IAEA ---------- International Atomic Energy Agency
IAG ---------- Inter-Agency Group
ICC ---------- initial concept conference
ICP ---------- Incremental Cost Program
ID(L) ---------- Infantry Division (Light)
IEC ---------- intelligence exchange conference
ILS ---------- Integrated Logistics System
IMET ---------- International Military Education and Training
IMI ---------- International Military Information
IMS ---------- information management system
INCA ---------- Intelligence Communications Architecture (Integration Committee)
INFOSEC ---------- Information Systems Security
INS ---------- Immigration and Naturalization Service
INTELEX ---------- Intelligence Exchange Conference
IO ---------- Indian Ocean
IPAC ---------- Intelligence Center Pacific
IPC ---------- initial planning conference
IPDS ---------- Imagery Production and Dissemination System
IPR ---------- in-progress review
ISA ---------- International Security Affairs
ISDB ---------- Integrated SATCOM Data Base
ITO ---------- Integrated Tasking Order

J

JAIS-PAC ---------- Joint Area Information System-Pacific
JASDF ---------- Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCET ---------- Joint Combined Exchange Training
JCM ---------- Joint Conflict Model
JCMC-1 ---------- Joint Crisis Management Capability level one
JCRC ---------- Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JDA ---------- Japan Defense Agency
JDS ---------- Japan Defense Society
JFA ---------- Joint Field Activity
JFIP ---------- Japan Facilities Improvement Program
JFMO ---------- Joint Frequency Management Office
JGSDF ---------- Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
JIB ---------- Joint Intelligence Division
JICPAC ---------- Joint Intelligence Center Pacific
JIEO ---------- Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization

	(formerly the Joint Tactical C3 Agency)
JITC	Joint Interoperability Test Center
JLPC	Joint Labor Policy Committee
JMAO-PAC	Joint Mortuary Affairs Office Pacific
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JNCC	Joint Nuclear Control Commission
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JRD	Japan Reconfiguration and Digitization
JS	Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTF-5	Joint Task Force Five
JTF-FA	Joint Task Force-Full Accounting
JTFS	Joint Task Force Simulation
JTIDS	Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
JUIT	Joint Unit Intermodal Transportation
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
JWG	Joint Working Group

K

KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army
KE	KEEN EDGE
KEU	Korean Employees Union
KNTDS	Korean Navy Tactical Data System
KPA	Korean People's Army
KSC	Korean Service Corps
KTACS	Korean Tactical Air Control System
KTDS	Korean Tactical Data System

L

LAD	latest arrival date
LAN	local area network
LASH	Lighter Aboard Ship
LCC	Logistics Cooperation Committee
LCU	landing craft, USN
LEA	law enforcement agency
LKA	last-known-alive
LMI	Logistics Management Institute
LOGEX	Logistics Exercise
LSI	live sighting investigation
LSV	logistics support vessel
LWP	Logistics Working Party

M

MAC ---------- Military Armistice Commission
MACON ---------- major command
MAERU ---------- Mobile Ammunition Evaluation and Renovation Unit (Navy)
MAF ---------- Malaysian Armed Forces
MARFORPAC ---------- Marine Forces, Pacific
MAS ---------- Military Airlift Squadron
MAW ---------- Military Airlift Wing
MCIP ---------- Military Customs Inspection Program
MDAO ---------- Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MDB ---------- Mutual Defense Board
MDT ---------- message distribution terminal; Mutual Defense Treaty
MEDCAP ---------- Medical CAP
MEDRETE ---------- medical readiness training exercise
MEF ---------- Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU(SOC) ---------- Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MFA ---------- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIA ---------- missing-in-action
MILCON ---------- military construction
MILDEP ---------- Military Department
MILES ---------- multiple integrated laser engagement system
MILNET ---------- Military Network
MILSATCOM ---------- Military Satellite Communications
MINEX ---------- mining exercise
MISC ---------- Military Information Support Cell
MLS ---------- multi-level security
MMP ---------- Modern Munitions Program
MND ---------- Ministry of National Defense
MNS ---------- Ministry of National Security
MOA ---------- memorandum of agreement
MOD ---------- Ministry of Defense
MOFA ---------- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOI ---------- Ministry of the Interior
MOP ---------- memorandum of policy
MOU ---------- memorandum of understanding
MPA ---------- maritime patrol aircraft
MPS ---------- Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MPSA ---------- Military Postal Service Agency
MRC ---------- major regional contingency
MRE ---------- meal-ready-to-eat
MSA ---------- Maritime Safety Agency
MSE ---------- mobile subscriber equipment
MSEL ---------- Master Scenario Events List
MTACCS ---------- Marine Corps' Tactical Command and Control System
MTDP ---------- Mid-Term Defense Plan
MTF ---------- Message Text Format
MTIC ---------- Military Target Intelligence Committee
MTT ---------- mobile training team

MWD ---------- military working dog
MWT ---------- megawatt thermal

N

NAEW ---------- NATO airborne early warning
NAF ---------- Naval Air Facility
NAMRU ---------- Naval Medical Research Unit
NAMRU-2 ---------- U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2
NAS ---------- Naval Air Station
NAVCOMMSTA ---------- Naval Communications Station
NAVFAC ---------- Naval Facility
NCCOSC ---------- Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center
NCCS ---------- nuclear command and control system
NCND ---------- neither confirm nor deny
NCPAC ---------- National Security Agency/ Central Security Service, Pacific
NCPAC ---------- NSA Pacific
NCR ---------- Non-Communist Resistance
NCTSI ---------- Navy Center for Tactical Systems Interoperability
NEA ---------- Northeast Asia
NEACP ---------- National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NEEACTPAC ---------- Naval Electronics Engineering Activity, Pacific
NEMD ---------- North-East Military District
NEO ---------- Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
NGO ---------- non-governmental organizations
NGS ---------- naval gunfire support
NIS ---------- Newly Independent States
NISE WEST ---------- Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center in Service Engineering (formerly NEEACTPAC)
NMCC ---------- National Military Command Center
NMS ---------- National Military Strategy; Network Management System
NOT ---------- Nuclear Operations Team
NPC ---------- Nonproliferation Center
NPES ---------- Nuclear Planning and Execution System
NPS ---------- National Park Service
NPW ---------- nuclear powered warship
NRC ---------- Navy Resource Council
NRP ---------- Nuclear Restrike Planning
NSD ---------- Naval Supply Depot
NSL ---------- National Security Law
NSNF ---------- Non-Strategic Nuclear Force
NSO ---------- non-SIOP option
NTC ---------- National Telecommunications Commission
NTCC ---------- Naval Telecommunications Center
NWPAC ---------- Northwest Pacific

O

OASD ---------- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OCR ---------- Optical Character Reader
ODES ---------- Operation Deployment Experiment Simulator
ODIS ---------- Origin-Destination Information System
OHA ---------- Office of Humanitarian Assistance
OP3 ---------- Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program
OPCON ---------- operational control
OPLAN ---------- Operations Plan
OPR ---------- office of primary responsibility
OPT ---------- Operations Planning Team
OPTEMPO ---------- operations tempo
OSD ---------- Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSS ---------- Operations Support System
OTAR ---------- Over-the-air Re-key
OTAT ---------- Over-the-air Transfer
OTH-B ---------- over-the-horizon backscatter radar
OTL ---------- operational test launch
OTS ---------- Oahu Telephone System

P

P&A ---------- price and availability
PA ---------- Public Affairs
PACAL ---------- Pacific Area Cooperative Acquisition and Logistics
PACC ---------- Pacific Air Chiefs Conference
PACFLT ---------- Pacific Fleet
PACSAC ---------- Pacific Command Security Assistance Conference
PAL ---------- Permissive Action Link
PAMS ---------- Pacific Armies Management Seminar
PAMSO ---------- Pacific Area Maintenance and Supply Organization
PARMIS ---------- PACOM Reconnaissance Mission Information System
PASOC ---------- Pacific Area Special Operations Conference
PASOLS ---------- Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar
PASS ---------- USPACOM ADP Service Site
PAWG ---------- USPACOM Weaponeering Guide
PAX ---------- passenger
PBG ---------- Program Budget Guide
PC3AIC ---------- Pacific Command, Control and Communications Architecture
PCIL ---------- USPACOM Contingency Installation List
PCS ---------- Pacific Command Strategy; permanent change of station
PCTL ---------- USPACOM Conventional Target List
PD ---------- PRIME DIRECTIVE

PDC ---------- Project Development Committee
PDS ---------- Protected Distribution System
PDTATAC ---------- Per Diem, Travel, and Transportation Allowance Committee
PFMAS ---------- PACOM Frequency Management ADP System
PHS ---------- Public Health Service
PIB ---------- USPACOM Intelligence Board
PIF ---------- Productivity Investment Funds
PKO ---------- peacekeeping operations
PLDT ---------- Philippines Long Distance Telephone
PM ---------- Prime Minister
PMCT ---------- Permissive Action Link Management Control Team
PMRF ---------- Pacific Missile Range Facility
POC ---------- point of contact
POD ---------- port of debarkation
POL ---------- Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POLMIL ---------- Political Military
POLMSGS ---------- POL Message Slate
POM ---------- Program Objective Memorandum
POV ---------- privately owned vehicles
POW ---------- prisoner of war
PRC ---------- People's Republic of China
PRP ---------- Personnel Reliability Program
PSCM ---------- Pacific Senior Communicators Meeting
PSOCIL ---------- USPACOM Special Operations Contingency Installations List
PSOTL ---------- USPACOM Special Operations Target List
PSYOP ---------- Psychological Operations
PTA ---------- Pohakuloa Training Area
PTEC ---------- Pacific Theater Education Council
PWC ---------- Public Works Center

R

RAAF ---------- Royal Australian Air Force
RAAP ---------- Rapid Application of Air Power
RAS ---------- refueling-at-sea
RBECS ---------- Revised Battlefield Electronic CEOI System
RC ---------- Reserve Component
RDT&E ---------- Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
RECA ---------- Residual Capabilities Assessment
REDTRAIN ---------- Readiness Training
RIMPAC ---------- Rim-of-the-Pacific
RMAF ---------- Royal Malaysian Air Force
RMI ---------- Republic of the Marshall Islands
RMN ---------- Royal Malaysian Navy
RMO ---------- resource management officer
RN ---------- Regency Net
RNP ---------- Remote Network Processing

ROK ---------- Republic of Korea
ROKFC ---------- ROK Funded Construction
ROKG ---------- Republic of Korea Government
ROTH-R ---------- relocatable over-the-horizon radar
RP ---------- Republic of the Philippines
RSC ---------- Reactor Safeguards Clearance
RTA ---------- Royal Thai Army
RTADS ---------- Royal Thai Air Defense System
RTAF ---------- Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFB ---------- Royal Thai Air Force Base
RTARF ---------- Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTG ---------- Reconnaissance Technical Group
RTMC ---------- Royal Thai Marine Corps
RTN ---------- Royal Thai Navy

S

SAAM ---------- special assignment airlift mission
SAO ---------- Security Assistance Office
SAR ---------- search and rescue
SASC ---------- Senate Armed Services Committee
SAT ---------- Situational Awareness Terminal
SAV ---------- staff assistance visit
SB ---------- STONY BEACH
SCI ---------- sensitive compartmented information
SCM ---------- Security Consultative Meeting
SDN ---------- System Development Notification
SDS ---------- Self-Defense Ship
SEA ---------- Southeast Asia
SEABEE ---------- construction battalion (Navy); construction engineer (Navy)
SEAS ---------- Symposium on East Asia Security
SECARMY ---------- Secretary of the Army
SECNAV ---------- Secretary of the Navy
SEV ---------- Stockpile Emergency Verification
SHF ---------- Super High Frequency
SIMON ---------- SIOP Monitoring
SIO ---------- Senior Intelligence Officers
SIOP ---------- Single Integrated Operational Plan
SITREP ---------- situation report
SLBM ---------- submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLM ---------- Staff Level Meeting
SLOC ---------- sea lines of communication
SLRP ---------- survey liaison party
SMA ---------- Special Measures Agreement
SMEB ---------- significant military exercise brief
SNTA ---------- suspected narcotics trafficking aircraft
SOA ---------- speed of advance
SOC ---------- State of Cambodia
SOCPAC ---------- Special Operations Command, Pacific
SOF ---------- Special Operations Forces
SOFA ---------- Status of Forces Agreement

SOO ---------- Sea of Okhotsk
SORTS ---------- Status of Resources and Training System
SOUTHCOM ---------- Southern Command
SOUTHCOM CN OPS ---------- SOUTHCOM Counternarcotics Operations
SOW ---------- Statement of Work
SPA ---------- Supreme People's Assembly
SPAWARS ---------- Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
SPINTCOMS ---------- Special Intelligence Communications Handling Systems
SRF ---------- Ship Repair Facility
SRV ---------- Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSC ---------- Security Subcommittee
STACCS ---------- Standard Theater Army Command and Control System
STARS ---------- Strategic Target System
STRATOPS ---------- Strategic Operations
STS ---------- Secure Telephone System
SWA ---------- Southwest Asia

T

TAC ---------- Tactical Air Command
TACCIMS ---------- Theater Automated Command and Control Information Management System
TACSAT ---------- tactical satellite
TADIL-A ---------- Tactical Digital Information Links-A
TAG ---------- Target Actions Group
TAMC ---------- Tripler Army Medical Center
TAPS ---------- Theater Analysis and Planning System
TAV ---------- technical assistance visit
TB ---------- TEMPO BRAVE
TBMW ---------- Tactical Ballistic Missile Warning
TBMWN ---------- Tactical Ballistic Missile Warning Network
TERS ---------- Tactical Event Reporting Systems
TF ---------- task force
TIP ---------- Target Intelligence Package; Technology Insertion Project
TKP ---------- Trans-Korea Pipeline
TLAM/N ---------- TOMAHAWK nuclear land attack missile
TM ---------- target materials
TPFDD ---------- Time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL ---------- Time-Phased Force Deployment List
tropo ---------- tropospheric scatter
TROSCOM ---------- Troop Support Command, U.S. Army
TS ---------- TEAM SPIRIT
TT ---------- TANDEM THRUST

TTM ---------- tactical target materials
TTSM ---------- theater transition sustainment model

U

UCMJ ---------- Uniform Code of Military Justice
UE ---------- unit equipment
UFL ---------- ULCHI/FOCUS LENS
UNC ---------- United Nations Command
UNTAC ---------- United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia
USASDC ---------- U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command
USBP ---------- U.S. Bureau of Prisons
USC ---------- United States Code
USCINCENT ---------- U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command
USCINCPACREPPHIL ---------- USCINCPAC Representative, Philippines
USCS ---------- U.S. Customs Service
USDA ---------- U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFK ---------- U.S. Forces Korea
USFWS ---------- United States Fish and Wildlife Service
USG ---------- U.S. Government
USIA ---------- United States Information Agency
USMTF ---------- U.S. Message Text Format
USPS ---------- U.S. Postal Service
USTRANSCOM ---------- U.S. Transportation Command

V

VHF ---------- very high frequency
VNOSMP ---------- Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons

W

WAM ---------- WWMCCS ADP Modernization
WHNS ---------- Wartime Host Nation Support
WHO ---------- World Health Organization
WIN ---------- WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WINTRNG ---------- WWMCCS Teleconference
WIS ---------- WWMCCS Information System
WP ---------- Western Pacific
WPC ---------- Warrior Preparation Center
WPNS ---------- Western Pacific Naval Symposium
WRS-T ---------- War Reserve Stockpile-Thailand
WRS-Thai ---------- War Reserve Stockpile - Thailand
WRSA ---------- War Reserve Stocks for Allies
WTC ---------- Weapons and Tactics Center
WWMCCS ---------- World Wide Military Command and Control System

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