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CINCPAC

COMMAND HISTORY

1976

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I

1976

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1977

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL M. F. WEISNER
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

FOREWORD

This year--1976--was the first in many years that U.S. involvement in mainland Southeast Asia has not obscured our larger and more permanent interests in the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean area. While the communist successes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should not be dismissed lightly, it is too early to assess them in historical perspective. A reaction already evident is the increasing awareness by the Japanese people and their government that they must play a greater role in their own security.

With the fall of South Vietnam, the Southeast Asian nations felt exposed and vulnerable to expected pressure from a resurgent Hanoi and possibly to a great post-war power struggle in the area. One result was impetus for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to assume a greater regional role. The first ASEAN summit conference of heads of state was held in Bali in February 1976.

By mid-1976 we had completed the withdrawal of military forces from Thailand, leaving a small Military Advisory Group as the sole U.S. military organization. Later in the year, the political environment in the Western Pacific was affected once more by a change in government in Thailand. Although the present government faces an uncertain future in striving for stability, it remains in our interest to support that effort.

In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union continued to maintain a considerable naval presence during the year. In addition, the Russians and Chinese approached some island nations of the South Pacific with blandishments of diplomatic recognition and economic assistance which could presage attempts to establish political and military enclaves in the region. This activity was balanced somewhat by renewed assurances from our Australian and New Zealand allies of their interests in the island nations.

Negotiations were resumed in 1976 with the Republic of the Philippines on a revised military bases agreement. The ensuing dialogue quickly broadened to encompass the status of our mutual defense treaty, and the dialogue was unofficially suspended after four months of technical-level talks. The position of this command continues to be that the bases in the Philippines are needed to maintain a credible deterrent posture and to protect vital sea and air lines of communication.

The situation on the Korean peninsula continued to be a volatile and unpredictable threat to the peace of Asia. The August 1976 incident in the demilitarized zone in which two U.S. officers were killed illustrated the tension on the peninsula.

Japan's vital role in the economic stability of Asia and the world continued to be dependent upon oil from the Middle East transported by tankers using the sea lanes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Since Japan's military forces are dedicated to a defensive mission consistent with their constitution, the developing public acceptance in Japan of the need to cooperate in our security partnership was welcome.

An important aspect of Asian/Pacific affairs is the far-reaching impact which the action of any single nation has on other nations in the region. Any action to alter our military posture should first and foremost be weighed in the context of its impact on area stability. Political and economic initiatives are acknowledged tools of diplomacy. There can be little hope of long-term stability, however, unless diplomatic initiatives are backed up by military forces perceived by friend and foe alike to be adequate in terms of size, capability, and location.

M. F. WEISNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific

PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1969, as updated by SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 and SM-547-77 of 16 June 1977, require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The required report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records. The CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Beginning with the 1971 history, the organization of subject matter was changed from the previous geographic orientation, with emphasis on Southeast Asia, to a more functionalized format.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. The identification of the MACV history as Annex A to the CINCPAC history will be retained to facilitate future research. Annex B of the 1976 history is the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI) (January - September 1976) and the continuing history of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAGTHAI) for the period October - December 1976. Histories of the U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea continue as Annexes C through E respectively, and are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

The 1976 CINCPAC history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume II. Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages cited as

ALFA messages are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters. Titles of documents cited as footnotes are unclassified unless otherwise indicated.

Chapters II, X, and Section I of Chapter IX were written by the undersigned. Pauline K. Tallman wrote Chapters I, III, IV, Sections I and IV of Chapter XI and supervised the physical layout of the product. Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, and Sections II and III of Chapters IX and XI were written by Major Stanley E. Henning, USA. The index was a joint effort and the glossary was compiled by Specialist 6 Joseph S. Simpson, USA.

The manuscript was typed by Specialist Simpson and Shirley A. Streck. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.

CARL O. CLEVER
Command Historian

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CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(C) PACOM assigned strength increased slightly in 1976, for the first time since major reductions had begun in 1969. This increase, however, reflected changes in Navy and Marine forces assigned to CINCPAC but located in the Continental United States; the forces located in the PACOM continued to decline.

(C) A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:

	1 January 1976	31 December 1976	Change
Army	58,193	53,787	-4,406
Navy	151,164	164,613	+13,449
Marine Corps	69,033	71,982	+2,949
Air Force	51,984	43,570	-8,414
Total	330,374	333,952	+3,578

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1976 and the amounts of change from the year before are shown in the following table. Neither Taiwan nor Thailand had sufficient U.S. Forces to be included this year.

	Military		Dependents	
	31 Dec 76	Change	31 Dec 76	Change
Guam	10,525	+ 645	9,683	- 1,357
Hawaii	44,274	- 203	85,524	+23,797
Japan	49,022	- 565	38,624	- 3,103
Korea	39,718	- 668	15,462	- 1,586
Philippines	14,850	+ 419	22,536	+ 2,997

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The date of information on these charts is as of 31 December 1976, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

THE PACIFIC COMMAND



* Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 3.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM



Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 4.

COMMAND ORGANIZATION

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interest of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South, and Southeast Asia; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west longitude, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 25 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, the Indian Ocean east of 12 degrees east longitude, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast and South Asia (including Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and the Himalayan States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan), and the Islands in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians (excluding air defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Island.

CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Adviser/Representative to the following organizations.

a. SEATO Council: U.S. Military Adviser

b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative

c. Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board

d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the U.S. Ambassador who serves as the Chairman of the U.S. representation.

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:

a. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)

b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

The PACOM Service Component Commanders' reponsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in the CINCPAC Supplement to the DOD Military Assistance and Sales Manual.

CINCPAC's Army Component Command, the U.S. Army Pacific, was disestablished 31 December 1974. U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, a field operating agency of the Department of the Army, assumed most of the CINCUSARPAC responsibilites. There is no Army Component Commander at this time.

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are three subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:

a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea)*, Seoul, Korea

b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan)*, Yokota Air Base, Japan

c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC)*, Taipei, Taiwan

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPs): CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed:

a. Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI), Agana, Guam.

b. Commander U.S. Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines)*, Subic Bay, Philippines.

c. USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia)*, American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

d. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHIEFJUSMAGTHAI)*, is the CINCPAC Representative Thailand (CINCPACREP Thailand), Bangkok, Thailand.

e. Commander Naval Station Adak (COMNAVSTAADAK) is the CINCPAC Representative Aleutians (CINCPACREP ALEUTIANS), Adak, Alaska.

f. Commander Mid-East Forces (COMMIDEASTFOR) is the CINCPAC Representative Indian Ocean (CINCPACREP INDIAN OCEAN).

g. CINCPAC Representative Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command (CINCPACREP JSTPS/SAC), Offut AFB, Nebraska.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAGs): Military Assistance Programs (including Foreign Military Sales) are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:

a. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China - Taipei, Taiwan

b. Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan - Tokyo, Japan

c. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand

d. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines

e. Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea - Seoul, Korea

f. Office of Defense Cooperation - New Delhi, India

g. U.S. Defense Representative Pakistan* - Islamabad, Pakistan

h. Chief U.S. Defense Group, Indonesia* performs the MAP functions of planning and programming for Indonesia - Jakarta, Indonesia

i. Defense Attaches Afghanistan*, Australia, Burma*, Malaysia*, Nepal*, New Zealand*, Singapore*, and Sri Lanka* are responsible for the Security Assistance function for their respective countries.

6. CINCPAC Liaison Officer to Commander, Alaska Air Command.

*Designated as U.S. Defense Representative in September 1975. The U.S. Defense Liaison Officer serves as the USDR in Hong Kong.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 5.

SECRET

SECRET

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

Commander in Chief/Commander	GEN	John W. VESSEY, JR., USA
Deputy Commander	LT GEN	John J. BURNS, USAF
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	John K. SINGLAUB, USA
Sp Asst ROK Mil Aff and CHJUSMAG	MAJ GEN	Oliver D. STREET III, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Franklyn S. NELSON, USA
CDR HQ UNC (Rear)/Secy UN Jt Bd and Dep UN Rep	COL	William W. WOODSIDE, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	COL	Paul E. RAABE, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	CAPT	Albert M. HUNT, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	MAJ GEN	John J. KOEHLER, JR., USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	BGEN	Emil L. KONOPNICKI, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	CAPT	Edwin L. HERRING, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	James L. YOUNG, USA
Ch Arm Affairs Div & Secy UNCMAC	COL	Terrence W. MCCLAIN, USA
COMNAVFORKOREA	RADM	Mark P. FRUDDEN, USN

UNITED STATES FORCES JAPAN

Commander/Commander 5 AF	LT GEN	Walter T. GALLIGAN, USAF
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	Otis C. LYNN, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Louis H. BUEHL III, USMC
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	CAPT	Keith C. SPAYDE, JR., USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	Richard A. HATCH, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	COL	Samuel K. DIZER, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	COL	James W. ABRAHAM, USMC
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	COL	Glenn M. REISLING, JR., USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Paul J. JOHNSTON, USAF
Chief Okinawa Area Field Office	LCOL	Robert G. WHALEY, USMC
Commanding General USARJ	LT GEN	John R. GUTHRIE, USA
COMNAVFORJAPAN	RADM	Thomas B. RUSSELL, JR., USN

UNITED STATES TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND

Commander	VADM	Edwin K. SNYDER, USN
Chief of Staff	BGEN	Dan A. BROOKSHER, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J1/J4	COL	Bruce D. FERRIER, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	Walter A. MERRITT, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	CAPT	Lawrence PHILLIPS, JR., USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	John C. NORCROSS, USA
Public Affairs Officer/002	LCDR	Neil B. THOMPSON, USN
Legal Officer/J7	CAPT	Joseph M. BATTAGLINO, USN
Commander, Patrol and Recon Force, 7th Fleet	RADM	Wycliffe D. TOOLE, JR., USN

CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI

COMNAV Marianas and CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI	RADM	Kent J. CARROLL, USN
Chief of Staff and Aide	CAPT	Charles H. CROSS, USN
Commander, 3rd Air Div	MAJ GEN	Hilding JACOBSON, USAF

CINCPACREP PHIL

Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay/COMUSNAV Phil/ CINCPACREP Phil	RADM	Thomas J. KILCLINE, USN
Chief of Staff and Aide	CAPT	James C. HAYES, JR., USN
Commander 13th Air Force	MAJ GEN	Freddie L. POSTON, USAF
Chief of Staff	COL	Donald A. KELLUM, USAF

CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA

CINCPACREP/USAF Liaison Officer/U.S. Defense Rep	COL	Jack L. DETOUR, USAF

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

Commander	COL	William M. HUBBELL, USAF

OFFICE OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, PAKISTAN

USDRP	CDR	Richard F. GIBBS, USAF

OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION, INDIA

USDRI	COL	Albert RYAN, USN

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, ALEUTIANS

CO, NAVSTAADAK/ CINCPAC REP ALEUTIANS	CAPT	Donald J. CHILDERS, USN

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 8.

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS

FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP CHINA

Chief	BGEN	Leslie P. COPNEY, JR., USA
Senior Ministry of National Defense Advisor	COL	Hugh R. BUMPAS, JR., USMC
Executive Officer	LCOL	Richard H. KAMERLING, USA
Chief Operations and Training	COL	James H. WESTBERRY, USAF
Chief Resources	CAPT	Robert W. LANDEAUR, USN
Staff Judge Advocate	LCOL	Earle F. LASSITER, USA
Sr Advisor (Chinese Army)	COL	George P. KELLY, USA
Sr Advisor (Chinese Navy)	CAPT	Ace E. IPASE, USN
Sr Advisor (Chinese Marine Corps)	COL	Glen T. BLANCHAMP, USMC
Sr Advisor (Chinese Air Force)	COL	Joseph L. PHINNEY, USAF

JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP, KOREA

Chief	MAJ GEN	Oliver D. STREET III, USA
Chief of Staff	CAPT	Maurice W. RUMBEL, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/ Plans and Programs	COL	Robert S. KAN, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/ Development and Acquisition	COL	Elwood J. HEIN, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/ Logistics	COL	Allen C. LIVINGSTON, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	LCOL	Samuel J. AZZARELLI, USA
Senior Army Assistance Officer	COL	Foy RICE, USA
Senior Naval Assistance Officer	CAPT	John L. EVERNGAM, JR., USN
Senior Air Assistance Officer	COL	Daniel G. McINTOSH, USAF
Senior Marine Assistance Officer	COL	John J. KEEFE, USMC

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN

Chief	CAPT	Charles W. COLE, USN
Deputy Chief	CIV	C. Lawrence O'NEILL

JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, THAILAND

Chief	COL	Aaron E. WALKER, USA
Deputy Chief	COL	Roy C. DALTON, USAF
Chief, Command Admin	CPT	Larry R. BRUMBACK, USA
Chief, Army Division	COL	John G. HAYES, USA
Chief, Navy Division/ CINCPACFLEREPRAT	CAPT	John F. DUNN, USN
Senior Marine Advisor	COL	John B. HARRIS, USMC
Chief, Air Force Division	COL	Charles K. ROSE, III, USAF
Chief, Support Division	LCOL	John H. REDD, JR., USA
Staff Judge Advocate	MAJ	Gary L. ANDERSON, USA

UNITED STATES DEFENSE LIAISON GROUP, INDONESIA

Chief	COL	William W. TORBAUGH, USA
Deputy Chief	COL	Mayer LITTMAN, USAF
Executive Officer	LCOL	Laurence J. YOUNG, USA
Chief, Army Branch	LCOL (P)	Duane R. BROLER, USA
Chief, Navy/Marine Branch	CDR	Gerald M. HIGBEE, USN
Chief, Air Force Branch	LCOL	Morgan B. LAFFITTE, USAF
Chief, Plans and Programs Branch	LCOL	Richard S. VARNEY, USMC
Chief, Communications and Electronics Branch	LCOL	Robert D. DUNCAN, USA
Chief, Personnel and Admin Branch	MAJ	Donald E. CUKJATI, USA

JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, PHILIPPINES

Chief	BGEN	James H. MAPP, USA
Chief, Ground Forces Div	COL	Herbert H. RAY, USA
Chief, Navy Div	CAPT	James R. TURNBULL, USN
Chief, Air Force Div	COL	Thomas H. MAHS, USAF
Chief, Joint Plans and Programs Div	COL	James R. GOBER, USA
Advisor, Philippine Marine Corps	LCOL	George D. NAVADEL, USMC
Chief, Personnel and Admin Div/AG	LCOL	Francis KAYE, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 9.

PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL - SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976

	GRAND TOTAL	MILITARY					U.S. CIVILIANS					LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS					DEPENDENTS				
		TOTAL	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOTAL	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOTAL	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOTAL	USA	USN	USMC	USAF
ALASKA	3,862	1,992		1,88	110		432		42	5							1,438		1,404	34	
AUSTRALIA	1,914	697	3	42		267	10		9		1	243		243			964	6	382		576
DIEGO GARCIA	1,099	1,099		1,099																	
GUAM	25,625	10,525	80	6,250	348	3,741	5,059	5	4,089		1,065	338		338			9,683	163	4,421	152	4,942
HAWAII	153,387	44,274	17,704	10,55	9,619	6,398	23,089	5,207	13,10	1,348	3,530						85,524	19,569	45,574	8,445	11,936
HONG KONG	68	25	6	13		6											43	13	20		10
INDIA	24	6	3	1		2	1		1			3		3			14	6	2		6
INDONESIA	271	78	24	10	2	42	5		5			19		19			169	38	53	5	73
JAPAN, Less Okinawa	58,077	16,911	1,314	4,656	4,480	5,961	2,816	667	1,288	68	793	17,471	3,453	9,681	1,148	3,189	21,379	2,879	11,148	1,004	6,348
JAPAN, Oki Prefecture	58,954	32,611	2,544	2,708	18,661	8,608	1,561	801	20	202	538	7,537	3,911	122	1,606	1,898	17,245	4,258	*	2,514	10,473
JOHNSTON ISLAND	134	130	83			47	1	1									3				3
KOREA	81,624	39,278	31,530	259	21	7,906	1,703	1,500	65		138	21,741	22,013	225		2,503	15,462	12,530	373	42	2,517
MALAYSIA	16	5	3			2											11	3			8
MARSHALL IS	3,833	21	21				1,900	1,900				519	519				1,393	1,393			
MIDWAY ISLAND	1,647	868		868			101		101								678		678		
NEW ZEALAND	195	113	2	102		9	6		6			25		25			51	4	19		28
PAKISTAN	76	23	6	2		15						7		7			46	15	5		26
PHILIPPINES	58,316	13,850	24	4,951	588	9,287	943	1	549		393	19,987	2	14,699	124	5,163	22,536	55	9,813	464	12,204
AMERICAN SAMOA	25	1	1														24		24		
SINGAPORE	65	29	1	25		1	5		5			15		15			16	7	5		4
TAIWAN	6,717	1,953	370	398	7	1,186	170	17	100		53	2,048	216	1,315		517	2,546	676	598	20	1,252
THAILAND	540	167	60	16	4	87	16		16			62		61		1	295	113	45	10	127
WAKE ISLAND	5	5				5															
WESTPAC	25,537	25,537		25,537																	
MIDPAC	12,376	12,376		12,376																	
EASTPAC	55,690	55,690		55,690																	
SUB TOTAL	550,157	259,204	53,787	126,005	33,842	43,570	38,418	10,599	19,685	1,623	6,511	73,015	30,114	26,753	2,877	13,271	179,520	41,728	74,564	12,695	50,533
CONUS	74,748	74,748		38,609	38,140																
GRAND TOTAL	624,905	333,952	53,787	164,614	71,982	43,570	38,418	10,599	19,685	1,623	6,511	73,015	30,114	26,753	2,877	13,271	179,520	41,728	74,564	12,695	50,533

* REPORTED IN JAPAN

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 23.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CINCPAC, COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MIL		U.S. CIV	LOCAL HIRE CIV	TOTAL MIL AND CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
CINCPAC	111	64	99	137	22	13	106	78	338	292	107	0	737
USACSG	37	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	6	62	0	105
CINCPACFLT	0	0	140	162	0	0	0	0	140	162	54	0	356
CINCPACAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	421	404	421	404	248	0	1,073
COMUSJAPAN	14	4	7	4	6	1	13	8	40	17	23	8	88
COMUSKOREA	74	104	34	50	10	1	56	69	174	224	14*	0*	412
COMUSTDC	10	6	19	19	3	1	12	7	44	33	12	7	96
JCRC	3	4	0	4	0	1	3	1	6	10	2	0	18
GRAND TOTAL	249	188	299	376	41	17	611	567	1,200	1,148	522	15	2,885

*Additional civilians listed here on previous charts transferred to other headquarters activity with reorganization; still employed in Korea.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 24.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP PERSONNEL-PACIFIC COMMAND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN CATEGORY

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976

CATEGORY	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOT MIL		US CIV	TOT US PERS	LOCAL HIRE
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
MAAG CHINA	11	4	4	2	3	0	8	1	26	7	5	38	12
ODC INDIA	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	3
USDLG INDONESIA	11	10	4	6	2	0	8	10	25	26	5	56	19
MDAO JAPAN	2	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	7	0	5	12	5
JUSMAGKOREA	40	13	20	14	8	4	29	22	97	53	43	193	49
JUSMAGPHIL	18	2	4	3	1	0	6	4	29	9	9	47	6
JUSMAGTHAI	40	17	11	5	3	1	18	13	72	36	16	124	61
OOR PAKISTAN	2	2	1	1	0	0	2	1	5	4	0	9	7
TOTAL	124	49	48	31	17	5	73	51	262	136	84	482	162

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 25.

MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976

	ARMY	NAVY	MC	TOTAL NAVY & MC	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED *	3,822	148,054	69,909	217,963	24,222	246,007
OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**	49,965	16,559	2,073	18,632	19,348	87,945
TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM	53,787	164,613	71,982	236,595	43,570	333,952

* FORCES ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

** FORCES PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN PACOM AREA BUT NOT ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 22.

AVAILABLE FORCES

ARMY	NAVY/MARINES	AIR FORCE
ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC		
1 Army Headquarters 2 Corps Headquarters 2 Infantry Divisions 1 Missile Command 1 Air Defense Brigade 8 Separate Aviation Company 3 Separate Engineer Battalion	2 Numbered Fleets 6 Attack Carriers 15 Cruisers 61 Destroyers/Frigates 10 Submarines (SSBN) 34 Submarines (SS/SSN) 32 Amphibious Warfare Ships 6 Carrier Air Wings 30 Fighter/Attack Sqdn 9 Reconnaissance/EW Units 6 Early Warning Units 9 Carrier ASW Sqdn 3 LAMPS Sqdn 12 Patrol Sqdn 6 Tanker Detachments 4 EC-130Q ELF Relay (TACAMO) 9 SOSUS Stations 2 Marine Amphibious Force Hq 2 Marine Divisions 2 Marine Aircraft Wings 14 Fighter/Attack Sqdn 1 Photo/Reconnaissance Sqdn 2 Tanker Sqdn 1 Observation Sqdn 15 Helicopter sqdn	2 Numbered Air Forces 3 Air Divisions 1 Composite Wing 1 Tactical Airlift Wing 3 Tactical Fighter Wings 1 Aeromed Airlift Sqdn 2 Tactical Air Support Sqdn 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Sqdn 1 Special Operations Sqdn 9 Tactical Fighter Sqdn 2 Tactical Airlift Sqdn 1 Airborne Command & Control Sqdn
IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC		
1 Engineer Group 1 Signal Brigade 1 Heavy Boat Co USASA Units in the Pacific Army National Guard Units 1 Infantry Brigade Army Reserve Units 1 Infantry Battalion 1 Civil Affairs Group 1 Engineer Construction Battalion 1 Corps Headquarters (ZOG)	10 Destroyers (Naval Reserve Trng) 9 Mine Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Trng) 2 Amphibious Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Trng) 60 Auxiliary Ships 3 Patrol Combatants 2 Submarines 1 Tactical Control Sqdn 1 Naval Warfare Group 1 Fleet Composite Operations Readiness Group	1 Air Division (SAC) 2 Strategic Wings (SAC) 1 Air Refueling Sqdn (SAC) 1 Bomber Sqdn (SAC) 2 Strategic Reconnaissance Sqdn (SAC) 2 Weather Reconnaissance Sqdn (MAC) 1 Test Group (AFSC) 1 Tactical Fighter Sqdn (Air National Guard) Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS) Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS) Air-Sea Rescue/Recovery Sqdn (MAC) Air Weather Service Units (MAC) Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Units (MAC)

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 10.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS



Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 13.

DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS



Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 16.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS



NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT INDICATE U.E. AUTHORIZATION.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 19.

SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1976

Commander in Chief Pacific

(U) Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, succeeded Admiral Noel Gayler, USN, as Commander in Chief Pacific on 30 August 1976. The change of command and related events are described elsewhere in this section. For the period 131700Z to 241800Z February 1976 Admiral Weisner, who at the time served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was designated Acting CINCPAC while Admiral Gayler was on leave. COL Maurice O. Edmonds, USA, served throughout the year as Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to CINCPAC.[1]

Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN Leroy J. Manor, USAF, became Chief of Staff on 13 October replacing LT GEN William G. Moore, Jr., USAF.

Political Adviser

(U) Mr. Leo J. Moser became the Political Adviser on 28 July replacing Mr. Roger W. Sullivan.

Joint Secretary

(U) COL Alan Coville, USAF, replaced COL Alan H. Birdsall, USAF, on 1 July.

Director for Plans

(U) RADM William R. McClendon, USN, continued to serve as Director for Plans. As his deputy, COL E. Gene Sprague, USA, served until he was replaced by BGEN Jack R. Sadler, USA, on 17 July.

Staff Judge Advocate

(U) CAPT Gardiner M. Haight, JAGC, USN, replaced CAPT Harland B. Cope, JAGC, USN, on 21 June.

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1. CINCPAC 022072Z Feb 76.

HUGH A. BENTON
RADM USN
Director for Logistics
and Security Assistance

WILLIAM R. MC CLENDON
RADM USN
Director for Plans

JACK R. SADLER
BGEN USA
Deputy Director for Plans

CHARLES E. WILLIAMS, JR.
BGEN USAF
Director for Communications-
Data Processing

BOBBY L. HATCH
CAPT SC USN
Comptroller

GARDINER M. HAIGHT
CAPT JAGC USN
Staff Judge Advocate



ROBERT G. W. WILLIAMS, JR.
RADM MC USN
Surgeon

ROY F. LINSENMEYER
GS-16 CIV
Chief, Research and Analysis Office

RICHARD U. SCOTT
PL 313, GS-17E CIV
Director ARDP

KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

LEROY J. MANOR
LT GEN USAF
Chief of Staff

WILLIAM E. MC LEOD
MAJ GEN USA
Deputy Chief of Staff

LEO J. MOSER
FSO-1 CIV
Political Adviser

ALFRED J. LYNN
GS-15 CIV
Chief Office for Public
and Governmental Affairs

ALAN COVILLE
COL USAF
Joint Secretary

JAMES H. JOHNSON
BGEN USA
Director for Personnel
and Inspector General

DOYLE E. LARSON
BGEN USAF
Director for Intelligence



FRANK C. LANG
MAJ GEN USMC
Director for Operations

Change of Command

(U) Admiral Maurice F. Weisner became Commander in Chief Pacific on 30 August 1976, relieving Admiral Noel Gayler, who had been CINCPAC since 1972. Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., headed the list of distinguished guests and visitors and addressed the assembly. General Fred C. Weyand, Army Chief of Staff, presented the Distinguished Service Medal to Admiral Gayler, who retired from active duty the following day.

(U) The ceremony was a great deal like the one held four years earlier for change of command. On the mall near Hickam Tower at Hickam Air Force Base, troops of all Services massed in formation on a sunny, hot Hawaiian afternoon. One departure from the 1972 ceremony was that the men and women in the military formations did not pass in review. The Navy, it was learned, no longer taught marching in boot camp. But the ceremony was concluded by a fly-by of aircraft from all of the Services, with the faster jets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps followed by Army helicopters.

(U) The CINCPAC Protocol Office was responsible for development of guest lists (1,800 names), design and ordering of invitations, seating and parking identification systems, and ceremony brochures. The ceremony itself was believed to cost about $32,000, with the principal portion of that amount (over $23,000) the cost for movement and repair of bleachers. The reception that followed, attended by about 800, cost approximately $3,600. The ceremony coordinator, a Plans Directorate officer, recommended that consideration be given to using the new (1976) public Aloha Stadium for the next such ceremony as it was an attractive site, had seating in place, had a field already lined and marked, had close and abundant parking, and was centrally located. Also, it would be considerably less expensive.[1]

(U) Admiral Maurice Franklin Weisner was born on 20 November 1917 in Knoxville, Tennessee, the son of Clint Hall and Adra Inex (Ogg) Weisner. After graduation from Knoxville High School, he attended the University of Tennessee before entering the U.S. Naval Academy in 1937. He graduated and was commissioned on 7 February 1941, and then served on the aircraft carrier WASP. On 20 May 1943 he was designated a naval aviator and joined Patrol Bombing Squadron TWENTY for service in the Southwest Pacific war area until 1945.

(U) This service was followed by duty with Patrol Bombing Squadron NINETY-EIGHT; the staff of Commander Fleet Air, West Coast; tours of duty as navigator on board the USS BADOENG STRAIT and USS RENDOVA; and service on the

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1. J003/75 After Action Report, 9 Sep 76, and enclosures.

staff of Commander Fleet Air Wing FOURTEEN. During 1949 and 1950 he became executive officer and then commanding officer of Patrol Squadron FORTY-SIX in combat in Korea. In May 1951 he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In April 1953 he became executive officer of All-Weather Fighter Squadron THREE. Then, after command of Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE in 1954 and 1955, he returned to the Office of the CNO where he headed the Air Striking Forces Unit until July 1958.

(U) After completing the National War College, he took command of Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED ONE in June 1959. In January the following year he became operations officer of Commander Carrier Division ONE, and in November assumed command of USS GUADALUPE. A year later he became commanding officer of USS CORAL SEA.

(U) He served in the Bureau of Naval Personnel from July 1962 to March 1964, when he was assigned as Director, Air Weapons System Analysis Staff in the Office of the CNO. In September 1965 he became Commander Carrier Division ONE, and from March 1967 to June 1969 he was Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Personnel Control and then Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel. In July 1969 he was named Commander, Attack Carrier Striking Force, Seventh Fleet/Commander Attack Carrier Division FIVE, operating all the carrier forces of the Seventh Fleet. In March 1970 he took command of the Seventh Fleet. He became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) in September 1971 and in September 1973 became Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet.

(U) The Admiral's decorations include three Distinguished Service Medals, two Legions of Merit, two Distinguished Flying Crosses, six Air Medals, the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V", and more than 20 unit, campaign, and foreign decorations.

(U) The Admiral married the former Norma H. Smith of Knoxville. Their three sons are Maurice Hall, Franklin Lee, and Stewart Holland.

Staff Organizational Changes

(U) The year 1976 saw fewer major organizational changes than had taken place in many years. The few minor adjustments that were made are outlined briefly below.

Research and Analysis Office

(U) In November 1974 a Review and Analysis Office had been established to provide advice and counsel on scientific and technical matters relating to CINCPAC's missions and functional responsibilities, and to conduct a review

and analysis program for CINCPAC and his staff, and, when required, for subordinate unified commanders and Military Assistance Program activities. This office had been created to consolidate functions previously performed by the Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC and certain functions of the Scientific Analysis Group of the Operations Directorate. The office was subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff and was called Code J021.[1]

(U) On 22 November 1976 this office was redesignated the Research and Analysis Office, maintaining essentially the same charter as noted above, with the tasking to provide objective bases for command decision-making wherever possible. It was also created as an independent office, Code J77, with administrative support to continue to be provided by J301 in the Operations Directorate. Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer continued to serve as Chief of this office.[2]

(U) Because of limited fiscal and manpower analytical resources within the headquarters, the office acted as a focal point for studies that required the use of those resources. In November 1976 a Studies and Analyses Steering Committee and Senior Review Group were established for the management of studies, analyses, war games, computer simulations, and similar activities undertaken by CINCPAC and CINCPAC staff agencies with a scientific basis for decision-making, but which were not normally performed by a division action officer. The Research and Analysis Office served as the executive agent for such studies and analyses, which had been approved by a Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy Director for Plans and consisting of the Deputy Directors for Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Communications-Data Processing, with the Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Pacific invited to participate. The committee was to review requirements, work in progress, completed studies, and requirements for assistance from component commands or contractors. The Senior Review Group, which consisted of the Chief of Staff and his Deputy and selected Directors appropriate to the business at hand, would review the committee's work and take appropriate action on recommendations.[3]

Office for Public and Governmental Affairs

(U) In 1974 a new position had been created within the executive offices, a Special Assistant to CINCPAC to be coordinator for Congressional matters.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.
2. CINCPAC Notice 5401, 22 Nov 76, Subj: Research and Analysis Office, J77, establishment of; J77 Admin HistSum Dec 76.
3. CINCPACINST 5250.1, 22 Nov 76, Subj: Conduct and Management of Studies and Analyses.

On 25 April 1975 the special assistant also assumed duties for direction and administration of Public Affairs and Protocol; thus staff codes were revised to J003/74 and J003/75, respectively. The mission and functions of the office remained the same in 1976, but on 29 November the position of the office in the organization was realigned and redesignated Code J03. The office was charged to recommend public affairs policy for the PACOM and supervise implementation of the DOD public affairs program to include administration of Pacific Stars and Stripes. The office monitored the status of legislation that affected the command and prepared CINCPAC for Congressional discussions and briefings. The office also directed the supervised protocol activities for the command and served as focal point for General Accounting Office audits of command interest.[1]

Operations Directorate

(U) During October two modifications were made in the Operations Directorate. On 1 October the Command and Control Systems Architect, Plans, and Requirements Branch (J335) of the Command and Control Division (J33) was transferred to the Requirements, Evaluation and Special Projects Division (J34). This was done to centralize the technical management and planning of future Operations Directorate command and control development programs into a single division. After the transfer J335 was redesignated J341, with the name Command and Control Architecture Branch, and J34 was renamed the Technology, Requirements, and Evaluation Division. J341 continued to support the Command and Control Division in all of its previous functions and also retained its support functions of automated data processing services and Worldwide Military Command and Control System overview for the Operations Directorate. Action officers and operations analysts previously assigned to J34 were placed in a new technology and evaluation oriented branch, J342, with the same title as the division.[2]

(U) On 1 August the Oceanography and Meteorology Office had absorbed the personnel and functions of the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Office (J222M) of the Intelligence Directorate, creating the Staff Oceanography, Meteorology, Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Office (J30B). In October that office was redesignated the Geophysics Division (J37). Mission, function, and personnel were unchanged.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 21-22; CINCPAC Notice 5400, 29 Nov 76, Subj: Office for Public and Governmental Affairs; realignment and redesignation of.
2. J340 HistSum Oct 76.
3. J37A HistSum Oct 76.

Management Control Detachment-Pacific Disestablished

(C) As discussed in the CINCPAC Command History for 1974, the CINCPAC Management Control Detachment-Pacific had been relocated from Yokota Air Base, Japan to Hawaii. This agency was disestablished effective 1 April 1976 and its residual functions were performed in CINCPAC's Directorate for Operations by the Permissive Action Link (PAL) Management Control Team (PMCT). Effective 31 March all Army personnel were reassigned from the unit. Four officers and three enlisted personnel were assigned to the Operations Directorate; the remaining four officers were reassigned to other commands.[1]

Consolidation of Special Operations and PSYOP/Unconventional Warfare Agencies

(U) The consolidation of the Operations Directorate's Special Operations Branch (J316) and the Plans Directorate's Psychological Operations/Unconventional Warfare Division (J55) had been under study for some time, as discussed in the 1975 History, with all agreeing on the idea of consolidation, but not in agreement on where the consolidated organization belonged on the staff. As directed by the Chief of Staff, the two offices were merged on 15 May 1976 in a new Special Operations Division in the Directorate for Operations. The new organization had the code J36. Besides providing for an integrated operation, a manpower saving of two spaces resulted. In addition to the duties of the former two agencies, the new division was responsible for certain collateral functions that had been managed by J316; these were foreign and domestic disaster relief, lava control, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and the Central Identification Laboratory. The new division was directed to be responsive to the Plans Directorate in preparation of the Joint Strategic Operations Plan and other contingency plans.[2]

Reconnaissance Activities Consolidated

(U) By 1 July the colocation of several branches of the Intelligence and Operations Directorates was completed. From the Current Operations Division of the Operations Directorate, the Reconnaissance Branch and the Electronic Warfare Branch were colocated with the Intelligence Directorate Collection Management Division's Signal Intelligence and Photo Intelligence Branches. The relocation was directed by the Chief of Staff to improve CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 31; J131 HistSum Feb 76; J142 HistSum Mar 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 23-24; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 1254, 23 Jun 76, Subj: Change 2 to HQ CINCPAC Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), 1 Nov 75; J3/Memo/329-76, 5 May 76, Subj: HQ CINCPAC Staff Reorganization; J01/Memo/18-76, 19 Apr 76, Subj; HQ CINCPAC Staff Reorganization.

reconnaissance command, control, and management. Associated with this colocation was the establishment of the position of Joint Reconnaissance Center Watch Officer (for which five new officer spaces were established) located in the PACOM Intelligence Watch Center.[1]

Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate Reorganized

(U) Effective 1 July the Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate reverted to a single deputy concept. (Two deputies had been assigned since the consolidation of two separate directorates, one for Logistics and the other for Security Assistance, which had taken place effective 1 July 1975.) The reorganization also reduced the divisions responsible for security assistance materiel and services program management and training from three to two. In a 1 December 1975 reorganization the number of Security Assistance plans and program divisions had been reduced from four to three, which were North Asia (J46), East Asia (J47), and South Asia (J48). With the 1 July 1976 reorganization the two newly formed divisions were the East Asia Plans/Programs Division (J46) with responsibility for Australia, Fiji, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and a South Asia Plans/Programs Division (J47) responsible for Afghanistan, Brunei, Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The Evaluation and Management Division staff code was changed from J49 to J48.[2]

Redesignation of Organization Administering Air Force Personnel Matters

(U) Air Force personnel on the CINCPAC staff were serviced by an Air Force Branch of the Headquarters Personnel Division (J14). In addition, they were considered to be assigned to an Air Force organization, the name of which had been Detachment 1, 1131st USAF Special Activities Squadron. Effective 1 April the title for that organization was changed to Air Force Element Pacific Command.[3]

(U) This change was instituted to more clearly identify the various Headquarters Command operating locations throughout the Air Force and better determine supply and budgetary priorities. Effective 1 July 1976 the Headquarters Command in the Pentagon assumed the function of a major command. The position that had been designated "Detachment Commander" in Hawaii was changed to "Program Manager." His responsibilities were similar to those of the Detachment Commander, except that he had no statutory authority to levy

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1. J3141 HistSum Jul 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 24-25; J452 HistSum Jul 76.
3. J143 HistSum Apr 76.

AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES

	1 January 1976				30 June 1976[1]				31 December 1976			
	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOT	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOT	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOT
CINCPAC	7	15	3	25	5	16	0	21	5	17	0	22
Inspector General	5	3	1	9	5	3	1	9	5	3	1	9
Office for Public/Governmental Affairs	0	0	0	0	13	10	11	34	13	10	11	34
Chief of Staff	5	1	5	11	3	2	4	9	3	2	4	9
Deputy Chief of Staff					2	0	1	3	2	0	1	3
Review and Analysis Office	2	0	6	8	2	0	7	9	2	0	9	11
Joint Secretariat	7	40	11	58	7	40	12	59	7	39	12	58
Personnel Directorate	18	18	11	47	19	18	11	48	18	17	13	48
Intelligence Directorate	37	67	8	112	38	67	8	113	37	66	7	110
Operations Directorate	76	53	10	139	94	58	10	162	99	60	11	170
Logistics Directorate	45	23	19	87	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate	0	0	0	0	67	26	26	119	61	21	18	100
Plans Directorate	54	27	10	91	55	27	10	92	52	26	9	87
Communications-Electronics Directorate	32	15	10	57	30	14	10	54	30	14	10	54
Comptroller	4	0	7	11	4	0	9	13	4	0	9	13
Staff Judge Advocate	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8
Public Affairs	10	7	4	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protocol Office	3	3	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Surgeon	3	3	1	7	3	3	1	7	3	3	1	7
Security Assistance Directorate	40	23	23	86	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liaison Officer to CINCAL	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	353	301	131	785	351	287	122	760	345	281	117	743
Airborne Command Post	33	8	1	42	33	8	1	42	33	8	1	42
PACOM ADP Systems Support Group	22	41	25	88	26	46	34	106	26	46	34	106
Intelligence Center Pacific	108	139	58	305	108	139	58	305	108	139	58	305
Management Control Detachment Pacific	16	9	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Miscellaneous Units[2]	2	6	0	8	2	6	0	8	5	9	26	40
Sub-Total	181	203	84	468	169	199	93	461	172	202	119	493
GRAND TOTAL	534	504	215	1,253	520	486	215	1,221	517	483	236	1,236

1. Headquarters CINCPAC FY 76 Joint Manpower Program (revised 1 November 1975) was approved by JCS 9242/271742Z Feb 76.
2. PACOM Miscellaneous Units FY 77 Joint Manpower Program (revised) and three out-of-cycle changes were approved by JCS 1753/132213Z Sep 76, JCS 7027/011903Z Oct 76, and JCS 7316/302322Z Dec 76. The total of 26 civilians includes 23 Local Wage Rate spaces. The miscellaneous units as of 31 December were Australia Foreign Military Sales, Administrative Specialist to the Defense Attache Office in Singapore, Administrative Assistant to the Defense Attache Office in Malaysia, the U.S. Military Advisor's Representative to SEATO and SEATO support, USMACTHAI Residual Accounting, Management of Ammunition in Thailand, and the Office of Defense Cooperation, India.

non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The host commander of the 15th Air Base Wing, at Hickam Air Force Base, was charged with that responsibility, which was stipulated in the local host-tenant agreement under AFR 11-4.[1]

Joint Manpower Programs

(U) The authorized strengths of CINCPAC staff directorates and the various other Joint Manpower Programs administered by CINCPAC are as shown on the accompanying chart. In December 1975 the JCS had tasked CINCPAC to submit plans for reduction by 20 percent for the following PACOM support activities: the Airborne Command Post, the ADP Systems Support Group, the Management Control Detachment-Pacific, the Intelligence Center Pacific, and the USMACTHAI Support Group. On 30 December 1975 CINCPAC had reported reaching those reduction goals for all except the Airborne Command Post and the Intelligence Center Pacific. On 30 January 1976 the JCS, responding to the Secretary of Defense, supported the CINCPAC position to exempt those two agencies from further reductions at that time.[2]

(U) On 29 October the JCS approved an out-of-cycle change 2 to the Joint Table of Distribution for FY 76 and extended it for FY 77. The FY 76 year-end authorization of 743 (626 military and 117 civilian) represented a decrease of 58 spaces from the year-end FY 75 strength of 801, and a net reduction of approximately 5 percent (42 spaces), using a JCS-directed baseline of 808 spaces.[3]

Flag and General Officers on CINCPAC Staff

(U) The number of general and flag officer billets on the staff, the grade levels assigned, and the Service of those officers was a matter of continuing study over the years. On 23 March 1976 CINCPAC submitted to the JCS his recommendations in this regard for the revised FY 76 Joint Table of Distribution. He had concluded that certain changes were needed. He recommended that the position of Director for Logistics and Security Assistance be changed from Navy to Army, to provide the Army with a major billet consistent with one of its major interests (as well as to improve the numerical balance among the Services, a continuing goal on joint staffs). He recommended reestablishment of the Deputy Director for Plans billet as an Army brigadier general. This had been the circumstance until 1 August 1975, when the departing deputy

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1. J143 Memo to J01, 22 Mar 76, Subj: Redesignation of Special Activity Units.
2. J131 HistSum Jan 76, which cited MJCS 413-75 of 1 Dec 75, CINCPAC Ltr Ser C468 of 30 Dec 75, and JCSM-33-76 of 30 Jan 76.
3. J134 HistSum Nov 76.

had been replaced by an Army colonel from the Plans Directorate. He noted that reestablishment at the general officer level was completely justified on the basis of workload and representational requirements. Also, it could be accomplished within the total number of flag and general officers authorized. He recommended that the Director for Personnel be changed from an Army brigadier general to rotate, at the same rank, between the Navy and Marine Corps to maintain a Service balance. He planned to rotate the billet of the Director for Operations between the Marine Corps and Air Force.[1]

(U) The JCS reply of 3 May, however, was not in agreement with CINCPAC's proposal. A comparison of the two follows:[2]

Position	CINCPAC's Proposal	JCS Answer
Commander in Chief	010 Navy	010 Navy
Chief of Staff	09 Air Force/Army	09 Air Force/Army
Deputy Chief of Staff	08 Army/Air Force	08 Army/Air Force
Director for Personnal and Inspector General	07 Navy/Marine Corps	07 Army
Director for Intelligence	07 Air Force	07 Air Force/Navy
Director for Operations	08 Marine Corps/ Air Force	08 Marine Corps
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance	08 Army	08 Navy
Director for Plans	08 Navy	08 Navy/Air Force
Deputy Director for Plans	07 Army	07 Army/Navy
Deputy for Communications and Data Processing	07 Air Force	07 Air Force/Army

(U) On 5 May CINCPAC advised the JCS that he would like to reclama the JCS answer. He recognized that some rotational billets were necessary, but he preferred a minimum of them at the director level. "Extension or curtailment of normal tours due to promotion, retirement or Service requirements can disrupt mix or necessitate short tours," CINCPAC said. He continued that rotation could cause the director and deputy to be of the same Service or cause lack of continuity because of simultaneous reassignment. He urged two specific requirements. The first was for an Army officer as the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance. These two areas were best served by Army expertise, he said. The other was that the Air Force should share influence in the Operations Directorate. Rotation was the "only way to do this." The proposed rotation of Service for the Director for Personnel was to keep a Service balance when the Director for Operations changed Service. He continued

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 33; CINCPAC 230306Z Mar 76.
2. JCS 2536/031348Z May 76; CINCPAC 040317Z May 76.

that a rotational Deputy Director for Plans would be particularly difficult to manage with the Director's billet also being rotational. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he realized there were infinite combinations, but he didn't understand the rationale for the distribution provided by the JCS.[1]

(U) CINCPAC subsequently advised the JCS that he recognized Service interests and the possible problem of worldwide balance on joint staffs. As a general policy, however, he noted, "I would think that primary consideration would be given to a CINC's views on tailoring his own staff--provided, of course, that he maintained a reasonable balance." He noted that he had not been told of any specific objection to his original March proposal. Instead, he had simply been given a different line-up that appeared to be based solely on inter-Service compromise. "I do not think this is the way to go about tailoring a staff."[2]

(U) Meanwhile, CINCPAC sought and received approval for filling the position of Deputy Director for Plans with an Army brigadier general, pending resolution of the whole matter.[3]

(U) In September CINCPAC provided the JCS, in response to their request, with his recommended normal tour lengths for flag and general officers in the PACOM. All were for three years, except two-year tours were recommended for the Chiefs of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Groups in Korea and the Philippines and the Chief MAAG China. He recommended "strongly" that "we avoid rigid adherence to set tour lengths, and that the Services be given flexibility to reassign general and flag officers for purposes of career enhancement, promotion, etc." Regarding the two-year MAP tours, this allowed flexibility and tours could be extended on a case-by-case basis.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 050430Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC 131905Z Jun 76.
3. CINCPAC 201941Z May 76 and JCS 241354Z May 76 (both BOM).
4. CINCPAC 090326Z Sep 76; J131 HistSum Sep 76.

SECTION III--OTHER PACOM HEADQUARTERS STAFFING

Reductions in MAAGs and U.S. Personnel so Assigned

(S) On 28 February the JCS advised CINCPAC of a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs that legislation passed by the U.S. Senate (S.2662), if enacted into law, would require the disestablishment of 10 Military Assistance Advisory Groups worldwide. In addition, it would be necessary to withdraw 222 of the authorized 1,622 spaces in such MAAGs by 30 June 1976. The JCS asked for prompt action to identify the MAAGs that were logical candidates for disestablishment and the personnel spaces that should be earmarked for deletion from authorization documents. Actions regarding personnel in the process of being assigned should be held in abeyance to avoid personnel hardships resulting from reassignment while in transit or shortly after arriving at a new assignment. Possible personnel shortfalls, it was acknowledged, could occur if the legislation did not become law.[1]

(U) CINCPAC provided a list in order of priority and identified personnel spaces for reduction. The JCS further requested rationale for such prioritization of MAAGs in terms of U.S. interests and justification for their retention. This CINCPAC report was provided on 16 May, and is discussed in greater detail in the Security Assistance chapter of this history.[2]

(U) Throughout this middle part of 1976 major changes were occuring in the national-level management of the Security Assistance Program; these are also addressed in the Security Assistance chapter.

(S) When the final decision was made in the Defense Department and passed on to the State Department for review and approval, there were 11 MAAGs slated for disestablishment. Only one was in the PACOM; that was India. The others were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay. All personnel actions and movement of personnel made excess by reductions was to be completed as soon as feasible, but not later than 15 February 1977. "Consider in such planning retention of a 3 man liaison group allowed by Sec 104 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976."[3]

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1. JCS 9748/280630Z Feb 75.
2. CINCPAC 160410Z May 76.
3. JCS 1285/091723Z Aug 76.

(C) The military assistance organization in India, the Office of the Defense Representative India, was the only CINCPAC agency designated for disestablishment. The office there, however, which had been physically located within the Embassy, enjoyed a somewhat unique situation in that the number of currently assigned American personnel (one officer, one enlisted, one civilian secretary) was within the manning allowed by the 1976 law. Therefore, the termination action, according to the ODRI, "should not affect the continuity of our day-to-day operations" with the Government of India in any way. Assignment of three U.S. personnel to the Embassy staff, which was authorized, would not reduce the services being provided nor would it affect liaison actions with the Ministry of Defense. The Ambassador noted that the fact that the Military Assistance agency in Pakistan had not been terminated could lend emphasis to the thinking in some corners of the Indian Government that the United States was "tipping the scales in favor of Islamabad." As the termination was to be merely an internal change, the Ambassador saw no need to inform the Indian Government, either formally or informally, that there had been any change. If questioned, it would be stated that there had been some internal changes, but that it was "business as usual."[1]

(C) CINCPAC officially disestablished the Office of the Defense Representative India effective 30 September. He directed that the residual liaison group be responsible for Security Assistance programs for India and for U.S. property when assigned to the former ODRI. In September CINCPAC requested JCS approval to transfer the billets in the residual element to the FY 77 PACOM "Miscellaneous Units" Joint Manpower Program. The JCS approved CINCPAC's request on 30 December.[2]

(U) In the PACOM, the following Service assignments and grade levels were authorized for the heads of Security Assistance agencies:[3]

China	07	Rotational Air Force/Army
India	06	Army
Indonesia	06	Rotational Army/Navy/Air Force
Japan	06	Rotational Navy/Air Force/Army
Korea	08	Army
Pakistan	06	Air Force
Philippines	07	Army
Thailand	07	Rotational Army/Air Force

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1. AMEMB New Delhi 11945/150940Z Aug 76.
2. CINCPAC 240410Z Aug 76 and 282352Z Sep; JCS 7316/302322Z Dec 76.
3. JCS 9054/051934Z May 76.

(S) This last authorization, however, came under further study. On 19 June CINCPAC advised that he believed that a continuing requirement existed for an 07 Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand "for at least next year," but by October an Army 06 had been assigned to that billet.[1]

(U) The India billet was filled by a Navy 05 beginning in July 1976, but the position had been changed to Air Force 05 and would be so filled in 1977.

Defense Attaché Office Laos Disestablished

(U) In September 1973 the position of Defense Attaché in Laos was established. (Formerly there had been a Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Attaché.) Revised Terms of Reference were approved by the JCS on 12 March 1976. On 25 May, however, the JCS closed the Joint Manpower Program. Of the total authorization of 154 spaces (29 military, 15 U.S. civilian, and 110 local Wage Rate), the following actions took place. Returned to the Defense Intelligence Agency were 3 military, 6 U.S. civilians, and 6 Local Wage Rate. Eight were used for compensation with other PACOM Joint Manpower Programs (5 military and 3 U.S. civilian). The remaining 131 were returned to the Services (21 military, 6 U.S. civilians, and 104 Local Wage Rate). By June the DAO was manned by two officers, one non-commissioned officer, and two Local Wage Rate employees.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 190254Z Jun 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 57-58; JCS 8919/121633Z Mar 76 and 5698/252030Z May 76; J1313 HistSum May 76.

SECTION IV--COMMAND AND CONTROL

Unified Command Plan Changes Expand the PACOM

(U) The Unified Command Plan, published by the JCS, was the basic charter of the unified and specified commands. It was based on decisions made by the President and the Secretary of Defense. It outlined the areas and responsibilities of the various commands. Revisions to this plan, therefore, were the means by which commands were formed or disestablished, by which geographic boundaries were set, and by which basic missions were assigned.

(U) The last major change that had affected the PACOM had been effective on 1 January 1972, when the command, which was already the largest of the unified commands, was increased in area from about 85 million square miles to about 94 million. Additions at that time included the countries of Southern Asia extending westward to the eastern border of Iran, and much of the Indian Ocean as well as the Aleutian Islands and parts of the Arctic Ocean.[1]

~~(C)~~ On 2 April 1976 the JCS advised that a change to the plan had been recommended to move the boundary between the Atlantic Command and the PACOM farther westward, from 62°E to 17°E, giving CINCPAC responsibility for the entire Indian Ocean, effective 1 May 1976. The change had been approved by the President on 3 March and the Secretary of Defense had directed implementation on 23 March. The JCS encouraged the continuation of inter-command arrangements relative to the Pacific/Atlantic/European Commands similar to those already in effect.[2]

~~(C)~~ The enlarged command included the entire Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden, but excluding the Malagasy Republic. The expanded area included the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives. All land areas of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, remained in the European Command area. Africa south of the Sahara and the Malagasy Republic remained unassigned. Accompanying these changes were plans for manpower reductions in all of the commands, all the result of a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense that tasked the JCS to review potential realignments, tasking of the unified and specified commands, and reducing or

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, p. 41.
2. JCS 2290/022322Z Apr 76.

eliminating outdated tasks with the objective of streamlining military headquarters. (Staff reductions throughout the command are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.)[1]

(S) On 8 April, in anticipation of the boundary change, CINCPAC advised his component commanders and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group of the expansion and asked them to assess additional area responsibilities against available assets to accomplish required tasks and respond to potential contingencies. The functions that he asked them to report on included (but were not limited to) the collection and reporting of intelligence; control and protection of shipping; search and rescue missions; port visit arrangements; disaster relief; noncombatant emergency evacuation; exercises with friendly forces; and antisubmarine warfare operations.[2]

(U) On 19 August the Honolulu Star-Bulletin published a report that the PACOM "again stretches out," noting that another eight million square miles of water off East Africa had been acquired in May, expanding the command to an area of 102 million square miles.[3]

Review of PACOM Tasking

(U) As noted above, in October the Secretary of Defense directed that the JCS review the taskings of the unified and specified commands and Defense agencies that reported through the JCS with a view toward eliminating or reducing tasks that were outdated. The JCS forwarded a list of tasks to be reviewed in JCS J5M 293-76 of 27 February. It contained approximately 1,150 individual tasking statements taken from the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, JCS publications, JCS and Defense Department directives, and public affairs and protocol requirements. CINCPAC was directed to review each tasking and provide recommendations, by exception, for elimination or reduction of specific tasks. The JCS also requested a compilation of tasks from other sources, not included in their list, with command and recommendation as appropriate.

(U) CINCPAC initiated such a review, establishing an ad hoc working group comprised of directorate, staff agency, and Service representatives. The detailed review of each task was conducted by the directorate or agency in

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1. J563 HistSum Jan 76; SECDEF Memo to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman, JCS, and the Directors of Defense Agencies, 22 Oct 75, Subj: Unified and Specified Commands (PACOM, USEUCOM, USREDCOM, LANTCOM, SAC) and Supporting Structure.
2. CINCPAC 080231Z Apr 76. See the Plans chapter for CINCPAC's Indian Ocean Assessment.
3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 19 Aug 76, p. D-8.

whose area of cognizance the task fell. CINCPAC's Navy and Air Force component commands and the Army's CINCPAC Support Group reviewed the entire list and commented, where appropriate, on tasks with Service implications.

(U) The results of CINCPAC's review were forwarded to meet the 1 April suspense. The forwarding letter also commented on the numerous Service Department directives the PACOM headquarters was required to respond to because of the joint make-up of its personnel, and the significant impact of one-time requirements and taskings from higher authority.[1]

CINCPAC-CINCEUR Command Arrangements Agreement

(C) On 16 April 1974 the Commander in Chief of the European Command had forwarded a proposed draft of a USCINCEUR-CINCPAC Command Arrangements Agreement. He noted the contiguous areas of responsibility of the two commanders, and recognized the possible situations in which the employment in proximity of forces of both unified commands might be required or beneficial to U.S. objectives. The purpose of establishing command arrangements, he said, was to promote effective mutual support between the forces of the two commands. He then listed possible arrangements in regard to the authorization of direct liaison for planning, cooperative measures for intelligence matters, and particularly with regard to exchange of operational command for the Mid-East Force and Indian Ocean task forces.[2]

(C) Work continued throughout 1975 and half of 1976 before the agreement was finally completed. Admiral Gayler signed as CINCPAC on 19 May and General A.M. Haig, Jr., Commander in Chief of the European Command, signed on 1 July 1976.[3]

(C) Part of the delay concerned the planned movement of the PACOM boundary which is discussed in changes to the Unified Command Plan elsewhere in this history. The principal other delay concerned whether or not the forces operating in the geographic area of a unified commander should be "chopped" to him during normal peacetime operations. This term meant that operational command/operational control (which the JCS had defined as synonymous) of forces was to pass from CINCEUR to CINCPAC when forces were operating in the PACOM area. CINCPAC wanted the forces to be chopped to him; CINCEUR did not agree. There seemed to be no clear-cut guidance in JCS publications, although both Unified Action Armed Forces and the Unified Command Plan pertained.

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1. J563 HistSum Mar 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 88-89.
3. Memorandum of Agreement between Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and Commander in Chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR).

(C) CINCPAC provided his thoughts on this matter to the CINCEUR on 20 March 1976. He noted that there was one area of concern to him, "effective and unambiguous chain of command." He believed the following principles should apply:[1]

> ...Tactical control of forces in a given area should be unified.
>
> ...A commander should be able to exercise effective control over all politico-military matters in his area, including port visits.
>
> ...He should have a clear-cut military chain of command vice quote cooperative unquote and quote coordinating unquote arrangements.
>
> ...Arrangements should be joint and therefore agreed between unified commanders. [The Commanders in Chief of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets had been working on their own arrangements.]

He noted that the Indian Ocean boundary had been changed to reduce forever the ambiguity from multiple command arrangements. Unity of command and unity of effort demanded that it be kept unambiguous, he said. "Operational command" avoided unnecessary administrative complications, "and I think it essential for both of us." He forwarded a command arrangements agreement that reflected these thoughts.

(C) When the JCS advised of the boundary change in the revised Unified Command Plan, however, they encouraged the continuation of inter-command arrangements relative to PACOM/LANTCOM/USEUCOM boundaries similar to those already in effect.[2]

(C) On 8 April the CINCEUR provided his rationale as to why forces should not be chopped as they crossed boundary lines. He believed that the parent unified commander should retain operational command of forces unless it was mutually agreed in a given instance by the two commanders, or directed by the JCS. The existing CINCEUR-CINCLANT agreement, which did not chop forces, had "provided the essential flexibility to permit MIDEASTFOR to frequently cross UCP 'boundaries' and still operate on USCINCEUR's behalf effectively, as well as in the best interests of national objectives." He continued that he

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1. CINCPAC 200249Z Mar 76.
2. Op. Cit., JCS 2290/022322Z Apr 76.

believed there would be "no perceivable gain in requiring ships and aircraft during routine operations to chop upon crossing UCP boundaries; in fact, such a rigid procedure could contribute to confusion and uncertainty."[1]

(C) CINCPAC provided still further rationale for the principles he had outlined on 20 March. Included were thoughts that any occurrence involving a MIDEASTFOR ship operating in the PACOM likely to cause an issue or create a diplomatic incident was to be resolved by CINCPAC; that operations involving MIDEASTFOR ships and Seventh Fleet ships in company or on a common task should be under the direction of only one unified commander; that CINCPAC needed to be able to direct MIDEASTFOR ships on short notice on urgent but unexpected requirements, such as search and rescue or disaster assistance; the need for CINCPAC to approve all port visits to PACOM countries (procedures in this regard were already in effect and working); and the need to be able to employ MIDEASTFOR ships from time to time to carry out tasks for which authoritative direction should be provided by CINCPAC.[2]

(C) With these recommendations, CINCPAC forwarded another draft agreement that he believed would maintain unity of command in the best way short of a change in operational command.[3]

(C) The final agreement then was concurred in by both commands, and signed as noted above. COMIDEASTFOR was to be assigned additional duty as the CINCPAC Representative, Indian Ocean, on a not-to-interfere basis with COMIDEASTFOR responsibilities to USCINCEUR. During his normal operations he would be assigned additional duty to CINCPACFLT to accomplish CINCPAC tasks in CINCPAC's area of responsibility on a not-to-interfere basis with his responsibilities to USCINCEUR. In that regard, one specific task concerned Operational Control Authority in the Naval Control of Shipping Organization, in coordination with the Commander Third Fleet, within the single integrated area encompassing the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean west of 78°E longitude.

(C) During normal peacetime operations, operational control of forces was to remain with the parent unified commander regardless of geographic location of forces, unless otherwise agreed mutually by USCINCEUR and CINCPAC, or as directed by the JCS. The commands were to inform one another in a timely manner of operations planned or conducted in the western Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Gulfs of Aden and Oman in order to permit close coordination and preclude mutual interference between U.S. Forces.

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1. USCINCEUR 081627Z Apr 76.
2. CINCPAC 272321Z Apr 76 (EX).
3. J5/Memo/055-76, 26 Apr 76, Subj: CINCPAC-USCINCEUR CAA (U).

COMIDEASTFOR was to operate in support of CINCPACFLT for those operations in the Indian Ocean that supported CINCPAC's mission, with certain exceptions. These were that when it was mutually agreed by the two unified commanders, for the accomplishment of specific missions, OPCOM of COMIDEASTFOR and forces assigned, as required, would be passed to CINCPAC for operations in the PACOM area of responsibility as directed by CINCPACFLT, with OPCOM to be returned to USCINCEUR upon completion of assigned missions; that for short-term urgent requirements, such as search and rescue or disaster assistance, MIDEASTFOR ships operating in the PACOM area would operate as directed by CINCPACFLT, who was to keep all concerned informed; and that whenever MIDEASTFOR ships operated in company or on a common task with Seventh Fleet forces, tactical command and conduct of operations would be as directed by CINCPACFLT for the duration of the operation.

(C) By agreement with CINCLANT, operational command of MIDEASTFOR relieving ships transiting via the Cape of Good Hope passed to CINCPAC at 17°E. Operational command of these ships would be passed to USCINCEUR upon crossing EUCOM boundaries, at a port designated as point of relief, or as mutually agreed by USCINCEUR and CINCPAC.

(C) The agreement discussed war or contingency operations resulting from attack or threat of attack on U.S. Forces of the forces or territory of a country considered vital to U.S. interests. Arrangements were outlined for four situations: CINCPAC forces operating in support of USCINCEUR, CINCPAC forces augmenting USCINCEUR, USCINCEUR forces operating in support of CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR forces augmenting CINCPAC.

(C) Also outlined were arrangements regarding the exchange of operational command of CINCPAC forces augmenting USCINCEUR for a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, regarding the release and employment of nuclear weapons, and regarding Public Affairs responsibilities.

Commanders' Conference

(C) On 18 and 19 May CINCPAC attended a conference convened by the Chairman of the JCS at the Readiness Command Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. It was attended by the Service Chiefs and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. In preparation for the conference, CINCPAC submitted seven proposed discussion topics, and subsequently expanded on the seven in response to a request from the European Command. Only two of the seven topics were selected for presentation, however,

during what was actually one day of meetings. Admiral Gayler led a discussion on the two topics: foreign military training--value versus costs, and realistic contingency planning and crisis management.[1]

Kunia Facility Closed

(b1)

[redacted]

(c) In 1962 CINCPAC had initiated a project to build a ground headquarters on top of the Kunia facility to replace his Camp Smith Headquarters (which was also of World War II vintage) and the Secretary of Defense had included the cost in the FY 66 Military Construction Program, but Congressional committees did not authorize such construction.[2]

[redacted]

(U) Modernization of the facility continued over the years. In 1972 a Honeywell H6050 computer was installed as part of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS); it was the first such computer in the PACOM. In 1974 an Emergency Action Booth was enlarged and equipped with Western Electric Model 304 consoles similar to those at Camp Smith.[4]

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1. JCS 1811/242244Z Mar 76 (EX); CINCPAC 070749Z Apr 76; SSO Seoul (Golf 3) 060533Z May 76 (BOM); JCS 5737/112217Z May 76 (EX).
2. CINCPAC Command Histories 1963, Vol. I, p. 18; and 1964, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.
3. CINCPAC Command Histories 1963, Vol. I, p. 18; and 1967, Vol. I, p. 48.
4. CINCPAC Command Histories 1972, Vol. I, p. 40; and 1973, Vol. I, p. 67.

(U) During 1975 still further ADP improvements were made at both Camp Smith and Kunia, but by the end of that year many proposals regarding Kunia were being held in abeyance as continued use of the facility came under study. One reason was that improvements were also occuring elsewhere.[1]

(S) On 9 January 1976 CINCPACFLT advised that the computer system that provided all ocean surveillance and status of forces data on the Fleet, and the system that generated the FORSTAT (Force Status and Identity Report) data cards for CINCPAC and the JCS was no longer in use. An evolutional process had allowed transfer of Navy functions from Kunia to CINCPACFLT's Headquarters at Makalapa (near Pearl Harbor). The only data base information maintained by computer at Kunia was the Single Integrated Operation Plan data from CINCPAC's Honeywell 6060 system. There were no Fleet plans to implement a remote terminal capability at Kunia from Makalapa. "In view of the foregoing, the continuation of the ERS [Emergency Relocation Site for CINCPACFLT] and the ACFK [Alternate Command Facility] at Kunia is of doubtful usefulness since the facility no longer has the requisite communications support capability." He estimated that closing the facility entirely would result in an annual saving of $5.6 million, conversion to caretaker status a saving of $4 million, and securing of all CINCPACFLT Emergency Relocation Site spaces as $100,000. He rescinded the requirement to maintain Kunia as a Navy ERS, and asked that CINCPAC look closely at his requirement to maintain an Alternate Command Facility there.[2]

(C) CINCPAC had already had the matter under study throughout 1975. The ever-decreasing use of the facility made it less cost effective to keep open. An Operations Directorate preliminary analysis of costs, floor-space use, and tenant functions was presented to CINCPAC in July 1975. He requested further information, and recommended closure actions were presented to CINCPAC in January 1976, coinciding with CINCPACFLT's proposal. CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that the requirement for both the ERS and the ACFK was rescinded. To fulfill his obligation for continuity of operations, he explained, he was examining other locations that could serve as an Alternate Command Post. (Establishment of this new Alternate Command Post (ALCOP) is discussed in more detail below.) CINCPAC said that he understood that the Kunia facility could be closed entirely with the relocation of the remaining tenants and that this should be accomplished without delay. CINCPAC also advised all tenant agencies of this decision and encouraged them to assist CINCPACFLT as the responsible executive in taking appropriate action as soon as possible.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 56.
2. CINCPACFLT Ltr Ser 34/A-18, 9 Jan 76, Subj: Kunia Facility; use of (U).
3. CINCPAC Ltr Ser C21, 21 Jan 76, Subj: Kunia Facility (U); CINCPAC 232007Z Jan 76; J341 HistSum Jan 76.

(C) CINCPACFLT notified the Chief of Naval Operations that Kunia was excess to Navy needs and requested authority to dispose of the facility. The CNO, however, subsequently alerted CINCPACFLT regarding a joint study that the Navy was to lead on military real property requirements in Hawaii. The study had been directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The CNO wanted certification that the Kunia closure was in support of study objectives, which were to obtain maximum possible combined Service utilization of real property over the long term; to identify current, long-range, and mobilization real property requirements; and to determine dominant users for each significant installation, activity, and property associated with requirements. The CNO asked CINCPACFLT to advise if the Kunia property was significantly peculiar that disposal decision would not be of significance in meeting new study objectives. He also asked that CINCPACFLT identify tenant commands involved in the action and the impact associated for each by the closure.[1]

(U) Subsequently, permission from the Secretary of the Navy and the Congress would be required before decommissioning of the facility, but this would not be forthcoming until the spring of 1977.[2]

(C) Certain CINCPAC actions regarding relocation were begun early in 1976. The Communications-Data Processing Directorate, in coordination with CINCPACFLT, began removal of the 800-line Government-owned telephone exchange to be replaced with a few commercial lines until the facility was closed; estimated cost savings were $600,000 a year. That directorate also began coordinating with the Army to relocate the WWMCCS computer from Kunia to Fort Shafter, where it would be used temporarily until it was to be moved once again to the proposed Regional ADP Center to be in the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific building in 1978. The move to Fort Shafter was accomplished and the Honeywell 6060 computer was operational there by June 1976. The Kunia Nuclear Operations Branch (J32K) completed its relocation to Fort Shafter on 21 May and was redesignated the Fort Shafter Nuclear Operations Branch (J32S). That organization attained full operational status on 1 June. June 1976 had been set by CINCPACFLT as the target date for relocation of all activities, but that date was not attained by all agencies. Total moving expenses were estimated at approximately $3 million.[3]

(C) In April the Fleet Operations Control Center Pacific (FOCCPAC) had notified all Kunia tenants that existing Inter-Service Support Agreements would be cancelled on 1 October. This was the target date for final relocation of the CINCPAC Alternate Command Post to Hickam Air Force Base. Effective 1 June

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1. CNO 312159Z Mar 76.
2. J340 HistSum Feb 77.
3. CINCPAC 121904Z Mar 76; J341 HistSums Jan, Jun 76; J322 HistSum May 76.

the CINCPACAF Alternate Command Facility at Kunia was closed; PACAF retained alternate headquarters at 5th Air Force Headquarters at Yokota Air Base, Japan, and at 13th Air Force Headquarters at Clark Air Base in the Philippines.[1]

(C) In April CINCPAC had requested JCS approval to install the Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System at the new ALCOP at Hickam, but it was subsequently decided (and approved by the JCS) to install it at Camp Smith with an Automatic Digital Network terminal at the ALCOP. This equipment was expected to be ready in the spring of 1977.[2]

(C) The Defense Communications Agency, Pacific completed removal of all equipment and relocated to nearby Wheeler Air Force Base on 10 September. Also moving to Wheeler was the 326th Air Division; this move was completed by 15 October.[3]

(C) The 326th Air Division had been one of the last two tenants. The last was the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility, which terminated operations at Kunia on 19 October. The Fleet Operations Control Center continued to provide support until the departure of all tenants. They terminated their communications center operations on 19 October. Their in-house generators were secured on 18 October, with pumps and fans being run from Hawaiian Electric Company sources and billed to Barbers Point Naval Air Station.[4]

(C) FOCCPAC made plans to secure the interior entrance of the exhaust tunnel containing the Hawaiian Telephone Company systems, which needed outside access. They planned to build a more useful outside entrance for this tunnel, provide it with security systems remoted to a nearby facility and supply it with Hawaiian Electric Company power. The tunnel could then be entered from the outside of the facility by telephone company employees for maintenance on their systems, and also be used for remote control operations of the Navy microwave relay system within the tunnel. The facility would be placed under administrative control of the Naval Air Station at Barbers Point after deactivation of the FOCCPAC.[5]

(U) By early 1977 all major internal systems had been turned off except for a pumping system that fed water through the facility to irrigate the pineapple fields above. Upon receipt of expected closure approval from the

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1. J34 HistSums Apr, Jun 76.
2. Ibid.
3. J34 HistSums Sep-Oct 76.
4. Ibid.
5. J34 HistSums Aug-Sep 76.

Secretary of the Navy, FOCCPAC was to be decommissioned and the Navy's Facilities Engineering Command Pacific Division was expected to handle negotiations for disposition of the facility. It was first to be offered to the other Services and then the State of Hawaii. If not taken over by a government agency or the State of Hawaii, its ownership would revert to the Campbell Estate.[1]

New Alternate Command Post Established

(C) In connection with the closing of CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility at Kunia, discussed above, on 27 March CINCPAC announced a new concept for continuity of operations. The CINCPAC Command Center at Camp H.M. Smith would function as the primary command post until it was disabled or until primary command post duties were assumed by the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post, airborne. In time of war, the CINCPAC ABNCP would function as the primary command post during a trans/post nuclear attack. In peacetime, a fixed ALCOP would function as the primary command post when the CINCPAC Command Center at Camp Smith was disabled. The CINCPAC ABNCP ground facility at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii was designated the CINCPAC ALCOP. At this time CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF that CINCPAC staff people would coordinate space and other requirements to support establishment of the ALCOP.[2]

(C) In May CINCPACAF approved use of the ABNCP Ground Operations site to locate the new CINCPAC ALCOP. CINCPACAF had assumed the lead for site preparation and the installation of communications equipment. On 14 July the final design of space reconstruction was finished by the 15th Air Base Wing and forwarded to the Navy's Public Works Center on 16 July. The PWC funded the first $20,000 of an expected $90,000 cost on 14 July. Completion was expected by 15 September.[3]

(U) The new facility was activated on 15 October and Kunia's post was closed on 19 October. Only partial service was available until 15 December when installation of a switching console was completed.[4]

(C) Teletype support to insure continuity of operations was outlined in a CINCPAC message of 1 May. "The ALCOP must provide a capability to relay JCS Emergency Action Messages to SIOP [Single Integrated Operation Plan] forces, to fulfill responsibilities assigned in the EAP-JCS Vol IV [Emergency Action Procedures], and to provide space for a very austere Command Center Watch Team (CCWT) and a minimum staff." The austere CCWT would consist of five

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1. J340 HistSum Feb 77.
2. CINCPAC 270126Z Mar 76; J332 HistSum Apr 76.
3. J34 HistSums May, Jul 76.
4. J340 HistSum Oct 76.

people. The only time more than five would be required to deploy to the ALCOP would be in the unlikely situation in which both a disabled Camp Smith and an emergency situation existed at the same time. Under those circumstances, approximately 15 more people would deploy. The message then listed the minimum required communications capability: JCS Alert Network termination and conferencing; Missile Warning Display System (receive only); CINCPAC Teletype Alert Network (teletype connectivity to PACOM commands); teletype uplink position to CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (airborne); Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (this requirement was subsequently deleted--IEMATS was installed at Camp Smith); World-wide Automatic Secure Voice Conferencing Network; Automatic Secure Voice Communications; dual access Automatic Digital Network; Automatic Voice Network access; and World-wide Military Command and Control System ADP Visual Information Processor and line printer (medium speed). Certain of these facilities were already in place in the ABNCP Ground Operations area.[1]

Airborne Command Post Activities

(U) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post, nicknamed BLUE EAGLE, maintained the ground alert status that had begun in January 1970, conducting deployments, exercises, and training throughout the year. In 1976 the EC-135 aircraft that comprised the Airborne Command Post were all converted from the "P" model to the "J" model. The first of the "J" models had arrived in 1975, the second arrived on 23 January 1976 and the third and last in August. They were assigned to the 15th Air Base Wing to support the CINCPAC ABNCP mission. The new aircraft carried numbers 055, 056, and 057. The aircraft had the same basic communications capability as the earlier "P" model, but the addition of fan jet engines and improved navigational equipment enhanced the system. The addition of the fan jet engines increased endurance or range by approximately 12 percent.[2]

(U) On 22 February the first mission using the ABNCP in a secondary tactical role was flown. Two Battle Staffs participated in a Marine Corps exercise called BEARING THUNDER on the Island of Hawaii. Special arrangements were made to unsecure the communications nets for the period as the BLUE EAGLE aircraft were not equipped with secure voice radios. In March, however, a very high frequency secure voice system was installed in Aircraft 056 to enhance the operation of the aircraft in a tactical role. During November the aircraft were modified with installation of satellite communications equipment. In December, utilizing this equipment and the Navy's GAPFILLER satellite, communications training exercises were accomplished during a routine deployment.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 010211Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 53-55; J3310 HistSums Jan, Aug 76.
3. J3310 HistSums Feb-Mar, Nov-Dec 76.

(C) The first deployment of the ABNCP to the Indian Ocean area occurred in January. A two-day stop at Diego Garcia was made and a local mission of six hour's duration was flown from that island northwest into the Arabian Sea. Communications with the Commander Middle East Force and elements of command were exercised during the flight. CINCPAC's Director for Communications-Data Processing was aboard during the entire deployment.[1]

(C) As was the usual procdure, there were two kinds of training exercises conducted regularly throughout the year. BLUE EAGLE TWO was an alert training exercise in which the aircraft taxied to a runway hold area; BLUE EAGLE FOUR was an exercise that launched the aircraft on a local flight. For each, the standard for completion was to be less than 15 minutes. Most were well within that time frame, and only one exceeded it. On 30 January a false start and puddling of fuel in the tail pipe caused an engine fire. After "correcting the problem" the flight proceeded normally, but 19 minutes and 58 seconds elapsed before takeoff. BLUE EAGLE TWO exercises averaged about three a month, with eight during the year from deployed locations, usually Kadena on Okinawa or Yokota in Japan. BLUE EAGLE FOUR exercises averaged two a month.[2]

(C) Regular tests of low frequency/very low frequency operations were also conducted by the ABNCP. Between January and the final test in September, an average of about five tests a month were conducted with designated Naval Communications Stations. After this coverage testing was completed, results were to be published by the Defense Communications Agency. In two-thirds of the months in which such tests were conducted, one or two scheduled tests were cancelled because of weather or equipment problems. Also, throughout the year tests were conducted in support of the Defense Communications Agency's Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) Technical Evaluation Plan for contingency communications link to fleet ballistic missile submarines. These tests ran from one to three a month.[3]

(U) Various officers visited and were briefed on the ABNCP during 1976. Shortly after he was assigned as CINCPAC, Admiral Weisner visited, was briefed on operations, and toured a BLUE EAGLE aircraft. Others who visited or toured the aircraft included some visitors from Richmond Royal Australian Air Force Base, where the aircraft had deployed; Mr. Richard Shriver, Director of Telecommuniations and Command Control Systems from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; LT GEN C.J. LeVan, Director of Operations in the Office of the JCS;

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1. J3310 HistSum Jan 76.
2. J3310 HistSums Jan-Dec 76.
3. J33145 HistSums Jan-Dec 76.

RADM W.R. McClendon, CINCPAC's Director for Plans; and members of a House of Representatives Appropriations Staff subcommittee.[1]

(U) On 29 and 30 November instructors from the Joint Air Ground Operations School presented a course of instruction to all battle staff members. The course had been designed to fill a requirement to develop battle staffs capable of coordinating small-scale tactical operations.[2]

(U) Four times during the year parts of antennas were lost, but no damage to the aircraft or other property was incurred in any case.[3]

(C) BLUE EAGLE participated in JCS POLO HAT Exercises on 27 May and 26 August, and on 29 October supported GIANT MOON 8, a test of the Emergency Rocket Communications System.[4]

Review of PACOM Command and Control Facilities

(U) In late August and early September members of CINCPAC's Command and Control Division in the Operations Directorate visited a number of facilities in the PACOM to examine command and control facilities, to include emergency action training and procedures, crisis action management, and command and control communications. Specific areas examined included emergency action training and certification procedures; physical layout of command centers; commanders' availability test call procedures; manning of command centers to include the number and qualification of personnel and watch team schedules; command and control communications, to include use of the JCS Alert Network, CINCPAC's Voice and Teletype Alert Networks, and All-Source Information Center nets; crisis action notification procedures; organization for crisis actions; and problem areas requiring CINCPAC's support. Without exception, the team found that all areas visited appeared to be well organized and personnel were highly motivated and appeared well qualified. Specific units visited were as follows:[5]

Guam: Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 3 and the Naval Communications Station.

Philippines: The 13th Air Force Command Center, the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing Command Center, and the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post Van Facility.

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1. J3310 HistSums Feb, Aug-Nov 76.
2. J3310 HistSum Nov 76.
3. J3310 HistSums Feb, Jun, Aug 76.
4. J3310 HistSums May, Aug, Oct 76.
5. J3321 HistSum Sep 76

Taiwan: The Taiwan Defense Command's Command Center and All-Source Information Center, Detachment 1 of the 13th Air Force, and the Republic of China's Tactical Air Control Center.

Korea: Both the Main Command Post and the Forward Command Post of the UNC/U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army, the 51st Composite Wing and 314th Air Division Command Center, and the Osan Air Base Tactical Air Control Center.

Japan: The 5th Air Force's Command Center and its Command Advisory Function/Reconnaissance Operations Center/ All-Source Information Center; the Yokota Air Base Consolidated Command Post, and the CINCPAC ABNCP Alert Facility and Van.

Command Center Modernization Project

(U) In late August, just as he was about to relinquish command, Admiral Gayler advised the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that he had learned of a decision by the Navy Comptroller to defer the Command Center Modernization Project, P-002, from the FY 78 Military Construction Program to the FY 79 program. He sought the CNO's assistance in overturning this decision, noting that Admiral Weisner supported his position. On 13 September Admiral Weisner was advised that the project remained in the FY 78 program, as requested. This project designed to rebuild the CINCPAC Command Center facility was funded in the Department of the Navy Military Construction Program at $4.2 million.[1]

Intelligent Terminal Project

(U) An "intelligent" terminal for use at CINCPAC headquarters had been demonstrated in 1975 and endorsed by Admiral Gayler. This was an experimental Touch Terminal device, a piece of equipment like a portable television set that was activated by physically touching the screen to select and print the range of things within its capability. In April 1976 a team from the University of Illinois (which had introduced the concept to CINCPAC) demonstrated it for CINCPAC staff members. "Everyone liked the feature of touch entry vice keyboard." The team was able to link the Digital Equipment Corporation computer with the Honeywell 6060 computer for the first time in the World-Wide Military Command and Control System community. FORSTAT (Force Status and Identity Report) data retrieval became available on the device in June.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 280200Z Aug 76; CNO 131954Z Sep 76; J3/Memo/T543-77, 19 Sep 77, Subj: Review of Draft CINCPAC Command History, Chapters I and III.
2. J335 HistSum Apr 76.

Command and Control Communications

(S) In response to a request from the JCS, CINCPAC provided his satellite communications requirements, as follows:

> ...The early achievement of a high quality military communications satellite capability that provided channels in quantity and continuous operation is considered an urgent requirement. Such a capability would have been of inestimable value in support of operations in Southeast Asia...even if sophisticated secure control circuits, anti-jam protection, and nuclear survivability features were not provided. Recognizing that a worldwide...[satellite communications system] might some day be called on to resist enemy spoofing, jamming, or direct attack...[CINCPAC] urged that the program be vigorously pursued with the most simple and uncomplicated design schemes that could be devised. CINCPAC preferred a soon-in-operation, high quality system with reasonable protection to a spoof-proof, jam-proof, highly protected facility in the 1980's.

This statement was submitted regarding the Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project and was dated 19 November 1966.[1]

(S) The requirement for satellite communications continued to be expressed 10 years later in 1976, although the additional requirement for "secure" communications had been added. In comments on broad architectural alternatives for the WWMCCS, on 10 February CINCPAC's message to the JCS stated that it was "imperative" that we "move out now (not wait for 1985) to satisfy critical requirement for satellite based, secure, conferenceable, high capacity, rapid, reliable, interoperable communications." This, it was believed, would result in cost savings. Even though satellites were initially expensive, they were not so in the long run "considering manpower and all other aspects." "We must immediately improve wide band secure communications in this theater. High quality voice interoperability of communications with the diplomatic/State [Department] community in PACOM is an absolute must." In selecting what he considered the most viable of the WWMCCS alternatives presented, he again stated the need for sufficient secure wide band communications "now," provision of portable stations in the right places, insurance that there was adequate interoperability between

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1. J335 HistSum Apr 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1966, Vol. I, pp. 119-120, which cited CINCPAC Ltr Ser 001901 of 19 Nov 66.

the right people and systems, improvement of automated data processing (and the data input), and improvement of the operations and communications security of "all our forces."[1]

(S) The same subject was addressed by CINCPAC to the JCS in connection with on-going study of the PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (of 12 December 1975). CINCPAC noted that the primary PACOM objective continued to be achievement of a "capacious satellite communications system at earliest practical date." The operation connected with the seizure of the SS MAYAGUEZ, he noted, was "executed under marginally adequate communications...." He outlined some of the problems still being encountered and then addressed future contingencies.

(S) CINCPAC said that these future contingencies, which had become the major concern, were infinite in variety, unpredictable, and fast-breaking. Effective command, control, and communications "will be crucial to success of our operations." Experience had shown that the prime command circuit would be one that could conference the JCS, the theater commander, the executing commander, and a limited number of supporting commanders by secure voice. "Voice commands must then be followed by secure record data, on dedicated channels that can provide simultaneous upward and downward data flow." Additionally, tactical communications "must be" compatible across land, sea, and air. Long-haul communications should be satellite where possible, for security, capacity, reliability, and flexibility; air-transportable satellite terminals had to be available. High frequency communications should be relied on as little as possible. "Where they must be used, alternate circuits and proper frequency choice are essential, preempting frequency allocations as may be necessary."

(S) "Immediate priority must be given," the message continued, "to achieving viable alternatives against failure of operational satellites; obtaining higher communications capacity for the Indian Ocean; expanded capability for wide band secure voice and secure voice/data conferencing; and additional terminals to include shipboard, airborne, and mobile ground additions." A second major objective was to provide CINCPAC and his staff with a facility that would make relevant and unambiguous the mass of information converging on the headquarters during a crisis. "Lack of visual real-time display of crisis events and locations was felt strongly at PACOM Headquarters, where conflicting reports causing dissimilar perceptions of crisis situations had to be repeatedly clarified." Identification of these shortcomings had mostly resulted from problems encountered in live situations. Methods must be developed, it was believed, to allow adequate identification and quantification of real world deficiencies

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1. CINCPAC 100113Z Feb 76.

at other than crisis times. "Substantial effort must be devoted to identification and promulgation of critical WWMCCS evaluation criteria," and adequate funding provided to allow the testing of critical assets during exercise environments. (As an example, participation of an Airborne Command and Control Center in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT was considered highly desirable, but funding was not available.) "Such actions would assist the formulation of meaningful exercises and result in improved training outcomes and realistic rather than artificial determinations of C^3 capabilities."[1]

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1. CINCPAC 202010Z Mar 76.

SECTION V--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

Posture of U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific

(S) In 1973 the U.S. Army had begun major studies for its own reorganization. One immediate effect on CINCPAC had been the proposed disestablishment of his Army component command in Hawaii. That U.S. Army Pacific headquarters had, in fact, been disestablished on 31 December 1974, and in its place was created a unique organization, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group that was a field operating agency of the Department of the Army, not a CINCPAC component command. The details of this action were addressed in the CINCPAC Command History for 1974, as were the beginnings of other Army studies throughout the PACOM. These studies continued in 1975 under sanction of the Secretary of Defense with the goal of reducing the Army support structure in the Western Pacific, particularly Japan. These actions were known as WESTPAC II, and at the Defense level as Program Budget Decision 253.[1]

(S) By 1976 the program was known as the WESTPAC III Study - Posture of U.S. Army Forces in Western Pacific, FY 78-FY 82 (U), and the matter was still under review. In this WESTPAC III the Army provided a review of Pacific logistic forces and supporting bases and forces, particularly Northeast Asia, and examined the Army's ability to support the evolving Forward Defense Strategy in Korea. On 23 September the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the Army study, although not a detailed review on a line-by-line basis. Rather, the JCS asked for comments on the proposed realignment actions as to their political, military, or contingency implications. The JCS then asked CINCPAC to comment on a number of specific questions raised in a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. CINCPAC's specific replies will be addressed later in this discussion. In the meantime, CINCPAC asked for the comments of his subordinate unified and component commanders, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and the CINCPAC Representatives in the Philippines and Guam/TTPI. Abstracts of selected replies follow:[2]

(S) COMUS Korea provided his thoughts on 2 September. He provided a number of general comments relative to continuing the Army force presence in Northeast Asia through FY 82. He noted that the defense of Korea was the forward defense of Japan, and that regional perceptions of the U.S. commitment to WESTPAC were as important as the actual commitment. Japan was important as a reservoir for shipment of materials from the Continental United States, as an

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1. Detailed accounts are provided in CINCPAC Command Histories 1974, Vol. I, pp. 63-80; and 1975, Vol. I, pp. 89-96.
2. JCS 4167/152226Z Sep 76 and 5657/231932Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 240224Z Sep 76.

intermediate staging area for airlift, and as an area for the performance of heavy maintenance. Japan also provided an alternative to basing in Korea and Taiwan. If the United States closed out or reduced facilities in Japan, "we seriously hamper our flexibility in future years for projecting U.S. interests in the Western Pacific." He concluded that a strategic lift shortfall would seriously hamper the U.S. Army's ability to logistically support its own ground forces and those of its allies.[1]

(S) COMUS Japan noted that the Japanese Government had repeatedly expressed concern over the residual U.S. Force structure in Japan, during both formal and informal discussions. He outlined the concern that had been expressed over the years by COMUS Japan and CINCPAC to the JCS over the lack of communication with the Japanese concerning proposed reorganizations. Both the State Department and the JCS had acknowledged the validity of such concerns and recognized the adverse impact on U.S.-Japan relations that might result. However, it had been directed that no discussions be held, or notification of intentions given, until Service-proposed reductions and realignments were integrated into a single coordinated position. He continued, "Presently one and one half years after receiving JCS directives not to discuss plans for reorganization/reduction of U.S. Forces in Japan with the GOJ [Government of Japan] until a coordinated U.S. position was determined, there still appears to be no coordinated U.S. military approach to the future stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan." He continued that movement of war reserve assets was considered to be the most sensitive issue in WESTPAC III and discussion prior to implementation would perhaps moderate its potentially adverse impact on U.S.-Japan relations. Finally, there remained an even greater concern regarding U.S.-Japan relationships. WESTPAC III represented a unilateral U.S. Army view and did not include similar uni-Service plans for force changes in Japan. COMUS Japan was aware such plans were or had been under consideration. "There appears to be a need to examine the question of total Army presence in Japan and the viability of the types of functions residual Army forces would be assigned...in the light of other Service plans--in other words a unified approach rather than single-Service approaches."[2]

(S) The U.S. Ambassador commented on WESTPAC III in response to a request from COMUS Japan. He noted that the Army's plan involved withdrawal of most Army activities from Okinawa and transfer of about half of the Army ammunition stored in Japan to Korea. The Embassy was concerned about implications Japan might draw from the plan concerning long-term U.S. intentions and about labor and facilities problems associated with its implementation. The Ambassador elaborated on these views. The Japanese reaction, he noted, would depend not

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1. COMUS Korea 020735Z Sep 76.
2. COMUS Japan 060440Z Oct 76.

so much on the content of the Army plan as on the U.S. ability to provide its rationale within the broader context of long-range U.S. planning for the Western Pacific. [redacted] 1.5L Implementation of the plan would apparently involve additional Army reduction-in-force actions on Okinawa at a time when past reductions were already responsible for a significant portion of Okinawa's serious unemployment problem. Regarding facilities, while the Embassy was not aware of the extent to which other Services would acquire Okinawa facilities released by the Army, "there obviously will be major impact on previously agreed consolidation plans such as Okinawan Base Consolidation Package (OBCP), and the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP)." The proposed Army drawdown would stimulate pressures for further base releases. The Ambassador recommended that U.S. Forces review overall facilities requirements on Okinawa in the light of WESTPAC III and existing consolidation and reductions plans.[1]

(S) CINCPAC's Navy and Air Force component commanders commented. CINCPACFLT saw no impact on his plans provided POL service on Okinawa continued as it had in the past. (Transfer of POL functions on Okinawa was one of the matters under consideration in the plan.) CINCPACAF provided his specific comments on the questions posed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, but also provided some general observations. The Army's proposal to move a heavy boat company to Hawaii to support inter-island training movements of the 25th Infantry Division would result in significant savings on contract barge expenses, etc., but it would not obviate the requirement for airlift to training sites on Hawaiian islands other than Oahu. CINCPACAF believed this airlift was necessary to provide joint training in planning, load preparation, loading and off-loading, documentation, and safety requirements. Movement for training solely by boat could erode proficiency and adversely affect the 25th Division's capability to deploy rapidly and effectively by air in a contingency. Also, the study did not address aerial resupply support (materiel, personnel) required to augment the 19th Support Brigade in Korea in the event of a contingency in Korea or elsewhere in the PACOM requiring aerial resupply. Prior to the withdrawal from Southeast Asia the Army had maintained a delivery rigging support complex in Okinawa and Thailand that supported Cambodian resupply efforts. Army adjustments since then had reduced their in-theater capability to support a major aerial resupply effort. Such a requirement could realistically occur as a result of initial North Korean attacks or might be required to support

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 14863/050225Z Oct 76.

the COMUS Korea counteroffensive. Finally, it appeared that the dollar value of War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) proposals would be substantial and should be addressed in relation to available WRSA funds and related needs of the other Services.[1]

(S) CINCPAC considered all of the inputs when he provided his response to the JCS on 15 October. First he noted that he understood the Army's rationale for charting a new course for Army forces and facility realignments in the five year period under study. CINCPAC's major concern was Japanese reaction, the possible reduction in logistic support flexibility, and the potential permanent loss of access to Japanese facilities. He assumed coordination with the allies and other Services would be accomplished prior to incremental implementation. He then addressed specific answers to the questions that had been asked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Certain of these questions and CINCPAC's comments in reply follow.[2]

(S) Will the further commitment of our munitions base to Korea and reduction of our support structure in Japan compromise broader theater support capabilities and flexibilities? "Since the security of Japan and the ROK are closely linked, the movement of some Class V stocks [munitions] presently stored in Japan to Korea will enhance security of Northeast Asia (NEA) by placing stocks in location where need is most likely. However, reduction of Army support base in Japan could limit Army's ability to support contingencies outside Korea."

(S) What is the impact of moving the material resources to Korea, should it become national policy to substantially reduce the U.S. presence in Korea? "Impact should be minimal. U.S. national policy is to assist allies in their own defense. U.S. plans for forward defense require prepositioning of stocks in-country regardless of U.S. Force levels maintained in a particular country. If national policy calls for a further reduction of U.S. presence in Korea, it does not necessarily follow that simultaneous retrograde of stocks in Korea would be required. However, if it is determined that simultaneous retrograde was necessary, redeployment of forces and retrograde of stocks could be time phased as necessary. Alternatively, ammunition could be sold to the ROK."

(S) How does WESTPAC III impact on U.S.-Japanese defense relations? "Key to the issue is Japan's perception of the change. Worst case would be if GOJ interprets WESTPAC III as shift in policy away from Japan and perceives a reduction in U.S. resolve. Japan's perception ultimately depends on effectiveness of U.S. efforts to explain move. In theory, repositioning additional war

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1. CINCPACFLT 070127Z Oct 76; CINCPACAF 072030Z Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC 150213Z Oct 76.

reserves to Korea suggests a better capability to defend ROK--mutually understood to be in Japan's interest. However, reductions...could be viewed as a lack of U.S. commitment to the direct defense of Japan, even though lessening of U.S. military presence on Honshu and Okinawa could be of political benefit to GOJ."

(S) After some questions and answers about specific logistic matters associated with munitions storage, it was asked, "If, in fact, capability for direct defense of Japan is degraded, is degradation a prudent risk under threat projections for Northeast Asia through FY 82?" "In view of current GOJ and U.S. threat perceptions...degradation considered a prudent risk. However, additional factors need consideration. First, U.S. withdrawal from Japanese facilities is normally irreversible. Second, potential change in U.S.-Korea relations should Congress direct substantial U.S. force withdrawals from Korea prior to FY 82. Third, PRC [People's Republic of China] policy changes as they might affect the current balance of power and international relations in Northeast Asia prior to FY 82. Therefore, prudent risk as we see it now is subject to continuing assessment."

(S) With regard to Army facilities on Okinawa that would be vacated under WESTPAC III implementation, were there any other Service requirements which would justify transfer and retention by U.S. Forces and preclude reversion of facilities to the GOJ and minimize RIF of local national work force? "Since May 1972 reversion, U.S. Forces and facilities on Okinawa have been reduced/consolidated. PBD [Program Budget Decision] 280 and 253 further reduce U.S. Army force level and facilities in Okinawa. Since there is a continuing requirement to provide support to USMC and USAF combat forces in Okinawa, facilities identified as excess by a Service would automatically result in other Service review for retention. Therefore a proposal to return a costly facility such as the Makiminato Service Area to the GOJ is subject to these reviews. Recognize that past RIFs have been dictated more by changes in mission requirements than by return of facilities to the GOJ. To minimize the impact of RIFs caused by any future changes in mission, U.S. should continue past practice of closely coordinating our force adjustments among the Services and with the GOJ."

(S) Several other specific questions were addressed before the matter of POL functions on Okinawa, which the Army study had suggested be transferred to another Service. CINCPAC commented that such a transfer would not result in savings to the Defense Department as the function would have to be performed by another Service or agency.

(S) Commenting on the Makiminato Service Area, which was under discussion, CINCPAC noted that he considered early return to the Japanese Government in total or in part a sensitive issue to be reviewed by all Services prior to decision. The area housed a mortuary, milk plant, laundry and dry cleaning facility, cold storage and subsistence warehousing, property disposal, and other support activities that were required by U.S. Forces on Okinawa. Experience had indicated that real estate returned to the Japanese Government was no longer available for military use. Once released, no provisions existed for reentry. Japan could interpret a U.S. proposal for joint use as an indication that real estate was no longer needed.

(S) In the matter of the implication that the 15-day safety factor for ammunition WRSA would be eliminated, CINCPAC commented that the WESTPAC III proposal to maintain only a 60-day level of ammunition WRSA for Korea was an area of concern. The proposal eliminated the 15-day safety factor. CINCPAC Operation Plan 5027 called for the 15-day level for U.S. and ROK forces. He believed that the goal for ammunition planning for WRSA should remain at 75 days. He also addressed the proposed elimination of Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Stocks (PWRMS) for PACOM reserve and reinforcing divisions. CINCPAC recognized that Planning and Programming Guidance governed and limited prepositioning, but the WESTPAC III plan to eliminate all PWRMS for Army reserve and reinforcing divisions "raises serious doubts of whether adequate materiel, especially ammunition, will be available to support Army contingency operations within the Pacific." From a logistics point of view, CINCPAC continued, such "action limits flexibility within PACOM." He outlined what the Army logistics posture would be in the defense of Korea and other PACOM contingencies, noting that he believed that a flexible logistic posture was important as a hedge against possible contingencies.[1]

Forces and Basing in Korea

(C) Early in December officials in both Korea and Japan began expressing apprehension regarding the direction of U.S. Korean policy under the newly elected American Government. Japanese officials had repeatedly stressed the importance of consultations before any troop withdrawals and had been "unprecedentedly explicit in describing U.S. force presence in ROK as 'essential prerequisite' for stability in NE Asia." One Japanese observer detected similar uneasiness at the Soviet and Chinese embassies in Tokyo over the possibility of rapid troop withdrawal. At the same time, however, accounts in the Korean press, attributed to a high official in the U.S. State Department, had assured the Japanese that Japan and Korea need not worry about the reduction of American troops in the Carter Administration. If true, this

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1. Ibid.

was overtaken by events. The President-elect's news conference of 21 December announced the planned withdrawal of some ground forces, and by early 1977 the United States had advised both Korea and Japan that it intended to withdraw 6,000 of 30,000 ground forces by the end of 1978.[1]

(S) The matter of the 4th Missile Command's disestablishment was included in a report entitled the Defense Department Pacific Basing Study, prepared at the request of the Senate Armed Services Committee and provided to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee. On 16 December a member of that House Committee was briefed by representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the JCS and was told:[2]

> The transfer of the HONEST JOHN battalion to the ROK, the deactivation of the SERGEANT battalion, and deactivation of the 4th Missile Command is expected to be completed in FY 77-FY 78.

Military Use of Cheju-Do

(S) As noted in the 1975 Command History, Cheju-Do was an island off the southern coast of Korea. At that time President Park had again raised the issue of possible use of Cheju-Do for basing USAF units, but had been advised that the United States saw no use for the island, that mainland sites should have first priority in planning for additional airfields.[3]

(S) In 1976 the subject was raised again, this time by the ROK Defense Attaché, who implied that the ROK Government might be willing to assume partial or complete costs of land acquisition and construction of facilities for U.S. use on the island. In early April the JCS tasked CINCPAC to provide comments and recommendations on possible military use of the island. CINCPAC sought the comments of COMUS Korea, COMUS Japan, the Strategic Air Command, the CINCPAC component commanders, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group.[4]

(S) CINCPAC considered these comments when he provided his reply to the JCS on 20 April. He advised that he saw no attractive requirement for permanent peacetime basing of U.S. Forces on the island. PACAF had two bases

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1. AMEMB Seoul 9560/030815Z Dec 76; AMEMB Tokyo 17851/030900Z Dec 76; AMEMB Seoul 10180/270812Z Dec 76; Deadline Data on World Affairs.
2. CINCUNC/USFK/EUSA Seoul 160102Z Dec 76, readdressed to CINCPAC as JCS 221330Z Dec 76; JCS 2864/230001Z Dec 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 110.
4. JCS 5081/061809Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 070143Z Apr 76.

in Korea in caretaker status available for upgrading. The Army was eliminating some bases in Japan and consolidating facilities in Korea. Navy and Marine requirements in the Western Pacific could be better served by the existing base structure. The U.S. base and support structure in Japan and Korea represented substantial investment in terms of cost and commitment, CINCPAC said, and well served U.S. peacetime presence. He believed the United States should turn down the ROK offer and attempt to convince the ROK Government that its resources could be better used to improve and expand the mainland base structure, particularly at Pohang and Yechon.[1]

Forces and Bases on Taiwan

(U) President Nixon's 1972 visit to China was followed by plans for drawdowns of U.S. Forces and the closing of U.S. bases on Taiwan. The United States had, in the Shanghai Communiqué, agreed to progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as tension in the area diminished. Such reductions had begun and as of 31 July 1975 there were 2,977 Americans assigned in Defense Department agencies, and as Embassy guards.[2]

(U) On 11 March 1976 a story in the Boston Globe reported that President Ford had given a secret pledge to China to reduce the American military presence on Taiwan by about 50 percent over the next year, according to "well-placed administration officials." The pledge reportedly was made by the President during his December 1975 visit, and was meant to reassure China's leaders that the United States was determined to further the normalization of relations even if it wasn't quite ready to break formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish them with China. American troop strength, according to the newspaper report, had already been reduced from a force of 8,600 at the time of Nixon's first visit to approximately 2,200.[3]

~~(TS)~~ On 19 February the JCS had advised CINCPAC and COMUSTDC of a meeting of the Senior Review Group of the National Security Council to be held on 23 February to consider a 50 percent withdrawal of U.S. military personnel on Taiwan by the end of 1976. The meeting was also to consider possible alternative locations for the U.S. Army Communications Command, War Reserve Material (WRM) storage, and the Shu Lin Kou Station. The JCS requested CINCPAC's views and recommendations.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 200106Z Apr 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 113-115.
3. The newspaper text was quoted in SECSTATE 059426/1/111818Z Mar 76.
4. JCS 1617/191339Z Feb 76.

(TS) CINCPAC's response of 21 February reviewed the importance of COMUSTDC for support of the Mutual Defense Treaty; WRM in support of CINCPAC Operation Plan 5025, Defense of Taiwan/Penghus (C); the requirement for a communications link from the Philippines through Taiwan to Northeast Asia; and the high value placed on retention of the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center to handle aircraft maintenance. CINCPAC identified 289 spaces for possible deletion, with 15 from the TDC and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) staffs, 40 from the USN Support Activity at Taichung/Tsoying, 59 in the conversion of the Navy hospital at Taipei into a dispensary, and 175 for base support personnel required to maintain WRM storage at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base. CINCPAC deferred to the National Security Agency on reductions of intelligence activities.[1]

(TS) On 23 March the JCS further tasked CINCPAC to provide data on the U.S. dependent population on Taiwan and requested comments regarding the possible imposition of a remote-tour policy for the island. CINCPAC's reply of 3 April further defined his original input on the reduction of U.S. military presence, plus a full report on dependent population and assessment of an isolated-tour policy on mission, morale, personnel actions, and funding. CINCPAC identified 862 military spaces for potential reductions. A detailed review of all units and activities with authorized manning was submitted with proposed reductions by unit.[2]

(TS) On 20 April the JCS expressed appreciation for the refined and expanded information. They advised that the civilianization of selected military functions, a key element of the CINCPAC plan, was being pursued with "appropriate authorities." The JCS noted CINCPAC nonconcurrence with JCS priorities for deletion of non-intelligence functions and requested CINCPAC's comments. CINCPAC sought the comments of his component commanders, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and COMUSTDC.[3]

(TS) CINCPAC considered the responses from those commanders in preparation of his reply of 6 May. The specific questions raised by the JCS were answered as follows:[4]

- Would deletion of WRM include return of caretaker facilities at CCK [Ching Chuan Kang] and Tainan Air Bases to ROC [Republic of China] armed forces? CINCPAC said that while withdrawal of WRM would not require return of caretaker

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1. CINCPAC 210130Z Feb 76.
2. JCS 9680/231997Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 030349Z Apr 76.
3. JCS 9362/202317Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 220052Z Apr 76.
4. CINCPAC 062321Z May 76.

facilities, the need to retain them under this situation was questionable. The loss of Taiwan WRM "would have more serious impact on capability to establish viable combat force than loss of caretaker facilities." The establishment of combat operations capability at bare bases could be accomplished faster than reintroduction of war-sustaining WRM. Reintroduction of the necessary level of munitions was time consuming and posed serious logistic problems.

- Would deletion or reduction of USTDC have greater adverse impact on U.S. capability to fulfill treaty obligations than deletion of WRM? CINCPAC advised that both USTDC and the WRM were considered essential to support treaty obligations. It was the ROC Government's perception of U.S. intent or capability to fulfill treaty obligations that was crucial in determining which activity was the most important. Prepositioned WRM were essential to meet initial requirements for the defense of Taiwan, and the concept in OPLAN 2025 relied heavily on these munitions. Removal of WRM could be viewed by the ROC as a unilateral action by the United States to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty. Deletion of the TDC could also result in a similar perception by the ROC, and reduction of that agency would inhibit effective bilateral planning. Substantial reduction or elimination of the TDC would create problems in reconstituting the headquarters for emergencies or contingencies because of the austere manning levels at other PACOM headquarters. In summary, CINCPAC said, it was difficult to compare the impact of deleting TDC versus WRM because of different missions and links to the security treaty. He considered the retention of the TDC most important, especially during the drawdown period. Upon tacit or open demise of the treaty and withdrawal of the WRM, TDC could be eliminated. The headquarters should be retained, however, as long as the mission remained unchanged.

- Are communication requirements of DAO, MAAG, USTDC, AFCMC [the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center, a Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) operation that was engaged in aircraft repairing], and NAMRU-2 [Navy Medical Research Unit 2] supportable by other means if USACC-T [U.S. Army Communications Command-Taiwan] is deleted? CINCPAC provided the means by which those agencies could be supported if the USACC-T was deleted, but recommended retention of a USACC-T detachment.

- Other than economic advantages and shortened transit times, how does PDM on Taiwan as opposed to relocation of PDM to CONUS contribute to PACOM readiness? CINCPAC replied that economic advantages and shortened transit times were important considerations for retention of the PDM facility. PACOM readiness was the "primary consideration." CINCPAC provided expanded data on the need for retention of the PDM facility on Taiwan, a facility that accommodated Navy, Marine, and Air Forces aircraft and helicopters. Relocation to the CONUS would be "extremely costly" in terms of funding and loss of aircraft in the theater.

(TS) In a concluding remark, CINCPAC noted that removal of WRM and personnel from Taiwan would also impact on other PACOM plans or contingencies. Under the existing theater-wide WRM concept, WRM positioned on Taiwan could be used to support other PACOM contingencies. Movement off the island would require redistribution in the theater to the maximum extent possible. The loss of POL storage would increase the PACOM-wide shortfall as additional storage facilities were not available.

(TS) The JCS, in response to CINCPAC's earlier initiative on civilianization of U.S. military spaces as a means to accomplish the 50 percent reduction, prepared a memorandum on the subject in May for the Secretary of Defense, recommending that the Secretary forward it to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.[1]

(TS) Late in June the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments regarding the minimum U.S. capability required to support the ROC under the Mutual Defense Treaty. CINCPAC's response was based on the forces earmarked for contingency deployment and civilianization of certain military spaces. It was as follows:[2]

- Major U.S. Forces earmarked for commitment included, from the Army, 2 HAWK battalions, 1 HERCULES battalion, 1 Special Forces battalion, and communications-electronics and logistics units; from the Air Force, 12 tactical fighter squadrons, 2 tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and support units; and from the Navy, 3 carriers, 43 destroyers, 2 nuclear-powered submarines, and support units.

- Implementation of OPLAN 5025 would require an on-island U.S. command to interface with the ROC military and

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1. J5313 HistSum May 76, which cited JCSM-198-76 of 24 May 76.
2. JCS 9101/292152Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 191330Z Jul 76.

Ministry of National Defense. U.S. naval forces afloat supporting 5025 would continue to operate under CINCPAC operational control through CINCPACFLT in coordination with the U.S. on-island commander.

- The TDC, CINCPAC said, fulfilled the on-island requirement, but its presence was not essential for purely military reasons; the requirement was based on political, not military, need. A U.S. command could be provided by other means.

- The MAAG was considered essential to ROC force modernization and could accept TDC peacetime functions should the TDC be withdrawn. This latter option would require some augmentation. In addition, some military spaces could be converted to U.S. civilian billets.

- Caretaker airfields, WRM, and communications support functions would require 139 military personnel, providing qualified civilian personnel and contractors were available for augmentation to maintain the existing level of readiness.

- The U.S. Army Communications Command-Taiwan would require 35 U.S. military personnel to maintain communications links, provided qualified civilians and contractors were available to maintain the communications system for residual U.S. Forces.

(TS) The JCS noted that CINCPAC's reply appeared to be dependent on the availability of qualified civilians and contractors. As no determination had yet been made regarding the civilianization matter, the JCS asked CINCPAC to provide the minimum number of military spaces required to provide initial support at the air bases if civilianization was not approved. CINCPAC then stated a requirement for 178 military spaces for contingency support at Taipei, Ching Chuan Kang, and Tainan, and 43 for communications support.[1]

(TS) In still another exchange, on 31 August the JCS requested that CINCPAC provide a statement of the minimum military personnel required to support a residual force of 417 communications and air base support (including WRM) personnel. CINCPAC estimated a minimum of 85 U.S. military and 27 Defense Department civilians.[2]

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1. JCS 4875/042152Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 120242Z Aug 76.
2. JCS 4961/312217Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 042215Z Sep 76.

(TS) Project GINSENG was under development during 1976 and will be the subject of further discussion below. This was a project to automate and collect remotely certain intelligence gathered by the Shu Lin Kou facility. Because of the availability of the equipment, manpower and dollar savings, and upgrading of facilities, it was expected to provide automation without product degradation. The equipment had been originally intended for installation at Ramasun, Thailand, but that facility was no longer available to the United States. The use of remote relay technology instead of the existing operation was considered to be a matter of replacing personnel with machines that represented the latest "state of the art."[1]

(TS) "Highest authority" directed a number of actions regarding these planned force deployments, the JCS advised CINCPAC on 22 September. The instructions were as follows. A manpower reduction in Taiwan to a ceiling of not more than 1,400 by 31 December 1976 of Defense Department personnel, military and civilian. The ceiling did not apply to those assigned to the American Embassy or contractual personnel including those associated with the remoting facility to be installed at Shu Lin Kou. The Embassy in Taipei was to be notified in advance of specific drawdowns. There was an injunction against the total withdrawal during 1976 of any single unit or activity without prior approval by the National Security Council. In connection with the installation of the remoting facility at Shu Lin Kou, there was to be inclusion within the overall manpower reduction during 1976 of as many Defense Department personnel as possible then assigned to that facility. Implementing actions should be based on the assumption that the remoting facility would be approved and installed by mid-December 1976 and fully operational by March 1977, at which time it would be operated by contractual personnel with only four Defense Department supervisory personnel. Another assumption was that the manpower ceiling would be implemented by 31 December 1976, but that personnel reassignments would be programmed to reach the manpower ceiling as operational requirements permitted. The JCS requested that CINCPAC provide recommendations on space reductions to reach the indicated ceiling.[2]

(TS) The JCS provided additional guidance on 25 September, noting that accomplishment of this reduction "may be feasible only by accepting certain impacts," such as possible loss of operational capability to Shu Lin Kou, personnel turbulence, and degradation of other capabilities. Accordingly, the JCS requested that CINCPAC's reply to the 22 September message include alternative plans that would reach the goal, but with accompanying impacts.[3]

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1. SECSTATE 238153/250211Z Sep 76.
2. JCS 4526/221933Z Sep 76.
3. JCS 7776/251659Z Sep 76.

(TS) On 1 October CINCPAC advised that while he recognized the Taiwan drawdown as "inevitable," he saw major difficulties in completing the reduction by the end of December. He said that the United States would run the risk of very serious diplomatic, logistics, and personnel problems. Such a rapid reduction was likely to be viewed diplomatically as a "mass exodus," contrary to the desired American image. The logistics problems associated with moving personnel, dependents, and household goods would severely tax existing transportation facilities even if the execute order were received immediately. Morale would be adversely affected by a disruptive short-notice move during the holiday season and by potential monetary loss to individuals. He hoped for a more realistic drawdown schedule.[1]

(TS) CINCPAC provided still further rationale for delaying the drawdown in his message of 7 October in which he provided the requested plan to reduce to 1,400 to the JCS. He said:[2]

> ...Believe it important to emphasize that mass reduction by 31 December 1976 is not prudent course of action. Effect of highly visible airlift, movement of personnel and logistics activities increases potential for creating unfavorable national and international publicity adversely affecting U.S. image and desired low-profile approach. Specific operational impacts include: degraded intelligence; degraded command and control capability; reduced contract maintenance capability; reduced communications responsiveness; reduced investigative service (OSI and NIS); reduced medical service; elimination of civil engineer function; degraded finance capability; reduced commissary and support activities; and reduced postal service. Reduction under guidelines outlined in...[the JCS message of 25 September] could be accomplished, but significant problems would result....

(TS) CINCPAC forwarded a basic plan to accommodate a personnel reduction from the existing strength of 2,250 to 1,400 by the end of the year. The reduction included approximately 170 personnel from Shu Lin Kou. The preferred alternative that CINCPAC forwarded was to phase out approximately 770 Shu Lin Kou personnel by March or April 1977, when Project GINSENG was fully operational, and make minor adjustments in other organizations to reach the directed ceiling. A second alternative was to reduce the force level in a two-step approach to 1,749 by 31 December and to 1,400 by 28 February 1977. The third alternative

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1. CINCPAC 012009Z Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC 072355Z Oct 76.

was to reduce the force level to 1,400 by 31 December by withdrawing all 770 Shu Lin Kou personnel and making minor adjustments in assigned strength of other units on Taiwan.[1]

(TS) On 30 October the JCS advised that the National Security Council had agreed to CINCPAC's preferred alternative. Troop reductions were to follow a timetable that would reduce to an authorized strength of 1,400 by 31 December; reduce to an assigned strength of 1,950 by 31 December and to an assigned strength of 1,400 by 31 March 1977.[2]

(S) On 30 November the JCS requested that CINCPAC, through COMUSTDC and the Headquarters Support Activity on Taiwan, provide support to the National Security Agency and its contractors for the installation and support of Project GINSENG. CINCPAC requested that COMUSTDC accept the tasking for GINSENG support and reiterated that TDC coordinate all activities regarding the Taiwan drawdown.[3]

(TS) At the end of 1976 the drawdown was progressing as planned, and residual Defense Department military and civilian personnel strength was down to 1,950 by 31 December. The installation of Project GINSENG was progressing as planned with an initial operational capability of 5 January 1977. Details concerning support arrangements for GINSENG were being developed, with Memoranda of Understanding and Inter-Service Support Agreements between the National Security Agency and the Headquarters Support Activity either signed or being negotiated at the end of the year.[4]

Drawdown in Thailand

(S) At the beginning of 1976, U.S. force reductions in Thailand were progressing according to a plan developed in 1975, which envisioned a force of 2,951 remaining in country after 20 March 1976. By 10 March 1976, however, CINCPAC became convinced that the United States was not likely to get Thai acceptance of anything approaching the 3,000-man limit previously negotiated. Based on this appraisal, CINCPAC advised the JCS that, to protect its vital interests, the United States should be prepared to go well below the 3,000-man limit. He viewed the following as essential:[5]

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 2479/301521Z Oct 76.
3. JCS 8465/302200Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 020043Z Dec 76.
4. J5323 HistSum Dec 76.
5. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 131; COMUSMACTHAI-CHJUSMAGTHAI Command History 1975, pp. 73-74; CINCPAC 100251Z Mar 76 (EX).

- Intelligence facility at Ramasun.

- Basing or staging capability for Southeast Asia surveillance and heavy lift air supply at U-Tapao (ultimately Takhli replaced U-Tapao for transit aircraft).

- MAAG to administer remaining Security Assistance programs.

(S) CINCPAC further noted that U-Tapao air base operations could be turned over to the Thai and that the United States could give up the following operations without great loss, as their product did not justify their continuance:[1]

- Ko Kha

- Chiang Mai

- U-2 operations

(S) On 20 March 1976 the American Embassy, Bangkok reported that the Royal Thai Government had decided that U.S. military operations, except for JUSMAG, DAO, and Embassy security guard activities, must cease effective 21 March 1976. The Departments of State and Defense advised that, since the RTG had not raised questions relating to flight operations in support of retrograde, withdrawal, and other essential humanitarian and safety operations, continued suspension of flight operations to and from and within Thailand (suspension had been ordered for four days effective 19 March 1976) did not appear necessary. The subject of continued use of U-Tapao for aircraft transiting en route to and from Diego Garcia was to be addressed separately.[2]

(S) The JCS execute message for the standdown of U.S. military operations in Thailand was issued on 21 March 1976. CINCPAC, in turn, issued guidance for the withdrawal of forces to be completed by 20 July 1976, based on Option II (accelerated drawdown) of CINCPAC's 15 July 1975 withdrawal plan and the COMUSMACTHAI support plan of 29 September 1975. Option II retained the Defense Attaché Office and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), and required only 450 military spaces.[3]

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1. Op. Cit., CINCPAC 100251Z Mar 76 (EX).
2. AMEMB Bangkok 6534/201327Z Mar 76; Joint State/Defense 068636/202242Z Mar 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 122; JCS 8189/210026Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 220006Z Mar 76.

(S) During the brief 120-day period between 20 March and 20 July 1976, approximately 80,000 short tons of equipment were retrograded by surface and air transport, and MACTHAI inventoried and transferred 22 installations and communications sites to the RTG, while planning and executing its own disestablishment and withdrawal. COMUSMACTHAI folded his flag and departed 21 July 1976 as the last general officer to leave Southeast Asia. The following were among the key U.S. operations terminated by 20 July 1976:[1]

Activity	Date Terminated
Ko Kha	19 May 1976
Ramasun	20 June 1976
U-Tapao (635 AEROSG)	20 June 1976
Chiang Mai (Det 415)	30 June 1976

(S) An in-country roll-up force was formed to handle administrative wrap-up of logistics, comptroller, and civilian personnel activities, and on 8 November 1976 the JCS retroactively disestablished the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (1 October 1976), and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand Support Group (20 July 1976). Effective 20 July 1976 authorized DOD residual organizations came under the umbrella of the JUSMAG and U.S. military presence was, and would remain, below 270.[2]

(S) The following major issues remained unsettled beyond the drawdown completion date of 20 July 1976:[3]

- Disposition of the 17-site Integrated Communications System (ICS) (see Security Assistance Chapter for detailed discussion of turnover to Thai).

- Disposition of 14,476 short tons of U.S. ammunition stocks left in Thailand (AIT) at Korat (see Logistics Chapter for details on turnover to Thai).

- Continued operation of the Chiang Mai seismic research station. The Memorandum of Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding were signed 29 December 1976. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. Government would pay all costs associated with maintenance and operation of the

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1. CINCPAC 152251Z Jun 76 and 030257Z Apr 76; 13AF 110830Z Jun 76.
2. MACTHAI 200330Z Jul 76 and 161350Z Jun 76; J134 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC Daily Summary No. 3/220046Z Jul 76.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 18805/290219Z Jun 76 and 34791/300535Z Dec 76; CINCPAC 230732Z Aug 76.

facility, train Thai technicians, and provide the technical expertise required to conduct periodic quality control checks. In exchange, the RTG would share all data produced, as received, on a 24-hour daily basis.

- P-3 surveillance aircraft transit flights via Takhli en route to and from Diego Garcia. By 21 August 1976 support arrangements for P-3 transit flights had been completed for an initial period of 30 days and the American Embassy was authorized to provide routine automatic clearance for P-3 aircraft on request (see also Logistics Chapter concerning requirements at Takhli).

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) For many years the status of negotiations regarding the political future of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), a territory assigned to the United States in trusteeship by the United Nations in 1946, had been of interest to CINCPAC. Support facilities in this area served as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in the PACOM.

(U) As noted in the 1975 Command History, a covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands had been approved by the District Legislature, approved by a plebiscite (by 80 percent), and submitted to the U.S. Congress. On 21 April 1976 in Saipan and the following day on Rota and Tinian there were ceremonies celebrating the Presidential signing of the covenant. The Presidential delegation was headed by Ambassador F. Haydn Williams; the military delegation was headed by CINCPAC's Representative to Guam and the TTPI. Formal military ceremonies were conducted on all three islands; participants included the CINCPACFLT band detachment on Guam and a Marine Corps color guard and for the ceremonies on Saipan a fly-over of B-52 and KC-135 aircraft. The CINCPACREP described as very apparent the pride of the people of the islands in their new association with the United States.[1]

~~(C)~~ In the rest of Micronesia, the relationship with the United States was not so clear. After returning from a visit to the TTPI, the Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission said that "unity of Micronesia is hopeless." Relations with certain districts are addressed briefly below.[2]

~~(S)~~ A review of U.S. policy toward the future status of Micronesia (less the Northern Marianas) was being taken by the National Security Council

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 81; CINCPACREP Guam 240146Z Apr 76.
2. CINCPACREP Guam 150022Z Apr 76.

Under-Secretaries Committee. That committee asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs certain questions regarding security interests in the area. The JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments. It was noted that previous instructions had authorized the President's Personal Representative to make an independence offer to the Micronesians any time he considered it advisable. The draft constitution that had been produced during 1975 had strongly emphasized Micronesian sovereignty and the apparent desire to establish a treaty relationship with the United States. One question the committee asked was, "Can any treaty relationship, in lieu of the compact of free association, be accepted by the U.S. Government without undue risk to our national security interests in Micronesia?" CINCPAC's reply concluded that the treaty relationship could neither politically nor legally assure U.S. security interests. CINCPAC explained that the key provisions of the draft compact of free association were a denial of foreign military powers and U.S. responsibility and authority over foreign affairs and defense matters. Any arrangement that would weaken those key points would be undesirable. As Micronesia had never been a sovereign state, it would be necessary for the United States to terminate the trusteeship, grant independence, and recognize the sovereign state of Micronesia in order to execute a valid treaty under international law. The treaty could gain exclusive U.S. basing, but the legal viability and durability of such a treaty was historically questionable. The treaty would be vulnerable to abrogation, with the resultant risk of loss of access to desired basing options and attendant probability of increased influence by nations whose interests were counter to those of the United States.

(S) The JCS also asked, "Assuming that it is desirable, from a Defense perspective, to maintain full U.S. authority over all matters related to the foreign affairs and defense of Micronesia, the patrol of territorial waters and fishing zones in Micronesia is likely to be a U.S. responsibility. Given an expanded 200-mile fishing zone, can the Military Services perform this patrol mission satisfactorily with assets currently available to PACOM?" CINCPAC noted that maintaining military security included measures to protect U.S. military installations from espionage, sabotage, hostile acts, and foreign encroachment. Limited Seventh Fleet and PACAF assets made continuous patrolling of the TTPI infeasible. It was not possible to accomplish the patrolling tasks without unacceptable degradation of assigned missions.

(S) The final question concerned the search and rescue responsibility in the TTPI area, which, beginning in June 1974, was being transferred from CINCPACFLT to the Commander of the 14th Coast Guard District. The question was when would Defense be replaced by the Coast Guard in these civil SAR responsibilities? CINCPAC advised that agreement had been concluded to transfer the function on 1 January 1977. CINCPAC, however, was concerned with the continuing lack of dedicated assets to cover the Guam area; they were

not expected to be available for five years. CINCPAC recommended that the JCS take advantage of the National Security Council review to urge the Coast Guard to expedite acquisition of assets for the SAR mission in the area.[1]

(S) The National Security Council study contained the unanimous view of all of the participating departments and agencies that a united Micronesia (the Carolines and Marshalls) continued to be in the best interest of the United States and called for vigorous U.S. policy actions in pursuit of that objective.[2]

(U) CINCPAC continued throughout the year to monitor the progress of any status talks, although these were State and Interior Department matters.

(U) Late in the year the CINCPACREP Guam sent CINCPAC a copy of an editorial that appeared in the Pacific Daily News on 15 December, commenting on a story written by a reporter on the Washington Post regarding the CIA's electronic surveillance of Micronesian representatives participating in the negotiations. The editorial said that the State Department apparently had filed an objection with the White House, arguing that the surveillance was improper, in part because the United States was in effect negotiating with the Micronesians to become U.S. citizens. The editorial disputed that because, "We don't think most Micronesians ever wanted to become U.S. citizens." A more valid point, the author continued, was not that these were potential citizens, but rather that they were wards of the United States. "It's like bugging your adopted son after you welcomed him into your house with open arms." The editorial continued:[3]

> ...We said that we weren't surprised about the reported surveillance because there have been plenty of hints over the past 10 years that the CIA (and its military cohorts) were out in the islands in force.
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> Nobody is soon going to forget that earlier this year a former Daily News correspondent, Ruth Gilliam, claimed that she was offered a spying job in Palau by a military planner who operated out of Guam.
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> [The editorial next addressed at length the former representative of the President, F. Haydn Williams, and his role or knowledge in the surveillance activity.]

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1. JCS 4055/162343Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 260117Z Mar 76.
2. CINCPACREP Guam 050600Z May 76.
3. CINCPACREP Guam 201138Z Dec 76.

The Micronesian status talks are currently stalemated, and probably won't be held for several months after the next Congress of Micronesia session in Saipan, which won't end until March. After these disclosures, how could the Micronesians ever trust the U.S. negotiators again? We wonder if there is even any point in holding future talks under such a cloud....We can't help but wonder if this is part of some overall strategy to keep the Micronesians in the U.S. camp on a permanent basis.

Some high-level strategic planners believe Micronesia has significant potential military value in the post-Vietnam period. Thus justifying CIA surveillance if it helps maintain U.S. control of the islands. The reasoning goes that if the U.S. Armed Forces were compelled to withdraw from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the Micronesian Islands could become the westernmost defense position for U.S. bases. This, coupled with the recently advanced view that oceans are suddenly worth hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars under the new economic-zone device, in both fish and mineral resources, is bound to lead many U.S. planners to the view that Micronesia can't be released....

We think that three or four years ago, with unity, the Micronesians had a chance for independence. Now we don't believe that they do any more. We see a situation in which the U.S. Congress will reject any Micronesian attempt for self-government, and may in fact annex the islands. This electronic surveillance is just about in the same league as bombing Bikini. It gives us a bad taste.

(U) The Acting Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Philip W. Manhard, replied to a joint statement issued by Micronesian political leaders, stressing the great importance the United States attached to the continuation of friendship and trust between Micronesia and the United States, not only throughout the duration of the trusteeship, but also thereafter. "Such a relationship will best serve, we believe, the interests of both our peoples." He noted that the negotiations had never been conducted in an adversary manner; the United States had always sought to be faithful to our responsibilities as trustee and to find the most constructive solutions for the best possible future for Micronesia and its relations with us. It was the policy of the United States to pursue negotiations on the basis of complete respect for the Micronesian negotiators themselves and their duly authorized responsibility to represent the best interests of all the people of Micronesia.

"The President has taken steps to ensure that this policy is observed without exception." It was concluded that the United States welcomed and fully supported the Micronesian statement that both should take a positive approach and look to the future.[1]

Civic Action Program

(U) In 1969 the Secretaries of Defense and Interior agreed to share the cost of Civic Action Teams (CAT) on selected islands of the TTPI. By 1970 there were six teams in place. The cost of maintaining the teams was split among the Defense Department (salaries, equipment, support), Interior (per diem), and TTPI districts (construction material and training). The teams provided needed facilities and improvements, and also created much goodwill toward the United States.[2]

(U) When the budget was being prepared for FY 76, the cost to the Department of the Interior had nearly doubled and the High Commissioner of the TTPI had stated he could support only 2 1/2 teams in FY 76. Additional funding was not forthcoming, and the JCS approved a two-team deployment for FY 76. There were two teams budgeted for FY 77 also. Early in 1976 there were teams on Palau (a Navy team) and Truk (an Air Force team). The Palau team was disestablished and a new team established at Kusaie on 1 June 1976; the Truk team was rotated.[3]

(C) On 21 June the JCS requested the proposal for CAT deployment for FY 78. The High Commissioner advised that funding was available for three teams that year. CINCPAC recommended approval for three teams as requested and provided justification for continued Service funding.[4]

(U) Thus, the program for FY 78 provided for continuation of operations on Kusaie by the Navy and on Truk by the Air Force. The JCS advised that a third team to Yap would be Navy sponsored, but that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not yet given final approval for the three-team program. There were also plans to introduce a fourth team in Palau if funding from the Department of the Interior and the District became available later in the budget year. Action regarding Palau, however, would not be undertaken until a formal request from the High Commissioner was received.[5]

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1. SECSTATE 306155/172111Z Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 84; J5124 HistSum Jul 76.
3. J5123 HistSum Feb 76; J5124 HistSum Jul 76.
4. JCS 7961/211610Z Jun 76; CINCPACREP Guam 300237Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 312307Z Jul 76.
5. J5124 HistSum Dec 76; CINCPAC 150131Z Dec 76.

Kwajalein/Ebeye

(C) Ebeye was a tiny island (.12 square miles) located four miles northeast of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. When Kwajalein had been taken over as a missile range headquarters (Kwajalein Missile Range--KMR) in 1950, all Marshallese had been moved from Kwajalein to Ebeye, approximately 450 people. About 250 of them continued to be employed at KMR at the U.S. minimum wage, which was well above what other Marshallese could have been expected to make. The result was an influx from other islands to Ebeye in search of jobs. Also, Micronesian custom required a man making money to share it with his "extended family," even the most distant relatives. Many such relatives joined supporting families in the ensuing years. By 1976 the population had burgeoned to over 7,000, and housing, water, sewerage, etc., were woefully inadequate by U.S. standards. In 1975 Admiral Gayler had visited Ebeye and expressed his dismay to the Chairman of the JCS concerning "overcrowded and deplorable conditions among Marshallese on island." He asked if the Secretary of Defense could put pressure on the Department of the Interior to improve conditions there. In July 1976, concurrent with hearings on Ebeye by a Congressional delegation, CINCPAC again voiced his concern to both the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense concerning the persistent problem of Ebeye.[1]

(C) The Department of the Army was subsequently tasked by the Secretary of Defense to form a study group to investigate conditions on Kwajalein. On 15 October the Secretary asked CINCPAC to provide views on how the Ebeye situation developed, what Defense agencies had done to keep conditions from worsening, and how the U.S. Government should proceed.[2]

(C) CINCPAC's reply of 27 November provided the requested information. The United States, through the Department of the Interior and the Trust Territory Government, administered Ebeye Island under a United Nations mandate. Ebeye was not leased by the United States as part of the KMR. In addition to Trust Territory authority, CINCPAC noted, traditional Marshallese leaders were afforded considerable power in controlling local politics. The U.S. Coast Guard maintained a small station on the southern tip of the island. The Defense Department had no program or activities on the island and did not control who lived there.[3]

(C) CINCPAC continued that inhabitants of Kwajalein and other islets had moved to Ebeye after accepting payment for use of their home islands for the

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1. J5124 HistSum Jul 76; CINCPAC 160350Z Jul 76 (EX).
2. SECDEF 5682/152343Z Oct 76.
3. CINCPAC 270036Z Nov 76.

KMR. These displaced persons totaled fewer than 500. The "luxuries" afforded by the U.S. minimum wage had resulted in the subsequent migration of others, and the island that was about a mile long and 250 yards wide had a population of over 7,000. Living conditions were considerably lower than U.S. standards, but, nevertheless, no worse than many villages and communities throughout the TTPI. Although densely populated, Ebeye had public utilities not available in most of Micronesia. The fact that over one-third of the Marshallese people had elected to live there, and refused to leave, was considered evidence that they saw it as a relatively desirable place to live.

(C) CINCPAC advised that competing political and economic forces were at work; in some cases conditions were being exploited to achieve other political and economic objectives, and efforts to improve the situation were often impeded by the most vocal critics of the existing situation. Economic factors were the driving force behind the Marshallese separatist movement. The Marshallese believed that the KMR was irreplaceable and absolutely essential to the United States. Thus, they believed they could hold out for exorbitant lease terms (at that time they were talking about $60 million a year); such an amount would support an independent political entity with no other supporting economic base. They had used Congressional and United Nations hearings to highlight their stand on separate status and the "crucial" need for increased revenues to improve conditions, but it was significant that the local government had not budgeted its own funds to improve conditions.

(C) CINCPAC next addressed the U.S. efforts to keep conditions from worsening, and potential future U.S. courses of action, including negotiations regarding future status, KMR lease terms, and other alternatives. CINCPAC noted that the U.S. Army had not been responsible for conditions on Ebeye and had made a more than reasonable effort to assist. He believed that creation of the Army study group was ill advised as it was tantamount to an admission of Army culpability. In concert with the TTPI High Commissioner, CINCPAC recommended formation of a multi-agency study group, to include Interior, Defense, Army, KMR, TTPI and Marshallese officials, and traditional leaders. The data obtained by the Army fact-finding group could be used by the interdepartmental study group, the first meeting of which was expected early in 1977.[1]

U.S.-U.K. Disputed Pacific Islands

(U) On 12 February the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the need to maintain a U.S. claim over disputed Pacific Islands and to seek military rights in view of a move by the U.K. to grant independence in 1978-79.

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1. Ibid.

Fourteen of 18 Pacific islands jointly claimed by the two governments were included in the proposed new entity, which was to consist of the Ocean, Gilbert, Phoenix, Line, and Christmas Islands. The Ellice Islands were to remain a Crown Colony.[1]

(C) CINCPAC replied that, taking into consideration the evolving political status of Micronesia, the key military factor was the continued adherence to the policy of denial of the Pacific Island area to third country military activity. The United States had no requirement at the time for the islands, but should seek an arrangement that denied the area to any other military presence. Future U.S. defense needs were not clear, but CINCPAC could visualize a potential requirement to reactivate missile tracking facilities or to control sea and air lines of communication throughout the area. If the United States relinquished its claims, it should seek a quid pro quo from the United Kingdom to reserve military reentry rights. If the U.K. lacked the authority to grant such rights, arrangements should be made with the new island entities for such rights in exchange for relinquishment of claims.[2]

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1. JCS 1747/282236Z Jan 76.
2. CINCPAC 120450Z Feb 76.

CHAPTER II

THE THREAT

SECTION I--THE SOVIET UNION

The Overall Threat[1]

(~~S~~) The Soviet Union was the only world power with the potential to challenge the United States militarily. Detente with the United States, the Sino-Soviet rift, economic progress, and strategic parity with the United States lessened the probability of conflict. However, the Russians could be expected to pursue all opportunities to enhance their position.

(~~S~~) The Soviet Union continued to emphasize the development of superior forces. Russia placed high priority on advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), sea control technology, anti-satellite and advanced air defense systems, air and satellite surveillance systems, and command and control systems.

(~~S~~) A highly effective naval force designed to deny U.S. control of the seas was capable in some areas of attaining that goal. DELTA-class ballistic missile submarines with a 4,200 nautical mile missile range were operational in the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and more were expected to be deployed.

(~~S~~) Continued design, development, and operational deployment of new combat aircraft gave the Soviets the capability to maintain local air superiority in many areas. A program to replace older aircraft facing Pacific Command forces was expected to continue.

(~~S~~) The large Russian ground force was expected to continue its modernization with new tanks, heavy mobile artillery, helicopters, missiles, armored vehicles, and small arms. Because of the Sino-Soviet rift, Russia was expected to continue to improve its defenses along the Chinese border, primarily by qualitative improvements in weapon systems.

(~~S~~) CINCPAC expected a continued presence of the Soviet Navy and long-range air for the support of Soviet political and economic objectives in the PACOM area. Russia was expected to increase its capability to interfere with PACOM lines of communication (LOC) by improving and establishing new port and base facilities.

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1. CINCPAC 291934Z Oct 76.

(S) The Russian implementation of "peaceful coexistence" would include the support of local armed conflicts, intimidation by display of military might, propaganda, economic measures, and the use of surrogate forces when possible in "wars of liberation."

(S) Because of inadequate airlift and sealift forces, Russian ability for a conventional ground attack against Japan was extremely limited. No increase was expected in this capability in the near future.

Threat to LOC

(S) In a wartime situation, the main Soviet threat to allied LOC was from Soviet submarine and anti-ship missile-capable bombers. The degree of the threat was proportional to the distance of a LOC from Soviet naval and air bases. The threat to the U.S.-to-Japan LOC, therefore, was greater than to a U.S.-Australia LOC. In a wartime situation, the interdiction of U.S./allied LOC would be secondary to the protection of the Soviet Union, and the use of vulnerable surface combatants beyond local waters was unlikely. The degree of the Soviet threat against sea LOC in the Indian Ocean would be dependent upon the accessibility of the Suez Canal, and the survivability of Soviet surface units in the Indian Ocean was doubtful if struck by allied navies. Only the nuclear submarines were capable of sustained anti-sea LOC operations in the Indian Ocean without shore/auxiliary support.[1]

(S) In a peacetime situation, the Soviet threat would be proportional to the strength of forces in proximity to LOC during crisis periods when diplomatic, political, and economic decisions were made. The standing Soviet naval force in the Northwest Indian Ocean was a threat to, and could temporarily cut off, the oil supply to Western Europe and Japan. The Soviet Navy was able to deploy a peacetime show of force to implicitly threaten any U.S./allied sea LOC in the PACOM area. The timeliness and credibility of such implicit threats was in direct proportion to the distance from Soviet bases.[2]

Indian Ocean Presence

(S) Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean had increased steadily since 1968 when three surface combatants and two tankers were deployed. In 1976 the average force in the Indian Ocean was 19 ships, including 8 combatants. Despite the reopening of the Suez Canal, which offered the potential for rapid reinforcement of the Indian Ocean force, nearly all of the Soviet Indian Ocean

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1. IPAC Point Paper, 16 Jun 76, Subj: Soviet Threat to Allied LOC in PACOM.
2. Ibid.

contingent continued to deploy from the Pacific Fleet via the Malacca Strait. The annual turnover operation between the Soviet Pacific Fleet units and the Indian Ocean contingent was effected on 4 September 1976.[1]

(S) Soviet facilities in the Indian Ocean area were primarily located in Berbera, Somalia and included a deep-water port, petroleum storage facilities, a probable naval cruise missile handling facility, a communications facility, and five airfields with permanent surface runways longer than 7,500 feet. Soviet ships also used facilities and anchorages in other littoral countries in the Indian Ocean area. Port and bunkering facilities were available to the Soviets in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (formerly South Yemen) port of Aden, the Iraqi ports of Umm Qasar and Al Basrah, and Port Louis, Mauritius. Singapore shipyards were routinely used for the repair of Soviet auxiliary vessels. Anchorages used by Soviet naval units included Socotra, Chagos Archipelago, Coetivy, the Arab Shoals, and south of Aden.[2]

(U) The Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean had been documented in the CINCPAC History for a number of years and had received increasing attention in the U.S. media as a result of the concern expressed by the U.S. Government. However, it was not until after elections held in late 1975 that the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean was specifically acknowledged by the new governments of Australia and New Zealand. In January 1976 Prime Minister Fraser of Australia acknowledged that one purpose of the new $50 million Cockburn Sound Naval Base was to play a key role in supporting the U.S. naval force in the Indian Ocean and to maintain a balance of the major powers in the area. Fraser was also quoted as supporting the buildup of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the construction of the Diego Garcia facility. He also noted that the Soviet buildup would have to be reduced substantially before it reached the same level as the United States, and that the prospects of the Soviet Union reducing its level of activity were very remote.[3]

(C) In a June 1976 speech to the Australian Parliament, Fraser strongly endorsed Australia's alliance with the United States and called upon the Soviet Union to show that it was serious about reaching global accommodation with the West. He expressed confidence that China supported Australia's views on the need for an effective American presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. On relations with the United States and Soviet intentions, Fraser said:[4]

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1. DIA 4820/090118Z Sep 76; IPAC Point Paper, 22 Nov 76, Subj: Soviet Activities and Facilities in the Indian Ocean.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Canberra 294/140551Z Jan 76.
4. AMEMB Canberra 3958/020621Z Jun 76.

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...America is the only power that can balance the might of the Soviet Union. If America does not undertake that task it will not be done. If it is not done the whole basis of peace and stability is unsupported....

...As understood by people throughout the world, detente meant not merely the search for security from nuclear war, but a genuine overall relaxation of political and military tensions. Unfortunately the reality has not matched the aspirations--the Soviet Union is unquestionably committed to the avoidance of nuclear warfare. Reasonable people can however reasonably conclude that the Soviet Union still seeks to expand its influence throughout the world to achieve Soviet primacy. Its actions all too often appear inconsistent with the aim of reducing world tension....

In the last decade, the Soviet Union has expanded its armed forces by one million. The Soviet Navy has grown substantially while the size of the United States naval forces has declined.

* * * * *

The Soviet leaders now have a strategic and political reach--a capacity to influence and even intervene--well beyond the periphery of the established zones of Soviet security interest.

The USSR has demonstrated the will to exploit that capacity where the opportunity offers.

The fabric of negotiations with the Soviet Union--which we strongly support--has unfortunately had limited success in winning restraint in this campaign.

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Stability is disturbed and tension increased if the Soviet Union makes geo-political gains through its support of wars of national liberation, by the use of surrogates.

The time has come to expect a sign from the USSR that it understands this and that it is serious about reaching global accommodation with the West. A tangible signal is required from the USSR in the form of a restraint in its military expansion. The pace is being set by the USSR, not by the U.S.

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In recent years, China's relations with the U.S. have improved due to certain mutual interests.

China is clearly concerned at the Soviet role on her northern and southern frontiers.

Australia and China have a like interest in seeing that Soviet power in the Pacific and Southeast Asia is balanced by the power of other major states or by appropriate regional arrangements.

We can therefore expect Chinese support for our own views on the need for an effective American presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Such support has, in fact, been given.

While I was in New Zealand, the Pacific Forum countries agreed to accept the movement of U.S. nuclear ships in the Pacific Ocean area. Such a decision, of course, reflected each country's independent assessment of its own interests. China has acknowledged that such an arrangement is in her interests also.

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The Indian Ocean is of considerable political and strategic importance to Australia. Much of the vital flow of oil to our neighbors, friends, and trading partners passes through it. The entrance to the Persian Gulf has become a major focus of international attention.

> The objective of a neutral zone in the Indian Ocean, while admirable, has little chance of success with the USSR significantly increasing its permanent presence in the vital northwest sector of the ocean. It is clearly contrary to Australia's interests for the balance in this area to move against our major ally, the U.S.
>
> It is also against our interests for both superpowers to embark on an unrestricted competition in the Indian Ocean. We seek balance and restraint. We have supported the U.S. development of logistic facilities at Diego Garcia so that the balance necessary to stability in the area can be maintained. We also strongly support the recent appeal by the U.S. Administration for restraint so that the balance can now be maintained at a relatively low level.

(U) This strong indictment of Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific areas was matched by Prime Minister Muldoon of New Zealand in May 1976. At a special news conference, he exhibited photographs of Soviet naval ships entering and leaving the Indian Ocean, provided statistics on Soviet and U.S. ship days in that region, quoted Soviet Admiral Gorshkov's 1972 statements on Russia's worldwide naval might, reiterated support for U.S. facilities on Diego Garcia, and quoted CINCPAC's view on the pace of Soviet Russia's buildup and the CINCPAC statement that the Indian Ocean was "no one's lake." Muldoon also made reference to the recent accreditation of the Soviet Ambassador to New Zealand as the Ambassador to the Kingdom of Tonga. The Soviet Ambassador had stated that press speculation as to the motives of the Soviet Union in accrediting an Ambassador to Tonga distorted the peaceful course of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Prime Minister Muldoon, on the other hand, announced that the Government of New Zealand would wait and see what the Tongan Government would do in response to a Soviet offer to build a larger airport. This proposal, he said, was part of a growing Soviet interest in the South Pacific which made the Government of New Zealand uneasy.[1]

Soviet Penetration of Southwest Pacific Islands

~~(S)~~ In April 1976 the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, who was also U.S. Ambassador to the Government of Western Samoa, reported on a four-day visit to Tonga which had followed by only a few hours the departure of the newly accredited Soviet Ambassador. The U.S. Ambassador advised the State Department that he had learned of the Russian Ambassador's offers of technical assistance in agriculture and industrial development, the offer of scholarships for young

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1. AMEMB Wellington 1885/202243Z May 76.

Tongans to study in Russia and the sale on the local market of fish from the Russian fishing fleet at cheaper prices than Tonga paid elsewhere. The Russian Ambassador had also suggested that the Russian fleet might purchase vegetables and other local products during their stopovers in Tonga. The U.S. Ambassador noted that the recognition of the Soviet Union by Tonga, the recognition of both the Soviet Union and the PRC by Fiji, and the recognition of the PRC by Western Samoa indicated a growing interest in the area by both Russia and China. The Ambassador believed that this was a matter of real concern to the United States. Thus began a series of messages citing attempts to verify rumors in Tonga that the Soviet Union had sought permission to establish a naval base at Vava'u. It was also rumored that the Soviet Ambassador, during his accreditation call in Tonga, had offered to develop an international-class airport in Tonga. Early in May a delegation from Tonga called on Foreign Minister Peacock of New Zealand to confirm the offer by the Soviet Ambassador of a fish canning plant, the extension of the airport runway, and other benefits in exchange for facilities in Tonga for Soviet aircraft and ships. These Tongan representatives stated that the King of Tonga felt that he had received inadequate help from the United States and the Western countries and would have to accept the Soviet offer if no additional Western aid were offered. In a parallel development, the Prime Minister of Western Samoa had stated that the Western Samoan Government was considering a request to the PRC for technical development advisers. Since, in early April, the King of Tonga had paid a State visit to Western Samoa, the U.S. diplomatic mission in New Zealand conceded the possibility of collusion between the two governments to put pressure on the Western countries for additional assistance.[1]

(S) From sources within the international diplomatic community, the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand became aware of approaches by Tongan officials to other Western nations and the interest of these nations in a possible joint effort to assist Tonga. The U.S. Embassy in New Zealand suggested that the State Department consider the encouragement of such joint efforts in view of the strengthening of diplomatic relations by the PRC and Russia with the island nations of Tonga, Fiji, and Western Samoa.[2]

(S) On 9 May the State Department informed the diplomatic community that the Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington had been requested to obtain further information from their governments on Soviet and Chinese activity in the Pacific. State cited the need, "...to improve our data base on this subject..." in order to confirm that the Soviets actually had made specific aid offers to Tonga. When, "...better information" had been obtained,

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1. AMEMB Suva 438/210300Z Apr 76 and 489/040140Z May 76; AMEMB Wellington 1568/270321Z Apr 76; SECSTATE 107090/031737Z May 76.
2. AMEMB Wellington 1667/050416Z May 76.

State intended to convene an informal meeting in Washington with the Australian and New Zealand Embassies to discuss the facts and implications of Soviet and Chinese activity. This would be followed by consideration within the U.S. Government of an appropriate U.S. response, if any. This State Department acknowledgement of a possible cause for concern in the South Pacific area was followed on the next day by a report in an Australian newspaper that Russia had offered to build an international airport in Tonga and to develop industries such as fishing and canning. The newspaper report stated that the Soviets were eager to use Tonga as a South Seas base for shipping vessels, and described the Soviet move as one of vital interest because of the power struggle between Russia and the United States in the Indian Ocean. This article discussed a visit by the Crown Prince of Tonga to Australia in which he had characterized the Tongan-Russian discussions as, "...a very delicate matter." He reportedly had stated that it was the general feeling of Tongan officials that, "...Tonga has many friends, and all we ask of them is that they don't choose our enemies for us." This Australian news report was also carried in a Fiji newspaper along with a denial by the Russian mission in New Zealand that the Soviets planned to establish a base in Tonga.[1]

(C) On the day before the newspaper article was published in Australia, the Crown Prince of Tonga, Prince Tupoutoa, had called on Admiral Gayler in Hawaii. Following CINCPAC's overview of Soviet interest in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, the Crown Prince had emphasized that while Tonga desired friendly relations with all countries, his government was aware of the risks in getting too close to Russia. At the same time, he expressed confidence that the Soviet Union would be unable to develop or exploit a split between the people and the monarchy because the people were strongly anti-communist. The Prince specifically denied that Tongan students would attend the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. The Crown Prince acknowledged the offer by the Soviet Ambassador to build a "Honolulu Airport" for Tonga but maintained that the King had simply thanked the Ambassador but had made no commitment. The Crown Prince commented to CINCPAC that he believed the "understandable" concern of the United States regarding the reports stemmed from the absence of U.S. representation on Tonga. This forced the United States, in his view, to rely on press rumors and reports of government statements which he said were no more reliable when emanating from Tonga than from any other country.[2]

(C) In a 13 May message from the U.S. Embassy in Wellington to the Department of State the Embassy confirmed that the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received positive confirmation of the offers to the King of Tonga by the Soviet Ambassador. This was followed shortly thereafter

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1. SECSTATE 113191/090131Z May 76; AMEMB Suva 505/100205Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC 111903Z May 76.

by a report from the U.S. Embassy in Wellington that Russia had offered a fishing fleet to the Government of Western Samoa. The source of this report noted that the Soviet offer could be highly tempting to the Government of Western Samoa, which badly needed fish for local consumption and the foreign exchange which fish exports could bring.[1]

(S) This growing evidence from diplomatic and intelligence sources of Soviet and PRC initiatives to establish close diplomatic and economic ties with the developing states of the Southwest Pacific caused CINCPAC to request a staff analysis of the situation. The CINCPAC Director for Plans produced several studies and analyses regarding the vulnerability of the Southwest Pacific islands to Soviet and PRC penetration. [redacted] Although the indications of Soviet interest in Tonga and Western Samoa should not be overestimated, CINCPAC recommended that the State and Defense Departments review the U.S. Government presence in each island country, ways in which the United States might provide low cost economic assistance, and the enlistment of regional joint efforts to resist Soviet penetration. CINCPAC acknowledged that the United States could not be a patron to every island in the Pacific but stressed the need to enhance closer ties between the Pacific islands and the United States whenever possible. Late in July the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Suva reported that, as a result of a visit to Tonga and Western Samoa by a Soviet fishing delegation, Russia and Western Samoa were close to agreement to develop a Samoan fishing industry. Thereupon, CINCPAC reiterated his concern to the JCS and suggested discreet economic assistance and an official U.S. delegation to Tonga and Western Samoa to examine such possibilities.[2]

[redacted]

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1. AMEMB Wellington 1812/132236Z May 76, 1851/182002Z May 76, and 1854/190339Z May 76.
2. J51 HistSum Jul 76; AMEMB Suva 826/272200Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 100214Z Jun 76 and 312107Z Jul 76.

[redacted]

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1. AMEMB Suva 839/030100Z Aug 76, 874/100010Z Aug 76, and 922/232230Z Aug 76.
2. AMEMB Suva 1142/160930Z Oct 76.

[redacted]

(C) In November the JCS solicited specific recommendations from CINCPAC for consideration by various Washington area interagency working groups to deal with the problem of Soviet and PRC efforts to establish footholds in the South Pacific island nations. CINCPAC requested component commands to recommend specific actions with particular emphasis on relatively simple, inexpensive efforts which the military or other government agencies could undertake. By December the U.S. Chargé in Suva noted that recent Australian initiatives, German gestures, apprehensions of island leaders, and apparent Soviet and PRC

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1. AMEMB Canberra 7707/220837Z Oct 76.
2. SECSTATE 212014/260450Z Aug 76, which transmitted AMEMB Port Moresby 865/23 Aug 76.

inertia had together impeded the momentum of the latter's penetration of the South Pacific and that the islanders had gained confidence that traditional friends would help with their developmental aspirations. An Australian official, recently returned from lengthy visits to Tonga and Western Samoa, had been struck by the complete absence of allusions by the Samoan Prime Minister or the King of Tonga to Soviet or PRC offers of assistance as a means of gaining leverage for Australian help. Both leaders appeared to be cooling--toward Russian overtures in particular. The Government of Australia had programmed the expenditure of at least $11 million on Samoan development in the agriculture and maritime fields, and West Germany had also offered a modest contribution. In addition, a treaty of friendship and technical cooperation had been concluded between West Germany and the Kingdom of Tonga, and Australia had offered to do a complete study of airport facilities, improve port facilities, and consider improvements to telecommunications. These Australian initiatives and the new German interest, stated the U.S. Chargé, were in highly favorable contrast to the apparent footdragging on the communist side which, aside from political considerations, had contributed to a cooling of attitudes toward their assistance.[1]

Other Threat Perceptions

(C) The growing Soviet military strength, and especially the increased naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, was addressed in an editorial transmitted to the State Department by the U.S. Embassy in Singapore in June of 1976. This Singapore editorial surveyed the emerging geo-political scene in the Southeast Asian region, using as a starting point the request by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) that all U.S. bases in Thailand be closed. The editorial noted that, henceforth, the only American bases in the region would be those in the Philippines which, unlike Thailand, felt no urgent pressure to eliminate the U.S. military presence. The opinion was expressed that the continuing decline of the United States military presence in the region and the concomitant growth of the Russian presence was not in the interest of ASEAN. The editorial referred to statements by Australian and New Zealand officials concerning Soviet intentions and the use by the New Zealand Prime Minister of photographs of Soviet warships off Singapore on their way to or from the Indian Ocean to support the statement that the Soviet presence was not only increasing, but ominous.[2]

(C) The reference in the Singapore editorial to the apparent absence of pressure regarding U.S. bases in the Philippines had an interesting sequel

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1. J51 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 261907Z Nov 76 and 270051Z Nov 76; AMEMB Suva 1342/010455Z Dec 76.
2. AMEMB Singapore 2777/041237Z Jun 76.

two months later. On 7 August the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines accompanied Admiral Gayler during the latter's farewell call on President Marcos. During a discussion of the growing Soviet maritime presence, Marcos informed his U.S. guests that he had come under "insistent" pressure from the Soviets to accept an arrangement for basing Soviet fishing vessels in Philippine ports and permitting Aeroflot to operate commercially in Manila. CINCPAC explained that similar proposals had been made by the Soviets to South Pacific countries. He conveyed his assumption that the Russian fishing fleet/Aeroflot combination would permit the fleet to be more or less permanently deployed in an area, with the crews rotated through airline operations. Marcos informed the visitors that the Philippine Government was "studying" the proposals but showed no enthusiasm to accept them. He appeared, stated the Ambassador, to be aware of the potential security significance of the Soviet moves.[1]

(S) In response to query from the State Department, the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea provided a lengthy analysis of Korean perceptions of Soviet military presence in the Pacific in September 1976. The U.S. Ambassador stated that the Korean Government, press, and newspaper reading public were keenly aware of increases in Soviet naval presence in the Pacific. The Korean military had always shown interest in Soviet military activities, but that interest had increased substantially during 1976. In addition to order of battle information and exchanges of intelligence regarding the Soviet naval presence and capabilities in the Pacific Fleet area, ROK photo collection activity relative to Soviet merchant ships transiting waters off the ROK coast had increased. Since April 1976 the ROK Navy had received a daily report from CINCPACFLT on Soviet ships in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Korean press was acutely aware of and had commented extensively on the growing Soviet military presence in Asia. The greatest volume of press comment, and by far the most thoughtful analysis, had been prompted by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations' statement in February 1976 that the Seventh Fleet operated in the Sea of Japan only on the sufferance of the Soviet Navy. Since the Holloway statement, press observations had often cited the professed inability of the United States to operate effectively in the Sea of Japan and had displayed deepening fear of the Soviet Union and its intentions. On the other hand, perceptions of the regional power balance had prompted a low-key initiative on the part of the ROK Chief of Naval Operations to participate in combined operations involving U.S. and Japanese naval forces. This initiative had been taken in spite of the fact that security relations with Japan continued to be a sensitive issue in the ROK press as well as in the Government.[2]

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1. AMEMB Manila 11805/090520Z Aug 76.
2. AMEMB Seoul 7328/140837Z Sep 76.

SECTION II--THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

The Overall Threat[1]

(S) The PRC viewed the Soviet Union as its major adversary but considered both the United States and Russia to be imperialists. The large PRC Army was designed to meet the Soviet threat and internal security problems. The Air Force had over 3,800 fighters primarily assigned to the air defense role. The naval inventory continued to grow and included a large number of conventional-powered submarines (plus one nuclear-powered) which gave the PRC a limited capability to interdict the sea LOC of the United States. Deficiencies included the lack of long-range reconnaissance capability and the disadvantages of diesel submarines.

(S) The PRC strategic force continued to develop slowly. The CSS-X-3 (3,200-3,500 nautical mile range) had been tested in its ballistic missile role three times (1970, 1971, and in May 1976). It had also been used to place two small satellites in orbit (1970 and 1971). Two operational silos had been identified but it was considered probable that only limited numbers would be deployed in silos. The CSS-X-4 (7,000 nautical mile range) apparently had developmental problems, but this missile was used in the successful launching of three earth satellite vehicles in 1975 and one in August 1976, thus indicating that problems had been resolved. The construction of operational silos had not yet begun but the system could be operational in the 1978-1980 time period. CINCPAC believed that the PRC would eventually obtain its objective of a secure second strike nuclear capability.

(S) The PRC emphasized government-to-government diplomacy, but, at the same time, continued to support revolution. The PRC no longer opposed U.S. presence in East Asia, considering such presence to be a stabilizing influence and a counter to the Soviet Union and North Korean adventurism. China was not financially able to compete with Russia, and thus considered it acceptable for the United States, which was not the main adversary, to counter the Soviets. The PRC also served as a restraining force on North Korea. Although there were signs of impatience in Peking over the Taiwan issue, there was no indication that China would attempt to use force to "liberate" the island.

(S) Although, since the death of Mao Tse-tung, the PRC leadership had undergone extensive modification, it appeared that moderate elements had prevailed. The new leadership was expected to include moderates and military representation, thus leading to a period of emphasis on economic development.

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1. Op. Cit., CINCPAC 291934Z Oct 76.

It appeared likely that there would be no degradation of relations with the United States, and that current strained relations with Russia would continue.

PRC Threat Against Taiwan[1]

(S) The PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) are separated by the Taiwan Strait, an international waterway which is only about 70 nautical miles wide at its northern approach. Control of this waterway had always been viewed by the ROC, with U.S. concurrence, as essential for the defense of Taiwan. Following a spate of air engagements over the Strait in the late 1950's, the PRC restricted its air operations inland some 5 nautical miles from the coastline opposite Taiwan. Along the coast, naval activity paralleled that of the Air Force and no confirmed PRC naval transits of the Taiwan Strait were reported in the 1960's and early 1970's.

(S) However, from 1974 this situation began to change with the pattern of PRC air operations shifting outward toward the Strait. In 1975 defensive air patrols over the coast were first reported. In 1976 the PRC Air Force made the first deep penetration of the Taiwan Strait airspace since 1968 and defensive patrols between the coast and off-shore islands became commonplace. Because the boundaries between PRC and ROC air operational areas were undefined, hostile action was possible at any time, whether deliberate or inadvertent.

(S) PRC naval transits of the Strait began with three in 1974 and there were four in 1975. By 1976 these transits had increased to 16 confirmed. The Commander of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command believed that military and commercial transits of the Strait, combined with PRC naval/air dispositions, enabled the PRC to restrict the use of the northern strait approach to all shipping except that of the United States and Russia.

(S) In his end of tour report, Vice Admiral E.K. Snyder noted the adoption and implementation by the PRC of an aggressive forward policy vis-a-vis the Taiwan Strait and the Republic of China. He believed this policy to be controlled at the highest levels of government and that the Peking leadership would attempt to avoid unprogrammed incidents over or in the Strait. Nevertheless, the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976 had left a leadership vacuum which could increase the possibility of inadvertent hostile incidents in the Taiwan Strait. Admiral Snyder stated that the PRC could not, for the foreseeable future, invade Taiwan successfully.

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1. COMUSTDC Ltr to CINCPAC, Ser S014, 25 Jul 77, Subj: End of Tour Report; Transmittal of, with one enclosure: End of Tour Report.

PRC View of the Russian Threat

(U) The PRC view of Russian intentions was revealed in a scathing denunciation of a new book by S.G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, entitled The Maritime Might of the State. The People's Daily commentary on the Gorshkov book was illustrative of the "hot propaganda" war conducted between the two nations:[1]

> ...The Military Publishing House of the Soviet Union in 1976 published a new book by S.G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Revisionist Navy, titled The Maritime Might of the State. In this book, the old tunes of "detente" and "lasting peace" on which Soviet revisionism consistently harped are played no more. Abounding throughout the length of the book are war outcries about practicing imperialist gunboat policy and carrying forward old tsars' policies by stepping up naval strength to seize maritime and global hegemony.
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> Soviet-imperialism's features as a pirate are thus fully and thoroughly exposed.
>
> The author fanatically clamors about the necessity of establishing a powerful Navy. He openly quotes old tsars by saying that Peter I has descriptively stated: "To have an armed force consisting of the Army alone is like being a one-armed person; he is two-armed when he also has a Navy."
>
> Then the author recalls that since Khrushchev's usurpation of power and restoration of capitalism powerful ocean-going guided missile nuclear fleets have been built in a massive way and that these fleets have quickly possessed all the strategic features of modern warfare--that is, features of external aggression and expansion. This is openly admitting that the fleet that Soviet revisionism has built with all-out efforts is not for defense but for aggression and expansion, a wild intention in itself and an ambition even greater than that of the old tsars.

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1. FBIS Okinawa 120634Z Jun 76.

The author also barefacedly trumpets old-line imperialism's policy from strength and gunboat diplomacy, saying that the Navy is an important pillar of diplomacy in time of peace. He says that numerous cases show that diplomatic problems are solved on the basis of the military strength of parties to negotiations either in feudalist or capitalist eras. Whoever has greater strength can impose self-benefiting policies on other countries that do not have a matching strength.

The author admits that the Soviet Union regards the Navy as an important means for seizing maritime and global hegemony, alleging that the limitation of the Navy's role to seizing supremacy on the sea is still of current signficance and that, however, the Soviet Navy always holds that supremacy of the sea is not an end in itself but a precondition for world control.

Styling himself as a maritime overlord, the author arrogantly flings a challenge at his rival, alleging that the Soviet Union cannot agree to the Western maritime powers' perpetual domination of seas and must compel the Pentagon to realize that oceans which used to protect America from attacks have lost the shielding effect they once had. He asserts that once war breaks out, U.S. imperialism will be faced with the horrendous threat of punishment every day and every hour.

The author also attacks other countries, particularly the third world countries, for their defense of sovereignty and territorial waters and establishment of the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones, saying that they are disregarding the interests of other countries and arbitrarily ruling on the width of their territorial waters. He ferociously shouts that unilateral and endless widening of territorial waters is not tolerable. This once again fully exposes the hypocritical features of the superpower which claims to be the natural ally of the third world countries.

The book The Maritime Might of the State recently dished up by Gorshkov, the chieftain of Soviet revisionism's Navy, is an excellent teaching material by negative example. It is extremely clearcut and poignant. It tears off Soviet revisionism's veil of sham peace, blatantly shows off naval strength and clamors that military strength is more important

than everything else. It inadvertently tells the truth that Soviet revisionism is the most dangerous source of war.

SECTION III--NORTH KOREA

The Overall Threat[1]

(S) North Korea's military capability was formidable, with a growing inventory of modern weapons and equipment in all the Services. A sizeable percentage of the ground force was deployed well forward and could launch an attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) with little or no warning. The North Korean Air Force was capable of strong air defense over the battle area and the homeland, but had limited strike capability. The North Korean capability to interdict sea LOC off the Korean peninsula was limited to the Korean coastal waters.

(S) CINCPAC did not foresee a major change in the Korean situation. The anti-U.S./ROK attitude maintained by North Korea was expected to continue, as were tests of the U.S. resolve/commitment in the form of low-key incidents.

(S) Premier Kim Il-sung's basic objectives during 1976 were not fulfilled. He failed to obtain desired support from the non-aligned nations at Colombo, which may have influenced the later withdrawal of the North Korean resolution at the United Nations. North Korean diplomats had been expelled from Scandinavian countries for the illegal sale of duty-free items, and reported factional strife within Pyongyang's hierarchy was possibly the result of Kim's plans to have his son succeed him. North Korea's economic problems were serious, with a reported $2 billion of trade debts to both Communist and Western nations.

The ROK View of the Threat

(S) In April the ROK press carried headline stories of intelligence estimates of North Korean military strength as cited by a Japanese newspaper with attribution to U.S. military sources in Seoul. Some of the data cited were consistent with ROK intelligence estimates prepared for the 1976 Security Consultative Meeting, and evidence indicated a low-level leak by a ROK official. The stories stated that North Korea was prepared to mass-produce military jet fighter planes, tanks, and submarines. The articles claimed that North Korea had succeeded in manufacturing two submarines, two destroyers, several tanks and three MIG fighter planes, and, encouraged by this success, had begun to develop a heavy war equipment mass-production system. The articles cited the North Korean order of battle and credited the North Koreans with an increase in "shock troop" strength from 80,000 in 1975 to 100,000 in 1976. Some of the

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1. Op. Cit., CINCPAC 291934Z Oct 76.

order of battle figures and other statistics coincided with ROK intelligence estimates prepared for use in the "threat assessment" portion of the scheduled May meeting in Hawaii.[1]

(S) Of significance was the fact that while U.S. intelligence estimates of the North Korean order of battle were different from those of South Korea, the article in question quoted many of the exact figures used by the South Koreans. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul commented that, although the ROK Government may have leaked the information in order to influence the sense of the North Korean threat both in Korea and in the United States, it was more probable that the leak was at a lower level with no official sanction.[2]

The North Korea/ROK Balance

(S) In November the Commander in Chief of the United Nations (U.N.) Command invited the attention of the JCS to a Korean situation assessment made by the Strategic Warning Staff. The thrust of this assessment compared the economic problems of North Korea with the economic strength of South Korea and its purchases of sophisticated foreign weapons systems, the development of its domestic arms industry, and continued U.S. assistance. This was postulated to bring the military balance between the two countries to a point within the next two to five years where the North could not be confident that an attack against the South would be successful even if the ROK received no assistance. The U.N. Commander noted that this comparison by the Strategic Warning Staff could strengthen the position of those in North Korea who believed that if they were to have any hope of reunification by force, they most move before South Korea became so strong as to make the military option worthless. He also pointed out that such an assessment could lead U.S. domestic intelligence consumers to believe that the ROK could successfully withstand an attack from the North in the next two to five years without U.S. assistance--a very dangerous conclusion.[3]

(S) Although the ROK was building its military strength rapidly, as the report suggested, it was building first the outward manifestations of deterrence rather than the solid support capability required to defeat an attack from the North. In the meantime, stated the U.N. Commander, United States support would tip the balance and deter war so long as that support was clear to friend and enemy alike. The completion of the ROK Force Improvement Plan (see Security Assistance chapter) would result in a reduction of a number of major vulnerabilities but would not achieve parity with North Korean capabilities.

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1. AMEMB Seoul 3149/280926Z Apr 76.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCUNC 110914Z Nov 76.

He cautioned against serious consideration of the rapid reduction of U.S. Forces before the balance was clearly in the ROK favor. Such withdrawal, he believed, was Kim Il-sung's main objective and if it came too early it might well invite attack.[1]

Provocations

(U) The provocation of incidents in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) continued during 1976. On 18 August two U.S. Army officers were murdered and nine other U.N. Command personnel (five ROK, four U.S.) were injured at Panmunjom when attacked by some 30 North Korean guards wielding axes, ax handles, and metal pipes. These were the first fatalities in the truce negotiation area, although there had been 25 physical confrontations between security guards in the joint security area (JSA) since the 1953 armistice. After an increase in alert posture on both sides and the deployment of additional forces to the area by the United States, a task force of U.N. Command personnel entered the JSA on 21 August 1976 and cut down the tree which was the focal point of the 18 August incident. In addition, two illegal road barriers which had been constructed by the Communists in the JSA were also removed. The JSA incident probably resulted from the poor judgment of an overzealous North Korean officer in charge of the reaction force in his attempt to gain propaganda from any type of incident.[2]

(S) There were prior indications that an incident could occur. In June the U.S. Embassy in Seoul informed the State Department that there had been a number of "meddlesome incidents" within the JSA which, while not of major significance or unprecedented, had combined to produce an aura of heightened tension in that area. Since 1 June, along with the usual obscenities, rock throwing, and spitting by the North Korean Army, a North Korean Army vehicle had obstructed the passage of a U.N. Command senior officer vehicle, a North Korean jeep and truck attempted to run another U.N. Command vehicle off the road, and there had been a scuffle between North Korean and U.N. Command guards. The Swiss member of the neutral nations supervisory commission had noted the prevailing atmosphere in the JSA, and had speculated that North Korea could be attempting to provoke an incident which they would then try to blame on the U.N. Command.[3]

(S) In a press conference on 23 June in India, the North Korean Ambassador charged the United States with creating tension along the military demarcation line in Korea by frequent violations--more than 90 on an average day--and said that because of these "new war provocations" there was the possibility of war

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1. Ibid.
2. Chronology, UNC/USFK/EUSA, 1 Jul-31 Dec 76.
3. AMEMB Seoul 4588/160935Z Jun 76.

in Korea at any time. The North Korean Ambassador stated that the United States had recently begun military exercises including fleet units in Okinawa, had transported nearly 4,600 tons of ammunition into South Korea from Japan, and that the United States and the ROK were planning a joint military/naval operation beginning on 28 June. He continued that after the "defeat in Indochina" the United States had declared South Korea a "forward defense area" and had inserted large numbers of modern weapons of mass destruction and military equipment including nuclear arms and deployed them along the DMZ. This, stated the U.S. Embassy in India, was the most inflammatory statement by a North Korea spokesman in the last three years.[1]

(C) In reply to the message from the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, the State Department acknowledged the recent increase of minor friction in the DMZ area, a recent North Korean agent infiltration incident south of the DMZ, and a more strident tone to North Korean propaganda. However, the State Department did not consider the North Korean Ambassador's comments during the 23 June press conference as much different from current North Korean propaganda elsewhere. The State Department considered the North Korean accusations to be preparation for the Colombo nonaligned nation summit conference and the annual debate of the U.N. General Assembly on Korea rather than a signal of the level of tension which could result in a resumption of hostilities.[2]

(C) On 12 August, six days before the murder of the U.S. officers in the DMZ, the American Consul in Hong Kong passed to the State Department the commentary by a PRC-owned paper in Hong Kong regarding the tensions on the Korean peninsula. The commentary noted North Korean accusations of U.S.-ROK war preparations and recent incidents along the DMZ, but declared only that the Korean situation deserved attention. Without specific reference to the North Korean statement regarding U.S.-ROK war preparations, the commentary maintained that these preparations along the DMZ had created a situation wherein war could break out at any time. The article repeated the standard PRC line that the only way to ease tensions and eliminate the threat of war in Korea was for the United States to act in accordance with principles advanced by North Korea to permit the peaceful reunification of Korea. This PRC-sponsored commentary did not include even the most routine statement of Chinese support for North Korea and the Korean people.[3]

(C) After the 18 August incident and the subsequent U.N. Command response on 21 August, other incidents continued to occur. On 30 August a South Korean fishing boat was seized by North Korean naval forces. The South Korean vessel

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1. AMEMB New Delhi 9300/231315Z Jun 76.
2. SECSTATE 157003/232028Z Jun 76.
3. AMCONSUL Hong Kong 9527/120822Z Aug 76.

had been captured in North Korean waters approximately two miles off the North Korean coast and ten miles north of the military demarcation line. The U.S. Embassy ascribed the capture of the vessel in North Korean waters to a navigational error and no reason was evident to relate this incident with the 18 August JSA incident. In September the ROK Navy reported that two enemy agents had been killed and one had been captured. The captured agent stated that five additional agents had escaped on the off-shore island of Komun-Do, and that 50 additional agents had remained on the boat that had placed him ashore. A subsequent report on this incident stated that seven agents had landed on Komun-Do, and that the agents had been killed during a quarrel in which one agent refused to return to North Korea.[1]

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1. AMEMB Seoul 6795/300848Z Aug 76; COMUSK 192155Z Sep 76 and 200045Z Sep 76.

SECTION IV--SOUTHEAST ASIA

Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)[1]

(S) The SRV continued to be the major threat to Southeast Asia. It had the largest battle-tested and best equipped armed force in Southeast Asia and had emerged as the major regional military and political power. For the immediate future, the SRV was expected to continue its preoccupation with internal reconstruction; however, long-range goals were uncertain. The SRV already dominated Laos and supported insurgency in Thailand and might, in time, attempt to extend its hegemony over Cambodia and possibly Thailand. The SRV was expected to continue to exert pressures to reduce American influence in Southeast Asia.

(S) The SRV was under the full control of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party. To maintain/insure control, Hanoi had 17 Army divisions and thousands of political organizers in the south.

Laos/Cambodia[2]

(S) The Communist government in Laos had pursued relatively moderate measures in imposing its control. The Lao government was restricted from following an independent course since more than 30,000 Vietnamese troops remained in Laos. Additionally, 20,000 Chinese engineering troops were in north and northwest Laos. Some 1,000 Soviet technicians were working in aviation activities, but the Lao People's Democratic Republic was firmly "wedded" to Vietnam and its policies were expected to be responsive to Hanoi, at least for the immediate future.

(S) Cambodia had the harshest of the new Indochina Communist regimes. The Communists had moved ruthlessly to establish their domination. Foreign influence and assistance had been primarily from the PRC and North Korea. Russia had failed to gain a foothold, and traditional animosities with the Vietnamese had limited Hanoi's influence. As of the end of 1976, Cambodia was turned inwardly and was not considered likely to be an influential factor in shaping Southeast Asian affairs.

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1. Op. Cit., CINCPAC 291934Z Oct 76.
2. Ibid.

Insurgencies in Southeast Asia[1]

(S) Insurgencies in Southeast Asia continued to be a problem for many nations. The PRC, SRV, and Laos continued to offer low-level support to insurgencies by giving some logistical support, propaganda, training, and sanctuary. The 8,700 Communist insurgents in Thailand were making inroads among the rural population in the north and northeast, but posed no serious threat to Bangkok. However, the potential for expansion of the insurgency was great so long as it received support from Communist neighbors.

(S) Insurgent groups in Burma and Malaysia were irritants, but posed no threat to government stability unless they increased membership significantly and acquired massive outside aide. No such increase in insurgent assistance was anticipated.

(S) The Muslim and Communist insurgencies in the Philippines appeared to be under control; however, they were a continuing drain on Filipino military resources and were a continuing political liability for President Marcos, both internally and externally.

(S) In Indonesia, the communist threat was minimal and the separatists movements were ineffectual. Less than 1,000 Fretilin guerillas were scattered throughout East Timor in small groups under little command or control. However, they were capable of forcing Jakarta to maintain a sizeable military force in Timor province for several years.

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1. Ibid.

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COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

USSR*

MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY

4	Combined Arms Army Headquarters	
2	Corps Headquarters	
29	Motorized Rifle Divisions	(TO 12,164)
4	Tank Divisions	(TO 9,479)
7	Artillery (Gun) Divisions	
2	Motorized Rifle Brigades	
4	Artillery Brigades	
5	SS-1 (SCUD) Brigades	

PERSONNEL: 345,000**

* Includes Transbaikal and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia.

** Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews and support elements of the air forces; (d) Internal Security Forces and Border Guard Troops (33,250 and 8,750).

NORTH KOREA

8	Corps	
23	Infantry Divisions (3 Motorized)	(TO 9,322)
2	Armored Divisions	(TO 6,924/7,604)
3	Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions	(TO 3,507)
2	Surface-to-Air Missile Brigades	(TO 2,000)
3	Infantry Brigades	(TO 8,337)
10	Artillery Regiments (Non-Divisional)	(TO 833)
2	Howitzer Regiments (Reinforced)	(TO 1,053)
3	Heavy Mortar Regiments	(TO 858)
7	Rocket Launcher Regiments	(TO 975)
5	Armored Regiments	(TO 1,527)
3	FROG Battalions	(TO 167)
10	Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments	(TO 451)

PERSONNEL:

Current estimated strength	426,000
Paramilitary/Security Forces	38,000

CHINA

117	Infantry Divisions	(TO 12,606)
42	Artillery Divisions:	
20	Field Artillery	(TO HOW 6,621)
3	Anti-Tank	(TO 4,462)
19	Antiaircraft Artillery*	(TO 4,006)
11	Armored Divisions	(TO 9,549)
1	Cavalry Division (Security)	(TO 4,838)
3	Airborne/Air Transportable Divisions	(TO 9,730)
41	Border Defense/ID Divisions	(TO 6,723)
35	Garrison Divisions	(TO 7,993)
16	Railway Engineer Divisions	(TO 11,583)
270	Independent Regiments**	

PERSONNEL (Army): 3,483,000**

*30 additional AAA divisions subordinate to the Air Defense Command of the CCAF.

**Includes approximately 14,000-15,000 PRCA troops believed to be in Laos, several hundred PRC troops in Burma, and a few hundred military advisors and technicians in North Vietnam.

VIETNAM

REGULAR FORCES

26	Infantry Divisions*	(TO 10,400)
1	Training Division	(TO 10-15,000)
17	Artillery Regiments	(TO 1,200)
1	Sapper Command (9 Battalions)	(TO 5,000)
30	Independent Infantry Regiments**	(TO 3,000)
6	Armored Regiments	(TO 1,500)
55	Antiaircraft Artillery Regt	(TO 1,000)
20	SA-2 Regiments	(TO 2,100)
20	Independent Engineer Regiments***	(TO 2,000)

MILITIA:

Class I - Full-time militia members armed with semi- and automatic weapons and medium caliber artillery weapons.

SECURITY FORCES:

Armed Public Security Forces 16,500

PERSONNEL:

Regular Army 498,000-566,500

Militia - estimated to consist of 1.6 million people's militia/self-defense forces and 3 million reserve forces.

*Includes one Division in Laos
**Includes four Independent Regiments in Laos
***Includes six Engineer Regiments in Laos

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 58.

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COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH

FAR EAST & PACIFIC

CATEGORY		USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA	NORTH KOREA	VIETNAM	TOTAL
SUBMARINES	NUCLEAR					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	18	0	0	0	18
	CRUISE MISSILE	15	0	0	0	15
	TORPEDO ATTACK	12	1	0	0	13
	DIESEL					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	12	1	0	0	13
	CRUISE MISSILE	6	0	0	0	6
	LONG RANGE ATTACK	27 (1)	0	0	0	27 (1)
	MED RANGE ATTACK	18 (27)	77	11	0	106 (27)
	SHORT RANGE ATTACK (OLD)	0	0	0	0	0
	UNDETERMINED TYPE	0	0	1	0	1
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS	LIGHT CRUISERS (COMMAND AND CONTROL)	1	0	0	0	1
	LIGHT CRUISERS (MISSILE)	5	0	0	0	5
	LIGHT CRUISERS (GUN)	2 (1)	0	0	0	2 (1)
	DESTROYERS (MISSILE)	8	10	0	0	18
	DESTROYERS (GUN)	17 (7)	0	0	0	17 (7)
	FRIGATES (FF/FFG, MISSILE)	0	9	0	0	9
	FRIGATES (FF, GUN)	27 (4)	5	2	2	36 (4)
MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS	MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS	211 (1)	944	344	187	1,686 (1)
	MINE WARFARE TYPES	78 (9)	43	0	8	129 (9)
	AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES	43 (25)	496 e.	94	10	643 (25)
	NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPES	211	238	3	400 f	852
	SERVICE CRAFT TYPES	a	805	0	0	805
PERSONNEL STRENGTH		100,000 b	325,000 c	28,000 d	3,000	

NOTE: Figures in parentheses indicate additional units in reserve.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 60.

a. Included in Auxiliary Count.
b. Includes personnel in Naval Aviation, Naval Infantry, and Coastal Defense.
c. Does not include 33,000 personnel of Naval Air Force.
d. Possibly includes Naval Infantry and Coast Defense.
e. Includes 450 Mechanized Landing Craft (LCM).
f. Includes Service Craft types.

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SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

	USSR [1]		CHINA		NORTH KOREA	VIETNAM	TOTAL
	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	AIR FORCE	
COMBAT AIRCRAFT [2]							
Jet Fighter (Day)	0	0	3,446	348	527 (Day & A/W)	381 (Day & A/W)	4,702
Jet Fighter (All Weather)	1,506	0	194	43	0	0	1,743
Piston Attack	0	0	0	0	0	36	36
Jet Attack/Fighter Bomber	596	0	449	146	0	110	1,301
Jet Light Bomber	35	0	277	105	74	0	491
Jet Medium Bomber	144	156	71	6	0	0	377
Piston Light Bomber	0	0	81	18	0	0	99
Piston Medium Bomber	0	0	12	0	0	0	12
Jet Heavy Bomber	40	0	0	0	0	0	40
Turboprop Heavy Bomber	44	0	0	0	0	0	44
Antisubmarine Warfare	0	134 [3]	0	0	0	0	134
TOTAL	2,365	290	4,530	666	601	527	8,979
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT [4]							
Piston Transport, Light	0	0	379 [5]	40	245	112	776
Piston Transport, Medium	156	8	0	0	3	40	207
Jet & Turboprop Transport, Light	64	4	59	5	7	19	158
Jet Transport, Medium	13	2	17	0	2	1	35
Turboprop Transport, Medium	183	11	20	0	1	14	229
Jet Trainer	560	0	919	41	44	11	1,575
Piston Trainer	0	0	911	104	50	22	1,087
Helicopter	1,283	75	211	29	67	510	2,175
Reconnaissance	231	21	32	6	27	20 (Est)	337
TOTAL	2,490	121	2,548	225	446	749	6,579
TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT	2,655		5,196		601	527	8,979
TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT	2,611		2,773		446	749	6,579
GRAND TOTAL	5,266		7,969		1,047	1,276	15,558
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS	100,000	13,500	401,000 [6]	30,000	44,400	10,000 (Est)	598,900

1. Includes aircraft within the Far East, Transbaikal, Siberian, Central Asian, and Turkestan Military Districts which are a threat to PACOM.
2. Combat Aircraft: Fighter and bomber aircraft only, which are used in fighter, gound attack, bomber/tanker, or antisubmarine warfre roles.
3. Includes 85 antisubmarine warfare helicopters.
4. Combat Support Aircraft: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of reconnaissance aircraft, all types of utility/liaison aircraft, and jet fighter trainers.
5. Includes 157 COLTS used for liaison.
6. Includes 173,900 personnel assigned to the Far East Missile Forces.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 63.

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SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

USSR			PRC			NORTH KOREA			VIETNAM		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS	TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS	TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS	TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE*			SURFACE TO SURFACE			SURFACE TO SURFACE			SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM	217	233	ICBM	2	2	ICBM			ICBM		
IRBM	0	0	IRBM	31	32	IRBM			IRBM		
MRBM	0	0	MRBM	15	21	MRBM			MRBM		
TOTAL	217	233	UNK/VARIOUS	7	7	COASTAL DEFENSE			COASTAL DEFENSE		
			COASTAL DEFENSE	10	36	TOTAL			TOTAL		
SURFACE TO AIR**			TOTAL	65	98						
SA-2	87					SURFACE TO AIR			SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-3	57		SURFACE TO AIR						SA-2[b]	95	114
SA-5[c]	14		SA-2[a]	73	177-295	SA-2	84 SITES	43 DCC	SA-3[d]	19	20
			SA-3			SA-3					

a. 59 occupied; CHI Com SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launchers.
b. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. 15-25 sites estimated to be occupied at one time.
c. SA-5 complexes may consist of 3 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.
d. Battalions move between prepared sites, none of which is known to be outside the Hanoi, Haiphong, Phuc Yen Triangle. 5-10 sites estimated to be occupied at one time.

* East of 100° E.
** Occupied sites East of 100° E.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 65.

CHAPTER III

PLANNING

SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 78 Posture Statement

(S) For a number of years the Chairman of the JCS had requested input from CINCPAC (and other unified and specified commanders) regarding his annual Posture Statement. In his request of 8 October, the Chairman noted that he wanted to strengthen and improve the usefulness of the statement. In particular, he wanted to stress the balance of military force levels--regionally as well as worldwide--so that existing trends in military force levels could be better understood by the Congress and by the American people.[1]

(U) CINCPAC requested and received inputs from his component commanders, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and his own staff.

(S) The main thrust of his reply to the Chairman addressed the lack of sufficient funds and the impact of that lack on PACOM force levels, readiness, and training. CINCPAC first outlined the threat to the United States and its friends and allies. (This subject is addressed in detail in Chapter II of this history.)[2]

[redacted]

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1. JCS 7896/081428Z Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC 291934Z Oct 76; J5324 HistSum Oct 76.

Sec 1.5 (a), (d) (g)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) The Chairman of the JCS thanked CINCPAC for his input in a message on 23 November, in which he acknowledged the unique problems of the PACOM, but also noted that CINCPAC's comments were uniform with those of the other CINCs in calling attention to the growing need to emphasize readiness, and the comments on the difficulties faced because of lack of funds and/or realistic training environments. He shared CINCPAC's concern and said he would stress it in upcoming Congressional hearings. "I know you will do all in your power to improve readiness throughout the Pacific Command." The Chairman especially thanked CINCPAC for couching his comments in terms that would be readily understood by the American people and the Congress and described the "thoughtful observations" as of "real assistance."[2]

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) was the JCS mid-range planning vehicle and a major document in military planning. It was published in two volumes, the first concerned with military strategy and force planning guidance, and the second with force levels designed in relation to that strategy. CINCPAC provided input for both volumes of the FY 79-86 plan in 1976.

~~(S)~~ As had been the case in the request the previous year, when the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments they specifically solicited his views on trends, either military or political, that might have an impact on strategic planning guidance. Of special interest were new or innovative ideas on strategic concepts for the various world regions. To prepare his reply, CINCPAC sought

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 5361/232341Z Nov 76.

and received the comments of his component commanders, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and his own staff.[1]

(C) In his message of 2 February 1976 CINCPAC said he welcomed the opportunity to provide his recommendations. He believed that the strategy and force planning guidance should include realistic political and military trends; probable contingency situations; and militarily sound, practical courses of action.[2]

[redacted]

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1. JCS 5529/032036Z Dec 75.
2. CINCPAC 022215Z Feb 76; J5322 HistSum Feb 76.
3. CINCPAC reiterated these comments subsequently in his 240406Z Mar 76, in response to a JCS request to comment on a Defense Department draft report to the Congress on Mobilization and Deployment Planning for NATO. (J5221 HistSum Mar 76).

[redacted]

(U) Next, CINCPAC provided a list of specific comments and recommendations on a line-in, line-out basis.

(U) In May the JCS promulgated permanent guidelines for the preparation of Volume II of the JSOP, which concerned the levels of forces recommended to accomplish the objectives outlined in Volume I, and recommendations for mid-range objective force levels for allied and friendly forces. The JCS planned to revise their guidance and input suspense dates each year by message, thereby simplifying and accelerating the overall procedures involved in preparation of CINCPAC's input.

(C) The format for Book I (Strategic Forces) remained the same, while formats for Books II (General Purpose Forces) and III (Allied and Friendly Forces) were altered to enhance their utility. JCS-required inputs for Book II included a tabular summary of required forces for each case; a specific threat, to include assessed capabilities, for each case against which total force requirements were determined; a brief description of the scenario used for two of the cases; and an invitation to unified and specified commanders to comment on the risks inherent in current JSOP force planning estimates and recommended force objectives.

(U) Book III was condensed by combining Part I (Security Assistance) and Part II (Major Force Objectives for Allied and Friendly Countries) into one volume. The security assistance table was extended to cover a five-year period instead of only one year.[1]

(U) CINCPAC provided his input for Volume II in a letter on 6 August. Later that month, however, he provided additional thoughts on Volume II, Book II. He told the JCS he appreciated the efforts to enhance the JSOP's utility and reduce the time and workload required in its annual preparation. The use of permanent guidelines and consolidation of documents for U.S. General Purpose Forces were good steps, CINCPAC said.

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1. J5311 HistSum Aug 76, which cited JCS SM-400-76, Subj: Guidelines for the Development of Volume II (Analysis and Force Tabulations and Annexes to the JSOP), of 24 May 76.

(S) The CINCPAC letter stated, finally, that the need for unified and specified commands to submit required force levels for U.S. General Purpose Forces was still questioned. In comparison with existing capabilities, the high numbers of aircraft carriers, submarines, and aircraft derived in the JSOP negated its credibility in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Unified and specified commands, it was believed, should develop U.S. General Purpose Forces requirements based on real world resources. Permanent JCS guidelines should task unified and specified commands to submit objective force levels "reflecting prudent risk and reasonable attainability."[1]

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the near-term document in the JCS Joint Program for Planning. It addressed the application of in-being forces and capabilities to tasks and contingencies. In 1976 CINCPAC first received the JSCP as revised by the JCS for FY 77 (JCS SM-381-75, revised on 20 April 1976) and subsequently was asked for his comments and recommendations for consideration in preparation of the JSCP for FY 78.

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1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser T69, 6 Aug 76, Subj: Volume II, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1979-1986 (JSOP FY 79-86), and Ltr Ser T78, 25 Aug 76, same subject.

[redacted]

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1. J5/Memo/00029-76, 20 May 76, Subj: Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-77).

[redacted]

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 300825Z Oct 76; J522 HistSum Oct 76.

[redacted]

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Pacific Strategy and Symbolic Actions

(U) On 30 April CINCPAC provided his thoughts on Pacific strategy and U.S. symbolic actions to the Chairman and other members of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the CINC of the European Command. The material that follows is extracted from that message.[2]

(C) He first noted that basic Pacific strategy depended strongly on friendly and cooperative relationships with a wide variety of countries. Not only were bases and other access needed, but also supportive political attitudes on many questions in many places. "It is no exaggeration to say that without this physical and political support we cannot attain basic security at any reasonable force level." And without those attitudes, he continued, "we cannot foreclose the serious possibility that the USSR may gain further positions athwart our lines of communication."

(C) Symbolic actions, he said, could be extraordinarily important. Without falling victim to competitive bidding situations (between the United States and the USSR) or making excessive money or goods transfers, "we can make a lot of vitally necessary points by understanding and responsiveness, often at small cost."

(C) CINCPAC also noted that there were some unfortunate ways in which "we can inadvertently clobber ourselves." He cited three examples. The first was by unilaterally raising substantially the price of training or material after agreement had been reached. "Even if this may be in the fine print of the agreement, it smacks of breach of faith." A second was an excessive delay in response to minor requests, leading to an impression of disinterest. A third was failure to join, in a problem solving mood, to meet minor but urgent needs. In short, he said, "we should be able to give friendly foreign leaders fast service on matters that are minor to us but major to them." He was convinced that the "security payoff" to the United States would be many fold.

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 300329Z Apr 76.

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 010001Z May 76.

[redacted]

(S) CINCPAC next outlined the facilities and capabilities of the various countries interested in the region in such matters as intelligence/surveillance, communications, antisubmarine warfare/ocean surveillance, sea and air control, and sea and air logistics.

(S) Lastly, CINCPAC provided his recommendations. U.S. military assets had been minimal in recent years. He realized budgetary constraints and political sensitivity, but believed that the U.S. priorities for allocation of funds and resources for the area should be raised in an effort to counter Soviet inroads and provide alternative choices for the littoral states. The first priority was phased improvement of certain capabilities.

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(S) After outlining those first priority improvements in communications, surveillance, and intelligence capabilities, CINCPAC addressed the matter of the need for greater flexibility in the deployment of forces into the area, keyed to a developing threat, or contingency requirements for specialized capabilities. He believed that the United States should continue to maintain a naval presence on a routine basis, as had been the practice, but must also be prepared to quickly increase that presence, as necessary, to counter perceived Soviet objectives. "Deployments of naval task groups will not have desired impact unless composition is perceived by littoral nations as capable of countering current Soviet deployed forces."

(S) He next addressed unity of command for principal tasks. He considered such unity of command a prerequisite for efficient and timely employment of the limited forces available to perform required functions inherent in support of Indian Ocean operations and Middle East contingencies. These functions would include LOC protection, area denial, and logistics support, and would require a maximum effort by all available forces. The westward movement of the PACOM boundary enhanced achievement of U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean and Middle East by strengthening unity of command. He believed that it was important that all forces, functions, and activities in the area be coordinated by one unified commander to insure the most effective use of available assets.

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(S) The JCS advised CINCPAC on 14 May that they appreciated his in-depth assessment of the situation and would keep under consideration his recommendations for improvement of U.S. capabilities. Because of the broad interest in this area, and possible impacts on neighboring commands, they recommended that CINCPAC keep the CINCs of the Atlantic and European Commands informed; the JCS had passed to them CINCPAC's 1 May message.[1]

Joint Operation Planning System Orientation Course

(U) On 6 February the JCS proposed that CINCPAC sponsor a Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) orientation course at Camp Smith. The course had been taught in Washington by instructors from the Air Training Command supplemented by speakers from the Office of the JCS. It was proposed to hold the course at three sponsor sites, Washington, the European Command, and CINCPAC, with local unified command members briefing in the areas previously covered by OJCS members. CINCPAC concurred with the proposal and agreed to provide guest speakers on the following topics: introduction to the JOPS, Joint Organization for National Defense, the planning process, the Crisis Action System, and the Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT). Because of the demand for the course, it was presented twice in the PACOM. The first, from 18 to 22 October, was attended by 26; the second, from 26 to 29 October, was attended by 31. They came from the component commands, COMUS Korea, and various other PACOM commands, with grades varying from officer O-3 to O-5, enlisted from E-6 to E-8, and civilians from GS-5 through GS-13. It was planned to continue this program.[2]

Release of Joint Operation Planning System Volume on Crisis Action

(U) On 5 April COMUS Korea requested permission to locally reproduce JOPS Volume IV, which concerned crisis action, for release to the Korean Government. The JCS granted release authority, but denied permission for local reproduction

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1. JCS 9236/142359Z May 76.
2. J5231 HistSum Dec 76; JCS 8507/061751Z Feb 76; CINCPAC 051859Z Mar 76.

in accordance with JOPS provisions. CINCPAC's headquarters provided 20 additional copies to COMUS Korea to pass to the Koreans.[1]

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1. J5242 HistSum Apr 76; COMUSK 050715Z Apr 76; JCS 4130/141932Z Apr 76.

SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans

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1. J52 Report "Plans Status," Ser T2 of 1 Jan 77.

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1. J522 HistSum Dec 76, which cited CINCPAC OPLAN 5001, Ser T84 of 2 Sep 76.

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1. CINCPAC 272130Z Nov 76; JCS 4553/031752Z Dec 76.
2. J5212 HistSum Dec 76; J52 Report, "Plans Status," Ser T2 of 1 Jan 77.
3. JCS 8696/092247Z Jul 76; J5213 HistSum Jul 76.
4. Ibid.; CINCPAC 012215Z Aug 76.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 207.
2. J5223 HistSum Apr 76; J5211 HistSums Jul, Dec 76; CINCPAC 200229Z Nov 76; JCS 9865/270252Z Nov 76; COMUSK 120440Z Aug 76. K-X was nearing completion at the end of 1976.
3. CINCPAC Planning Directive, Ser T70 of 9 Aug 76, Subj: Conventional Offensive Operations Against the PRC; J5223 HistSum Oct 76.

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC 152334Z Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC 292113Z Apr 76.

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 209-211; J5243 HistSum Jan 76, which cited CINCPAC's Memo for Record of 27 Aug 75, Subj: Planning and Exercise Requirements, Korea (U).
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 242232Z Jan 76.
3. J52 Report, "Plans Status," CINCPAC Ser T2 of 1 Jan 77.
4. J5221 HistSum Dec 76, which cited JCS SM-1022-76 of 20 Dec 76, Subj; Review of Revised CINCPAC CONPLAN 5060, which cited CINCPAC Ltr Ser C188 of 11 Aug 76, Subj: CINCPAC CONPLAN 5060 (U).

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1. CINCPAC 310310Z Jul 76.
2. J5232 HistSum Mar 76; CINCPAC 200336Z Mar 76.

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Worldwide Conference of Plans Directors

(U) In August the JCS invited comments from all Service headquarters and unified and specified commands on a proposal for a worldwide conference of Plans Directors. They also solicited ideas for agenda topics. Subsequent responses welcomed such a meeting. Over 70 subjects were suggested for discussion at the meeting set for 28 October.

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1. J5221 HistSum Feb 76; CINCLANT 231436Z Jan 76.
2. CINCPAC 070433Z Feb 76.
3. J5224 HistSum Dec 76; CINCPAC 070125Z Oct 76.

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1. J522 HistSum Dec 76, which cited J-5M 1993-76, 12 Nov 76, Subj: Conference Reports.

SECTION III--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Quick-Reaction Planning Capability for Joint Task Force Operations

(U) Following the contingency operations that had taken place in the spring of 1975 (the evacuations of Cambodia and Saigon and the SS MAYAGUEZ incident), CINCPAC had tasked an ad hoc board to report on intelligence and operations in contingencies. The CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LT GEN William G. Moore, USAF, was named president of the board. The following is quoted from the report prepared by that board in response to CINCPAC's request; the report was forwarded to Admiral Gayler on 5 December 1975.[1]

(S) The tasking had been specifically aimed at resolving the shortcomings in dissemination of intelligence during the MAYAGUEZ incident and providing remedies for future emergencies. Further, because intelligence dissemination was an inherent responsibility of command, the board of necessity focused its inquiry primarily on command arrangements established for execution of the MAYAGUEZ operations. The military force assigned the task of recapturing the MAYAGUEZ and rescuing its crew from hostile Cambodian forces successfully achieved its objective. Immediate execution of the assault on Koh Tang was essential to success. Therefore, forces were marshaled rapidly at U-Tapao, Thailand, and the operation executed with minimum preparation. Constraints, with regard to time and and available forces, complicated both planning and execution.[2]

(U) Findings principally concerned command arrangements, terminology, and the dissemination of intelligence information. Each was addressed in some detail.

(S) In the matter of command arrangements, CINCPAC had retained operational control as well as command, had designated the Commander of the U.S. Support Activity Group (COMUSSAG) in Thailand as coordinating authority for supporting

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1. Memo, CINCPAC Ad Hoc Board to Admiral Gayler, 5 Dec 75, Subj: Report on Intelligence and Operations in Contingencies (U).
2. The Board also considered intelligence and operations in the evacuation operations from Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam that had occurred in April 1975. See Appendices I, IV, and VI to the CINCPAC Command History 1975 for more detailed discussions of these operations.

forces, and had approved his assumption of the role of on-scene commander. USSAG was a joint activity with no operating forces. It was not a subordinate unified command, nor was it established as a Joint Task Force (JTF).[1]

(S) There was no evidence of fragmentary orders "chopping" operational units to COMUSSAG. ["CHOP" was the acronym for Change of Operational Control.]

(S) A joint command post was not established at the staging area at U-Tapao to insure the uninterrupted flow of operational and intelligence information and the conduct of normal staff coordination. The designation of a Coordinator/Liaison Officer (LNO) to represent COMUSSAG at U-Tapao proved inadequate. His exact duties were vague and not defined to key participants. He was not a properly appointed Coordinating Authority to carry out the function as defined in JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.

(S) The secure voice conference net was used for ad hoc direction at all echelons without the benefit of detailed written confirmation. Checks and balances in normal staffing and coordination were by-passed since hard copy could not keep up with the situation.

(S) In matters relating to terminology, there were numerous instances of imprecise terms, both in standing instructions and message traffic during the MAYAGUEZ incident. While imprecise language may not have affected the MAYAGUEZ operation, deviations from JCS approved joint procedures and terminology invited confusion and misunderstanding. Examples:

- On-Scene Commander as defined in CINCPAC Instruction S3100.1B [Peacetime Emergency Situation Command & Control Procedures (U)] appears to be at variance with its application to the role of USSAG. The term intermediate commander would have been more correct.

- The USSAG plan stated the ABCCC [Airborne Command and Control Center] role as "focal point" for all on-scene activities. This is an undefined and redundant term.

- Ground Security Forces is not a defined term.

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1. A discussion of the origin and nature of USSAG/7AF is in CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 47-50.

- Operational Command and operational control were improperly used collectively. Operational command is an authority only to unified or sub-unified commanders.

- Central Coordinating Authority, On-Scene Coordinating Authority, and Coordinator/LNO are not JCS Pub 1 terms. Their use presents opportunities to confuse command relationships. Additionally, Coordinating Authority, an authorized term, is normally reserved for planning, not the conduct of operations (JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces).

(S) Regarding the dissemination of intelligence information, it was noted that essential intelligence information was available at USSAG and U-Tapao. There was an interruption in the flow of essential intelligence because the recipients at U-Tapao were not asked to pass it on to operating units.

(S) Proper command and control arrangements provided for the flow of information and functional interface. However, the system does not guarantee essential information is received by the commander. Requiring commanders to formally acknowledge receipt of essential intelligence information would be impractical due to time constraints and communications system limitations during a crisis. A numbered sequence system does not insure receipt of messages by the commander.

(S) Requiring commanders at the lowest applicable echelon to include in their Commander's Situation Report (SITREP) an update of their estimate of the threat is a practical solution that expands on established procedures and assures acknowledgement by commanders. The time of initiation and frequency of SITREPs would be determined by CINCPAC.

(S) Conclusions reached by the ad hoc board were as follows:

- The command and control arrangements for the operation did not evolve in the precise manner defined in Joint Doctrine. A formalized command channel was not established from USSAG to the operating forces; however, the assault force commanders received verbal instructions and, in effect, COMUSSAG exercised operational control of the assault force. Commanders took the necessary action to accomplish the operation.

- Command relationships which are not precisely prescribed in accordance with JCS Pub 2 have the potential for confusion at the operational unit level.

- Significantly, Commander Task Group 79.9 and Commanders of Air Force units participating in the operations did consider themselves under the OPCON of COMUSSAG for the MAYAGUEZ operation. COMUSSAG also considered them under his OPCON.

- Lacking a formal command and control arrangement at U-Tapao, procedural vulnerabilities were present which contributed to the intelligence dissemination failure.

- The COMUSSAG Coordinator/LNO at U-Tapao, the intended extension of COMUSSAG, proved to be an inadequate substitute for a formally appointed Coordinating Authority with a staff and necessary communications. A properly appointed representative of COMUSSAG would have established effective coordination and control.

- JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, is the joint doctrine for establishment of temporary command arrangements during emergencies: it is imperative that the commander in joint operations have unequivocal authority to perform the mission and control assigned forces.

- Modification of procedures established in CINCPAC Instruction 3500.8, Commander's Situation Report (SITREP), to include an update of the perceived threat is necessary.

- Immediate hard copy follow-up of verbal orders is essential for verification and record.

- The term "Ground Security Force" was not defined and improperly described the USMC forces employed in the MAYAGUEZ incident.

TS Lastly, the board provided the following recommendations:

- Command be exercised in accordance with JCS Pub 2, with the preferred method being the establishment of a JTF when two or more Services are involved.

- A CINCPAC plan for activation, staffing, generation of forces, deployment, employment, and support of a Joint Task Force be developed.

- CINCPAC Instruction 3500.8, Commander's Situation Report, be revised to include the perceived threat.

- Joint doctrine be developed for secure voice conferencing of command and control and its relationships to hard copy directives.

- The foregoing recommendations be incorporated into the PACOM joint exercise programs.

- PACOM recommend to JCS adoption of additional terms for forces used during politically sensitive military operations that preclude reference to an assault/invasion force.

(U) The following officers concurred in the report: MAJ GEN C.C. Pattillo, USAF, Vice Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces; RADM O.H. Oberg, USN, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet; MAJ GEN J. Koler, Jr., USMC, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; BGEN R.E. Round, Jr., USA, Assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry Division; and two officers from the CINCPAC staff, MAJ GEN F.C. Lang, USMC, Director for Operations, and BGEN D.E. Larson, USAF, Director for Intelligence.

(S) On 8 December the report was endorsed by Admiral Gayler, back to the board chairman. He approved the findings and recommendations, with one exception: the recommendation that joint doctrine be developed for secure voice conferencing of command and control and its relationships to hard copy directives, the Admiral directed, should be changed to add, "Develop communications and procedural capability to follow voice conferencing decisions by hard copy without significant time delay."

(U) The Admiral directed that responsible staff divisions should take action as soon as possible to implement the board's recommendations, and report the anticipated date of such accomplishment to him. Finally, he commended the members of the board for their "prompt and most constructive advice."[1]

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1. First Endorsement on CINCPAC AD HOC Board Secret Memo of 5 Dec 75; the Admiral sent copies to his component commanders, the Commander, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and the Commander U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group.

(U) One result was a CINCPAC Instruction (3120.25) entitled "Quick-Reaction Planning Capability for Joint Task Force (JTF) Operations." The policy defined in that instruction was as follows:[1]

- Readiness to act in contingencies with military forces, as necessary, is an essential part of U.S. security and may be needed to protect U.S. interests, forestall larger problems, and to enforce the rule of law. It is essential that the CINCPAC staff act with speed and certainty. Plans and decisions must be quick and right.

- Since all but the smallest operations in the PACOM will be joint, the joint chain of command must be used. Lines of command and control must be clear and unambiguous.

- CINCPAC will exercise operational command in accordance with JCS Pub 2, with the preferred method being establishment of a JTF when two or more Services are involved and it is impracticable to exercise command through a subordinate unified commander.

- The CINCPAC staff will develop and maintain a quick-reaction capability, supported by an adequate body of data, intelligence, and doctrine, which can respond immediately to crisis situations and make plans and decisions.

- This policy will be reflected in appropriate PACOM plans, practiced in training exercises, and incorporated into related directives.

(U) A JTF was defined as a force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Military Services or two or more of those Services that was constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified or specified command or an existing task force. A JTF was not to be a permanent command arrangement; it was established when the mission to be accomplished had a specific limited objective and required execution of responsibilities involving two or more Services and close integration of effort. When feasible, an established PACOM commander with a staff and communications capable of command and control of joint forces was to be designated as commander of the JTF. The JTF staff was to be augmented to insure balanced representation and

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1. CINCPACINST 3120.25, 23 Apr 76, Subj: Quick-Reaction Planning Capability for Joint Task Force Operations.

expertise from all Services involved. A JTF was to be dissolved when the purpose for which it had been created had been achieved.

(U) CINCPAC had the authority to establish a JTF in the PACOM. He was to establish and designate the JTF, designate the commander, assign the mission, assign forces, and provide for appropriate staff augmentation. When such a JTF was activated, the commander was to communicate directly with and be under the direct operational command of CINCPAC. CINCPAC would also exercise directive authority in the field of logistics to insure immediate and coordinated support of the JTF forces.[1]

(U) The Commander of the JTF would exercise operational control and logistic control of assigned or attached forces. Operational control authority consisted of the functions of command involving the composition (tactical tailoring) of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It did not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. A CJTF would exercise logistic coordination or control only to the extent necessary to meet those logistic needs of the subordinate commanders that were essential to the successful accomplishment of his missions, and to meet any request of the subordinate commanders for logistic support.

(U) When a JTF was activated, the joint chain of command (CJTF-CINCPAC-JCS) and channel of communications would be used. Tactical communications were to be compatible among ground, naval, and air forces. Other communications requirements were outlined.

(U) Forces to be used were outlined. It was noted that possible minor contingencies in the PACOM were infinite in variety and when they did occur were usually fastbreaking and unpredictable. In general, they had to be handled with the forces at hand or readily deployable by air. Time for planning and execution was usually extremely limited (such as had been the case in the MAYAGUEZ incident). The most likely to be employed forces were those that were already deployed forward, or operating in forward areas; air transportable and deployable theater familiar assets; and forces that were combat-ready on short notice. Forces identified in applicable contingency plans would be used where possible in accordance with preplanned force generation schedules and time-phased force deployment lists. When situations arose

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1. See the CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 189-190 for a discussion of CINCPAC's authority in logistics matters as interpreted by the JCS at that time.

that had not been anticipated, however, and for which no plans had been developed, CINCPAC would determine the forces to be deployed.

(U) All CINCPAC staff agencies were to have qualified personnel alerted for short-notice assembly and on call of the Chief of Staff. They were to maintain files of appropriate data, plans, directives, doctrine, etc., readily available for use during crisis planning and decision making. They were to insure that participating headquarters adhered to the use of accepted joint terms, doctrines, and procedures. The instruction then outlined the individual responsibilities of the various staff agency heads.

(U) An enclosure to the instruction listed a number of questions that should be considered by planners during a crisis situation. They were general in nature, and not intended to be all inclusive, but provided a checklist to direct the thoughts of those involved. It is quoted here:

- What unusual is occurring?
- What is the threat?
- What is the impact on U.S. personnel or interests?
- What requests, if any, have been made by foreign governments?
- What is the who, what, when, and where of the situation?
- What forces are readily available and how long before commitment? What is the major constraint to their commitment?
- Does the United States have any treaty or legal obligations?
- Is there an OPLAN or CONPLAN for the area?
- Are there any U.S. military in the area? What elements? How many?
- Are there any U.S. noncombatants in the area? How many? Are they in any danger?
- What is the status of communications to the area?

- Estimate for foreign government of enemy intentions or capabilities.

- How stable is the country?

- What reactions are coming from other U.S. Government agencies.

- What reactions are coming from friendly, neutral, or unfriendly foreign governments?

- What is the status of strategic mobility resources?

- What are the objectives established by the National Command Authorities?

- What is the status of airfields and ports involved in action under consideration?

- What constraints to the military have been identified by the National Command Authorities?

- What are the current Rules of Engagement in the area?

- Is there a noncombatant evacuation plan for the area?

- What are the public affairs implications/responsibilities for the area?

- Is there a matter of logistic significance that could affect actions under consideration?

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1. CDRUSACSG 100620Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 030201Z May 76; COMUSK 250826Z May 76.
2. CDRCAMOPAC 300241Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 040109Z Aug 76; JCS 131644Z Sep 76.
3. J54 HistSum Dec 76

[redacted]

Riot Control Agents

(U) Under restrictions of national policy placed on the use of Riot Control Agents (RCA) (very similar in effect to tear gas), RCA could be used by a commander only on a military base and only for the protection of that base. Under this policy, RCA could not be used off base even to recover a nuclear weapon. Efforts of the CINCPAC staff to achieve a change in this policy over the previous 18 months came to a successful culmination, when, on 2 March 1977, the JCS published SM 156-76 announcing that the national policy had been changed to permit use of RCA in recovery of nuclear weapons off base.

Detailed Combined Planning with Korea/Force Beddowns

(S) In 1975 guidance from the JCS in August cautioned that throughout combined planning with the Republic of Korea care was to be taken to insure that Korea could not infer policy implications or added U.S. commitment for its defense or any specific force levels the United States would commit to the defense of Korea. On 3 December CINCPAC requested authority to permit release of notional U.S. augmentation forces to the Koreans in bilateral plans for the defense of Korea.[2]

(S) The JCS reply was received on 13 February 1976. They concurred with the CINCPAC rationale that desired levels of detailed planning with the Koreans could not occur without the provision of certain notional planning data, but release of notional force lists other than identified in this message was considered premature because of ongoing actions relative to ROK defense. They provided the following guidance for use as appropriate:[3]

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1. J54 HistSum Dec 76.
2. J5222 HistSum Dec 75; JCS 7586/151912Z Aug 75; CINCPAC 031857Z Dec 75.
3. JCS 6542/131627Z Feb 76.

- ...Combined force planning should, first, build from a baseline of those available ROK-U.S. Forces presently in country; second, incorporate those PACOM regional naval and air forces which might logically be utilized for Korean contingency augmentation consistent with Pacific security responsibilities; and third, identify those areas in which a force shortfall will occur in order to plan better for the evolving strategy for the defense of the ROK.

- ...The evolving strategy for the defense of the ROK may require a change to logistic support under current plans. Logistic supportability of the evolving strategy cannot be determined until the development of the defense concept and evaluation of the requirements have been completed. Concurrent with present strategic planning, logistic concepts are being studied, which, if adopted and Congressional constraints permit, will form a basis for ROK-U.S. combined logistic planning.

(S) CINCPAC passed the authority to discuss notional forces taken from the list of "PACOM Assigned" forces in JSCP, Volume II to COMUS Korea for the purpose of providing an entrée for U.S.-ROK discussions on the upgrading of airfields. Thus, for long-range purposes, additional beddown space might be made available to alleviate the contingency beddown space shortages for USMC/USAF augmentation aircraft.[1]

(S) In April CINCPACAF advised that that headquarters fully supported the PACFLT and FMFPAC initiatives to develop a beddown capability at Pohang (K-3) and/or Yechon (K-X). That headquarters, however, could not support certain near-term proposals that would require the use of PACAF resources while requiring the Air Force to forego deployment of forces for which those resources had been intended. They sought alternatives that would permit early deployment of Marines without impacting on PACAF capabilities.[2]

(S) On 20 November CINCPAC noted that construction of K-X was nearing completion, and it was expected that the ROK Air Force would deploy a tactical fighter squadron there by December. The ROK also had plans for expanding and resurfacing the existing airfield at Pohang. CINCPAC planned to ask COMUS Korea to initiate negotiations with Korea for the use of facilities at those two bases and for Korean development or maintenance of additional facilities

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1. CINCPAC 142012Z Feb 76.
2. CINCPACAF 022030Z Apr 76.

for U.S. contingency use. Negotiations would be coordinated with the Embassy in Seoul and a copy of a concluded agreement forwarded to the JCS. The JCS approved CINCPAC's proposal on 27 November.[1]

Military Support of Emergencies in the Aleutians

(U) In the matter of domestic emergencies in the Aleutian Islands, the JCS responded to a CINCPAC request for clarification of responsibilities. JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, the JCS advised, designated the Commander, Alaskan Air Command, the senior military officer in Alaska, as the single point of contact for military matters within the State of Alaska. That publication further tasked COMAAC to develop and coordinate plans for domestic emergencies (excluding civil disturbances) throughout the State. The JCS advised that the 5 December 1975 Memorandum of Agreement between CINCPAC and the COMAAC was within the provisions of JCS Pub 2 and was appropriate in regard to assigned Unified Command Plan responsibilities.[2]

(U) In the matter of civil disturbances noted above, the Commander of the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group subsequently requested clarification of planning responsibilities in the Aleutians. JCS Pub 2 tasked CINCPAC to plan for and conduct civil disturbance operations, although these were normally a State's responsibility. Because of this inconsistency, CINCPAC proposed that civil disturbance matters become the responsibility of COMAAC, who concurred in CINCPAC's proposal.[3]

(C) Accordingly, on 18 August CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that Pub 2 and Defense Department Directive 3025.12 (Military Support of Civil Disturbance Operations) be changed to reflect this new alignment of responsibilities. He noted that the CINCPAC-COMAAC Memorandum of Agreement established the Alaskan commander as the single point of contact for military support to Alaska during domestic emergencies wherever they may occur. As the responsibility for handling domestic emergencies was primarily a function of State government, such agreement aligned responsibility for military support for all emergencies to the senior military commander on the scene.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 200229Z Nov 76; JCS 9865/270252Z Nov 76.
2. J3162 HistSum Feb 76; JCS 2024/192105Z Feb 76.
3. J5223 HistSum Aug 76; CINCPAC 100102Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 130223Z Jul 76; AAC Elmendorf 262335Z Jul 76 and 310020Z Jul 76.
4. CINCPAC 180219Z Aug 76.

Military Advice

(C) On 19 July the Chairman of the JCS advised the commanders of unified and specified commands of a recent meeting at which the Secretary of Defense had made a strong point that the Chairman agreed with and wished to pass to the JCS and other senior military commanders. He said:[1]

> ...We...must ensure that our advice, recommendations, and requirements are not diluted or compromised by political or diplomatic constraints. We must state our views clearly and objectively in an unvarnished, unrestrained manner based upon military needs. Although we should identify and discuss political or diplomatic implications where they exist, there should be no doubt as to our military advice. It is our responsibility to provide it, and the Secretary and the President expect it.

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1. JCS 7697/192219Z Jul 76.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Readiness of PACOM Forces

(U) CINCPAC provided semiannual reports on the readiness of forces in the PACOM as required by the JCS. The October 1976 report is summarized in the paragraphs that follow.[1]

(S) His commander's summary noted that PACOM forces were operationally capable of meeting the requirements of JCS-approved plans, except when they were required to redeploy to the Atlantic and European Commands in support of NATO operations. CINCPAC continued to rely on CONUS-based combat and combat support forces for essential augmentation in the event of implementation of operation plans. The report addressed specific plans, particularly OPLAN 5001, the PACOM Defense Plan (U); 5025, Defense of Taiwan/Penghus (C); 5027, the Defense of Korea (C); 5027N, the defense of the ROK against a major North Korean attack; and 5125, Augmentation/Support of Other Commands (U).

(S) In personnel matters, for the Air Force CINCPAC noted that projected personnel status indicated sufficient personnel for CINCPAC plans, but simultaneous implementation of two or more plans would require reassessment. Overall pilot experience and training levels had improved with the influx of experienced crews from CONUS tactical wings. Those experience levels were expected to remain high. The Navy's overall manning was 97.1 percent of the allowance, with sea duty at 98.7 percent. Although there had been some improvement since the last report, petty officer shortages totaled 8,279 (6,040 at sea). There were also shortages of E5 to E9 supervisory personnel in engineering and combat systems related technical ratings. Marines remained combat ready. Although shortfalls existed in certain occupations, personnel strength had continued to improve. The overall operating strength of the Army was relatively high, with 99 percent of all combat units meeting or exceeding their authorized levels. Specific Army deficiencies in Hawaii, Japan, and Korea were outlined. In Korea, for example, critical occupational specialty shortages continued to exist in missile units for both crew and maintenance skills. While personnel turnover continued to be a problem, there had been substantial improvement in that area.

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1. CINCPAC 182108Z Oct 76.

(S) In matters of intelligence, the PACOM posture was generally adequate to meet single, but not multiple, OPLAN commitments, with the exception of 5001, which would require additional resources. Specific shortfalls were listed.

(TS) In matters of operations and training, specifics by Service were outlined. For the Air Force, the capability of the Korean Tactical Air Control System continued to be marginal, but improving. The rate and effect of improvements were inhibited by restrictions to foreign disclosure on bilateral planning, and ROK funding limitations that delayed or negated the purchase of required equipment. Incremental force reductions in the Western Pacific had pared PACAF forces to the minimum acceptable level for adequate response to crisis situations and contingencies. A lack of realistic tactical range facilities impacted on aircrew readiness. PACAF had no electronic countermeasures support jamming assets assigned and none were planned to augment PACAF forces. PACAF would require augmentation by an Airborne Command and Control Center and an Airborne Warning and Control System from the CONUS to direct and support air actions over a battle area, particularly in areas of limited radar coverage.

(TS) In Navy operations and training, the overall force continued to be below desired levels, although new construction had resulted in a net gain in ships during the reporting period. The Fleet's capability to counter an enemy mining campaign was limited by obsolete and inadequate countermeasure resources. There were shortages of mines and mine-delivery vehicles. The shortage of amphibious ships seriously degraded training at the Marine Amphibious Brigade level. The Third Fleet's 25 percent operating tempo was below the minimum necessary to satisfy basic and intermediate training exercises. In the Seventh Fleet the 48 percent operating tempo was devoted largely to meeting bilateral and major exercise commitments and JCS-directed special operations with minimal at-sea time devoted to training requirements. Additional factors significantly degrading PACFLT's readiness included the gap between capability and potential threat in antisubmarine warfare; anti-air warfare/anti-ship missile defense/electronic warfare limitations; and inadequate command, control, and communications equipment. These factors continued to render PACFLT marginally capable of fully supporting all PACOM missions and responsibilities.

(TS) In operations and training of Army forces, the overall readiness condition remained high, but shortages in electronic warfare and infrared countermeasures equipment would have a detrimental effect on Army operational capabilities in a combat environment.

(TS) In reconnaissance operations and training, the initial phase tasking in all CINCPAC operational orders could be accomplished, with available CONUS-based augmentation assets. Tactical reconnaissance in support of contingency operations or during periods of increased tension, prior to relaxation of JCS-imposed reconnaissance restrictions, was severely limited during bad weather. CINCPAC considered essential the early introduction into the PACOM of the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance (TEREC) system, the RF-4 (UPD-4) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) pod, and the U-2 SENIOR LANCE STAR system, all of which provided near-real-time, stand-off, all-weather reconnaissance.

(S) Communications-electronics readiness was addressed. The status of such activities, as had been noted in the previous report, had improved with operational Navy-leased GAPSATs over the Atlantic and Pacific, launch of a third over the Indian Ocean, installation of UHF satellite receivers/transceivers on ships, activation of two Defense Satellite Communication System super high frequency (DSCS SHF) satellite terminals at Clark Air Base, and provision of high-quality secure voice service from Oahu to Seoul by means of DSCS SHF. The lack of a theater-wide satellite-based, flexible, reliable, modern, and high capacity secure communications system continued to limit the ability to support plans, respond to crises and contingencies, and react to the changing political environment. The Single Integrated Operation Plan/Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network connectivity between TACAMO (Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting) and the airborne command posts (CINCPAC's, the National Emergency ACP, and the Strategic Air Command's Western Auxiliary ABNCP) continued to rely on unreliable high frequency links. Relief was anticipated through the GAPSAT terminal installations in the CINCPAC ABNCP and TACAMO; the other links would remain high frequency. Various other communications deficiencies were outlined.

(S) Logistics readiness of the Air Force and Fleet was satisfactory to support CINCPAC plans individually, but not simultaneously. The Army's capability to support plans was marginal because of the drawdown of support forces in the PACOM and the less-tan-required fill of prepositioned war reserve materiel and operational project stocks. PACOM pre-stocked bulk aviation, ground, and ship propellant inventories (fuel) were satisfactory, except for a 2.4 million-barrel deficit in JP-4 fuel, approximately 20 percent of the requirement. An increase in ammunition throughput capacity of CONUS West Coast ports was necessary to support the 5001 and 5027 plans. Specific Service shortfalls were outlined.

(S) In medical support of OPLAN 5027, a shortfall of 7,000 hospital beds at D plus 120 was reported. This could be resolved, however, by commitment of additional hospital resources from the CONUS or by reducing the theater evacuation policy to 30 days.[1]

Rules of Engagement

(S) A number of modifications were made in 1976 to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) under which U.S. Forces operated to carry out their missions. Some of those are addressed here. Following the Yellow Sea incident that had occurred in Korea on 26-27 February 1975, during which U.S. fighter aircraft had been launched in response to North Korean aircraft penetrating the Republic of Korea Air Defense Identification Zone, CINCPAC had provided specific guidance. He said, "Let us keep them [U.S. aircraft] on the ground unless threat to American installations is clear, positive, imminent, and serious." In September CINCPAC advised that the ROE would be rewritten as required, stating the mission of U.S. air defense forces in Korea during peacetime. His position was that all such forces were to maintain a high state of readiness and be prepared to respond immediately when U.S. Forces or installations were attacked, or clearly threatened with attack, by hostile forces. U.S. air defense forces were also to be prepared to provide immediate assistance to the ROK, when directed by the JCS or higher authority, in meeting commitments under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The air defense forces of the ROK, under the operational control of the United Nations Command, had the mission and responsibility for protection of ROK air space. This position was to clarify responsibility, not degrade U.S. resolve to meet its commitments to come to the defense of the ROK.[2]

(S) On 29 October 1976 Admiral Weisner modified the previous CINCPAC guidance. A statement of revised ROE was provided to COMUS Korea, the JCS, the component commands, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group by CINCPAC with the further statement to the JCS that the CINCPAC Instruction on the subject (S3710.2C) would be revised to reflect this new guidance. The new guidance was as follows:[3]

> A. Command relations in ROK provide for integrated air defense structure and basing; however, normal peacetime defense of Korean air space is the responsibility of CINCUNC with ROK forces under his OPCOM. U.S. air defense forces will be

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 240-246.
3. J311 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 292319Z Oct 76; COMUSK and the Chairman, JCS were advised by CINCPAC 292317Z Oct 76 (EX).

prepared to provide immediate assistance to the ROK, when required and when criteria of para [1]B are met. Any air defense action by U.S. to protect U.S./friendly forces/ installations will continue to be prudent, and be tempered by a high degree of restraint. Must ensure, in as far as possible, that U.S. Forces do not overreact to deliberate provocation designed by NK to cause an overreaction on which they can capitalize.

B. Hostile aircraft will only be engaged by U.S. air defense forces whenever threat to U.S./friendly forces/ installations is clear, positive, imminent, and serious.

(U) Three messages from the JCS in 1976 concerned other specific ROE matters, as discussed below.

(S) On 30 July the JCS replied to a CINCPAC request for clarification of ROE regarding conduct of seaborne forces during normal/routine operations in claimed territorial waters of foreign countries that extended beyond three nautical miles and the applicability of JCS guidance issued in 1970. The JCS advised that the CINCPAC interpretation was accurate, as the JCS paper had addressed only the defense of U.S. territory and forces. U.S. policy limited territorial seas to three nautical miles and all ships had the right of innocent passage therein. The area beyond three nautical miles was considered to be "high seas" with free use rights for all ships. In affirmation of a free use policy, the JCS continued, U.S. Forces should continue to conduct overflight, surface, and submerged operations in areas within 3 to 12 miles off foreign coasts unless specifically prohibited by political sensitivity or other considerations.[1]

(TS) On 24 August the JCS replied to a CINCPAC message requesting definitive planning guidance and clarification of authority to conduct defensive air strikes.

(S) There were no restrictions on planning, the JCS advised, which was what CINCPAC's request had addressed. "It should be recognized, however, that the existing situation would be considered by JCS prior to the initiation of military operations and restricting Rules of Engagement would be included in JCS planning/execution messages." The peacetime ROE contained in JCS guidance in 1969 were considered appropriate for the existing situation. The JCS advised, however, that authority for planning should not be construed as authority to conduct defensive or offensive strikes. They concluded that

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1. JCS 9421/301240Z Jul 76.

nothing in the ROE modified in any manner the requirement for a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander was to take immediate action against the attacking force.[1]

(S) In one final matter, the JCS advised in October that a final report of the Defense Science Board task force on Identification Friend, Foe, or Neutral recommended several actions that could ultimately provide U.S. combat forces with a more effective identification capability in support of weapons systems. The board recommended that ROE should take into account the existence of a variety of devices that contributed to the identification problem; specified which combination of sensors justified firing, and permitted the firing platform commander to exercise his operational judgment. They recommended that ROE be reviewed frequently as situations changed or as new equipment or capabilities were added to U.S. or enemy forces.

(S) The JCS, therefore, requested that a review of pertinent ROE, including those promulgated in OPLANs, be conducted by appropriate operational commanders. The review was to focus on identifying and, where required, modifying ROE (in accordance with Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan guidance) that contained unnecessary restrictions in light of advances made in both weapons employment techniques and identification methods. Further, when it was feasible, ROE should reflect those essential elements of information required to justify weapons release. The JCS requested that CINCPAC (and the commanders of other unified and specified commands and the Service chiefs) report the status of their review by the end of February 1977.[2]

Operation PAUL BUNYAN

(U) The PACOM was at peace in 1976, but on 18 August an incident took place in the Joint Security Area (JSA) between North and South Korea in which two U.S. Army officers of the United Nations Command (UNC) were killed by North Koreans. Others were injured. The incident took place during the pruning of a large tree near a UNC checkpoint that partially obscured the line of sight between the checkpoint and another UNC observation post. The following is taken from CINCUNC's summary description of the incident.[3]

(U) The operation had been planned previously, on 2 or 3 August, when Korean laborers under the operational control of the U.S. Army Support Group

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1. JCS 6907/241303Z Aug 76, which cited CINCPAC 202143Z Aug 76 and JCS 3574/301754Z Jun 69.
2. JCS 1998/041857Z Oct 76.
3. CINCUNC 310848Z Aug 76; Honolulu Advertiser, 20 Aug 76, p. 1.

at the JSA surveyed the tree and determined that to cut the tree down or prune it was within the laborers' capability; no firm date for cutting the tree was established. On 6 August the Korean workers, without instructions from the Army Support Group, proceeded to the site to fell the tree, accompanied by four security guards. Reportedly a Korean People's Army (KPA) guard questioned what they were doing and when informed told them to leave the tree alone. "This type of dialogue between the KPA and the UNC elements is a common occurrence in the JSA at other than formal meetings." The KPA did not lodge a formal or informal protest over the matter, a normal response if they had decided to make an issue of it. Subsequently the Army Support Group commander determined that visibility could be improved by merely trimming some branches instead of cutting the tree down. No further contact with the KPA occurred until 18 August.

(U) At approximately 1030 hours in Korea on the 18th a UNC work force of five Korean laborers, accompanied by a security force of 10 JSA UNC personnel including two U.S. Army officers, CAPT Arthur G. Bonifas and 1LT Mark T. Barrett, and one ROK Army officer, was dispatched to the area to prune the tree.

(U) The KPA routinely protested or threatened dire consequences for actions that UNC guard personnel took in the performance of their duties and the security group commander regularly took certain precautionary security measures, as in this case where a dialogue had occurred. In addition to the 10 with the work party, the remainder of the security platoon (the JSA duty force) was positioned at a nearby checkpoint with instructions to be ready for immediate employment. The checkpoint was augmented by one additional man for a total of three. The Joint Duty Officer, an officer who had arrived to replace MAJ Bonifas, and an additional staff officer were positioned to observe the work party's activities and the entire vicinity. [The initial reports and the press had referred to Arthur Bonifas as a captain, the wrap-up report from the UNC referred to him as a major.] Other security instructions had included the secreting of pick handles in the back of the truck supporting the work detail; instructions to the JSA Quick Reaction Force, a 30-man platoon, to monitor activity from their normal position about 300 meters south of another checkpoint; sending a ROK Army captain to communicate with KPA personnel if they should arrive on the scene; positioning cameras to record any unusual activity; and issuing instructions that, should an impasse occur, an immediate on-the-spot security officers' meeting was to be called by the UNC on-scene commander, MAJ Bonifas.

(U) Shortly after the UNC work force arrived at the tree and began pruning, two KPA officers and approximately nine guards arrived in a truck. One KPA officer, identified as a LT Pak Chul, asked the ROKA officer what the

party was doing; when told the tree was being pruned, not cut down, he replied, "Good." Work continued for about 15 minutes during which the KPA guards were apparently trying to instruct the laborers how to prune the tree. The CINCUNC account continued:

> ...At approximately 1050 hours, LT Pak, for no known reason, instructed the UNC officer to have the work stopped. A short discussion followed during which the KPA officer told the ROKA captain "If you cut more branches, there will be a big problem (trouble)." The UNC on-the-scene commander directed the work to continue since the work was a legitimate operation. LT Pak then told the ROKA officer "the branches that are cut will be of no use just as you will be after you die." LT Pak then attempted to order the KSC [Korean Service Corps--the laborers] personnel to stop working. The UNC on-the-scene commander reiterated his order to continue the work. One of the other KPA guards said, "If you cut more branches, you are going to die." All of these statements were translated to MAJ Bonifas who indicated to CPT Kim that he believed the KPA were just threatening again and did not intend to act. The commander...[of the U.S. Army Support Group in the JSA] indicates that threats of this nature are a common occurrence and that hardly a week goes by when he does not receive at least one threat to his life or to the lives of his personnel.
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> ...Immediately preceding the assault, LT Pak took off his watch and put it in his pocket. The other KPA officer was observed rolling up his sleeves. MAJ Bonifas was observing the tree cutting, however, and did not notice these hostile indications. LT Pak then yelled the single word "Kill" in Korean and kicked MAJ Bonifas in the groin and the fight started. ("Kill" when used as a military order translates in English as "Kill them all.") Several KPA guards surrounded MAJ Bonifas and continued to beat him. Concurrently, the remaining guards were attacked by the other KPA guards with pick handles and clubs. Additionally, KPA guards picked up the axes used by the tree pruners and attacked the UNC guards. Witnesses from the 10 man security force observed KPA guards beating MAJ Bonifas with the blunt head of the axes while he was on the ground.

> ...The KPA force was superior to the UNC force by a factor of about three to one. Photographs of the incident reveal two instances where seven and nine KPA guards were clustered around individual UNC guards beating them with pick handles, clubs, feet and fists. The photographs also reveal that the UNC guards were attempting to break contact and evacuate the area or extricate other UNC personnel. Korean laborers were not attacked by KPA guards. The fight lasted from 30 seconds (per timing of motion picture films) to four minutes (per witness statements).
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> ...Witness accounts indicate a UNC guard, SP4 Bickley, got in the security force's...truck, drove it around MAJ Bonifas who was lying in the road, and attempted to drive into the KPA guards. This action appeared to terminate the actual assaults with KPA guards moving back across the Bridge of No Return. The security platoon (-) arrived at about this time and undoubtedly contributed to the disengagement and withdrawal of the KPA.

(U) On 18 August the Defense Department released a statement to newsmen in which they advised that the two American Army officers had died from massive head injuries and stab wounds inflicted by the Koreans. Personnel had picked up the body of CAPT Bonifas and injured personnel and withdrawn. When they reassembled, they noted that LT Barrett was missing. Returning to the scene they found him unconscious. They removed him for medical treatment, with no interference by KPA guards, but he was found to be dead en route to the hospital. He was found approximately 25 minutes after the first blow was struck.[1]

~~(C)~~ In an earlier summary of the incident, COMUS Korea had reported that all U.S., ROK, and KATUSA personnel [Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army] received repeated beatings. In that summary, CINCUNC noted that UNC personnel had reacted to a surprise, unprovoked attack with restraint and self-discipline. Both U.S. officers were struck down almost immediately leaving the force without a U.S. officer in charge. There was some evidence of an on-the-spot decision by the KPA to gain a numerical advantage and isolate the UNC leaders as quickly as possible.[2]

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1. SECDEF 2162/182106Z Aug 76; Honolulu Advertiser, 20 Aug 76, p. 1; CINCUNC 310848Z Aug 76.
2. COMUSK 181735Z Aug 76.

(U) CINCUNC's summary report noted that firearms were not used by the security force for a number of reasons. The incident was sudden, and resulted in close hand-to-hand combat. The security force's instructions were to terminate incidents promptly and remove UNC personnel involved, using only the amount of force necessary to extricate themselves. The severity of the attack on MAJ Bonifas was obscured from the vision of other UNC personnel; LT Barrett was on the other side of a retaining wall and lost from view. Loss of both officers left the group leaderless. CINCUNC also noted that three AK-47s were located in the KPA guard post that covered all routes of withdrawal. In the instance at hand a much higher casualty figure might have resulted if the use of firearms had been initiated.

(U) CINCUNC concluded his summary report:[1]

> ...The actions taken by the KPA prior to the fight were not unusual. It is common for them to reinforce in strength when they make a deliberate confrontation. On-the-spot security officers' meetings or JDO [Joint Duty Officer] meetings have, in the past, ameliorated the situation without serious injury other than in the Major Henderson incident. [MAJ Henderson had been a JSA Joint Security Officer beaten and kicked by some KPA troops several months earlier.] The KPA continually make threats against our guards. They are unpredictable, doctrinaire and hostile. Tensions are always high. The actual assaults were initiated suddenly and without further warning.

(U) The JCS directed a number of actions in response to the incident. The Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) for UNC Forces was raised from 4 to 3, and air and naval units were deployed to strengthen U.S. posture. The advanced DEFCON was declared at 190200Z Aug 76 for both ROK and U.S. Forces.[2]

~~(S)~~ On 18 August the JCS directed CINCPAC to deploy one F-4 squadron with WILD WEASEL capability from Kadena, Okinawa to Korea. CINCPACAF directed the 5th Air Force to deploy one tactical fighter squadron (UE 18) to Kunsan Air Base, to include up to 6 WILD WEASEL aircraft. If the WILD WEASEL aircraft were not immediately available, they were to be provided as soon as practical. In addition, four RF-4, two HC-130, and two HH-53 aircraft were deployed from Kadena to Korea. CONUS-based forces deployed into the PACOM area included one

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1. CINCUNC 310848Z Aug 76.
2. OSAN CCP OSAN AB Korea 190250Z Aug 76.

F-111 fighter squadron (20 UE) and two GBU-15 equipped F-4Es. Movement of all augmentation forces was completed without incident.[1]

(S) The JCS also directed the CINC of the Strategic Air Command to conduct B-52D Korean training sorties at the rate of one cell per day for five days.[2]

(S) On 19 August the JCS directed deployment of Task Group 77.4 to the vicinity of the southern approaches to the Korean Strait. Units of that group departed Yokosuka on 20 August, arriving on station on 22 August. The group consisted of USS MIDWAY (CV-41), with Commander Carrier Group SEVEN, Carrier Wing FIVE embarked; USS GRIDLEY (CG-21); USS KIRK (FF-1087), with Commander Destroyer Squadron FIFTEEN embarked; USS FRANCIS HAMMOND (FF-1067); USS MEYERKORD (FF-1058); USS LANG (FF-1060); USS COOK (FF-1083); USS LOCKWOOD (FF-1064); USS ASHTABULA (AO-51); USS MISPILLION (T-AO-105); and USS COCHRANE (DDG-21), with Commander Destroyer Squadron THIRTY THREE embarked.[3]

(S) CINCUNC had proposed two courses of action. The first was to deploy a small security force and engineer work detail to the site, cut the tree rapidly, and withdraw from the area with no prior notification of the KPA. A second was to notify the KPA at the next Military Armistice Commission meeting of the intention to trim the tree and invite neutrals and the press to attend. He preferred the first course of action, but deferred to the JCS "due to broader considerations."[4]

(U) General Stilwell's proposed operation consisted of a U.N. task force to enter the JSA to fell the tree and simultaneously demolish two barriers that the KPA had constructed over UNC objections, which damaged vehicles and inhibited movement.

(U) The task force was to be 50 to 60 strong, including skilled U.S. engineers and 50 of the ROKA's toughest, most expert Tae Kwan Do experts. The operation was to be initiated around 0700 and take about 45 minutes; the KPA were to be notified only after the operation had begun. CINCUNC wanted to have the flexibility to fell the tree by either saw or explosive, determination of which would hinge on the availability of saws powerful enough to do the job in 30 minutes. The back-up force was to include the authorized security force immediately available, a company from the 2d Division close to the JSA, armed with clubs only (their weapons in nearby trucks), a company of ROK soldiers near the JSA deployed with their organic weapons, one company in helicopters,

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1. J311 HistSum Aug 76; JCS 2374/190103Z Aug 76; CINCPACAF 190230Z Aug 76.
2. J311 HistSum Aug 76; JCS 3567/200246Z Aug 76.
3. J313 HistSum Aug 76.
4. CINCPAC 190250Z Aug 76.

launched at H-Hour, orbiting in view of the JSA, a battalion task force of two tank companies and one mechanized infantry company positioned south of the Imjin River, and artillery prepared to support the operation with air and ground forward observers in position.[1]

(S) COMUS Korea provided an operational summary on 21 August reporting that the operation had been executed that day, as planned. For Operation PAUL BUNYAN the joint task force entered the JSA at 0700 and cleared the area at 0826. A message had been passed to the KPA at the JSA informing them of the operation at 0715. They were also informed that as long as the work party was not molested, no further action would be taken by the UNC side. By 0745 all three tree limbs were down and only the stump remained. Both of the KPA-constructed barriers had also been destroyed. At 0758 the JSA reported a message in Korean (Hangul) from Pyongyang formally protesting the UNC actions and demanding that the UNC clear the area of all task force elements. The area was cleared on completion of the mission. By 0832 a considerable number of KPA guards had gathered by the tree stump; the Quick Reaction Force remained in alert posture. The U.S. Air Force flew 16 fighter/forward air controller sorties in support of the operation. Throughout the event, 14 F-4Ds flew in three holding patterns east of Seoul in an advanced readiness state to provide close air support if required. The operation included coordinated air refueling and forward air controllers flying two OV-10 aircraft. All missions were flown without incident. Task Group 77.4 continued en route to the objective area and was expected to arrive in the early morning of 23 August. COMUS Korea noted that the command remained at its high state of readiness.[2]

(U) On 21 August the Supreme Commander of the KPA, through his Senior Member on the Military Armistice Commission, expressed "regret" that the incident had occurred. At the 380th meeting of that commission on 25 August the KPA representative proposed that KPA and UNC forces be separated in the JSA. At the end of August negotiations were continuing with a general decrease in tensions.[3]

(S) As noted above, COMUS Korea retained his higher DEFCON status, and believed that a reduction should be based on an assessment of North Korean political and military intentions; he concurred with a State Department position that the posture and force deployment should be maintained until a satisfactory outcome was reached at Panmunjom. He noted that the initial intent of increased readiness had been first as a prudent defensive measure in face of the North Korean threat, and secondly as visible evidence of U.S. resolve to "put certain

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1. J312 HistSum Aug 76.
2. COMUSK 210425Z Aug 76.
3. J312 HistSum Aug 76.

matters aright." He agreed with CINCPAC's 25 August assessment that increased North Korean readiness was defensive in nature, a reaction to U.S. actions and activities. With regard to the second objective, however, "we have twice tabled demands at Panmunjom. To date these demands have not been satisfactorily answered." Events and pronouncements indicated, COMUS Korea continued, that North Korea, "while not yet ready to acquiesce to our conditions considers herself under some pressure to come to some sort of mutually acceptable conclusion." He did not believe it propitious, therefore, to reduce readiness until satisfactory outcomes had been reached. In the meantime, a training program employed the air assets of Air Forces Korea, the USN, and the Strategic Air Command in a variety of coordinated scenarios "designed to hone augmented mission capabilities."[1]

(S) On 4 September the JCS advised that they intended to return U.S. Forces in Korea to DEFCON 4 following ratification of the revised security arrangements for the JSA; the change was to be effective 072300Z September. They asked CINCUNC, in company with the U.S. Ambassador, to notify the ROK Government of the U.S. intention and advise when it had been accomplished.[2]

(S) On 6 September CINCUNC reported on his discussions with the ROK Minister of National Defense on the return to DEFCON 4 status. Both U.S. and Korean forces had been raised simultaneously, and CINCUNC wanted to revert simultaneously, but the ROK forces might want to stay on alert through September. On 7 September CINCPAC directed a return to DEFCON 4 for U.S. Forces; that same day CINCUNC directed UNC/U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army forces to return to DEFCON 4, but provided for increased preparedness by retaining at DEFCON 3 certain intelligence, operations, and logistics actions. This condition was attained at 091050Z.[3]

(S) With the return to lowered DEFCON, the JCS directed the incremental redeployment of air augmentation forces commencing on or about 15 September. CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to execute the redeployment. Eight F-111s and eight F-4s, including WILD WEASELS, remained in Korea until 6 October. Movement commenced on 14 September and was completed on 17 September. On 8 September the JCS directed termination of B-52 training flights over the ROK and recommended scheduling of follow-on training missions through Service channels at a frequency of one per month.[4]

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1. CINCUNC 270845Z Aug 76.
2. JCS 2166/041646Z Sep 76.
3. CINCUNC 060430Z Sep 76 and 092200Z Sep 76, which cited CINCPAC 071444Z Sep 76.
4. J311 HistSum Sep 76; JCS 3149/071448Z Sep 76 and 4400/081831Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 080019Z Sep 76; CINCPACAF 082150Z Sep 76.

(S) Operational control of U.S. in-country forces and augmentation USAF forces alerted for possible action in response to the JSA incident was exercised throughout the operation by General Stilwell as COMUS Korea. In response to a request by General Stilwell, CINCPAC established the following command relationships effective 201935Z Aug 76:[1]

- 314th AD and augmentation F-111 squadron passed to OPCON COMUS Korea (EUSA already assigned to OPCON of COMUS Korea) for support of CINCUNC operations in JSA.

- PACFLT forces remain under CINCPACFLT OPCON but will support COMUS Korea and CINCUNC, as required.

- COMUS Korea support CINCUNC operations as required.

(S) Concurrently, CINCUNC requested to JCS that COMUS Korea with assigned forces be assigned to the OPCON of CINCUNC for the duration/until completion of activities related to JSA. CINCPAC supported the CINCUNC request.[2]

(S) The Chairman of JCS responded on 24 August 1977, stating:[3]

> ...I find logic in your case for assuming OPCON of U.S. Forces as CINCUNC persuasive; however, in view of considerations that: (1) apparently, given North Korean posture to date, there is no immediate need for you to have OPCON of U.S. Forces as CINCUNC; (2) need here to evaluate possible U.S. public reaction to passing U.S. Forces to control by United Nations Command; and (3) need to assess implications of bringing U.N. formally into this affair, we may not be able to get authority you request. However, since North Koreans may react without warning in near term, we are seeking authority to pass OPCON of U.S. Forces now assigned COMUS Korea to CINCUNC. Such authority must come from NCA.

Indian Ocean Operations

(C) Prior to the Vietnam War, periodic Indian Ocean deployments had been conducted by units of the Seventh Fleet. These were in addition to the presence of the Middle East Force, based in Bahrain since 1949 and consisting of a flagship (in 1976 USS LA SALLE (AGF-3)) and two destroyers or frigates of the

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1. CINCPAC 201935Z Aug 76.
2. CINCUNC 201646Z Aug 76; CINCUNC 230831Z Aug 76.
3. CJCS 241645Z Aug 76.

Atlantic Fleet. Deployments in the post-Vietnam era had included about three Seventh Fleet task force deployments a year. It was U.S. policy to continue such deployments.[1]

(S) Two routine deployments occurred in 1976 and a third was accelerated by the U.S. show of support to Kenya following the dramatic Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda.

(C) The first deployment of the year occurred with Task Group 75.1, which deployed via the Malacca Strait on 14 January. It operated in the Indian Ocean and redeployed by the same route on 13 March. Units in the group were USS FOX (CG-33), USS GRAY (FF-1054), USS HEPBURN (FF-1055), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (T-AO-107). A fifth support ship, USS SAN JOSE (AFS-7) joined the group during the period 7-20 February. Passing exercises were conducted with units of the Kenyan and Imperial Iranian navies. The task group was trailed by Soviet units PETYA (FFL-828), MSF 853, MSF 854, KOTLIN (DD-400), and KRIVAK (209) from 6 to 11 February. Port visits during the deployment were made to Mombasa, Port Victoria, Port Louis, Diego Garcia, and Reunion.[2]

(U) As mentioned above, on 3 and 4 July in a surprise raid from Jerusalem, Israeli commando units raided the airport at Entebbe, Uganda, where pro-Palestinian hijackers of a French jet aircraft held 98 passengers, mostly Israelis, and a crew of 12 hostage. The rescuing Israelis flew back to Israel with 103 of the hostages, stopping in Nairobi, Kenya, to refuel. On 10 July a Kenya newspaper claimed that 245 Kenyan citizens living in Uganda had been killed since the raid.

(S) On 8 July the JCS directed CINCPAC to deploy Task Group 77.7 at best speed into the Indian Ocean to an operating area approximately 100 nautical miles off the coast of Kenya. The group consisted of USS RANGER (CV-61), USS PREBLE (DDG-46), USS GOLDSBOROUGH (DDG-20), and USS OUELLETT (FF-1077). Additionally, the European Command was directed to deploy the Mid-East Force's frigate USS DONALD B. BEARY (FF-1085) to Mombasa, and CINCPAC was directed to deploy a P3 aircraft from Diego Garcia to Nairobi as soon as practicable to conduct normal ocean surveillance operations and area orientation in that vicinity. Deployment of the P3, the JCS said, should be for three days. The aircraft arrived on 10 July; BEARY visited Mombasa 12-16 July. USS CAPODANNO (FF-1093) also visited Mombasa 22-25 July.[3]

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1. J313 Point Paper, 4 Oct 76, Subj: Indian Ocean Operation; J513 Point Paper, 7 May 76, Subj: Plans and Problems Related to US Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean (U).
2. J313 HistSum Mar 76.
3. J313 HistSum Jul 76; JCS 7521/082239Z Jul 76 and 7571/082350Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 090044Z Jul 76.

(S) CINCPAC also directed that a second P3 plan to deploy from Diego Garcia to Nairobi for relief of the first aircraft, with a planned overlap of at least half a day. The JCS subsequently directed that the second aircraft deploy. The commander of each aircraft was to report to the Embassy on arrival. Neither was to conduct local flight operations while at Nairobi, but they were to conduct normal ocean surveillance operations and area orientation during the transit.[1]

(S) The RANGER task group had been tasked for earliest arrival and the oiler NAVASOTA (T-AO-106) traveled in company with the group for about six days. Another immediate consideration was planning for secure voice communication between RANGER and the National Military Command Center. CINCPACFLT advised that his headquarters and CINCPAC should be included in the testing net.[2]

(S) On 18 July the RANGER task group was directed to conduct operations within 100 miles of a modified location between Diego Garcia and the Seychelles. USS WABASH (AOR-5) and USS WHITE PLAINS (AFS-4) had joined the task group, which on 27 July the JCS released from Indian Ocean tasking. On 1 August the group exited through the Malacca Strait. Estimated time of arrival at Pearl Harbor was 30 August.[3]

(C) The third deployment of 1976 began on 26 October when Task Group 75.1 deployed via the Malacca Strait. The group departed via the Malacca and Sunda Straits on 3 December. Units making the deployment were USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35) with the Commander of Task Force 75 embarked, USS TOWERS (DDG-9), USS RAMSEY (FFG-2), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (T-AO-107). The task group participated in the annual CENTO Exercise MIDLINK 76 from 13 to 21 November. Port visits during the deployment were made to Penang, Colombo, and Karachi.[4]

(S) In September CINCPAC received JCS guidance on planning for deployments for the period FY 7T-77. Three deployments should be planned for the period, the JCS advised, each of 45 to 60 days duration, and one of which should be conducted by a carrier task group. They were to be distributed over the five-quarter period. The JCS said that because of the particular strategic importance attached to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea area, each of the three deployments was to include substantial presence and operations in the Arabian

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1. CINCPAC 090004Z Jul 76; JCS 8693/092244Z Jul 76.
2. CINCPAC 100325Z Jul 76, 100326Z Jul 76, 101930Z Jul 76, and 100420Z Jul 76.
3. J313 HistSum Jul 76; CINCPAC 210123Z Jul 76; CINCPACFLT 011957Z Aug 76.
4. J313 HistSum Dec 76.

Sea. Port visits to countries on the littoral of the designated areas of operations should be planned where practicable.[1]

Cockburn Sound Naval Base

(S) Australia was building a large, new naval base at Cockburn Sound, south of Freemantle in Southwestern Australia. According to an article in a Melbourne newspaper on 14 January, the United States was welcome at the base, and the new $50 million base would "play a key role in supporting the United States naval force in the Indian Ocean." The Prime Minister was quoted as saying that Australia already had an understanding with the United States that the base would help to maintain a balance in the Indian Ocean. The base would have facilities to maintain and refuel destroyers and submarines, and would be the "Western Powers' third most important base in the Indian Ocean after Simonstown in South Africa and Diego Garcia Island." During a visit to Australia the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, in casual conversation with an Australian defense official, had discussed the possibility of some U.S. ships visiting "in and out of Cockburn Sound for an extended period of time." He said he did not want to use the term "homeport." Neither did the Ambassador in Canberra or the U.S. Secretary of State, who subsequently advised the Ambassador that there were no plans to initiate "homeporting" at Cockburn Sound. The United States would be examining the possibility of regular use of the base, but any concrete proposals would be fully coordinated beforehand with the U.S. Ambassador.[2]

Diego Garcia

(S) Australian use of Diego Garcia came under study in 1976. In May the JCS advised that Australia had contacted the British regarding approval for an Australian Navy ship to visit Diego Garcia in June. The ship, an oceanographic survey vessel, would be en route to the Seychelles. This would be the first call at Diego Garcia by a third country ship since the signing of the U.S.-U.K. agreement on use of the island. Australia seemed a desirable choice, politically, for "breaking the ice."[3]

(S) In October the Secretary of State advised that the Australian Government was approaching the United States and British Governments concerning the possible use of Diego Garcia by long-range maritime patrol aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force to increase the operational effectiveness of Australian surveillance

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1. JCS 2857/142103Z Sep 76.
2. AMEMB Canberra 0294/140551Z Jan 76 and 4760/010710Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 171389/141436Z Jul 76.
4. JCS 9433/282304Z May 76.

in the Indian Ocean. The Ambassador in Canberra noted that the proposal, to stage one, or at most two, flights a month from the Cocos to Diego Garcia and back, would be "a tangible demonstration that a littoral state supports our presence in the Indian Ocean." The JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments, asking also for comment on the advisability of asking Australia to stage some of the P3 flights through Singapore in order to facilitite the acceptability to the people of Singapore of U.S. P3 operations from there.[1]

(C) CINCPAC replied that he welcomed participation of the RAAF in ocean surveillance of the Indian Ocean. He recommended continuation of the U.S. Navy's P3 aircraft once monthly flight to Cocos Island together with one Australian Air Force P3 flight monthly to Diego Garcia.[2]

(C) On 15 October the Secretary of State advised the Ambassador in Canberra that an aide memoire had been passed to Australia welcoming the interest of the Australian Government in the possible use of Diego Garcia and outlining acceptable arrangements to formalize the visits.[3]

P3 Maritime Air Patrol Operations

(S) P3 maritime air patrols were the primary PACOM source of accurate, reliable, and responsive maritime intelligence in the Indian Ocean. The information obtained by those flights provided intelligence support to Seventh Fleet forces operating there, as well as providing continuing support and threat warning to the Commander of the Mid-East Force. This information included the location, identification, and activity of Soviet naval surface combatants, submarines, auxiliaries, and merchant shipping as well as regional acoustic and oceanographic data for the development of environmental forecast data bases. Primary areas of interest were the Malacca Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the major shipping routes connecting them. P3 operations had been conducted from U-Tapao, Thailand; the Cocos Islands; Karachi; Bandar Abbas; Djibouti; Masirah; and Diego Garcia.[4]

(S) At the end of 1976 there were 62 P3 aircraft in the PACOM; in the southwestern part of the command nine of these were based at Cubi Point and three rotated to Diego Garcia. The operations and basing of P3 aircraft in the PACOM received considerable study in 1976.[5]

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1. SECSTATE 251241/082205Z Oct 76; AMEMB Canberra 7335/120225Z Oct 76; JCS 4456/132202Z Oct 76.
2. J5132 HistSum Oct 76; CINCPAC 132043Z Oct 76.
3. SECSTATE 256079/152025Z Oct 76.
4. J311 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: Indian Ocean Maritime Air Patrol (MAP) Operations.
5. Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 16.

Kenya

(S) As noted in the discussion of Indian Ocean Operations, P3 aircraft had been deployed to Kenya following the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The first aircraft deployed from Diego Garcia arrived on 10 July; subsequent deployments continued through 26 July. There were four deployments altogether; local flight operations were not conducted while the aircraft were at Nairobi.[1]

(S) On 16 July CINCPAC asked the JCS for continued authorization for P3 operations into Nairobi with the purpose of conducting surveillance in the Northwest Indian Ocean. CINCPAC advised that the capability to conduct maritime air patrol missions while transiting to and from Nairobi afforded the opportunity to increase surveillance of sea lanes from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, northward to Masirah. He noted the immediate need for increased surveillance of Soviet activity in the vicinity of Mogadiscio and Socotra, as well as traffic in and out of Berbera.[2]

(S) On 13 July the JCS asked CINCPAC about proposed flights to Mombasa, which appeared to be a logical follow-on to P3 operations then being conducted in Kenya. CINCPAC's reply of 17 July compared the airfields at Nairobi and Mombasa. The short runway and high temperature at Mombasa could result in reduced mission capability; a minimum runway length of 7,500 feet was desired for P3s operating in tropical climates. The communications and airfield support capabilities at Mombasa were unknown. Operations from Eastleigh Airfield in Nairobi would provide adequate runway, military support facilities including base security, and access to the Embassy communications facilities. CINCPAC advised that six Diego Garcia to Mombasa flights per quarter could be accomplished (with appropriate support) during routine Indian Ocean operations without augmenting the normal three P3 presence in the Indian Ocean. Combining the flights with P3 visits to Masirah was feasible if diplomatic clearance could be effected. A primary consideration regarding the use of the Mombasa round robin missions would be availability of communications for quick reaction contingency tasking. CINCPAC proposed that the facilities in Kenya be assessed, the first flight to arrive 27 July.[3]

(S) On 25 September the JCS advised of State Department concern regarding the frequency and timing of flights to Kenya and the Seychelles that could impact adversely on Southern Africa initiatives. The JCS provided three options for P3 use of Kenya and Seychelles airfields and requested recommendations about the number of flights per quarter. CINCPAC's 1 October reply noted that

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1. J311 HistSum Jul 76.
2. CINCPAC 160727Z Jul 76.
3. AMEMB Nairobi 7536/201115Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 172227Z Jul 76.

operational and scheduling considerations dictated low-level initial utilization (one flight quarterly), with increased utilization when necessitated by operational requirements.[1]

Masirah Airfield, Oman

(S) The use of Masirah Airfield by the United States had come under study in 1974 when the results of a British defense review revealed plans to withdraw all British forces east of Suez including Masirah. Facilities at the air base included an 8,200-foot asphalt runway, TACAN and GCA navigational aids, POL storage (an estimated capacity of 5 million gallons on base and 31 million off base), and billeting facilities for approximately 800 personnel. When Sultan Qaboos of Oman visited Washington in January 1975 the United States requested occasional access to Masirah and the Sultan agreed.[2]

(S) In June 1976 the Secretary of State, noting the British intent to withdraw entirely by 31 March 1977, directed the Ambassador in Iran to conduct follow-on negotiations with the Sultan under certain guidelines. There was no plan to station U.S. Government personnel there; usage would approximate six days per quarter with the first landing prior to the British departure; usage might involve occasional logistics flights by aircraft when the U.S. Fleet was in the Northwest Indian Ocean; and the United States had no intention of replacing the Royal Air Force presence in Masirah and was not interested in Thamarit (Midway) airfield in Dhofar. Guidance from the U.S. Secretary of State on 7 July noted that U.S. objectives were to establish the routine usage of the field while the British controlled it and to remain in a bargaining posture for future negotiations, but without giving the Sultan the perception the United States placed high value on it that could escalate the quid-pro-quos for post-April 1977 use of the complex.[3]

(S) On 8 July the Chief of Naval Operations advised that once approval for use of the field was granted, the first flight should be scheduled on or before 19 July. The stated purpose of the flight should be area familiarization and aircrew training. Maximum assessment and evaluation of facilities, including communications, was desired to determine the suitability of the base for future usage and support requirements.[4]

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1. JCS 7741/251625Z Sep 76; J5132 HistSum Oct 76; CINCPAC 010353Z Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 283-284.
3. J5325 Point Paper, 21 Sep 76, Subj: Use of Masirah Island (U).
4. CINCPACFLT 082121Z Jul 76, which transmitted CNO 072349Z Jul 76.

(S) On 9 July the JCS requested that CINCPAC initiate P3 operations, and CINCPAC executed the initial flight that occurred on 14 July. A maximum of six P3 flights per quarter were to be scheduled to operate through Masirah.[1]

(S) On 2 August the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on further use of Masirah, to include not only the agreed-on P3 operations but possible use as an alternative site for a communications station should Kagnew Station in Ethiopia become untenable, as a potential site for a deep-space surveillance station, and for continued operation of intelligence collection and high frequency direction finding facilities.[2]

(S) CINCPAC welcomed the opportunity to comment on Masirah Island. CINCPAC said, "Capability to visit and operate aircraft from Masirah serves our interest in Arabian Sea-Northwest Indian Ocean areas and adds flexibility when U.S. naval task units operate in area." He believed the United States should continue use as an overnight and support base for routine surveillance and replenishment flights, keeping options flexible, responsive, and workable. Although requirements at the time were few, he did not believe the United States should be pinned down to precise usage. The airfield operations offered the potential for surveillance of Soviet operations off Berbera, Socotra, and the Gulf of Aden. The high frequency direction finding site was additionally important in view of the combined losses of contributions by Ramasun Station in Thailand and Karamursel in Turkey. The facility was important in tracking Soviet combatants in the Indian Ocean. Masirah offered the potential for fixed acoustic surveillance looking into the Gulf of Aden; in general CINCPAC saw no need any many disadvantages in gratuitously volunteering limitations on future operations.

(S) In matters of deep-space surveillance, CINCPAC deferred to the National Security Agency. He did, however, stress the need for secure, reliable communications for timely reporting of intelligence data in the Indian Ocean area. He believed the United States should operate the airfield communication system after the British withdrawal. Support of Masirah required weekly logistic flights by the Military Airlift Command. CINCPAC concluded that the United States needed arrangements for unrestricted aircraft operations from at least one airfield in the Arabian Sea area, and Masirah was the best location. Occasional visits to southerly locations such as Mauritius, Mombasa, La Reunion, and the Seychelles would lay the groundwork for contingency operations when and if required. He said that the P3 aircraft provided a flexible low-key presence and badly needed intelligence when substantial naval forces were not present.[3]

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1. JCS 8191/091419Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 091837Z Jul 76.
2. JCS 2879/022231Z Aug 76.
3. CINCPAC 052345Z Aug 76.

(S) By 22 September six P3 flights had been completed from Diego Garcia to Masirah and return. Seven more had been scheduled for the remainder of the year.[1]

Singapore

(S) Since December 1974 P3s had been conducting non-operational familiarization flights into Singapore (one flight every three weeks) to establish a pattern of usage that might prove beneficial in furthering negotiations between the United States and Singapore regarding P3 basing for Indian Ocean maritime air patrol operations. The political situation in Thailand had caused the United States to look for alternative basing arrangements.[2]

(S) The U.S. Ambassador in Singapore advised in April that he was fully aware that Washington agencies were actively considering the problem of how to maintain military operational requirements in the Indian Ocean that had been previously handled out of Thailand. "Since Singapore has been leaning more in our direction of late and has been cooperative with respect to visits of the Seventh Fleet it will be a natural temptation to look to Singapore facilities to handle many of these operational requirements." There were indications that the Government of Singapore would be willing to accept short-term solutions and a probable willingness for long-term solution of Military Airlift Command channel support. Long-term P3 staging requirements, the Ambassador said, "may present some difficulty." He believed that the chances of obtaining full cooperation would be increased if the "burden" would be shared with at least one other country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, possibly Indonesia.[3]

(S) The Ambassador in Jakarta had replied to this proposal, noting that the prospects were "very unlikely" in the light of Indonesia's non-alignment policy and historical refusal to permit the use of its territory as a base for military operations by any of the great powers.[4]

(S) In the spring the Ambassador in Singapore also voiced the opinion that Washington agencies should consider all U.S. requirements with respect to possible use of Singapore facilities, taking all factors into consideration. From the Embassy's view, it would be confusing and counterproductive to take up with the Singapore Government each immediate requirement on an ad hoc basis

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1. J5325 Point Paper, 21 Sep 76, Subj: Use of Masirah Island (U).
2. J311 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: Indian Ocean Maritime Air Patrol (MAP) Operations.
3. AMEMB Singapore 130907Z Apr 76.
4. AMEMB Jakarta 5015/160820Z Apr 76.

without first considering within the U.S. Government the totality of needs and weighing political as well as operational requirements.[1]

(S) The subject of the use of Singapore remained in the diplomatic community and no decisions in this regard were made in 1976.

(S) On 7 August, however, the Chief of Naval Operations told the JCS that it appeared that if staging rights were to be eventually acquired in Singapore, overflights should be conducted first. (He also noted that the strait between Malaysia and Indonesia was not considered politically sensitive. Overflight of the Strait of Malacca was encouraged to support, by usage, the U.S. law of the sea position.)[2]

(S) On 11 August the JCS directed CINCPAC to commence overflights of Singapore air space at the earliest practicable time, employing P3 aircraft en route to and from the Indian Ocean. For overflight clearance, at least 48 hours advance notice was to be provided (except weekends and holidays). The JCS directed the Air Force to insure that, two or three weeks after commencement of the P3 overflights, the existing Clark Air Base to Diego Garcia Military Airlift Command support flights begin to transit Singapore to and from Diego Garcia at an initial rate of about three times per month. At least 72 hours prior notice was to be provided. The JCS asked both CINCPAC and the Air Force to advise them on schedules for overflights and landings and of the desired number and frequency of flights, "should it become possible to increase Singapore transits in the future." CINCPAC directed execution of the flights, the first of which occurred on 25 August.[3]

(S) On 2 September CINCPACFLT reported to CINCPAC on the first overflight. He advised that continuation of the overflights was feasible under normal flight conditions, that is, if there were no excessive headwinds, no severe meteorological conditions requiring extensive use of anti-icing or route diversion within the Malacca Strait to avoid thunderstorms (which might result in overflying Malaysia or Indonesian airspace), and no aircraft pressurization problems necessitating a descent from cruising altitude.[4]

(S) Throughout the rest of the year the flights continued at the rate of two or three a month. They were normal repositioning flights between Diego

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1. AMEMB Singapore 1360/220400Z Mar 76.
2. CINCPACFLT 070304Z Aug 76, which retransmitted CNO 070035Z Aug 76.
3. J311 HistSum Aug 76; JCS 3196/111426Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 112116Z Aug 76.
4. CINCPACFLT 020317Z Sep 76.

Garcia and Cubi Point. No maritime air patrol operations were conducted during these repositioning flights.[1]

Thailand

(S) With the closure of U-Tapao in June 1976, P3 operations were no longer conducted through that base. On 14 July the JCS directed CINCPAC to commence transit of P3 flights through Takhli as soon as suitable support arrangements could be made. CINCPAC directed such activity the next day. The JCS further noted the requirement to avoid P3 transits during scheduled C-130 operations.[2]

(S) On 1 October CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that an evaluation of the Takhli flights conducted in September indicated that support arrangements were adequate for occasional P3 transit operations. Accordingly, he intended to schedule Takhli flights at a frequency of one to two a month. This level of usage was sufficient to maintain a P3 presence in Southeast Asia while familiarizing aircrews with Takhli facilities, in a manner that would not conflict with C-130 operations.[3]

Nuclear Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports

(S) Political considerations arising from the fears of Pacific people concerning nuclear radiation, often exploited by anti-government factions in the host countries, had hampered the granting of routine clearance for USN nuclear powered warships (NPW) to visit certain PACOM ports. Events in this regard have been reported through the years in the Command History. There were also very specific conditions that a port had to reach before the Chief of Naval Operations granted reactor clearance; these requirements ruled out some ports that would otherwise have been available. It was CINCPAC's position that access to the ports of PACOM countries was important for the most effective use of those "first line units." It was important to stress the NPW safety record, detailed Navy environmental monitoring of radioactivity, and defense relationships in gaining NPW access.[4]

(U) In the material that follows will be a discussion of certain specific events in 1976, with particular emphasis on visits to Australia and New Zealand.

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1. J311 HistSum Dec 76.
2. JCS 3564/142049Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 150131Z Jul 76; CINCPACFLT 010243Z Oct 76, which referenced JCS 272147Z Sep 76.
3. CINCPACFLT 010243Z Oct 76.
4. J313 Point Paper, 11 May 76, Subj: Visit Access to Foreign Ports in PACOM for Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW)

(U) Compensation for damage involving the nuclear reactors of U.S. warships was the subject of an Executive Order signed by President Ford on 1 June. He ordered that prompt, adequate, and effective compensation would be provided in the unlikely event of injury or damage resulting from a nuclear incident involving the nuclear reactor of a U.S. warship. The Secretary of Defense was empowered to authorize the expenditure of Department funds; if the Secretary considered it appropriate, he could certify such claims, and transmit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget his recommendation with respect to appropriation by the Congress of such additional sums as may be necessary. The provisions of this order were not to be deemed to replace, alter, or diminish the statutory and other functions vested in the Attorney General. Any functions exercised in regard to claims were to be in consultation with the Secretary of State in the case of any incident giving rise to a claim of a foreign country or national thereof.[1]

Australia

(S) This Executive Order was of particular importance to Australia. The last NPW visit to that country had occurred in 1971 amid mounting concern regarding the hazards, risks, and safety implications of such visits. In the intervening years the governments of both Australia and New Zealand had delayed any U.S. initiatives and had followed an anti-nuclear policy.[2]

(S) In January 1976, however, with a new coalition government headed by Prime Minister John Malcolm Fraser, elected by a landslide the previous December, the U.S. State Department believed that the time might be opportune to seek a political decision that would allow early resumption of NPW visits. The Secretary asked the Ambassador to approach the Australian Government, drawing on a number of arguments. These are summarized:[3]

- For nearly five years Australia had excluded U.S. NPW visits even though access was clearly advantageous to the defense interests of both countries. The United States had made every effort to satisfy outstanding questions raised by Australia, such as nuclear liability, but had been confronted with additional issues and requirements.

- NPW were ideally suited to operations in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans, where distances were great and logistic lines extremely long. Operations in those areas

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1. SECSTATE 138657/050359Z Jun 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975. Vol. II, pp. 715-718.
3. SECSTATE 021823/1/290103Z Jan 76.

could only be effectively conducted, however, if the United States could depend on port access from friends and allies, particularly those with whom the United States had a direct defense relationship.

[redacted]

- The assurances given to Australia represented the same basis on which NPW had visited over 36 countries. Even countries with which there was no formal defense relationship had accepted those assurances as an adequate basis for access by those ships.

- In the past, senior Australian officials had indicated that they were not concerned about the safety of U.S. NPW or that such ships would cause environmental problems. As the single largest reactor program in the world, the ships had accumulated over 1,300 years of reactor operation without ever experiencing a reactor accident.

- The most recent communication from Australia before the election indicated that the Minister of Environment intended to issue an unclassified environmental impact statement and hold public hearings. Such action could delay a decision and subject the matter to a forum where opposition elements could use the issue to stir public concern and gain political advantage. Because of the classified technology involved, the U.S. Government would have the same problem if public hearings were held in the United States. The necessary assurances had been provided, however.

(S) Agreement on resumption of visits was reached without difficulty and the first such visit began when USS SNOOK (SSN-592) arrived at Cockburn Sound, Australia on 14 August, one hour earlier than scheduled, in a driving rain. The only indication of opposition to the visit was a group of 25-30 demonstrators carrying anti-nuclear banners huddled in the rain four miles from the SNOOK

berth. That berth was 18 miles from Freemantle, 30 from Perth. The submarine departed on 19 August.[1]

(S) USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35) visited Melbourne on 7 September, docking at Station Pier without tug assistance and with almost no negative displays. Favorable demonstrators far outnumbered negative demonstrators in boats escorting TRUXTUN through Port Phillip Bay and in the welcoming crowd on the pier. A small aircraft towed a sign that said, "Welcome TRUXTUN." Port workers, however, struck on the arrival of the ship. At a meeting later in the day they voted resoundingly not to extend the strike for the entire visit or even to two days; they were back at work the next day. The Ambassador and his party drove through a small group of protesters at pier gates without incident. The protesters "seemed to be enjoying the quiet, sunny spring day at the seashore. Adequate police guard had nothing to do." [redacted]

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1. J313 HistSum Aug 76; CINCPAC 170313Z Aug 76.
2. AMEMB Canberra 6453/080220Z Sep 76 and 6480/090644Z Sep 76; J313 HistSum Sep 76.
3. SECSTATE 241550/1/290115Z Sep 76, 246053/030113Z Oct 76, and 262561/222202Z Oct 76; AMEMB Canberra 7104/011017Z Oct 76.

(S) USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9) arrived in Melbourne on 30 October for a seven-day visit. The ship had not been permitted to berth at Princess Pier because of the arrival of four different ships during the visit (American, Russian, and English cruise ships and an Italian passenger liner), all carrying substantial numbers of people, which would be tied up at Station Pier, less than 600 meters from Princess Pier. The United States did not subscribe to the concern expressed, but accepted the assigned anchorage in Port Phillip Bay, with the understanding that it did not set a precedent.[1]

(S) Clear skies greeted LONG BEACH, but the weather soon deteriorated and overcast skies and scattered showers dominated, with winds 15-25 knots. The unprotected anchorage and southerly winds necessitated securing of ship's boating three times during the visit, for periods varying from 2 to 24 hours. Many persons visited the ship, and protests and demonstrations were extremely limited in scope and intensity. Outstanding hospitality was provided for large liberty parties; the Australian Navy provided transport for both personnel and cargo during the inclement weather, which proved "invaluable."[2]

(U) An Australian newspaper story that appeared 21 September announced that the State government had decided to open the port of Hobart in Tasmania to U.S. NPW. Thus, on 29 October USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) entered Storm Bay led by an Australian ship and a tug and accompanied by a flotilla of approximately 200 small pleasure craft, sail boats, fishing vessels, and "smiling faces." Only one minor show of protest was a small boat with a poster reading, "Nuclear Power, the Permanent Polluter." The seven-day visit was considered a resounding success, in every respect. Thousands of citizens visited the ship in port and then lined the beaches and roads as the ship got underway; aircraft from the carrier provided a flyover salute as a departure courtesy. After the initial news media conference on the day of arrival, the NPW aspects weren't even mentioned in the press or social conversation.[3]

New Zealand

(U) On 29 November 1975 the National Party of New Zealand won 53 of 87 seats in a general election and the new Prime Minister was Robert D. Muldoon. The new Prime Minister's comments to a U.S. Congressional delegation in January 1976 were as follows:[4]

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1. AMEMB Canberra 7770/261123Z Oct 76; SECSTATE 267492/292337Z Oct 76.
2. USS LONG BEACH 060226Z Nov 76.
3. AMEMB Canberra 6789/210641Z Sep 76; USS ENTERPRISE 290634Z Oct 76; COMSEVENFLT 060150Z Nov 76; J313 HistSum Oct 76.
4. AMEMB Wellington 0113/142152Z Jan 76.

> ...If we regard ANZUS as about the most important treaty we have then we've got to play our part in ANZUS and we can't say to the United States, "Yes we expect you to come to our assistance in accordance with ANZUS [and] that we are going to determine the kinds of weapons you use, and we are going to require you to use World War I rifles when you come to help New Zealand." What we are talking about is access to New Zealand ports from time to time by nuclear-powered, not nuclear-armed, but nuclear-powered vessels. The Labor Government never prohibited it. They put certain requirements which were met, that is to say, absolute liability and after that they kept on talking about it. As far as we are concerned, we certainly would not prohibit access to New Zealand ports by vessels of the United States, an ANZUS country.

(S) The time seemed ripe to request an NPW visit and on 23 February the U.S. Defense Attaché, "as directed by Ambassador Selden, and with wholehearted concurrence entire Country Team," requested that a visit of a single, small, surface NPW be scheduled during the 1976 New Zealand winter; that the visit be to Auckland and include a weekend to permit general visiting by the public; and that the ship nominated be one en route to the Western Pacific, rather than one homeward bound. It was not desired to have a visit by an NPW that was a carrier or submarine. Oil-fired ships in company would be welcomed, but were seen as possibly diluting the impact of the visit. Auckland was chosen over Wellington because of better berthing, crowd control, public access, and safety considerations.[1]

(U) This would be the first NPW visit since LONG BEACH and BAINBRIDGE had visited Wellington in September 1964.[2]

(U) On 25 June the press reported organization of a "peace squadron" of private boats to blockade the entrance of Wellington Harbor, should an NPW be scheduled to berth there.[3]

(S) USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35) departed Pearl Harbor on 16 August en route to Wellington. [redacted]

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1. USDAO Wellington 231841Z Feb 76.
2. CINCPAC 020429Z Mar 76.
3. AMEMB Wellington 2353/250502Z Jun 76.
4. CINCPAC 180110Z Aug 76.

(C) TRUXTUN arrived on schedule in Wellington on 27 August for a six-day visit. The ship was greeted at the harbor entrance by six or eight boats of the "peace squadron," but its movement to anchorage was in no way interfered with. The "Watersiders," the union laborers in the harbor area, declared a boycott while TRUXTUN was in port, which stopped movement of Cook Strait ferries between North and South Islands and created a situation of possible showdown between the government and the union. The most dramatic development connected with the visit was the cutting of a guy wire on a transmitting antenna at the U.S. Navy communications unit in Christchurch, causing the antenna to collapse. The Ambassador believed that both the short and long-term political effect of the TRUXTUN visit would be beneficial, however.[1]

(S) While TRUXTUN was in port, the Prime Minister, having lunch on board, told the Ambassador he was anxious to have another American NPW visit at an early date, to help defuse the issue and condition the people to viewing the visit of an NPW as little different from a call by a conventionally-powered warship. [redacted] The Ambassador strongly recommended a second visit.[2]

(C) CINCPACFLT advised the Chief of Naval Operations that it was feasible for LONG BEACH (CGN-9) to visit en route to the KANGAROO II exercise. When more detailed planning began, New Zealand proposed that LONG BEACH be anchored in a remote location. This was not satisfactory to the United States; it was not considered adequate from a "presence/impact" standpoint and the long distance required for personnel travel was time consuming and unsatisfactory from a boating safety standpoint. After considerable negotiation, this was resolved to the agreement of all and LONG BEACH docked at Pier 3.[3]

(C) New Zealand had also requested assurances that LONG BEACH was able to get underway on two hours notice. The Chief of Naval Operations advised that the United States could not agree to such a requirement. It established an unnecessary and unacceptable precedent for a visit by any warship, and appeared to contravene the general requirements for port entry in New Zealand documents.

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1. AMEMB Wellington 3219/270455Z Aug 76 and 3219/300403Z Aug 76; J313 HistSum Aug 76.
2. AMEMB Wellington 3277/310459Z Aug 76.
3. J313 HistSum Oct 76; CINCPACFLT 010441Z Sep 76, 160610Z Sep 76, 182250Z Sep 76, and 240204Z Sep 76; AMEMB Wellington 3506/170345Z Sep 76, 3574/230431Z Sep 76, 3597/250202Z Sep 76, and 3616/270339Z Sep 76; CNO 181328Z Sep 76; USDAO Wellington 212235Z Sep 76 and 290600Z Sep 76.

The Defense Attaché in Wellington was authorized to assure the New Zealand Government that, as was the case with all U.S. warships, LONG BEACH would have sufficient crew on board at all times to take the ship to sea on short notice.[1]

(U) LONG BEACH was greeted on arrival by a contingent of about 100 "peace squadron" boats as well as some welcoming boats; she proceeded without incident. Media coverage was heavy and with very rare exceptions very positive. A waterside workers' strike tied up the port and unions refused to assist ships chandlers in getting provisions to the ship. The only major commodity affected was some fresh milk. The news media effectively juxtaposed this refusal of dairy supplies with the LONG BEACH sailors' donation of 200 pints of blood to the Auckland blood bank. Several Auckland citizens reacted with indignation and brought pints of milk to the ship. The visit, which had begun on 1 October, ended on the 6th.[2]

(C) The Opposition Party leader was reported to have warned the U.S. Secretary of State of a "grave danger" of anti-American backlash as a result of NPW visits. The Ambassador in Wellington did not see that such visits were or were likely to become a persuasive political issue. Should such occur, it would likely be the result of stimulative efforts by the Labor Party, which might be "painting itself into a corner" on this issue. The Ambassador was also concerned about that party continuing a foreign policy that tended toward a prominent "third world" role rather than that of an active ally.[3]

(C) While both New Zealand's Government and the United States were anxious for the visit of a nuclear submarine to a New Zealand port, the Ambassador believed that to avoid the image of NPW saturation, the next several visits should be oil-fired ships. One other issue needed to be resolved before visits of any kind were normal and routine; it concerned a possible requirement to seal meat lockers on American vessels in New Zealand ports to protect the livestock of that country. The Ambassador believed that until accommodation on that issue was reached, the United States should avoid confrontation by scheduling only westbound visitors.[4]

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1. CNO 292224Z Sep 76.
2. J313 HistSum Oct 76; AMEMB Wellington 3674/010015Z Oct 76 and 3697/040500Z Oct 76.
3. AMEMB Wellington 3867/180320Z Oct 76.
4. AMEMB Wellington 3866/180319Z Oct 76. A 1966 New Zealand law required uncooked meat brought into a New Zealand port be sealed in meat lockers while the ship was in port.

Korea

(S) Nuclear-powered submarines had been visiting certain PACOM ports over the years, but from 19 to 22 December the USS SAM HOUSTON (SSBN-609) conducted a successful port visit to Chinhae, Korea, the first foreign port visit in the PACOM by a Fleet Ballistic Missile nuclear submarine.[1]

(S) Reactor safeguard clearance for recurring visits by NPW had been granted by the Korean Chief of Naval Operations for the ports of Pusan, Inchon, and Chinhae.[2]

Other PACOM Areas

(S) Access granted to U.S. NPWs to visit in the PACOM continued in the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand during 1976.[3]

PACOM Fleet Ballistic Missile Force Activity

(S) Throughout 1976 there were six or seven nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines assigned at any one time in the PACOM; an eighth, USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) had departed Pearl Harbor on 3 January for a scheduled overhaul at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in California. On 1 June USS PATRICK HENRY (SSBN-599) departed Pearl for Bangor, Washington, to off-load its POLARIS missiles before proceeding to Mare Island for regular overhaul. This reduced the SSBN level to six until 23 July, when USS THOMAS JEFFERSON (SSBN-618) arrived following overhaul at that shipyard. While at Pearl, the JEFFERSON assumed Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) Target Package SB85 on 27 July, bringing the number of SIOP-committed SSBNs back to seven. The number was again reduced on 13 October, however, when USS ROBERT E. LEE (SSBN-601) departed for the shipyard for a 17-month overhaul. It raised back to seven when USS JOHN MARSHALL (SSBN-611) assumed coverage of Target Package SB85 on 18 December. This was MARSHALL's initial deployment following overhaul.[4]

(S) In May 1975 the PACOM fleet ballistic missile submarine force had begun conversion from the POLARIS A3T missile to the POLARIS A3TA. The conversion consisted of modifying the flight control package. The purpose was to reduce the second-stage overflight of the aim point to a maximum of 150 miles. By April 1976 the conversion program had been completed.[5]

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1. J313 HistSum Dec 76.
2. J313 Point Paper, 11 May 76, Subj: Visit Access to Foreign Ports in PACOM for Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW).
3. Ibid.
4. J321 HistSums Jan, Jun, Jul, Oct, Dec 76.
5. J321 HistSum Apr 76.

(S) Tests of POLARIS were held during the year. In January USS ETHAN ALLEN (SSBN-608) and USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (SSBN-600) conducted A3 tests. ALLEN launched four inert missiles and ROOSEVELT launched two. All were launched from a South Pacific launch point and were programmed to impact in the Midway Missile Impact Locating System. All flew normal trajectories to the impact area. In September USS THOMAS EDISON (SSBN-610) and USS SAM HOUSTON (SSBN-609) each launched two inert missiles in similar tests. After such tests the data was analyzed by the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University.[1]

[redacted]

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1. J321 HistSums Jan, Apr, Sep 76.
2. J3221 HistSum Jan 76; J322 HistSum Aug 76.
3. J322 HistSum Sep 76.
4. J323 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 150501Z Sep 76, 100032Z Nov 76, and 010245Z Dec 76; CINCPACAF 070331Z Oct 76; JCS 7970/060505Z Nov 76; CINCPACREPPHIL 151030Z Nov 76.

SIOP Briefings for CINCPAC

(S) Twice during 1976 the Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff visited PACOM headquarters to brief CINCPAC, his staff, and representatives of the component commands on the current Single Integrated Operation Plan. The briefing on SIOP-5 was presented on 8 and 9 January; the briefing on Revision A to that plan, which was implemented on 1 November, was presented on 10 and 11 November.[1]

Sea Surveillance Training by the Strategic Air Command

(C) As explained in the CINCPAC Command History for 1975, agreement had been reached between the Navy and the Air Force on collateral training functions as, "It is becoming increasingly more important for the unified commander to utilize effectively any resources that are made available to conduct sea control in accordance with the spirit and intent of mutual reinforcement."[2]

(U) On 5 May 1976 CINCSAC advised CINCPAC that SAC had flown its first sea surveillance mission on 18 August 1975 and by 5 May, 25 sorties had been flown (of 32 scheduled with the rest cancelled for reasons of headquarters-directed missions or weather). Certain units had been designated as primary ocean surveillance units, and these received special briefings and training. A typical B-52 ocean surveillance training mission profile was described by SAC as follows:[3]

- Mission duration: 8.5 hours.
- Search area location (distance offshore): 300-1,400 nautical miles with an average of 650.
- Size of search area: 100,000 square miles.
- Time to contact after entry: 45 minutes.
- Time with objective: 40 minutes.
- Number of "rigs" accomplished: 4. ("Rigging" referred to the descent to lower altitude to photograph the subject under study.)

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1. J3211 HistSum Jan 76; J3212 HistSum Nov 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 78-79.
3. CINCSAC 051918Z May 76.

- Number of 35mm photos taken: 25.

- Approximate aircraft navigation system error at objective: less than 10NM.

PONY EXPRESS

[redacted]

(S) On 23 August ARNOLD again departed for a 45-day PONY EXPRESS collection operation, arriving on station on 3 September after a stop at Adak for fuel. The ship came under the operational control of Commander Task Group 30.2, which

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 224-226.
2. J313 HistSums Jun-Jul 76.

was under Commander, Third Fleet. On 14 September ARNOLD returned to Adak for the humanitarian transfer of a crewman and to obtain required equipment and repair parts to improve readiness, returning to station late on 19 September. ARNOLD again departed station on 30 September for Adak to effect two humanitarian transfers. After returning, ARNOLD departed the station on 15 October for Yokosuka, Japan, where modifications were made to the ship to enhance severe weather survivability.[1]

(S) Prior to the next deployment, which began on 9 November, CINCPAC's Director for Operations reemphasized the requirement for intensive medical and emergency screening of personnel.[2]

(S) On 16 November ARNOLD again departed station for the medical evacuation of a technician with internal bleeding from a peptic ulcer. In a message of 17 November to the JCS, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, the Military Sealift Command, and the Defense Special Missile and Aeronautics Center, CINCPAC again reemphasized the need for detailed personnel screening. In that message CINCPAC provided a recapitulation of previous medical and humanitarian evacuations.[3]

[redacted]

COMMANDO TALON

(S) On 30 September 1975 COMUS Korea advised that North Korean agent infiltrations continued to cause great concern in the ROK Government. In two earlier incidents, the high speed boats (called "SKUNK" boats) used for infiltration had been detected, but contact was lost because of limitations of

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1. J313 HistSums Aug-Sep 76.
2. CINCPAC SSO 050225Z Oct 76 (BOM).
3. CINCPAC 170206Z Nov 76.
4. J313 HistSums Nov-Dec 76; J3/Memo/T564-77, 29 Sep 77, Subj: Review of Draft CINCPAC Command History, Chapter IV.

detection equipment. The ROK Air Force had taken procurement action to install two Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) systems in their AC-123 aircraft. Until they were so equipped, COMUS Korea asked CINCPAC for authority to continue the use of USAF aircraft in the program called COMMANDO TALON. On 21 November 1975 elaboration of justification for the proposal was forwarded by the Commander of the 314th Air Division, who would be executing the program. He said that he fully realized the political implications of U.S. involvement in any anti-infiltration role. It had never been intended, he said, for COMBAT TALON aircraft to become actively engaged in a forward air controller role with ROK forces, nor to talk directly with them, nor to identify a vessel as an agent boat. He said they were initially unaware of the capabilities of the FLIR system, but that during March, April, and May 1975 there had been nine successful missions flown during periods of complete darkness. The tests proved that the system could detect surface vessels and differentiate between freighters, sailboats, fishing junks, and small high-powered boats. The intent had been to relay sighting information through an intermediary to ROK forces (with the information encoded and transmitted on secure channels), at which time the U.S. aircraft would depart the area prior to any ROK action.[1]

(S) On 4 October CINCPAC authorized additional COMMANDO TALON testing until 31 December 1975, subject to certain restrictions. Those were as follows:[2]

- The area of operations was to be south of 35°N.

- Intelligence gained could be shared with the ROK only to the extent that it could be covered by collection and releasability under other, existing programs.

- No releasability of COMBAT TALON aircraft or systems information, except in accordance with applicable directives.

- Testing with cooperative targets, coordinated with the ROK and consistent with the other restrictions was encouraged.

- The closest point of approach to fishing craft should be no closer than required for the mission and in no case closer than 1,000 feet slant range. Closest point of approach for other aircraft and ships was one nautical mile.

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1. 314 Air Div Osan 150245Z Sep 75 retransmitted to CINCPAC by COMUSK 302330Z Sep 75; 314 Air Div Osan 060840Z Nov 75 retransmitted as Hq UNC/USFK/EUSA 211055Z Nov 75.
2. CINCPAC 040015Z Oct 75.

- COMMANDO TALON/COMBAT TALON operations over the high seas in a sea surface surveillance role required prior coordination by CINCPACAF and COMUS Korea with CINCPACFLT to prevent mutual interference and assure that merchant and naval ship contacts gained during incident testing were reported.

(S) Following a review of the testing operations, CINCPACAF recommended continuation of the program. CINCPAC approved the proposal on 27 May, with the following restrictions:[1]

- The area of operations was to be within the ROK Air Defense Identification Zone, south of 35°N.

- Tracking of suspicious contacts was authorized, within the operating area. Contact encounters and reporting were to be in accordance with CINCPACFLT instruction.

- Passing of near-real-time contact and tracking data to the ROK was not authorized. Intelligence gained could be shared with the ROK only to the extent it could be covered by collection and releasability under other, existing programs.

- COMMANDO TALON aircraft were to maintain a passive role only. They were to withdraw from the search area in the event the ROK Air Force or Navy reacted to the contact information gained unilaterally. The importance for the United States to avoid involvement in any actions that appeared to violate accepted principles of International Law was emphasized.

- Operations were approved for one year, to end 30 June 1977.

OLYMPIC GAME Operations

(S) Approval was granted by the JCS on 3 February to conduct a 90-day U-2R operations test in Korea; the operation was called OLYMPIC GAME. Mission aircraft of the Strategic Air Command, support personnel, and necessary equipment were deployed to Osan Air Base, Korea, and were operationally capable for the first OLYMPIC GAME flight on 26 February. The operations were evaluated by the JCS, who recommended continuation of the program. "Higher authority"

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1. J3141 HistSum May 76; CINCPACAF 252100Z Feb 76; CINCPAC 270033Z May 76.

approved such operations and the JCS so advised CINCPAC, CINCSAC, and the National Security Agency. The JCS also advised that they were initiating a review of the Northeast Asia airborne signal intelligence mix.[1]

Japanese Aircraft Incident in La Perouse Strait

(S) Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force P2J aircraft operated routinely in the vicinity of Japan concurrently with U.S. Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) aircraft. On 2 April 1976 there was a possible USSR attempt to shoot down such an aircraft. The Japanese plane had been on an ice reconnaissance mission in La Perouse Strait. PARPRO reconnaissance flights in PARPRO geographic area THREE (the USSR, from the Barents Sea to the Sea of Japan) were aborted or cancelled as a result. On 5 April the area was reopened.[2]

(S) The Republic of Korea was also developing an EC-47 signal intelligence reconnaissance program (PROJECT CANDLE) and was developing an F-4 photo pod capability. Hostile reaction to those craft as well as the Japanese P2Js was considered possible and CINCPAC provided for procedures to abort the flights of aircraft operating in the geographic region in which the possible hostile act had occurred. The Fifth Air Force's PACOM Reconnaissance Operations Center was directed to close that geographic area to PARPRO operations pending a CINCPAC evaluation of the threat.[3]

USNS SILAS BENT Operations

(S) On 19 May the JCS approved the oceanographic survey of La Perouse Strait, to be conducted by USNS SILAS BENT, a civilian-manned research vessel, assisted by a specially configured VXN-8 P3 aircraft and a Fleet P3 aircraft. The purpose of the operation was to gather oceanographic data in the Sea of Japan, Sea of Ohkotsk, and La Perouse Strait in support of Fleet antisubmarine warfare operations. SILAS BENT began shipboard oceanographic surveys on schedule on 21 May. Two aerial collection flights were conducted during the operating period that ended 8 June. The ship was under surveillance by a Soviet destroyer escort of the RIGA class. The ship visited Hakodate, Japan from 9 to 15 June, after which it stopped at Wakkanai to pick up a meter array. In addition to the RIGA class ship, a Soviet T-43 class minesweeper conducted surveillance. The survey was completed on schedule on 29 June and SILAS BENT cleared the Sea of Okhotsk via Proliv Bussoi on 30 June en route to Adak, AK.[4]

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1. J3141 HistSum Feb 76, which cited SSO, DIA, JCS/J3 061703Z Feb 76 (BOM); CSAF 280019Z Feb 76; J3141 HistSum Dec 76; JCS 1503/211245Z Jun 76.
2. J3141 HistSum Apr 76; CINCPAC 050720Z Apr 76.
3. J3142 HistSum Jun 76.
4. J313 HistSums May-Jun 76.

Hard Structure Munitions Program

(S) The Air Force had been testing munitions designed to destroy hard structures, as explained in the 1975 CINCPAC Command History. CINCPAC had provided his wholehearted support for the program, but he had hoped that the program would be accelerated and expanded to make use of more numerous, cheaper, and more available means of delivery than the sophisticated systems under development. He had said, "In short, would much rather have penetration capability soonest to meet Korean and other hard target requirements than pie in the sky by and by."[1]

(S) It had been planned by the Air Force to combine the weapon with the GBU-15 glide bomb. On 15 January the Air Force advised CINCPAC that they understood CINCPAC's interest in trying to adapt the HSM program in combination with existing laser guidance kits. They provided their rationale, supporting the position that the LGB (laser-guided bomb) weaponization was unsatisfactory. CINCPAC staff members visited the Air Staff's HSM office in February to discuss CINCPAC concerns. On 4 February the Air Staff issued a revised Program Management Directive that included a requirement that the Air Force Systems Command investigate, by means of analysis and simulation, the feasibility of weaponizing the HSM using MK-84 LGB components. The results were very favorable and supported the LGB configuration in the prototype. Members of the Air Staff briefed the Tactical Air Commands and the Air Force components of the European and Pacific Commands (the three were called the Tactical Air Forces (TAF)). The TAF supported early capability using the LGB weaponization.[2]

(S) On 14 July the first high-speed (1,570 feet per second) test of an HSM two-stage warhead (forward and follow-through charge) against a composite target was conducted at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. The target was 6.5 feet of earth plus 6.5 feet of reinforced concrete, plus another 6.5 feet of earth, and finally 20 inches of reinforced concrete. The follow-through charge of the warhead penetrated the target. The top 15 feet of final layer broke off 5 feet above the base, was thrown against another target 5 feet away, and had a 3-foot diameter hole. The follow-through charge was live, but fuzing was inert. All test objectives were met. A fully-fuzed warhead was to be tested against a similar target early in 1977.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 271-272.
2. J343 HistSums Jan-Feb, Jun-Jul 76.
3. J343 HistSum Jul 76.

Cost-Effectiveness Study of Basic and Improved HAWK System

(U) In mid-1975 the CINCPAC Staff began collecting cost and effectiveness data regarding the Improved HAWK missile system that was being considered for deployment to the Republic of Korea. The Army's program manager had briefed interested staff members at that time. The collection of data began; preliminary analysis indicated the Improved HAWK was cost effective over the basic HAWK. The final study was not completed until late April 1976 at which time interested persons on the CINCPAC and CINCPACAF staffs were briefed on the findings. The study revealed that the Improved HAWK was more cost effective in an electronic countermeasures environment.[1]

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1. J342 HistSums Jun-Jul 75; J343 HistSums Sep, Dec 75; J34 HistSums Apr-May 76.
2. J362 HistSum Jun 76; CINCUNC 280555Z Apr 76; JCS 9319/052303Z May 76; CDRUSACSG 120105Z Jun 76, retransmitting DA 071630Z Jun 76.
3. CDRUSA JFKCENMA Ft Bragg 161310Z Jul 76; DA 221325Z Jul 76; JCS 5544/051434Z Aug 76; J362 HistSum Jul 76.
4. J362 HistSum Sep 76.

[redacted]

Asia-Pacific Defense Forum

(S) As the result of a 1973 PACOM PSYOP conference, tasking in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and field visits by PACOM staff officers, CINCPAC staff members and the U.S. Information Agency Adviser to CINCPAC proposed that CINCPAC publish a credible and professional military journal. The publication was to be targeted toward selected foreign military leaders, and middle-echelon potential leaders, primarily those who had attended U.S. Service schools. The objectives of the journal would be to generate and maintain an understanding of U.S. defense policy, and to provide appropriate follow-up support to the Security Assistance Program. By the end of 1974 policy for the publication had been formulated, themes developed for consideration, and sample copies printed and distributed.[4]

(U) On 30 March 1976 CINCPAC formally announced plans to publish the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum and requested Country Teams in the command to confirm subscription orders. On 16 January the U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii procurement officer had selected Abbott Associates, Inc., a Washington, DC firm,

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1. COMUSK 140618Z Dec 76; JCS 4994/271638Z Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC 060447Z Aug 76; JCS 6591/241622Z Sep 76.
3. J362 HistSum Dec 76; CINCUNC 150741Z Dec 76; CINCPAC 171739Z Dec 76.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol: I, pp. 201-202.

to edit and prepare copy for the magazine. The firm had been evaluated as second, technically, but had submitted the lowest bid of $74,604. Four contractors had competed, with the highest bid $99,700.[1]

(U) The first two issues were published on 17 June and 27 September, with subscriptions numbering about 3,900. For the third issue, scheduled for publication in 1977, the distribution was increased to approximately 4,500. Content was primarily reprinted material from other U.S. publications, selected by the editorial board and approved by CINCPAC. Foreign source material was encouraged.[2]

(U) Response to the publication was favorable. A formal assessment and survey of the readership was planned for the second year of circulation.[3]

Operations Security

(U) Operations Security (OPSEC) was defined as "the protection of military operations and activities resulting from the identification and subsequent elimination or control of intelligence indicators susceptible to hostile exploitation." CINCPAC had continued to emphasize the application of OPSEC in all aspects of military operations and activities. Activities in the OPSEC program in 1976 are described in the material that follows.[4]

[redacted]

(S) Because of increased Soviet interest in U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile testing into the Kwajalein impact area, CINCPAC proposed in February that an OPSEC survey of U.S. strategic missile testing operations be conducted. The JCS approved the survey on 5 March. The CINCPAC OPSEC team visited Washington, DC and Huntsville, AL in March to coordinate the survey, develop an initial data base, and survey the National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency for related intelligence holdings. The team visited the Kwajalein missile range during the period 4-15 April, at which time interviews were conducted with Kwajalein personnel to determine operating procedures, time

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1. CINCPAC 300032Z Mar 76; J551 HistSum Jan 76; J362 HistSum May 76.
2. J362 HistSum Dec 76.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS Pub 18, Operations Security Policy, Concepts, and Standards, 25 Oct 74.
5. J3191 HistSum Jan 76.

sequences of information exchanges, and communications patterns. Subsequently, the team visited the Space and Missile Systems organization in Los Angeles; the MINUTEMAN III program office at Norton AFB, California; the Space and Missile Test Center at Vandenburg AFB, California; the Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Magu, California; and the Air Logistics Command at Hill AFB, Utah. At all locations interviews were conducted to determine operational procedures, time sequences of information exchanges, and communications patterns. The final report was released on 25 August.[1]

(S) Exercise TEAM SPIRIT was the subject of an OPSEC survey 4-23 June. This was a large-scale land-sea-air, joint and combined exercise conducted by COMUS Korea to provide training in the planning, conduct, and evaluation of deploying, employing, and redeploying joint/combined forces. The survey was limited to the CINC United Nations Command/COMUS Korea area of responsibility to include adjacent waters where U.S. naval forces were employed. Among the units and activities visited at various bases in Korea were 7 at Yongsan, including the Headquarters CINCUNC/COMUS Korea; 11 at Osan; 5 at Kunsan; 4 at Kwang Ju; and 1 each at Taegu and Chun Chon.[2]

(S) In December CINCPAC replied to an inquiry from the JCS about OPSEC support for CINC-sponsored field training exercises (FTX). The JCS provided a description of the OPSEC support that may be provided to assist in determining the exploitation of FTX operational activities by hostile sources. CINCPAC welcomed such support. In addition, he recommended that OPSEC support also address assets that might be targeted against an exercise, including surface signal intelligence collection (AGI/AGM) assets; airborne SIGINT and long-range aerial reconnaissance collection assets (TU-16/YS 11/TU-95); and ground-based SIGINT collection/HFDF assets. CINCPAC also noted that the post-exercise analysis should assess the reason for any additional deployment above the norm, the SIGINT capability of each asset, the probable targets of SIGINT efforts and variations in activity. He named the significant exercises in the PACOM that be believed warranted OPSEC support; these were TEAM SPIRIT, RIMPAC, MIDLINK, KANGAROO, and exercises in the COPE THUNDER/ELITE/STRIKE/JADE series. CINCPAC concluded that to insure maximum OPSEC improvement benefits were derived from this effort, the post-exercise analysis should be published at the lowest possible classification level, with compartmented information developed during analysis forwarded separately in appropriate channels.[3]

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1. J316 HistSum Aug 76, which cited CINCPAC Ltr Ser S405 of 25 Aug 76, Subj: Strategic Missile Testing; JCS 6109/051918Z Mar 76.
2. J316 HistSum Sep 76, which cited CINCPAC Ltr Ser S423 of 8 Sep 76, Subj: CINCPAC Operations Security Survey of Exercise TEAM SPIRIT; CINCPAC 240159Z May 76; PACOM Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 53.
3. CINCPAC 222030Z Dec 76.

Joint Exercises

(S) The funding constraints that had plagued the exercise program in preceding years continued in 1976. In January the JCS advised that anticipated Congressional reductions in funds for the FY 76 appropriations bill caused modification of the approved exercise schedule. The approval had been subject to such Congressional action, principally in regard to the planned application of unsubscribed USAF airlift hours to the exercise program. For planning purposes, the JCS advised, airlift support for the FY 76 schedule after 1 January 1976 for the PACOM was $6.301 million.[1]

(S) On 26 February CINCPAC outlined his concern for the readiness and capability of the command to respond to potential conflicts ranging from small urgent operations through limited war to war with the USSR. Major shortfalls were caused by insufficient funding and resource limitations to establish and maintain a viable joint exercise program. CINCPAC said that the increased Soviet threat, exercised directly or by proxy, was his greatest concern. Increasingly this threat was focused on the Pacific area with the opening of the Suez Canal, base developments in Africa, an uncontested foothold in Southeast Asia, and increased dependence of the Free World on access to Mid-East oil. "The threat was increasing numerically and, more dramatically, in a technological sense," CINCPAC said. The "formidable" list of Soviet technological advances included a satellite system that provided them with a worldwide command and control network directly linked to their operating forces. They had exploited their unique command and control capability by conducting numerous large-scale joint exercises. They were well ahead of the United States in the frequency, magnitude, and technical scope of joint exercises. They exercised their forces in regional and worldwide operations that brought together all components of high technology. Thus, they were learning to employ new technology, developing doctrine and tactics involving large-scale forces, training their people, and strengthening their military leadership both technically and operationally.

(U) PACOM forces, CINCPAC continued, were "playing catch-up and we are not holding our own." During the "past few years" the largest exercise held had involved a Marine Corps brigade. There had not been an Army division or brigade size deployment and participation in a joint exercise. The largest Air Force deployment exercise contained eight aircraft. Less than $700,000 had been spent for airlift to support joint exercises in the PACOM during FY 75, initially due to fiscal constraints and subsequently to contingency operations. Even the proficiency developed during the Vietnam conflict, largely irrelevant to the modern technical problem, was rapidly eroding. "We are drawing down forces and losing experienced leaders." The vast PACOM area, he noted, coupled

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1. JCS 8520/262133Z Jan 76.

with these force drawdowns, required intra-theater and CONUS-to-theater deployments over long distances to position forces for exercises. Exercise costs were thus increasing.

(U) CINCPAC continued that joint exercises, large and small, were essential as a means of developing tactical doctrine, identifying and developing a high quality leadership, learning to exploit new equipment, and identifying shortcomings and the means for overcoming them. "Large scale exercises are also useful for political reasons. The U.S. as a Pacific power must demonstrate its resolve to stand with its allies and thus motivate them to develop a strong defense of their own." CINCPAC noted that during a meeting of the Pacific area Chiefs of Mission a frequently voiced view had been that client countries were looking for signals of U.S. resolve in the Pacific. "In view of events during 1975, a clear prompt signal is a major task requiring special emphasis." CINCPAC sought the support of the JCS to find ways to increase joint exercise funding for the PACOM. He noted that his input for the exercise schedule had established a strategic airlift funding requirement for $39.7 million in FY 77 and $32.8 million in FY 78. Guidance, however, was that only $8.9 million and $9.9 million for those two years would be available. He believed the "best hope" was to seek support from the Secretary of Defense for supplemental funding. He "would hope to avoid actions which reduce funds for essential Service programs, e.g., new procurement, research and development and manpower."[1]

(C) The JCS provided their reply on 18 May. They advised that they considered it inappropriate to request an increase in funds at that time, although they acknowledged that commanders of all unified and specified commands could profitably use additional funds. They noted that the annual joint exercise budget had more than doubled since FY 73 because of rising exercise costs, as well as an expanded exercise program resulting from an increased emphasis on exercises. "CINCPAC's share of these funds during the same period has also increased, both in dollar amounts and as a percentage share of the total budget."[2]

(C) In another matter, in 1975 CINCPAC had provided some recommendations regarding procedures for scheduling and reporting exercises. On 2 February the JCS advised that a reduction in the number of exercises considered "significant" held the most promise for relief from burdens of reporting requirements. A procedure had been proposed to the Defense Department for downgrading from "significant" to "routine" those exercises that had attracted high-level interest, when conditions no longer warranted their being considered

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1. CINCPAC 262356Z Feb 76.
2. JCS 3428/182250Z May 76.

"significant." The JCS had already initiated action requesting that the Secretary of Defense seek an early meeting with the Department of State, with Joint Staff participation, to review the list of politically sensitive areas.[1]

(C) In still another matter, at the beginning of 1976 CINCPAC's Operations Directorate invited wider staff participation as exercise observers and evaluators. A listing of significant exercises was circulated to the staff with recommendations regarding participation by the various agencies of CINCPAC's staff.[2]

(U) Certain specific joint and combined exercises are discussed in the material that follows.

PRIME TARGET-77

(U) Exercise PRIME TARGET-77 was one in a series of biennial, worldwide, procedural, general war, command post exercises, sponsored and conducted by the JCS in conjunction with the biennial NATO exercise WINTEX. The previous exercise in the series had been PRIME RATE-75.

(S) As he had during the planning and development of PRIME RATE-75, CINCPAC again voiced his concern that the scenarios for exercises in this series failed to provide realism and recognize situations that would probably exist. Again in 1976 CINCPAC urged that "we not fall into trap of stereotyped exercise scenarios and unrealistic descriptions of enemy and friendly actions with preconceived strategy options. Exercise PRIME TARGET 77 as now structured headed that direction," CINCPAC said on 28 June. The plan for the exercise depicted a simulated PACOM force deployment to the Atlantic and European Commands prior to the start of NATO-Warsaw Pact war. This assumed away the "real problems dealing with military practicality and operational feasibility inherent in the redeployment strategy." CINCPAC continued that there was no "reality" in talking about a NATO-only war with the USSR. Far East forces constituted about one-third of all Soviet forces and posed the closest, most direct threat to United States territory, forces, and interest, defense of which was paramount to any other priority. He discussed the problems of disengagement, time lost in transit when forces were available to neither theater, and the effect on a Pacific-Asian conflict, including the possible loss of Asian allies.

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1. JCS 5298/021952Z Feb 76.
2. J3/Memo/C26-76, 9 Jan 76, Subj: PACOM Exercise Observers.

(C) CINCPAC, therefore, "strongly" opposed the exercise scenario that ignored the basic military problems associated with the redeployment strategy.[1]

(S) The JCS appreciated CINCPAC's interest and concern in a reply on 9 July. "As you know," the JCS said, "in interfacing PRIME TARGET with the NATO exercise, we are committed to adhere closely to the WINTEX 77 scenario developed by SACEUR [Supreme Allied Command Europe] as agreed upon by the NATO nations and commands and the current U.S. military strategy as ennunciated in the JSCP [Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan]. It would be inadvisable to attempt a reexamination of U.S. military strategy in a procedural exercise involving our NATO allies." The JCS advised that CINCPAC's reservations concerning the broader issues of U.S. military strategy would be considered carefully in the next JSCP review. (The CINCPAC staff ultimately did not participate in the exercise because of JCS manpower constraints which limited PACOM participation.)[2]

TEAM SPIRIT-76

(C) Exercise TEAM SPIRIT-76 was conceived at the 1975 Security Consultative Meeting with the Republic of Korea. CINCPAC stressed his strong support for a joint/combined military field training exercise that demonstrated resolve of the U.S. commitment to Korea. TEAM SPIRIT-76 was conducted from 7 to 24 June 1976 in the Korean theater. The exercise scenario simulated combined U.S.-ROK military operations to counter aggression by North Korea. The U.S. deployed ground, air, and naval forces to the Korean theater in support of CINCUNC. Forces deployed were selected samples of type units that might be deployed in the event of an actual conflict.

(S) The exercise was constrained by several significant factors. Inadequate planning time limited the design of the exercise to a series of isolated events played with little realistic continuity between Services. Fiscal shortcomings precluded airlifting of sufficient forces to adequately test critical features such as reception, beddown, and saturation of the Korean Tactical Air Control System. Finally, political sensitivity to U.S.-Japanese relations resulted in no U.S. combat air operations being flown from bases in Japan. Marine air from Japan that participated in the exercises bedded down in Korea.

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1. CINCPAC 282339Z Jun 76. For a discussion of another study on this redeployment strategy, see Research and Analysis Office Activities in the last chapter of this history.
2. JCS 8447/091907Z Jul 76.

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(C) Nonetheless the exercise was deemed a success. It was the largest Joint/combined military exercise ever conducted in the Pacific. TEAM SPIRIT-76 achieved its purpose and goals and the lessons learned served to strengthen the readiness posture of PACOM forces. It also provided the foundation for future annual TEAM SPIRIT exercises, each one intended to be more sophisticated than its predecessor.[1]

POLO HAT (b)(1) 1.5(a)(f)

[redacted]

PORT ARMS

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(C) Exercises in the PORT ARMS series also continued during 1976. These were JCS-conducted readiness increase exercises. They were intended to insure that personnel were familiar with the publications, procedures, and actions necessary to attain a higher Defense Readiness Condition. Also participating were CINCPAC's Air Force and Navy components, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and the subordinate unified commands.[3]

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1. J35 HistSum Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 239; J3322 HistSum Dec 76.
3. J3321 HistSums Nov-Dec 76.

POLE VAULT

[redacted] CINCPAC played in a "response cell" role. Staff agencies were not actively engaged, and component and subordinate unified commands sent representatives to Hawaii to participate. [redacted]

Telephone Notification Exercise

(U) One of a series of planned quarterly exercises to conduct a practice telephone notification exercise was conducted on 30 March. The purpose was to assess the no-notice availability of the PACOM staff in response to an after duty hours crisis or emergency. The exercise resulted in a review of procedures and an update to the CINCPAC Instruction that pertained (3120.23).[2]

FOCUS WEST III

U ~~(S)~~ In August 1975 CINCPAC advised his PACOM commanders and the JCS of a series of crisis management exercises which were to be periodic command post exercises to be initiated by CINCPAC to evaluate capabilities to handle contingencies in the PACOM. Two such exercises had been conducted in 1975.[3]

~~(C)~~ FOCUS WEST III was conducted 27-28 January 1976. [redacted] A Battle Staff briefing was conducted; the Operations Action Group, Operations Planning Group, and Current Operations Support Element were formed; and actions were initiated by these groups to solve the simulated crisis. Improvement in coordination, administrative functions, and planning were obvious in the third exercise in this series. Also, action officers increased usage of the automated Status of Actions Log. Operations Directorate personnel updated the file with inputs from the Operations Action Group. Computer printouts were used by exercise participants to keep informed of on-going actions.[4]

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1. J3321 HistSum Mar 76.
2. J332 HistSum Apr 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 259-261.
4. J3321 and J335 HistSums Jan 76.

(S) On 20 February CINCPAC advised the JCS and other participants of the results of the exercise. The exercise objective had been to evaluate courses of action for defense of the islands to include planning for CINCPAC support and participation. Further objectives were to focus attention on a potential crisis area, evaluate plans and concepts, identify shortfalls, and exercise procedures and train personnel. The exercise scenario had not been announced and initiation had been without notice. [redacted] Sensitive political/military issues surfaced during the play demonstrated the potential for productive national level participation in future exercises of this type.[1]

JACK FROST

(U) JACK FROST was a Readiness Command-sponsored, JCS-coordinated joint readiness exercise. The January 1976 exercise had been designed to train both Alaska-based forces and USREDCOM augmentation forces in the defense of the Alaska pipeline. On 14 April CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC's Liaison Officer to the Alaskan Air Command of his desire to participate in future JACK FROST exercises. Training emphasis was desired in the areas of low-level terrain-following navigation, electronic countermeasures penetration of air defenses, low-level infiltration, short field tactical exfiltration operations, and blind aerial resupply with high-speed, low-level aerial delivery system. CINCPACAF advised that his headquarters would welcome an opportunity to participate actively in planning for JACK FROST 77 from concept to exercise employment.[2]

KANGAROO II

(U) On 29 December CINCPACFLT provided CINCPAC with a wrap-up report on the KANGAROO II exercise that had been conducted 12-28 October. This had been a combined land-sea-air defense exercise with participating forces from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps participants were 16,000 personnel representing over 60 commands, and included

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1. CINCPAC 200242Z Feb 76.
2. J3162 HistSum Apr 76; CINCPACAF 142231Z Apr 76; USCINCRED 291815Z Jan 76.

18 ships and over 130 aircraft. CINCPACFLT praised the coordination and cooperation among the exercise forces, offered a summary and highlights of the maritime operations and the Amphibious Task Group/Marine operations. He highlighted certain problem areas. Some were traceable to the planning process and the unfamiliarity of the planning staff with USN-USMC equipment and doctrine. Some deficiencies resulted from exercise artificialities deemed necessary by the exercise director's staff. CINCPACFLT listed a number of specifics, noting that most could be corrected in future planning conferences.[1]

F-111 Korean Deployments

(U) The Tactical Air Command deployed six F-111 aircraft of the 366th Tactical Fighter Squadron from Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, to Osan, Korea during the period 24 February-11 March. The aircraft participated in air/ground exercises (Exercise COPE TRAIN) while there, and provided orientation flights for high-ranking ROK officials and officers; 51 sorties were flown. It was the first time the F-111s had been sent directly from CONUS. "Both the press and all echelons of the public and private sector applauded the deployment as earnest of U.S. resolve to support the Republic of Korea," COMUS Korea reported. He described the visit as an "extraordinarily successful operation."[2]

(U) As reported by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, however, North Korea viewed the matter differently. Part of the protest sent to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission stated, "The introduction from the U.S. mainland into South Korea by the U.S. imperialist aggressors of the up-to-date fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads is based on their criminal design to realize their purpose of aggression on the whole Korea and Asia at any cost, using South Korea as their strategic military base." And so on.[3]

(C) Two further deployments in 1976 were under discussion. The U.S. Ambassador in Seoul advised that a deployment planned for the month of September 1977 would appear to cause no problem; the proposed 30 October to 30 November 1976 F-111 deployment would probably coincide with a discussion of the Korean issue in the United Nations General Assembly. In view of the strong North Korean opposition to the F-111s, such deployment could be portrayed by North Korea as "purposely provocative."[4]

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1. CINCPACFLT 290623Z Dec 76.
2. J311 HistSum Mar 76; CINCUNC 150904Z Mar 76; AFK/314AD Osan 180555Z Mar 76; UNC/USFK/EUSA Chronology 1 Jan-30 Jun 76.
3. FBIS Okinawa 260417Z Feb 76.
4. AMEMB Seoul 4590/160945Z Jun 76.

(S) On 29 June CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS that the planning for exercise participation had become increasingly difficult because of a requirement to fix maximum training opportunities into a stringent budget. He was providing his thoughts in response to the Ambassador's comments on timing. He advised that the F-111 deployment had been carefully interfaced with Exercise KANGAROO II, a major combined exercise in Australia scheduled for 5-30 October. He noted that of equal importance with dollar savings was the development of a military capability and credibility to flex the deployment system and test capability to move tactical forces quickly throughout the PACOM. "Deployment CPX [Command Post Exercise] or paper assurance is no substitute," he said. He continued:[1]

> ...Need now, more than ever, in view of limited forces and funds is for early acceptance of exercise concepts and planning, with a measure of constancy assured. Although real diplomatic exigencies should and can be accommodated, such cases should be weighed carefully and with full consideration given to the advantages of an ordered, efficient, theater-wide exercise program.

(S) CINCUNC also provided his thoughts on this matter. He agreed with CINCPAC that the deployment should take place as scheduled, and provided some insight into the nature of North Korean propaganda barrages. He noted that the considerable reaction to the previous F-111 deployment followed sizable coverage of the deployment by ROK and U.S. Forces press. The North Korean reaction, therefore, had been predictable. For Exercise BEACON CHERRY, however, a single U.S.-ROK press release had been issued and the exercise was "only periodically and routinely castigated" by North Korea. For the much bigger Exercise TEAM SPIRIT there had been no U.S. or ROK press coverage prior to the conclusion of the exercise, and nearly a month later there had been no North Korean commentary. Thus, North Korean overt reaction to allied exercises "is directly proportional to the public emphasis which we accord these events." He said it was his intent that there be no publicity regarding the planned F-111 deployment.[2]

(S) On 17 August the JCS advised of approval to deploy the F-111s for participation in KANGAROO II. Plans to deploy to Korea following that exercise were still under study. The next day two American officers were killed in the Joint Security Area in Korea; in response a deployment of air and naval forces was dispatched. (See Operation PAUL BUNYAN elsewhere in this chapter.) Among

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1. CINCPAC 290205Z Jun 76.
2. CINCUNC 190900Z Jul 76.

deployed forces were F-111 aircraft. Following their deployment in Korea, some aircraft went on to participate in KANGAROO II, others returned to CONUS.[1]

Deployment of F-4 Aircraft to Korea

(S) The Secretary of Defense had indicated that 12 F-4 aircraft should be kept on continuing rotation from Clark Air Base in the Philippines and Kadena Air Base, Japan (Okinawa) to maintain a 72-aircraft capability in Korea. The purpose of the deployment was to demonstrate U.S. resolve and to allow more aircrews to become familiar with Korean operations. To fulfill this requirement, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Kadena would maintain eight F-4D aircraft on continuous rotation to the 8th TFW at Kunsan Air Base, Korea. The 3d TFW at Clark was to maintain four F-4Es on continuous rotation to the 51st Composite Wing at Osan, Korea. The requirement for continuous rotation of the 12 aircraft was indefinite. The action was directed by CINCPACAF OPORD 76-4, COMMANDO FROG.[2]

Casualty Resolution

(U) Attempts to resolve the status of Americans who were missing in action and recover, if possible, the bodies of the dead still in Southeast Asia were the tasks of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). That agency relocated to Hawaii from Thailand in 1976, as discussed below. In January CINCPAC addressed the matter of the command channel for communications between the JCRC and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (there was a Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic Affairs and Prisoner of War/Missing-in-Action Affairs). In a message to the JCS on 7 January CINCPAC had noted that the JCS had approved Terms of Reference for the JCRC, but that frequent direct communications had been occuring between the JCRC and the OASD(ISA). CINCPAC requested that in accordance with the approved TOR all communications between the Washington agency and JCRC be directed through his headquarters. He recognized that, in some circumstances, time sensitive information would be needed to be passed directly but that this should clearly be the exception, and even in those cases CINCPAC should be informed immediately. The JCS/OSD would be included in coordination on all matters concerning inquiries and visits of Congressional delegates, next-of-kin, or missing-in-action groups. On 9 January the JCS advised that the matter had been discussed with the OASD(ISA) and would be as requested by CINCPAC.[3]

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1. JCS 1199/172116Z Aug 76.
2. J311 HistSum Feb 76; CINCPACAF 281900Z Feb 76.
3. CINCPAC 070300Z Jan 76; JCS 4276/091924Z Jan 76.

(C) Relocation of the facility from Thailand was part of the major base and force reduction in that country. CINCPAC favored relocation to the Philippines. He provided the following rationale. Domestic political considerations might require location of the facility as far forward in the theater as possible. The Philippines provided the proximity to Indochina for possible remains repatriation operations. It demonstrated the continued U.S. resolve to the next-of-kin and the Southeast Asia governments on the MIA issue. It also gave the ability to provide immediate assistance and support to Congressional delegations and their staffs during negotiation or repatriation efforts. Both Clark Air Base and the San Miguel Naval Communications facility could accommodate the move, but San Miguel was favored because of lower preparation costs. If, however, political liabilities precluded Philippine basing, CINCPAC suggested Continental United States or Hawaii basing as an alternative.[1]

(C) The political sensitivities had been outlined by the Embassy in Manila on 31 March. It was pointed out that a move to the Philippines would raise "serious problems" for the United States with the Philippine Government, which was "acutely sensitive to anything which might tend to trouble its tentative and delicate relationship with Hanoi." As the United States was about to enter sensitive negotiations to try to preserve the most important of the military facilities already there, it was not the time to be seeking from that government the authority to establish a facility with the political connotations of the JCRC.[2]

(C) It was decided to relocate in Hawaii, and on 4 May CINCPAC, as authorized by the JCS, so directed. The JCRC relocated from U-Tapao to Barbers Point Naval Air Station on Oahu on 18 May. Throughout the disruption of the move, the fundamental task of compiling and analyzing casualty resolution data continued without interruption.[3]

(C) The Central Identification Laboratory was also relocated from the Camp Samae San/U-Tapao area to Hawaii. It was moved to Camp Kapalama on Oahu with the main staff arriving 19 May with a final residual force closing on 6 June. The facility was redesignated the Central Identification Laboratory,

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1. CINCPAC 060345Z Apr 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 4508/310845Z Mar 76.
3. CINCPAC 042023Z May 76; USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI General Order 70, 11 May 76, Subj: Central Identification Laboratory Thailand (CIL THAI); JCRC Rear Det U-Tapao RTNAB TH 210215Z May 76; JCRC Historical Report 17 May-30 Jun 76 of 19 Aug 76.

Pacific. It had only limited operational capability at that time, however, as renovation and modification of the building in which it was housed was necessary.[1]

(C) On 9 July the JCS approved a revised Joint Manpower Program for the JCRC; strength was reduced from 76 to 19, although a subsequent change on 27 September added another space. The Negotiations Assistance Division was deleted and the Casualty Data and Operations Divisions were sharply reduced. A two-man Liaison Division was established at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. The JCRC commander was an Air Force colonel.[2]

(C) In matters of casualty resolution, while still in Thailand the CIL processed the remains of five persons that had been returned by China and Vietnam. The bodies were moved by the Military Airlift Command to Travis AFB on 13 January. On 6 September the Vietnamese Embassy in Paris provided a list of 12 American airmen killed when their aircraft had crashed in North Vietnam. The next day the President of the United States issued a statement advising that the Embassy in Paris was to advise the Vietnamese that the United States expected a full accounting on all Americans missing in Vietnam. He welcomed information on the 12, but noted that Vietnam had information on hundreds more and that "normalization of relations" could not take place until Vietnam rendered a full accounting.[3]

(U) The JCRC continued to work on the preparation of casualty negotiation folders. During the last quarter of the year the center prepared 1,554 folders, accounting for 2,613 individuals, completing this project. Folders were forwarded to OASD(ISA). Work continued on the declassification of casualty file documents as well as the fundamental task of analyzing and correlating casualty resolution data.[4]

(U) An end of the month report for December listed the statistical summary for the JCRC at that time:[5]

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1. CDRUSACILPACFTSHAFTER HI 080259Z Jun 76.
2. JCRC Historical Reports, 17 May-30 Jun 76 of 19 Aug and 1 Jul-30 Sep 76 of 22 Oct 76.
3. J3181 HistSum Jan 76; JCS 2764/061745Z Sep 76; SECSTATE 237991/242341Z Sep 76.
4. JCRC Historical Report 1 Oct-31 Dec 76 of 5 Jan 77; CDT JCRC 052358Z Jan 77.
5. CDT JCRC 052358Z Jan 77.

Active cases - 2,613
U.S. military missing - 762
U.S. military dead, body not recovered - 1,743
U.S. civilian missing - 23
U.S. civilians dead, body not recovered - 18
Third Country Nationals - 67

Inactive cases - 881
Rescued - 4
Escaped - 33
Released - 724
Remains recovered/identified - 120

Total sites of JCRC interest - 1,328
Inland sites (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, China) - 1,270
At sea sites - 57
Grave sites correlated to one or more sites or individuals - 123

(C) On 15 December the final report of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Americans Missing in Southeast Asia was released. It was the committee's belief that no Americans were being held alive as prisoners in Indochina and that the Defense Department should begin individual case reviews as prescribed by law. Total accounting by Indochinese governments was not possible, but partial accounting was possible. The committee considered the return of possibly 150 bodies as a reasonable expectation. The most effective way to obtain this accounting, the report said, was through direct governmental discussions with Indochina countries. The State Department "should promptly engage these governments in such discussions." The House should maintain POW/MIA oversight capability in the International Relations Committee to monitor such talks. A number of other recommendations were included.[1]

Freedom of Information Act Activities

(U) On 28 January CINCPAC submitted an annual report on activities connected with requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. None had been unmanageable, it was reported, but servicing such requests required unprogrammed manhours and was expensive (in excess of $1,700 at that time).

(U) One unresolved problem existed at that time. The Joint Casualty Resolution Center handled all records on those missing in action or whose bodies were not recovered in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC asked the JCS for clarification on who had access to those records under the Freedom of

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1. SECSTATE 305388/162258Z Dec 76.

Information Act when it impacted against the Privacy Act. The question was referred to the Defense Department's Privacy Board for a determination. Subsequently, when Freedom of Information requests were received, copies of all records were forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (PW-MIA Affairs). The JCRC was to provide a record of the cost of research and preparation, but actual charges were waived in this area.[1]

Disaster Relief

(U) With the redeployment of the Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFASIA) from the PACOM in 1974, it had been necessary to reappraise capabilities to provide Disaster Assistance Relief Teams to foreign disaster areas on request. In 1975 CINCPAC had created a PACOM Survey Team, and early in 1976 CINCPAC convened a Foreign Disaster Relief Survey Team Seminar. CINCPAC had invited a representative from the State Department's Office of Foreign Disaster Relief Coordination in the Agency for International Development, but he was unable to attend. The State Department had recommended participation by a representative of the Southern Command in view of their pioneer efforts and repeated experience, but CINCPAC replied that while he would welcome such a visit he could not fund it. No representative from that command attended, but representatives of CINCPAC's Navy and Air Force component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group attended, as did an Army major formerly assigned to the Southern Command where he had helped develop procedures for Foreign Disaster Survey Teams and had been deployed about 300 days on various disaster relief operations.[2]

(U) The meeting was held on 15 January, at which several problem areas were surfaced regarding CINCPAC's Instruction on the subject (3050.1E). CINCPACFLT representatives questioned tasking of the Fleet for the team officer in charge and for overall responsibility for survey team organization, training, and equipment. They acknowledged that the draft CINCPAC Instruction had been concurred in by that headquarters, but said that it had not been properly coordinated. The concept of a forward location for the survey team was also discussed (Philippines, Guam, Okinawa, etc.).

(U) On 2 March CINCPAC received a message from CINCPACFLT regarding the instruction recommending, among other things, clarification of command and control; reporting requirements; and of the duties, organization, chain of

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1. CINCPAC 280213Z Jan 76; JCS 3505/172018Z Sep 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 205-207, 268; J3182 HistSums Nov-Dec 75; J3182 HistSum Jan 76; CINCPAC 150237Z Nov 75 and 290116Z Nov 75; SECSTATE 274520/200016Z Nov 75; SECDEF 5871/291728Z Dec 75.

command, and responsibilities of the Disaster Area Survey Team (DAST) and the officer in charge. CINCPAC concurred in recommended clarification of command and control arrangements and forwarded revised arrangements, requesting supporting plans. CINCPACFLT, from which an officer was selected as the team commander, forwarded specific skill requirements of DAST members and defined individual responsibilities. The team was to proceed, upon the request of the U.S. Ambassador concerned, to the scene of a disaster, to survey the situation, to determine requirements for U.S. military assistance, and provide initial coordination of U.S. relief efforts.[1]

Guam

(U) From 14 May, when the first warning of Tropical Depression 06 was issued, until 22 May when the winds abated, Guam was was struck by what became known as "Super" Typhoon PAMELA, a major disaster. As CINCPAC's Representative on Guam stated in his after-action report, "From the time of Magellan to the twentieth century, every military man who has realized the strategic importance of the Island of Guam has had to be prepared to face the forces of nature--most damaging of which has been the typhoon." He believed that Guam should be reconstructed to become as "typhoon proof" as possible. He realized that justifying the cost of such construction to those who had never suffered the situation was a continuing problem, but he noted that during PAMELA it became clear that the utilities, particularly power and communications, including telephones, required intensive analysis and subsequent redesign if Guam was to function properly during natural disasters such as typhoons. The comprehensive report from the CINCPACREP on the military activity associated with the disaster PAMELA is available in CINCPAC archives. It should be noted that PAMELA occurred at exactly the same time of year that in 1975 had seen Guam reach its peak of refugee population from Southeast Asia. At that time the refugee population had reached a total of 50,430, with most living in tents. The CINCPACREP had frequently repeated his fears regarding this situation in 1975 because of the typhoon potential. The loss of life if PAMELA had struck during Operation NEW LIFE could have been devastating.[2]

~~(C)~~ On 1 June CINCPAC provided his final PAMELA disaster relief situation report. He said that progress in overall recovery had been most impressive. Except for some distribution problems that were being worked on, power and water supplies had been restored. Commercial and military ports were in operation and both airfields were receiving normal traffic. The civilian air

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1. J3182 HistSum Jan 76; CINCPACFLT 020447Z Mar 76, 260547Z Mar 76, and 250257Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 122105Z Mar 76.
2. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI Ser 487 of 3 Mar 76, Operation NEW LIFE After Action Report and Ser 1657 of 10 Aug 76, Typhoon PAMELA After Action Report.

terminal was also back in operation and the flow of tourists had been resumed. Only minor backlogs or airlift disaster relief supplies remained in the system. Commissary and exchange facilities were back in operation and inbound military families were being received. All major military communications facilities had been restored.[1]

(U) Another collection of lessons learned was prepared by CINCPAC's Operations Directorate with inputs from the Military Airlift Command, Fleet Weather Central on Guam, CINCSAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT. These were consolidated on 26 October and disseminated to all interested agencies. The compilation included after-action reports and lessons learned on the CINCPAC staff by the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) and the Disaster Relief Coordinating Center. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.[2]

(U) The LRC of the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate noted that the center had been manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week beginning 220200Z May and terminating 250200Z May. The primary functions performed were coordinating airlift requirements and coordinating Andersen Air Force Base requirements between the Strategic Air Command and CINCPACAF. Navy requirements processed by the LRC had been minimal. The LRC was manned by one action officer assisted by a clerk, with augmentation from concerned divisions of the Logistics Directorate when required; this proved adequate.

(U) There was confusion regarding use of standard supply systems. Both CINCPACFLT and the CINCPACREP Guam after-action reports had emphasized the use of normal supply channels. In future actions of this sort, however, it was to be clearly pointed out that the intended role of the CINCPAC LRC was to assist and coordinate in locating and obtaining those items available within PACOM resources that were not carried or immediately available in the supply system.[3]

(U) CINCPACAF had established a Disaster Airlift Center on 22 May. This center had acted as the central point of contact for all Guam airlift support, receiving all requirements and airlift flow data. This expanded the normal mission of the Pacific Airlift Management Office by coordinating all Special Assignment Airlift Missions and tracking all shipments destined for Guam. Flight information was furnished to the CINCPAC LRC on a routine basis. When requirements exceeded capability, the LRC determined relative priorities.

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1. CINCPAC 012328Z Jun 76.
2. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2321, 26 Oct 76, Subj: Lessons Learned from Super Typhoon PAMELA.
3. See also the Transportation Section of the Logistics Chapter of this history.

The Disaster Airlift Center proved to be a very effective management tool; no significant problems were encountered in airlift support.

(U) The Disaster Relief Coordinating Center (DRCC) began round-the-clock operations at 202000W May. Contact was established with CINCPAC staff elements, the CINCPACREP in Guam, the component commands, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. PACOM assets and resources that could be made available were identified.

(U) The DRCC was organized on an ad hoc basis to facilitate communications with the various agencies and commands involved. The Special Operations Division of the Plans Directorate provided personnel cognizant of appropriate Defense Department and CINCPAC Instructions, federal and military points of contact, and functioned as the focal point for coordinating assistance. That Division provided the nucleus for the DRCC during PAMELA, supported by the Command Center Watch Team, representatives from the Communications-Data Processing Directorate, and administrative personnel from other staff elements in the Operations Directorate.

(U) The CINCPAC role was primarily limited to coordinating movement of critically needed supplies, equipment, and technicians to the disaster area. The majority of disaster relief actions were logistically oriented.

(U) The following lessons were learned:

- The Special Operations Division was not adequately staffed to undertake 24-hour-a-day disaster relief operations without unacceptable degradation of other functions.

- That division had insufficient administrative and clerical personnel to support sustained operations.

- Disaster relief operations required access to multiple communications means, with a high order of responsiveness and reliability. Common-user communication means and normal message distribution procedures were inadequate to deal with urgent, time-sensitive requirements.

(U) The DRCC report concluded that to function in future operations it would be desirable to combine the background and expertise of the Special Operations Division in such matters as disaster relief organizations and responsibilities, contact points, etc., with the Command Center Watch Team, in addition to normal operations, providing communications and clerical,

administrative, and other assistance to the Special Operations Division, as required, with Special Operations being responsible for initiating action on relief operations matters.[1]

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) informed CINCPAC that the President had declared the Palau District a major disaster area on 22 April in the wake of Typhoon MARIE. Based on a subsequent FDAA request, CINCPAC directed his Representative in Guam and the Trust Territory to provide a damage assessment survey team to inspect and report on damage and to estimate the cost of repairs. Subsequent assistance was provided to Truk in the wake of Typhoon PAMELA in May, when the High Commissioner of the TTPI had requested airlift support for relief personnel and supplies and an aerial survey team.[2]

Philippines

(U) The CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines reported on 21 May that no damage had occurred to U.S. military facilities from Tropical Storm OLGA and that no request from the Philippine Government for military disaster assistance was anticipated. Heavy rain, however, had caused flooding in the Manila area and central Luzon Valley. On 24 May the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines reported the possibility that the Philippines would request disaster relief assistance with emphasis on small amphibious craft and helicopter delivery of food. The Philippine Government requested trucks and helicopters in the Pampanga and Agno River basins on 26 May. The U.S. Ambassador exercised disaster relief authority to obligate up to $25,000 and requested authority for supportive funding up to $100,000. This was subsequently raised to nearly half a million dollars.

(U) Flooding was reported as great as that of the 1972 disaster. The JCS tasked CINCPAC to coordinate U.S. military relief efforts and provide funding authorities, a tasking delegated to the CINCPACREP Philippines to be accomplished

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1. Ibid.
2. J3162 HistSum Apr 76; J363 HistSum May 76; FDAA 232230Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 282126Z Apr 76 and 192152Z May 76. In addition to CINCPAC, the FDAA notification message was addressed to the Food and Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture; the American National Red Cross; the Manpower Division of the Department of Labor; the Small Business Administration; the Internal Revenue Service; the Staff Director for Intergovernmental Cooperation of the U.S. Forest Service; the Department of Housing and Urban Development; and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior.

as requested by the Ambassador. On 28 May the Ambassador reported 160 storm deaths with the toll likely to increase as beleaguered areas were reached. That same day 12 helicopters and one C-130 assisted in relief operations. By the 29th they had been joined by 14 more helicopters and numerous fixed wing aircraft, with relief and rescue operations concentrated in the Dalton Pass area of Central Luzon. The final estimate of direct costs for the support consisted of $5,000 for "nutribuns" and $123,666 for air operations.[1]

(C) In August, however, following an earthquake in the Philippines, President Marcos expressed gratitude for offers of aid, including American, but said that the Philippines didn't need any outside help, saying, "We think we can handle the situation under our policy of self-reliance." It is believed that a memorandum from the Agency for International Development contained some unknown "political analysis" that was subsequently repudiated by the State Department. While the Ambassador did not believe that this memo precipitated Philippine refusal of U.S. and foreign aid offers, it presumably increased the President's already announced determination to hew to a policy of self-reliance. President Marcos had earlier praised the Chinese pattern of "dignified" response to offers of assistance.[2]

Kahoolawe

(U) Kahoolawe was a small, uninhabited island off the coast of Maui in the Hawaiian Islands. It had been used as a target area for many years and was covered with live, unexploded ordnance. Certain Hawaiian groups began calling for a halt to the bombing and individuals began visiting the island, illegally. As CINCPAC explained to a House of Representatives member from Hawaii on 24 January 1976, it was "a very dangerous place to visit." He noted his deep concern about the safety of trespassers. The Navy (the Commandant, 14th Naval District was the point of contact for these matters) had been making every effort to respond to numerous requests from Hawaiian groups to visit the island. Unauthorized intruders continued their activities throughout the year; there were a number of arrests. The news media gave the matter extensive coverage.[3]

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1. J361 HistSum May 76; CINCPACREPPHIL 211155Z May 76, 250212Z May 76, and 311556Z May 76; JCS 7051/262203Z May 76 and 8216/272240Z May 76; CINCPAC 270150Z May 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 12780/230959Z Aug 76.
3. CINCPAC 240118Z Jan 76; COMFOURTEEN 220227Z Sep 76, 161831Z Oct 76, and 211823Z Dec 76.

Coast Guard Search and Rescue Responsibility--Guam

(C) As explained in the 1974 history, the drawdown of forces impacted on the search and rescue capability in the PACOM. In June 1972 the U.S. Coast Guard had removed their aircraft from the Guam area as a result of an agreement with the Commander, Naval Forces Marianas, in which civil SAR was transferred to that commander. In 1973 the Navy HU-16s had been restricted from water landings, and Air Force SAR capability was being phased down drastically. CINCPAC recommended that the Coast Guard resume responsibility and the JCS agreed. CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to insure the transfer on an orderly, time-phased basis.[1]

(U) Agreement was reached between CINCPACFLT and the Commander of the 14th Coast Guard District in 1975, and SAR coordination responsibility for the Guam sector was assumed on 31 December 1976 by the Coast Guard. The Commander, Coast Guard Section Marianas was designated the Guam SAR coordinator. Assumption of SAR coordination responsibility did not include changes in SAR resources; operational SAR activities would continue to be performed by opportune resources.[2]

(U) See also Chapter I, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for a discussion of PACOM SAR assets.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 261-262.
2. J311 HistSum Dec 76; Guam SARCOORD 311220Z Dec 76; CCDGFOURTEEN 120014Z Dec 76.

CHAPTER V

LOGISTICS

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY

Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS)

Interim Software Program

(C) During 1976 JOPS interim software became a permanent part of the JOPS under the title "JOPS Volume III Software." A major subsystem of JOPS, the Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE), had failed to produce required transportation summary data required for CINCPAC Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5027N analysis and evaluation. As an interim measure the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed that the Gross Feasibility Estimator (GFE III) be used for transportation feasibility analysis until the TFE was updated.[1]

OPLAN Transportation Feasibility Analysis

(C) Because of problems with TFE, transportation planners from JCS and the unified commands met at headquarters European Command (EUCOM) during the period 29 September to 14 October 1976 to evaluate the TFE/GFE capabilities and limitations in processing real world OPLANs. OPLAN 5027N (CINCPAC) and 4102 (EUCOM) were used for the test. Both OPLANs were run successfully using GFE III and TFE. However, TFE revealed several deficiencies which had to be corrected before it could be a viable transportation planning tool. In spite of the deficiencies, the TFE was selected as the desired simulator because of its compatibility with the rest of the JOPS III subsystems. The planners agreed to continue to use the GFE III pending modification and update of the modules and supporting files of TFE, after which transition would be made to the TFE.[2]

Catalog of PACOM Logistic Rationalization Initiatives

(U) Beginning 30 August 1976 the CINCPAC Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate chaired a working group, including component representatives, to prepare a draft Catalog of PACOM Logistic Rationalization Initiatives. Essentially, the terminology, "Rationalization Initiatives," could be translated to read, "Courses of action to increase logistic efficiency." The

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 303; J416 HistSum Jun 76.
2. J432 HistSum Nov 76.

concept for this catalog was derived from an already published EUCOM catalog. The courses of action listed in the catalog were directed at minimizing duplication of national logistic systems, improving capabilities for mutual support, integration of transportation requirements and systems, and any other steps that might be taken to enhance PACOM logistic cooperation. CINCPAC realized that, among the courses of action listed, there were some which would ultimately depend on higher authority to implement; therefore, the catalog was forwarded to subordinates in draft in October 1976 not as a directive but as "...a method of providing an expression for creativity in logistics management." Courses of action or "initiatives" were listed under seven major categories:[1]

- Logistics Management
- Logistics Support Services
- Logistics Movement
- Logistics Facilities and Installations
- Logistics in Exercises
- POL and Fuels
- Ammunition

(U) Review of the draft catalog was completed by 31 December 1976 by PACOM subordinate organizations and the final product was expected to be completed by late January 1977.[2]

Materiel Requirements in the PACOM Area--Phase II

(S) During 1974 CINCPAC had participated in Phase I of a study which addressed PACOM theater materiel storage requirements and assets. In April 1976 the JCS requested CINCPAC comments on participation in Phase II of the study, which was to establish construction requirements through 1982. CINCPAC recommended that it act as the JCS agent for the PACOM with the MILDEPS providing the input data. By the end of 1976 the JCS action officer had reported informally that the Services would be tasked to define deficiencies, which the JCS would consolidate and send to CINCPAC to review. CINCPAC would validate the requirements and do a PACOM-wide analysis of deficiencies versus excesses. The JCS also recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the study be deferred until 1 July 1977, or six months after the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) for OPLAN 5027N became available. This was to insure that facility programs resulting from the study were consistent with current planning guidance.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Ltrs Ser S457 and S458 of 4 Oct 76, Subj: Catalog of PACOM Logistics Rationalization Initiatives (CPLRI); J4 Draft Catalog of PACOM Logistics Rationalization Initiatives (CPLRI), undated; J4 WEB 21-27 Aug 76.
2. J412 HistSum Jan 77.
3. JCS 8812/272145Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 152001Z May 76; J442 HistSum Jun 76; J443 HistSum Dec 76.

Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) Program

(U) Throughout 1976 PACOM DRIS program efforts continued to be directed at improving interservice support and consolidation of duplicative support functions. The task organization for the DRIS program in PACOM consisted of a Joint Interservice Support Board (JISB), with membership from the components and the CINCPAC Support Group (CSG), chaired by a representative from the CINCPAC Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate. There were Sub-Zone Groups (SZGs) in Japan, Korea, Hawaii, Taiwan, Guam, and the Philippines.[1]

(U) During the period FY 75-FY 76 the DRIS program scope of activity included reviewing 130 areas for the feasibility of establishing interservice support. Fifty-five were either partially or fully implemented for an estimated savings of $5.5 million, including a reduction of 359 manpower spaces.[2]

(U) As of May 1976 there were 50 studies in progress, of which six were considered to offer great potential savings if implemented:[3]

Study	Potential Savings
Calibration Consolidation, Oahu	$ 800,000
Calibration Consolidation, Okinawa	400,000
Calibration Consolidation, Honshu	709,600
Consolidation Ammo Storage and Renovation Facilities, Okinawa	1,000,000
Hawaiian Armed Forces Police	50,000
Real Property Maintenance, Oahu	1,200,000
	$4,159,600

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1. J4212 HistSum Dec 76.
2. J4213 Talking Paper on Interservice Support, 14 May 76.
3. Ibid.; J4213 Outline for CINCPAC Talk to SECDEF Rumsfeld, "Interservice Support (ISS)," undated.

PACOM Interservice Support Agreement Picture
(as of 1 October 1976)

	Location	Number of ISA	Amount $ million	Percent Providing					Percent Receiving				
				USAF	USA	USN	USMC	Other	USAF	USA	USN	USMC	Other
SUB ZONE GROUPS	Guam	22	.44	.1		99.9			71.7	13.9			14.4
	Hawaii	203	6.85	14	23.7	62.3			37.9	24.2	18.8	1.8	17.3
	Japan	315	20.8	13.9	57.1	14.4	14.	.6	40	16	18	11	14
	Korea	192	8.6	18	81.6	.4			45.6	15.8	15.6	.2	22.8
	Philippines	57	2.28	39.2	.4	1.38			46.1		13.8		40.1
	Taiwan	42	2.15	1.7		98.3			26.7	45.6	1.3	23.9	2.5
	Other	41	1.78										
	PACOM Total	872	42.9	7.6	48.2	28.8		8.7					

Source: Adapted from data in J4212 HistSum Dec 76

(U) On 13 August 1976 the DOD Joint Logistics Council confirmed the decision to consolidate calibration activities in Hawaii under the Navy Sea Systems Command as the lead agency. The anticipated five-year savings was $800,000. In September 1976 the Japan SZG completed a study to consolidate calibration activities on Honshu, Japan. The estimated one-time savings were $608,036 with an annual recurring savings of $101,590. At year's end this study was awaiting approval by the Joint Technical Coordination Group for Metrology and Calibration, Washington, D.C. Also in September the Hawaii SZG recommended a reduction in the mission and organization of the Hawaiian Armed Forces Police and assignment to the CSG for operational control. The savings estimated from this action were $240,000. CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and Commander Marine Corps Bases Pacific concurred with the recommendation; the Coast Guard withdrew from participation; and CSG nonconcurred. Efforts were continuing at year's end to resolve CSG's nonconcurrence.[1]

(U) As of 1 October 1976 the PACOM Interservice Support Agreement status was as depicted on the facing chart, based upon the CINCPAC data base; however, through year's end a problem persisted in reconciling PACOM and Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC) data. Part of the difference lay in CINCPAC's maintaining ISA data, not likewise maintained by DLSC, on non-appropriated fund activities, and non-federally funded activities such as Bank of America and the American Red Cross. Also, the DLSC data base did not contain the data element needed to produce reports stratifying the PACOM DRIS program. The JCS had specifically requested not to be identified as a "major command" or Executive Coordinating Agency (ECA), thus effectively eliminating the unified command structure from any means of identification. Efforts were begun at year's end to correct this deficiency.[2]

(U) Impacting significantly upon the DRIS program in PACOM, particularly on the Army role in Japan/Okinawa, were a series of Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Budget Decisions (PBDs), beginning with PBD 280, "Pacific Manpower," issued in December 1974, which projected 90 percent military and 60 percent civilian Army strength reductions during FY 76-77. On 2 December 1975 PBD 253 was issued and later revised (PBD 253R) on 13 March 1976, resulting in the realignment of force structures in Japan/Okinawa, and changes in interservice support as follows:[3]

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1. J4 WEB 14-20 Aug 76, 4-10 Sep 76, and 18-24 Sep 76.
2. J42/Memo/58-77, 23 Mar 77, Subj: Interservice Support Agreement (ISA) Reconciliation with Defense Logistics Service Center (DLSC), 7-12 Mar 77.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 307-308; J421 Point Paper, 27 Apr 76, Subj: WESTPAC II/PBD 253 and 253R Up-Date; J4213 Outline for CINCPAC Talk to SECDEF Rumsfeld, "Interservice Support (ISS)," undated.

Service	Providing Service Pre-253R	Post-253R
Army	85%	38%
Navy/Marine Corps	9%	35%
Air Force	6%	19%
DSA	Negligible	8%

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)

(U) In April 1976 CINCPAC assumed the responsibility for conducting the annual PASOLS from the Commander CSG. Five previous PASOLS were Army-oriented while the sixth, hosted by CINCPAC 19-22 October 1976 at the Hale Koa Hotel in Honolulu, was expanded to a tri-Service seminar with the theme "Integrated Logistics Management." Presentations were made by the seven countries represented (Philippines, China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand); Mr. Shrontz, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics (ASD(I&L)); RADM Johnson, J4, JCS; BGEN Edwards, Air Force Logistics Command; and RADM Dowd, Commander Naval Supply Systems Command.[1]

Thailand Withdrawal

(U) The withdrawal of all U.S. Forces except the Defense Attaché Office, Marine Security Guards, and a maximum of 270 JUSMAGTHAI personnel was completed on 20 July 1976. A total of 198,000 short tons (ST) of equipment and supplies were removed from Thailand to fill existing U.S. DOD requirements. Nearly 100,000 ST of this total was moved after the 20 March 1976 Thai decision on U.S. residual force strength. Included in the retrograde were 329 Relocatable Structures (RS)/Pre-Engineered Buildings (PEB) and 100,000 ST of ammunition. Not included was the organizational/mobility equipment withdrawn with Air Force flying units as they moved out during the phasedown.[2]

Philippines Base Negotiations

(U) The logistics implications of Philippines base negotiations were reviewed on a daily basis during 1976 by a Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate (J4) representative to a staff ad hoc committee chaired by a Plans Directorate (J5) action officer. By year's end the J4 had weighed-in on the following topics:[3]

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1. J451 HistSum May 76; J452 HistSum Oct 76.
2. J4233 HistSum Aug 76.
3. J443 HistSum Aug 76.

- Local Procurement
- Use of U.S. Contractors
- Environment
- Title to Non-removable Property
- Construction and Alteration of Facilities
- Use of Land, Water, and Air Space
- Watershed
- Disposal of Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

(~~U~~) At the end of 1976, 25 issues remained unresolved in the base negotiations, of which President Marcos considered seven to be essential to Philippine sovereignty. No further progress was made in 1976 pending settling in of the new U.S. Administration.[1]

[redacted]

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1. J443 HistSum Dec 76.
2. J419 HistSum Dec 76.

PACOM Logistic Readiness

(TS) The Semiannual Readiness SITREP submitted for the period 1 April-30 September 1976 revealed the following PACOM logistic readiness assessment of component capability to support CINCPAC Operation Plans (OPLANs) 5001, 5025, 5027, and 5125.[1]

- CINCPACAF was capable of logistically supporting OPLANs.

- CINCPACFLT overall readiness was adequate to support OPLANs 5025, 5027, and 5125 individually but not simultaneously. Significant factors that degraded CINCPACFLT's ability to support OPLAN 5001 included the inability to simultaneously support Naval combat operations and provide protection for PACOM sea lines of communication plus a lack of amphibious lift and mine warfare capability.

- Army forces were capable of performing wartime mission requirements, but there was concern as to limitations in combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) capabilities and a shortfall in pre-positioned war reserve stocks (PWRS) and war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA) in Korea.

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1. CINCPAC 182108Z Oct 76.

SECTION II--PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS

PACOM Petroleum Organization

(U) In June 1976 CINCPAC proposed to the JCS the merging of the PACOM Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) and the Defense Fuel Region, Pacific (DFR-PAC) into a single JPO-centered agency. CINCPAC based the proposal on the belief that the merger would eliminate duplication of effort, and effect personnel savings and economy of operations. It was discussed at a JCS/DFSC Worldwide Petroleum Conference held at Washington, D.C., 8-11 June 1976, and was actively supported by Headquarters EUCOM. The initial DSA reaction appeared to be one of tentative agreement, but with the survivor organization being DFSC-centered. The JCS found the functions performed by the JPO and DFR-PAC to be distinct, although obscured by the assignment of the JPO as agent for DSA; therefore, while the JCS considered merger of the two organizations to be inappropriate, they initiated action to delete the role of the JPO as agent for DSA and to define more precisely JPO and DSA functions. The JCS further defined the distinct general functions of the two organizations:[1]

> JPOs: Staff offices of the Unified Commands to discharge staff petroleum logistics responsibilities.
>
> DFRs: Perform DSA contract administrative functions related to integrated materiel management (IMM) of bulk petroleum, and procurement of petroleum products from foreign oil companies.

Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System (OPDS)

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC 020401Z Jun 76; CINCEUR 12613/191623Z Jul 76; JCS 9160/211329Z Jul 76 and 6456/062140Z Dec 76; J422 HistSum Aug 76.

[redacted]

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1. J422 HistSums Feb-Apr, Jun, Aug 76; J422(A) HistSum May 76.
2. J422 HistSum Dec 76.
3. J422 HistSum Sep 76; AMEMB Tokyo 17969/070725Z Dec 76.

[redacted]

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1. J422 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 300503Z Oct 76.

PACOM POL CONSUMPTION
(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)



[redacted]

SECTION III--MUNITIONS

PACOM Munitions Summary

(S) The following is a comparison in short tons of the PACOM munitions inventory status at the beginning and end of 1976:[1]

	As of 31 Dec 75		As of 30 Sep 76	
	Requirements	On Hand	Requirements	On Hand
Army	517,606	357,720	491,926	355,790
Air Force	156,912	115,523	112,269	100,708
Navy/Marine				
Surface	91,624	98,725	91,205	107,607
Air	79,799	83,446	84,423	79,918
Total	845,941	655,414	779,823	644,023

U. S. Ammunition (Left) in Thailand (AIT)

(S) In early June 1976 the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the JCS agreed on retention of AIT stocks at Korat if:[2]

- Congress amended Section 514, FAA [Foreign Assistance Act] and the President signed the legislation.

- Thailand indicated a desire to purchase these stocks over a three-year period.

- Thailand would agree to allow stocks to be retrograded if appropriate FMS sales arrangements were not negotiated.

(S) By October 1976 AIT stocks at Korat had been reduced to 14,476 ST valued at approximately $39 million. In December the American Embassy, Bangkok advised that the RTG had approved the proposal to purchase AIT under the terms of a draft Memorandum of Acceptance. Two letters of offer (one for U.S. Army and one for U.S. Air Force Stocks) were to be signed not later than 15 April 1977, with initial payment at that time of a minimum of $9.5 million. Three additional payments would be due on 31 October of 1977, 1978, and 1979,

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1. J423 HistSums Jan and Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 320, 323-324.

and payments were authorized by cash or FMS credit with a nine-year repayment schedule, if available. CINCPAC emphasized that responsibility for management of the AIT program, to include security, remained with CHJUSMAGTHAI.[1]

War Reserve Munitions (WRM) at U-Tapao

(S) The CINCPAC Thailand withdrawal plan had originally recognized the need to store about 41,000 ST of WRM at U-Tapao to support U.S. security policy in PACOM. As of April 1976 there were 35,000 ST stored at U-Tapao, but they ultimately became part of 100,000 ST of ammunition retrograded within PACOM and to CONUS in the withdrawal from Thailand.[2]

War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA), Korea

[redacted]

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1. J423 Point Paper, 14 Oct 76, Subj: Disposition of Ammunition Stored at Korat Thailand; AMEMB Bangkok 34188/210530Z Dec 76; CINCPAC 021909Z Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 324-325; J423 Point Paper, 1 Apr 76, Subj: Disposition of U.S. Ammunition Stored in Thailand; J4233 HistSum Aug 76.
3. J423 Point Paper, 18 Feb 76, Subj: Ammo Storage, Korea.
4. J452 HistSum Jun 76; J423 Point Paper, 30 Sep 76, Subj: Shipments of Ammunition to Korea.

[redacted]

Logistic Planning for Defense of Korea

(S) On 10 December 1976 representatives from CINCPAC and COMUS Korea met to clarify planning issues for the defense of Korea. Of primary concern was the shortfall in ground ammunition for the forward defense concept (FDC) for the first 30 days. Clarification of the following related issues was pending at year's end:[2]

- Specific tonnages of munitions required.
- Location, quantity and applicability of PACOM US/ROK Army ammunition stocks.
- Projection of loss rates to enemy action.
- Anticipated effect of $125 million authorization to build additional war reserve stocks for PACOM allies.
- Ammunition resupply times.

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1. J423 Point Paper, 30 Sep 76, Subj: Shipments of Ammunition to Korea.
2. CINCPAC 240345Z Dec 76; J418 HistSum Dec 76.

SECTION IV--TRANSPORTATION

Status of Sealift in PACOM

(U) The Military Sealift Command (MSC) had been totally responsive to PACOM operational requirements to include previous Southeast Asia supply and evacuation operations, and current retrograde of material from Thailand; however, it was clear that, for large scale future contingencies, increased reliance would have to be placed on charter and, if necessary, requisition of additional ocean shipping. Currently, one-half of the worldwide MSC-controlled cargo fleet was operating in the Pacific area:[1]

	MSC-controlled Cargo Fleet
Nucleus	3
Time Charter	13
Ready Reserve/Reduced Operating Status	2
Total	18

(U) In addition to the above assets, the following ocean shipping support was available during FY 76 by charter commitment between the MSC and commercial operations under the Sealift Readiness Program:[2]

Breakbulk Ships	57
Container Ships	53
LASH (Lighterage Aboard Ships)	5
Total	115

Status of PACOM Airlift Mobility Forces

(U) The geographically spread out forces and operations in the PACOM relied heavily upon strategic and tactical intra-and inter-theater airlift logistics support. Historically, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) had provided adequate airlift to satisfy all PACOM strategic airlift requirements to include such contingencies as Operation BABYLIFT (evacuation of orphans from Vietnam), Operation NEW LIFE (evacuation of personnel from Vietnam and Cambodia), and the SS MAYAGUEZ Incident during 1975. When required MAC had also augmented PACOM tactical intra-theater airlift forces (composed of two

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1. J431 Point Paper, 14 May 76, Subj: Sealift in PACOM.
2. Ibid.

C-130 squadrons), which were consolidated under the MAC Airlift Service Industrial Fund (ASIF) effective 1 October 1976.[1]

(U) Of particular concern to CINCPAC during 1976 was Congressional termination of the heavy lift helicopter (HLH) (Boeing VERTOL XCH-62) development program in October 1975, with the prototype 90 percent complete. This concern was based on the increased use of containers to ship DOD cargo (60-70 percent) and related off-load problem from non-self-sustaining vessels. The current capability to transport heavy pieces of combat and engineering equipment, tactical operations centers, and communications modules over remote, inaccessible terrain to forward areas was seriously limited. The following comparison of container lift capabilities was based on current assets and projected HLH assets:[2]

Aircraft	Lift Capability (in short tons)
CH-53	8
CH-54	12
CH-53E	16
HLH	22.5

MAC Service to Thailand

(U) MAC service to Thailand was terminated on 20 July 1976. After this time, air transport of MAAG, MAP-Grant Aid, and Embassy Cargo was by U.S. flag air carriers direct from CONUS.[3]

Air Transportability of Helicopters

(U) Experience gained in Southeast Asia contingencies during 1975 such as the evacuation of U.S. personnel from Phnom Penh, Cambodia and recovery of the SS MAYAGUEZ emphasized the need for rapid helicopter deployment. CINCPAC had recommended considering air transportability in future helicopter designs and development of modifications to current aircraft to reduce disassembly/reassembly and loading/unloading times. Coordination with Service helicopter project officers indicated that there were no current modifications underway to improve air transportability of CH-46, CH-47, or CH-53 aircraft. Some operational modifications did exist, however, to include an on-going CH-47

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1. J434 Point Paper, 14 May 76, Subj: PACOM Airlift Mobility Forces; J4313 Point Paper, 12 Jan 76, Subj: Heavy Lift Helicopter (HLH) (Boeing VERTOL XCH-62).
2. Ibid.
3. J4 WEB 7-13 Aug 76.

modification from hydraulic to wire controls which would improve knock-down/ reassembly times. Of helicopters commonly used, only the UH-1 would fit in a C-5A without time consuming disassembly of rotor blades and hub assemblies. Estimates of the time required to load a C-5A with other helicopters and prepare them for flight at destination ranged from 92 hours for CH/HH-3 to 178 hours for CH-46 and CH/HH-53.[1]

(U) Based on a study conducted by Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC), the Marines felt that evacuation opeations could best be accomplished by the UH-1N helicopter. Seven assembled UH-1Ns with 13-passenger capacity and a 200 nautical mile range (doubled with two 150-gallon bladder tanks) could be transported by a C-5A.[2]

Diego Garcia Support via Singapore

(S) After the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Thailand in July 1976, twice weekly MAC flights through U-Tapao between Clark Air Base, Philippines and Diego Garcia could no longer be supported. Except as an interim measure, current direct flights between Clark and Diego Garcia were considered inadequate. The following requirements had to be considered in selecting a new route:[3]

- Timely transport of perishable subsistence.
- Maintenance of an adequate Environmental and Morale Leave (E&ML) program for personnel assigned to Diego Garcia.
- Procurement of repair parts and equipment from commercial sources.

(S) CINCPACFLT requested routing through Singapore as opposed to continued direct flights from Clark or through Australia, Jakarta, Cocos Isles, or Butterworth (Malaysia), all possibilities which the CINCPAC staff had considered. The Singapore route was considered least costly overall, while meeting all the above requirements.[4]

(S) On 11 August 1976 the JCS directed Clark to Diego Garcia MAC support flights to begin transiting Singapore two to three weeks after commencement of P-3 overflights, which were planned after completion of the Colombo

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1. J4313 Point Paper, 6 Feb 76, Subj: Air Transportability of Helicopters.
2. Ibid.
3. J435 HistSum Nov 76.
4. Ibid.; J434 Point Paper, 2 Apr 76, Subj: Diego Garcia Support.

Conference of Nonaligned Nations, 19 August 1976 (see also the Operations Chapter of this history). On 22 September 1976 the JCS provided the following guidance for initial flights:[1]

- Not more than two round trip missions via Singapore per month.

- Do not overfly Indonesia or Malaysia.

- After two months, review operations to consider increase in frequency and regular scheduling.

(S) With no significant problems arising during the initial two months of operation (October and November 1976), CINCPAC queried the American Embassy, Singapore and the JCS on the possibility of increasing flight frequency and authorizing leave in Singapore for Diego Garcia personnel. In response to CINCPAC's initiative, the JCS approved increasing the frequency to three round trips per month and beginning a conservative leave program effective 1 January 1977.[2]

Guam Disaster Relief - Typhoon PAMELA

(U) On 21 May 1976 Super Typhoon PAMELA with winds in excess of 125 knots struck Guam, causing extensive damage there and on other islands of the Marianas chain. Thousands of homes were badly damaged, hundreds destroyed; defoliation was estimated at at least 90 percent, crops were estimated a total loss, and the animal population was decimated, resulting in the President declaring Guam a major disaster area.[3]

(U) In response to this situation, the CINCPAC Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) was activated at 220200Z May 1976 to provide centralized management and control over the employment of logistic and airlift resources in support of Guam disaster relief.[4]

(U) A disaster relief airlift operated from 22 May to 1 June 1976 as follows at an approximate cost of $2.7 million:[5]

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1. JCS 3196/111426Z Aug 76.
2. CINCPAC 240146Z Nov 76; JCS 9572/202243Z Dec 76.
3. J434 HistSum May 76; CINCPACREP Guam 230830Z May 76.
4. J434 HistSum May 76.
5. Ibid.

Aircraft	Missions	Tons Cargo	Passengers
C-141	52	1,111	51
C-5	24	1,179	60
C-130	3	87	13
Commercial Contract	2	66	41
Total	81	2,443	165

(U) The principal commodities airlifted to Guam included construction materials, bedding, subsistence items, vehicles, repair parts/supplies, charcoal, lighter fluid, Coleman stoves, refrigerators, and communications equipment.[1]

(C) In addition to airlift support, there were eight ships en route to Guam with estimated times of arrival between 222200Z May and 282200Z May 1976, all with water-making capability and ability to provide rations and medical supplies.[2]

Trial Movement of Household Goods

(U) Phase II (final phase) of the trial movement of household goods between the Continental United States and Okinawa by submission of one-time bids by household goods carriers was completed on 31 December 1975. The total cost avoidance during the period 1 January through 31 December 1975 was estimated at $1,455,267. DOD continued the competitive bid system in Okinawa while results of the trial were evaluated, and it was anticipated that a decision would be made to expand the system into other PACOM areas, and possibly to EUCOM.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 230158Z May 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 337; J4 HistSum Mar 76.

SECTION V--FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION

FY 77 MILCON Appropriations Bill

(U) The FY 77 MILCON appropriations bill contained two major projects of interest to CINCPAC:[1]

- Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) Project P-001 at $4.3 million.

- Enewetak Cleanup Project at $20 million.

(U) On 3 July the President vetoed the bill because of an amendment which would have required the DOD to inform Congress of any planned base closure one year in advance. By October 1976 the President had approved the bill without the above amendment.[2]

Facilities on Oahu

Military Real Property Requirements in Hawaii (MILPRO-HI)

(U) On 12 February 1976 the Secretary of Defense directed major revision of the Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii (FRESH) Study. The Navy was given the lead on this revision with the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command as the local agent. The objectives of this revision were:[3]

- Develop a mid-range land use plan for Defense requirements in Hawaii which will optimize combined Service utilization of real property in Hawaii.

- Develop a proposed narrative rationale for long-range holdings in Hawaii which ties specific requirements to specific land parcels. This rationale was to include land in both active and inactive use for requirements both classified and unclassified.

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1. J442 HistSum Jun 76.
2. J441 HistSum Oct 76; J442 HistSum Dec 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 339-341; OASD(I&H) Memo, 12 Feb 76, Subj: Military Property Requirements in Hawaii; CNO Ltr Ser 402E/707492 of 9 Apr 76, Subj: Military Property Requirements in Hawaii.

(U) At year's end CINCPAC was reviewing the findings for comments prior to forwarding to the JCS.[1]

Bikeway Systems on Military Installations

(U) By the end of 1976 the (Hawaii) State designed section of the Honolulu bikeway system between the Pearl Harbor Naval Base Halawa and Makalapa gates was completed. This project eliminated the after-duty-hours restriction to use of the bikeway through Navy property caused by the locked Halawa gate. The bikeway system project had received strong CINCPAC support from its inception as an example of civil-military cooperation in Hawaii.[2]

Facilities in Japan

Government of Japan (GOJ)-Funded Relocation and Consolidation Programs

(U) The concept of relocating and consolidating U.S. base facilities in Japan/Okinawa had its beginning in a joint statement by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. (Johnson-McCain Report) in September 1968. Subsequent Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meetings between the U.S. and Japanese Governments resulted in follow-on agreements, and by 1976 these GOJ-funded programs totaled between $600 million and one billion dollars. The level of construction involved during the last two years had been over $100 million per year. As of 1976 the major programs included:[3]

Okinawa

- Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP)
- Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan (OBCP)
- Consolidation and Reduction of Okinawa Facilities (CROF)

Honshu

- Kanto Plains Consolidation Plan (KPCP)
- Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Program (KFCP)
- Yokohama Housing Relocation
- Camp Fuchinobe

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1. J442 HistSum Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 341; J442 HistSums May and Dec 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. I. pp. 70-71; J441 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: GOJ Funded Relocation Programs; J443 Point Paper, 22 Jan 76, Subj: GOJ Funded Construction; J441 HistSum Oct 76.

Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP)

(C) The JFAP was a multi-Service plan to move all U.S. air units off Naha Air Base in return for GOJ projects at Kadena, Futenma, Iwakuni, and Misawa. There were 148 projects involved, 81 agreed on through Joint Committee action, and 69 had been completed. The cost of the program was estimated at $320.5 million. Naha airfield had been returned to the GOJ in June 1975, but as of 1976 the GOJ funding of projects at Misawa remained a major unresolved issue. The overall JFAP credit balance stood at $65 million, but COMUS Japan advised that remaining debitable projects consisted of a total estimated cost of $81.1 million or $16.1 million above the $65 million credit. Also, the GOJ desired an increase to the $9.4 million to be debited to the $65 million credit due to increased costs incurred in completing earlier Programs I and II of the JFAP (involving movement of Navy aircraft from Naha to Kadena vice Futenma per GOJ desires). On 12 March 1976 COMUS Japan advised that the U.S. Government was initially prepared to withdraw certain projects at Iwakuni and Misawa from the JFAP to reach a satisfactory solution with the GOJ, but not to modify the funding arrangements concerning Programs I and II of the JFAP.[1]

(C) On 30 March 1976 CINCPAC hosted a meeting of the components to develop recommendations for project deletions in the amount of $16.1 million. The result was a relative priority listing of remaining projects, deletions from which could come from the bottom of the list without the need to obtain Washington approval on a case-by-case basis. PACAF, COMMARCORBASEPAC, and USAFSS all agreed with the list; CINCPACFLT concurred with two minor exceptions; however, CDRUSARJ and CDRUSACSG disagreed and recommended a complete reordering of priorities. On 10 April 1976 CINCPAC forwarded the revised priority list to the Secretary of Defense, essentially as agreed upon at the 30 March meeting. The Secretary of Defense approved the list as submitted.[2]

(C) By 22 October 1976 the American Embassy, Tokyo reported that the GOJ agreed to the $9.4 million debit limit to completed Programs I and II, with the remaining credit of $55.6 million available for completed and future projects in Programs III, IV, VII, and VIII, based on actual construction costs and value of the dollar at the beginning of each Japan Fiscal Year (JFY).[3]

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1. J441 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: GOJ Funded Relocation Programs; SECSTATE 047978/1/271827Z Feb 76; COMUSJ 120600Z Mar 76 and 130125Z Mar 76.
2. CINCPAC 270434Z Mar 76, 010436Z Apr 76, and 102007Z Apr 76; CINCPACAF 022353Z Apr 76; COMMARCORBASEPAC 030434Z Apr 76; USAFSS 021500Z Apr 76; CINCPACFLT 060354Z Apr 76; CDRUSARJ 050741Z Apr 76; CDRUSACSG 060430Z Apr 76; SECDEF 8943/201542Z Apr 76.
3. J441 HistSum Oct 76; AMEMB Tokyo 15907/221040Z Oct 76; COMUSJ 240230Z Oct 76.

(C) As of 22 October 1976 the GOJ recognized 52 remaining JFAP projects, 35 of which they were ready to implement in accordance with U.S. Government priorities. However, the GOJ claimed that 17 of the projects could not be reconciled with the "Ohira Statement," which required that GOJ-funded JFAP construction be on a quid pro quo. This issue, as well as Japanese willingness to repair the Misawa runway, remained open at year's end.[1]

Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan (OBCP)

(U) The OBCP, introduced at the 15th SCC in January 1974, was designed to reduce the visibility of U.S. Forces on Okinawa. The program consisted of 48 facility actions, of which 22 required relocation construction. Twenty-two actions had been completed, and four were within the JFY 76 budget. The remaining 22 OBCP actions required Joint Committee negotiations. Major items of construction currently under consideration were petroleum storage and pipeline facilities. The cost of OBCP projects was estimated at about $100 million, excluding unknown costs for relocating Naha Port.[2]

Consolidation and Reduction of Okinawa Facilities (CROF)

(U) The CROF program was based on GOJ desire to develop another program for return of additional facilities on Okinawa, preferably not involving relocation construction. This approach surfaced under a former Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General, Yamanaka, and the first recommendations were received by the U.S. Government in November 1974. This program initially called for the return of 27 segments of various facilities throughout Okinawa, including the air-to-ground range at Ie Shima. The reasons for the program ranged from the need to return land to private or prefectural ownership to provision for public parks and game refuges. Initial Service reactions to the proposal indicated room for accommodation, but further negotiations were necessary and some relocation construction was required. A formal GOJ proposal was received which contained 14 specific facility actions on 12 facilities for an estimated cost of $30 million.[3]

Kanto Plains Consolidation Plan (KPCP)

(U) The KPCP was a program to consolidate major U.S. Air Force activities on Yokota Air Base. It was endorsed by the 14th SCC in January 1973, and comprised return to the GOJ of facilities covering 15 million square feet

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 15907/221040Z Oct 76; J441 Point Paper, 13 Sep 76, Subj: Misawa-JFAP Issues.
2. J441 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: GOJ Funded Relocation Programs.
3. Ibid.

of building space on 5,000 acres for 3.7 million square feet of new construction at Yokota Air Base. The initial increment of the plan (about $95 million) was 40 percent complete by 1976. Originally scheduled for completion in March 1976, the plan had been delayed by GOJ funding constraints. Current costs for the KPCP were estimated at $190 million.[1]

Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Program (KFCP)

(U) The KFCP centered around medical facilities located at Sagami-Ono and Yokosuka. The initial concept, presented to the GOJ in October 1973, provided for relocation of the U.S. Army Medical Center at Sagami-Ono to Camp Zama. On 15 December 1975 the Secretary of Defense directed COMUS Japan to initiate another feasibility study for replacement of the Naval Regional Medical Center at Yokosuka. On 6 January 1976 CINCPAC recommended that the Secretary of Defense send a professional team of medical planners to determine total requirements in the Tokyo area. The Secretary of Defense-recommended end-position for medical facilities in Japan included:[2]

- New Air Force hospital at Yokota (in process).
- Replace Naval hospital at Yokosuka.
- Continue operation of medical clinics at Misawa, Iwakuni, Atsugi, and Sasebo.
- Camp Zama required only medical clinic support within existing facility.
- Reduce staffing at Yokohama housing area when it is reduced to the planned 400 family dwellings.
- Pending more detailed study, tentatively plan to construct up to 30,000 square feet of laboratory space at Yokota Air Base to support area requirements.
- Do not release or demolish existing bed capacities at Yokosuka or Sagami-Ono unless the DOD contingency bed shortfall could be accommodated.

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1. Ibid.
2. J441 Point Paper, 16 Sep 76, Subj: Sagami-Ono and Yokosuka Consolidation Plan; SECDEF 5846/152115Z Dec 75, 1010/182241Z Feb 76; CINCPAC 060307Z Jan 76.

(C) On 2 April 1976 CINCPAC requested the Secretary of Defense to rescind the hold on disposition of the Sagami-Ono hospital and replacement of the Yokosuka hospital based on USARJ budget restraints which might dictate closure of the Sagami-Ono facility without a quid pro quo replacement. CINCPAC noted that the loss of bed capacity might add about 10 percent to the existing shortfall, but suggested that accommodation could be made by contingency commitment of additional resources to PACOM or by reduction of the theater evacuation policy to 30 days. On 16 April the Secretary of Defense replied that theater evacuation policy was firm as established by the JCS, but that CINCPAC could choose to commit additional resources if they were identified. The reply further authorized negotiations with the GOJ to release the Sagami-Ono and Yokosuka facilities on a quid pro quo basis.[1]

(C) On 9 August 1976 COMUS Japan reported that the GOJ expressed interest in the Sagami-Ono/Yokosuka proposal, but that action on these facilities would have to be combined to be consistent with the "Ohira View" on quid pro quo replacement. COMUS Japan noted that USARJ objected to the combined package. It would require the Army to continue funding the Sagami-Ono facility at an annual rate of over $4.0 million in operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures for the benefit of another Service for an undetermined period, pending the outcome of negotiations with the GOJ. COMUS Japan therefore requested that USARJ be given funding relief to continue services at the Sagami-Ono facility. CINCPAC, in turn, recommended that the Navy share the expense of temporarily continuing the operation. Through year's end the GOJ still appeared interested in the project, which was now being closely monitored by the JCS.[2]

Yokohama Housing Relocation

(U) The Yokohama housing relocation program surfaced at the 9th SCC in 1968 and was endorsed by the 14th SCC in 1973. It involved relocation of dependent housing and related support facilities from Yokohama to Yokosuka. Some housing was retained in Yokohama to support residual U.S. activities there, and a tentative agreement was reached to relocate 778 housing units. Construction had started on the first increment which included six high-rise apartment buildings with 288 units. As of 1976 negotiations were in progress on the total scope of the program, including support facilities. The estimated cost of the program was $100 million.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 022033Z Apr 76; SECDEF 6591/162038Z Apr 76.
2. COMUSJ 090459Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 170502Z Aug 76; JCS 1614/082248Z Dec 76 and 2763/222246Z Dec 76.
3. J441 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: GOJ Funded Relocation Programs.

Camp Fuchinobe

(U) The Camp Fuchinobe program, as endorsed by the 14th SCC, provided for relocation construction of family quarters, support facilities, and warehouses from Camp Fuchinobe to Camp Zama. Although construction on warehouse facilities was still in progress in 1976, the program was considered essentially complete. Camp Fuchinobe had been released to the GOJ in November 1974. The cost of the program was estimated to be $8 million.[1]

Honshu Housing

(U) A review, prompted by CINCPAC, of family housing data for U.S. facilities on Honshu during 1976 revealed the following deficiencies based on a Secretary of Defense-imposed 80 percent program limit:[2]

- Army (Camp Zama): Deficiency of one percent or six units.

- Marines (Iwakuni): Deficiency of 48 percent; however, COMMARCORPBASES Pacific considered off base housing adequate, thus reducing the deficiency to zero.

- Navy (Yokosuka, Yokohama, Nagai, Kamiseya): Deficiency of 16 percent or 500 units which would grow to 20 percent or 702 units upon completion of Yokosuka Housing Relocation Program (net loss of 202 units).

- Air Force (Misawa, Yokota/Tachikawa): December 1975 data on Misawa had showed a deficiency of 2.3 percent or 28 units (excess of 39 units if housing provided to key civilians only); however, as of August 1976 there was an overage of 131 units. The current (September 1976) Yokota/Tachikawa situation limited concurrent travel, but with completion of the GOJ funded KPCP the projection was for a 12 percent excess or 318 units based on the 80 percent program limit.

(U) While actions were underway to relieve the Air Force housing problem at Yokota/Tachikawa, there was no solution in sight to solve the Navy problem. In July 1976 CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC to review the possibility of obtaining Navy use of Army housing at Camp Zama for partial relief from

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1. Ibid.
2. J441 Point Paper, 10 Sep 76, Subj: Honshu Housing.

deficiencies in the Atsugi area; however, COMUS Japan reported that Camp Zama housing was not available for Navy personnel. CINCPAC recommended CINCPACFLT submit a proposed long-range solution through channels to the Secretary of Defense.[1]

Sanno Hotel Relocation

(U) On 30 October 1976 COMUS Japan requested CINCPAC's assistance to obtain information on U.S. Forces hotel arrangements in West Germany. The request was in preparation for negotiations with the GOJ on a replacement location for the U.S. Forces Sanno Hotel in the Tokyo metropolitan area. In response to CINCPAC's request, CINCEUR noted that the West German Government furnished five hotels, located in Berlin, Munich, and Nuremberg.[2]

(U) On 10 December 1976 COMUS Japan notified CINCPAC that the Navy had decided to withhold Navy appropriated fund support from the Sanno Hotel effective 30 September 1977. This action would close the Sanno, thus relieving the GOJ of any responsibility for a replacement facility. USARJ, executive agent for the Sanno Hotel, provided figures for the period FY 75-FY 7T which revealed that not only was Navy utilization greater than that of the other Services, but also that it was steadily increasing. Temporary additional duty (TAD) and permanent change of station (PCS) only amounted to about 15 percent of the total Navy utilization, illustrating the importance of the Sanno for morale purposes. USARJ provided the following percentages of utilization by Navy personnel: FY 75, 32.6%; FY 76, 41.7%; FY 7T, 54.0%.[3]

(U) On 23 November 1976, prior to the Navy announcement to withdraw support, a revised memorandum to the Facilities Subcommittee, concurred in by the components, had been submitted to the GOJ outlining minimum requirements for a Sanno-type facility in the metropolitan Tokyo area through 1981. At year's end further action was pending. It was recognized, however, that unilateral Service action to terminate support would undoubtedly negate GOJ efforts to provide a replacement. Loss of Navy support to the Sanno for FY 78 would amount to $281,297 or 44.3 percent of the total.[4]

Integrated Relocation Construction Program

(S) On 14 August 1976 COMUS Japan submitted an integrated relocation construction program intended to reflect overall U.S. requirements and

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1. CINCPACFLT 011921Z Jul 76; COMUSJ 150535Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 242156Z Jul 76.
2. COMUSJ 300144Z Oct 76.
3. CINCEUR 21474/061123Z Dec 76; COMUSJ 100834Z Dec 76 and 170800Z Dec 76.
4. COMUSJ 170800Z Dec 76; J441 HistSum Dec 76.

priorities, recognize GOJ interests, and represent an effort to influence the GOJ in the selection of projects to be programmed and funded in JFY 77. This approach was taken realizing that, in the past, allowing for some exceptions, construction had generally followed GOJ priorities. The funding level proposed for JFY 77 was $186 million. CINCPAC concurred, and the Secretary of Defense approved COMUS Japan's priorities as recommended for submission to the GOJ.[1]

Environmental Issues

(U) A major area of concern involving the presence of U.S. Forces and facilities in Japan was their environmental impact. The subject first surfaced in 1972 when the Japanese opposition party (Komeito) presented the GOJ with survey results alleging that U.S. facilities were polluting the environment. As a result of this allegation, the United States and Japanese Governments cooperated in conducting an environmental survey of U.S. facilities and an Ad Hoc Environmental Group was formed to review environmental matters. In November 1975 the GOJ briefed U.S. Government environmental representatives on the survey results and provided English translations of all Japanese national environmental laws. In January 1976 COMUS Japan promulgated the survey results to Service components with instructions to take necessary corrective action. Also during 1976, the GOJ indicated favorable consideration of a U.S.-initiated draft memorandum and terms of reference to establish a formal Environmental Subcommittee under the Joint Committee.[2]

(U) Most environmental problems proved to be relatively minor and did not cause public concern; however, one recurrent discrepancy was boiler emissions. By the latter part of 1976 some boiler conversion to cleaner fuels had been completed, while others were underway. Other current areas of concern were as follows:[3]

- Noise abatement problems, especially at Yokota and Kadena, which were anticipated to result in court actions related to night flight operations. Efforts were being taken to minimize night operations where possible.

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1. COMUSJ 140830Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 210620Z Aug 76; SECDEF 4891/312109Z Aug 76.
2. J442 Point Papers, 16 Sep 76, Subj: Cooperation with GOJ on Environmental Matters, and 15 Sep 76, Subj: Establishment of Environmental Subcommittee.
3. J442 Point Papers, 16 Sep 76, Subj: Cooperation with GOJ on Environmental Matters; 16 Sep 76, Subj: Noise Abatement Problems in Japan; 15 Sep 76, Subj: Tsurumi Tank Farm; 16 Sep 76, Subj: Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System (OPDS); and 15 Sep 76, Subj: Compliance with Japanese Automotive Emission Standards.

- Petroleum storage at Tsurumi Tank Farm, Yokohama, and OPDS pipeline operations on Okinawa (See also Section II).

- Compliance with Japanese automotive emission standards which applied to all privately owned vehicles (POVs) manufactured after 31 March 1976. CINCPAC recommended to the DOD that no U.S. Forces POVs be imported to Japan pending resolution of COMUS Japan efforts to certify POVs.

Facilities on Guam

Mid-Range Plans for Guam

(S) Throughout 1976 the Secretary of Defense reviewed the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command draft report on mid-range plans for Guam. The major thrust of the plan was consolidation of military activities into the northern and Apra Harbor areas of the island. The study showed a requirement to acquire 1,556 acres of land to meet safety criteria for air operations and ammunition storage. Identified for possible release, lease, or joint use were 5,995 acres in the mid-range and 5,000 acres in the long range. (Note that figures listed in CINCPAC Command History 1975 for mid and long-range release were incomplete.)[1]

Special Weapons Storage on Guam

(S) In January 1975 the Secretary of Defense requested the JCS to perform a site-by-site review of Special Weapons (SW) sites to identify those sites which could be consolidated or closed. The draft mid-range plan for Guam, completed in September 1975, concluded that SW sites at the Naval Magazine and Andersen Air Force Base could be expanded to accommodate the total DOD SW requirements on Guam. In December 1975 CINCPAC recommended as the best long-term solution consolidating all SW at Andersen AFB. In February 1976 CINCSAC noted that, while storage facilities at Andersen AFB were fully utilized, sufficient land was available for expansion. In June 1976 the JCS approved consolidation of Army SW at Andersen AFB, upgrading the physical security of the Naval Magazine and compression of the SW storage area.[2]

(S) Upon completion of the following security improvement projects in approximately mid-1978, the Naval Magazine Guam would attain waiver-free security status:[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 349-350; J442 Point Paper, 2 Nov 76, Subj: Mid-Range Plans for Guam.
2. J442 Point Paper, 3 Nov 76, Subj: Special Weapons Storage on Guam.
3. Ibid.

Project	Scope	Cost	Source
P-438	Security improvements	$ 1,094,000	Seabees
P-600	Harden power distribution system	649,000	FY 77 MILCON
P-607	Alarm Control Center alterations	219,000	FY 75 minor construction
P-611	Storage Magazine	11,934,000	FY 77 MILCON

(S) The Army project at Andersen AFB included construction of 8 Stradley-type earth covered magazines, a surveillance building, storage building, and related support facilities for an estimated cost of $3,511,000.[1]

Guam Typhoon Reconstruction

(U) As a result of the destruction left in the wake of Super Typhoon PAMELA in May 1976, the President signed a supplemental authorization act in October for military construction to restore typhoon damage on Guam. Funds appropriated included $97.909 million to meet Navy requirements and $44.08 million to meet Air Force requirements. Project design was in process during 1976 and contract awards were anticipated in the March to June 1977 time period.[2]

Facilities in Thailand

Thai-Am Udorn Facility Closed

(U) On 8 March 1976 the Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) advised that the last of 102 aircraft, a T-28D, was shipped from the Thai-Am Udorn aircraft maintenance facility on 5 March 1976. Inventory of facilities and remaining equipment was completed and signed for by Royal Thai Government (RTG) representatives on 27 February 1976. Originally planned for disestablishment on 31 October 1975, the facility remained active through February 1976 at a cost of approximately $100,000 per month pending allocation of Military Assistance Program (MAP) aircraft recovered from Laos and Cambodia.[3]

Materiel/Facilities Left in Thailand

(C) In April 1976 the CINCPAC staff estimated the total depreciated value of materiel and facilities being left to the Royal Thai Government in the wake

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1. Ibid.
2. J442 Point Paper, 2 Nov 76, Subj: Guam Typhoon Reconstruction.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 310-312; J4 WEB 6-12 Mar 76.

of U.S. Force withdrawals as $190.7 million. The current value of facilities (acquisition cost plus improvements less straight line depreciation based on estimated life) was $144.0 million. The majority of these facilities were semi-permanent, constructed between 1965-1970, with an expected life of 15 years. Material included Integrated Communications Systems (ICS) equipment valued at $11.3 million and Excess Defense Articles (EDA), major items valued at $18.5 million and secondary items valued at $16.9 million. The ICS equipment, most of which was installed in 1967 with a 12 year life expectancy, was depreciated on a straight line basis. Major EDA items were transferred based on 33 1/3 percent of acquisition cost for charge against the worldwide $100 million EDA ceiling. Secondary items were transferred at stock list price.[1]

MILCON on Diego Garcia

(S) On 1 May 1976 the CNO authorized CINCPACFLT to proceed with construction of the FY 76 Diego Garcia MILCON program, which had been delayed until 15 April to allow time for US/USSR discussions on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean area. The Administration deemed arms limitations initiatives to be inappropriate at that time.[2]

(U) By October 1976 the overall completion status for FY 71-76 construction programs on Diego Garcia was 43 percent. Completion of FY 75 and FY 76 construction projects was scheduled for early CY 79. The total cost for construction projects on Diego Garcia was estimated in excess of $175 million, including direct construction plus related support such as hardware procurement and installation, food, salaries, transportation, repair parts, and replacement of construction equipment.[3]

(U) Facilities included in the FY 75, FY 76, and FY 78 programs, especially for POL storage, were expected to provide assured logistic support to sustain a normal carrier task group for 30 days.[4]

Enewetak Cleanup

(U) During the first half of 1976 LT GEN Johnson, Director, Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), worked to assure Congressional approval of funding for

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1. J4233 Point Paper, 3 Apr 76, Subj: Dollar Value Material/Facilities Left in Thailand.
2. CNO N11000/011824Z May 76; SECSTATE 098319/1/230512Z Apr 76.
3. J442 Point Paper, 4 Oct 76, Subj: Diego Garcia Construction Status; J442 Point Paper, 4 Oct 76, Subj: Diego Garcia Construction Chronology.
4. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 345.

the Enewetak cleanup project which had been dropped from the FY 76 MILCON Appropriations Bill on 12 November 1975. During February 1976 he accompanied a Congressional Staff Delegation to the atoll to solicit FY 77 funding support for the project. Also in February, CINCPAC, in replying to a JCS query on the availability of PACOM troops and equipment to support the project, advised that PACOM engineer units were already otherwise committed. CINCPAC suggested assigning a TOE battalion from CONUS assets but not troop labor from combat outfits.[1]

(U) The FY 77 MILCON bill authorized the expenditure of $20 million for Enewetak cleanup, subject to two provisions:[2]

- No funds could be expended until Enewetak landowners agreed that $20 million constituted the total U.S. Government commitment for cleanup (accomplished on 17 September 1976).

- Project had to be accomplished with the use of existing DOD resources, including troop support. Some support must be provided by Services on a non-reimburseable basis. (JCS tasking of Services originally expected about 12 November 1976, but delayed to CY 77 by the end of the year.)

(U) On 21 August 1976 CINCPAC commented to the JCS on the Field Command, DNA (FCDNA) conceptual plan for the cleanup. Primary concern was for the expected impact on the readiness and training of PACOM units that might be tasked. The cleanup was scheduled to begin 15 March 1977 and take 2½ years to complete. By December 1976 the scheduled beginning date had slipped to 15 June 1977.[3]

Road Construction in American Samoa

(U) By the end of 1975 coordination between the Department of Defense, Department of the Interior, CINCPAC, and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group had resulted in approval of the civic action project to construct an access road to a television transmitter facility atop Mt. Alava on the island of Tutuila.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 308; J441 HistSums Jan-Feb 76; CINCPAC 191916Z Feb 76.
2. J443 Point Paper, 1 Nov 76, Subj: Enewetak Cleanup.
3. CINCPAC 212250Z Aug 76; J443 HistSum Dec 76.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 348; J441 HistSum Mar 76.

(U) With the Governor of American Samoa providing for transportation costs ($200,000), equipment and men (60) of the U.S. Army 84th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) had all arrived in American Samoa by 26 March 1976. The project was originally expected to take sixty men four months to complete, however, unforeseen delays extended the time required to complete the project. Dedication ceremonies were held on 15 November 1976.[1]

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1. J441 HistSum Mar 76; J441 Point Paper, 15 Mar 76, Subj: American Samoa Road Project; J443 HistSum Dec 76.

CHAPTER VI

COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION I--PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Dynamic Command Information System (DYCIS)

(U) DYCIS was the project title for all related efforts to provide Automatic Data Processing (ADP) support during crises and exercises to command center personnel and other decision makers. Ongoing projects during 1976 included:[1]

- DYCIS Executive Program. This interactive executive level computer program integrated the available computer applications for the user.

- Dynamic Planning System (DPS). This interactive computer program provided the capability to quickly retrieve status of forces information by specified selection criteria. Selectable criteria included geographic area, Service, types of equipment, readiness conditions, association with OPLANs, OPCON, level of units, and type ships.

- Flexible Reporting System (FLEXRP). This system allowed ad hoc reporting via near-simultaneous display of identical status boards/displays at multiple headquarters using Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) for computer-to-computer linkage. Any headquarters with AUTODIN access could be a participant.

- Touch Terminals. These minicomputer-based terminals alleviated the need for typing skills by providing a touch-driven interface with information stored on the WWMCCS computer. Operational interfaces included the DYCIS Executive Program, DPS, and FLEXRP. Other applications planned for implementation were Airports, Seaports, Forces Status Reports (FORSTAT), OPLANs, Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Information Systems (NEMVAC) and Movement Reports (MOVRP).

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1. J6318 HistSums, Jan-Dec 76.

- Worldwide Military Command Control ADP System/ Military Message Experiment (WWMCCS/MME) Integration. This effort would allow MME users to access the WWMCCS ADP system and vice versa.

Joint High Frequency (HF) Secure Voice Requirements

(S) On 8 June 1976 the JCS advised that national policy was to secure all military voice communications. The DOD Planning Programming and Guidance Memorandum (PPGM) specified that 100 percent of all critical telecommunications would be secured by 1982. JCS Memorandum 174-76, 12 May 1976, recommended that Parkhill HF secure voice equipment be considered for use by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as part of the effort toward securing communications; however, the Army did not agree because Parkhill equipment did not provide acceptable intelligibility when tested with AN/GRC-106 equipment. In the meantime, the Commander U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea) had submitted a request for Parkhill equipment to upgrade communications security in support of the Short War concept for the defense of South Korea. CINCPAC recommended approval to the JCS, who approved the requirement for secure HF communications on 16 June 1976, pending an acceptable solution to the Parkhill intelligibility problem experienced by the Army.[1]

(S) Based on the possible impact of the Army decision on Parkhill equipment the JCS requested unified and specified commands to identify joint HF nets where interoperability was critical. CINCPAC forwarded this information on 1 July 1976.[2]

GAPFILLER Satellite (GAPSAT)

(S) The maritime satellite (MARISAT) program consisted of three satellites built by Hughes Corporation for COMSAT General Corporation for civilian maritime communications. The Navy leased the UHF portion of two of these satellites to provide interim UHF communications until their UHF Fleet Satellite Communication (FLTSATCOM) system became operational in CY 78. The Navy called this lease the GAPFILLER Satellite (GAPSAT) program. The original MARISAT deployment concept was to provide one satellite for the Atlantic and one for the Pacific with the third being a ground spare. The Atlantic satellite, located at 15°W, was launched in February and became operational in March 1976. The Pacific satellite, located at 176.5°E, was launched in June and was operational on 17 July 1976. CINCPAC requested the third satellite be launched

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1. JCS 8157/081930Z Jun 76 and 6393/161938Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 270401Z Feb 76; COMUSK 090832Z Feb 76.
2. JCS 8157/081930Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 010127Z Jul 76.

and leased to provide Indian Ocean GAPFILLER coverage. The JCS approved this request, and the Indian Ocean GAPSAT was launched 14 October 1976 and positioned over the Pacific for contractor testing, completed by 16 November 1976. The satellite was then moved to a permanent position over the Indian Ocean, and initial operating capability was expected about 1 January 1977 when the AN/WSC-5 earth terminal installation was to be completed on Guam.[1]

(C) The GAPSAT provided the following capabilities:[2]

- One 500KHz channel for Navy Tactical Communications
  - 2400 bps Secure Voice (narrow band)
  - 2400 bps Data (CUDIXS, SSTIXS, SSIXS)
  - 75 bps TTY Tactical Intelligence
  - 75 bps TTY Ship-Shore
  - 75 bps TTY TACAMO-ABNCP
- One 25 KHz channel for Navy Fleet Broadcast
- One 25 KHz channel for Army use

(C) A number of terminals were used with GAPFILLER, and these same terminals would be used with FLTSATCOM when it became operational:[3]

- AN-SSR-1: A receive-only terminal installed on all PACFLT ships for receiving the Fleet Broadcast.
- AN/WSC-5: An eight channel ground configuration installed at Guam and Honolulu in the Pacific.
- AN/WSC-5 shipboard configuration: A four channel terminal installed on 12 major PACFLT ships.
- AN/WSC-3: A half duplex terminal currently installed on 34 PACFLT ships. It would eventually be installed on all

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1. J6124 HistSum Jun 76; COMNAVELEXSYSCOM 2053/150525Z Oct 76.
2. J6124 HistSum Jun 76.
3. Ibid.

ships, with multiple installations on the major ships to provide a multi-channel CINCPAC capability.

Joint Manual Communications Security (COMSEC) Systems

(S) In September 1976 the JCS advised that the Commander, Military Airlift Command (MAC) proposed the development of a unique MAC PELE authentication system and MAC operations code for worldwide use in support of airlift requirements. The JCS requested comments relative to the usability and possible problem areas associated with the proposed system and code. CINCPAC did not concur in the development of a unique MAC PELE authentication system and operations code because management on a worldwide basis would be difficult. Instead, CINCPAC recommended development of a CINCPAC general purpose code which would satisfy MAC needs in PACOM and have utility between CINCPAC, component and subunified commands.[1]

CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) Communications

Secure Voice Capability

(S) At the beginning of 1976 secure voice communications, 622A VHF/FM radio, and KY 28 encryption equipment were installed on one CINCPAC ABNCP aircraft to support crisis management requirements. The system was tested in two tactical exercises with the ABNCP in a monitor role; First Marine Brigade Exercise BEARING THUNDER on the island of Hawaii from 16 February to 8 March 1976, and Air Force Korea joint/combined, air defense/tactical offense Exercise COPE JACK on 12-13 May 1976. Based on the successful outcome of these tests, CINCPAC submitted Required Operational Capability (ROC) 12 to the JCS on 15 June 1976 for three more systems for the remaining three ABNCP aircraft. In November 1976 the JCS tasked the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to perform the technical analysis and cost estimate to implement ROC-12 for CINCPAC.[2]

Satellite Communications Capability

(U) With the availability of the GAPFILLER Satellite, an agreement was completed between the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy on 6 July 1976 to reserve one channel within the 500 KHz band of the Pacific and Atlantic satellite for use by the Worldwide Airborne Command Posts (WWABNCP). On 21 September 1976 an operational concept was developed for use of this capability, and actions were taken to install necessary equipment on

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1. JCS 4829/161415Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 070115Z Oct 76.
2. J6225 HistSum Dec 76; CINCPAC Ltr 335, S290 of 25 Jun 76, Subj: Required Operational Capability (ROC) for ABNCP Communications Capability Upgrade.

the CINCPAC ABNCP and provide training with a required operational date of 1 January 1977. This new capability would provide a greatly enhanced communication connectivity between the CINCPAC ABNCP and Navy Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Braodcasting Aircraft (TACAMO), while operating within the confines of the Pacific GAPFILLER satellite footprint. It would become the primary link between the two airborne platforms in lieu of HF radio, characterized by range restrictions and unpredictable performance.[1]

Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) Restoral for Command and Control

(C) Designated subordinate commands in PACOM had two AUTODIN terminals installed to insure delivery of fast-reaction critical messages. In February 1976 CINCPAC requested that restoral paths be established and circuit restoration priorities be upgraded to enable terminals to maintain continuous AUTODIN system access even in the event of a catastrophic switch failure. A meeting to review the restoral engineering and circuit costs was held at Defense Communications Agency (DCA) Pacific in March 1976 and by November 1976 the restoral paths had been upgraded and priorities had been processed and were incorporated into the AUTODIN Management Index (AMIE).[2]

Pacific Area Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) Restoral Plan

(C) CINCPAC and the DCA Pacific had been working since early 1975 on revising the Pacific Area AUTOVON Restoral Plan. On 30 June 1975 DCA Pacific submitted a modified restoral plan to CINCPAC for review and approval. It was noted that 27 out of the 54 circuits selected for restoral in this plan were assigned restoration priority (RP) zero-zero (00) as not requiring timely restoral. In October 1975 CINCPAC tasked component Communications Validating Offices (CVO) to review all low priority circuits and submit Telecommunications Service Requests (TSRs) for upgrade where necessary. The upgraded restoral plan was forwarded by CINCPAC to DCA Pacific in May 1976 and the final plan was implemented by 31 October 1976.[3]

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1. J6225 HistSum Jan 76; CINCPAC 072246Z Oct 76 and 040229Z Nov 76; 9ACCS Hickam AFB 240115Z Nov 76.
2. CINCPAC 252116Z Feb 76 and 062000Z Nov 76; DCAPAC 250050Z Mar 76 and 210108Z Apr 76.
3. CINCPAC 130157Z Feb 75, 310147Z Oct 75, and 130007Z May 76; DCAPAC P442/81 022132Z Jun 76.

CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) Reconfiguration

(U) On 2 August 1976 reconfiguration of the CINCPAC CVAN was completed. The project resulted in savings of $30,000 monthly.[1]

Communications Concept for Operation PAUL BUNYAN

(U) The communications concept for Operation PAUL BUNYAN in August 1976 (see the Operations chapter for further details) was based on experience gained in EAGLE PULL and FREQUENT WIND, and was a good example of "Lessons Learned" being put to practical use. Basically, there was a secure voice conference which included Washington, Hawaii, and COMUS Korea. Record backup paralleled this conference. The wideband secure voice command conference linking the NMCC, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and COMUS Korea used the Pentagon 758C and the Pearl Harbor FTC 31 conference bridges and extended via the Seoul secure switchboard into the COMUS Korea Command Center. The on-scene commander provided real-time inputs to the COMUS Korea Command Center by FM secure and unsecure voice. This input was retransmitted into the secure voice command conference and the secure voice reporting conference. The reporting conference paralleled the command conference but used HY-11 narrowband equipment and linked COMUS Korea by AUTOVON directly to the Pentagon 758C, thus precluding COMUS Korea isolation if the Pearl Harbor switch failed. The hard copy backup was provided to PACOM commands via CINCPAC Teletype Alert Network and extended to the NMCC via the secondary Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System circuit.[2]

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1. J6223 HistSum Jun 76.
2. J6/Memo/S43-77 of 12 Sep 77, Subj: 1976 Command History; Review of Draft.

SECTION II--SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Communications Security Assistance to Japan

(S) On 14 January 1976 the U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB) approved the loan of four KY-8 secure voice sets to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) for use during a combined USN-JMSDF anti-submarine warfare exercise (ASWEX) in March 1976. The equipment remained under the continuous (24 hour) custody of USN personnel while aboard JMSDF surface ships.[1]

(S) During 1976 two requests, both concurred in by CINCPAC, were submitted to establish secure record capabilities between U.S. and Japanese Forces. One request, initiated in August 1976, was for a secure circuit between the 5th U.S. Air Force Indications & Warning Center and the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) Air Defense Center (ADC) at Fuchu Air Station. The other request, informally initiated in June 1976, was for a secure circuit between COMUS Japan, Yokota Air Base, and the Joint Staff, Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Hinokicho. As of December 1976, favorable USCSB action was expected on the former request in January 1977, and an engineering/feasibility study was conducted on the latter request and forwarded to the JCS at year's end.[2]

Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) Support

(U) Integration of the COMUSTDC/CINCPAC teleprocessing capability and Headquarters CINCPAC Automated Message Output Processing (MOP) capability was completed on 6 May 1976. This allowed COMUSTDC to compose and release messages through the Camp Smith WWMCCS computer. COMUSTDC and Commander Detachment 1, 13th Air Force Air Operation Group, Taipei, thus had a more timely means of preparing and releasing message reports such as Operation Reports (OPREPs) and Situation Reports (SITREPs) during contingencies and exercises.[3]

Commander U.S. Forces Korea Support

(U) A wideband secure voice circuit between Hawaii and Korea was made operational on 1 June 1976. This circuit provided a link between the Pearl Harbor secure voice switch via satellite to Taegu and ground link to Seoul, thus including COMUS Korea in the CINCPAC secure voice conference network.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 359; J613 HistSum Jan 76.
2. J613 HistSum Dec 76; CINCPAC 181806Z Jun 76, 181807Z Jun 76, 182356Z Oct 76, and 290100Z Dec 76; COMUSJ 150430Z Jun 76, 070718Z Oct 76, 150211Z Oct 76, 050005Z Nov 76, and 080333Z Nov 76; NAVSEEACT Japan 2300/190858Z Nov 76.
3. J6318 HistSum May 76.
4. Ibid.

Disestablishment of Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) J6

(U) On 30 June 1976 the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics (J6), COMUSMACTHAI, was disestablished, and Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) Army Division continued coordination of remaining/residual communications-electronics matters in Thailand.[1]

Disestablishment of DCA Thailand

(U) On 20 June 1976 AUTODIN service to Thailand was terminated and, on 30 June 1976, the DCA Thailand Field Office was disestablished. The American Embassy, Bangkok assumed responsibility for providing record communication services for all military activities remaining in Thailand.[2]

Taiwan-Okinawa Integrated Joint Communications System (IJCS) Submarine Cable Disruption

(C) Taiwan-Okinawa IJCS submarine cable failed on 30 July 1976. This disruption was the first failure experienced since the restoral responsibility was transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. The DCA Pacific Restoral Plan was implemented within 27 minutes and priority communications were restored within one hour. Additional communication capability into and out of Taiwan was provided by leasing commercial circuits and establishing an emergency defense satellite communication system between Clark Air Base, Philippines and Okinawa. The CNO, through Commander Naval Electronic Systems Command, tasked Cable Repair Ship, USNS A.J. MYER, under the OPCOM of COMTHIRDFLEET, to repair the cable. The USNS A.J. MYER departed Yokosuka, Japan on 6 August and, although delayed by Typhoon BILLIE, located and repaired the damaged cable by 15 August. After three days of realignment and quality control testing, the repaired cable was returned to operation on 18 August. The failure, which occurred approximately 35 nautical miles north of Keelung, Taiwan, was believed to have been caused by a massive change in the ocean floor due to a series of earthquakes in the affected area.[3]

USS OKLAHOMA CITY Satellite Terminal

(U) CINCPACFLT, with DCA-PAC support, configured a satellite circuit to allow Naval Communication Area Master Station Eastern Pacific (NAVCAMSEASTPAC) Hawaii to control the WESTPAC Fleet broadcast while Guam communications were

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1. MACTHAI 290326Z Jun 76.
2. DCA-PAC 120201Z Jun 76 and 291613Z Jun 76.
3. J6231 HistSum Aug 76.

down due to Typhoon PAMELA damage. The circuit was via DSCS II Satellite from Wahiawa to the USS OKLAHOMA CITY (in port Yokosuka), then tropo-cable/microwave (MW) to HF transmitters at Naval Communications Stations (NAVCOMMSTAs) Japan and Philippines. Use of a shipboard satellite communications capability to support shore NAVCOMMSTAs was unique. The circuit was established and operational prior to loss of communications capability at Guam:[1]



CINCPAC Message Traffic - 1976

(U) CINCPAC's message Traffic was handled by the Camp Smith Telecommunications Center under the operational control of the Naval Communication Station, Honolulu. A summary of CINCPAC message traffic for 1976 follows:[2]

---

1. J6 WEB 17-21 May 76.
2. Naval Communications Station Honolulu was redesignated Naval Communications Area Master Station, Eastern Pacific (NAVCAMSEASTPAC) on 1 April 1976.

Month	Messages Sent	Messages Received
January	4,869	23,457
February	4,245	20,776
March	4,939	22,409
April	4,430	20,427
May	5,242	24,321
June	3,540	20,080
July	3,994	21,442
August	5,049	23,170
September	5,981	20,415
October	4,287	21,065
November	5,759	22,000
December	3,535	19,856
Monthly Average	4,655	21,618

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CHAPTER VII

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Funding the Security Assistance Program During 1976

(U) Actual funds expended for the FY 76 and FY 7T PACOM security assistance program and funds proposed and allocated during 1976 for the FY 77 program are shown on the following two charts.

FY 76 and FY 7T
PACOM Security Assistance Program
(Actual amount in thousands of dollars)

	FMS Credit		MAP		IMETP*	
Country	FY 76	FY 7T	FY 76	FY 7T	FY 76	FY 7T
Afghanistan					198	49
China (Taiwan)	80,000	13,000	764[a]	258[a]	470	93
India					113	8
Indonesia	23,100		12,849	9,800	1,599	775
Korea	126,000	134,075	59,378	1,219[a]	1,865	338
Malaysia	17,000				279	101
Nepal					27	8
Pakistan					339	68
Philippines		17,400			725	203
Thailand		36,700	16,000	863[a]	1,347	493
TOTAL	246,100	201,175	88,991	12,140	6,962	2,136

*International Military Education & Training Program
a. Supply Operations Only

SOURCE: FY 78 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)

FY 77
PACOM Security Assistance Program
(Dollars in Thousands)

Country	FMS Credit Proposed[a]	FMS Credit Estimate[b]	MAP Proposed[a]	MAP Allocated[c]	IMETP* Proposed[a]	IMETP* Allocated[c]
Afghanistan					200	190
Bangladesh						50[d]
China (Taiwan)	35,000	35,000	400	85	500	440
India					200	170
Indonesia	23,100	23,100	19,400	15,000	3,000	2,600
Korea	275,000	275,000	8,300	4,300	2,700	1,400
Malaysia	36,000	36,000			300	300[e]
Nepal					35	31[e]
Pakistan					325	300
Philippines	20,000	20,000	19,600	17,000	600	600
Sri Lanka					15	10
Thailand	30,000	30,000	20,000	15,000	1,500	1,200
TOTAL	419,100	419,100	67,700	51,385	9,375	7,291

*International Military Education and Training Program

SOURCE:
a. CPD FY 77, 8 Mar 76.
b. J452 HistSum Dec 76.
c. SECSTATE 270572/1/031519Z Nov 76.
d. SECDEF 092254Z Feb 77; SECSTATE 162231Z Dec 76.
e. SECSTATE 111412Z Jan 77.

(S) Based on FY 77 allocations and estimates, and FY 79 guidance, funding was projected through FY 79 with the following percentage changes:[1]

Country	FMS Credit % Change	MAP % Change	MAP Termination	IMETP* % Change
Afghanistan				+163
China (Taiwan)[a]	-57	-100	FY 77	+ 14
India				+ 76
Indonesia	+52	+ 33	FY 81	+ 46
Korea	0	-100	FY 77	0
Malaysia	-44			+ 79
Nepal				+ 67
Pakistan				+100
Philippines[b]	0	+ 15	FY 81	+ 33
Sri Lanka				+400
Thailand	0	- 53	FY 79	- 33
TOTAL	-5.8	- 10		+ 32

*International Military Education & Training Program

a. Taiwan FY 80 FMS Credit level reduced to $10 million. Restricted to FMS cash/commercial after FY 80.

b. Philippine levels subject to outcome of base negotiations.

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976

(U) On 30 June 1976 the President signed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Major provisions of the act affecting the PACOM security assistance program were as follows:[2]

- MAAGs worldwide were reduced to 34 effective 30 September 1976.

- All MAAGs except those specifically authorized by Congress were to be eliminated effective 30 September 1977.

- After 30 September 1977 no security assistance (SA) functions could be performed by Defense Attache Office (DAO) personnel.

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1. J452 HistSum Dec 76.
2. J452 HistSum Jun 76.

- The President could assign no more than three Armed Forces personnel to Embassy staffs to perform security assistance functions where MAAGs were terminated or where there were no MAAGs.

- All MAP grant materiel was to terminate effective 30 September 1977, unless specifically authorized by Congress.

- Authority was provided to terminate, by a joint resolution of Congress, security assistance to any country which engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights.

- Submission of a report on Korea was required within 90 days after enactment, and at least once during the next five years which reviewed the progress of the Korea modernization plan, the role of the United States in mutual security efforts there, and the prospect of phased reductions of U.S. Forces in Korea.

- The President was requested to communicate "in forceful terms," within 60 days after enactment, Congressional concern for the erosion of civil liberties in South Korea.

(U) At the time of enactment, the status of PACOM security assistance activities was as follows:[1]

MAAG-Type Organizations	DAOs Performing SA Functions	Countries Receiving Grant Materiel
China (Taiwan)	Afghanistan	Indonesia
India	Australia	Korea
Indonesia	Burma	Philippines
Japan	Malaysia	Thailand
Korea	Nepal	
Pakistan	New Zealand	
Philippines	Singapore	
Thailand	Sri Lanka	

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1. J453 Point Papers, 29 Apr 76, Subj: Impact of International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976; and 13 Oct 76, Subj: Impact of Adjustments in Security Assistance Program in PACOM.

(C) The immediate result of the Act was disestablishment of the Office of the Defense Representative, India as a separate entity and its incorporation into the U.S. Mission as the Office of Defense Cooperation, India, with two assigned military personnel and no major impact on the small India program.[1]

(C) In the eyes of the CINCPAC staff, the impact of the Act on PACOM SA activities would be determined by the extent of Congressional action. Elimination of MAAGs or severe reductions in personnel were seen as having a major adverse impact by reducing ability to maintain important military relationships within PACOM, precluding efficient control and management of SA programs, a decline of total force planning, and an increase in third country influence.[2]

(C) Termination of grant materiel (FY 76 was the last year scheduled for Korean grant materiel) was expected to result in possible reorientation of allied and friendly force modernization toward third country support and a reduction in U.S. leverage to keep the arms race within bounds. An increase in FMS credit, however, was seen as providing at least a partial balance.[3]

(C) The provisions on human rights were seen as a possible problem for Korea and Indonesia, and SA activities in Korea were clearly being subjected to close scrutiny.[4]

Simplification of Security Assistance Operations

(U) Simplified security assistance procedures proposed by the Secretary of Defense in 1975 were implemented by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) on 1 February 1976. Under these procedures CINCPAC retained direct management control by:[5]

- Commanding MAAGs (except in Korea).
- Determining requirements for new weapons systems and recommending release of high technology by comment on all such MAAG proposals.

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1. CINCPAC 240410Z Aug 76, 282352Z Sep 76; JCS 7316/302322Z Dec 76.
2. Op. Cit., J453 Point Paper of 13 Oct 76.
3. Ibid.
4. Op. Cit., J453 Point Paper of 29 Apr 76.
5. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 381; SECDEF 4280/091945Z Jan 76; CINCPAC 150217Z Jan 76 and 021845Z Feb 76.

- Making comments and recommendations on all Military Security Assistance Projections (MSAP) (formerly called Program Objectives Memorandum or POM) forwarded to the DSAA.

- Developing the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) for security assistance (Volume 2, Book 3, Analysis and Force Tabulation Allied and Friendly Forces).

- Scheduling and reviewing Foreign Military Training Programs through hosting the Annual Tri-Service Training Workshop.

- Providing program management documents to MAAGs and PACOM staff.

- Conducting Phase IV training of MAAG personnel in accordance with DOD Directive 2000.10.

(U) CINCPAC maintained indirect management control by monitoring minor grant aid program changes sent to the DOD by MAAGs. CINCPAC also monitored foreign military sales (FMS) cases. DSAA provided weekly feedback on Letters of Request and Case Listings; information on potential sales cases from discussions between DSAA and foreign representatives; and PACOM statistical data on total FMS credits repayable (principal plus interest), and financial impact. Monitoring also included country materiel and training dollar levels, excess major items (MIMEX), and non-MAP Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Military Articles PACOM Excess (MAPEX).[1]

(S) In July 1976 the Secretary of Defense, in an apparent attempt at further simplification, established 1 September 1976 as the date to complete a reorganization of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) and the DSAA which would assign MAAGs directly to ISA/DSAA. In his response to this plan, Admiral Gayler noted:[2]

> I see no agency better positioned or equipped to oversee MAAGs and render military judgment on PACOM security assistance programs than CINCPAC--charged with military responsibility for the area, able to distinguish real needs from perceived needs....Finally, there are too many stovepipe organizations now. Let's not create more....

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1. J452 HistSum Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC TANGO 11/052340Z Aug 76 (EX); J452 Point Paper, 20 Oct 76, Subj: MAAGs-Retention Justification and New Command Arrangements.

(S) As of year's end the above-mentioned Secretary of Defense reorganization had not been implemented.[1]

MAAG/MISSION/MILGP Tour Enhancement

(U) In May 1976, as a result of comments received revealing a growing disenchantment with MAAG/MISSION/MILGP duty, the JCS requested information from the unified commands to determine actions that would enhance such duty. CINCPAC's evaluation of information received from PACOM MAAGs indicated two causes that may have contributed to disenchantment of MAAG personnel: first, a widespread perception among MAAG personnel that such duty was adverse to future promotion and career development; and, secondly, personal and financial hardships experienced by MAAG personnel and dependents, particularly in the remote areas of India, Pakistan, and Indonesia.[2]

(U) To alleviate the above causes of disenchantment CINCPAC submitted a list of 20 recommended actions, the following of which were approved by the JCS on 16 November 1976:[3]

- Actions to improve overall program:

  - Provide adequate language and country orientation training.
  - Provide adequate security assistance training.
  - Standardize Service regulations pertaining to SA duty.
  - Provide for adequate screening/selection of personnel for SA duty.

- Actions to improve career-related perceptions:

  - Authorize an Outstanding Unit Award for joint organizations.
  - Insure special recognition (establish SA-related career fields as in Army).
  - Offer personnel choice of assignment following SA duty.
  - Insure prestige of SA-related assignments as a topic to be presented at basic, staff, and senior Service college.

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1. Op. Cit., J452 Point Paper of 20 Oct 76.
2. JCS 4458/241954Z May 76; CINCPAC 260055Z Jun 76.
3. Op. Cit., CINCPAC 260055Z Jun 76; J451 Discussion Topic, 1 Dec 76, Subj: MAAG/MISSION/MILGP/Defense Attache System Tour Enhancement.

- Actions to alleviate specific hardships:

  - Authorize space required dependent student travel.
  - Provide funded emergency leave travel to nearest overseas MAC aerial port.
  - Insure security of military personnel and dependents in foreign countries.
  - Provide adequate medical/dental support.

FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference

(U) The FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference, originally scheduled for 18-20 November 1975, was held at Camp Smith, HI from 3 to 5 February 1976, and was attended by representatives from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Departments, MAAGs, ODRs, DAOs, PACOM components, and PACOM staff directorates.[1]

(U) The conference agenda included discussion of the following topics of mutual concern:[2]

- Export of high technology and weapons, including relationships with U.S. defense contractors.

- Grant Aid: benefits compared with FMS (cash and credit), impact if terminated, alternatives and program results.

- Examination of U.S. regional objectives in post-Vietnam era.

- Influence of foreign military training and pricing policies.

- Local defense production in Asia.

- Phase IV training.

- Relationships between MAAGs and CINCPAC.

- Impact of increase in training costs.

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1. J454 HistSum Feb 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 387.
2. J454 HistSum Feb 76.

(S) Major conclusions arrived at by the participants of the conference included:[1]

- The United States had no firm policy on the release of high technology. (See CINCPAC Command History 1975 for discussion on this subject and CINCPAC position.)

- Termination of grant aid would diminish U.S. influence in decision making regarding force objectives and equipment of affected countries. (See also discussion, this section, under International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.)

- Foreign military training needed to be retained, and the sudden increase in training costs needed to be smoothed over by an attempt to secure relief at Congressional level. (See also discussion, this section, under Foreign Military Training tuition pricing.)

- Local defense production in Asia was a "non-starter." (See CINCPAC Command History 1975 for discussion of the problem of local production and recipient country sales of U.S. origin defense items to third countries.)

- Evaluation of Phase IV training was needed. (See also discussion, this section, under Phase IV Training for U.S. Security Assistance Personnel.)

- Review of regional objectives in PACOM countries was needed.

(U) Admiral Gayler closed the conference commenting on the fact that the military was in a period of close scrutiny by Congress, and it could expect to spend more time in the public arena. He noted that the impressions and ideas of visiting political staffers became Congressional reports. He pointed out that the GAO was as interested in American strength and readiness as anyone else and that, approached in that spirit, they would be found to be allies. He stressed the necessity for good public relations and further advised the MAAG chiefs that personal contacts were their "bread-and-butter," an extremely important part of their jobs, and possibly the most important thing they could contribute toward their influence for the United States.[2]

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 373-381.
2. Ibid.

FY 77 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference

(U) The FY 77 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference was held at Camp Smith, HI from 17 to 19 November 1976, with added representation from the National Security Council (NSC). Specific topics discussed included:[1]

- The elimination of MAAGs and security assistance functions of DAOs. (See also discussion, this section, under International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.)

- The centralization of security assistance programs. (See also discussion, this section, under Simplification of Security Assistance Operations.)

- MAAG/MISSION/MILGP tour enhancement. (See also discussion, this section, under this title.)

- The release of advanced technology and sophisticated systems [also an item of interest for the FY 76 Conference]. (See also CINCPAC Command History 1975 for CINCPAC position; and discussion, this section, under Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries, for developments during 1976.)

- Relations between the U.S. Government and commercial contractors regarding sales to foreign countries, and an update on MILDEP programs for organization, control, and review procedures in the sales process.

- The progress of FY 78 legislation and expected future trends.

- Planning, programming, and resource management techniques.

- Out-year planning for use of technology acquired through co-production.

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1. J454 HistSum Nov 76.

(C) Results of the Conference indicated that:[1]

- Congress, through such issues as human rights, was attempting to use security assistance to achieve goals for which the program was not intended and which were possibly not attainable.

- Congress was sharply critical of MAAGs, perceiving them as "arms salesmen," and fearing that their presence would lead to intervention.

- While there was Congressional opposition to security assistance, it was not unanimous, and actions were necessary to overcome the existing negative attitudes.

- Security assistance recipients were likely to be limited to those nations providing facilities for the United States and those too poor to finance their own defense effort. Except for training, programs would probably be limited to no more than 8 or 9 countries.

- Sales would increase. Country presentations emphasized host country military preference for U.S. equipment and training. In this regard, it was noted that 60 percent of total sales were for services and non-lethal items.

- Training was still the best investment. Country presentations highlighted strong support for increased dollar levels, not only to offset inflation, but also to increase enrollment. It was noted that a roll-back of training costs could be at the expense of the DOD budget. (See also discussion, this section, under Foreign Military Training Tuition Pricing.)

- U.S. defense policy placed emphasis on security assistance, and all agencies of the State and Defense Departments were actively engaged in review of procedures to overcome deficiencies in the system.

(U) Admiral Weisner closed the conference noting that the PACOM theater strongly supported the security assistance program. He considered the money spent in the program to have a very high payoff, giving a tremendous return.

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1. Ibid.

Also, with reference to support for the program, and the need to avoid adversary relationships, he expressed strong feelings about the "we" and the "they" being one and the same, "we" being the "we" here (at CINCPAC) this year and the "they" back there (in Washington) next year.[1]

Recipient Country Sales of U.S. Origin Defense Items to Third Countries

(S) The representatives at the FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference noted that production or co-production of small arms, military vehicles, and aircraft by security assistance recipient countries created a desire to sell abroad and to regional neighbors (in obvious competition with U.S. commercial interests); thus, the consensus was that local defense production in Asia was a "non-starter."[2]

(C) The U.S. Government policy on sales of U.S. origin defense items to third countries evolved as a result of several cases arising during 1975. The essence of this policy was to generally discourage third country sales, but make exceptions on a case-by-case basis, generally disapproving requests involving modern standard items still available from U.S. stock or production, and sympathetically considering requests involving items which were obsolete or out of production in the United States. Specific determinations forming this policy during 1975 were as follows:[3]

Item	Seller	Buyer	USG Approval
M-16 Rifles	Singapore	Thailand	No
AN/PRC-77 Radios	Singapore	New Zealand	Yes
105mm & 155mm Ammo	Republic of China	Philippines	No
Small Arms Powder	Republic of China	Philippines	Yes
M-67 Grenades	Republic of Korea	Malaysia	No
SB-22 Switchboards	Republic of Korea	Malaysia	Yes

(C) U.S. Government approval of the Singapore AN/PRC-77 radio sale to New Zealand was clearly an exception to the general sales policy based on political considerations. The M-16 rifle sale to Thailand, on the other hand, was concluded without U.S. Government approval as had been a 1974 sale of M-16s to the Philippines; this illustrated the difficulty of enforcing the third country sales policy and confirming the view that local defense production in Asia was a "non-starter."[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. Report of the 1975 [FY 76] PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference, n.d., p. 3.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 373-376.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 373-375.

(U) During 1976 Republic of Korea (ROK) and Republic of China (ROC) third country sales requests were reviewed.

ROK Sales to Third Countries

(C) During 1976 the ROK continued to investigate possibilities to export items to third countries (and even to the United States) as a way to earn foreign exchange by using excess capacity in their production facilities. In April the American Embassy, Seoul, reported that ROK Foreign Minister Park had asked for the U.S. Government reaction to Moroccan interest in ROK military hardware and training advisers. The request included uniforms, M-16 rifles, AN/PRC-77 and AN/VRC-12 radios, 60mm and 81mm mortars, and 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles. The State Department reply was sympathetic to all but the M-16 rifles, and the ROK Government was invited to submit a request. No further action was taken during 1976.[1]

(C) On 3 September 1976 the Korea Tacoma Marine Industries (KTMI) signed a contract for the sale of four guided missile patrol boats to Indonesia. There was initial concern, in this case, that KTMI could have applied data acquired under a U.S. Munitions Control (MC) license to the Indonesian patrol boat design, and as to the possibility of Korea, as a recipient of U.S. Government credit, further providing credit to a third country. KTMI denied any violation of the MC license, and the country team supported the ROK Government extension of credit, claimed to be to KTMI and not the Government of Indonesia, as reasonable commercial practice.[2]

ROC Sales to Third Countries

(C) In September 1976 the ROC Ministry of National Defense advised MAAG China that Singapore had requested the ROC to sell them 500 M-151A2 (one-fourth ton) trucks and 160 M-825 (one-fourth ton) carriages to mount 106mm recoilless rifles. The M-151A2 was being produced as part of a GROC/U.S. Government co-production program. Chief, MAAG China noted that the additional workload would be welcomed by the ROC's military vehicle plant which already had been supplementing its reduced military workload by manufacture and assembly of commercial trucks and buses. CINCPAC supported the MAAG China request for concurrence, but in November 1976 the Secretary of State advised that the U.S. Government would not approve the sale based on the foreign source of export competition that would be created for U.S. manufacturers.[3]

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1. AMEMB Seoul 2552/070719Z Apr 76; J463 HistSum Apr 76.
2. AMEMB Seoul 6759/300309Z Aug 76; J463 Point Paper, 14 Sep 76, Subj: Third Country Sales.
3. CHMAAG Taipei 150801Z Sep 76; USDAO Singapore 1771/240438Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 250011Z Sep 76; SECSTATE 288932/250323Z Nov 76.

Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries

(S) The release of high technology to PACOM countries continued to be an item of great concern to CINCPAC throughout 1976. This concern was expressed to the JCS during October 1975 and CINCPAC's position had been clearly stated in an 18 December 1975 letter from Admiral Gayler to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Philip C. Habib; however, at the FY 76 MAAG Chiefs' Conference one of the major conclusions was that the United States had no firm policy on the subject.[1]

[redacted]

Release of Advanced Technology to the ROK

(S) The United States had provided the ROK with NIKE, HARPOON, HONEST JOHN, Standard ARM, and HAWK missiles, and transfer of technology and equipment had been limited to that needed for inventory maintenance and acceptance testing of those missiles already in the ROK inventory. The ROK Agency for Defense Development (ADD) was trying to acquire a research and development (R&D)

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 376-381.
2. CINCPAC 050110Z Jun 76.

capability to develop what would result in a strategic surface-to-surface missile in the Korean scenario, but the United States did not support an independent ROK R&D effort in advanced missile technology. As for the transfer of other weapons and technologies, each request was evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The Country Team stressed that ROK requests should receive sympathetic consideration if they were expected to achieve a self-reliant defense posture with reduced dependence on the presence of U.S. Forces. The CINCPAC position on release of advanced systems/technology to the ROK during 1976 was as follows:[1]

Item	CINCPAC position/remarks
PAVEWAY I	Release
Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) Kits	Release
MAVERICK	AGM-65A only
SHRIKE	Release cost & performance data
PAVEKNIFE	Release cost & performance data
HARPOON System	Release cost & performance data
Standard ARM System	Release cost & performance data
WALLEYE	WALLEYE I only
HARM	No - system in R&D
SAGM	No - system never produced
CONDOR System	No - not available to FMS
BULLDOG	No - not available to FMS
PAVE SPIKE	Release cost & performance data
PAVE TACK	No - system in R&D
AN/TSQ-73 Air Defense Control System	No - pending completion of ROK study using integrated systems approach
Improved CHAPARRAL	No - technology too advanced

Release of Advanced Technology to the ROC

(~~S~~) Like the ROK, the ROC also desired planning data on the Improved CHAPARRAL with the goal of improving their air defense system. CINCPAC had nonconcurred with a previous request in October 1975 and remained firm to this position in response to a MAAG Taipei September 1976 request. CINCPAC did recommend, however, that, if a decision were made to release Improved CHAPARRAL (export model) or AIM-9L to NATO or other European countries, the export model should then also be released to Korea and Taiwan.[2]

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1. J463 Point Paper, 10 Sep 76, Subj: Transfer of Advanced Weapons Systems, Production Technology, and Sensitive R&D Technology to ROK; CINCPAC 200147Z Feb 76, 171921Z Mar 76, 080015Z Jul 76, and 212345Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 376-377; CHMAAG Taipei 071014Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 240330Z Dec 76.

Release of the Standard Missile to Indonesia

(S) In August 1976 the Secretary of State disapproved a request by the American Embassy, Jakarta, for a General Dynamics briefing on the Standard Missile system for the Government of Indonesia Department of Defense and Security. In November 1976 the JCS requested CINCPAC's assessment of the possible sale of the Standard Missile and release of associated SECRET data to Indonesia. [redacted]

Adoption of Guidelines for Release of Advanced Weapons Technology

(S) As a result of CINCPAC's concern in July 1976 over the potential transfer of technology of the AIM-9L air-to-air missile to Australia and Japan, the JCS developed a set of guidelines, which CINCPAC helped to refine, to assess the impact on U.S. national objectives of the transfer of weapons technology, and to provide a framework for policy decisions on the release of advanced weapons technology. These guidelines consisted of a list of questions related to the impact of release on U.S. national military objectives:[2]

- Will release provide any clearly defined advantages to U.S. interest?

- What will be the impact on U.S. Forces
  - Readiness?
  - Capability?
  - Combat operational advantages?

- What will be the overall effect if the equipment is not provided?

- Will the sale of this equipment post a military threat to the United States/other friendly nations now or in the future?

- What effect will this transaction have on regional stability?

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1. SECSTATE 190509/021417Z Aug 76; JCS 9509/050012Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 110016Z Nov 76.
2. JCS 3599/072242Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 160123Z Sep 76.

- Can the recipient country provide the necessary
  - technical support?
  - safeguards against compromise?

- What obligations will be incurred by the United States?

- What is the overall effect if the equipment is compromised?

- What military contribution does this equipment make toward existing alliances/total force policy?

- What contribution does this equipment make to regional defense?

- How essential is this equipment for the recipient country in the maintenance of security against subversion?

- How essential is this equipment for the recipient country in defense against external aggression?

- Can the threat [to recipient country] be countered only by the item requested, or can it be countered by an item of lesser technology or complexity?*

- Can the country afford the system?*

- Can this technology be used by the country in development of a weapon system other than that requested?*

* CINCPAC-recommended additions.

(S) If a determination were made to provide advanced weapons, then the above guidelines were to be reviewed again in consideration of the level of technology to be released with the weapons. If, on the other hand, full release of equipment or technology were not recommended, then the explanatory rationale was to include a discussion of possible alternatives.[1]

(C) CINCPAC concurred in the JCS-developed guidelines with the additions shown above, and further recommended that the procedures include obtaining the unified command's views as part of the JCS military assessment. The

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1. JCS 3599/072242Z Sep 76.

guidelines were first used in November 1976 when the JCS requested CINCPAC's assessment of the possible sale of the Standard Missile and release of associated SECRET data to Indonesia.[1]

Training

PACOM Tri-Service Training Conference

(U) CINCPAC hosted the second Tri-Service training conference at Hickam Air Force Base between 1-10 March 1976. Participants included representatives from the Secretary of Defense (DSAA), the Military Departments, Service training commands, CINCPAC, PACOM Service components, USACSG, and each MAAG/DAO with a sizeable training program. The purpose of this conference was to refine the FY 77 International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) for each PACOM country, and prepare and submit the initial FY 78 IMETP. Because of extensive CONUS school tuition costing turbulence at the time of the conference, the latter goal was not accomplished until later in the year.[2]

Foreign Military Training Tuition Pricing

(U) While reviewing FY 76 training appropriations, Congressional appropriations committees noted major differences in training costs between the Services for similar training. As a result, Congress directed the Department of Defense to provide definitive, standardized costing guidance to all the Services. This was done in an Assistant Secretary of Defense/Comptroller memorandum of 5 November 1975 which resulted in training cost increases of from 100 to 400 percent, effective 1 January 1976.[3]

(C) The sudden and precipitous rise in training costs was a matter of considerable concern to CINCPAC as it was expected to reduce FY 76 student input by about one-third and FY 77 programs by one-half. It could also result in an overall long-range reduction in the numbers of foreign personnel, destined for top military and civilian leadership positions, who would be exposed to U.S. training. The importance of this exposure was emphasized by a PACOM country survey which revealed that there were 400 foreign personnel, trained through the security assistance program, who were currently holding national level military and governmental positions.[4]

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1. JCS 9509/050012Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 110016Z Nov 76.
2. J452 HistSum Dec 76.
3. J452 HistSum Aug 76.
4. J45 Point Paper, 12 May 76, Subj: Foreign Military Training-Value vs Cost.

(U) Impact statements from the unified commands, numerous MAAGs, and Embassies caused the Secretary of Defense to reevaluate the increases. As a result, on 21 May 1976, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) rescinded previous guidance applicable to FY 76 and FY 7T grant aid training increases, rolling back the prices to those in effect prior to the 5 November 1975 OSD Memorandum. On 27 August 1976 FY 77 prices were also rolled back; however, the increased costs were to be applied to the FY 78 IMETP effective 1 October 1977. Also the rollbacks of grant aid prices did not apply to FMS training programs.[1]

Training of U.S. Security Assistance Personnel

(U) Through the first half of 1976 an Office of the Secretary of Defense ad hoc committee had studied and recommended establishing a Defense Institute for Security Assistance, responsible for all security assistance instruction for the Services, at Fort Bragg, NC. CINCPAC strongly supported this concept, designed to eliminate duplication among the Services by standardizing publications, procedures, and reports. By the second half of 1976 Department of the Air Force vice Department of the Army was designated executive agent for all Department of Defense Security Assistance training which was now to be conducted at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH beginning the second quarter, FY 77. At year's end the AFIT had identified five available security assistance courses, and CINCPAC had notified MAAGs/Missions/DAOs of those courses preferred for attendance en route along with instructions for updating Joint Manpower Programs (JMP) to reflect these new training requirements.[2]

Phase IV Training for U.S. Security Assistance Personnel

(U) During the period 29 November - 10 December 1976, a CINCPAC Mobile Training Team conducted Phase IV training of U.S. personnel assigned to security assistance duties in the PACOM. Training was conducted at Bangkok, Thailand; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Manila, Philippines. Comparing this "circuit rider" concept with the previous single location session, costs per student were reduced to $365 in 1976, about one-half of the 1975 per-student cost.[3]

(U) A total of 42 students from 11 different MAAGs/DAOs attended Phase IV training which consisted of two 21-hour parallel courses stressing needs for two groups of personnel: training requirements planners and programmers, and materiel programmers.[4]

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1. SECDEF 6789/211535Z May 76 and 3093/271518Z Aug 76.
2. J42 HistSums Jul, Sep-Oct 76; AFIT 271205Z Oct 76; CINCPAC 300457Z Oct 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 286; J452 HistSum Dec 76.
4. J452 HistSum Dec 76.

U.S. Army War College International Fellows Program (IFP)

(C) In October 1976 the Department of the Army requested unified commander's comments and a prioritized list of countries recommended to attend the first IFP class commencing in August 1977. Ten spaces were being allocated worldwide for officers in grades 05-07 (national level leadership positions). Realizing that the limited input precluded attendance from many PACOM countries, CINCPAC prepared the following prioritized list: (1) Japan, (2) Korea, (3) Philippines, (4) Singapore, (5) Indonesia, (6) Australia, (7) New Zealand, (8) Thailand, (9) Taiwan, and (10) Pakistan.[1]

CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Schedule

(U) During CY 76 the CINCPAC PEG evaluated the following PACOM U.S. security assistance program activities:[2]

Program	Period Covered	Date of Evaluation
Republic of the Philippines	FY 76	22 Mar - 2 Apr 76
Singapore	FY 76	24-25 May 76
Malaysia	FY 76	27-28 May 76
New Zealand	FY 76	31 May - 1 Jun 76
Australia	FY 76	2-4 Jun 76
Republic of Indonesia	FY 76	20 Sep - 1 Oct 76
Japan	FY 7T	29 Nov - 1 Dec 76
Republic of China	FY 77	2-10 Dec 76

(U) Effective 20 August 1976 the frequency of security assistance evaluations for major MAAGs in PACOM was increased to once a year and teams were to include Inspector General representation. Smaller security assistance activities would continue to be evaluated every two years, or sooner if deemed necessary.[3]

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1. J452 Point Paper, 27 Oct 76, Subj: United States Army War College International Fellows Program (IFP).
2. CINCPAC PEG Reports, Republic of the Philippines FY 76, 18 May 76; Singapore FY 76, n.d.; Malaysia FY 76, n.d.; New Zealand FY 76, 29 Jul 76; Australia FY 76, n.d.; Republic of Indonesia FY 7T, 23 Dec 76; Japan FY 77, 8 Feb 77; Republic of China FY 77, 8 Feb 77.
3. J4 WEB 14-20 Aug 76.

SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Australia

Overview

(C) All FMS to Australia were for cash. During FY 76 Australia, with actual purchases worth $533,736,000, ranked second only to the Republic of Korea in volume of sales. In purchasing U.S. military equipment the Government of Australia (GOA) advocated a program called Australian Industrial Participation whereby the firm selling the equipment or the U.S. Government agreed to make "offset" procurements of components, subsystems, and total systems from Australian industry as a condition of the sale. Offsets of up to 25 percent of each sale were encouraged if they could satisfy U.S. requirements for performance, quality, delivery, and cost. The objectives of the program were to broaden Australian industrial capability, stimulate technological advancement, and improve defense supply capability and self-reliance.[1]

(C) Australia had purchased the following major items of capital equipment from the United States:[2]

3 guided missile destroyers (DDG)
2 guided missile frigates (FFG-7) (during 1976)
37 C-130 transports (12 during 1976)
24 F-111C fighter bombers
19 P-3 (11 P-3B and 8 P-3C) long-range maritime patrol aircraft
20 A-4G carrier based fighter aircraft
36 P-2 patrol aircraft
17 S-2E anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft
Numerous helicopters and vehicles

(S) Major prospective sales of U.S. equipment for the period FY 77-81 included the following:[3]

- Replacements for 75 MIRAGE fighter aircraft

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1. FY 78 CPD, Vol. I, p. 37; J466 Point Paper, 13 Jul 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia.
2. J466 Point Paper, 13 Jul 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia; J466 HistSum Dec 76; DSAA Journal, 30 Sep 76.
3. J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia; DIA 6930/070614Z Dec 76.

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIA BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	2,970,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	13,695,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.7 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	98.5 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	71 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	8.4 ACRES
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$83.0 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$5,900
DEFENSE BUDGET	$2.2 BILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	2.5

GOVERNOR GENERAL	Sir John Robert KERR
PRIME MINISTER	John Malcolm FRASER
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER	John Douglas ANTHONY
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Denis James KILLEN
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Andrew S. PEACOCK
CHIEF OF DEFENSE FORCE STAFF	GEN Francis G. HASSETT
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, DOD (ARMY OFFICE)	LGEN Arthur L. MCDONALD
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, DOD (NAVY OFFICE)	VADM Anthony M. SYNNOT
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, DOD (AIR FORCE OFFICE)	AVM James A. ROWLAND

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. James W. HARGROVE
USDAO	COL Roger P. NUNEMATER, USAF
CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA	COL Jack T. DETOUR, USAF



U.S SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST POSSIBLE EXTERNAL THREATS AND CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE.

ASSIST IN MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.

MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN HOST COUNTRY AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, FOSTERING FAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND ENCOURAGING PURSUIT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS AND STRATEGY.

ENABLE DEFENSE OF CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA AREAS AND SEA/AIR ROUTES.

DEVELOP CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY FORCES OF OTHER ALLIED OR FRIENDLY NATIONS ENCOURAGING REGIONAL COOPERATION.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

6 Infantry Battalions, 1 Special Air Service Regiment, 3 Artillery Regiments, 1 Armored Regiment, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, 2 Cavalry Regiments. 74 non-jet aircraft in Army Aviation.

Strength: 31,500

[redacted]

NAVY

1 Carrier, 1 Destroyer type, 4 Submarines, 13 Coastal types, 5 Amphibious types, 4 Mine Warfare types, 8 Auxiliary types, 73 Service Craft, and 64 Naval aircraft.

Strength: 16,000, which includes 1,600 Naval Air personnel.

[redacted]

AIR FORCE

458 aircraft, of which 229 are jets.

Strength. 21,500

[redacted]

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 67.

- 47 utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS) helicopters (being developed)

- 104 105mm howitzers

- Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) helicopters

- Various types of missiles

- One FFG-7

- 2 P-3C aircraft

- 18 S-2 ASW aircraft (12 to replace those destroyed by fire in December 1976)

MIRAGE Replacement

(S) During 1976 the Royal Australian Air Force made plans to replace its three squadrons (75 aircraft) of French MIRAGE tactical fighter aircraft. The replacement would be either a multipurpose aircraft or a mix of ground support and air defense aircraft. As of year's end 10 possible U.S. and third country aircraft were under consideration. U.S. aircraft under consideration included the A-7, A-10, F-14, F-15, and F-16. The contenders were expected to be reduced to two or three as early as March 1977.[1]

[redacted]

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1. J462 Point Paper, 22 Jul 76, Subj: MIRAGE Replacement-Australia; J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia.
2. DIA 6930/070614Z Dec 76; CNO 141835Z Dec 76 and 141920Z Dec 76.

Transfer of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles to Papua New Guinea

(S) The GOA had been seeking U.S. Government approval to transfer U.S.-origin FMS articles, primarily small arms, related ammunition, and spare parts, to the Government of Papua New Guinea. On 6 October 1976 the Secretary of State authorized the transfer of these items.[1]

Republic of China

The U.S. Advisory Effort

(S) The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) had been reduced by approximately 35 percent since 1975 to a strength of 43 military, 5 U.S. civilians, and 12 local nationals during 1976. With this manpower reduction, the MAAG had adopted the approach of advising at the ROC managerial vice field level. During 1976 the MAAG had conducted a staff study based solely on a military appraisal to identify items the ROC should procure prior to normalization of U.S.-People's Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic relations. The study was hand-carried to CINCPAC on 11 November 1976 with the MAAG's position that certain proposed items would create either a credible ROC deterrent against the PRC or would be necessary to counter an actual PRC attack. Based upon an abbreviated list of weapons proposed for the ROC, provided by Vice Admiral Snyder (COMUSTDC) to Admiral Weisner on 31 August 1976, and CINCPAC's response to that list, it appeared that there was little hope that the ROC would receive additional FMS credit to support the proposed acquisitions. The abbreviated list was as follows:[2]

Air Force	Navy	Army
Item (Quantity)	Item (Quantity)	Item (Quantity)
F-16 Fighter (FX) (36)	DD (6)	TOW Missile (48)
E-2C EM Plane (1-2)	PB (B Class) (6)	M48 Tanks (50-100)
ASM (MAVERICK or other)	SSM HARPOON (120)	CHAPARRAL (AN/DAW-1)
RF-4E Recon Plane	Sea CHAPARRAL (AN/DAW-1)	VULCAN 40mm (modified)
Cluster Bomb Units (CBU)	SSM PENGUIN	
	Influenced Mine	

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1. J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Australia.
2. CINCPAC PEG Report, Republic of China, FY 77, 8 Feb 77, pp. I-1, A-6; J465 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 110152Z Sep 76.

~~NOFORN~~

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	14,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	16,286,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.9 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	90 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	70 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.1 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1976	$17.065 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$1,042
DEFENSE BUDGET (Self Financed) 1976	$1.23 BILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	7.8

PRESIDENT	YEN, Chia-Kan
PREMIER	CHIANG, Ching-Kuo
DEFENSE MINISTER	KAO, K'uei-yuan
CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF	ADM SUNG, Chang-Chih, Navy
CINC ARMY	GEN MA, An-Tan
CINC NAVY	ADM TSOU, Chien
CINC AIR FORCE	GEN SZU, Tu-fu
CINC, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE	GEN LO, Yu-lun
COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS	LGEN HUANG, Kwang-Lo

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U. S. AMBASSADOR	HON. Leonard UNGER
COMUSTDC	VADM Edwin P. SNYDER, USN
CHIEF, MAAG	BGEN Leslie FORNEY, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

SUPPORT MODERNIZATION OF ROC FORCES ESSENTIAL TO INITIAL DEFENSE OF TAIWAN AND THE PESCADORES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT.

ENSURE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. FORCES.

ENCOURAGE PURSUIT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

12 Heavy and 6 Light Infantry Divisions, 3 Armored Brigades, 1 Armored Infantry Brigade, 2 Armored Cavalry Regiments, 1 Special Warfare Command (Airborne), 25 Artillery Battalions, 1 Aviation Battalion, 1 Air Defense Group (Missile).

Strength: 324,000

Maintain internal security to conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, the Penghus, and Offshore Islands against small-scale attack if provided outside air, naval, and logistic support. Well organized and combat ready.

NAVY

18 Destroyer types, 2 Submarines, 19 Coastal Patrol types, 21 Mine Warfare types, 49 Amphibious types, 20 Auxiliary types, 2 Marine Divisions, 1 Landing Vehicle Track Regiment.

Strength: 67,000 (Includes 34,200 Marines)

The overall ability of the Chinese Navy to perform its assigned mission is considered fair. The Chinese Marines are considered capable of conducting division size amphibious operations, provided the required air and naval support, including amphibious shipping, is available.

AIR FORCE

13 Tactical Fighter Sq (2 F-5s, 5 F-100s, 1 F-104, 3 F/TF-104s), 1 Reconnaissance Sq (RF-104), 1 Search and Rescue Sq (HH-16, HH-1H), 6 Transportation Sq (C-119), 1 Antisubmarine Warfare Sq (S-2), 1 Tactical Support Sq (O-1).

Strength: 70,000

Force is combat ready. The Air force has demonstrated its ability to perform its primary function, air defense of Taiwan under day visual flight rules conditions. The limited all-weather defense capability is improving with the introduction of new F-5E fighters. Capable of providing fighter cover for naval operations in the area and tactical support for an Army corps.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 69.

SECRET

SECRET

Ongoing Programs

(S) Defense priorities for FY 78-82 were air defense, naval protection of contiguous sea areas, and improvement in defense ground force combat effectiveness. Major ongoing programs during 1976 included:[1]

- Co-production of 180 F-5E/F aircraft
- Semi-automated air defense system ($34 million contract with Hughes)
- Purchase of 16 S-2E aircraft
- Purchase of second Improved HAWK battalion
- Co-production of two Patrol Boat Multi-Mission (PGMM) with Tacoma Boat

F-5E/F Co-production Continuation Program

(C) During May 1976 CINCPAC requested the latest status of the ROC Country Team December 1975 request to permit extension of F-5E/F co-production authority from 120 to 200. The request was pending State Department and National Security Council concurrence until July 1976, when approval was given to co-produce an additional 60 F-5 aircraft with an option to co-produce 20 more for a total of 200.[2]

S-2E Aircraft Program

(C) During January 1976 the ROC purchased 16 Navy S-2E aircraft for a total estimated cost of $6,443,332 as part of the effort to improve their protection of contiguous sea areas.[3]

Improved HAWK Missiles

(C) In December 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei advised of the ROC decision to buy an additional 90 Improved HAWK missiles required to complete a third basic

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1. J465 Point Paper, 10 Dec 76, Subj: Security Assistance-Republic of China.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 406; CINCPAC 180450Z May 76; SECDEF 3341/182109Z May 76, 3742/150005Z Jul 76, and 6560/171917Z Jul 76.
3. CNO 022326Z Jan 76 and 092127Z Jan 76; CHMAAG Taipei 070803Z Jan 76 and 130803Z Jan 76.

load for their latest Improved HAWK battalion. Final action was pending at year's end.[1]

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on M-48 Tanks

(C) In September 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei advised that the Premier of the ROC had personally requested revision of the 16 May 1974 MOU to allow for turn-in of M-7 howitzers, self-propelled 105mm and M-8 howitzers, and 75mm assault guns, in lieu of the old M-18/M-24 tanks, for 100 M-48 tanks. Chief, MAAG Taipei, with CINCPAC support, had originally opposed revision of the MOU in 1975 due to the drain on operation and maintenance funds required for the upkeep of M-18/M-24 tanks, and the issue was held in abeyance until the Premier's personal interest was revealed. CINCPAC now concurred with the revision, which was approved by the Secretary of Defense at the end of September 1976.[2]

Letter of Offer for M-48A1 Tanks

(C) In October 1976 the Secretary of State requested comments and the detailed rationale from the American Embassy, Taipei concerning a ROC letter of offer for 55 M-48A1 tanks (by November the request had been increased to 100). The American Embassy noted that, while the Mission felt that the ROC should forego new tanks in favor of using its limited financial resources to enhance its air and naval capabilities, ROC domestic political concerns were an important determining factor favoring approval of this request.[3]

(C) The Army was an important element in the ROC domestic political equation, and the maintenance of its morale at an adequately high level was recognized as a factor bearing on the political stability of the ROC Government. The current Chief of the General Staff appeared to favor reductions in Army strength, but found it difficult to argue effectively for cuts in the Army when all new and sophisticated weapon systems went to the Air Force and Navy. It was felt that the provision of additional M-48 tanks would not have a significant adverse impact on ROC defense priorities, but would hopefully lessen the Army's resistance to manpower cuts and bring about a more cooperative attitude toward the goal of substituting firepower for manpower.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 405; CHMAAG Taipei 230809Z Dec 76.
2. CHMAAG Taipei 220816Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 282109Z Sep 76; SECDEF 4010/292226Z Sep 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 407-408.
3. SECSTATE 258538/191851Z Oct 76; AMEMB Taipei 7338/020820Z Nov 76.
4. AMEMB Taipei 7338/020820Z Nov 76.

(C) In fact, there was also a shortage of "good" tanks in the ROC Army inventory. There was an overall shortfall of 279 tanks from the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) authorization level, and a specific M-48 shortfall of 219 from the Army's TO&E requirement. CINCPAC supported the request for M-48A1s provided the MOU required one-for-one turn-in or old M-24s or M-18s. At the end of the year the State Department and DSAA indicated general agreement with this proviso, but a final position on the change in requirement from 55 to 100 tanks was pending at the end of the year.[1]

Acquisition of Long-Range Oblique Photography Aerial Cameras

(S) During November 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei informed the Secretary of Defense that the ROC Ministry of National Defense had submitted a requirement for four long-range oblique photography aerial camera sets, either four KA-102As or KS-127As, or a combination of two of each with a focal length of 66 inches to improve reconnaissance missions no closer than 15 miles off the PRC coast. The JCS suggested that the ROC consider a 24-inch model if the 66-inch models were not approved for release, but Chief, MAAG Taipei advised that the 24-inch model was not acceptable to the ROC. The Chief, MAAG Taipei position was passed by CINCPAC to the JCS for consideration on 30 December 1976.[2]

Advanced Air-to-Ground Munitions

(S) In October 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei expressed concern over the slow response to efforts since 1974 to obtain approval for release of information to the ROC on advanced air-to-ground munitions systems such as cluster bomb units (CBU), laser guided bombs (LGB), and MAVERICK missiles (AGM-65A).[3]

(S) In May 1975 the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) had emphasized the requirement for LGBs as a deterrent to PRC STYX missile-armed naval craft and the amphibious threat, without result. In June 1976 CINCPAC queried the JCS on this subject, noting that local studies had indicated that LGBs would provide the ROC a marginally effective counter to STYX and OSA missile boats and a very effective counter to an amphibious capability without risking compromise of advanced technology and without being interpreted as provocative by the PRC.[4]

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 110046Z Nov 76; JCS 7212/162009Z Nov 76.
2. CHMAAG Taipei 110801Z Nov 76 and 230806Z Dec 76; JCS 4384/031453Z Dec 76; CINCPAC 300431Z Dec 76.
3. CHMAAG Taipei 290804Z Oct 76.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 408; CINCPAC 040032Z Jun 76.

(S) Between July and September 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei requested, and CINCPAC provided, effectiveness information on several air-to-ground weapons. Also in September, Chief, MAAG Taipei requested, and CINCPAC supported, expanded data on the MAVERICK missile, to include characteristics, costs, and other information concerning its use with the F-5E.[1]

(S) In November 1976 CINCPAC expressed support for the release of information concerning CBU and LGB munitions to the ROC based on military considerations. At year's end the Secretary of Defense replied that the State Department was reviewing the issue of ROC access to these munitions, with the exception of the ROCKEYE CBU, an export license for components of which had been issued on 30 August 1976.[2]

PEACE EDGE Rotary Coupler Problem

(U) Project PEACE EDGE provided the Chinese Air Force four AN/FPS-110 search radar systems to upgrade the Taiwan Air Defense System. Since installation of the four systems, nine Rotary Couplers had failed by mid-December 1976. During December 1976 Chief, MAAG Taipei advised that, to maintain operation of the four sites, a substitute coupler was installed as a temporary fix; however, this limited the system's operation and resulted in a loss of radar coverage which degraded the Chinese air defense system. Chief, MAAG Taipei requested that additional efforts be expended to correct the situation, and at year's end the Director, Materiel Management, McClellan AFB, CA was working on the problem and had proposed a meeting of all concerned to attain a permanent fix and address other areas of concern. Chief, MAAG Taipei requested that the meeting be held in Taiwan with the date to be determined.[3]

Coastal Minesweeper (MSC) Decommissioning and Conversion

(S) During February 1976 the CNO approved a Chief, MAAG Taipei request on behalf of the Chinese Navy to cannibalize and convert ROC Navy MSCs 159 and 160 (formerly USN MSCs 302 and 300 respectively), which had been provided through MAP. Also, CINCPAC provided instructions for cannibalizing and scrapping ROC Navy MSC 163 (formerly USN MSC 101).[4]

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1. CHMAAG Taipei 270809Z Jul 76, 240807Z Aug 76, and 170805Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 100447Z Aug 76, 090426Z Sep 76, and 282105Z Sep 76.
2. CINCPAC 180606Z Nov 76; SECDEF 7491/072145Z Dec 76.
3. CHMAAG Taipei 150402Z Dec 76 and 270807Z Dec 76; DIR MAT MGT McClellan AFB CA 162315Z Dec 76.
4. CHMAAG Taipei 040802Z Feb 76; CINCPAC 092115Z Feb 76; CNO 132148Z Feb 76.

INDIA

INDIA BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	1,211,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	627,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.0 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	29 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	About 42 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.7 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$94 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$149
DEFENSE BUDGET	$3.1 BILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	Approx 3.3

PRESIDENT	MR. Basappa Danappa JATTI
PRIME MINISTER	MRS. Indira GANDHI
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Bansi LAL
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	GEN Tapashwar Narin RAINA
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	ADM Jal CURSETJI
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	AIR CHIEF MARSHAL Hrushikesh MOOLGAVKAR

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	(VACANT)
USDAO	COL Lewis H. GOAD, USA
USDRI	CDR Albert RYAN, USN



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

ASSIST INDIA'S ARMED FORCES TO MAINTAIN THEIR AIR FORCE TRANSPORT AND RADAR EARLY WARNING AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS THROUGH PROVISION OF SPARE PARTS FOR CASH.

MAINTAIN A MINIMUM-EFFORT SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA CONSISTENT WITH INDIA'S CURRENT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.

REDUCE SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

7 Corps, 16 Infantry Divisions, 10 Mountain Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions.

Strength: 1,100,000
(Paramilitary Strength: 433,000)

Excellent capability to maintain internal security and good capability to resist external aggression. Limited airborne capability. Dependent on foreign sources for some sophisticated weaponry.

NAVY

1 Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft Carrier, 2 Light Cruisers, 24 Frigates, 8 Submarines, 12 Patrol Craft (guided missile), 11 Coastal Patrol Ships/Craft, 7 Mine Warfare Ships, 6 Amphibious Warfare Ship's.

Strength: 40,000

Moderate capability to defend coastline. Limited long-range (offensive), antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and amphibious capabilities.

AIR FORCE

3 Light Bomber Squadrons (B(I)58), 11 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons (SU-7, HF-24, MIG-21M), 17 Fighter Squadrons (GNAT, MIG-21FL), 2 Reconnaissance Squadrons (PR-57, C-121), 10 Transport Squadrons (miscellaneous), 14 Helicopter Squadrons (MI-4, MI-8, Alouette III).

Strength: 105,000

Moderate interceptor and close air support capabilities. Limited airmobile capability.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 70.

Fiji

(S) During 1976 Fiji purchased a third coastal minesweeper (ex-USS WOODPECKER) for $20,000.[1]

India

(S) At the FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference the Defense Representative to India noted that the U.S. program (training only) operated in a hostile political environment, and that modification of the arms embargo (1975) did not result in increased interest in U.S. equipment. He did advise, however, that the training program was essential to the maintenance of rapport with the Indian Armed Forces.[2]

Indonesia

Overview

(S) As a result of Indonesia's invasion of Timor in December 1975 and Congressional concern over the issue of human rights in Indonesia, the grant aid program (MAP and IMETP) remained on Executive Branch "hold" from December 1975 to June 1976 when the new Foreign Assistance Act was passed. An immediate result of this "hold" was cancellation of programmed training until May 1976, when, as an exception to the "hold", the State Department approved funding for five flag/general officers to attend a Senior International Defense Management Course and for six other officers to attend Service command and staff courses.[3]

(S) During the period 25-29 June 1976 U.S.-Indonesian consultations were held in Washington, DC in conjunction with a visit by GOI Foreign Minister Malik. In staff talks held at the Department of Defense, the U.S. side indicated an intention to continue security assistance to Indonesia and the belief that completion of Congressional action on current legislation would resolve some of the existing technical difficulties. Both sides agreed on the nature of the basic threat to Indonesia as being outside support for insurgency, but the Indonesians had an obvious feeling of urgency which they seemed to think the United States did not fully share. Furthermore, the Indonesians

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 410; SECSTATE 084925/081736Z Apr 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 410; Op. Cit., Report on the 1975 [FY 76] PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference, p. 9.
3. CHUSDLG Jakarta 060900Z May 76 and 180540Z May 76; SECDEF 6696/122117Z May 76 and 3340/182109Z May 76; J473 Point Paper, 1 Apr 76, Subj: Security Assistance-Indonesia.

INDONESIA

INDONESIA BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	735,380 SQ MI
POPULATION	133,240,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.6 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	60 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	48 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	43 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1976 (Est)	$20 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$180
DEFENSE BUDGET (Self-Financed) 1976	$1,262 MILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	4

PRESIDENT	GEN SUHARTO
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY	GEN PANGGABEAN
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Adam MALIK
ARMED FORCES CINC	GEN PANGGABEAN
ARMED FORCES VICE CINC	GEN SURONO
ARMY COMMANDER	LT GEN MAKMUN
NAVY COMMANDER	ADM SUBYAKTO
AIR FORCE COMMANDER	AIR MARSHALL Saleh BESARAH
COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS	MAJ GEN ANWAR

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. David D. NEWSOM
USAID REPRESENTATIVE	MR. Richard M. CASHIN
CHUSDLG	COL William W. TOMBAUGH, USA



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INDONESIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND SELF-DEFENSE.

PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF U.S. SUPPORT TO AN INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AMENABLE TO U.S. INTERESTS.

CONTRIBUTE TO FRIENDLY GOI RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS AND THE UNITED STATES.

HELP PRESERVE U.S. ACCESS TO INDONESIAN RAW MATERIALS AND AIR AND SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION.

PROMOTE EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY, AND ASSIST THE GOI IN ATTAINING A DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

13 Infantry Brigades, 2 Airborne Brigades, 1 Paratroop/Commando Regiment, 1 Cavalry Brigade, 5 Field Artillery Regiments, 4 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments, 44 Infantry Battalions (Separate) 7 Cavalry Battalions (Separate), 5 Field Artillery Battalions, 7 Combat Engineer Battalions, 5 Airborne Infantry Battalions, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Separate), 3 Signal Battalions, 1 Air Defense Radar Battalion, 2 Quartermaster Battalions, 6 Transportation Battalions, 2 Military Police Battalions

Strength: 180,000

Maintain internal security and effectively repel minor incursions but not a major attack. Limited offensive capability. Overall readiness retarded by long lines of communication and logistical problems.

NAVY

7 Destroyer Escorts, 2 Submarines, 25 Patrol Ships/Craft, 5 Mine Warfare Ships, 10 Amphibious Warfare Ships/Craft, 10 Auxiliary, 1 Training Ship.

Strength: 26,000 Navy; 12,000 Marines

Partially suppress smuggling and provide limited support for amphibious operations. Conduct only token submarine interdiction and antisubmarine warfare operations. Marines are capable of providing a regimental size landing force for amphibious assaults.

AIR FORCE

11 C-130s, 16 C-47s, 16 PV-10s, 2 B-26s, 35 Miscellaneous Helicopters, 15 MK-32s, 16 T-33s, 20 Miscellaneous Light/Medium/VIP/Cargo Transports, 46 Training Aircraft.

Strength: 28,800

Forces in being can provide only limited tactical air support and air defense. Transport capability is growing but still can support only minor ground operations. Early warning radar and antiaircraft artillery defense systems extremely weak.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 71.

indicated disappointment at U.S. inability to offer more than a seven-year repayment period for FMS credits, and hesitantly signed the remaining FY 76 transactions just before the 30 June deadline. The U.S. side agreed to review the question of FMS terms during FY 77. CINCPAC had supported improved FMS terms, noting that varying payback periods created misunderstandings, that MAAG chiefs were faced with the dilemma of trying to explain differences without sufficient rationale, and that the decreasing attractiveness of U.S. Government credits might lead to additional third country sales and lessening of U.S. leverage with the host country military.[1]

OV-10 Aircraft

(U) By December 1976, 9 of the 16 OV-10F aircraft programmed under FY 75 FMS had arrived in country, with 7 remaining to be delivered over the next few months. GOI also contracted a $1.5 million FMS life support equipment case, portions of which had been delivered in September 1976. Some of this equipment was found to be old, soiled, and generally in a poor state of repair. This created an extreme state of irritation among officers in the highest echelon of the Indonesian Air Force until the situation was corrected. As a result of this incident, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force advised the responsible logistics units to insure that items shipped to Indonesia had at least a 75 percent usable life in accordance with Air Force Manual 67-1 requirements.[2]

(U) The OV-10 Mobile Training Team (MTT) conducted instructor, electronics, engine, and ground support training during November and December 1976. In spite of delays and problems caused by nonavailability of some special tools and parts required to conduct hands-on training, the MTT successfully completed its mission with one member remaining in country through January 1977 to finish ground support equipment training.[3]

(S) During November 1976 a Defense Intelligence Agency report noted that two of the OV-10 BRONCO counterinsurgency aircraft had been deployed to East Timor where there was an apparent continuing need for relatively sophisticated firepower in subduing the some 1,000 FRETILIN (National Front for the Liberation of East Timor) troops remaining in remote areas.[4]

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1. SECSTATE 166433/1/031718Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 160411Z May 76.
2. J473 HistSum Dec 76; CHUSDLG Jakarta 090033Z Sep 76; HQUSAF Wash DC 161938Z Sep 76.
3. CHUSDLG Jakarta 061022Z Dec 76, 171003Z Dec 76, and 300404Z Dec 76.
4. DIA 2084/182003Z Nov 76.

Indonesian Communications System (INDOCOM)

(C) INDOCOM was a high frequency (HF) radio network designed to provide nationwide military command and control communications. It was begun in 1971 as a 5-year project, but the planned completion date was extended from 1976 to 1980 as a result of program deviation beginning in FY 74 and long lead time associated with equipment (primarily civilian components) procurement. As of 1976 there were apparent problems in equipment maintenance, logistics support, and training which remained to be corrected before sustained operation of Project INDOCOM could be achieved.[1]

(C) In November 1976 the Chief, Defense Liaison Group (DLG) Jakarta requested guidance on the INDOCOM sub-project installation of communications equipment aboard 52 Indonesian-titled ships, 28 of which were of third country origin. The Secretary of Defense expressed no objection if two provisions were met:[2]

- Ships involved could not be of Communist Bloc origin.

- Prior written case-by-case approval would be required for the transfer of U.S.-origin equipment if the GOI intended to transfer any of the ships containing such equipment to a third country in the future.

Extension of Ship Lease Agreements

(C) In November 1976 the State Department authorized the extension of lease agreements on the following vessels until 30 September 1978: USS CLARK COUNTY (LST-601), USS IREDELL COUNTY (LST-839), USS TIDEWATER (AD-31), USS ASKARI (ARL-30).[3]

(C) The GOI had initially requested extension of the leases in September 1975, but positive action was delayed by the U.S. policy preference to sell rather than renew leases.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, pp. 410-411; CINCPAC PEG Report, Republic of Indonesia FY 7T, 23 Dec 76, pp. I-6-I-7, F-1-F-2; J474 Point Paper, 14 Apr 76, Subj: Indonesian Communications System (INDOCOM).
2. CHUSDLG Jakarta 010748Z Nov 76; SECDEF 1313/180031Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 040516Z Nov 76 and 190447Z Nov 76.
3. SECSTATE 289639/252159Z Nov 76.
4. J473 HistSum Nov 76.

Transfer of U.S.-Origin F-86 SABRE Jets from Malaysia

(C) In July 1976 the Secretary of State consented to Malaysian transfer of 16 F-86 SABRE jets to the Indonesian Air Force. Originally surfaced in December 1975, the transfer had been delayed, probably as a result of Indonesian involvement in Timor at that time. The GOI gave the required assurances regarding use and third-party transfers and the transaction was made on 22 July 1976.[1]

Replacement of UH-34D Helicopters

(U) In December 1976 the Chief, DLG Jakarta requested price and availability (P&A) data for UH-34Ds to replace two GOI helicopters which crashed in June and November 1976. The CNO advised that UH-34Ds were no longer available in the U.S. Navy inventory, nor were parts or rework capability available. The U.S. Air Force also reported no replacements available.[2]

V-150 Armored Cars

(U) On 1 September 1976 a shipment of 20 out of a total order of 45 V-150 Cadillac Gage armored cars left Mobile, AL for Indonesia.[3]

Disposal of Chemical Agent

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 445-446; SECSTATE 180098/211336Z Jul 76; COMIPAC 240315Z Jul 76.
2. CHUSDLG Jakarta 110122Z Dec 76; HQUSAF 171425Z Dec 76; CNO 211927Z Dec 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 415; J473 HistSum Sep 76.
4. CHUSDLG Jakarta 240827Z Sep 76; SECSTATE 241305/282304Z Sep 76; AMEMB Jakarta 12926/040340Z Oct 76; CINCPAC 021947Z Oct 76.

~~NOFORN~~

JAPAN

JAPAN BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	141,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	113,300,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.1 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	98.0 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	73 YEARS
ANNUAL GNP PER CAPITA	0.1 ZERO
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1977 (EST.)	$580 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$5,100
DEFENSE BUDGET 1977	$6.6 BILLION
% PERCENT OF GNP	0.9

EMPEROR	HIROHITO
PRIME MINISTER	FUKUDA Takeo
DEFENSE (STATE) MINISTER	MIHARA Asao
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	HATOYAMA Ichiro
CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL	ADM SAKEJIMA Hiroichi, JMSDF
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY	GEN KURISU Hiroomi
CHIEF OF STAFF, NAVY	ADM NAKAMURA Teiji
CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE	GEN HIRANO Akira

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. James D. HODGSON
COMUS JAPAN	LT GEN Walter T. GALLIGAN, USAF
USDAO	CAPT Marvin L. DUKE, USN
CINCPAC	CAPT Charles W. COLE, USN



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

ENCOURAGE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY IN ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, AIR DEFENSE, AND LOGISTICS, AND DISCOURAGE JAPAN'S ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

ENCOURAGE PROCUREMENT OF U.S. DEFENSE ARTICLES IN ORDER TO ENHANCE STANDARDIZATION, COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY OF U.S. AND JAPANESE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT, THEREBY PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARITY OF FORCES.

ENCOURAGE AN INCREASED DIALOGUE IN DEFENSE PLANNING FOR EXPANDED U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

12 Infantry Divisions, 1 Mechanized Division, 1 Airborne Brigade, 1 Tank Brigade, 1 Combined Brigade, 2 Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades (HAJ), 13 non-divisional Artillery Battalions, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (75mm gun), 1 Helicopter Brigade.

Strength: 156,000

Can maintain internal security, but requires U.S. support to repel aggression by a major power. Good discipline, morale, leadership, training, and equipment. Stock levels to support an expanded force are inadequate for sustained operations. Combat units are understrength.

NAVY

45 Destroyer types, 15 Submarines, 25 Coastal Patrol types, 9 Harbor Control types, 46 Mine Warfare types, 5 Amphibious types, 11 Auxiliary types, 101 Service Craft.

Strength: 40,000

Incapable of operations beyond coastal waters except in conjunction with U.S. forces. Lacks adequate air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and logistic support forces. Ships are well maintained; personnel highly motivated and well-trained.

AIR FORCE

990 Aircraft, including: 9 Fighter Interceptor Squadrons (141 F-104's, 88 F-4EJ), 3 Fighter Bomber Squadrons (84 F-86F), 1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (25 F-86F), 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (4 RF-86F, 14 RF-4EJ), 2 Transport Squadrons (7 C-46, 15 C-1, 9 YS-11), 269 Jet Trainers, 5 NIKE-AJAX Groups (162 Launchers, 452 missiles).

Strength: 43,000

Marginal capability to defend Japanese air space. However, lacks capability to defend against a major conventional penetration by either the PRC or USSR.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 72.

SECRET

SECRET

Patrol Ship Multi-Mission (PSMM) Purchase from Korea

(C) On 3 September 1976 the GOI signed a contract with Korea-Tacoma Marine Industries for four PSMMs (see also Section I). Originally, under FMS credit, two PSMMs were included as a multi-year buy beginning in FY 76, with four more to be purchased in later years; however, GOI inability to obtain assurances that U.S. FMS financing would be available with sufficiently long-term payback appeared to be at least partially responsible for their decision to deal with the Koreans.[1]

Third-Country Purchase Intentions

(S) As of the end of 1976 the GOI was known to be considering the purchase of two submarines from West Germany, a squadron of 16 Italian MB-326KB or MD-339 aircraft, and possibly an Italian-made ship-to-ship missile. These possible third-country purchases appeared to be motivated by more favorable credit terms and less concern with the size and nature of agent's fees than encountered in U.S. purchases.[2]

(U) In addition to the above possible purchases, the GOI finally signed a long-expected contract, on 22 March 1976, for the purchase of three Corvette-class destroyers from the Netherlands. Delivery was expected between mid-1979 and 1980.[3]

Japan

New Defense Plan

(C) On 29 October 1976 the Japanese Cabinet approved the New Defense Plan (Post-Fourth Defense Buildup Plan) which stressed:[4]

- Japan's dependence on the security relationship with the United States.

- The need for qualitative rather than quantitative improvements in Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 5377/240245Z Apr 76 and 11713/070710Z Sep 76.
2. J473 HistSum Dec 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 415; AMEMB Jakarta 3977/250840Z Mar 76.
4. AMEMB Tokyo 16355/020915Z Nov 76.

- The need to develop balanced peacetime forces capable of dealing by themselves with limited small-scale aggression.

- An assessment that full-scale aggression against Japan was unlikely because of the existing great-power balance and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

(C) The statement of the basic defense concept included an unprecedented phrase which called for "maintaining credibility of security arrangements with U.S. and consolidating arrangements for its smooth operation," thus laying a foundation for possible burden sharing.[1]

(C) Qualitative improvement of forces included procurement of the following major potential items:[2]

- P-3C Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) aircraft to replace aging P-2Js.

- Future fighter (FX) aircraft to replace F-104s.

- E-2C Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.

- Conversion of basic HAWK batteries to Improved HAWK.

- Armed helicopters.

Future Fighter (FX) Aircraft Selection

(C) By mid-January 1976 the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) had reduced the FX candidates to replace the F-104J from seven to three: F-14, Grumman; F-15, McDonnell-Douglas; and F-16, General Dynamics. Between 21 May and 13 July 1976 a Japanese FX selection team visited the United States for further evaluations. Between September and the end of the year all indications pointed toward selection of the F-15, although no formal announcement had been made. During the period 29 November-2 December 1976 an Office of the Secretary of Defense briefing team visited Japan to discuss the FX program, and Director General Sakata, JDA requested that data be developed using the F-15 as a pilot model. Total F-15 R&D cost was estimated at $1.7 billion, and, based on a production run of 1,065 aircraft, production costs were estimated at $1.6 million each.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. J462 Point Paper, 1 Oct 76, Subj: Japan's Post-Fourth Defense Buildup Plan.
3. CHMDAO Tokyo 8009/270120Z Jan 76, 8099/010815Z Oct 76, 8107/210548Z Oct 76, and 8130/020815Z Dec 76; SECDEF 1566/070257Z May 76.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Aircraft

(S) One major potential sale to Japan at the end of 1975 was the Lockheed P-3C Orion ASW aircraft. Before February 1976 acquisition of this aircraft appeared to be a foregone conclusion; however, in February testimonials before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revealed that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had paid $12.6 million in fees, commissions, and bribes to sell jetfighters and jetliners to Japan. As a result of this Lockheed pay-off scandal in Japan, the P-3C program came into question and the Japanese approach, while still leaning toward P-3C avionics, was to favor a domestically developed airframe. As of December 1976 no decision had been made and the DOD position that the avionics and airframe were inseparable was emphasized.[1]

Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft

(S) After the Cabinet approval on 29 October 1976, the Japanese National Defense Council (NDC) included a line item for one AEW aircraft squadron in the Defense Buildup Plan. Based on this inclusion, the JASDF AEW study team began to study the E-2C aircraft in greater detail to prepare a request for the Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1978 budget.[2]

Improved HAWK

(S) The JDA's planning objective was conversion of 4.5 HAWK battalions (18 batteries) to the Improved HAWK and production of approximately 500 new missiles in a 5 to 6 year period. At the end of 1976 the JFY 77 (1 April 1977-31 March 1978) budget review with the Finance Ministry made provisions for conversion of .5 battalions (2 batteries) and some (approximately 100) new missiles.[3]

(S) As a result of failure to meet some of its Fourth DBP (JFY 72-JFY 76, ending 31 March 1977) objectives, primarily due to inflation, the JDA revealed similar concern for the HAWK conversion program. Believing R&D charges could be more accurately programmed based on showing a larger quantity for acquisition purposes, the JDA desired to amend the 1967 basic HAWK MOU to include the JFY 77 Improved HAWK conversion (2 batteries), while including the remainder of the conversion (16 batteries) in a "side letter" to the MOU. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had no objection to handling the conversion in this manner,

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 418; J462 Point Papers, 1 Apr 76, Subj: Impact of Lockheed Allegations in Japan, and 1 Oct 76, Subj: ASW Aircraft-Japan; CHMDAO Tokyo 8135/060745Z Dec 76; Current History, Apr 76.
2. CHMDAO Tokyo 8109/020337Z Nov 76.
3. CHMDAO Tokyo 8141/150713Z Dec 76.

but noted that it would not affect the accuracy of determining R&D charges because a flat four percent of sale price would be levied, regardless of quantity, as the Improved HAWK had been an ongoing program for some years.[1]

Sale of Landing Ship to the City of Sasebo

(U) On 25 March 1976 a MAP ship (ex-LSSL-14) was sold to the city of Sasebo for $12,000. The ship was to serve as a breakwater/pier.[2]

Republic of Korea

Overview

(S) Since FY 71 security assistance to the ROK had been provided within the guidelines of the Five-Year Modernization Plan (MOD Plan), which originally provided for $1.5 billion total obligation authority through FY 75. Of this total, $1.25 billion was to be in FMS financing and new grant assistance and $250 million was to be the value of nonreimbursable transfers to consist primarily of grants of EDA under the MAP. At the 1973 (6th) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), U.S. delegates advised the ROK that the MOD Plan would have to be extended beyond FY 75 (ultimately to FY 77) and that resource transfer regardless of funding source (MAP, FMS financing, EDA, and no cost transfers) would be included in the mutual effort to achieve the $1.5 billion goal. Restrictions in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1974 on EDA transfers to the ROK, plus the termination of MAP grant aid at the end of FY 76, made it clear that achievement of the MOD Plan goal by FY 77 would be primarily through increased FMS financing. Based on this approach, the State Department concluded that the U.S. Government would actually exceed its commitment to the MOD Plan by some $14.5 million by the end of FY 77. The ROK, however, continued to view the approximately $104.3 million shortfall in nonreimbursable EDA as an outstanding U.S. commitment to the MOD Plan.[3]

(S) In 1975 the Koreans, realizing that they must become increasingly self-reliant in their defense, unilaterally prepared their own Five-Year (FY 76-80) Force Improvement Plan (FIP), which they revealed at the 8th SCM, 26-27 August 1975. Originally estimated at over $4 billion, the FIP emphasized improvements in air, sea, and land power required for a force capable of defending against North Korea without relying on U.S. Forces. The ROK asked for $1 billion in U.S. support for the FIP; however, the U.S. position was

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1. Ibid.; CHMDAO Tokyo 8142/160720Z Dec 76; SECDEF 2019/181713Z Dec 76.
2. CHMDAO Tokyo 300801Z Mar 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 421, 426-427; SECSTATE 239305/251637Z Sep 76; CHJUSMAGK 301013Z Aug 76.

~~NOFORN~~

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KOREA BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	38,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	35,200,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.0 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	90 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	50 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.2 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1976 (Est.)	$18.7 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$531
DEFENSE BUDGET (Self Financed) 1976 (Est.)	$1.4 BILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	5.3

PRESIDENT	GEN PARK Chong Hee
PRIME MINISTER	CHOE Kyu-Ha
DEFENSE MINISTER	SUH Jyong-Chul
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	PAK Tong-Chin
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	GEN NO Chae-Hyon, ROKA
CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY	GEN LEE Sae-Ho, ROKA
CHIEF NAVAL OPERATIONS	ADM HWANG Chong-Yon, ROKN
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE	GEN CHOO Young-Bock, ROKAF

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. Richard L. SNEIDER
U.S. AID DIRECTOR	MR. Michael H. B. ADLER
COMUS KOREA	GEN John W. VESSEY, JR., USA
CHIEF, JUSMAG-K	MAJ GEN Oliver D. STREET, III, USA



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

ASSIST ROK IN ACHIEVING MODERNIZED MILITARY FORCES CAPABLE OF UNILATERALLY DETERRING/DEFENDING AGAINST NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION WITH U.S. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

ASSIST IN OBTAINING AND MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.

PROMOTE THE SECURITY OF U.S. FACILITIES.

ASSIST ROK IN MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE COUNTERINFILTRATION CAPABILITY.

ENCOURAGE ROK TO REDUCE NONCOMBATANT, OVERHEAD MANPOWER AND TO CONCENTRATE ON ENHANCED USE OF MOD PLAN EQUIPMENT.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

17 Infantry Divisions, 1 Mechanized Infantry Division, 2 Armored Brigades, 2 Infantry Brigades, 2 Air Defense Artillery Brigades, 5 Special Forces Brigades, 1 Honest John Battalion, 28 Separate Field Artillery Battalions, 7 Separate Tank Battalions.

Strength: 523,000*

Maintain internal security and effectively repel a unilateral North Korean attack assuming adequate logistic, air and naval support is provided from outside sources.

NAVY

7 Destroyers and 3 Frigates, 53 Coastal Patrol Units, 11 Mine Warfare Units, 19 Amphibious Units, and 11 Auxiliary Units for a total of 104. 1 Marine Division.

Strength: 46,600, which includes 23,800 Marines*

Adequate capability of patrolling coastal waters, antisubmarine warfare, and amphibious operations. Limited minesweeping capability.

AIR FORCE

12 Tactical Fighter Interceptor Squadrons (10 F-86, F-5, 2 F-4), 1 Helicopter Squadron (UH-1H), 3 Transport Squadrons (2 C-46, 1 C-54), 1 Ocean Surveillance Squadron (S-2), 1 Tactical Air Support Squadron (O-1), 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (RF-5).

Strength: 27,700*

Forces in being operationally ready to support ground operations, and conduct VFR air and limited all weather defense missions.

*Strengths as of 1 August 1976

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 73.

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that the U.S. Government could not enter into multi-year commitments in support of the FIP. Most of the $275 million in FMS credit for FY 77 was required to finish the MOD Plan, although there would be some available for programs in the FIP.[1]

FY 76/7T Security Assistance Program

(C) The following were the major grant aid (MAP) programs for FY 76/7T:[2]

Amount ($ millions)	Number	Program	User
5.8		Aerospace Ground Equipment for F-5E Aircraft	ROKAF
.3		United Nations Forces Support	Tri Hq
12.2	6	F-5B Fighter Aircraft	ROKAF
10.0	72	Radar Warning Receivers for F-5E Aircraft (approximately 1/2 of F-5E Fleet)	ROKAF
4.3		War Reserve Munitions	ROKAF
20.1	5	Coastal Patrol & Interdiction Craft (CPIC)	ROKN
9.2		Supply Operations (packing, crating, handling, and transportation)	All Services
2.2		Training ($1.6M supports NIKE-related training)	All Services
64.1			

(C) Listed below are the major programs funded by FMS credit during FY 76/7T:[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 421-423; J463 Point Paper, 24 Nov 76, Subj: U.S. Security Assistance to ROK (Grant Aid and FMS).
2. J463 Point Paper, 24 Nov 76, Subj: U.S. Security Assistance to ROK (Grant Aid and FMS).
3. Ibid.

Amount ($ Millions)	Number*	Program	User
5.5	1	M-16 Rifle Plant (648,000 Rifles)	All Services
.5	1	Arsenal Expansion	All Services
4.5	800	AIM-9 Conversion	ROKAF
10.2	180	TOW Missile System	ROKA
3.7	10	F-5B Aircraft	ROKAF
24.8	1	Improved HAWK Battalion Conversion	ROKA
3.3	1	Missile Maintenance Depot	ROKA
16.4	19,958	Radio Co-production	All Services
7.3	5	PSMM Armament	ROKN
10.2	12	HARPOON Systems	ROKN
30.4	54	F-5E Aircraft	ROKAF
17.2	19	F-4E Aircraft	ROKAF
134.0			

*Most programs are multi-year endeavors. Credit levels shown under $ are FY 76/7T payments made. Numbers represent total acquisition for project (all years).

FY 77 Security Assistance Program

(C) In FY 77, for all practical purposes, the ROK assumed the responsibility for funding its entire defense effort through FMS and commercial sales. Remaining grant aid was for MAAG costs and payment of packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T) for equipment funded earlier but not yet delivered. Also, $2.7 million was proposed under the IMETP. The following is a breakout of FY 77 FMS projects:[1]

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1. Ibid.

Amount ($ Million)	Number*	Program
5.3	1	M-16 Rifle Plant (648,000 Rifles)
1.6	1	Small Arms Ammo Production Arsenal
3.7	5	Patrol Ship Multi-Mission Armament Suite
12.3	19,958	Radio Co-production
4.6	800	AIM-9 Conversion from E to J
6.9	180	TOW Missile Systems
16.7	1	Convert 1 Battalion Basic HAWK to Improved
5.8	1	Missile Maintenance Depot
29.0	12	HARPOON Missile Systems
1.6	1	Aircraft Maintenance Depot
98.4	54/6	F-5E/F-5F Fighter Aircraft
7.8	19	F-4E Fighter Aircraft
35.0	421	Upgrade M-48 Tanks
4.8	1 Battalion	Survey & Target Acquisition Equipment
8.9	5	Air Defense Command & Control Equipment
3.0	11	Ground Surveillance Equipment
3.0	1	Helicopter Simulator
1.0	1260	REDEYE
3.0	8	F-5F Aircraft
7.0	24	OV-10 Aircraft
0.5	1	Automation of Aircraft Control & Warning System
0.7	-	(AIM-7E/CBU-58/MK-82 Bomb) Munitions
1.1	90/5	Smart Bombs/PAVEWAY Illuminators
1.3	145	Radar Homing and Warning Receivers
2.9	42	Electronic-Countermeasure Pods
1.8	134	AN/MRC-108 Communications Central Radios
1.3	14	(AN/FRC-113 Radios) PEACE FORTUNE III
6.0	6	Transfer of 6 Batteries of U.S. NIKE HERCULES
275.0		

Grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

(S) In September 1976 CINCPAC, in response to a Chief, JUSMAGK initiative, recommended that the grant aid EDA program for Korea continue. Using the turnover of in-country NIKE-HERCULES battalions as an example, CINCPAC noted the advantages of grant aid EDA, especially in the wake of possible U.S. Forces drawdowns:[1]

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1. CINCPAC 112213Z Sep 76.

- It would provide a potential means of filling ROK unfunded requirements with a minimum of PCH&T costs.

- It would provide a feasible means of transferring U.S. excesses quickly, thus reducing handling and costs involved in transfers to the Defense Property Disposal Office, storage, scrap sales, etc.

- The U.S. Government could recover residual value at the end of useful equipment life under the provisions of Section 505(F) FAA.

- It would provide for suitable use of equipment in a purpose for which designed, vice transferring to the Defense Property Disposal Office or countries of less strategic importance.

(S) The Secretary of State, in responding to these attempts to maintain grant aid EDA support to Korea, noted that the MAP for Korea had ended on 30 June 1976, and that this termination applied to EDA as well as non-excess defense articles. The Secretary of State further denied the ROK Government contention relayed by Chief, JUSMAGK that $104.3 million in grant aid EDA was still outstanding under the Five-Year MOD Plan, noting changes introduced at the 1973 SCM.[1]

Missile Programs

(S) During 1976 continued ROK efforts to develop their overall missile capability, especially in the area of surface-to-surface missile systems, led to increased concern on the U.S. side. Chief, JUSMAGK and the American Embassy concluded that the direction of ROK effort was unacceptable. It was agreed that to defuse the situation, the United States should offer to help the ROK with acceptable development efforts and discourage undesirable trends, and a team of experts should be offered to make recommendations on ROK missile development programs. CINCPAC agreed with the idea of offering a team of experts, but was against committing the United States in advance to support the team recommendations. In general, CINCPAC rejected the need to extend the range of ROK missiles, to include the surface-to-surface range of the NIKE-HERCULES, for attack on Pyongyang, and advised that escalation in the ROK missile program could be perceived as threatening by North Korea, thus leading to a further arms buildup. CINCPAC did, however, support, on a case-by-case basis, ROK surface-to-surface missile development or acquisition programs

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1. SECSTATE 239305/251637Z Sep 76; CHJUSMAGK 301013Z Aug 76.

which met valid requirements, were within ROK capabilities, and were consistent with U.S. interests.[1]

NIKE-HERCULES

(S) In January 1975 the ROK agreed to accept six NIKE-HERCULES firing batteries (one battalion) of the U.S. 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. To meet the requirements to operate the U.S. sites, ROK trainees were programmed for CONUS training, in-country training at a ROK-established Air Defense School in Taegu, and infusion into U.S. sites. This training continued according to schedule during 1976, and on 30 September 1976 the ROK signed the LOA for turnover of the six batteries by the end of June 1977. The equipment was classified as EDA and was priced at $5.4 million.[2]

(S) During 1976 the ROK continued to press for release of surface-to-surface conversion kits for NIKE-HERCULES missiles. Requisitions for these kits were turned down by the Department of the Army during 1975, probably in conjunction with State and Defense Department opposition to other ROK initiatives to improve NIKE-HERCULES surface-to-surface capabilities. These initiatives included a McDonnell-Douglas study to improve the surface-to-surface capabilities of the NIKE-HERCULES system with respect to range, payload, and guidance accuracy, which would provide the ROK with greater self-sufficiency in intermediate range missiles. McDonnell-Douglas did not pursue this effort beyond the project feasibility phase. When the subject of sale of NIKE-HERCULES surface-to-surface conversion kits was raised again in May 1976, CINCPAC supported the sale if the kits offered no appreciable increased range and payload for the system. In response, the Secretary of Defense posed no objection to ROK acquisition of kits to enable use of the NIKE-HERCULES in a high explosive surface-to-surface role in accordance with the missile systems inherent and current capabilities. The Secretary of Defense, with Secretary of State concurrence, further authorized the Army to prepare an LOA for the ROK for 38 high explosive adapter kits for surface-to-surface firings.[3]

HAWK

(S) The ROK had three basic HAWK battalions. Approximately $35 million in FMS credit had been committed to conversion of one battalion to the Improved

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1. J461 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 172226Z Jul 76 and 182321Z Nov 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 432; J4 WEB 25 Sep-1 Oct 76; J46 Point Paper, 28 Apr 76, Subj: NIKE-HERCULES Transfer; J462 HistSum Oct 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 432-433; CINCPAC 050142Z Jun 76; SECDEF 8550/181602Z Jun 76.

HAWK beginning in May 1977. In August 1976 the ROK requested an LOA for conversion of their remaining two battalions to Improved HAWK for a cost of $80 million.[1]

(S) In January 1976 the ROK Minister of Defense was approached to determine his interest in acquiring 8 of the 12 U.S. HAWK batteries (2 battalions) located in Korea in the FY 79 time frame. The ROK Minister of Defense agreed in principle with the transfer, but preferred to delay the transfer to the 1980 time frame (after completion of the Korean FIP) due to the high costs involved. During 1976 price information was developed by the Secretary of Defense and initial indications were that the cost was expected to be near 100 percent of acquisition value, or $60 to $70 million per battalion.[2]

HARPOON

(S) On 30 March 1976 the ROK accepted the LOA for sale of 12 HARPOON missile systems and 120 missiles (FMS Case KS-AAP-P6). Subsequently, Chief, JUSMAGK asked for five additional systems for installation on CPIC. The Secretary of Defense authorized the CNO to amend the earlier FMS case and a survey team visited the ROK to evaluate the proposed installation on CPIC. At year's end the amended LOA was still pending release to the ROK.[3]

TOW Anti-Tank Missiles

(S) The ROK had signed two FMS cases for six companies (18 launchers per company) of TOW anti-tank missiles, two companies of which had been delivered at the end of 1975. In January 1976 Chief, JUSMAGK advised that the ROK had requested additional TOW missiles and equipment for four more TOW companies to bring the total to 10 companies as indicated in the ROK FIP.[4]

REDEYE

(S) In April 1976 Chief, JUSMAGK requested an LOA for 70 REDEYE missile systems for the ROK armed forces for defense against low flying aircraft in the Northwest Island chain. CINCPAC recommended loan of REDEYE for Northwest Island defense only, but the Secretary of State authorized transfer through

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1. CHJUSMAGK 090950Z Jan 76 and 191340Z Aug 76; J463 Point Paper, 15 Sep 76, Sugj: Conversion of ROKA Units to Improved HAWK.
2. COMUSK 090500Z Jan 76; J46 Point Paper, 28 Apr 76, Subj: HAWK Transfer.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 433; CHJUSMAGK 310151Z Mar 76; SECDEF 3489/200032Z Aug 76; J463 HistSum Dec 76.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 433; CHJUSMAGK 070910Z Jan 76.

FMS with the stipulation that the missile systems be sold back to the United States when no longer required for defense of the Northwest Islands. The National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee granted an exception to national disclosure policy allowing release of the 70 REDEYE missiles to the ROK, and they were sold to the ROK in June 1976 (FMS case URM) from 8th U.S. Army stocks.[1]

Aircraft Programs

Fighter/Attack Aircraft Status

(S) At the time of the 9th U.S.-ROK SCM, 26-27 May 1976, ROK fighter aircraft status was as follows:[2]

Aircraft	On-Hand	CY 76	CY 77	CY 78	Projected Total
F-86	89	0	0	0	73[a]
F-4D	34	0	0	0	34
F-4E	0	0	16	3	19[b]
F-5A	71	2[c]	0	0	73
RF-5A	8	1[c]	0	0	9
F-5B	26	8[d]	0	0	34
F-5E	48	25[e]	27[f]	27[f]	126
F-5F	0	0	3[f]	3[f]	6
A-37B	0	20	0	0	20[g]
Total	276	55	46	33	394[h]

a. Reflects washout schedule. By CY 80 only 57 to remain in inventory.
b. Acquired through FMS, project PEACE PHEASANT.
c. SEA retrograde obtained through FMS.
d. Acquired through grant aid/FMS mix, project PEACE NEEDLE.
e. Includes 21 aircraft returned by ROC to ROK under ENHANCE PLUS and last 3 grant aid funded F-5E aircraft.
f. Acquired under FMS project PEACE FREEDOM.
g. SEA retrograde obtained through FMS, project PEACE LODE, ROK also desired to purchase seven additional for cannibalization.
h. During CY 76-78 time frame, in conjunction with programmed acquisitions, ROKAF was scheduled to phaseout 6 T-33, 6 T-38, 12 C-46, 5 C-54, 6 H-19 in addition to 16 F-86 reflected in note "a" above.

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1. CHJUSMAGK 201012Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 230400Z Apr 76; SECSTATE 119814/151345Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 429-430; U.S.-ROK SCM Background Paper, n.d., Subj: ROKAF Fighter Aircraft Acquisitions: Status/Program; CHJUSMAGK 270847Z Apr 76; J463 HistSums Apr 76, Dec 76.

Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) for Fighter Aircraft

(S) In January 1976 the Director of Maintenance Management, Kelly AFB, TX provided a revised estimate for installing AN/ALR-46(V) RWR on ROK fighter aircraft. The estimate was reduced from $180.2 million for 205 F-5 aircraft to $72.9 million for 193 F-5 aircraft (12 F-5Es would be properly configured during production by separate estimate) due to the elimination of the requirement for a new environmental control system. To accommodate a portion of this program, Chief, JUSMAGK programmed $10 million of FY 76 grant aid funds against RWR modifications to 72 MAP-provided F-5E aircraft. The project was designated PEACE HOME.[1]

S-2E ASW Aircraft

(C) During 1976 one squadron (20 aircraft) of S-2Es was delivered to the ROK. As the U.S. Navy was phasing the S-2 out of its active inventory, allies were advised to deal directly with the commercial source (Grumman) for spares and repair parts. The ROK had contacted Grumman, but was slow to sign any contract. At year's end Chief, JUSMAGK requested the CNO to reconsider his position and establish a USN FMS Supply Support Arrangement to provide follow-on support for allies.[2]

F-16 Acquisition

(C) The ROK recognized the need for an advanced fighter in their FIP. In the past they had asked for various information, including price and availability of the F-16, and detailed cost and performance planning data for the F-4E, F-15, F-16, F-18, and A-10. The ROK informally requested U.S. Government approval for plans, with General Dynamics, to assemble F-16 aircraft in country during CY 79-81. The Country Team did not take a position on the ROK request, but asked for the opportunity to comment on the General Dynamics proposal prior to release to the ROK. In November the Secretary of Defense advised that the U.S. Government had made no decision to offer the F-16 for FMS to the ROK or to approve the assembly or co-production of the F-16 in the ROK. He further advised that the F-16 master plan indicated earliest F-16 availability to the ROK would be in mid-1982, and that the U.S. Government approval of co-production was a separate issue requiring extensive Washington review.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 431; DIR MAT MGT Kelly AFB TX 162230Z Jan 76; CHJUSMAGK 170636Z Jun 76 and 291003Z Sep 76; HQUSAF 231315Z Aug 76 and 242110Z Sep 76.
2. CNO 052110Z Aug 76; CHJUSMAGK 270608Z Dec 76.
3. SECDEF 4814/231338Z Nov 76; CHJUSMAGK 110243Z Nov 76; PACAF 032115Z Nov 76.

Close Air Support Study

(C) At the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in August 1975, CINCPAC conducted a study of the F-5E, A-7, and the A-10 to determine which aircraft could best perform the close air support mission in Korea. The CINCPAC study, completed 1 September 1976, concluded that the A-10 was the preferred aircraft primarily due to its larger ordnance carrying capability, lesser vulnerability to the anti-aircraft threat and its decided gun advantage.[1]

Air Defense Systems

Air Defense Control Systems

(S) In view of the North Korean tactical fighter threat, there was concern about the requirement for an integrated system for air-to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-air control in the Korea scenario. Both the tactical air and surface-to-air missile (SAM) control elements of the overall ROK system were manually operated. They needed to be automated and integrated. During 1976 the ROK had studied SAM control and was in the process of studying aircraft surveillance and control. In conjunction with these efforts the ROK desired to acquire the AN/TSQ-73 "missile minder" subsystem hardware during 1976. The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) supported ROK acquisition of an AN/TSQ-73, but CINCPAC advised delay in release of any LOA for the subsystem until systems design parameters of an integrated command and control system were established. At year's end CINCPAC had acquiesced in providing planning and budgetary information on the AN/TSQ-73, but still advised withholding the LOA.[2]

Low Altitude Aircraft Detection System (LAADS)

(S) In December 1976 CINCPAC, in response to a JCS request, recommended against sale of the LAADS to the ROK pending completion of the ROK air defense study.[3]

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1. J463 Point Paper, 13 Sep 76, Subj: Close Air Support Study, ROK; J461 HistSums Jan, Jul, Dec 76.
2. J463 Point Paper, 10 Sep 76, Subj: Air Surveillance and Control-ROK; CINCUNC 181600Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 080015Z Jul 76, 060055Z Nov 76, and 042154Z Dec 76; JCS 8779/281420Z Oct 76.
3. JCS 6564/042014Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 232044Z Dec 76.

Air-to-Ground Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)

(S) Throughout 1976 the ROK continued to indicate a high priority requirement for PGM, to include LGB and other systems. In view of the advanced technology involved in these systems, CINCPAC reviewed requests for release on a case-by-case basis (see Section I, Release of High Technology to PACOM Countries, for CINCPAC's case-by-case position).[1]

Tank Improvement Program

(S) By 1976 the ROK tank force, composed of 421 M-47, 140 M-48, and 280 M-48A2C tanks, was approaching a logistically unsupportable state. Life-of-type buys for repair parts for all gasoline engines, and for the M-47 tanks, had been completed and production facilities dismantled. Parts stocks were sufficient only to last through 1980.[2]

(S) The ROK Minister of Defense and Chief, JUSMAGK had conducted an analysis of options for improving the tank force, considering both logistical supportability and tactical effectiveness. The most cost effective ways for the ROK to improve the tank force appeared to be:[3]

- Replace the 421 M-47 tanks with M-48A1 tanks procured from the U.S. and upgrade these M-48A1 tanks to M-48A3 (diesel, 90mm gun) in Korea.

- Upgrade the remaining 420 M-48 tanks to M-48A3 configuration.

- Defer a decision to acquire new tanks until the post-FIP period.

(S) All U.S. M-48 tanks were originally programmed (SECDEF PDM for FY 77) to be retained and upgraded to the A-5 version in order to help reduce a serious U.S. tank inventory shortfall. Sale of 421 M-48 tanks to the ROK required Defense Department approval because it would exacerbate the U.S. shortfall and delay attainment of the U.S. inventory objective at current budget levels.[4]

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1. J463 HistSums Jan, Apr, Jun-Jul 76; J461 HistSum Jan 76.
2. U.S.-ROK SCM Background Paper, n.d., Subj: ROK Tank Improvement Program.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	128,400 SQ MI
POPULATION	11,862,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.7 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	35.5 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	60 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.68 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$8.2 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$710
DEFENSE BUDGET	$400 BILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	4.7

PARAMOUNT RULER	YAHYA Petra ibni Al Marhum Sultan Ibrahim
PRIME MINISTER ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER	HUSSEIN bin Onn
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Ahmad RITHAUDDEN
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS	Mohamed GHAZALI bin Shafie
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF	IBRAHIM bin Ismail, GEN
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, ARMY	Haji Mohamed SAID bin Abdul Ghaffer
CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF	Mohamed ZAIN bin Salleh, RADM
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	MOHAMED bin Taib, Air Vice Marshal

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. Francis T. UNDERHILL, JR.
USDAO	COL Richard C. EWAN, JR., USA



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FOR A STABLE NON-COMMUNIST MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT.

ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF FORCES CAPABLE OF ASSURING INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND IN FACILITATING THE SALE OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

ENCOURAGE REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND ITS NON-COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

9 Brigades, 31 Infantry Battalions

Strength: 51,500

(Police Field Service Strength: 14,800)

(Marine Police Strength: 2,000)

(Border Scouts Strength: 1,200)

Essentially an infantry force trained and experienced in jungle operations. Fairly effective in internal security and counterinsurgency missions up to battalion level. Very slight capability at brigade level and incapable of resisting a significant external attack or engaging in operations outside Malaysia without considerable outside assistance.

NAVY

2 Destroyer Escort types, 30 Coastal Patrol types (7 nonoperational), 6 Mine Warfare types, 1 Amphibious Warfare Ship, 28 Amphibious Warfare Craft, 4 Work Boats, 1 Survey Vessel, 1 Diving Tender.

Strength: 5,000

Offshore patrol, defense of sea lines of communication and territorial waters, as well as support of internal security operations. Limited by small size, maintenance problems, long coastline and geographic separation of the country into two portions.

AIR FORCE

39 Jets, 6 Turboprops, 41 Propeller Aircraft, 52 Helicopters.

Strength: 5,000

Can provide relatively effective transport support to Army, Navy, and Police for internal security missions. Modest ground support capability with CL-41's and F-5E aircraft.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 74.

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(S) At the 9th SCM Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved a ROK request to purchase 421 M-48A1 from U.S. Army depot stocks at the best possible price (eventually offered through FMS at $86,162 for serviceable and $78,329 for unserviceable tanks). In July 1976 the ROK requested sale and delivery of 190 available California National Guard M-48A1s and five complete M-48A3 modification kits for delivery by the end of CY 76. Through the end of 1976 further efforts were directed at preparing LOAs covering radios, CBR protection kits, machine guns, 90mm gun tubes, and 416 more tank conversion kits.[1]

U.S.-ROK Science and Technology Agreement

(S) On 22 November 1976 the U.S. Ambassador and ROK Foreign Minister ratified an agreement for cooperation in science and technology. Data begin exchanged under the agreement would not contribute to the ROK Missile Engineering Program.[2]

Malaysia

(S) Approximately 2,000 communist terrorists (CT) posed an internal threat to Malaysia, and over the past year there had been a gradual but steady increase in CT activity on the peninsula, mostly along the Malay-Thai border. Malaysia received "CONUS Training Only" through the International Military Education and Training Program and FMS. The current program, extending over a three-year period and based on an interdepartmental team (DOD-CIA) visit in 1975, consisted primarily of materiel and training appropriate for counter-insurgency operations. The priority of major security assistance items desired by the Government of Malaysia during FY 76-77 was: M-16s, S-61 helicopters, UH-1H helicopters, V-150 armored cars, LSTs, and 105mm howitzers.[3]

New Zealand

(S) FMS to New Zealand were on a cash basis. Sales for FY 76 totaled just over $6 million and FY 77 sales were projected at $4 million. New Zealand generally followed Australia's lead in procurement of major weapons systems. Past purchases had included 14 A-4K aircraft, 5 C-130 aircraft, 5 P-3B aircraft, 20 UH-1H helicopters, and training. Current FMS activity involved logistics arrangements (spare parts). Prospective sales for FY 77-81 included mostly aeronautical and naval modifications, missiles, vehicles,

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1. CHJUSMAGK 060100Z Jul 76; J463 HistSum Dec 76.
2. J461 HistSum Nov 76; AMEMB Seoul 9243/220658Z Nov 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 443-444; J472 Point Paper, 5 Oct 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Malaysia; J5121 Point Paper, 2 Mar 76, Subj: Political-Military Situation - Malaysia.

~~NOFORN~~

NEW ZEALAND

NEW ZEALAND BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	103,736 SQ MI
POPULATION	3,149,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.0 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	98 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	67 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.64 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$11.7 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$3,870
DEFENSE BUDGET	$238.3 MILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	2

GOVERNOR GENERAL	Sir Denis BLUNDELL
PRIME MINISTER	Robert D. MULDOON
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER	Brian E. TALBOYS
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Allan MCREADY
CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF	AIR MARSHAL Richard B. HOLT
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, ARMY	MAJ GEN Ronald O.P. HASSETT
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	RADM J. F. MCKENZIE
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	AVM Cyril L. SIEGERT

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. Armistead I. SELDEN, JR.
USDAO	COL William W. LEESBURG, USAF

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROMOTE CONTINUED AND ENHANCED COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND NEW ZEALAND FORCES.

MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE OUR CONTINUED ACCESS TO NEW ZEALAND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

ASSIST IN DEVELOPING, MAINTAINING, AND STRENGTHENING MODERN SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

PROMOTE STANDARDIZATION OF METHODS, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

1 Infantry Battalion, 2 Infantry Brigades, 1 Special Air Service Squadron

Strength: 5,600

[redacted]

NAVY

4 Destroyer types, 10 Coastal types, 4 Auxiliary types

Strength: 2,800

[redacted]

AIR FORCE

121 Aircraft, of which 29 are jets. 2 Attack Squadrons, 3 Transportation Squadrons, 1 Reconnaissance Squadron, 2 Battlefield Support Squadrons, 1 Training Wing, and 1 Base Wing.

Strength: 4,300

[redacted]

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 76.

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command and control equipment, 16 105mm howitzers, and training. Also the New Zealand Navy was faced with the problem of replacing aging frigates beginning in 1982. An interest was being shown in U.S. Coast Guard HAMILTON-class cutters.[1]

Pakistan

Overview

(S) After the State Department announced an end to its decade-long embargo on exports of military equipment to Pakistan in 1975, equipment was sold on a case-by-case cash-only basis. The Defense Representative to Pakistan noted at the FY 76 PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference that Pakistan appeared pleased with U.S. equipment and logistics support and soured on People's Republic of China and French-provided equipment because of high support costs and failure rates.[2]

A-7 Aircraft

(S) Early in 1976 a four-man Pakistan Air Force (PAF) team visited the United States to evaluate the A-4, F-5, and A-7 as possible follow-on aircraft for the PAF. Their evaluation resulted in a formal request, 19 May 1976, to purchase 110 A-7s and a complete (except for nuclear weapons) array of weapons systems, munitions, electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment and target acquisition capabilities. The JCS requested CINCPAC's views to incorporate in their response to the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC convened the newly-formed PACOM Release Review Group to consider the PAF request, based on the external threat and technology involved in the requested systems and munitions. As a result of this review, CINCPAC recommended sale of only 59 A-7s in conjunction with replacement of aging F-86s as recognized in the JSOP FY 78-85. Furthermore, CINCPAC recommended not including offensive capabilities such as inflight refueling, and not releasing certain systems based on technological grounds:[3]

- Target Recognition Attack Multisensor (TRAM)
- Laser Tracker

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1. J465 Point Paper, 18 Nov 76, Subj: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in New Zealand.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 452; Op. Cit., Report on the 1975 [FY 76] PACOM MAAG Chief's Conference, p. 8.
3. AMEMB Islamabad 5130/190858Z May 76; JCS 5510/192116Z May 76; CINCPAC 020355Z Jun 76.

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	310,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	72,600,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.2 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	14 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	About 40 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.1 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$12.25 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$175
DEFENSE BUDGET	$886 MILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	About 7 PERCENT

PRESIDENT	Fazal Elahi CHAUDHRY
PRIME MINISTER	Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO
CHAIRMAN JCS COMMITTEE	GEN Mohammed SHARIF
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF	GEN ZIA-UL-Haq
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF	ADM Mohammad SHARIFF
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF	ACM Zulfiqar Ali KHAN

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. Henry A. BYROADE
U.S. AID DIRECTOR	MR. Joseph C. WHEELER
U.S. DRB	COL Richard F. GIBBS, USAF



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE AREA BY ASSISTING PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITIES TO ASSURE INTERNAL DEFENSE AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE TO OUTSIDE AGGRESSION.

ASSIST IN OBTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES.

MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN HOST COUNTRY AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FOSTERING FAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND ENCOURAGING PURSUIT WITHIN THE MILITARY OF OBJECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS AND STRATEGY. PAKISTAN'S MILITARY IMPACTS ON COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL POLICIES.

ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA AREAS AND SEA/AIR ROUTES.

DEVELOP CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY FORCES OF OTHER ALLIED/FRIENDLY NATIONS ENCOURAGING REGIONAL COOPERATION.

STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN'S WILL AND ABILITY TO RESIST AND DETER EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PAKISTAN.

ENCOURAGE PAKISTAN'S INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF CENTO AND STRENGTHEN MILITARY FORCES TO ASSURE ITS VIABLE MEMBERSHIP.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

6 Corps Headquarters, 16 Infantry Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions.

Strength: 408,000
(Paramilitary Strength: 75,000)

Moderate capability to maintain internal security and limited capability to resist external aggression. Dependent on foreign sources of supply for most war materiel.

NAVY

1 Antiaircraft Cruiser, 4 Destroyers, 1 Frigate, 2 Large Submarine Chasers, 3 Submarines, 13 Motor Gunboats, 4 Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boats, 7 Inshore Minesweepers, 3 Auxiliaries.

Strength: 9,900

Incapable of defending coastline and has very limited anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare capability. No transport or amphibious capability.

AIR FORCE

1 Light Bomber Squadron (B-57B), 3 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons (F-86), 7 Fighter Squadrons (MIG-19 and MIRAGE III), 2 Transport Squadrons (C-130).

Strength: 17,600

Moderate interceptor and limited close air support capability.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 77.

- Later versions of WALLEYE, HARPOON, HARM, and CONDOR weapons systems.

- Advanced ECM equipment.

(U) No further action was taken on this request through year's end.

TOW Missiles

(C) On 4 July 1976 the 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles purchased by Pakistan in October 1975 had arrived in country. On 8 July the LOA for a follow-on buy of 200 launchers and 3,000 missiles, training set, and ancillary equipment was sent to the Pakistan Embassy. Congressional approval was required as the LOA was valued at $27 million.[1]

JEZEBEL ASW System

(C) The Pakistan Navy was concerned with their limited ASW capability in the face of India's submarine threat, and had requested the JEZEBEL ASW system to counter this threat. CINCPAC had recommended release of the JEZEBEL system to Pakistan, and by July 1976 the NDPC approved release of AN/AQA-5 JEZEBEL narrowband processing equipment and related confidential material for use on three Pakistani Atlantique aircraft acquired from France.[2]

T-37 Aircraft

(U) During April 1976 the PAF received 18 T-37 aircraft under lease to increase their trained pilot output from 60-65 per year to 100-150 per year.[3]

Miscellaneous FMS Cases

(C) On 16 July 1976 the Secretary of State notified the American Embassy, Islamabad that several major FMS cases for Pakistan, which had encountered some delay, were being processed. These cases included transfer of the GEARING-class destroyers and two ocean-going minesweepers, and LOAs on armored personnel carriers, tank recovery vehicles, tractors, and Mark-46 torpedoes. In reference to the destroyers, CINCPAC, on 8 October 1976, supported Commander Mid-East Force and CINCPACFLT views that SW-15 crypto equipment be installed and that antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) equipment be retained. The rationale behind

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 456; J4 WEB 24-30 Jul 76.
2. J4 WEBs 15-21 May 76 and 26 Jun-4 Jul 76.
3. J4 WEB 10-16 Apr 76.

this recommendation was the importance of Pakistan's basing and staging facilities for U.S. Fleet operations in the Indian Ocean.[1]

Republic of the Philippines

Overview

(S) Throughout 1976 the major focus in U.S.-Philippine relations was on the base negotiations. While they did not have a significant impact on the FY 76-FY 77 Philippine security assistance programs, levels of assistance beyond FY 77 were subject to the outcome of the negotiations, and its was realized that the quid, in the form of assistance, for use of the bases would be the hardest problem to solve. Ambassador Sullivan had originally thought that a grant aid guarantee of $15-20 million and FMS credit of $20-30 million a year could solve the problem. As of November 1976 the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had proposed a five-year financial package totalling two billion U.S. dollars, but on the U.S. side the matter was left for consideration by the new Administration.[2]

FY 78 Funding Estimates

(S) In November 1976 the Secretary of State forwarded proposed MAP ($19.6 million) and FMS credit ($20 million) funding levels for FY 78. Based on these levels, the American Embassy, Manila advised that the FMS credit would be used entirely against payments due for 11 F-5E aircraft, while MAP materiel major items of equipment were estimated in priority order, as follows:[3]

Item (Number)
Helicopters, UH-1H (5)
Armored Personnel Carriers (15)
105mm Howitzers (8)
Trucks (32)
Patrol Boats, 65-ft MK3 (4)
Medium Landing Craft (2)

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1. SECSTATE 177037/162247Z Jul 76; J4 WEB 2-8 Oct 76.
2. J5124 Point Paper, 9 Apr 76, Subj: U.S./Phil Base Negotiations; J5123 Point Paper, 30 Nov 76, Subj: Status of Philippine Base Negotiations.
3. SEXSTATE 283410/1/181354Z Nov 76; AMEMB Manila 18515/260925Z Nov 76.

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PHILIPPINES

PHILIPPINES BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	116,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	43,948,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.2 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	83 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	59 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.52 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT FY 75	$15.8 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$365
DEFENSE BUDGET (Self Financed) 1975	$413 MILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	$2.5

PRESIDENT	Ferdinand E. MARCOS
SECRETARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Carlos P. ROMULO
SECRETARY NATIONAL DEFENSE	Juan P. ENRILE
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP	GEN Romeo ESPINO, ARMY
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF AFP	LGEN Rafael ILETO, AF
CG, ARMY	MGEN Fortunato U. ABAT
FOIC, NAVY	RADM Ernesto R. OGBINAR
CG, AIR FORCE	MGEN Samuel O. SARMIENTO
CHIEF CONSTABULARY	MGEN Fidel RAMOS, PC

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. William H. SULLIVAN
U.S. AID DIRECTOR	MR. Thomas C. NIBLOCK
CHIEF JUSMAG	BGEN James H. HAPP, USA

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

ASSIST IN OBTAINING AND MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.

SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY TO MEET RECOGNIZED THREAT WHILE PROMOTING THE SECURITY OF U.S. FACILITIES.

PROMOTE EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND REGIONALLY, TO ENHANCE MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY, WHEN APPROPRIATE.

PROMOTE SELF-RELIANCE.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

4 Infantry Divisions, 1 Infantry Brigade, 1 Home Defense Force Company Airborne)

Strength: 63,500

Constabulary: 4 Zone Commands (Brigade), 11 Battalions, 1 Metrocom (Brigade), 1 Presidential Guard Battalion.

Strength: 40,200

In conjunction with the Constabulary, the Army can maintain internal security and perform counter-insurgency and civic action missions. Not capable of resisting a major external attack without considerable outside assistance. Budget limitations, understrength combat units, and lack of operational experience and training above battalion level retard combat readiness.

NAVY

1 Destroyer type, 50 Coastal Patrol types, 4 Mine Warfare types, 11 Amphibious types, 10 Auxiliary types, 1 Marine Brigade.

Strength: 19,900, which includes 6,000 Marines

Conduct limited offshore patrol and minor amphibious and anti-submarine warfare operations.

AIR FORCE

3 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (2 F-86, 1 F-5), 1 Attack Squadron (T-28, SF-260M), 1 Air Commando Squadron (UH-1H), 1 Liaison Squadron (U-17), 1 Air Rescue Squadron (UH-1H, HU-16), 5 Transport Squadrons (C-47, F-27, C123K, NORMAD N-22), 3 Training Squadrons (T-33, T-41, SF-260MX).

Strength: 16,800

Limited capability to assist the Army in maintaining internal security and contributing to the defense against external attack.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 78.

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Transfer of Ships Located in Japan

(C) Throughout 1976 efforts were made, with the base negotiations in mind, to expedite the transfer to the GOP of a total of 54 ships located in Japan. These ships included 31 already authorized in 1975 for pick up by the Philippine Navy as MAP-redistributable assets, 2 ex-Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer escorts (DE) to be sold under FMS for $95,000 each, 10 ex-Military Sealift Command LSTs to be sold under FMS for $200,000 each, and 11 other ex-JMSDF ships/craft. A major obstacle to expediting the transfer was the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, according to which logistics support from Japan for the transfer of excess ships to third countries was prohibited. Neither the use of grant aid PCH&T funds nor U.S. Navy opportune lift was considered cost effective. The remaining two options considered for transport to the Philippines were:[1]

- Activate and sail two DEs and three LSTs, and tow or load the remainder at a cost of $5.3 million.

- Commercially prepare and tow ships at a cost of $1.05 million.

(C) Based on President Marcos' interest in upgrading the Philippine Navy, a special budget was prepared for the ships located in Japan, and at year's end a Philippine Navy survey team was sent to Japan to inspect and survey the ships/craft and develop work packages for subsequent contracting with Japanese commercial shipyards.[2]

Ship Repair Facilities

(C) In May 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL provided an assessment of Philippine Navy drydock facilities in conjunction with the current increase in Philippine Navy ship acquisition:[3]

Identification	Lifting Capacity	Construction	Date	Condition
YD-205-formerly USN AFDL 44	2,800 tons	Reinf concrete	1944	Marginal
YD-204-formerly USN AFDL 20	1,000 tons	Steel	1944	Marginal
YD-200-formerly USN AFDL 24	1,000 tons	Steel	1943	Marginal
YD-203-formerly USN AFDL 3682	150 tons	Wood	1943	Unsat/inactive
Marine railway	150 tons		1974	Satisfactory

1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 459-460; CHJUSMAGPHIL 170242Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 212025Z May 76; AMEMB Tokyo 8039/281100Z May 76.
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 040855Z Nov 76.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 040432Z May 76.

(C) Plans for installation of a 3,500-ton syncrolift at Cavite Naval Shipyard to replace these aging MAP drydocks had to be shelved in the face of a commercial syncrolift scheduled for installation at the Bataan Shipbuilding and Engineering Company shipyard. In view of this situation CINCPAC requested the CNO to review the availability of USN assets for sale, lease, or loan. The CNO identified AFDL 10 (lifting capacity of 1,000 tons) and CINCPAC recommended its lease to the GOP and a continuing review of U.S. assets for availability of a 2,000 to 3,000-ton drydock. The availability of AFDL 10 was held in confidence pending the base negotiations.[1]

F-5E Acquisition



(S) In August 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL advised that the GOP desired to use $7.4 million in remaining FY 76 FMS credit as the initial F-5E payment (Project PEACE MAHOGANY); however, as of year's end, the GOP had not signed the LOA because of a desire to make a comparative evaluation of the F-5E with

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1. Ibid.; CHJUSMAGPHIL 250619Z May 76; CINCPAC 080347Z May 76, 190422Z May 76, and 290432Z May 76; CNO 142308Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC 200029Z Feb 76.

the F-8H, A-4C, and other aircraft of similar types. The LOA expiration date remained 3 January 1977.[1]

T-28 Aircraft

(C) During 1976 the GOP accepted a total of 60 T-28 aircraft, located in Thailand, under MIMEX procedures:[2]

Origin	T-28B	T-28C	T-28D	Totals
Cambodia	12*		23*	35*
Laos	8	3	14	25
	20	3	37	60

*GOP originally accepted total of 42 (15 T-28B and 27 T-28D); however, on-site inspection revealed that 3 T-28B and 4 T-28D were unsuitable. CINCPAC concurred in deletion and recommended turnover of these aircraft to Royal Thai Government for cannibalization or disposal in accordance with Section 505(F), FAA.

(C) On 2 December 1975 the Secretary of Defense had granted an exception to policy to allow MAP funding for rehabilitation of T-28s, which was to be done under contract with Philippine Airlines. Based on this authorization, and notification from Headquarters, USAF in October 1976 of a requirement for $198,500 to finance the program through December 1977, Chief, JUSMAGPHIL requested supplemental FY 77 funding for the $198,500 and Continuing Resolution Authority.[3]

Cooperative Logistics Program

(U) In September 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL advised that the PAF had asked to participate in the Cooperative Logistics Program for all aircraft and systems of U.S. origin. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) confirmed PAF eligibility to participate in the Supply Support Arrangement (SSA) Program and began to prepare definitized SSA lists for F-5A/B, C-130, C-123, T-33, and C-47 aircraft. Receipt of the C-123, C-47, and T-33 stock level case lists was acknowledged by Chief, JUSMAGPHIL on 12 November 1976. AFLC also

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 052326Z Aug 76, 140720Z Dec 76, 220548Z Dec 76, 230540Z Dec 76, and 230836Z Dec 76; HQUSAF 061335Z Aug 76 and 231455Z Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 460-462; AMEMB Manila 1058/210755Z Jan 76; CHJUSMAGPHIL 220846Z Jan 76 and 130654Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 220057Z Jan 76, 300451Z Jan 76, and 240413Z Aug 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 462; CHJUSMAGPHIL 190822Z Oct 76; HQUSAF 081840Z Oct 76 and 151805Z Oct 76.

recommended that the PAF develop definitized lists to support F-86 and AT-28D aircraft which could be requisitioned through the SSA program. As of October 1976 the AFLC had also begun to prepare a definitized list for the F-5E in conjunction with the LOA being prepared for that aircraft.[1]

Off-Shore Procurement-Japan (OSP-J) Vehicles

(U) In their FY 76 evaluation of the Philippine Security Assistance Program, 22 March-2 April 1976, the CINCPAC PEG Team noted that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had 3,161 obsolete OSP-J vehicles (primarily 1/4 ton, 3/4 ton and 2 1/2 ton) which were no longer MAP-supportable after FY 76. Based on PEG Team recommendations, Chief, JUSMAGPHIL, in November 1976, requested authority to transfer accountability of most of these OSP-J vehicles from the MAP to AFP ownership. As there was no legal basis for donation of MAP property to a recipient country, CINCPAC recommended they be transferred to the AFP at concessionary scrap value cost ($15 per vehicle), and uneconomically repairable vehicles be reported to the Defense Property Disposal Office. The Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC's recommendation and, at year's end, an AFP decision was awaited.[2]

Purchase of 2 1/2 ton Trucks

(U) In November 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL advised that the GOP had agreed to purchase 250 2 1/2 ton trucks through FMS ($6,098,063).[3]

Howitzers

(C) During 1976 six rebuilt M-101A1 105mm howitzers, out of an FMS case for 18, had been received in the Philippines. In April 1976 the Commander, Army Armament Command notified Chief, JUSMAGPHIL that shipment of the remaining 12 howitzers had been suspended pending a price adjustment from $17,003 each to $45,000 each. Chief, JUSMAGPHIL took exception to the price increase being effected after partial shipment, noting that it would be regarded by the Philippine Government as bad faith by the United States and a breach of contract. He also pointed out that this would not serve U.S. Government interests during the base rights negotiations. CINCPAC, through military channels, and the American Embassy, Philippines, through diplomatic channels, supported Chief,

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 080530Z Sep 76 and 241010Z Sep 76; INTL LOG OFC WPAFB 171330Z Sep 76, and 051603Z Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC PEG Report, Republic of the Philippines FY 76, 18 May 76, pp. B-7-B-8; CHJUSMAGPHIL 030045Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 120547Z Nov 76; SECDEF 6687/250200Z Nov 76.
3. J464 HistSum Nov 76; CHJUSMAGPHIL 200146Z Nov 76.

SINGAPORE

SINGAPORE BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	225 SQ MI
POPULATION	2,254,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.6 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	70 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	70 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	01 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$5.2 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$2,400
DEFENSE BUDGET	$335 MILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	6.1

PRESIDENT	Benjamin Henry SHEARS
PRIME MINISTER	LEE Kuan Yew
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	Sennathamby RAJARATNAM
MINISTER OF DEFENSE	GOH Keng Swee
DIRECTOR, GENERAL STAFF, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE	Winston CHOO Wee Leong, Brigadier
DIRECTOR, AIR STAFF, (COMMANDER) SINGAPORE AIR FORCE	Murray TURNBULL (RAAF), Group Captain
COMMANDER, SINGAPORE NAVY	KHOO En Ang, Colonel

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. John H. HOLDRIDGE
USDAO	COL Robert E. FOSTER, USAF



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

CONTINUED ACCESS TO SINGAPORE'S NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES.

CONTINUATION OF SINGAPORE SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT IN AND OVER THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE.

CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARDS AN ENHANCED CAPABILITY OF SINGAPORE TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN SECURITY.

CONTINUATION OF MODERATE, NONCOMMUNIST GOVERNMENT NOT SUBJECT TO UNDUE PRC OR SOVIET INFLUENCE.

IMPROVED SINGAPORE RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

3 Infantry Brigades, 1 Artillery Command, 1 Armored Brigade, 1 Commando Battalion, 2 Engineer Battalions, 1 Signal Battalion.

Strength: 15,000
(Police Strength: 7,400)

Capable of maintaining internal security, but would need outside assistance to resist external attack. No operational capability above battalion level.

NAVY

13 Coastal types, 7 Amphibious Warfare Craft, 1 Service type.

Strength: 1,200

Fair patrol capability in territorial waters. Incapable of defending against a major naval attack.

AIR FORCE

132 Aircraft, of which 100 are jets. This does not include 8 A-4s in the United States for training purposes.

Strength: 2,500

Potentially good ground support capability with A-4S aircraft. Limited air defense and transport/rescue capability.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 79.

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JUSMAG's position, and in May 1976 the Secretary of Defense advised that the unit price would remain at $17,003 as originally quoted.[1]

Miscellaneous Boat Acquisitions

(U) On 15 January 1976 a MAP-provided 65-foot patrol boat (65PB732) was turned over to the GOP and was designated PN PCF 338.[2]

(U) In May 1976 Chief, JUSMAGPHIL submitted an urgent request for 20 inflatable rubber boats for the AFP to use in flood relief efforts in the wake of TYPHOON OLGA. The Secretary of Defense, in turn, tasked the Department of the Army which prepared the boats under FMS, with 120-day payment terms, for shipment through Military Airlift Command channels to the Philippines.[3]

(U) On 10 September 1976 the Philippine Navy took custody of an ex-U.S. Army tug boat located in Guam.[4]

MAP Support for Philippine Constabulary (PC)

(C) In April 1976 the Secretary of Defense forwarded a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance query as to whether or not the PC was equipped by the United States and if this raised a question concerning the provision of equipment to police forces, which was prohibited by Section 660 of the FAA of 1961, as amended. CINCPAC replied that PC combat light infantry battalions (with same TO&E as Philippine Army infantry battalions) and the Presidential security battalion, which had two organic infantry companies currently committed in combat operations, did receive MAP support. CINCPAC advised that these units did qualify for assistance under the applicable legislation, and that no PC police elements were MAP supported.[5]

Singapore

Overview

(S) Basic U.S. Pacific strategy depended strongly on a friendly and cooperative relationship with Singapore. Of primary concern was the possibility that the USSR might develop additional positions athwart U.S. lines of

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 130614Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 150200Z Apr 76; AMEMB Manila 5916/290841Z Apr 76; SECDEF 5338/111518Z May 76.
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 210618Z Jan 76.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 260736Z May 76; SECDEF 8925/281538Z May 76; DA 282056Z May 76.
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 110200Z Sep 76.
5. SECDEF 7982/090001Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 140424Z Apr 76.

communication. The United States looked to Singapore for Seventh Fleet base support and access for Indian Ocean and Diego Garcia support. Support in the amount needed required favorable Government of Singapore (GOS) attitudes on many issues, and security assistance was the major means of obtaining concessions. Singapore depended heavily on the United States for military equipment and training, which was obtained through FMS cash and commercial sales. As of November 1976 these sales totaled about $164 million.[1]

(S) The security assistance program for Singapore centered around recommendations made by an inter-departmental team (DOD-CIA) visit in 1975. These recommendations included purchase of UH-1H helicopters, M-113A1 armored personnel carriers, mini armored troop carriers, 105mm howitzers, and a counterinsurgency training seminar for senior officers. The GOS expected the seminar cost to be around $100,000 and reacted negatively when informed that it was $225,000. Office of the Secretary of Defense pricing guidance effective 1 January 1976 directed the recovery of all costs associated with instruction preparation, proportionate share of base operations, and pay and allowances of all U.S. personnel involved. The Minister of Defense considered the cost unacceptable and wanted further negotiations cancelled. Prime Minister Lee overruled the Minister of Defense since he felt that the need for the counterinsurgency seminar overrode cost considerations because of conditions in Southeast Asia. The seminar was conducted from 10 May to 4 June 1976 and was given good reviews by attendees. The American Embassy described the cost of the seminar as a "burr in the saddle." By September 1975 final delivery had been made on 200 M-113A1 armored personnel carriers, and during 1976 a commercial sale contract was signed for an additional 246 M-113A1 armored personnel carriers for 1977 delivery.[2]

C-130B Aircraft

(U) On 12 July 1976 the GOS signed the LOA for two C-130Bs for a cost of about $2.6 million each. Lockheed Air Services Singapore (LASS) had agreed to deal directly with the GOS for interim use of LASS facilities and services leading to self-sufficient GOS aircraft operation. Lockheed was to provide air and ground crew training.[3]

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1. J472 Point Papers, 1 Dec 76, Subj: U.S.-Singapore Security Assistance Relationships; and 29 Nov 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Singapore.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 446-447; J472 Point Paper, 29 Nov 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Singapore.
3. J472 Point Paper, 29 Nov 76, Subj: Two C-130B Aircraft for Singapore.

F-5E/F Aircraft

(S) On 13 July 1976 the GOS requested an LOA for 18 F-5E and 3 F-5F aircraft. As of year's end the LOA had not been signed; however, an LOA for associated air interdiction missiles (AIM 9J-1) was signed on 11 November 1976 to facilitate contract negotiation of a large quantity buy.[1]

Management Training Assistance Team (MTAT) for RSAF

(S) On 1 September 1976 a proposed USAF management training program, designed to develop Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) managerial self-sufficiency at the end of two years, was presented to the GOS. The program covered the functional areas of operations, engineering, manpower, and command and control. A 5-man USAF MTAT was to be assigned to Singapore for two years, and the total cost of the program was estimated at $957,540. On 12 October 1976 the GOS accepted the basic proposal and at year's end the LOA was being prepared.[2]

A-4 Training in the Philippines

(S) Early in 1975 the Government of Singapore approached the U.S. Government on the subject of continuation training of SKYHAWK pilots at a U.S. base in the Philippines. The U.S. Government had advised the GOS it would be willing to examine the question of what arrangements could be worked out at Cubi Point once the GOS obtained approval from the Government of the Philippines. In April 1976 the U.S. Defense Attache Office Singapore advised that this approval had been obtained. Between 25 April-1 May 1976 an RSAF survey team visited the Philippines to discuss training needs and inspect Cubi Point and Clark Air Base as possible training sites. The RSAF team selected Clark as first choice with Cubi as an acceptable fallback; however, a GOP restriction against the RSAF conducting low-level navigational training outside of the Clark reservation prevented further action on this project through year's end.[3]

Sri Lanka

(S) Sri Lanka was designated a "CONUS Only Training" country with an FY 77 training dollar ceiling of $15,000. The American Embassy and the USDAO consistently supported retention of a small grant aid training line as a counter

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1. J472 Point Paper, 29 Nov 76, Subj: F-5E/F Aircraft for Singapore.
2. J472 Point Paper, 1 Dec 76, Subj: MTAT for RSAF.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 448; USDAO Singapore 0540/020846Z Apr 76; AMEMB Manila 6062/030730Z May 76.

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SRI LANKA

SRI LANKA BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	25,300 SQ MI
POPULATION	14,180,000
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.2 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	82 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	62 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.3 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	$2.7 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$195
DEFENSE BUDGET	$21.3 MILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP	2

PRESIDENT	MR. William GOPALLAWA
PRIME MINISTER	MRS. Sirimavo BANDARANAIKE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS	MRS. Sirimavo BANDARANAIKE
ARMY COMMANDER	LT GEN Don Sepala ATTYGALE
NAVY COMMANDER	COMMODORE Don Basil GOONESEKARA
AIR FORCE COMMANDER	COMMODORE W.D.H.S.W. GOONETILEKE

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	MR. John REED
U.S. AID DIRECTOR	MR. Ernest KANPICH
USDAO	CDR Paul O. CUTCHEN, USN



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

SERVE AS A TANGIBLE REMINDER OF U.S. INTERESTS BY:

ASSISTING IN THE SKILLS NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF U.S. ACQUIRED EQUIPMENT.

DEVELOPING NEEDED EXPERTISE FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF PRESENT SRI LANKA DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.

MAINTAIN GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELEMENTS TO ENABLE COUNTERWEIGHT TO PRESENCE OF SOVIET AND PRC IN SRI LANKA.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

3 Infantry Battalions, 1 Artillery Regiment (Battalion), 1 Reconnaissance Regiment (Battalion).

Strength: 9,000
Reserves (Volunteer Force): 9,000

Incapable of repelling an invasion. In conjunction with police and other services, can maintain internal security, but has serious command and control deficiencies. Completely reliant on foreign sources for logistics support.

NAVY

1 Patrol Escort, 1 Fast Patrol Boat, 5 Motor Gunboats, 23 Patrol Craft

Strength: 2,600

No capability against even minor enemy naval attack. Adequate in assisting internal security operations. Limited anti-smuggling capability.

AIR FORCE

1 Tactical Squadron (MIG 17, T-51), 2 Transport Squadron (DH-114, C-1, Cessna 337, Convair 440, DC-3, Cessna 150), 1 Helicopter Squadron (DH-13H, Bell 206A, KA-26), 1 Training Squadron (T-51, DHC-1, C-1).

Strength: 2,300

Limited capability to provide close support to the Army and in day air defense. Adequate in assisting internal security and in anti-smuggling operations.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 80.

SECRET

to Soviet influence. The visit to Hawaii of Lieutenant General Don Sepola Attygalle, Commander, Sri Lankan Army, between 14-20 October 1976 was the first use of training funds allocated to Sri Lanka since 1970. This visit was funded as an exception to policy as an orientation training tour under the IMETP. The visit allowed LT GEN Attygalle to view military hardware that would be appropriate for use by the Sri Lankan Army and to observe small-scale military ground operations. Activities visited included CINCPAC headquarters, CINCPACFLT, USACSG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, the 25th Infantry Division, and the First Marine Brigade, FMFPAC.[1]

Thailand

Overview

(S) Thailand was faced with new and potentially hostile Communist neighbors on its northern and eastern borders, and a communist-controlled insurgency, with external support, existed within the country. The U.S. security assistance program encouraged the Thai to acquire weapons needed to meet the immediate threat of insurgency as well as to modernize existing conventional defensive military units. The security assistance trend was toward reduction in the grant MAP and increased FMS. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) accepted $8 million in FMS credit for the first time in FY 75, but failed to use it during 1975. Six million dollars of FY 75 credits were obligated during FY 76 and 77. An exception was granted to Thailand to use these credits towards operations and maintenance (O&M) costs related to the MAP program. All O&M costs would be assumed by the RTG at the end of FY 77. Also, during 1976 the Thai-perceived need for fighter aircraft, not necessarily shared by U.S. officials, finally caused the RTG to sign an LOA for the purchase of 16 F-5E/F aircraft at a cost of $75 million (FMS Case PEACE ETERNAL).[2]

Integrated Communications System (ICS)

(S) By the end of 1976 the American Embassy, Bangkok had prepared a revised memorandum of agreement for turnover of the 17-site U.S. military ICS to the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). Under this agreement the RTARF would assume the responsibility for safeguarding all components and maintaining the property in good condition and repair at their own expense. No components were to be transferred to any third country or be relocated, and the U.S.

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1. J471 Point Paper, 12 Oct 76, Subj: Security Assistance for Sri Lanka; J471 HistSum Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 464-466; FY 78 CPD, p. 79; J476 Point Paper, 13 Oct 76, Subj: General Overview Security Assistance in Thailand; J4 WEB 8-14 May 76.

THAILAND

THAILAND BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	198,500 SQ MI
POPULATION	43.6 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.1 PERCENT
LITERACY RATE	70 PERCENT
LIFE EXPECTANCY	61 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.7 ACRE
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1975)	$14.2 BILLION
PER CAPITA	$335
DEFENSE BUDGET FY 77	$617 MILLION
AS PERCENT OF GNP (FY 76)	4

DEFENSE BUDGET INCLUDES INTERNAL SECURITY

KING	PHUMIPHON Adundet
PRIME MINISTER	THANIN Kraiwichian
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER	GEN(RET) BUNCHAI Bamrungphong; ANPHON Chanthravichit
CINC ARMY	GEN SOEM Na Nakhon
CINC NAVY	ADM AMON Sirikaya
CINC AIR FORCE	Air Chief Marshal KAMON Thejatunga

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR	HON. Charles S. WHITEHOUSE
U.S. AID DIRECTOR	MR. Roger ERNST
CHIEF MAAG/THAI	COL Aaron E. WALKER, USA



U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

ASSIST IN OBTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. FORCES, AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND AGAINST LIMITED EXTERNAL MILITARY THREATS AND PROTECT MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

ASSIST THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPRESS INSURGENCY AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY.

ENHANCE DEFENSE MATERIEL COMPATIBILITY.

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR COST EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS THAT DEVELOP THAI MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

7 Infantry Divisions, 1 Regimental Combat Team, 3 Special Forces Groups, 1 Airborne Battalion, 1 Field Artillery Battalion.

Strength: 137,000

Moderate capability to maintain internal security and limited resistance to external aggression. Military leadership preoccupied with politico-economic affairs. Inadequate senior command and staff supervision of operational missions, shortage of modern equipment, ineffective logistics system, insufficient combined arms training. lack of sufficient anti-armor and antiaircraft capability. Cultural factors a limiting factor, plus lack of motivation toward goal achievement.

NAVY

2 Destroyer types, 46 Coastal Patrol types, 31 River Patrol types, 18 Mine Warfare types, 49 Amphibious types, 7 Auxiliary types, 1 Anti-submarine Warfare Squadron (S-2), 1 Utility Squadron (HU-16, U-17A, C-37), 1 Reconnaissance/Close Support Squadron (O-1). 1 Marine Brigade, 5 Marine Infantry Battalions, 3 Marine Light Infantry Battalions, 1 Marine Artillery Battalion.

Strength: 25,758, which includes 8,892 Marines.

Limited ability to conduct coastal defense and patrol in Gulf of Thailand and internal waterways. Limited antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and amphibious support. Varied origin of ships and equipment necessitates use of foreign supply sources. Shortage of trained personnel.

AIR FORCE

4 Fighter/Reconnaissance Squadrons (1 F-5A/B, RF-5A; 1 T-33A/RT-33A, 2 OV-10); 3 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons (2 T-28D, 1 A-37); 2 Helicopter Squadrons (1 CH-34C/D, 1 UH-1H); 1 Utility Squadron (AU-23A); 2 Transport Squadrons (1 C-123, HS-748, 1 C-47 D/VC/AC/RC); 1 Training Squadron (T-41); Forward Air Control Squadron (O-1A/G/C, U-10D).

Strength: 43,100

Limited airborne operations, close support of the Army, and day air defense.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 81.

Government could inspect the Chiang Mai-Bangkok communication service, supporting residual U.S. requirements, with 15-day prior notice. Also, the RTARF was to provide telephonic communications between the Korat ammunition storage depot and JUSMAGTHAI on a 24-hour basis at no cost to the U.S. Government. The American Embassy, Bangkok hoped the State Department would approve the agreements so they could be signed.[1]

AU-23 Aircraft

(U) Under FMS Case PEACE CHAO PHYA, 13 AU-23 aircraft were delivered to Thailand in April 1976.[2]

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)

(U) Since December 1969 the TTPI had acquired $24.8 million worth of DOD PACOM excess materiel free except for PCH&T. On 14 January 1976 the CINCPAC Representative, Guam, requested assistance in obtaining two landing craft (LCM-8) for use in the Truk Lagoon. A screening of DOD excesses revealed none available. In August 1976 CINCPAC suggested further screening, but as of year's end no excess assets, affordable to the TTPI, had turned up.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 354-355; AMEMB Bangkok 30059/ 011117Z Nov 76.
2. J4 WEB 10-16 Apr 76.
3. J465 HistSum Jun 76; J465 Point Paper, 4 Nov 76, Subj: Security Assistance-Trust Territories Pacific Islands (TTPI).

CHAPTER VIII

PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

CINCPAC Headquarters

Outstanding Performance Ratings (OPRs) for Civilian Personnel

(U) The following were the results of OPRs, including Quality Step Increases (QSI) and Sustained Superior Performance Awards (SSPA) for civilian employees of CINCPAC for the rating period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:[1]

Civilians Assigned	OPRs Recommended	OPRs Approved	Cash Awards Recommended		Cash Awards Approved	
			QSI	SSPA	QSI	SSPA
139	64 (47%)	29 (21%)	23 (17%)	4 (3%)	2 (1%)	7 (5%)

Civilian Personnel Activities in PACOM Countries

Japan and Okinawa

Labor Cost Sharing

(C) On 1 June 1976 the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense jointly approved American Embassy, Tokyo and COMUS Japan initiatives to explore with Government of Japan (GOJ) officials the possibilities of sharing the cost of the U.S. Forces (USF) Japanese workforce. The prospect was raised initially as a result of a 1973 COMUS Japan study which revealed that the United States could save up to $2 billion over a five-year period if the GOJ assumed some or all of the USF Japanese labor costs. That study was endorsed favorably by CINCPAC to the Secretary of Defense, but the proposal was not considered timely, economically or politically, through 1975.[2]

(C) U.S. Forces' use of Japanese labor and attendant increasing costs was a major item of discussion at the 8 July 1976 U.S.-GOJ Security Consultative Committee Meeting. At the meeting, Admiral Gayler noted that Japanese workforce costs had increased by 100 percent from 1971 to 1975 and that the cost of the

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 481; J144 HistSum May 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 483; SECSTATE 134478/012001Z Jun 76.

U.S. presence was affecting the ability to maintain USF in Japan. A U.S.-GOJ Joint Committee agreement was also reached in early July 1976 which initiated a joint USF-GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency study of labor problems including a number of USF cost-cutting recommendations. COMUS Japan did not see a need to compensate employees in excess of Japanese private sector practices. Principal excesses included a 10 percent USF pay differential and a too generous severance pay/retirement plan. Findings and recommendations were finally reported to the Joint Committee on 1 December 1976, and the Joint Committee was to work out a proposal to solve the issues by 1 November 1977.[1]

(C) In July and August 1976 a delegation of GOJ officials journeyed to PACOM headquarters, Washington, DC, and the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain information on defense burden sharing arrangements. Major emphasis was on the administration and budgeting arrangement of USF use of host country labor (e.g., budgeting method used, applicability of domestic law). The GOJ delegation findings were expected to be used in support of increased GOJ burden sharing in Japan.[2]

Labor Strikes

(U) During March 1976 USF local national (LN) employees scheduled strikes against all U.S. facilities in Japan to protest the delay in concluding USF-GOJ 1975 wage adjustment negotiations. Okinawa strikes were programmed for two hours per day on 17, 18, 23, and 24 March 1976. One hour strikes per day on 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 March 1976 were scheduled for the rest of Japan. A 48-hour follow-on strike was scheduled against all USF activities beginning 30 March 1976, but was called off. The negotiations were concluded on 31 March 1976.[3]

(U) Beginning 28 May 1976 a 24-hour strike was conducted against all USF activities on Okinawa to demand withdrawal of announced large reduction in force (RIF) (600 employees in June), security of employment, and relief measures for unemployment.[4]

(U) Two hour strikes were conducted at U.S. Army installations on Okinawa on 18 and 19 August 1976, and at all USF installations on Okinawa on 26 and 27 August 1976. The purpose was to protest a U.S. Army Japan announcement of a RIF of 287 Japanese employees on 30 November 1976 and 982 employees on 30 September 1976 as part of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 253R.[5]

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1. J121 HistSums Jul and Dec 76; AMEMB Tokyo 10062/020946Z Jul 76.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 10308/090035Z Jul 76; COMUSJ 130832Z Jul 76.
3. J1 WEBs 8-14 Mar 76, 22-28 Mar 76; J121 HistSum Mar 76.
4. J1 WEB 24-30 May 76.
5. J1 WEBs 16-22 Aug 76, 23-29 Aug 76.

1975 Wage Adjustment Negotiations

(U) Wage adjustment negotiations between U.S. Forces Japan and GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) for 1975 were concluded on 31 March 1976. Agreement was reached to grant the 26,500 USF LN employees in Japan a pay increase of 10.85 percent retroactive to 1 April 1975. The 10.85 percent included a 6 percent provisional pay increase approved on 2 February 1976 retroactive to 1 April 1975. By agreement with GOJ, the amount and effective day of USF pay adjustments paralled those approved by the Diet for Japan National Public Service employees. A comparable National Public Service increase had received Diet approval in November 1975.[1]

(U) As part of the wage negotiations, the USF demand for concurrent conclusion of a joint USF-DFAA indirect-hire agreement (IHA) job study was met. One hundred fifty nine USF job categories not common to the Japan National Public Service were reviewed. Information on pay and benefits practices for these occupations was obtained from 127 private sector food service, billeting and retail sales firms. Findings indicated that USF compensation exceeded that of private firms in these occupations. After lengthy and difficult negotiations, agreement was reached to continue the two USF basic IHA wage tables for all IHA jobs, and add three new steps below those in the existing tables for the 159 job categories included in the study. The three steps provided a lower entry level for new hires with a delay in attaining higher step rates. Agreement was also reached to lower four overpaid job categories (kitchen worker, bartender, sales clerk, bowling machine repairer) by one pay level. The 270 LNs currently employed in the latter jobs were to be downgraded effective 1 July 1976, but with pay savings to include the 1975 wage adjustment increase.[2]

(U) The USF nonconcurred in two DFAA-proposed benefit increases:[3]

- The USF would not provide a housing allowance to LN employees living in GOJ subsidized housing.

- The USF was unwilling to provide longevity pay increases in excess of those on already established wage tables.

(U) The USF conceded to withdraw seven major proposals in order to achieve agreement on the 1975 wage adjustment. These proposals were for

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1. COMUSJ 090540Z Apr 76; J121 HistSum Feb 76.
2. Ibid.
3. COMUSJ 090540Z Apr 76.

changes to pay-setting methods and would receive further, but separate, joint USF-GOJ attention.[1]

1976 Wage Adjustment Negotiations

(U) The 1976 wage adjustment negotiations between the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the GOJ DFAA were concluded on 21 December 1976. Agreement was reached to grant the 24,000 USF LN employees in Japan a pay increase of 6.94 percent retroactive to 1 April 1976. The wage adjustment also included a modest increase to family, housing, and commutation allowances and a decrease in seasonal bonuses from 5.2 to 5.0 months pay. Wage adjustment changes paralleled those approved by the Diet for Japan National Public Service employees in November 1976. They were based on a survey of Japan industrial practices conducted by the GOJ in the spring of 1976.[2]

(C) The USF entered negotiations on 1 December 1976 with several proposals to lower labor costs. The objectives of these proposals were:[3]

- To preserve the right for the USF to negotiate changes to labor contracts.

- To minimize the impact of the 1976 wage adjustment on USF labor costs.

- To continue to advertise the spiraling labor costs in support of long term objectives of the Joint Committee study.

(C) The proposals caused considerable concern within DFAA and were withdrawn in order to avoid protracted negotiations as had been the case in 1975. DFAA did agree to one cost saving point: to delete from provisions of the Master Labor Contract and Marine Contract the current USF obligation to pay retirement allowance for DFAA headquarters Labor Department personnel beginning Japan FY 75. COMUS Japan estimated a savings on this of some $400,000 during the period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1978. COMUS Japan sought and received the support of CINCPAC and the PACOM Service components for the cost saving proposals it placed on the negotiating table.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. COMUSJ 230055Z Dec 76.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., COMUSJ 270201Z Nov 76.

Korea

Revised Wage Schedules for LN Employees

(U) Revised wage schedules for Korean LN employees were based on data obtained during a survey of 108 private sector firms in four Korean urban areas during August and September 1976. Revised compensation benefits, effective 1 November 1976, resulted in an average increase of 23.1 percent for some 23,000 employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. The increase was comprised of 13 percent to base pay, 5.8 percent as a Consolidated Allowance Payment, a flat 36 Won per hour as a Payment-in-Kind Allowance, and 1.7 percent to increase the year-end bonus from 1 to 1 1/2 months of pay. The Consolidated Allowance Payment was new and represented cash amounts given by private sector employers to employees for such purposes as meals, lodging, transportation, special skills, and cost of living. The Payment-in-Kind Allowance, established first in 1975, represented an amount equivalent to benefits other than cash received by private sector employees in the form of employer-provided meals, bags of rice, uniforms, and transportation. An equivalent amount for these allowances was previously included in USF employee base pay. With allowances identified and paid separately, base pay was effectively lowered and became more representative of private sector pay practices. This also served to lower overall USF labor costs in that base pay, exclusive of allowances, was used to compute employee severance pay.[1]

(U) In addition to the above compensation increases, two additional holidays were authorized for observance by USF LN employees. These would coincide with U.S. national holidays to minimize disruption to the USF mission.[2]

Philippines

Revised Wage Schedules for LN Employees

(U) Revised schedules of wages for some 22,000 USF LN employees in the Philippines were jointly approved and issued by the PACOM Service component commands effective 1 October 1976. The revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of 30 private sector employers in the greater Manila area during July and August 1976, and they resulted in an increase of 19 percent for manual and 11 percent for non-manual employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds.[3]

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1. HQ USF Korea Ltr EACP-K-C&EM, 18 Oct 76, Subj: U.S. Forces Wage and Benefits Survey Findings and Recommendations; USACSG Ltr MOCG-PE, 29 Oct 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedules-Korea.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPACFLT Ltr FF1-1 12531 Ser 74/8188 of 14 Sep 76.

Collective Bargaining

(U) After nearly seven months of bargaining with the Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Associations, a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement was successfully concluded in January 1976. The agreement resulted in a near status quo on two hard-fought bargaining issues from which the U.S. bases would not retreat. Compensation items were to continue to be based on local prevailing private sector practices as determined by USF-conducted survey; they were not negotiable, a position sought by the Federation. Final appeal on disciplinary cases would remain with U.S. bases top management through use of advisory arbitration; there would be no binding arbitration as sought by the Federation with the support of the Government of the Philippines (GOP) Department of Labor. A formal signing ceremony was held at Subic Bay on 16 January 1976, and a 300 Peso signing bonus, as authorized by the Secretary of Defense, was to be granted to each Federation member of record on 1 March 1976.[1]

Taiwan

Revised Wage Schedules for LN Employees

(U) Revised wage schedules for LN employees on Taiwan were based on data obtained during a survey of 36 private sector firms in the Taipei area in September 1976. The new rates, effective 1 December 1976, resulted in an average total compensation increase of 25.7 percent for some 2,200 general schedule and patron service employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. The high percentage rate resulted, in part, from the fact that it had been over two years since the previous Taiwan wage survey. Part of the increase was to be given as a new Payment-in-Kind allowance of 4.3 New Taiwan dollars to each employee. That allowance represented an amount equivalent to benefits received by private sector employees in the form of employer-provided meals, uniforms, transportation, and other benefits. An equivalent amount was previously included in base pay. It was now identified and paid separately, thereby making base pay more representative of private sector pay practices. This also served to lower overall USF labor costs in that base pay was used to compute other compensation such as overtime, other premium pay, and severance/retirement pay.[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 486-489; AMEMB Manila 0472/090911Z Jan 76 and 1274/160915Z Jan 76; CINCPACFLT 240254Z Dec 75.
2. USTDC Ltr 12000 Ser C-84, 15 Oct 76, Subj: Taiwan Wage and Fringe Benefit Survey-1976; HQ PACAF Ltr DPCC, 29 Oct 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedules-Taiwan.

(C) Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command and the Services in Taiwan proposed a 1 November 1976 implementation date. The American Embassy, Taipei, also a survey participant, wanted a uniform implementation date for all U.S. agencies, but required State Department approval of the survey findings and recommendations, which could delay the implementation up to two months. CINCPAC, with the concurrence of PACOM Service commands, appealed to the Secretary of Defense to implement the new schedule on or after 1 November 1976 but no later than 1 December 1976 for USF activities. In response to this appeal, the Secretary of Defense approved a 1 December 1976 implementation date.[1]

(U) In conjunction with the revised wage schedules, an interim pay increase was authorized for motion picture theater employees effective 1 December 1976. These employees, paid on a performance basis, had not previously been covered by regular USF wage schedules. The increase amounted to 20.1 percent. A study was also being conducted to convert these employees to regular hourly wage schedule rates.[2]

Thailand

Civilian Personnel Phasedown

(U) Civilian employment strength of the USF in Thailand had been reduced from a 1970 peak of over 20,000 employees to nearly 9,000 by the start of 1976. Plans were to further reduce and stabilize at about 1,500 by 20 March 1976. By mid-March, however, a decision was made that only the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and a select group of functions would remain in Thailand after 20 July 1976, with a total expected civilian staffing of less than 100. The rapid phasedown required out-of-country placement or separation for most of the 470 U.S.civilian employees and separation for all but a small number of the 8,500 Thai national employees. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI) imposed a command-wide hiring freeze, and special exceptions to DOD policy were sought to ease phasedown operations. In November 1975 Thailand was declared a major RIF area for U.S. civilian employees. In February 1976 the Secretary of Defense granted an exception to policy allowing Thailand activities permission to displace U.S. civilians on Overseas Limited Appointments (OSL) with qualified priority placement program registrants stationed in Thailand. In March 1976 DOD activities in Thailand were exempted from the requirement to grant U.S. citizen career and career-conditional employees 30 days annual

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1. CINCPAC 300024Z Oct 76; SECDEF 4336/101908Z Nov 76.
2. HQ PACAF Ltr DPCC, 30 Nov 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedule-Motion Picture Theater Employees.

leave or leave without pay in order to provide 90 days advance notice prior to RIF.[1]

(U) The Air Force civilian personnel office (CPO) ceased in-country operations on 20 July 1976. COMUSMACTHAI arranged for the Base Industrial Relations Office, U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay (Philippines) to provide personnel servicing of JUSMAG U.S. civilian employees, and the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok to provide personnel and payroll services for Thai national employees of JUSMAG and other USF activities. Concurrently, the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) authorized the use of U.S. Embassy LN personnel policies and procedures for USF Thai nationals to be serviced by the Embassy.[2]

(U) A USMACTHAI in-country roll-up team was organized to close out functions remaining beyond 20 July 1976. Civilian personnel operations were continued until 20 September 1976 to process actions of 19 excess U.S. citizens and 1,000 excess Thai nationals still on the rolls as of 19 July 1976. Actions included RIF, other separations, payroll coordination, processing remaining grievances and appeals, and preparing records for shipment. The last Civilian Personnel Officer of the DOD in Thailand departed country on 21 September 1976.[3]

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)

Wage Practices

(U) PACOM Service component commands delegated authority to the Commander in Chief Pacific Representative Guam/TTPI to revise compensation rates and benefits for USF TTPI citizen employees (the U.S. Navy employed four TTPI citizens). Revisions were to conform to pay and benefit changes granted TTPI government employees by the Office of the High Commissioner, TTPI. Such changes were made for TTPI government employees effective 23 November 1975; however, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI did not become aware of these changes until mid-December 1975, and revised USF rates were not applied until 1 January 1976. To correct this situation, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI asked for authority to make the pay adjustment retroactive to 23 November 1975. Based on this request, CINCPAC sought advice from the Secretary of Defense on the legality of authorizing retroactive payment, and the Secretary of Defense

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 490-491; J121 HistSum Sep 76; MACTHAI 230340Z Feb 76; SECDEF 7272/052007Z Feb 76 and 1461/241642Z Mar 76.
2. CINCPACFLT 120110Z May 76.
3. MACTHAI 021015Z Jun 76.

responded by authorizing correction of an administrative error to allow payment effective 23 November 1975, the date of increase to TTPI government employees.[1]

Foreign National Motion Picture Theater Employee Pay

(U) Under Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service (AAFMPS) administration prior to 29 June 1975, foreign national motion picture theater employees had traditionally been paid on a "per performance" basis, at rates set by the AAFMPS. When the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) assumed personnel administration for these employees, pay setting came within the jurisdiction of the Pacific Command Joint Labor Policy Committee. Accordingly, AAFES-PAC initiated action to determine appropriate pay adjustments for these employees.[2]

(U) The first country to come under study was Korea, where no basis could be found for previous pay setting practices. Korean national theater employees had not been granted a pay increase since 1974, so Service commands in Korea, as represented on the COMUS Korea Joint Labor Affairs Committee (JLAC), undertook the task of determining future wage schedules for these employees. As an interim measure, a pay adjustment, as proposed by the COMUS Korea JLAC, was approved by the PACOM JLPC. The adjustment, applicable to some 50 Korean employess, provided for a 33.1 percent increase above 1974 rates effective 1 May 1976. This percentage was the average of total compensation increases that were granted all other USF Korean national employees in comparable level positions on 1 November 1975. With this interim adjustment, the former relationship between motion picture theater employee pay and general employee pay was restored. Local national employee pay practices in other PACOM foreign areas having AAFES motion picture theater operations were to be reviewed along with USF-conducted wage schedules in each area.[3]

Foreign National Temporary Duty (TDY) Pay

(U) Based on a CINCPAC request for clarification in December 1975, the Secretary of Defense relayed a U.S. Civil Service Commission decision that the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1937, as amended in 1974, were applicable to non-exempt USF direct hire non-U.S. citizen employees when performing TDY from their home country to the United States and other select areas. The matter arose as a result of differing

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1. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 190424Z Dec 75; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 67 of 12 Jan 76; SECDEF 1846/021614Z Apr 76.
2. J121 HistSum Apr 76.
3. USACSG Ltr MOCG-PE, 30 Apr 76, Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedule-Motion Picture Theater Employees.

policy guidance among the Services in the Pacific; the Navy and Air Force required use of the FLSA minimum wage, but the Army did not.[1]

(U) The 1974 amendment made FLSA provisions applicable for the first time to all non-exempt Federal Government employees when performing duties in the 50 States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, outer continental shelf lands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, Enewetak, Kwajalein, Johnston Atoll, and the Canal Zone. Non-exempt included, among others, clerical, trades, and craft employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. Exempt were those in bona fide executive, administrative, and professional positions. Minimum hourly rates for non-exempt employees were to be $2.00 from 1 May to 31 December 1974, $2.10 during CY 75, and $2.30 starting 1 January 1976.[2]

(U) The home country pay rate for most direct hire USF local national employees in PACOM was less than the FLSA required minimum. As a consequence, a non-exempt employee TDY to a covered area, receiving the required FLSA $2.30 minimum wage, would be paid more than his exempt supervisor who would be paid at his lower home country rate while on TDY. To correct this inequity, effective 16 May 1976, the PACOM Service components, under the terms of CINCPAC Instruction 12200.3A, administratively extended the FLSA $2.30 minimum hourly wage to all exempt direct hire non-U.S. citizen employees when TDY to any area to which the Act applied.[3]

(U) In advising PACOM foreign area commands of the above decision, CINCPAC noted that, in a TDY situation to a covered area, either the FLSA minimum or the home country basic hourly wage rate would apply, whichever was higher. CINCPAC also noted that the U.S. minimum wage paid a LN on TDY would not be considered as base pay for purposes of computing bonuses or other allowances applicable to the employee in his home country. Any such authorized benefits would be based on home country rates.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 082334Z Dec 75; SECDEF 2872/131701Z Apr 76.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 120212Z May 76.
4. Ibid.

SECTION II--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Urinalysis Program

Termination of the Random Urinalysis Program for Drug Abuse Detection

(U) Congressional action terminated the random urinalysis program effective 1 October 1976. The random testings were unannounced tests of units/individuals on a revolving area percentage basis which would insure each individual under age 26 was tested a minimum of once a year. Resources previously supporting the random urinalysis program were to be directed to the alcohol abuse program. Other aspects of the DOD urinalysis program remained in effect.[1]

Urinalysis Testing for Cocaine

(U) Reports of increased use of cocaine among civilians prompted a 13 July 1976 ASD/Health Affairs Memorandum directing military urinalysis labs to conduct tests for this drug from October 1976 to January 1977. Analysis of test results was expected to reveal the scope of the problem within the DOD and the necessity for continuation of testing for cocaine. USACSG Drug Abuse Officer reported that the two Pacific drug abuse urinalysis labs, Schofield and Camp Zama, would make the tests.[2]

U.S. Customs Service (USCS)

USCS Advisors in the PACOM

(U) The reduction of USF and closure of bases in Thailand eliminated the need there for a full-time advisor. After 15 March 1976 the USCS advisor to the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines provided advisory assistance for continuing operations in Thailand and Diego Garcia.[3]

(U) In June 1976 the USCS and the DOD mutually agreed to retain three USCS advisors in the PACOM as follows:[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 475; J112 HistSum Sep 76.
2. J112 HistSum Sep 76.
3. J112 HistSum Jan 76.
4. DA 041545Z Jun 76.

Home Base	Coverage
Okinawa	Japan (including Okinawa) and Guam
Korea	Korea
Philippines	Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Diego Garcia

(U) In April 1976 CINCPAC, in coordination with the USCS and Department of the Army (DOD Executive Agent for the program) had reviewed the need for continued USCS advisor support. CINCPAC had strongly recommended no reduction in the number of advisors (four) if possible, but retention of a minimum of three as shown above if reduction were mandatory.[1]

(U) The three new USCS advisors to PACOM departed for their duty stations on 5 September 1976, after attending a PACOM orientation conference from 30 August to 2 September 1976.[2]

Military Customs Inspector (MCI) Grade Requirements

(U) A CINCPAC staff review of DOD guidance outlining minimum grade standards for MCIs revealed conflicting requirements. A September 1976 policy statement from the Department of the Army (DA), DOD Executive Agent for Military Customs, specified GS-5 as the minimum grade for civilian MCIs. January 1975 guidance from the same headquarters listed GS-4 as the minimum. As a result of a CINCPAC query on this matter, DA published revised minimum grades to clarify the issue. Enlisted MCIs remained at E-4 or above and civilians were raised to GS-5 or above. The unified commander was authorized to waive the E-4 requirement; however, DA retained waiver authority for civilian grades. As of FY 7T the PACOM MCI strength included 1,401 military and 35 civilians. Since the CINCPAC staff had been conservative with waiver approvals, no significant impact was anticipated within the command as a result of this policy change.[3]

PACOM Military Customs Staff Visit

(U) The DOD Executive Agent for Military Customs and the CINCPAC staff military customs representative conducted a staff visit at selected locations throughout PACOM from 21 September to 5 October 1976. The visits at activities

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1. J111 HistSum Apr 76; CINCPAC 070114Z Apr 76.
2. J112 HistSum Aug 76.
3. J112 HistSum Nov 76.

in the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and Guam confirmed that PACOM military customs inspection efforts were effective in preventing shipment of illegal narcotics, drugs, and other contraband from entering the United States through military channels. Particularly strong efforts were noted in the inspection of aircraft and passengers, household goods, and personal property shipments. Acceptable results were observed in inspection of ships and cargo. Procedures for inspection of mail required strengthening at several locations and additional manpower authorizations required formal validation at most installations. Support of the customs program by senior commanders was evident. As a result of observations made during the visit, the pending DOD Instruction 5030.49R, Military Customs Program, was to be changed to clarify several issues for field units.[1]

Awards and Decorations

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (AFEM)

(U) In January 1976 the JCS, in response to CINCPAC's September 1975 recommendation, approved award of the AFEM to personnel who participated in Operation EAGLE PULL (11-13 April 1975) and Operation FREQUENT WIND (29-30 April 1975). In December 1976 the AFEM was approved for personnel participation in the recovery of the SS MAYAGUEZ (15 May 1975).[2]

Change in Awards Procedures

(U) Effective July 1976 the CINCPAC Chief of Staff (J01) directed that the CINCPAC Awards Board contain at least one enlisted member when reviewing award recommendations for enlisted personnel.[3]

DOD Dependent Schools

Pacific Region Advisory Council

(U) Under the provisions of the FY 76 DOD Appropriations Bill the Office of Overseas Dependent Education (OODE) was established on 1 July 1976. The OODE replaced the former Tri-Service geographical manager arrangement for operating the DOD dependent school system. At OODE request, a DOD Dependent Schools Pacific Region Advisory Council was established with membership composed of a Chairman (CINCPAC J1), Executive Secretary (Director, Dependent Schools

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1. J112 HistSum Oct 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 497; JCS 2581/191653Z Jan 76 and 3660/021557Z Dec 76.
3. J113 HistSum Jun 76.

Pacific), and one representative from each component headquarters. The Council was scheduled to meet quarterly to discuss school related programs.[1]

Guam Public Schools

(U) Three representatives from the U.S. Office of Education and the Director of DOD Dependent Schools-Pacific visited Guam between 8 and 10 September 1976 to present a three-phase package for improvement of Guam schools to Governor Bordallo:[2]

- Phase I-Immediate Federal assistance to the Government of Guam: The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and DOD would assist in teacher recruiting, transportation of teachers, procurement of equipment and supplies, finding housing for teachers, and provision of low cost temporary classrooms.

- Phase II-Milestone for the Government of Guam tie-in with Federal assistance: Obtain sufficient qualified teachers, adequate substitute teacher funds, sufficient supplies and textbooks, and submit progress report to U.S. Commissioner of Education by 1 December 1976.

- Phase III-Education technical assistance plan: Management specialists would visit Guam to determine requirements.

(U) Schools opened on 7 September 1976 with few problems and the morale of teachers and administrators was reported "high." Fifty-nine teachers were required to fill the existing shortage. One hundred thirty "limited term" teachers (teachers who lacked college degrees, courses, or were graduates of unaccredited colleges) would be dismissed when certified teachers were found. The Teachers Corps In-Service Educational Project provided $600,000 for in-service training of Guam teachers, and the U.S. Office of Education Federal Resources Coordinator arrived 11 October 1976 and was assigned as special assistant to the Director of Education.[3]

(U) Forty Butler buildings provided by the Navy arrived on Guam on 23 October 1976 for use as portable classrooms. Their arrival eliminated

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1. J114 HistSum Aug 76.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; J114 Fact Sheet, 3 Nov 76, Subj: Guam Schools.

double sessions held in some schools. Construction work on permanent buildings was scheduled for completion by January 1977.[1]

Taiwan Phasedown

(U) On 8 October 1976 the JCS directed cancellation on all inbound permanent change of station (PCS) personnel to Shu Lin Kou and placed all other Taiwan inbound personnel in a hold status. On 9 October CINCPAC designated COMUSTDC as the U.S. Taiwan coordinator between Service military personnel centers and on-island commanders to minimize personnel impact. COMUSTDC notified the Services of the support positions affected and directed them to place all PCS inbound personnel on hold until further notice. On 4 November 1976 the JCS directed a reduction on Taiwan to no more than 1,950 personnel by 31 December 1976 and no more than 1,400 by 31 March 1977, and authorized spaces were reduced to 1,400 by 31 December 1976. Also, the JCS tasked CINCPAC to establish new manpower space authorizations on Taiwan and to submit monthly personnel status reports. On 18 November 1976 CINCPAC established individual units, new military and civilian manpower space authorizations, and directed all units to modify their service manpower documents to reflect new authorization figures effective 31 December 1976. On 20 November 1976 CINCPAC submitted the first manpower status report to the JCS, which indicated 2,163 personnel on Taiwan effective 17 November 1976 and projected 1,950 personnel by 31 December 1976. On 24 December 1976 CINCPAC reported that, effective 23 December 1976, 1,907 personnel were on Taiwan.[2]

Enlistment of Micronesians in the U.S. Armed Forces

(U) In August 1976 the CINCPACREP Guam requested establishment of procedures whereby Micronesians might enlist in the U.S. Armed Forces. CINCPAC supported the concept in principle, but noted certain problem areas which would have to be dealt with before attempting to authorize recruitment of Micronesians:[3]

- Current restrictions in U.S. immigration law.
- Determination as to whether or not recruitment was acceptable under the provisions of the U.N. trusteeship.

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1. J114 Fact Sheet, 3 Nov 76, Subj: Guam Schools.
2. J113 HistSums Nov and Dec 76.
3. CINCPAC 102317Z Sep 76.

- Charges that U.S. Government was creating a drain of valuable personnel resources by recruiting Micronesians.

(U) CINCPAC also recognized the problem of recruiting Micronesians for the U.S. Armed Forces as only one aspect of the total negotiation on future Micronesian status.[1]

FY 77 Combined Federal Campaign-Pacific

(U) PACOM contributions to the FY 77 Combined Federal Campaign totaled $1,666,746.07 for an 11 percent increase over the previous year. This was a continuation of the steadily increasing trend since FY 74, PACOM's first "million dollar year."[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 150106Z Dec 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 510.

CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--MANAGEMENT

PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC)

(U) In 1975 the Department of Defense (DOD) approved a CINCPAC proposal for a PDSC as a separate command under CINCPAC, with one operating system on a 24-hour per day, seven day per week basis. The PDSC concept consolidated automated data processing (ADP) from five locations using 1,000 programs in 10 program languages and 3 operating systems. The component commands would be served by mini-computers with full access to the PDSC main frame. In November and December 1975 Hickam Air Force Base was tentatively chosen as the site for the PDSC and contractor assistance was being provided to the PACOM Systems Architectural Group (SAG) in developing a specific "required operational capability (ROC)" for improving PDSC increments and in collecting data for PDSC analysis.[1]

(U) In January 1976 ROCs for the Indications and Warning (I&W) data analysis collecting system and the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) were developed, signed by CINCPAC, and forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS on 26 January. Also in January the SAG prepared a letter requesting authority to contract for system engineering/system integration (SE/SI) support to develop and implement the PDSC. The estimated Phase I cost of the SE/SI effort was $400,000. This letter also requested authority to extend the contract for 2-3 years, as necessary, until full PDSC operational capability was achieved about January 1979. Also beginning in January representatives of the contractor, RCA Corporation, began to work with the SAG on concept development. As viewed by the contractor, five main tasks were identified for eventual accomplishment. These included review of current capabilities, identification of alternative configurations, the organization and analysis of data, the analysis of alternatives, and a final report.[2]

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) validated the I&W and IDHS ROCs in February 1976 and forwarded them to the JCS for review. Meanwhile, the CINCPAC letter requesting authority to contract for SE/SI support reached the CNO. Since the authority requested exceeded $250,000, the approval of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management was necessary.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 516-517.
2. J213 HistSum Jan 76.

Concurrently, contractor bids for Phase I of the SE/SI effort were under evaluation by the Rome Air Development Center (RADC). By the end of February the tasks of the RCA Corporation representatives relating to the PDSC study were complete with the exception of the final report. A representative of the RADC was scheduled to visit CINCPAC to assist in the preparation of the final report.[1]

(U) By the end of March the final five-volume report on the PDSC was completed by the RCA Corporation. The CNO had advised CINCPAC that the Navy Programs Objective Memorandum (POM) for FY 78 would include $6.6 million for hardware procurement for the PDSC. In April the CNO granted authority to contract for SE/SI support and initial funding of $300,000 had been sent to the RADC. CINCPAC was also advised that the Naval Intelligence Command had agreed to add $400,000 in Operations and Maintenance Navy (O&MN) funds to the FY 78 POM for PDSC computer procurement, making the total PDSC funding in FY 78 $7.0 million.[2]

(U) By memorandum to CINCPAC on 10 May, the JCS advised that the ROCs were responsive to current guidance and requested that CINCPAC develop an implementation plan to support the ROCs and to initiate an overview study to determine CINCPAC's long-range intelligence requirements and resulting resource applications. The contract for SE/SI support was awarded to the Hughes Aircraft Corporation (HAC), and Mr. Al Stone had been designated as the on-site project manager for Hughes. The effective date of the contract was 15 June 1976, and approximately eight HAC personnel began to work full-time with CINCPAC Directorate for Intelligence (J2) personnel at CINCPAC headquarters.[3]

(U) The first major product under the HAC contract was a master Automated Data Systems (ADS) development plan to be provided to the CNO by 1 October 1976. The ADS plan would provide the basis for future budgetary actions regarding the PDSC. During July meetings held by HAC with representatives from the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC), the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) at Hickam Air Force Base, and the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC), a software functional architecture document was prepared by the contractor. Also in July, the first J2-initiated PDSC Steering Committee meeting was held, with representatives from CINCPAC, IPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT attending. The purpose of the PDSC Steering Committee was to discuss policy issues and technical matters relating to the concerns of the various commands. Meetings were to be scheduled on an ad hoc basis. During the first meeting HAC advised the committee members that the master ADS development plan to be delivered to the

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1. J213 HistSum Feb 76.
2. J213 HistSums Mar-Apr 76.
3. J213 HistSums Jun-Jul 76.

CNO would justify hardware expenditure, and also would serve as the implementation plan requested by the JCS in connection with the ROCs.[1]

(U) After considerable coordination by the HAC with CINCPAC J2, IPAC, PACAF, and PACFLT, a 396-page PDSC ADS development plan was completed on 1 October 1976. This development plan was the basis for a fully operational PDSC which would satisfy validated operational requirements of the 1980's. Under organizational relationships prescribed in the plan, the CINCPAC J2 was designated as the PDSC Program Manager, and the IPAC was tasked with responsibility for operation and management of the PDSC host complex along with specific subsystems supporting PACOM I&W and IPAC analysis functions.[2]

(U) The ADS plan was delivered to the CNO and the JCS by a CINCPAC J2 personal representative who briefed the plan to all concerned agencies in Washington. By the end of September it had become obvious that a single site location for the entire PDSC would be impossible. Factors ranging from space adequacy to operational responsibility considerations militated against a single site. Tentative site distribution included a message processing and distribution subsystem in separate locations at Camp Smith, Oahu, and a host, front-end processor and Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (WICS) network processor at Hickam Air Force Base. Node resources for PACAF and FICPAC would be located at Hickam and Makalapa, Oahu, respectively. By the end of October the estimated development cost of the PDSC had increased to $2.144 million over the budget, and CINCPAC J2 and IPAC had begun to plan for the manpower needs of the PDSC.[3]

(U) By the end of the year CINCPAC awaited action on the ADS development plan submitted to the CNO and the JCS on 1 October, and the contractor continued to refine the various complex elements of the PDSC. Also in December CINCPAC J2 convened a meeting of the PDSC Steering Committee to develop a coordinated transition plan for PDSC manning. During the meeting extracts from the IPAC Joint Manpower Program (JMP) document were provided for consideration by the participants. The extracts included requirements for transitional manning of the PDSC in FYs 78-79. Since no compensating billets could be identified for the transitional manning, an alternative manning proposal was developed by CINCPAC J2 and IPAC representatives. Tentatively, this plan incorporated specific requirements, source of personnel, and time-phased manning, with parallel development of figures reflecting the cost differential between a transition to the PDSC with contractor support by 1980 versus a phased acquisition of Government personnel resources. On 30 December IPAC personnel presented

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1. J213 HistSum Jul 76, with atch: Minutes of the PDSC Steering Committee.
2. PACOM ADS Development Plan, 1 Oct 76, pp. 7, 355.
3. J213 HistSums Sep-Oct 76.

CINCPAC J2 representatives with the results of a cost analysis of phased manning requirements for the PDSC organization. The analysis revealed that the phased manning plan was needed if the PDSC development was to be accomplished within projected funding levels.[1]

PACOM IDHSC/WICS Network

(U) The PACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) Network was designed to provide the intelligence community with communications up to the special intelligence/special activities office (SI/SAO) level for interactive, on-line query and response, and bulk data exchange using internetted IDHS computers on Oahu and the CONUS. Related to this system was the WICS which incorporated the PACOM IDHSC network. For clarity, this intelligence communications structure in the PACOM was labeled the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network; it included PACOM access to community on-line intelligence network systems (COINS) and the DIA on-line system (DIAOLS). Late in 1975 CINCPAC had supported a FICPAC package of IDHSC/WICS switch system operations and procedures designed to assist the DIA in formulating a fully accredited system for inter-leaving of all-source and collateral bulk data transferred between the DIA and PACOM switches.[2]

(U) In 1975 the PACAF terminal and computer, located at the 548th RTG, became an operational host computer on the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network. Several new capabilities were developed to access the PACAF-hosted computer whereby PACAF and IPAC cathode-ray tube (CRT) users at Hickam Air Force Base were able to retrieve data from COINS files at the National Security Agency (NSA). CRT users from the PACAF computer attained IDHSC-COINS retrieval capabilities and Strategic Air Command (SAC) was able to make on-line data retrievals directly from the PACAF IDHSC-hosted file. These SAC queries of a PACOM IDHSC-hosted file marked the first regular direct data retrievals from PACOM files by a user outside of the PACOM. Another access mode was developed when, on 7 November 1975, the DIA completed action to allow a DIAOLS interactive terminal user to access the PACAF installations file. Since most DIAOLS interactive terminals were in the Washington area, this marked the beginning of Washington user access to PACOM-hosted IDHSC files. In 1974 and 1975 the IDHSC/WICS system was extended to terminals in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) at U.S. Forces Korea Headquarters in Seoul, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command Headquaters in Taipei, and had been approved at U.S. Forces Japan/5th Air Force Headquarters at Yokota and 13th Air Force Headquarters at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. PACAF had been tasked by CINCPAC to establish IDHSC/WICS terminals at both Air Force-supported sites (Clark and Yokota), but operational status was dependent upon

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1. J213 HistSum Dec 76; IPAC HistSum Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 524-525.

the acquisition and installation of an AN/GYQ-21(V) computer at Hickam Air Force Base. The DIA had also formally validated the functional requirement for an IDHSC/WICS terminal at the Fleet Air Intelligence Support Center (FAISC) at Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines. CINCPAC had tasked CINCPACFLT with the establishment of the FAISC terminal after the January 1976 validation by the DIA.[1]

(U) In March 1976 arrangements were completed to provide the PACOM IDHSC/WICS network users with WICS I "store and forward" access to 21 DIA files previously available only in the DIAOLS interactive mode. That new access capability made the DIAOLS files available to Oahu CRT terminal users and WESTPAC users who had lacked effective DIAOLS interactive access because of system limitations. The new capability allowed users to access the files in the same manner as COINS files through the PACOM network switch.[2]

(U) In April CINCPACFLT identified IDHSC/WICS switch manning problems which could cause potential reductions in switch operating hours from 24 hours to 16 hours per day, five days per week. The main impact of such a reduction would be felt by terminal users in WESTPAC who would lose on-line access to IPAC system electronic intelligence (ELINT)-oriented files during morning working hours. In an April meeting among representatives of CINCPAC, FICPAC, IPAC, and CINCPACAF, the problems were identified and remedial actions proposed. These included efforts to maintain or increase currently authorized manning, redistribution of the bulk data workload, and hardware changes to a future AN/GYQ-21(V) computer, which would permit more hours of operation with a given number of personnel.[3]

(U) By the end of April CINCPAC had learned that planning by PACAF and the Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS) to implement the terminals at Clark and Yokota was dependent upon the delivery of an AN/GYQ-21(V) processor computer to Hickam Air Force Base and the delivery of Teletype Corporation Model 40 CRTs to the AFIS by July 1976. Upon receipt of the Model 40 CRTs the AFIS intended to release their computers for shipment to Clark and Yokota for use as the initial IDHSC/WICS user terminals at these WESTPAC sites. The implementation of the terminal at the FAISC at Cubi Point was planned for 1 January 1977.[4]

(U) Action to replace the IBM 360/30 PACOM switch with an AN/GYQ-21(V) progressed significantly with the completion of the PACOM switch WICS subnetwork development plan (SDP) and the ADS plan discussed in the PDSC section.

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1. Ibid.; J211 HistSum Jan 76.
2. J211 HistSum Apr 76.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

The SDP was forwarded to the DIA on 24 May 1976 and the ADS forwarded to the CNO in June. These documents requested the acquisition of the AN/GYQ-21(V) PACOM switch replacement by November 1976. In May 1976 the DIA promulgated the WICS Management Implementation Plan (MIP) with a revised implementation schedule which called for full implementation of WICS II in May 1977. The accreditation of full bulk data inter-leaving operations was executed by CINCPAC J2 in May, and in June the full implementation and responsibility for maintaining security levels under DIA regulations for automated intelligence systems was accomplished. Following the completion of a successful operational test in September 1976, authority was granted to commence regular inter-leaving of data.[1]

(U) In July CINCPAC received approval from the CNO and the Naval Intelligence Command of the SDP to upgrade the PACOM switch. The ADS development plan was approved by the CNO in September and funds were identified in the FY 77 budget for the procurement of the AN/GYQ-21(V) system to replace the IBM 360/30 PACOM switch. In September a contract for $100,000 was let to INCO Incorporated for the software development of WICS II. The contractor personnel were scheduled to arrive in the PACOM when the 21(V) equipment arrived in order to install the software and supervise the installation.[2]

(U) Although in September FICPAC was forced to reduce switch operations by one shift per day, the new authority to inter-leave collateral and general service (GENSER) bulk data with queries had improved response time and data exchange rates. Even though one less shift was available, the new authority allowed service to continue at the same level as before. However, in October the General Services Administration (GSA) determined that competitive bids were required to procure the 21(V) system and refused to delegate procurement authority to the Air Force. Since all planning had revolved around the 21(V) computer as a replacement at the PACOM switch and for the implementation of WICS II, full implementation was expected to slip well into 1977.[3]

Delegated Production Control

(S) In 1974 the DIA initiated a program to delegate production of intelligence data so as to utilize available resources to the maximum extent. In January 1975 the DIA was advised by IPAC that the production of Ground Order of Battle (GOB), both strength and disposition, of all PACOM countries except Russia could be assumed by IPAC. At the same time IPAC recommended to the DIA that the existing production of the Naval Order of Battle (NOB), with strength

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1. J211 HistSum Jun 76.
2. J211 HistSum Dec 76, which updated the period Jul-Dec 76.
3. Ibid.

figures produced nationally and the disposition produced by the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC) in Hawaii, be continued. For the Air Order of Battle (AOB) IPAC recommended that the strength be produced nationally, with IPAC assuming responsibility for aircraft disposition within the PACOM. In March 1975 a format was developed for the IPAC GOB to be placed on-line in the DIAOLS/COINS network by August of 1975. During that meeting, IPAC provided DIA personnel with a sample format for the standard GOB to be used in the Delegated Production System (DPS). Subsequent discussions during 1975 by the DIA with CINCPAC, SAC, and the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) examined other tentatively selected areas of delegation; e.g., GOB, NOB, and the command geographic area of interest, less Russia, to the PACOM. Other tentative delegations included the Space Order of Battle to CONAD and the Strategic Missile Order of Battle (MOB) worldwide to SAC. These delegations would also include associated Automated Installation Intelligence Files (AIF). In April 1975 the first microfiche GOB printouts were distributed to users of the collateral IPAC GOB, and later in the year IPAC developed an on-line data entry system which permitted GOB analysts to input data on the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) terminals for storage in card image format.[1]

(C) During the DIA-sponsored Air and Missile Order of Battle Standardization Conference held in October 1976 in Washington, policy, procedural, and technical aspects of delegated production were discussed. At this conference IPAC proposed the acceptance of delegation of production of 83 data elements on AOB on 4 communist and 18 non-communist countries in the PACOM area. Responsibility for the PACOM AIF was recommended for retention by DIA. However, the position taken by DIA at the conference was that the AIF and Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World (ASSOTW) responsibilities could not be separated for the communist countries even though there was no objection to separating the responsibilities for AIF maintenance in the case of NOB and for separating the AIF and ASSOTW responsibilities from the AOB maintenance for non-communist countries. Worldwide responsibility for the defensive MOB was tentatively divided between SAC and the Ninth Tactical Intelligence Squadron, with responsibility for the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam to be assumed by SAC. IPAC agreed to investigate the possibility of its assumption of production responsibilities for North Korean and Vietnamese defensive MOB.[2]

Intelligence Exchanges

(S) The ongoing program of bilateral exchanges of intelligence and orientation and familiarization visits by intelligence personnel of various

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 527-528.
2. J223 HistSum Oct 76, with two encl: Draft Report of AOB/MOB Conference, 4-8 Oct 76; Summary of PACOM Role in Delegated Production.

[redacted]

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1. J221 HistSums Feb, May 76; ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 13/090009Z Nov 76.
2. J223 HistSum Apr 76.

[redacted]

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1. 5AF 030745Z May 76 (BOM); there were two such messages, with the same DTG, passed through AFSSO 5AF from BGEN Larson, CINCPAC J2. The same messages were passed to the U.S. Defense Attachés of both countries via GENSER channels.
2. USDAO Canberra 060608Z May 76; USDAO Wellington 100320Z May 76; IPAC HistSum Jun 76.
3. IPAC HistSum Jul 76; CINCPAC 210413Z Jul 76.
4. IPAC HistSum Oct 76; J233 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 110039Z Sep 76; COMIPAC 150019Z Sep 76.

[redacted]

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1. J233 HistSum Oct 76; DIA 1134/082010Z Oct 76; J23/Memo/C426-76 to IPAC, 22 Oct 76, Subj: Foreign Officer Exchange; DIA Ltr to CINCPAC, 13 Oct 76, Subj: Disclosure Guidance, with one atch: DIA/JIO Agreement on Intelligence and Liaison (C).
2. IPAC HistSum Dec 76; J233 HistSum Dec 76; IPAC/Memo/C12-76 to CINCPAC, 1 Dec 76, Subj: Exception to National Foreign Disclosure Policy, with one encl: Request for Exception to National Foreign Disclosure Policy; J2/Memo/C46-76 to COMIPAC, 22 Dec 76, Subj: Foreign Officer Exchange; J233 Point Paper, 20 Dec 76, Subj: Foreign Officer Exchange-IPAC Project 9-2.

PACOM Indications and Warning Upgrade

(S) On 18 November 1975 the CINCPAC J2 realigned the headquarters PACOM Indications and Warning (I&W) center by establishing the PACOM Intelligence Watch. This action combined into a single operation those functions previously done by the J2 I&W Center, IPAC, and the National Security Agency Operations Group. The Commander, IPAC was tasked to operate the Intelligence Watch under the guidance and direction of CINCPAC J2. In March 1975 CINCPAC J2 established a small study group to assess the overall structure and capabilities of I&W centers throughout the PACOM. This group was chaired by a J2 representative; other representatives were from IPAC and the NSA/Central Security Service Pacific (NCPAC). The final report of the study group was published under CINCPAC letter in December 1975. The thrust of the study was that the basic ingredients for a reliable I&W system in the PACOM--well-placed, professionally manned centers with reasonably satisfactory communications--were already in existence. The primary shortcomings discussed in the study included the need for a common I&W goal definition, and the need for one focal point in the theater to actively organize and operate the existing I&W centers. The study group recommended that all system elements be interconnected so that each element was coordinated and interdependent, that each element be organized within the system to form a network in which all elements continuously act and interact, that element system contributions be fused, that flexibility to change from the routine to the crisis be stressed, and that the PACOM I&W system have a central controlling and coordinating authority. Lastly, the study group stressed the need for computer driven I&W support systems because in crisis situations, manual methods of intelligence handling continuously overwhelmed the analysts.[1]

(U) On 29-30 January 1976 the PACOM sponsored a Korean I&W seminar with a special U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) review group. As a result of this seminar, actions were begun to conduct a 90-day Korea I&W test in conjunction with the U-2R deployment to Korea. In support of this test, a Korean Correlation and Sensor Direction Facility (KCDF) was established in the U.S. Forces Korea J2 indications center. The KCDF was manned by personnel from CINCPAC, IPAC, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, PACAF, 5th Air Force, and the DIA. In February 1976 a 100-word-per-minute I&W teletype circuit was established between the PACOM Intelligence Watch and USFK I&W center. The circuit was intended as part of the DIA/PACOM I&W network, and additional I&W circuits were planned for 5th Air Force in Japan, 13th Air Force in the Philippines, and U.S. Taiwan Defense Command on Taiwan. Also in support of

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 517-524.

the Korean I&W test, the first IPAC advanced liaison forward area (ALFA) team was deployed to Korea on 27 February.[1]

(U) In March a 24-hour day, five-day week computer manning schedule was instituted by IPAC to provide support to the ELINT processing function in support of the Korea I&W test. Early in March representatives of Decisions and Design Incorporated (DDI) visited IPAC to begin training IPAC personnel in probabilistic forecasting and to develop a hierarchical model to support the current Korean I&W program. Forty-two analysts were trained on a computer supplied by DDI.[2]

(C) In April DDI representatives worked with IPAC Korea analysts on the structure of two models associated with IPAC program 3.0, Advanced Decision Aids and Probabilistic Forecasting. A North Korea preferred strategy model, developed by a DDI representative, was restructured to suit the needs of the analysts and to provide a more comprehensive and accurate set of interactive data elements associated with the basic levels of the model, based upon the current Korea indicators list and detailed discussions with the IPAC Korea analysts. Demonstrations of the computer program developed for the preferred strategy model were provided for CINCPAC, IPAC, component representatives, and the KCDF director at the mid-point Korea I&W test meeting.[3]

[redacted]

(U) The 90-day Korean test was completed on 30 May 1976, and the KCDF, which had been augmented from seven commands and agencies, also terminated

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1. IPAC HistSums Jan-Feb 76; J212 HistSum Feb 76; J242 HistSum Feb 76.
2. IPAC HistSum Mar 76.
3. IPAC HistSum Apr 76.
4. J21 Point Paper, n.d. (circa Apr 76), Subj: Korea Indications and Warning (I&W) Test.

operations on 30 May. During a DIA I&W seminar conducted on 9-10 June and attended by representatives from the major unified commands and numerous Washington area intelligence agencies, the results of the 90-day I&W test in Korea were briefed. Considerable attention was given to the problem of the "operations/intelligence" interface as it related to the I&W.[1]

(U) In June, I Corps requested USFK to initiate action to procure equipment and install an operations communications (OPSCOMM) circuit between SSO I Corps and the USFK indications center. In August CINCPAC concurred in a message to the Commanders of U.S. Forces Korea, I Corps, and the Naval Telecommunications Command that a valid requirement existed to activate an SI circuit between the SSO I Corps Tactical Operations Center and the USFK indications center. CINCPAC tasked the addressees to take all actions necessary to achieve a 1 September 1976 activation date for the OPSCOMM circuit.[2]

(U) Meanwhile, IPAC received from DDI the latest tape containing new computer threat models of the Korean I&W support programs. It was in mid-August also that representatives of Aeroneutronic-Ford visited IPAC and PACFLT. Discussions were held with intelligence and targeting analysts, data processing personnel, and members of the Watch Center concerning enhancement of all-source data correlation, display of imagery, and improvement of Command Center capabilities. Aero-Ford was seeking ways to improve the capabilities in those areas and information on "actual" Watch Center and analyst activities.[3]

[redacted]

(S) On 1-3 December the first PACOM I&W meeting was held at Yokota Air Base in Japan and attended by representatives from each I&W center in the Pacific. Mission, manning, and functions of each center were discussed to give

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1. J212 HistSums Jun-Jul 76.
2. CINCPAC 140349Z Aug 76.
3. IPAC HistSum Aug 76.
4. IPAC HistSum Oct 76.

the attendees a better appreciation for the strength and weaknesses of each I&W operation. Briefings were presented on the various on-going projects to upgrade the PACOM I&W capability.[1]

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1. J212 HistSum Dec 76.

SECTION II--INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ADMINISTRATION

Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT)

HUMINT Presence in Thailand

(S) On 30 April 1976 information was received from the Defense Intelligence Agency that Military Human Intelligence Units would remain in Thailand under the JUSMAG umbrella. [redacted] Later in the year, an American Embassy, Bangkok review of the past activities of these detachments led the Ambassador to ask for their prompt phasing out and in November 1976 the DIA reluctantly acceded to the Ambassador's position. A phase-out schedule was forthcoming from the Military Departments at year's end.[1]

HUMINT Environment in Japan

[redacted] COMUS Japan convened a special HUMINT Board meeting to discuss the changing environment. Operationally it was concluded that the following were appropriate:[2]

- Review of on-going activities.
- Emphasize alertness for indicators of asset disenchantment or undue curiosity.
- Temporarily curtail or eliminate new developments.
- Assess carefully and delay recruitment actions if appropriate.

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1. DIA 9858/302024Z Apr 76 and 2948/091532Z Nov 76.
[redacted]

- Avoid panic and any other reaction.

- Use natural reasons for deferral of actions already initiated.

PACOM HUMINT Board Meeting

(S) The PACOM HUMINT Board met on 9 December 1976 in the FMFPAC Conference Room, Camp Smith. Agenda items included the discussion of a proposal by the AFIS to establish a 7602nd Air Intelligence Group Liaison Office at Hickam AFB. The Board agreed that a Liaison Office should be established and recommended working arrangements similar to those between the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency and CINCPAC/IPAC.[1]

Photo/Electronic Intelligence

U-Tapao U-2 Operations

[redacted]

SR-71 Availability and Use in PACOM

(S) CINCPAC considered the SR-71 as a prime resource for providing critical intelligence support during periods of increased tension, developing crisis, or the actual outbreak of hostilities. The SR-71's unique operating and collection capabilities made it an extremely valuable and versatile asset. The range of options varied with the seriousness of the situation and ranged from tasking for special exploitation by the 548th RTG to requests for quick reaction photo coverage, to special coverage requirements under conditions of increased tension, to requests for activation of the Kadena MPC, and culminating in

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1. Minutes, PACOM HUMINT Board Meeting, 9 Dec 76.
2. CINCPAC 260219Z Mar 76; J231 Point Paper, 5 Apr 76, Subj: U-2 Operations in Indian Ocean.

requests for authority to conduct overflights. These options were readily apparent during all major exercise play by CINCPAC, and accurately reflected anticipated real-world contingency actions.[1]

[redacted]

(C) An example of SR-71 use in PACOM came in November 1976, when film from a SAC SR-71 search and rescue mission near Guam arrived at the 548th RTG for immediate processing. During processing, an object appeared on the imagery which was thought to be a fourteen foot boat. A position was provided, but the boat was not found. Following identification of several other possible boat sightings on the imagery, the search was abandoned.[3]

(C) The 548th RTG provided a wrap-up of the exploitation mission and recommended revised measures to improve results of exploitation imagery for search and rescue missions:[4]

- If possible, known ground points should be photographed to insure reference points for correlation of camera systems in the event computer support systems are inoperative.

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1. J231 Point Paper, 2 Apr 76, Subj: SR-71 Availability in PACOM.
2. Ibid.
3. 548RTG 021000Z Nov 76.
4. 548RTG 060400Z Nov 76.

- An automatic mission planning (AMPS) track should be provided to the exploitation unit as a backup to onboard computers.

- Using the recon platform, and as part of the mission, an object which resembles the lost object should be photographed to familiarize PI's to size and shape.

- If feasible, operational altitude should be lowered to maximize scale and resolution.

Guam Typhoon PAMELA Damage Assessment

(C) At the request of 3d Air Division (SAC) on Guam, HQ SAC authorized aerial photo coverage of the entire island utilizing a U-2R from SAC OL-OA at Osan AB, Korea to aid officials on Guam in assessing damage caused by Typhoon PAMELA. Flown on 27 May 1976, the U-2R used the 66-inch focal length "H" camera in the vertical mode and obtained excellent photography. The unprocessed film was sent via Armed Forces Courier Station to the 548th RTG for processing and production of a mosaic. The 548th RTG voluntarily worked through the Memorial Day weekend, complying with CINCPAC Intelligence Directorate (J231) film handling instructions and producing a timely quality product which was expedited to the 3d Air Division for distribution.[1]

Activation of Mobile Processing Center (MPC) at Kadena

[redacted]

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1. STRATRECONCEN 262229Z May 76; OL-OA (18TFW) 290755Z May 76; CINCPAC 272359Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC 241932Z Aug 76; DIA 252350Z Aug 76; JCS 2485/262339Z Aug 76 and 3622/172131Z Sep 76; SSO SACRECON 311320Z Aug 76; J2312 HistSum Oct 76.

Aerial Photography for Fiji

(C) In August 1976 the USDAO Wellington, New Zealand relayed an informal inquiry of the Government of Fiji Environmental Advisor as to whether the U.S. Government could assist in taking aerial photographs of selected areas along the Fiji coastline and of the Suva metropolitan area. The photographs would assist the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forests in determining commercial fishing feasibility in coastal reef areas, and the Environmental Advisor in assessing environmental conditions in Suva. CINCPAC noted that, although there were currently no photo assets available in that area, it might be possible to obtain the desired coverage during future scheduled operations in that area, if timeliness were not a factor. Other possibilities would have required a special mission with its attendant costs. No further inquiry was made on this matter during 1976.[1]

Access to PACFLT Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System (OSIS) Data Base

(S) In February 1976 CINCPAC requested access to the OSIS data base by IPAC via the WWMCCS to obtain the identical sanitized all-source OSIS data provided the CINCPACFLT Command Center (FCC). Further coordination with CINCPACFLT resulted in the following amplified requirements by October 1976:

- On-line, 24 hour access to Intelligence Support System (ISS) files (Red surface and sub-surface forces and merchantships) to allow PACOM I&W net controller to obtain past, present, and projected maritime positional data and patterns of foreign naval operations, and to support IPAC hull-to-emitter correlation (HULTEL) analysis.

- On-line, 24 hour access to the Navy WWMCCS software standardized (NWSS) unitrack files (Blue surface force) to allow PACOM I&W net controller to obtain positional data on U.S./allied naval forces.

(S) In November 1976 CINCPAC submitted the desired data elements for the evaluated Red and Blue positional information to be available through interface of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT WWMCCS H6060 computers. Planning for the project was underway in December 1976 and remote access was anticipated by summer 1977.[2]

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1. USDAO Wellington 172048Z Aug 76; J2 Current Issues, 18 Aug 76, Subj: Aerial Photos of Fiji Coastal Resources.
2. CINCPAC 060527Z Feb 76, 210246Z May 76, 010321Z Oct 76, and 182015Z Nov 76; CINCPACFLT 190617Z Jun 76 and 200157Z Oct 76; J2312 HistSum Dec 76.

Ocean Surface Surveillance (OSS)

(S) On 27 October 1976, as a result of coordination during the B-52 OSS Conference (19-20 October 1976), CINCPACFLT provided the guidelines for the conduct of B-52 OSS against Soviet units in the Pacific Ocean. It was anticipated that the initial missions would be conducted by the 3d Air Division, 43d Security Wing, from Andersen AFB, Guam in January 1977. In issuing the guidelines CINCPACFLT advised that these missions would not be conducted under Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) rules because:[1]

- The areas proposed lay wholly outside JCS-designated PARPRO sensitive areas.

- Dual reporting procedures (OPREP and RAINFORM) would unnecessarily complicate communications procedures and contribute to communications overload.

- B-52 OSS of Soviet units was not considered a PARPRO sensitive mission, but was merely an extension of existing OSS training in the Pacific.

Counterintelligence

International Terrorism

(U) From 1 through 4 June 1976 Dr. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation visited CINCPAC and held discussions concerning international terrorism. A total of 35 personnel representing 23 different staff elements and organizations attended the various discussions. On 4 June Dr. Jenkins met with analysts from IPAC and discussed their assessments of the threat to the Pacific Command. On 10 June Admiral Gayler, in a memorandum to the CINCPAC staff, emphasized the need for alertness and vigilance to potential terrorist threats in the PACOM, and directed the following staff actions:[2]

- A review of existing directives to insure a free and rapid exchange of information concerning terrorism.

- Preparation by the J3 Crisis Action Group to formulate reactions to any terrorist incident.

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1. CINCPACFLT 252204Z Sep 76 and 270520Z Oct 76.
2. J2334 HistSum Jul 76; JOO/Memo, 10 Jun 76, Subj: Terrorism.

- IPAC monitoring of terrorist trends on an all-source basis.

Administrative Activities

Freedom of Information Actions

(U) During 1976 there were only two requests of note processed under the Freedom of Information Act (FIA)--one a continuation of a request initiated in late 1975, the other initiated by a Hawaii resident in May 1976. In the first case, an individual had submitted a request, under the FIA, to purchase "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia," published by CINCPAC from July 1967 to July 1968, and "The Mekong River: An Obstacle to Crosscountry Movement," from the PACOM Intelligence Digest of 17 January 1969. At the end of 1975 the requestor was advised that the "Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia" documents were releasable upon receipt of payment for search and reproduction costs ($61.30), but CINCPAC had requested and received DIA concurrence to deny the Intelligence Digest article request. On 9 February 1976 the requestor expressed regret at not being able to pay the reproduction costs, noting that he could obtain the documents on inter-library loan from the Air University Library. He further requested CINCPAC conduct a declassification review of the remaining back file of "Measurement of Progress" and inform the Air University Library of the results. He was informed that CINCPAC would advise all holders that the July 1967 through July 1968 issues of "Measurement of Progress" had been declassified, but that subsequent requests would require an advance payment of approximately $25.00 for each quarterly report. He was also informed that the U.S. Government had expended $592.95 for the initial efforts made to release "Measurement of Progress."[1]

(U) Based on DIA reassessment of the PACOM Intelligence Digest article, CINCPAC declassified that document in March 1976 and notified the Judge Advocate General of the Navy that the requestor could obtain the article upon receipt of $11.90 to pay for search and reproduction costs.[2]

(U) In the second case, a Hawaii resident requested access to, and copies of, all files and documents that might be on file at CINCPAC pertaining to himself and the organization he represented. As this request was quite general in nature, CINCPAC advised the requestor that identifying a specific incident,

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 542; Ltr from Mr. T. Jeffery Hughes to COL Alan H. Birdsall, CINCPAC, 9 Feb 76; CINCPAC Ltr J233 Ser 397 of 25 Feb 76 to T. Jeffery Hughes.
2. CINCPAC Ltr J233 Ser 579 of 23 Mar 76, Subj: Freedom of Information Act Appeal in the Case of Mr. T. Jeffery Hughes.

activity, subject, or time would assist in reducing the manhours required for search, and thus the cost to the requestor. He was further provided the fee schedule for search and duplication of documents and was advised of the minimum fee of $68.05 due in advance to begin search. On 8 June 1976 the requestor asked for further specifics to aid his request, including a description of the functions of the CINCPAC staff agencies. This information was provided on 22 June 1976, and no further correspondence was received from the requestor during 1976.[1]

Declassification Actions

ROLLING THUNDER - Route Package

(U) In May 1976 Admiral Sharp (Retired), former CINCPAC, requested review of the Operation ROLLING THUNDER (Air Operations against North Vietnam) Route Package Area Map for possible declassification action. The map was declassified by the CINCPAC Operations Directorate on 17 May 1976, and released to Admiral Sharp.[2]

PACOM Intelligence Digest

(U) On 27 April 1976 the Department of the Army requested a review of pages 8 through 11, PACOM Intelligence Digest of 7 June 1968 for possible utilization by Army historians working on the official history of the United States Army in the War in Vietnam. IPAC analysts recommended the retention of current classification due to the sensitive type of information contained therein. On 17 May 1976 CINCPAC requested the DIA to conduct further review. The DIA, in turn, coordinated with OJCS and Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (OASD(ISA)) and requested a final decision from CIA. On 23 July 1976 the DIA notified CINCPAC of the CIA final decision, agreeing to the declassification of the four-page article, "South Vietnam: The Political War."[3]

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1. Ltrs, American Friends Service Committee, Inc., Hawaii Area Program Office (Ian Yonge Lind, Program Secretary) to CINCPAC, 13 May 76 and 8 Jun 76; CINCPAC Ltrs J233 Ser 1062 of 27 May 76 and Ser 1240 of 22 Jun 76 to Mr. Ian Yonge Lind.
2. J2/Memo/S48-76 of 17 May 76, Subj: Declassification Action (ROLLING THUNDER-Route Package Areas) with J3 handwritten approval.
3. DA Ltr DAAG-AMR-S, 27 Apr 76, Subj: Request for Declassification Review: TAG Action 7626311; CINCPAC Ltr J233 Ser C115 of 17 May 76; DIA 6654/261506Z May 76 and 2615/231710Z Jul 76.

Release of Classified Information to Foreign Governments

Japan

[redacted]

Korea

[redacted]

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1. USFJ/J2 Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Release of U.S. Military Intelligence to Representatives of the Government of Japan, 28 Sep 76.
2. COMUS Korea 200747Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 202200Z Aug 76; JCS 4637/210018Z Aug 76.

SECTION III--TARGET INTELLIGENCE

PACOM Target Action Group (TAG)

(S) During 1976 the coordinating body for PACOM targeting activities met a total of eleven times. During 1975, this body, comprised of representatives from CINCPAC (chairman), IPAC, PACAF, and CINCPACFLT (FICPAC), met as the PACOM Target List Review Group (TLRG). For the first five meetings of 1976, this body met as the Target List Review Group/PACOM Target Materials Review Group (TLRG/PATMRG) and, beginning with meeting 6-76, 23 June 1976, and for the remainder of 1976, it met as the PACOM Target Action Group (TAG). Beginning with meeting 3-76, 25 March 1976, membership included representation from the 548th RTG.[1]

CCTL/CNTL

[redacted]

IOCTL

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 553; TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 1-76 thru 5-76; TAG Minutes, 6-76 thru 8-76.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 561-564; TAG Minutes, 7-76, 9-76, 10-76, 11-76.
3. TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 2-76; TAG Minutes, 7-76, and Encl 4, Modification to IOCTL.

(S) On 19 November CINCPAC Intelligence Director issued a tasking letter to PACAF Division of Intelligence Collection which defined imagery support required in PACOM. The 548th RTG served as the executive agency for the PACOM imagery data base. Also covered in the tasking were IOCTL objectives outside the Unified Command Plan (UCP).[1]

NKTTL

(S) As part of the continuing review, in February 1976 IPAC submitted several revisions to the data and coding of the North Korean Tactical Target List (NKTTL). Included were area codes which reflected five nautical mile circles around population centers vice the former arbitrary geographic areas.[2]

[redacted]

TDCATL

[redacted]

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1. TAG Minutes, 11-76 and Encl 4, Imagery Data Base Responsibility.
2. TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 2-76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 555-556; TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 4-76, and Encl 3, Target List Modifications; TAG Minutes, 7-76, and Encl 1, Revision of NKTTL Foreword; TAG Minutes, 9-76, and Encl 1, NKTTL Modification to Accommodate 5027N.

[redacted]

Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (APPS)

(S) By June 1976 PACAF had received APPS equipment intended to support their F-111 and F-4 radar bombing program, and had conducted a one week training program for the other components. By the end of September, PACFLT had also received and used their APPS equipment. Their data base was deployed aboard the USS MIDWAY for flight crew use in planning and selecting aimpoints. Carriers were scheduled to receive the APPS in 1977.[2]

[redacted]

Unconventional Warfare (UW) Targeting

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 558-561; TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 2-76 and 3-76.
2. TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 2-76; TAG Minutes, 6-76 and 9-76.
3. TAG Minutes, 9-76; HQ DMA 161920Z Sep 76, 071200Z Oct 76; DMAAC 191900Z Mar 76.

[redacted]

Target List Distribution in Wartime

(S) On 29 April 1976 the TAG IPAC representative referenced a 19 March 1976 memo suggesting use of AUTODIN cards to provide responsive updating in wartime. PACAF saw no problem with its units, but believed a printout would be preferable to cards for routine applications. PACFLT (FICPAC) stated that the Seventh Fleet had no capability to receive cards or other bulk data when deployed and that tape was considered impractical due to printout speed. The Fleet Auxiliary Intelligence Service Center (FAISC) in WESTPAC could receive cards and fly them to Fleet Units. If in port, Fleet units could receive cards via shore communications. Realizing that these methods would be inadequate under wartime conditions, PACFLT worked through year's end to obtain highspeed communications systems onboard ships.[2]

Operation PAUL BUNYAN

(S) During the Korean Crisis of 18-21 August 1976, which resulted in Operation PAUL BUNYAN, the Joint Targeting Committee (JTC) was not activated. On 30 September the TAG membership agreed that the JTC should be activated in future crises and that activation during exercises would develop competency. The first exercise for consideration was PRIME TARGET, scheduled for March 1977.[3]

Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Material (TI/TTM)

(S) During the period 8-12 November 1976 the Chairman of the PACOM TAG served as voting representative at the DIA-sponsored TI/TTM Conference, Lowry AFB, Colorado. A total of 68 agenda items were considered, 17 of which were submitted by PACOM. Of the 17 PACOM items, all but four were passed as is or with minor modification.[4]

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1. TAG Minutes, 7-76.
2. TLRG/PATMRG Minutes, 4-76; TAG Minutes, 6-76.
3. TAG Minutes, 9-76.
4. J222 HistSums Aug 76 and Nov 76; TAG Minutes, 11-76.

CHAPTER X

POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION I--OVERVIEW

Selected Chronology 1976

(U) This unclassified chronology was compiled from Department of State Bulletins, the periodical Current History, and the wire service chronology submitted by the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office.

3 Jan - In India, the national convention of the congress party gave unanimous support to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's policies, including the postponement of parliamentary elections, the continuing state of emergency, and the proposed constitutional changes.

5 Jan - U.S. Senator George McGovern (D.-SD) said Pakistan had indicated to him its interest in buying arms from the United States.

- Cambodia announced that the constitution approved last month goes into effect today and that the country will be known officially as "Democratic Cambodia." Prince Norodom Sihanouk is still Chief of State.

8 Jan - The official Chinese press agency, Hsinhua, announced the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

- Prime Minister of Thailand, Kukrit Pramoj, brought the Opposition Social Agrarian Party into his coalition and took over the Ministry of the Interior.

9 Jan - Premier Chiang Ching-kuo visited the U.S. Seventh Fleet flag ship at Keelung Harbor in Taiwan.

10 Jan - In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko discussed a treaty to conclude World War II formally.

- An Indian Buddhist publication carried articles and editorials supporting the Communist government of Vietnam.

12 Jan - Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand submitted his resignation; King Phumiphol Aduldet dissolved Parliament and called for new elections in April. Kukrit agreed to head a caretaker government until the elections.

- Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko warned Japan that the USSR may "reconsider" its relations with Japan if Japan signs a peace treaty with China.

- Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said the United States should build up its naval and military presence in the Indian Ocean.

13 Jan - Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki said that his government is prepared to sign a peace treaty with China to conclude World War II, despite the objections of the Soviet Union. He said Japan is willing to sign a clause stating that both China and Japan oppose the efforts of any third nation to achieve "hegemony" in Asia.

14 Jan - Tun Abdul Razak, Prime Minister of Malaysia, died.

- Australian Prime Minister announced that the development of a major naval base in Western Australia which may be used by nuclear warships of allied nations will be speeded up.

- Indian Prime Minister told a meeting of international scientists that India will continue to experiment with nuclear explosions.

15 Jan - South Korean President Park Chung-hee disclosed the discovery of oil along the country's southeast coast.

- Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Onn was sworn in as Prime Minister.

16 Jan - The remains of two Americans shot down over China during the Vietnam War were flown to Thailand for processing.

18 Jan - Senator McGovern has been told that North Vietnam wants economic aid from the United States as a price for normalizing diplomatic relations.

19 Jan - Saigon radio announced that elections for a joint national assembly will be held on 25 April 1976.

20 Jan - Secretary of State Kissinger arrived in Moscow to confer with Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev for talks designed to limit the long-range missiles and bombers of the United States and the USSR.

- New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon strongly backed United States naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

21 Jan - Kim Young Sam, leader of the opposition in South Korea, was indicted on charges of violating emergency decrees issued by the President.

- President Ford presented his budget for fiscal year 1977 to Congress. In his budget message, he said that defense spending will rise to $100 billion in the next year and probably reach $141 billion by 1981.

- The Saigon military government officially turned over its ruling authority to a civilian administration, the People's Revolutionary Committee, headed by Vo Van Kiet.

22 Jan - Britain granted independence to the strategically important Seychelles Islands group in the Indian Ocean effective 29 June 1976.

24 Jan - A congressional report by the General Accounting Office released by Senator Gary Hart (D.-CO) revealed that to make way for U.S. Navy facilities the Administration secretly paid for the costs of the British evacuation of the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

- In Madrid, Secretary of State Kissinger signed a treaty with Spain allowing the United States to continue to use military bases in Spain.

26 Jan - Thailand officials claimed Cambodian soldiers shot and killed 200 Cambodian villagers as they tried to flee to Thailand.

- In its defense budget, the U.S. Defense Department dropped its plans to expand the 479-ship Navy to a 600-ship Navy.

- In Athens, U.S. and Greek officials met to discuss the future status of U.S. troops in Greece.

30 Jan - Philippine Army troops arrested more than 200 striking workers. In the past month, nearly 120 students, labor leaders and social leaders have been arrested on charges of being Communists or subversives.

2 Feb - In a television interview, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he believes that the United States should spend enough money on defense to keep a "rough equivalence" with the Soviet Union.

- Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway said the United States has lost its once undisputed control of the Sea of Japan.

3 Feb - Commenting on strategic arms limitation at a luncheon in California, Secretary of State Kissinger said as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throw weight while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication and we possess more warheads.

4 Feb - A U.S. Senate subcommittee in Washington, D.C., reported that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation paid a Japanese rightist leader $7 million as its "secret agent" to help the company sell planes in Japan.

7 Feb - A dispatch from Hsinhua, the official Chinese press agency, revealed the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng, Minister of Public Security and a Deputy Prime Minister, as Acting Prime Minister, succeeding the late Chou En-lai. Teng Hsiao-ping, the senior Deputy Prime Minister, acted for Chou during Chou's year-long last illness.

10 Feb - Vice Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, said his fleet was capable of meeting any challenge in the oceans it patrols.

- President Ford signed a $112.3-billion defense appropriation bill that includes a ban on further aid to forces in the Angolan civil war.

- Japanese government officials reported that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has lost a $1.3-billion order for new planes because of its involvement with a payoff scandal to Japanese officials.

12 Feb - The new Japanese Ambassador to the United States asked the State Department to provide all information available to the United States Government concerning the payment of some $12 million to Japanese agents by the Lockheed Corporation.

16 Feb - President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Anatole Dobrynin to discuss new proposals on strategic arms limitations.

17 Feb - State Department officials reported that the United States has broken off talks with India on the possible resumption of U.S. economic aid, to show displeasure at India's policies toward the United States.

- President Ford reorganized America's intelligence community, ordering a committee under CIA Director George Bush to manage all intelligence operations and creating an independent three-man board to report abuses.

18 Feb - The government closed Thailand's borders to refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

- Despite last year's collapse of American foreign policy in Indochina, the United States will honor defense commitments in Thailand and the Philippines, according to Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He said there were no plans to withdraw any American troops from South Korea.

- Australia's Defense Minister announced the purchase of two guided missile frigates for the Royal Australian Navy from the United States.

20 Feb - The Thailand government notified U.S. authorities that all American military advisers who remain after the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Thailand should eventually leave the country.

- As a private citizen, former President Richard Nixon departed on a trip to China to be the guest of the Chinese government.

22 Feb - The remains of the last two Americans killed in Vietnam (U.S. Marine guards during the evacuation of Saigon) were turned over to aides of Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-MA) and flown to Bangkok, Thailand.

23 Feb - A battle in international waters ended when a Thailand Navy ship sank one of five Cambodian patrol boats attacking Thailand fishermen.

- A Japanese government mission headed to Hanoi for talks with North Vietnamese officials on ways to strengthen ties between the two countries.

- Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung talked with former U.S. President Nixon in Peking; the meeting was described as a "friendly conversation on a wide range of subjects."

- The government of Vietnam announced that foreign visitors will be welcome beginning next month. Tourist facilities are being prepared.

24 Feb - Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev opened the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, noting that he sees "detente as the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction."

- The U.S. Senate voted to create the Northern Marianas Commonwealth, extending U.S. citizenship to some 14,000 residents of one district of the present U.N. Pacific Trust Territory upon termination of trusteeship in 1981.

- Japanese government officials seized tons of paper in the Tokyo office of Lockheed and in 27 private homes and businesses looking for information on the Lockheed scandal.

25 Feb - Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan sent a letter to U.S. President Ford asking for full cooperation in getting the names of "high ranking Japanese government officials" who allegedly received Lockheed's payoff in its sales promotion in Japan.

- Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto ended a 3-day trip to Canada, where he conferred with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The Canadian government wishes to exert control over the nuclear power reactors it sold to Pakistan.

26 Feb - President Ford announced he is withdrawing trade preference status from Laos under the law which bars such benefits to a developing country if it goes communist.

- In Japan, three Americans were subpoenaed by the lower house of Parliament to testify before a committee investigating the Lockheed bribery scandal.

- Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf said that the United States could defeat the Soviet Union at sea right now and that his major worry was future shipbuilding trends.

27 Feb - Cambodia claimed that three U.S. F-111 warplanes bombed and badly damaged the town of Siem Reap. U.S. military and Embassy spokesmen in Bangkok, Thailand, said, "The (Cambodian) report is ridiculous and completely without truth."

- Premier Chiang Ching-kuo stressed that the alliance between Taiwan and the United States should not be undermined by U.S. "accommodations" with China.

- Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan met in New York with U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger to discuss matters of mutual interest, including nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

1 Mar - As reported in the Navy Times, Admiral Noel Gayler, CINCPAC, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the inroads of inflation were undermining the ability of U.S. Forces to do their job and were having a detrimental effect on morale because money shortages were being "taken out of the hide" of military people. Giving an assessment of the status of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Gayler said he is most concerned about anti-submarine warfare capability, ocean surveillance, sealift, and the ability to provide tactical air and sea control.

- The United States announced the turnover of Camp Samae San to Thailand.

- President Ford said the term "detente" no longer applies to describe U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China but that he will continue negotiating with them in "a policy of peace through strength."

2 Mar - Twelve political and religious leaders petitioned South Korean President Park Chung Hee to resign and rescind the emergency decrees issued in 1972.

- The National Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists filed a petition with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to bar the shipment of 40,000 pounds of uranium to India, claiming that the shipment would be "inimical to the interests of the United States"; the groups claim that India has refused to sign the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation and has refused safeguard inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4 Mar - Phnom Penh radio, Cambodia reported that Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary led foreign diplomats from 12 countries and a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization on a tour of northwestern Cambodia. The diplomats reportedly viewed the bomb site of a town that the government said was bombed by American planes "last week."

7 Mar - Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said the United States has a "rough equivalence" with the Soviet Union's military power, but could slip to number two if present trends continue.

9 Mar - The Canadian Government reached an agreement with the Indian Government over the use of nuclear reactors sold to India. The Indian Government promised that the reactors will not be used to develop an explosive device.

10 Mar - Eleven critics of the Government of South Korea were arrested and charged with plotting to overthrow the Government. One of the 11, Kim Dae Jung, was the opposition party's most recent presidential candidate.

- The Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers expressed concern at increasing Soviet military activity throughout the world and called on the United States to maintain a global presence to match the threat.

11 Mar - President Ford personally assured Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki the United States would supply names and other evidence to Japanese authorities investigating Lockheed's acknowledged payoffs in Japan.

12 Mar - The Government of Japan agreed to keep secret any information supplied by the U.S. Government for its investigation of Japanese officials involved in the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation scandal. The U.S. Governemnt requested secrecy until all investigations are completed.

- In recent weeks, under the guise of a new "tenure" law, the Government of South Korea forced the ouster of more than 400 university professors.

13 Mar - Lockheed's Japanese "secret agent" was formally charged with evading income tax payments; he was the first to be charged in the Lockheed scandal.

15 Mar - The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea resumed; 156 nations were represented. Representatives are trying to reach international legal agreement on the use of the oceans.

16 Mar - In an address outlining U.S. foreign policy for the next decade, Secretary of State Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "peace in Asia depends upon the resolution of outstanding political conflicts, most prominently

that of the Korean Peninsula." "Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our Asia policy," and "the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is indispensable."

19 Mar - President Ford said he has promised Peking to continue reduction of U.S. Forces on Taiwan but not a specific 50 percent cut.

20 Mar - The Government of Thailand asked the United States to shut down operations in Thailand at midnight and remove all but 270 military personnel by 4 July 1976. The United States hoped to have 3,000 troops in Thailand to man various installations.

- The Government of Indonesia began withdrawing its troops from Portuguese Timor.

21 Mar - The U.S. military ceased all operations in Thailand in preparation for its final withdrawal.

22 Mar - White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen reported that last week President Ford received a written report from former President Nixon on his trip to China and found it "very interesting and useful."

24 Mar - President Ford signed "a covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in political union with the United States of America."

25 Mar - Supreme Commander Admiral Sa-Ngat Chaloryu said the Thailand military has proposed buying a squadron of F-5 fighter-bombers worth about $500 million to substitute for U.S. Forces withdrawing from Thailand.

26 Mar - Representative G.V. Montgomery announced a message to Hanoi from the Ford Administration which expressed hope that all matters in dispute between the U.S. and North Vietnam could be discussed and eventually resolved; the key issue is the fate of about 850 Americans still reported as missing-in-action.

- The United States and Turkey reached a new 4-year accord to allow American military bases in Turkey to be reopened; in return, the Administration pledged about $1 billion in loans and grants, which must be approved by both houses of Congress.

27 Mar - Philippine President Marcos retired three chiefs of the armed forces plus five other generals. This was the first shakeup in the armed forces since the Government declared martial law three years ago.

29 Mar - The United States, maintaining its hardline stand against any aid to North and South Vietnam, decided to boycott a fund-raising conference opening in Manila on medical assistance to the two war-ravaged countries.

1 Apr - In a just-released book, former President Diosdado Macapagal denounced the Government of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos as an illegal dictatorship. Macapagal applied for political asylum in the United States but was refused by the State Department.

5 Apr - Prince Norodom Sihanouk resigned his figurehead position as Head of State of Cambodia. The Cabinet accepted his resignation.

- Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj was defeated in his bid for reelection to the National Assembly. Party leader Seni Pramoj will become Prime Minister of Thailand.

7 Apr - Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of China was removed from his posts as deputy chairman of the party, first deputy Prime Minister and chief of staff of the armed forces; Hua Kuo-feng was appointed as Prime Minister and first deputy chairman of the Communist Party.

12 Apr - General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, met with Secretary of State Kissinger to begin negotiations regarding the use by the U.S. Armed Forces of facilities in Philippine military bases.

13 Apr - President Ford signed a law that extends the United States fisheries limit to 200 miles offshore.

14 Apr - The Marshall Islands District of the U.N. Trust Territory asked the United States to open separate negotiations for a political status in unity with the United States.

- Japan deplored the U.S. establishment of a 200-mile fisheries zone off its coast.

- Cambodian Information and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim announced the appointment of Khieu Samphan as "Chairman of the State Presidium"; he succeeded Sihanouk as Head of State. Pol Pot was named Prime Minister.

- The Supreme Court of Japan declared the nation's parliamentary election procedures unconstitutional because equal representation for voters was not assured and each vote was not of equal weight.

15 Apr - India and the USSR signed a 5-year trade agreement.

- The U.S. and Greek Governments signed an agreement providing for the United States to use bases in Greece and for $700 million in U.S. aid for Greece.

17 Apr - Peking radio reported the dismissal of Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying.

18 Apr - An article in Pravda said that U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger's remarks that the United States cannot support a country that permits communists in its government violates the Helsinki Agreement.

19 Apr - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India offered to resume discussions about reestablishing diplomatic relations with Pakistan. India and Pakistan severed diplomatic relations in 1971.

21 Apr - An Indian paramilitary patrol unit was fired upon by Bangladesh security forces.

- The Ford Administration stated that now was not the time to make an arms limitation initiative in the Indian Ocean because of Russian activities in Africa.

- King Phumipol of Thailand officially appointed the new Government of Prime Minister Seni Pramoj.

- President Ford predicted that Japan would accelerate its military rearmament in the future and said he would favor such action.

23 Apr - President Ford said he was willing to discuss "some humanitarian efforts" with North Vietnam but his Administration was not prepared to recognize the communist regime.

24 Apr - Prime Minister Takeo Miki said Japan will not seek a revision of its military security treaty with the United States to ban American nuclear weapons from Japanese soil.

25 Apr - Elections for 492 seats in the National Assembly were held in North and South Vietnam; these were the first country-wide assembly elections held since 1946.

26 Apr - The Chinese press agency Hsinhua reported that Cambodia and Burma have established diplomatic relations.

- Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister since 1967, died suddenly at the age of 72.

- Vietnam radio broadcasts reported a 99 percent voter turnout in some sections to elect 249 deputies in the North and 243 in the South; all candidates had been preselected by revolutionary committees.

- The Government of South Africa established full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

29 Apr - Dmitri F. Ustinov, a civilian in charge of the Soviet military industrial complex, was named to replace the late Andrei A. Grechko as Minister of Defense.

30 Apr - The North Korean radio announced that the 5th Supreme People's Assembly named Pak Sung Chul as Prime Minister to succeed Kim Il, who was appointed "first deputy chairman" of the Communist Party.

2 May - Government officials in Vietnam announced that Hanoi would become the diplomatic, publishing and international center of the country. Press offices and embassies in Saigon would be closed effective 8 May 1976.

6 May - Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.

7 May - After eight weeks of negotiations by representatives of 147 countries in New York, the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference adjourned with differences still unresolved; representatives agreed to another conference in New York starting 2 August 1976 to try to complete their work, which was begun in 1973.

- Saying that it would impose "unprecedented restrictions," President Ford vetoed the $4.4 billion foreign aid bill for fiscal 1976 and July, August, and September 1976. Pursuant to a 1976 law, the 1977 fiscal year started 1 October 1976, instead of 1 July 1976.

8 May - It was announced that Thailand and the United States will begin moving an additional 11,000 Indochinese refugees to the United States as soon as processing can be completed.

- Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev was promoted to field marshal.

9 May - Representative Les Aspin made public a Central Intelligence Agency report that the United States had outspent Russia almost 2-to-1 in the building of major warships during the last five years, spending $4.9 billion versus the Soviet expenditure of $2.5 billion.

14 May - The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan announced the decision of the two countries to restore diplomatic relations "within a short period of time."

15 May - During an interview for the NBC "Today" Show taped 15 May and broadcast on 17 May, Secretary of State Kissinger said the absolute precondition without which we cannot consider the normalization of relations with the Government of Vietnam is the accounting for missing-in-action and full accounting for the remains of Americans who were shot down over Vietnam or otherwise killed in Vietnam.

16 May - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to approve a 5-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain that provides $1.2 billion in U.S. aid to Spain in return for the continuing U.S. use of Spanish bases.

18 May - Canadian Foreign Secretary Allan MacEachen announced the termination of the nuclear cooperation pact with India.

19 May - The United States transferred Ko-Kha Base to the Thailand Government.

20 May - The Senate voted to postpone appropriations for the B-1 bomber until 1 February 1977.

24 May - In Japan, the upper house of Parliament completed ratification of the 1968 international treaty on the limitation of nuclear weapons.

- Protocol to the Treaty between the U.S. and USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was ratified by both countries and entered into force this date.

27 May - The Philippines complained that its military assistance agreements with the United States do not give the Philippines enough help to combat internal subversion.

- During a meeting held in Honolulu, HI between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and South Korean Defense Minister Suh Jyong Chul on security matters, Secretary Rumsfeld said that the United States is committed to the defense of South Korea.

28 May - In simultaneous actions in Washington, DC and Moscow, President Ford and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev signed a treaty which prohibited underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes above the 150-kiloton level and, for the first time, provided for on-site inspection of nuclear tests under some circumstances.

- Meeting in Indonesia, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries representatives voted to extend the freeze on petroleum prices "for the present"; the decision reportedly reflected the dominance of Saudi Arabia.

31 May - In Dili, Timor, the People's Assembly voted to become the 27th province of Indonesia; half the island formerly belonged to Portugal.

1 Jun - Thailand ordered the closing down of the last U.S. base in the country, thus ruling out any American military presence except the 270 advisors who would remain after the 20 July deadline.

- U.S. Navy and Air Force helicopters ended mercy flights in flood-stricken central Luzon, Philippines.

- The Philippines and the Soviet Union agreed to establish diplomatic relations.

2 Jun - Representatives of the U.S. and the USSR resumed discussions in Geneva in an attempt to reach further agreement expanding their 1972 accords curbing strategic nuclear weapons.

4 Jun - Canada announced the adoption of a 200-mile offshore fishing limit effective 1 January 1977.

5 Jun - On reaching the mandatory retirement age, President Suharto of Indonesia retired as general of the army; however, he retained his position as supreme commander of the armed forces.

8 Jun - The New York Times reported that the Chinese Government has opened a new oil terminal in the Manchurian port of Dairen. The new port can handle oil tankers up to 100,000 tons.

9 Jun - South Korean and Japanese Government leaders met in Tokyo for talks on Korea-Japan cooperation in the diplomatic and economic fields.

11 Jun - Pakistan and China signed a border trade agreement for 1976.

- In South Korea, opposition leader Kim Young Sam, president of the New Democratic Party, resigned his party post.

16 Jun - Japan and Australia signed a basic treaty of friendship and cooperation.

18 Jun - An agreement providing for Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for Japanese fiscal year 1976 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement went into force this date.

- The Government of Thailand announced an agreement with Cambodia establishing an Embassy in the other's capital and the demarcation of a 10-mile stretch of common border.

19 Jun - President Ford asked Congress to approve a U.S.-Turkish agreement that would permit the reopening of U.S. military bases in Turkey.

20 Jun - The U.S. Government closed its last two military bases in Thailand - the Ramasun electronic monitoring facility and the U-Tapao Air Base--and preparations for the withdrawal of remaining U.S. troops began.

22 Jun - The official Soviet press agency Tass reported the launching of a new Soviet space station into earth orbit.

24 Jun - White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen said that the U.S. has withdrawn its small military advisory teams from the Chinese Nationalist-controlled islands of Quemoy and Matsu, just off the coast of China.

28 Jun - India and Pakistan agreed to resume rail traffic between them.

29 Jun - The 92 Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, formerly a British colony, became an independent republic.

30 Jun - The President signed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 limiting the number of military missions, groups, and similar organizations to 34 by 30 September 1976. Under the Act, MAAGs in the following countries were terminated: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, India, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

1 Jul - The Senate voted to approve a $32.5 billion appropriation for military weapons, including a start on the construction of the controversial B-1 bomber; the House approved the Bill on 30 June.

2 Jul - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States announced its approval of a shipment of low-enriched uranium for use in an Indian nuclear reactor.

- President Ford exercised his 50th veto, vetoing a $3.3 billion military construction bill.

- North and South Vietnam were officially reunited under the name Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

3 Jul - Hanoi radio announced the composition of the new leadership in Vietnam; most of the 30 Cabinet ministers are men who held high positions in the North Vietnamese Government.

6 Jul - In China, Marshal Chu Teh, chairman of the National People's Congress and "father of the Red Army," died.

7 Jul - A manned Soviet Soyuz spacecraft was launched and successfully docked with the orbiting Salyut space station.

- Indonesian President Suharto signed a bill incorporating East Timor into Indonesia. East Timor had been under Portuguese rule for 400 years.

12 Jul - The establishment of Vietnamese/Philippines diplomatic relations was announced in a joint communique.

13 Jul - According to yesterday's communique, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed that no foreign country would be allowed to use the territory of one as a base for aggression against the other countries in the region.

14 Jul - Pakistan and Bangladesh agreed to set up a joint committee to promote trade between the two countries.

17 Jul - East Timor formally became Indonesia's 27th province.

20 Jul - The U.S. House of Representatives voted to allow American Samoa to elect its own governor and lieutenant governor.

- The last American combat soldier left Thailand; approximately 250 American military advisers remained by mutual U.S.-RTG agreement.

- Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien in Jakarta following visits to Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, assured Indonesian leaders that his country will help them attain peace and neutrality.

- Radio Rangoon, Burma announced that the forces of President Ne Win squelched an attempted coup d'etat 18 days ago.

- The landing vehicle from the American Viking I unmanned spacecraft made a successful soft landing on the surface of Mars after a journey of almost 11 months and half a billion miles; the news of the successful landing was transmitted to earth 19 minutes later. The landing device also transmitted spectacular pictures of Mars' surface, showing what appeared to be a wind-swept rocky desert plain.

21 Jul - Reports from Viking I showed that Mars has an atmosphere containing 3 percent nitrogen, indicating that there may be or may have been life on Mars.

- Vietnam agreed to allow all Americans stranded in that country to leave beginning 1 August and take their Vietnamese families with them.

22 Jul - Viking I sent back weather reports from Mars, reporting light winds and a temperature range of minus 122°F to minus 22°F.

- During an interview in Portland, Oregon, Secretary Kissinger proposed a forum with representatives of the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China to discuss the Korean situation. Under no circumstances would the U.S. unilaterally withdraw forces from Korea in the absence of a political arrangement.

24 Jul - India and Pakistan formally reestablished diplomatic relations.

- Peking Mayor Wu Teh, a deputy chairman of the People's Congress and a member of the Communist Party Politburo, succeeded Marshal Chu Teh as chairman of the National People's Congress.

27 Jul - Former Prime Minister of Japan, Kakuei Tanaka, was arrested and charged with illegally accepting Lockheed money. Tanaka resigned from his post as head of the Liberal-Democratic Party.

29 Jul - The Royal Thailand Navy took over the first of three fast-strike craft built by a Singapore shipyard.

- President Ford and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser announced agreement on increasing American strength in the Indian Ocean.

- Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia agreed to form a united front in their dealing with Southeast Asia.

31 Jul - According to Administration sources, President Ford planned to ask Congress for permission to sell MAVERICK air-to-surface missiles and "smart bombs" to Saudi Arabia.

- Instruments on Viking I indicated an unexpected amount of oxygen in Martian soil.

1 Aug - In a journey arranged by the United Nations, 49 U.S. citizens and their dependents flew from Saigon to Bangkok; they were virtually the last Americans in Vietnam.

2 Aug - Cambodia established diplomatic relations with Japan.

- The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea reconvened at United Nations Headquarters.

3 Aug - In a message to Congress, President Ford asked for new legislation requiring American firms to report all substantial payments they make in foreign countries, "whether proper or improper," which are designed to aid their sales to foreign governments.

4 Aug - Admiral Noel Gayler, retiring Chief of U.S. Pacific Forces, said the Soviet Union is trying to establish port facilities for its fishing fleet in the South Pacific and warned that it could lead to a Soviet military presence.

- Defense officials of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, completing a two-day meeting in Australia of the ANZUS Defense Alliance, decided to extend more economic aid to South Pacific islands in hopes of heading off Russian penetration.

- On his return from Seoul, French Minister for Foreign Trade Raymond Barre announced that France is negotiating terms with the South Korean Government to sell it additional nuclear power stations. He also revealed that France has agreed to guarantee the financing of the stations.

5 Aug - Reversing a district court ruling made 35 months ago, the Japanese High Court ruled that it is legal for the country to maintain military forces.

6 Aug - The Governments of Vietnam and Thailand agreed to establish diplomatic relations.

- Hostilities along the 151-mile border separating South Korea and North Korea flared up when troops of both sides fought a brief gunbattle in the mideastern frontline. No casualties were reported.

8 Aug - Secretary Kissinger met with Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto in Lahore, Pakistan for talks about Pakistan's determination to construct a French-designed nuclear reprocessing plant.

9 Aug - At an airport conference in Lahore, Kissinger said that Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto had agreed to work out a compromise that would make it impossible for Pakistan to divert nuclear material into nuclear explosives.

13 Aug - A soil sample test for life on Mars by the Viking I landing craft proved negative.

14 Aug - Prime Minister Pham Van Dong arrived in Sri Lanka for the conference of nonaligned countries. This was the first major international conference attended by a representative of a reunited Vietnam.

16 Aug - Former Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan was indicted on charges of accepting $1.6 million in bribes from Lockheed.

18 Aug - While trimming tree branches near Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea under U.N. Command, two U.S. Army officers were killed and four American enlisted men and five South Koreans were wounded when attacked by about 30 North Korean guards armed with axes and metal pipes.

- President Ford warned North Korea that they would be held responsible for "the consequences" of the killing of two American officers in the demilitarized zone.

20 Aug - Secretary of State Kissinger asserted that the United States "absolutely cannot and will not accept" the "premeditated act of murder" of two American officers in the Panmunjom truce zone; he said the United States is demanding "explanations and reparations" for the incident.

- The United States sent two jet fighter squadrons to South Korea and put its 42,000 troops there on special alert in response to the slaying of two American officers by ax-wielding North Korean guards.

- The United States was reported readying the aircraft carrier MIDWAY to move into waters adjacent to Korea.

- Leaders of 85 nonaligned nations concluded a 5-day meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka with warnings to the have nations to give more of their resources to the have-nots; the conference also deplored "imperialist aggression" in Korea.

- The Government of Vietnam applied for membership in the United Nations.

21 Aug - The United States staged a demonstration of military power in and around Korea at the same time as U.N. forces felled a tree that was the center of the dispute in which North Koreans killed two American officers.

- The U.S. intensified its military preparedness in Korea; two additional squadrons of jet fighter bombers were also ordered into that area.

22 Aug - North Korean President Kim Il Sung called the slaying of two American officers "regretful"; he said that both sides should take steps to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.

- Japanese officials reported the Soviet Union has intensified its aerial and naval intelligence activities around Japan recently, including frequent violation of Japanese air space and territorial waters.

23 Aug - The U.S. Department of State called North Korean President Kim Il Sung's note expressing regrets "a positive step."

- A 2nd test for organic material on Mars proved negative.

24 Aug - A Pentagon spokesman said American B-52 bombers have started practice missions in South Korea.

- Nearly 65 percent of the parliamentary members of the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party called unofficially for the ouster of Prime Minister Miki.

- Two Soviet astronauts aboard the Soyuz 21 descent module landed safely in Kazakhstan after spending 48 days in the orbiting Salyut 5 space station.

25 Aug - The French Cabinet announced its plans to complete the sale of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan, despite U.S. objections.

27 Aug - Representatives of 52 nations with little or no access to the sea threatened to block the adoption of a global maritime treaty unless their needs were considered. The issue centered around the control of sea beds.

28 Aug - At the 381st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, the United States agreed to consider the partition of the Panmunjom truce village into two sectors; it demanded that the safety of U.S. personnel stationed in the joint security area be firmly guaranteed.

29 Aug - Confirming a series of CIA reports, U.S. officials noted that Taiwan is beginning to reprocess spent nuclear reactor fuel to acquire a stockpile of plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons.

30 Aug - Taiwan authorities denied reports that Taiwan has started reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to make atomic weapons.

- Admiral M.F. Weisner replaced Admiral Noel Gayler as Commander in Chief Pacific in a change of command ceremony at Hickam Air Force Base, HI.

- In London, Jane's Fighting Ships reported that the Soviet Union has three times as many submarines as the United States.

31 Aug - In Washington, DC, Fred C. Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said that the Soviet Union is attempting to alter the nuclear weapons balance by deploying the SS-X-20, an intercontinental ballistic missile, in East Europe.

- U.S. B-52 bombers ended 10 days of practice radar bombing runs over South Korea.

1 Sep - Speaking to the National Guard Association's annual conference, President Ford warned against unilateral arms reduction by the United States; he said: "We cannot lay down our arms in the simple hope that others will follow our lead."

3 Sep - The Viking II landed successfully on the Utopia Plains of Mars and sent signals to earth; the land site was 4,000 miles northeast of the Viking I landing site.

6 Sep - A Soviet pilot landed a MIG-25 jet fighter in Hokkaido, Japan and asked for asylum in the United States.

- The U.N. Command and North Korea agreed on a new set of security arrangements, designed to prevent clashes between the two forces in the demilitarized zone.

- In Paris, the Vietnamese Embassy released the names of 12 missing American pilots who were allegedly killed in action in Indochina.

8 Sep - U.S. troops in South Korea returned to normal alert status as the military situation along the Korean border eased.

9 Sep - Hsinhua, the Chinese press agency, announced the death of Chinese Communist Party leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

- The defecting pilot of the Soviet MIG-25 jet fighter left Japan for the United States aboard a U.S. commercial airliner.

13 Sep - President Ford directed U.S. Representative to the United Nations William Scranton to veto Vietnam's application for membership in the United Nations when the application came before the Security Council.

14 Sep - The U.S. Security Council postponed consideration of the membership of reunified Vietnam in the United Nations until after the U.S. presidential elections in November, to try to avoid a U.S. veto.

- In its first public statement since the defecting Soviet pilot landed in Japan September 6th, the Soviet Government charged the Japanese Government with preventing the pilot from returning to the USSR and criticized the United States for granting the airman asylum.

- It is announced that new security arrangements will go into force at Panmunjom on 16 September separating military guards of the United Nations Command and North Korea.

15 Sep - Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan dismissed 13 ministers and appointed 13 new members to his Cabinet; he also appointed three new party officials to his ruling Liberal-Democratic Party.

17 Sep - The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference closed its 7-week session. The 150 participating countries were deadlocked over the regulation of the exploitation of seabed mineral wealth. The next session was scheduled for May 1977.

18 Sep - South Korea and Nationalist China agreed to step up economic cooperation and expand two-way trade.

21 Sep - The Indian Ocean island republic of Seychelles was admitted to the U.N. as its 145th member.

- In Geneva, American and Soviet negotiators resumed their talks on strategic arms limitations.

- A treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Spain entered into force this date.

23 Sep - A new biology experiment performed by the Viking II indicated that the possibility of life on Mars is "marginally positive."

25 Sep - Japanese and American experts began full-scale examinations of a top secret Soviet MIG-25 jet fighter at a heavily guarded air base outside Tokyo.

26 Sep - Hsinhua, the Chinese press agency, announced the successful explosion of a nuclear device.

28 Sep - The Senate voted to approve a foreign (including military) aid appropriation of $5.1 billion for fiscal 1977, over half of which was earmarked for Middle East nations. The House approved the Bill yesterday.

1 Oct - Japan formally protested China's latest nuclear test.

- President Ford and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Washington to discuss the deadlock in the SALT negotiations.

2 Oct - Japan officially informed the Soviet Union it would return the MIG-25 flown into the country by a defecting Russian pilot.

4 Oct - President Park Chung Hee said South Korea will continue a close relationship with the United States on the basis of a Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954.

- U.S. officials said that consideration is being given to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposals to the U.N. last week; Gromyko said that the USSR was prepared to discuss on-site inspection to insure compliance with a treaty banning all underground nuclear tests.

5 Oct - In the U.N. General Assembly, Foreign Minister (of China) Chiao Kuan-hua delivered the first foreign policy address since the death of Mao Tse-tung.

6 Oct - North Korean Ambassador Min Jun Kwon formally rejected Secretary of State Kissinger's proposal for a four-power conference on Korea.

- The Government of Thailand was deposed during a military coup.

- After a careful examination of the Soviet MIG-25 which a defecting Soviet pilot flew to Japan last month, Pentagon military experts reported that the MIG was outdated; it was apparently designed for use against the U.S. supersonic B-70 bomber, plans for which were cancelled after a Soviet missile shot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960.

- The Federal Energy Research and Development Agency reported that radioactive fallout from a Chinese nuclear weapons test of September 26 had been detected in parts of the eastern United States. The agency declared that the detected radiation levels were well below the danger level.

8 Oct - Sa-Ngat Chaloryu, leader of the new military government in Thailand, announced King Phumiphol's appointment of Supreme Court Justice Thanin Kraivichien as Prime Minister.

11 Oct - The military government of Thailand ordered purges of civilian ministries and of the military.

12 Oct - Unconfirmed reports from China indicated that four prominent leftist members of the Politburo had been arrested; they included Chiang Ching, Chairman Mao's widow, and Chang Chun-chiao, senior Deputy Prime Minister.

14 Oct - The Soviet Union launched two men into earth orbit aboard Soyuz 23.

15 Oct - The reactivation of the ANZUS Pact had caused "great concern" in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Oceania, according to the Communist Party newspaper Pravda.

16 Oct - Under a new order permitting the detention of suspected communists for up to 30 days, leftist intellectuals were taken into custody in Thailand.

- Two Soviet cosmonauts splashed down in a lake during a raging blizzard in the first Russian water landing of a manned spacecraft.

- In Shanghai, large crowds demonstrate against Chiang Ching.

- There are reports in Peking that more leftists have been removed from their posts and arrested.

17 Oct - China successfully conducted an underground nuclear test.

20 Oct - At a news conference in Washington, DC, President Ford said, "I would not tolerate an Arab oil embargo but...because of the leadership of the Ford Administration, you aren't going to have an Arab oil embargo."

- The new government of Thailand disclosed that nearly 4,000 persons have been arrested since the October 6 coup.

21 Oct - China announced the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, succeeding Mao Tse-tung.

- A report in the Far Eastern Economic Review said that the government (in Cambodia) had ended the large-scale executions of soldiers and civilians.

22 Oct - King Phumiphol appointed a 17-member Cabinet in Thailand, with Admiral Sa-Ngat Chaloryu as Defense Minister and General Boonchai Bamroongphong, former army commander in chief, as Deputy Prime Minister.

24 Oct - In Washington, DC, informed sources reported that government agencies are continuing to investigate charges that South Korean diplomats and businessmen in the United States had bribed officials and otherwise violated U.S. law. Influence peddling and illegal campaign contributions have been charged.

- Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in Thailand) Anand Panyarachun was ousted from his position in the foreign ministry and suspended from the civil service.

25 Oct - An editorial in Jenmin Jih Pao, the Communist Party newspaper, stated that the new government will carry out the economic development program of the late Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

27 Oct - A country-wide referendum in the Philippines resulted in continuation of martial law.

- Government sources reported that South Korean influence on U.S. politicians may involve 90 members of Congress.

28 Oct - President Ford announced a new and complicated program to prevent nuclear materials used in peaceful purposes from becoming weapons of war. The 14-page proposal, released in Washington, DC, asked all nations to exercise "maximum restraint" in the export of reprocessing equipment with military usefulness.

- Acting on the advice of Secretary of State Kissinger, President Ford allowed an affiliate of Control Data Corporation to sell two Cyber 172 computers to China as an exception to prevailing policy. If final negotiations were completed, China would receive a computer with military usefulness and be able to make calculations on nuclear tests.

29 Oct - According to an executive of Control Data Corporation, the company was preparing to deliver a Cyber 172 computer to the Soviet Union and was also negotiating the sale of two units to China.

2 Nov - Jenmin Jih Pao, the Communist Party newspaper, reported that Chiang Ching, Chairman Mao Tse-tung's widow, and three other leftists have been accused of interfering with the country's economic production.

- James Earl "Jimmy" Carter, Jr., was elected President of the United States.

12 Nov - In its 18th veto in the Security Council the United States blocked Vietnam from membership in the United Nations.

- The Government of Japan returned to the USSR the MIG-25 supersonic fighter plane flown to northern Japan by a defecting Soviet pilot in September.

17 Nov - In western China, a nuclear explosion equivalent to four kilotons of TNT was detonated.

26 Nov - The members of the Warsaw Pact proposed a draft of a treaty that would prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons by either side in a conflict. The draft was sent to nations that had signed the Helsinki Agreement on European Security.

29 Nov - In Washington, DC, a Korean source revealed that the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency had reorganized its U.S. branch under the command of President Park's son-in-law and had recalled its station chief.

30 Nov - Kim Sang Keun, a senior officer in the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, asked for political asylum in the United States. He said he would cooperate voluntarily with the U.S. inquiry into alleged bribery of members of Congress by Korean lobbyists.

- Western Samoa applied for membership in the United Nations.

1 Dec - The Indonesian Government announced the release of 2,500 detainees more than 11 years after their arrest in the wake of a 1965 communist coup attempt.

- The United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution calling for dismantling of U.S. military bases on Guam and acceleration of independence for the islands.

3 Dec - The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress fired Chiao Kuan-hua as Foreign Minister and named Huang Hua, the former Ambassador to the United Nations, as his successor.

6 Dec - Japan's Prime Minister Takeo Miki and Takeo Fukuda won reelection to the lower house of Parliament.

8 Dec - China successfully launched its seventh satellite.

9 Dec - France set off an underground nuclear explosion at its Pacific testing grounds on Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific.

13 Dec - Delegations from the Soviet Union, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa, South America, and Asia crowded into Hanoi for Vietnam's Fourth Communist Party Congress.

21 Dec - Malaysia and Thailand agreed to undertake joint security measures to combat internal insurgency without involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

31 Dec - Trains began running on a regular schedule between North Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) for the first time in 22 years.

Recapitulation of Chronology

(U) The shifting political winds of 1976 carried the potential for long-range effects on military relationships, not only in the PACOM, but worldwide. In the United States the political campaign culminated in the election of James Earl (Jimmy) Carter as President. As the year ended, Carter's pre-election position on many foreign policy issues, if adhered to, foretold some shift in U.S. foreign relationships and military force posture. In the Pacific Command, Admiral Maurice F. Weisner replaced Admiral Noel Gayler as Commander in Chief on 30 August.

(U) Early in January the death of People's Republic of China (PRC) Prime Minister Chou En-lai signaled the beginning of a power struggle for political dominance which was intensified by the death of Mao Tse-tung on 9 September. By the end of the year, Mao's widow, Chiang Ching, had been discredited as a political force and Hua Kuo-feng was apparently the leader of the PRC Government. Of less immediately apparent significance was the

death of long-time Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia on 14 January. Razak was succeeded by Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Onn.

(U) In Japan, the emergence of the Lockheed bribery scandal in February, and the indictment of former Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, forced Prime Minister Takeo Miki to call a nationwide election on 6 December. After the election, even though he had been reelected to his seat in the Diet, Miki resigned and, on 24 December, Takeo Fukuda became Prime Minister.

(U) On 18 August about 30 North Korean guards armed with axes and metal pipes killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded four American enlisted men and five South Koreans while the United Nations forces were on a tree-trimming detail in the demilitarized zone. The unmistakable United States reaction to this provocation was the deployment of substantial naval and air forces to South Korea and the removal of the contested tree on 21 August. In the aftermath of this incident, the United Nations Command and North Korea agreed on new security arrangements in the joint security area to separate the military guards of the two forces effective on 16 September. In October allegations began to appear in U.S. information media that South Korean lobbyists exerted undue influence on members of the U.S. Congress. As a result, Korean sources in Washington stated that the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency had reorganized its U.S. branch under the command of President Park Chung Hee's son-in-law and had recalled its station chief. A senior officer in the Korean CIA was reported to have requested political asylum in the United States and to have agreed to cooperate with any investigation of alleged bribery of members of Congress by Korean lobbyists. The potential political and/or military ramifications of the "Koreagate" scandal had not yet surfaced by the end of the year.

(U) In Thailand, the completion of the U.S. military withdrawal was accompanied by political turbulence which continued throughout the year. After two Prime Ministers and recurrent student unrest, a Thai military junta assumed control of the government in a bloodless coup and installed Thanin Kraivichien as Prime Minister on 21 October.

(U) In February the U.S. Senate voted to extend a commonwealth relationship and U.S. citizenship to some 14,000 residents of one district of the United Nations Pacific Trust Territory. One month later on 24 March President Ford signed a covenant to establish a commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands in political union with the United States. By the end of 1976, however, the Northern Marianas had not yet ratified the covenant.

(U) The Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, formerly a British colony, became an independent republic in June and, on 21 September, was

accepted as the 145th member of the United Nations. Another territorial change took place after an election in May when Indonesia announced that Timor had been annexed as its 27th province in July.

(U) In March, 156 nations were represented as the United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS) resumed. The LOS recessed in May, reconvened in August, and adjourned in September, once again without substantive results. Meanwhile, President Ford signed into law a bill extending the United States fisheries boundary to 200 miles offshore. About two months later, Canada also announced, in June, the adoption of a 200-mile offshore fishing limit. Both nations deferred the effective date of the new fisheries limits until 1977.

(U) In addition to the long-established bilateral security consultations held by the United States with Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, other regional alliances appeared to take on new life during the year. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) heads of state met in Indonesia in February. The dominant theme of the communiqué issued after the conference was economic cooperation. Later in the year, the participants in the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) collective security treaty held an August meeting in Australia. CINCPAC, as the U.S. military adviser to the ANZUS Council of Ministers, was quoted in a wire service report after the meeting as having warned that attempts by Russia to establish port facilities for its fishing fleet in the South Pacific could lead to a Soviet military presence. "...The major point is that...the fishing intelligence operations, the merchant fleet, and naval operations are all an integral part of the Soviet state." He also said, according to the article, that the Russian fishing fleet paved the way in Soviet policy.

SECTION II--DETENTE VERSUS DEFENSE

(U) The efficacy of detente with the Soviet Union as a national policy was only occasionally questioned in 1974. During 1975 it became a cause celebre when the vital link was made by broad segments of the political community and news media to detente vis-a-vis the growing Russian military threat. The political-military significance of the public debate lay not only in the merits thereof, but also in the increasing amount of space devoted to the subject in the news media. Early in 1975 a local newspaper article described the computerized analysis of international relations conducted over a 12-year period by a University of Hawaii political scientist. The thrust of this analysis purported to show that the path to peace lay not through the development of collaboration, transactions, or cooperation, but rather through sufficient dominance of military power to insure that the perceived cost of aggression outweighed the gains. The alternative was to dismantle power and submit to one's enemies.[1]

(U) One year later, in January 1976, the same political scientist was given six-column, full-page coverage in the same local newspaper. The article was adapted from a forthcoming book entitled Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente, the thrust of which was that Soviet military power in every significant category was overwhelmingly superior to that of the United States. This computer analysis, supported by detailed charts and graphs, concluded that not only was the United States weaker than the Soviet Union, but the trends pointed to even greater weakness and that Russia would soon be able to execute a first strike without fear of retaliation. In his forthcoming book, stated the author, he had established the relationship between his 1975 analysis of detente and his computerized analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the military forces of the United States and Russia.[2]

(U) In the same issue of the Honolulu newspaper, the first of two articles by a New York Times correspondent analyzed the background of U.S.-Soviet detente. Noting the beginning of an election year, the writer stated that the backers of the policy of detente with the Soviet Union were on the defensive. Arrayed against the policy, according to the writer, was a formidable list of politicians, intellectuals, labor leaders, and top military men. The attacks, stated the writer, had forced Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to abandon such phrases as "a generation of peace" in favor of "no alternative to detente" in the nuclear age. The writer acknowledged the results of public opinion

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 587-589.
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 6 Jan 76, "Detente and the Russian Threat," by R.J. Rummel.

surveys indicating broad support for detente among the American people, but noted that this support was shallow and accompanied by deep suspicion of Moscow's motives and widespread sentiment that the Russians had had the better of the deal. The writer reviewed the background of previous initiatives toward a relaxation of tension between Russia and the United States made by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson before the formal labeling of detente by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev in May 1972. As interpreted by a State Department official, the basic difference between detente and peaceful coexistence was that coexistence was passive, while detente was a policy to actively involve the Russians in a continuing series of agreements.[1]

(U) In the second of the two articles, the writer noted that, in spite of attempts to create formal agreements with incentives and penalties, the Soviets acknowledged mutual interest only in bilateral relationships but stressed divergent interest in peripheral areas. The process of detente, according to the Russian leaders, did not mean and had never meant the freezing of the social-political status quo. Nor did the Soviet version of detente preclude the support of revolutionary struggles and the projection of influence to local areas of military and political tension. The author recited the various pros and cons of the detente debate, and concluded his article by quoting a former Vice President of the United States who stated, "the burden on detente now is mostly up to the Russians."[2]

(U) When, in August of 1976, the editor of a local Honolulu newspaper received a copy of the University of Hawaii political scientist's book, he stated that the book was "must" reading for U.S. political candidates. An editor's note on the January article had compared the author with the Army private whose detection of planes approaching Pearl Harbor 50 minutes before the Japanese attack had been ignored. In his review of the book, the editor extended his comparison of the author's theme with General Billy Mitchell's warning of a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor as early as 1923. He noted that no one had paid much attention, except perhaps the Japanese. The editor described a scenario in the book in which a Russian counterforce first strike had crippled U.S. retaliatory power and, since Russia's reserve missiles were targeted on U.S. cities, the President was forced to forego retaliation. Faced with the alternative of destruction or surrender, the President surrendered. The editor then reviewed the charts, explanations, and discussion previously noted, and concluded that the possibility that the author was another Billy Mitchell was much too serious for it to be dismissed out of hand. On the same editorial page was a review of a 12-page monograph by Congressman

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1. Ibid., "Background of U.S.-Soviet Detente," by Leslie H. Gelb.
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 7 Jan 76, "Mixed Views on Detente," by Leslie H. Gelb.

Les Aspen (D.-WI) which purportedly accused the Defense Department of using comparisons exaggerating Russia's strength and U.S. relative weakness. The monograph alleged that U.S. defense spending was increasing faster than Russia's and that Americans were being unduly frightened. The editor then noted that, while all the facts about relative U.S.-Russian strength may not be known with certainty to anyone on either side, there was an obligation to maintain U.S. capability and credibility at a level to preclude a Russian attempt to execute the "unthinkable" first strike scenario as the Japanese did Billy Mitchell's.[1]

(U) On 1 March 1976 President Ford reportedly stated that the term "detente" no longer applied to describe U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China, but that he would continue to negotiate with them in "a policy of peace through strength." Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Kissinger was reported to have defended U.S.-Soviet detente, ascribed Ford's statement to the excitement of a political campaign, and criticized the critics of the detente policy and the term itself. In a curious juxtaposition of negatives, Kissinger was quoted in the article as having stated that, "I do not believe that the United States is not still the strongest nation in the world...I do not believe that the Soviet Union has made any unilateral gains."[2]

(U) Although not, in every case, rendered in the context of detente versus defense, the views of Admirals Gayler and Weisner received considerable attention from the local media during the year. For example, in March 1976 Admiral Gayler called a press conference in Honolulu to report on his testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington. The result was an approximately one-half page article in one Honolulu newspaper recounting the Admiral's view on a variety of subjects. He discussed what the writer called the "issue" of nuclear weapons on Oahu which had been raised publicly by several pacifist groups concerned about hazards from nuclear weapons. The Admiral neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons on Oahu, but signified his willingness to discuss the subject with the governor of Hawaii on a hypothetical basis. He also was reported to have stated his belief that Hawaiian activists could find places more appropriate than the Island of Kahoolawe as a target for the preservation of historic Hawaiian culture. Kahoolawe had been used by the U.S. military in Hawaii as a training area for aerial gunnery, bombing, and other activities since 1941. During the previous year and a half its use for this purpose had been challenged by Hawaiian ethnic groups on the grounds that religious and cultural

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 7 Aug 76, "Hypothesis of Chilling Threat," by A.A. Smyser (Editor), and "The Other Side," editorial (no attribution).
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 7 Mar 76, "Kissinger Defends Detente," dateline Atlanta (AP).

values were being destroyed. The Admiral stated that, although he had a strong feeling and sympathy for Hawaiian values, the use of Kahoolawe as a military training area was not an arbitrary whim, but rather militarily essential. Regarding his testimony in Washington, he had stressed the Russian military posture and buildup, "...making particularly the point that Russia has two ends and one of them is in the Pacific. It's inconceivable that we would have a military problem with Russia in NATO and not have a problem in the Pacific." Regarding military cutbacks, the Admiral stated that cost problems in the Pacific were severe and that it was difficult to do the job with the available funds. He also discussed possible reasons for the reported problems with the school system on Guam in connection with military dependents, and categorically denied activist charges that either the Navy or the CIA had placed missiles of any kind on the ocean floor. Regarding political turbulence in Thailand and the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, Admiral Gayler informed the reporters that the United States remained committed to provide assistance in the form of military materiel to help in insurgency problems.[1]

(U) Late in June, the military writer for one Honolulu newspaper stated that increased signs of Russian military power in the Pacific, coupled with a decline in American strength, posed what the writer called a "...delicate, disturbing dilemma for incoming Pacific Commander in Chief Admiral Maurice F. Weisner." In the context of a special Pacific Basin study conducted by the Defense Department and released in early 1976, the article discussed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand and initiatives by Russia toward improved relations with the island nations of the South Pacific. The writer noted that, according to the Defense Department study, the Russian initiative was a challenge to U.S. control of Pacific sea lanes. The study also addressed the attitude of Peking toward Russia's presence in the Pacific-Indian Ocean area, the balancing U.S. presence, and Peking's tolerance of the U.S. presence in Asia--especially in Korea. The writer quoted the study as emphasizing the need for U.S. bases in the Philippines, Korea, Japan, and Guam, noting that America needed to maintain conventional military forces in Asia to maintain the power balance and to avoid "total reliance on nuclear weapons." According to the article, the Pacific Basin report warned that Korea was a major danger area and that a U.S. reduction there would risk "renewed hostilities." In conclusion, the writer associated his perceived "dilemma" for Admiral Weisner with presidential candidate Carter's campaign statement that 42,000 men would be withdrawn from Korea within four years. Although Admiral Weisner understood the nuances of power balance in the Pacific Command, stated the writer, his vast experience would not lessen the problems posed by the study.[2]

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1. Honolulu Advertiser, 19 Mar 76, "Admiral Gayler Discusses Kahoolawe, Oahu Nukes, Russia, Guam," by Karen Horton.
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 29 Jun 76, "New Pacific Chief Inherits a Dilemma," by Lyle Nelson.

(U) In July the incoming CINCPAC, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was quoted by a wire service dispatch from San Diego regarding the expansion of the Russian aircraft carrier fleet. He said there were indications that Soviet carrier production would outstrip that of the United States, and that the U.S. Pacific Fleet carrier force had been reduced from 13 at the height of the Vietnam War to 6 carriers in 1976. He noted that the pattern of Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean had concentrated in the area of the Horn of Africa and that the Soviets were monitoring shipping in and out of the Persian Gulf, from which Japan received 80-90 percent of its oil.[1]

(U) As discussed previously, after the ANZUS meeting in Australia in early August, Admiral Gayler, identified as the retiring chief of U.S. Pacific Forces, had publicly acknowledged the efforts by the Soviet Union to establish port facilities for its fishing fleet in the South Pacific. He was reported to have warned that this effort could lead to a Soviet military presence if an international airport obstensibly constructed to support movements to or from the Russian fishing fleet were converted to an operating base for military aircraft. Gayler was reported to have voiced concern about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and to have welcomed the opening of Australian naval facilities to U.S. nuclear-powered warships.[2]

(U) Two days after Admiral Gayler's remarks in Australia were published in a Honolulu newspaper, an editorial in the same paper addressed the subject of the Soviet initiative toward Tonga and Western Samoa discussed in Chapter II of this history. The editor stated that some South Pacific nations apparently had learned how to play off the big powers against each other, noting that Russian overtures to Tonga and Western Samoa had prompted the ANZUS nations to agree to extend more economic aid in the region. After reviewing the Russian overtures, essentially as described in Chapter II of this history, the editor concluded that Gayler's warning in Canberra was welcome evidence that the situation was receiving the official attention it deserved.[3]

(U) About one week before he relinquished command, Admiral Gayler again received six-column one-half page coverage of an interview in which he was obstensibly quoted regarding the growth and disposition of Soviet forces, the need for forward deployment of U.S. Forces, and the importance to the United States of allies such as the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Australia,

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 13 Jul 76, "Weisner Warns of Soviet Fleet," dateline San Diego (AP).
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 4 Aug 76, "Red S. Pacific Threat Eyed," dateline Canberra, Australia (AP).
3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 6 Aug 76, "Response in Pacific," editorial.

and New Zealand. In this interview, the writer associated Gayler's remarks with the question of the detente policy:[1]

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> The former director of the National Security Agency espouses a Christian-like faith in detente with the USSR--but only as a formula for defuzing the nuclear confrontation.
>
> "I'm afraid we've thrown the baby out with the bath water." Gayler said, "The original idea of detente to defuze the nuclear confrontation is as good as it ever was; the hair-trigger aspects in our strategic nuclear standoff with Russia are very dangerous.
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> "I always thought detente was a good idea," Gayler continued, "it was a way of defuzing the tension. It is not in the Russian interest to get incinerated anymore than it is in our interest. From that simple premise we move to the vague notion that somehow or other the Russians have become benevolent, and that we don't have much to worry about. That's turned sour and caused much disappointment."

(U) Local news coverage of the change of command ceremony was extensive. One Honolulu newspaper included remarks by Admirals Gayler and Weisner, but devoted more coverage to the remarks of William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense. Clements reportedly accused the North Koreans of staging the tree-trimming episode during which two U.S. officers were killed, challenged talk of million dollar budget cuts by political candidates, and related U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean to Russian bases in Aden and Somalia. Admiral Gayler warned of the consequences of a Soviet "drive toward a seven-ocean navy," and the incoming CINCPAC, Admiral Weisner, stated that American military posture in the Pacific and elsewhere for the next five years "depends upon the will of the American people." Adjacent to the change of command coverage in the local newspaper was the wire service dispatch covering the most recent Jane's All The World's Fighting Ships report. Jane's, a standard reference of the world navies, reported that the Soviet Navy's growing strength and worldwide deployment appeared designed for a war of aggression against the West. Jane's reported that the Soviet Union had three times as many submarines

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 22 Aug 76, "U.S. Can't be Number 2 in Pacific," by Robert C. Miller, dateline Honolulu (UPI).

as the United States and had started to challenge America's years-long supremacy in carriers by building the first two of a planned fleet of six 40,000-ton Kiev-class aircraft carriers.[1]

(U) In a September speech, Admiral Weisner discussed the post-Mao leadership in China. He noted that, since Mao Tse-tung's death, China had shown no abatement in its anti-Soviet attacks, but had cut back its criticism of the United States. Weisner reviewed U.S. relations with the various countries in the Pacific Command, cited the buildup of the Soviet Navy, noted the "uneasy truce" between the Governments of North and South Korea, and speculated that neither China nor Russia had achieved dominant influence in Southeast Asia.[2]

(U) In October, during a conference of the Associated Press Association in Hawaii, Admiral Weisner stated that one of the few benefits of the Vietnam War was that it had made Japan more conscious of security matters. He noted the beginning of, "...an era of full cooperation in a security partnership with the United States...", and said that Japan played a vital role in the world's economy and was America's most important ally in Northeast Asia--"the pillar of our Pacific strategy." Weisner noted the dependence of the Japanese on oil from the Persian Gulf by way of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and ascribed Japanese cooperation with the United States in security matters as a reflection of common concern about the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean. A Honolulu newspaper reported Admiral Weisner's wide-ranging review of the political-military situation in the Pacific Command:[3]

> North Korea failed in its effort to create an advantageous situation for itself with the recent killing of two Americans in the demilitarized zone. He said Americans on the scene exercised restraint while still presenting a strong reaction.
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> Vietnam is becoming militarily strong as it recovers from the war and is making advances to neighboring countries, but its military intentions still cannot be gauged.
>
> Communist influence in Laos is switching to the Soviet Union, with the Chinese taking a back seat.

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 31 Aug 76, "Tough Speeches Mark Change of Command," by Lyle Nelson, and "Soviet Navy Viewed as Designed for Aggression," dateline London (UPI).
2. Honolulu Advertiser, 19 Sep 76, "New Pacific Chief Says China Easing Its Attacks on U.S.," no attribution.
3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 11 Oct 76, "Japan's Efforts Hailed: Weisner Cites Security Steps," by Dave Shapiro.

Cambodia has been faced with "considerable bloodshed... and great instability" since turning communist.

The death of Mao Tse-tung should not hamper efforts of the Chinese to improve relations with the United States, since the factors that led them to believe such improvement was in their interest still exist.

The overthrow of Thailand's democratic government was caused by the government's yielding "to the pressures of new realities resulting from the fall of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos."

Indonesia will take on an increasing military importance in coming years because of its strategic location on the sea lanes used to transport oil from the Persian Gulf to Asia.

Negotiations with the Philippines for continued use of American bases there likely will result in new concessions to the Filipinos, but will end to the satisfaction of both countries.

Australia and New Zealand will continue to be outspoken supporters of America's presence in the Indian Ocean.

(U) As the year ended, and still not directly in the context of detente, the editor of Jane's All the World's Aircraft was reported to have urged the United States to authorize construction of the B-1 bomber, to order urgent replacements for the F-106 interceptor, and to insist on classification on the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber as a strategic plane subject to the limitations of the SALT talks in Vienna. The editor was reported to have stated that Soviet airpower was outstripping America's so fast that the United States might have to use major nuclear weapons to counter a conventional communist attack. He reportedly asserted that Russia had 2,600 manned interceptors plus 12,000 surface-to-air missiles for defense, while the United States had only 315 1956-vintage F-106 interceptors and no surface-to-air missiles "allocated to the defense of the home states." He said that America's force of subsonic 1955-model B-52s was no match for Moscow's growing fleet of BACKFIRE bombers, which fly faster and longer than the 1,500-mile per hour CONCORDE airliner. In the judgment of the Jane's editor, lasting peace, "...can only be a product of precisely balanced strength, on any scale from extravagant overkill to common sense basic self-defense."[1]

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 22 Dec 76, "Jane's Warns of Large Gap in Air Power," dateline London (AP).

SECTION III--REGIONAL PACT ACTIVITY

SEATO

Phase Out

(U) The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed to administer the Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty (Manila Pact) in 1954. The eight original SEATO member nations were Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. By the end of 1973 Pakistan had withdrawn and France was inactive. As a result of a proposal submitted by CINCPAC in 1973, the Military Planning Office (MPO) of SEATO ceased to exist as a separate entity on 31 January 1974. The overall manning of SEATO Headquarters was reduced by 50 percent, existing SEATO plans were shelved, and the frequency of exercises and conferences of the Military Advisers (MILADs) was reduced.[1]

(U) In June 1974 the billet of the U.S. MILAD Representative (MILADREP), stationed in Bangkok, was dropped from the CINCPAC Joint Manpower Program and Joint Table of Distribution, and the MILADREP duties were assimilated under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) and further delegated to a U.S. Army colonel under COMUSMACTHAI command but attached to the political-military section of the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok. No MILAD-level conferences were held in 1973-1975, and, on 24 September 1975, during the 20th Annual SEATO Council Meeting in New York City, the Ministers agreed that, in view of the end of the Indochina War, SEATO should be phased out "in an orderly and systematic manner."[2]

(C) By 30 January 1976 a permanent working group (PWG) established by SEATO had completed a phase-out plan leading to the orderly termination of SEATO. Arrangements had been made for the disposition of SEATO chattels, and a majority of the PWG supported the continuation of a modest social and economic program in the fiscal year (FY) 1977 budget. It was anticipated that some of the programs would be picked up bilaterally and others by agencies of Thailand and the Philippines during the ensuing year. In March the State Department noted that the phase-out plan did not mention future meetings of the SEATO Council of Ministers. This was in accordance with the Secretary General's opinion that the plan did not address the future of the Council itself because that subject was outside the scope of the termination of the

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1. CINCPAC Command Histories 1973, Vol. II, pp. 653-660 and 1974, Vol. II, p. 554.
2. Ibid., pp. 554-555; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 576.

SEATO organization. The State Department advised the Embassy that, unless there were compelling reasons to hold a 21st meeting of the Council, the U.S. Government did not support another such meeting.[1]

Retention of SEATO Medical Laboratory

(C) In an Aide Memoire dated 11 May 1976, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) recalled that the SEATO Council of Ministers, at their 6th meeting in Washington in 1960, noted and welcomed the United States proposal that the SEATO Cholera Research Project in Thailand be transformed into SEATO Medical and Clinical Research Laboratories. Subsequently, on 23 December 1960, an exchange of notes between the RTG and the United States established the laboratories under SEATO auspices in Thailand with U.S. participation "as one of the major sponsors" of this "SEATO medical research project." The Aide Memoire also noted a 1 April 1963 Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of the SEATO Clinical Research Center as a joint medical project for professional research, training, and education. Accordingly, the RTG informed the U.S. Embassy that the RTG considered the SEATO Medical Laboratory to be unrelated to the termination of U.S. military activities in Thailand and authorized its continued operation until the scheduled 1 July 1977 phase-out of SEATO. The U.S. Embassy requested State Department agreement with a U.S. Aide Memoire advising the RTG that the U.S. element in the SEATO Medical Laboratory would continue operation at or below its current strength. The Embassy noted that the SEATO Medical Laboratory personnel would be treated as Defense Attaché Office (DAO) personnel and would not be charged against the residual Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) ceiling strength of 270.[2]

(C) Pending a reply from the State Department to the Embassy COMUSMACTHAI requested guidance from CINCPAC, noting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had directed the withdrawal from Thailand of all units except JUSMAG, DAO, and Marine security guards. Accordingly, the Thai withdrawal plan had included the SEATO Medical Laboratory for retrograde from Thailand not later than July 1976. On 25 May the State Department authorized the Embassy to send an Aide Memoire to the RTG Ministry of Foreign Affairs advising that U.S. participation in the SEATO Medical Laboratory would continue at current or reduced strength. On 3 June, after telephonic liaison between CINCPAC and the JCS, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACTHAI to modify the withdrawal plans to exclude the SEATO Medical Laboratory from retrograde action.[3]

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1. SECSTATE 63460/161847Z Mar 76, which transmitted AMEMB Bangkok 4074 of 23 Feb 76; SECSTATE 66546/190143Z Mar 76.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 13772/141249Z May 76.
3. J53 HistSum May 76; USMACTHAI 210420Z May 76; SECSTATE 123843/251500Z May 76; CINCPAC 030212Z Jun 76.

(Proposed) Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science

(C) In November 1976 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok informed the State Department of a note from the RTG which requested that the U.S. Army medical component operating under the auspices of the SEATO Medical Research Project and the SEATO Clinical Research Center be retained in Thailand to continue medical research in cooperation with the Royal Thai Armed Forces. The cooperative facility would be named the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science. The RTG suggested that, if the U.S. Government agreed, the retention of the U.S. Army medical component in Thailand be effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes. The text of the RTG note proposed that, upon reply from the U.S. Government, the agreement come into force on 1 July 1977. The Embassy requested authority to reply with a U.S. Government note agreeing to the proposals and stipulations contained in the RTG note and requested approval of a draft text.[1]

(U) On 28 January 1977, the Embassy delivered a U.S. Government note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to effect agreement on the continuation of U.S. Army medical component operations in Thailand.[2]

USMILADREP Terms of Reference (TOR)

(C) As noted in the phase-out discussion, the U.S. Military Adviser's Representative (USMILADREP) billet was assimilated within the authorized manning of the DAO in Bangkok. In June the U.S. Embassy advised CINCPAC that the current USMILADREP to SEATO, U.S. Army Colonel Kenneth R. Ebner, would depart Thailand shortly. Colonel Ebner's main duties had been as MACTHAI liaison officer in the political-military section of the Embassy. The Embassy noted that, although SEATO was phasing out, it was likely that the USMILADREP function would continue until SEATO's termination on 30 June 1977. Consequently, the Embassy recommended that CINCPAC designate the Defense Attaché/Air Attaché, Air Force Colonel Robert W. Koernig, to succeed Colonel Ebner as the USMILADREP. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his concurrence with the Embassy recommendation and submitted revised TOR for the USMILADREP for JCS approval. The TOR stipulated that the designation of the Defense Attaché (DATT) as the USMILADREP did not change the command relationship between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the DATT, nor did it change the authority of the Military Departments and DOD agencies and the relationships and responsibilities between the DATT and the Chief of his Service and the Secretary of his Military Department. The

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 32282/260443Z Nov 76.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 2187/281008Z Jan 77.

USMILADREP was under the supervision of, and directly responsible to CINCPAC. Accordingly, the TOR stipulated that the USMILADREP had direct access to CINCPAC.[1]

(C) In November the JCS approved the TOR submitted by CINCPAC for the USMILADREP with minor changes and CINCPAC so advised the USDAO in Bangkok on 20 November 1976.[2]

SEATO Operational Plans

(C) Late in 1975 the USMILADREP asked the SEATO Secretary General if SEATO Headquarters had any objection to the screening and destruction of SEATO operational plans and related classified documents by individual member nations. The Secretary General replied that the retention or destruction of national holdings was a national responsibility. He explained that the SEATO Council had shelved the operational plans in 1973 and that the disposition of documents held by SEATO Headquarters would be addressed shortly. The USMILADREP, therefore, recommended to CINCPAC that plans and documents held by various U.S. military headquarters be destroyed because of their limited usefulness. CINCPAC advised the JCS that, unless otherwise directed, he intended to authorize all concerned commands to destroy SEATO operational plans and related documents. In January 1976 the JCS concurred. On 21 January 1976 CINCPAC, as the USMILAD to SEATO, granted authority to all U.S. holders of SEATO plans and related documents to commence destruction. In addition, CINCPAC requested the Central U.S. Registry to determine which SEATO materials were required for historical purposes and to take the necessary action to collect and forward to the appropriate agency.[3]

(C) Late in 1976 the State Department and the Embassy in Bangkok addressed the problem of reclassification, downgrading, or destruction of those classified documents held by SEATO Headquarters. State noted that a separate review of each U.S.-originated document would be more time consuming and more expensive than destruction under the current classification. The Embassy replied that the documents in question involved those classified by other nations, as well as the United States, and that the majority of the PWG had agreed to basic guidelines for the downgrading and disposition of SEATO documents. If for political, military, or other reasons, individual member governments did not desire that documents be downgraded, these views would be

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1. J51 HistSum Jul 76; AMEMB Bangkok 18548/250930Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 072040Z Jul 76.
2. J51 HistSum Nov 76; JCS 1138/172050Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 201907Z Nov 76.
3. J51 HistSum Jan 76; USMILADREP SEATO 160437Z Dec 75; JCS 7669/141623Z Jan 76; CINCPAC 222214Z Dec 75 and 210224Z Jan 76.

respected by the PWG. On the other hand, the Embassy interpreted the State Department position to require the destruction of all U.S.-originated documents held by SEATO and member governments. If that interpretation were correct, the Embassy requested authorization to announce to the PWG the desire of the United States that such documents be destroyed and to dispatch diplomatic notes to member countries listing the documents involved and requesting confirmation that the countries had complied. The Embassy noted that instructions for procedures acceptable to the United States for proper destruction of TOP SECRET documents (or return of the documents for destruction by the United States) should be included in the notes to the member countries.[1]

SEATEX 53

(U) In addition to the USMILADREP, two representatives of the CINCPAC Inspector General's Office attended SEATO Exercise DAMAYAN (SEATO Exercise 53). SEATEX 53, held on 14-20 February 1976 on the Island of Luzon in the Philippines, was an engineer and signal military-civic action exercise.[2]

ANZUS

25th Council Meeting

(U) The Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) security treaty was signed on 1 September 1951. In a normal year, five ANZUS meetings were held--the Council Meeting, official talks, the meeting of the MILREPs, and two staff-level visits.[3]

(C) The 25th ANZUS Council Meeting was held in Canberra, Australia on 3-4 August 1976. Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson was the senior U.S. representative and Admiral Gayler attended in his role as the U.S. Military Representative to the Council. The communiqué issued after the Council Meeting made specific reference to the decision by the Australian and New Zealand Governments to permit the resumption of visits to their ports by United States nuclear-powered warships. The ANZUS Council, according to the communiqué, also welcomed the Australian Government's decision to accelerate the construction of a naval facility at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia. In connection with the increased Soviet military presence and capacity in the Indian Ocean, the Council welcomed the actions taken by the Government of the United States

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1. SECSTATE 270660/031754Z Nov 76; AMEMB Bangkok 30682/080812Z Nov 76.
2. IG HistSum Feb 76; USMILADREP SEATO 102355Z Feb 76.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 660-663.

to establish a modest facility at Diego Garcia to support United States Forces in the region.[1]

[redacted]

(U) In addition to the press coverage accorded the comments of CINCPAC after the ANZUS meeting, the appearance of Secretary Robinson at the Australian National Press Club in Canberra at the conclusion of the ANZUS Council meeting evoked positive editorial comment from leading Australian newspapers. One editorial comment agreed with Robinson's theme of renewed emphasis on economic policy as an adjunct to foreign policy. The editorials agreed with that approach, but noted that economic aid, as a countervailing force to present and future Soviet hegemony in countries bordering the Indian Ocean, had little to recommend it. The editorials conceded, however, that such an approach applied in the South Pacific and that, since the ANZUS partners had no reason to believe that Samoa and Tonga preferred Russian aid, they must be given no cause to look elsewhere. One leading newspaper echoed Secretary Robinson's statement that the "ANZUS Pact is more relevant to the future than to the past." This editorial noted three important developments in the area which affected the security of the ANZUS treaty partners. The first was that the treaty collaboration was interpreted to include the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia as well as the Pacific, which had been the only region originally named in the articles of treaty. The original terms of the treaty had not extended to the Indian Ocean since it was presumed to be "a British lake." This had changed so that the facilities provided by the United States at Diego Garcia and the naval base being constructed by Australia at Cockburn Sound were seen as part of the framework of defensive capabilities available to the ANZUS partners. The second development, according to the editorial, was the increased interest by outsiders in the newly independent small nations of the South Pacific. The third element in the changed security considerations concerned Indonesia, where doubts about the continued economic

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1. CINCPAC 11220Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 168831/081556Z Jul 76, 178397/192227Z Jul 76, 186772/281851Z Jul 76, and 190163/310111Z Jul 76.
2. AMEMB Canberra 5634/041250Z Aug 76.

viability of the country were complicated by the Indonesian intention to claim sovereignty over all of the sea within its archipelago. The editorial then linked that last factor with economic development and well-being and stressed the importance of keeping the relationships between the ANZUS partners, and between them and all nations of the region, in good working order.[1]

b(1)

[redacted]

b(1)

ANZUS MILREP Meeting

(S) Because of conflicts in schedules no ANZUS MILREP meeting was held in 1975. In 1976 Admiral Gayler, General Hassett of Australia, and LT GEN Webb of New Zealand held a MILREP meeting following the Council of Ministers' meeting in Canberra. One of the subjects agreed upon during the MILREP meeting was the need for closer coordination of the ANZUS nations' long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) programs. Pursuant to these discussions, CINCPACFLT developed a preliminary concept of operations. Copies of the draft concept were delivered to Australia and New Zealand representatives for discussion during the scheduled ANZUS staff level meeting to be held on 30 November-2 December 1976. Since LRMP was a Navy mission in the United States military, CINCPAC advised the ANZUS partners that CINCPACFLT would have primary U.S. responsibility for the development and coordination of the final concept of operations. In

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1. USIS Canberra 5707/060601Z Aug 76.
2. SECSTATE 240349/280044Z Sep 76.

October the Australian Chief of Defense Staff advised CINCPACFLT of his agreement with the concept developed for ANZUS coordinated surveillance.[1]

ANZUS Staff Level Meeting

(C) The 5th and 6th ANZUS Staff Level meetings were held in June and December 1975 respectively. These meetings provided a working-level forum for the discussion of military subjects concerning the Pacific area, and were attended by military delegations from each of the ANZUS countries, normally led by flag/general officers. Among the subjects discussed during these meetings were military exercises, combined planning, and exchanges of officers among the military forces. During 1975 the staff level meetings also laid plans for the first ANZUS Staff Level Seminar to be held in March 1976 at Camp Smith in Hawaii. The seminar was planned to include participation at the 04-06 level from the staffs of the three countries.[2]

(S) The 7th ANZUS Staff Level meeting was held in Auckland, New Zealand on 30 November-2 December 1976. The meeting included the following items on the agenda:[3]

- Functional integration of surveillance effort.
- Real-time dissemination of intelligence for operational purposes.
- LRMP reporting system.
- South Pacific surveillance.

ANZUS Seminar

(U) The topic for ANZUS Seminar Number 1, held on 29 March-2 April 1976, was joint and combined theoretical military planning and operations. U.S. participants included representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. Based on the results of Seminar One and subsequent discussion at the 7th ANZUS Staff Level meeting, it was determined that a document was needed to list all publications used by the ANZUS partners in contingency or exercise planning. As an additional aid to planning, the

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1. J51 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 230033Z Sep 76 and 110113Z Oct 76; CDFS Canberra 150710Z Oct 76.
2. J51 HistSums Jun and Dec 75; CINCPAC 200249Z Jun 75 and 202041Z Dec 75; NZDEF Wellington 280300Z Jun 76 and 060130Z Jul 76.
3. Defense Canberra 050400Z Oct 76; J5 HistSum Addendum, Dec 76.

document would also highlight any differences and/or divergencies in doctrine between the various publications. The participants at the 7th ANZUS Staff Level meeting agreed that the objective of Seminar Number Two (tentatively planned for April 1977 at CINCPAC) would be to develop such a reference document. It was also agreed that, by the end of February 1977, the three countries would exchange lists of applicable publications and begin to collect copies of those documents for use during the seminar. In December 1976 CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group to provide a list of publications considered applicable to the ANZUS contingency/exercise planning activities.[1]

[redacted]

ASEAN

(U) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 to promote the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development of its member nations. The original declaration had affirmed the position that all foreign bases located within each sovereign state were temporary. In 1971 the ASEAN members declared the neutrality of Southeast Asia and their resolve that Southeast Asia be recognized by the world as a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality." The sponsor of this resolution was Malaysia. The member states themselves could not agree on the definition of "neutrality," since two of the five (Thailand and the Philippines) had U.S. bases and were committed to the SEATO mutual defense pact against communism. Two of the other members, Malaysia and Indonesia, had experienced

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1. J51 HistSum Dec 76; CINCPAC 182140Z Dec 76.
2. J51 HistSum Sep 76; CINCPAC 142149Z Sep 76.

direct confrontations with communism, and Singapore, the fifth ASEAN member, had nursed a mortal fear of communism since achieving independence.[1]

The First ASEAN Summit Meeting

(U) During a session of the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN at Pattaya Beach, Thailand on 9-10 February, the Foreign Ministers were reported to have expressed concern for the region's security and indicated individually that they would like a continued American military presence in Asia. During this session, which was a prelude to the first ASEAN summit conference, Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo told reporters before the conference began that security threats to the region could not be ignored, but that ASEAN would be cautious in discussing military pacts. Another senior diplomat reportedly acknowledged that there would be discussions of security "related to the U.S. troop withdrawal from Southeast Asia" but that there would be no announcement of any possible decision reached on security issues, "since that would only invite enemies."[2]

(S) During other preliminary meetings, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN discussed the Singapore proposal to establish an ASEAN free-trade area. Early in January the U.S. Embassy in Singapore was advised that Singapore had reluctantly concluded that the ASEAN summit would not agree to such a free-trade area. The Singapore Government, however, remained hopeful that ASEAN would eventually accept it and that the summit would endorse a number of joint ASEAN industrial projects and agree to liberalize tariffs on a selected number of products. According to the Embassy, Indonesia was the sole hold-out against the concept of an ASEAN free-trade area, and Singapore intended to press for measures to promote closer economic cooperation between the ASEAN governments.[3]

(S) On 11 February President Marcos informed the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines that the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Pattaya had broken up without having reached final agreement on arrangements for the ASEAN summit meeting. Marcos stated that it was obvious the ministers would have to meet again before the summit meeting could take place, since it would be inappropriate for the chiefs of state to be haggling about words during their meeting. Two days later the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia informed the Embassy in Manila of a possible reason for the failure of the Foreign Ministers pre-summit conference. The Government of Malaysia had reversed its position favoring an ASEAN Treaty

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 625-626.
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 9 Feb 76, "Five Asian Nations Ask U.S. to Remain," dateline Pattaya Beach, Thailand (AP).
3. AMEMB Singapore 46/060857Z Jan 76.

of Amity and Friendship because of suspicion that President Marcos might use the treaty to justify a call for negotiations on the Muslim problem in the Southern Philippines. The U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur cited the failure of the new Malaysian Prime Minister, Hussein Onn, to visit Manila during his calls on other ASEAN chiefs of state as an indication of Malaysian feeling that Marcos sought to twist ASEAN to Philippine purposes. Although the Malaysian Government had been committed to support the treaty, this commitment had been made by the deceased Prime Minister Razak without consultations with his cabinet. One Malaysian official maintained that Marcos had never made good on a secret promise to the Indonesians to publicly abandon the Philippine claim to Sabah; however, this official did not directly link this failure to the withdrawal of official Malaysian support for the Muslim rebels in the Southern Philippines. An official Malaysian source had indicated that the Government of Malaysia would work actively to stop aid to the Muslim rebels if the Sabah claim was categorically dropped. The Treaty of Amity, Friendship, and Cooperation had been intended to cap the Bali summit of ASEAN chiefs of state, but the friction between Malaysia and the Philippines generated by the Muslim rebellion in the Southern Philippines and the Philippine claim to Sabah appeared to rule out its adoption. It had also been intended as a substitute for a highly legalistic section on internal resolution of disputes proposed by the Philippines as part of the framework for an ASEAN zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality.[1]

(S) In a 12 February press conference, Indonesian Prime Minister Malik indicated that two more high-level ASEAN meetings would be held in an attempt to resolve the remaining problem areas before the 23-25 February summit meeting. Malik said the ASEAN Foreign Ministers would meet again following the scheduled 18-19 February conference of ASEAN senior officials in Jakarta. Although Malik publicly expressed satisfaction with the just-concluded Foreign Ministers' meeting in Pattaya, other sources claimed the meeting underscored a continued lack of agreement on several key issues. Both Singapore's advocacy of an ASEAN free-trade zone, which was resisted by Indonesia, and the question of defense relationships in connection with ASEAN remained unresolved. Moreover, the Malaysian objection to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was based upon the possibility that the provision for arbitration of disputes between the two ASEAN members could be used by President Marcos to reopen the Sabah issue. President Suharto of Indonesia was reported to have sent an emissary to convince the Malaysian Prime Minister that it was too late to renegotiate the treaty.[2]

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1. AMEMB Manila 2086/110635Z Feb 76; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 838/130828Z Feb 76.
2. CINCPAC ALFA 12/140909Z Feb 76 (EX).

(U) On 23-24 February 1976 the ASEAN heads of state held the first summit conference on the Island of Bali in Indonesia. The day before the summit conference was scheduled to open, press reports indicated that the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN had settled on a compromise for the arbitration of conflicts, paving the way for the signing during the summit meeting of the Treaty of Amity and Friendship. The compromise, according to the press, involved the acceptance by the Philippines of the general principle of consensus for the settlement of problems, thus removing the main stumbling block in the discussions among the senior officials. This was reinforced by a subsequent press report announcing that ASEAN had taken initial steps toward a regional block patterned after the European economic community. This declaration on economic cooperation embraced 230 million people spread out over one million square miles. The Association members reportedly had agreed to share critical supplies of fuel and food in case of shortages or disasters and to set up complimentary large-scale industrial projects within the region. They had also agreed to lay the basis for preferential trading arrangements within the Association to facilitate trade expansion in basic commodities. The press report noted that, although the Philippines and Singapore had pressed for establishment of a free-trade zone, Indonesian objections had blocked that proposal.[1]

(U) On 8 April the Philippines became the first of the five ASEAN members to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and an agreement reached during the summit meeting to establish an ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.[2]

9th Annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting

(S) The 9th Annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Manila on 24-26 June 1976, with the Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister attending as an observer. President Marcos opened the meeting and emphasized the desirability of major power equilibrium in the region. He stated that dominance by any single power was not desirable, but that Asia remained on the periphery of detente as the role of one superpower waned and another (presumably the USSR) attempted to build up its presence. Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo stated, in a speech to the delegates, that the Foreign Ministers should propose an ASEAN doctrine, declaring the perimeters of the region as the sphere of influence solely of the countries of Southeast Asia, with support from the big powers in keeping the region free from interference with Southeast Asian internal affairs. He cited the dangers of disequilibrium

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1. Honolulu Advertiser, 23 Feb 76, "S.E. Asian Compromise," dateline Bali (UPI) and 1 Mar 76, "Step Toward Trade Block by S.E. Asian Nations," dateline Manila (UPI).
2. COMIPAC 090807Z Apr 76.

in the post-Vietnam era, citing Sino-Soviet rivalry, the partial disengagement of the United States which could encourage adventurism by other powers, and the unknown factor of a reunified, resurgent Vietnam. The Embassy in Manila reported to the State Department that local press coverage suggested that Romulo's "ASEAN doctrine" proposal was the subject of discussion at the 25 June closed-door session between the Foreign Ministers. According to the press, the Ministers discussed "boundaries" of ASEAN within which the "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" (and presumably ASEAN "doctrine") would be operative. As examples of the fact that the ASEAN "boundaries" had not yet been established, the press cited competing claims to the Spratley Islands, Malaysian-Thai border problems, and the possibility that membership in the ASEAN might be extended to PNG and the States of Indochina.[1]

(S) The Foreign Ministers also signed ASEAN declarations on narcotics and mutual assistance on natural disasters. They took note of the steps to set up a Secretariat to be in action by the fall of 1976 and confirmed Indonesia's General Dharsono as the ASEAN Secretary General. The communiqué issued at the meeting, however, was largely routine, and did not address the Romulo "ASEAN doctrine" proposal. They noted the hope that bilateral contacts among the states of the region would break barriers of suspicion and misunderstanding, and stressed that these contacts should be on the basis of mutual goodwill and through reciprocal initiatives. The communiqué gave pro forma attention to the 1971 ASEAN declaration for a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, but acknowledged that this concept remained a future goal. The communiqué also affirmed an agreement by the ASEAN members to give priority to rice and coal for regional preferential trade in critical circumstances.[2]

(S) IPAC analysts considered that the Bali summit and the 9th Foreign Ministers' meeting appeared to reflect careful orchestration and the growing determination of the member nation leaders to soft-pedal individual differences in the interest of collective objectives. IPAC noted that, among East Asian nations, ASEAN was viewed favorably by Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, Burma, and the PRC, giving the Association good prospects for the future. Overall, ASEAN's prospects for strengthened regional stability appeared good, with world economic and monetary problems posing the greatest threat to the Association's future.[3]

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1. AMEMB Manila 9185/260316Z Jun 76; IPAC Point Paper, 20 Jul 76, Subj: Southeast Asia Regional Stability (ASEAN).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

SECTION IV--PHILIPPINE MBA NEGOTIATIONS

The Background

(S) Renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in the Philippines had been in abeyance for several years. Nothing in the trial balloons, hand wringing, and posturing of the Filipino officials which linked the collapse of Indochina to an imperative reappraisal of the bases status was new. In 1972 United States and Philippine negotiators had reached agreement on the revision of all but 6 of the 29 articles in the MBA. These were criminal jurisdiction, immigration, shipping and navigation, exemption from customs and taxes, personal tax exemption, and the tenure of the MBA. The issue was dormant in 1973, but in 1974 the Government of the Philippines (GOP) indicated interest in resuming the MBA negotiations, setting off a flurry of U.S. exchanges of view already well massaged by all parties in previous years. Even though the negotiations were never officially resumed, "informal" papers were leaked during 1974 which contained many of the points belabored in public by Filipino officials in 1975. These included Filipino base commanders at U.S. bases; rentals for the use of the bases; specific reference to nuclear weapons control; immediate response by U.S. Forces to aggression against the Philippines; and the flying of only the Philippine flag over bases occupied by U.S. Forces. Another concept concerned the writing of a new Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), to which the MBA would be an annex, which portrayed the U.S. bases in the Philippines in a key role either in the defense of the Western Pacific, or perhaps the smaller areas encompassed by ASEAN. Another annex to the Treaty was proposed to "comfort" ASEAN neighbors and to emphasize the defensive nature of the bases. [redacted]

(S) Formal base negotiations were not officially resumed in 1975, but the provisions of the MBA were discussed by various U.S. and GOP officials throughout the year. In May 1975 U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William Sullivan, in connection with U.S. actions, initiatives, and posture toward ASEAN after the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, noted that one of the eventual considerations to be confronted would be U.S. military deployments in the Philippines. He noted that, in general, it was assumed that the U.S. naval facilities at Subic Bay and Cubi Point would continue to be required for U.S. strategic purposes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but:[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. II, pp. 637-639.
2. AMEMB Manila 5914/060753Z May 75.

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On the other hand, with the collapse or withdrawal of U.S. presence and/or responsibilities on mainland Southeast Asia, there does not rpt not appear to be an exclusively American rationale for the maintenance of U.S. air facilities at Clark Air Base. The only logical Air Force deployment at that facility, in newly changed circumstances, would be U.S. fighter interceptor units, provided for the explicit purpose of assisting in the air defense of the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty. It would be assumed that such units would be deployed only if GOP explicitly request them, and it would seem logical that they should become tenants on a Philippine-controlled Clark Air Base, in much the same way as U.S. units were deployed to Mactan during the height of the Vietnam War.

(S) Since CINCPAC and his Air Force component, PACAF, had been information addressees on the Ambassador's message, CINCPAC immediately challenged the Ambassador's statement that the United States no longer had an exclusively American rationale for the retention of Clark Air Base. In a message to the JCS, CINCPAC stated that Clark was strategically essential to the Pacific Command. He saw no change in national policy relative to U.S. commitments in the Pacific and Far East that would lessen its importance since U.S. Pacific Command military strategy depended on a forward presence as the key to support of U.S. national interests. Clark Air Base was the most important part of that forward base structure, CINCPAC stated, and it provided the essential link in the U.S. capability to project U.S.-based forces into the Southwest Pacific, Northeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean/Middle East areas. It was the only large aerial port in the Southwest Pacific, and its operation by the United States accented U.S. resolve and commitment to Pacific affairs. CINCPAC acknowledged that U.S. military posture would undergo some reassessment, but saw no reason to believe that the key role of Clark Air Base should change.[1]

(S) On 21 August 1975 the State Department acknowledged an Embassy report of an exploratory conversation with President Marcos regarding the future base negotiations. State noted, however, that a clear statement was needed from Marcos of GOP desires regarding the bases before the issues could be examined realistically. Later in August, during a discussion among Ambassador Sullivan, GOP Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo, and President Marcos, the Ambassador was assured that a GOP paper on the subject would be forthcoming soon. In October Marcos again raised the question of opening negotiations on

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1. CINCPAC 102120Z May 75.

U.S. military facilities and acknowledged to the Ambassador that the long-awaited GOP paper had not yet been delivered. During President Ford's visit to the Philippines in December 1975, some details of the MBA negotiations were settled. Negotiations were to start on the Ministerial level, with Romulo calling on Secretary of State Kissinger in Washington. The talks would then move quickly to Manila where Ambassador Sullivan would lead the U.S. negotiators. It was agreed that negotiations would not start until after the scheduled ASEAN summit meeting in February 1976.[1]

(U) In mid-December 1975 an editorial in a Honolulu newspaper listed GOP terms for a new MBA as reportedly released by the GOP Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. As listed in the newspaper, they were:[2]

- The United States would pay rent for the use of the bases.

- Only the Philippine flag would fly over the bases (at present the U.S. and Philippine flags fly side-by-side).

- Both Clark and Subic would have Filipino base commanders. But operational control would remain in American hands.

- The Philippines would have jurisdiction over American servicemen charged with crimes against Filipinos.

- Camp John Hay, a military recreational facility in the mountain resort of Baguio, would be handed over to the Philippine Government.

The Initial U.S. Drafts

(S) Following the January 1976 Chiefs of Mission conference in Honolulu, Ambassador Sullivan provided CINCPAC with a preliminary draft MBA which he proposed to table at the first session of U.S./Philippine base negotiations. CINCPAC provided comments to the JCS outlining basic concerns with the Ambassador's draft proposal.[3]

(S) Meanwhile, the State Department advised the Ambassador that an extensive inter-agency review of the Embassy draft agreement on the military bases

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, pp. 641-650.
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 17 Dec 75, "Philippine Bases," editorial.
3. J51 HistSum Feb 76; CINCPAC 131830Z Feb 76 (EX).

was underway in Washington. The Ambassador replied that the Embassy draft should be considered more in the nature of a final negotiating goal rather than an initial bargaining position. He did not think it desirable to approach the GOP for either a formal or informal statement of the GOP position. One reason, he stated, was his belief that any GOP position extracted would be exorbitant and therefore counterproductive. The most ticklish unresolved issue, according to the Ambassador, was "rental." He cited the MBA with Spain and the expected Turkish agreement as establishing a linkage between base utilization and military assistance. For example, according to the Ambassador, the Spanish agreement specified a $24 million annual grant component which was stated explicitly and an additional $10 million concealed in the concessional terms. The Ambassador also stated that, in his opinion, the GOP would endeavor to link MBA negotiations with parallel economic negotiations. Although an ostensible agreement to separate the two negotiations could be reached, the Ambassador suggested that there would nevertheless be a correlation. He specifically cited, as GOP goals on the economic front, tariff concessions on mahogany and coconut oil.[1]

(S) [redacted] COMUSNAVPHIL provided recommended changes and modifications to various portions of the draft MBA with particular reference to articles on facilities, security, the proposed indirect hire of Filipino labor, and criminal jurisdiction. Also noted was the apparently deliberate elimination of the word "bases" in the draft MBA. If the use of the words "installation" and "facility" were continued, consistent definitions would be needed. Lastly, COMUSNAVPHIL noted that the draft MBA made it coterminous with the MDT, thus officially recognizing the lack of stability of the MBA. In summary, stated COMUSNAVPHIL, the draft MBA represented a disturbing document with a much too accommodating position.[2]

(S) The foregoing statement was supported by CINCPACFLT in a message to CINCPAC which stressed the need for centralized, coordinated security as constituted under the current MBA. CINCPACFLT also supported the comments

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1. SECSTATE 31888/100008Z Feb 76, which transmitted AMEMB Manila 1983/090629Z Feb 76.
2. COMUSNAVPHIL 090620Z Feb 76.

pertaining to the indirect hire of labor, the assignment of a host country base commander, and concessions relating to criminal jurisdiction. After addressing specific portions of the draft MBA in detail, CINCPACFLT further recommended that prior to the development of a final negotiating goal, a more precise determination be made of the desires of the GOP.[1]

(S) Late in February the U.S. Embassy in Manila reaffirmed support of the indirect hire concept, stating that it was one of the most important elements in the draft base package. It helped to demonstrate in a direct and visible way the sovereignty of the GOP over the bases, eliminated U.S. involvement in labor disputes, and provided an important mechanism through which management, service, and other payments could be passed to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as the quid pro quo which could not be provided through rent, military assistance, or any other fixed annual payment. The Embassy provided a proposed text for the procedural Annex VII entitled "Labor Arrangements." According to the Embassy, the format of the Spanish agreement had been used, but the language had been especially tailored by labor experts of the civilian personnel offices at Subic and Clark Air Base to cover the Philippine labor environment. The AFP was designated as the executive agent of the GOP to administer the indirect hire agreement because a close structural relationship with the AFP was essential to the acceptability and durability of the overall agreement.[2]

(C) In March the JCS requested CINCPAC's views and recommendations on a joint State-Defense Department draft entitled "U.S.-Philippine Military Facilities Agreement." CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF comments on the draft for incorporation in a CINCPAC response to the JCS.[3]

(S) [redacted] CINCPACFLT acknowledged that the second draft did not address labor management, and concurred that this subject should not be included in the base negotiations. However, and referring to the previously discussed Embassy view on the importance of the indirect hire article, CINCPACFLT stated that the concessions intimated in the Embassy message would be inimical to the best interests of

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1. CINCPACFLT 180131Z Feb 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 2788/270221Z Feb 76 (BOM).
3. J51 HistSum Mar 76; JCS 1130/130331Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 130215Z Mar 76.

the military. The other general and specific comments submitted by CINCPACFLT were in consonance with previous remarks, and CINCPACFLT concluded that:[1]

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> It is understood that the AMEMBASSY draft was prepared without input from the senior military commanders in the Philippines. Further, the labor annex...was prepared after consulting with labor advisers from 13th AF and NAVBASE Subic whose basic advice was not incorporated in text. Because the proposals contained in Reference C [Embassy message on indirect hire of labor] reflect an apparent lack of understanding for some of the practical problems facing the bases and in view of the vital importance of the bases to U.S. military operations and presence in Western Pacific, strongly recommend the assignment of a senior military representative to the base negotiating team.

(S) The review of the State-DOD draft by PACAF addressed specific concerns in Articles II, III, IV, V, and VII pertaining to the use of facilities, command of the bases, security of the bases, mutual cooperation, and operating rights, respectively. PACAF acknowledged that the proposed agreement was far more acceptable than the previous Embassy draft, but believed that the initial U.S. position should be stronger in the areas of command and security.[2]

[redacted] CINCPAC agreed that the question of labor should

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1. CINCPACFLT 172117Z Mar 76.
2. CINCPACAF 180215Z Mar 76.

not be addressed in the Military Facilities Agreement. A change to the indirect hire system for 20,000 employees of the U.S. Forces was not in the best interests of the United States. The U.S. Forces would lose significant management and policy control of the work force and incur increased labor costs. The bases labor agreement (BLA) negotiated in 1968 continued to meet the needs of both governments, and the recently negotiated three-year collective bargaining agreement under the BLA promised reasonable labor relations stability.[1]

(S) [redacted]

Hence, negotiations pertaining to the return of U.S.-controlled land on Clark Air Base should be carefully studied to insure no adverse effect on Clark operations. CINCPAC conceded that the language in the draft pertaining to the use of facilities for combat operations and long-range missiles might be necessary to reach agreement. However, it was essential that language not be adopted which could be interpreted as limiting U.S. ability to support Indian Ocean operations; e.g., defining the purpose of the facilities as solely for the defense of the Philippines. CINCPAC noted that the major issue in the negotiations would be a quid pro quo in some form. He noted that this was not addressed in the draft Military Facilities Agreement, and suggested that a quid could be provided by some means outside the military such as trade agreements. CINCPAC concluded by urging the appointment of a senior military representative on the negotiating team.[2]

(S) Subsequently, CINCPAC summarized for the benefit of the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL) the key features of the State-DOD draft agreement. CINCPAC advised that the labor annex, the surrender of jurisdiction over inter se cases, and training of the AFP had been deleted. The word "base" was not used in the draft agreement, and the term "facility" was defined as lands, buildings, and permanent construction within Philippine military installations. In the draft agreement, it was stipulated that the U.S. flag would fly outside the headquarters of the U.S. commander. Under the agreement, the joint use of the John Hay recreational facility was specified, but no other bases were surrendered. The land specified for release at Clark Air Base was the same as that authorized for release to the Philippines since 1970. The MBA would be written as coterminous with the MDT, but no mention was made of a review period and a total of three years for withdrawal was specified.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 191811Z Mar 76.
2. Ibid.; J51 HistSum Mar 76.
3. CINCPAC 221809Z Mar 76.

(C) Late in March, based upon information provided by the U.S. Embassy in Manila, CINCPAC suggested to the Chairman of the JCS that U.S. economic negotiators be contacted through State and other channels to insure their understanding of the importance of the bases and the fact that the GOP officials linked the base negotiations with the economic negotiations. CINCPAC expressed his view that it should be national policy that the bases take primacy over mahogany and coconut oil, and that the negotiators should be so instructed. Economic negotiations, stated CINCPAC, could well be used to provide the necessary quid pro quo which would be difficult otherwise to provide. In reply, the Chairman stated that CINCPAC's views had been passed to DOD and the State Department for possible action.[1]

First Washington Meeting

(C) On 12 April 1976 the Philippine and U.S. military base negotiating teams headed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo met in Washington, DC. After an exchange of opening remarks, Secretary Kissinger handed Romulo a new draft bases agreement for consideration. The text of this agreement was somewhat different from the original State-DOD 5 March text previously discussed by CINCPAC:[2]

Article III - Command

- The installations described in Annex I of this Agreement are Philippine military installations. The installation commanders shall be Philippine officers. The Philippine flag shall be flown at the installations.

- The United States shall appoint a United States facilities commander at each installation where there are facilities designated for its use. The United States facilities commander shall exercise command and control over United States personnel, equipment, and material, over the facilities, and over military operations involving United States Forces. The United States facilities commander will coordinate with the Philippine installation commander to insure that activities at the facilities are conducted in a manner consistent with the terms of this Agreement.

- United States military authorities may display the United States flag within buildings and other indoor sites

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1. CINCPAC 242303Z Mar 76 (EX); JCS 4038/262349Z Mar 76 (EX).
2. SECSTATE 88158/130040Z Apr 76 (EX) and 90736/150130Z Apr 76.

at the facilities, outside the headquarters of the United States facilities commander, and upon coordination with the Philippine installation commander, for appropriate outdoor ceremonies such as military honors and parades on the facilities. Ships, aircraft, and vehicles of the United States Forces may use flags and insignia of command as prescribed by regulation.

Article IV - Security

- Within the facilities designated for its use, the United States is responsible for the control, supervision, and protection of its personnel, equipment, and material, and accordingly may take measures to fulfill these responsibilities therein. The United States may also participate in maintenance of security at the entrances and exits of the installations and at the joint bombing range. Procedures for joint participation in security measures shall be established by the Mutual Defense Board.

- The responsible Philippine installation commander will take such steps as may be necessary and appropriate in the circumstances to provide free and continuous access to, and movement within and between, the installations for members of the United States Forces or the civilian component, and dependents.

(C) During the 12 April meeting in Washington, Secretary Kissinger stressed that, although there might be disagreements during the discussions, the United States was confident that progress would be made and that the Agreement would be perceived as a major step in the relationship between the two nations. Secretary Romulo's opening remarks were very general and did not lay down any concrete negotiating position. He stressed that the MBA and the Military Assistance Agreement had never been satisfactory to the Philippines, and stated "we are not encumbered by provisions of any subsisting military agreements." In return, Secretary Kissinger informed Romulo that the U.S. Government opposed the concept of rent for the bases. It was, however, prepared to look at some sort of security assistance package based on the principle that the bases existed for the common defense. Romulo replied that the Philippines desired compensation for permitting the United States to use the bases, and that this compensation should not be a "sort of an aid or a dole or a grant." It was not necessary, stated Romulo, to call the compensation "rent."[1]

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1. SECSTATE 93275/162331Z Apr 76.

(S) This report of the meeting had been transmitted by the State Department to the U.S. Embassy in Manila by confidential means on the 16th of April. However, on 15 April the Embassy in Manila passed to the State Department, also by confidential means, quotations from the Manila press which gave prominent attention to Romulo's statement in Washington that the GOP was not encumbered by existing military agreements. One headline stated, "RP Abbrogates All Military Pacts with US"; another front page headline stated, "Bases Talks Starting From Scratch-CPR".[1]

(S) Late in April Ambassador Sullivan reported from Manila that Marcos believed the principal issue of the negotiations to be the question of "compensation." He cited two elements in the financial area, the first being the cost of operating the bases, and the second the GOP need to upgrade its military equipment. Marcos hoped, however, that a formula could be devised which did not look like a "handout program." Both Marcos and Romulo had expressed a preference for Baguio as the negotiating locale and had informed Sullivan that the Philippine team would be headed by the Philippine Ambassador to Washington, Eduardo Romualdez, and would include former Vice President and Foreign Secretary Manuel Pelaez.[2]

(S) Earlier in April the Secretary of Defense had nominated RADM Doniphan P. Shelton, CINCPACREPPHIL/COMUSNAVPHIL to be the senior military adviser of the U.S. delegation and MAJ GEN Leroy J. Manor, Commander of 13th Air Force, as the principal deputy. Later, while commenting to the State Department regarding the proposed Washington element of the military bases negotiating panel, Ambassador Sullivan stated that the numbers, "...look a little on the heavy side...", but indicated his confidence that he and Admiral Shelton could work out any "paring back" which would appear to be indicated as time went on. Noting the inclusion of four lawyers on the U.S. negotiating team and his shortage of clerical help, Ambassador Sullivan suggested that, if the lawyers did their own typing, it might mean fewer and briefer briefs.[3]

(S) On 11 June Ambassador Romualdez called on Ambassador Sullivan to discuss the resumption at Baguio on 15 June of the base negotiations. Romualdez stated that the draft agreement tabled by the United States on 12 April in Washington had been found to be "bristling" with vestiges of "extraterritoriality" and was unacceptable. He noted that the GOP was putting the finishing touches on a complete draft agreement which would be presented at Baguio. The Philippine draft agreement was provided to the U.S. delegation on 14 June (the day before the official opening of the talks) and, as analyzed

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1. AMEMB Manila 5259/150338Z Apr 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 5817/280657Z Apr 76.
3. JCS 5080/061807Z Apr 76; AMEMB Manila 6651/130621Z May 76.

by the Ambassador, was obviously not an acceptable basis for continued U.S. military presence in the Philippines. [redacted]

The Baguio Meeting

(C) The U.S. and Philippine negotiating panels met in two separate sessions of two hours each to open the military facilities negotiations in Baguio on 15 June. After brief public statements, and after the press had departed, Romualdez opened the session by expressing disappointment that the U.S. proposals had not significantly changed extraterritorial provisions and formally tabled the Philippine draft. [redacted] This information was provided in the first of a series of daily summaries from the U.S. delegation, interspersed with messages relating to specific facets of the negotiations. Complementing the daily summaries were daily official summary records and weekly assessments by Ambassador Sullivan.[2]

(C) During the negotiations, CINCPAC and his component commanders provided comments to the JCS for consideration during the evolution of State Department positions. Among the more noteworthy developments during the first two weeks of negotiations was authorization by the State Department to address the article in the Philippine draft pertaining to the hire of Filipino labor. The U.S. delegation was instructed to press for an article in the MBA which would not require renegotiation of the BLA. If unsuccessful, the delegation was authorized to state that the United States was prepared to renegotiate the BLA as a separate matter at the conclusion of the MBA negotiations. In response to CINCPAC query, both CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF indicated that the article in the Philippine draft pertaining to labor was unacceptable. During a subsequent meeting of the labor panel, the Philippine Under Secretary of Labor advised the U.S. delegation that the GOP concept included more than labor standards--particularly binding arbitration, collective bargaining, Department

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1. AMEMB Manila 8334/110931Z Jun 76; USDEL Baguio 4/151326Z Jun 76.
2. USDEL Baguio 5/151422Z Jun 76, 10/161201Z Jun 76, 13/161332Z Jun 76, 28/211414Z Jun 76, 32/221343Z Jun 76, 40/231443Z Jun 76, 44/250500Z Jun 76, 52/250827Z Jun 76, 35/230439Z Jun 76, 36/230429Z Jun 76, 45/250624Z Jun 76, 46/250626Z Jun 76, 48/250709Z Jun 76, 20/190437Z Jun 76, and 56/251027Z Jun 76.

of Labor control of hiring, and law compliance. Ambassador Sullivan suggested that commitment on this issue by the U.S. delegation be deferred as long as possible. Another subject pertained to the GOP draft Article II on intelligence sharing, which indicated GOP desire for closer relationships in intelligence matters. The State Department advised the U.S. delegation that this was a topic with broad ramifications involving the entire Washington intelligence community; therefore, State directed that discussions be deflected until a U.S. position had been developed.[1]

(C) On 24 June Ambassador Sullivan informed the State Department that the GOP negotiators had requested a change of venue from Baguio to Manila. On 25 June a joint press release was issued stating that the Philippine and United States panels had completed their initial review of the two drafts presented at the outset of the negotiations. Working groups had been formed, and, in order to allow for consultations with their respective governments, the Philippine and American panels had agreed to recess and reconvene in Manila on 1 July 1976.[2]

The Manila Meetings

(C) The U.S. and Philippine negotiating panels reconvened on the morning of 1 July in the Central Bank complex in Manila following the five-day recess. For the rest of the day on 1 July and on 2 July the panels visited Clark Air Base, Wallace Air Station, San Miguel, and Subic Bay on a familiarization tour. The U.S. Embassy informed the State Department that the Filipinos seemed to have acquired a sobering realization of the complexities of the bases as well as the fact that U.S. Forces were dedicated to combat capabilities and were not occupation troops.[3]

(C) During the ensuing negotiations in July and August 1976, CINCPAC continued to submit positions on the U.S. delegation proposals to the JCS on a daily basis. On 2 August CINCPAC nonconcurred with a Philippine proposal that Philippine currency (pesos) be the only legal tender on the bases. CINCPAC noted that the fluctuating Philippine currency would pose significant problems in procurement, nonappropriated fund operations, U.S. personnel

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1. CINCPAC 280041Z Jun 76 and 280042Z Jun 76; CINCPACFLT 240410Z Jun 76, 300331Z Jun 76, 300501Z Jun 76, and 010357Z Jul 76; CINCPACAF 240500Z Jun 76, and 010430Z Jul 76; USDEL Baguio 38/231210Z Jun 76 and 51/250750Z Jun 76; SECSTATE 155032/222328Z Jun 76 and 158482/260053Z Jun 76; DIA 6053/252050Z Jun 76.
2. USDEL Baguio 41/241100Z Jun 76 and 43/250449Z Jun 76.
3. 13AF 020915Z Jul 76; COMNAVBASE Subic 021032Z Jul 76; AMEMB Manila 9675/030707Z Jul 76/USDEL 69 and 9702/060623Z Jul 76/USDEL 71.

buying power/conversion to dollar instruments, basic pay and allowances for U.S. military, civilian pay (computed in dollars by statute), and that the sale of money orders would have to be discontinued by postal facilities. If it were necessary to accede to the Philippine proposal, CINCPAC recommended that major safeguards be stipulated. Among the safeguards were a guaranteed fixed-term rate of exchange, the ability of U.S. personnel to negotiate dollar instruments promptly at a guaranteed rate of exchange, reasonable limits for repatriation exchange, guaranteed ability to write dollar contracts with U.S. companies, and guaranteed ability for disbursing officers to make regular payroll (military and U.S. civilian) payments by U.S. Treasury check overprinted to insure negotiability in the Philippines in pesos.[1]

(C) Regarding the Philippine proposal to exercise control over aircraft/ship movements, CINCPAC advised the JCS that this proposal restricted operational flexibility and had a detrimental effect on the capability to respond to unforeseen contingencies in the area; therefore, this proposal was unacceptable. Specifically, any requirement for "prior" notification or diplomatic clearance, for all flights except international flights to and from the Philippine ports of entry, was unacceptable. A requirement in the Philippine proposal that all exercises and operations have prior approval of the Philippine Secretary of National Defense was also unacceptable. CINCPAC concurred that for safety of flight purposes, U.S. military flights should adhere to flight rules and regulations established by the Philippine Civil Aeronautics Administration. However, CINCPAC did not concur in the requirement for flight departure approval by the Philippine authorities. Further, for safety of flight at U.S. military installations, U.S. controllers must direct U.S. aircraft. CINCPAC did not concur with a broad stipulation that U.S. submarines remain surfaced when "in Philippine waters" except when authorized by Philippine authorities, noting that a definition of "Philippine waters" was needed. CINCPAC nonconcurred with a requirement for the Philippine Secretary of National Defense to approve operations and training in Philippine waters, especially without definition. Port control at Subic Bay Naval Base by the Philippine base commander was also unacceptable. Complete flexibility and control of ships entering/leaving Subic Bay must be retained by the United States.[2]

(C) When, in the course of negotiations concerning the U.S. use of facilities in the Philippines, an impasse developed over the phrase "prior consultation" as submitted in the U.S. draft and "express consent" as submitted in the Philippine draft, CINCPAC commented to the JCS on the tentative substitution of "mutual agreement" suggested by the U.S. delegation. CINCPAC concurred

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1. J51 HistSum Jul 76; CINCPAC 020404Z Jul 76.
2. CINCPAC 042237Z Jul 76.

with the Embassy view that the United States should be prepared to accept that change, reserving it until such time as operating rights in facilities were assured and then only if essential to the agreement. CINCPAC noted that the phrase "prior consultation" was acceptable pertaining to the operational use of the facilities, whereas the phrase "mutual agreement" might not be responsive to possible operational contingencies. Conversely, "mutual agreement" would be a reasonable phrase to apply for the establishment of new capabilities, i.e., long-range missiles. On 20 July the essence of CINCPAC's comments, as expressed to the JCS, was contained in instructions from the State Department to the Embassy in Manila.[1]

(C) Based upon strong positions expressed by CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF, CINCPAC urged the retention of the water shed area at Clark Air Base under U.S. control, and stressed the importance of a minimum of three water sheds at Subic Bay in response to a Philippine proposal that control of all water sheds be relinquished. Regarding water and land areas, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the United States retain control of waters in Subic Bay, that the boundaries of land areas retained for U.S. use should extend into the Bay waters sufficiently to include existing and planned piers, waterfront facilities, and other U.S. construction at Subic, and that the U.S. delegation press for continued and unhindered U.S. access and use of Philippine airspace.[2]

(C) In mid-July the U.S. delegation advised the State Department of a GOP desire to establish a special joint commission, separate and distinct from the Mutual Defense Board (MDB), to oversee the implementation and operation of the MBA. The Philippine proposal for a special joint commission was defective in organization and skimpy on operational detail. It should be made clear, stated the Embassy, that the joint commission, like the MDB, was under the aegis of the Council of Ministers created pursuant to the MDT of 30 August 1951. CINCPAC commented that, although no requirement for a joint commission in addition to the MDB was evident, the proposal might be worth a trade-off on other important matters. However, CINCPAC cautioned against the proposed joint commission's involvement in operations at the bases. This view was supported by the State Department which submitted changes to the draft article submitted by the Embassy for approval, in which reference to operational involvement was deleted. After consultation with the Philippine delegation, the Embassy

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1. AMEMB Manila 9831/071127Z Jul 76/USDEL 76; CINCPAC 080137Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 179509/202325Z Jul 76.
2. CINCPACAF 162310Z Jul 76; CINCPACFLT 280507Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 240245Z Jul 76 and 312305Z Jul 76.

submitted a revised proposal relating to the establishment of a joint commission, with the clear understanding that operational matters within the purview of the MDB were first submitted to that Board for resolution.[1]

(C) During negotiations on the wording of the preamble to the proposed MBA, which had been reserved for resolution by the Chairmen of the two delegations, Ambassadors Romualdez and Sullivan, the primary difficulty concerned specific mention of the MDT of 1951 in the preamble. CINCPAC acknowledged what appeared to be agreement on the wording of the preamble, but challenged preamble language stating, "for the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific area" and suggested that that sentence be concluded with the word "stability." CINCPAC's objection, based upon the possibility that such language could restrict the activities of U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, was supported in a message from the State Department back to the Embassy in Manila. However, negotiations on preamble language, which had appeared to be an area of agreement, disintegrated into continued haggling over subsequent repeated Philippine amendments.[2]

(C) The official summary record for the negotiating session of 7 July revealed considerable difficulty within the labor working group in establishing a foundation for negotiations. The U.S. and Philippine participants were far apart, each side having rejected the proposal of the other. The Philippine Under Secretary of Labor stressed the Philippine position that the labor article in the new agreement would supercede the BLA of 1968. Ambassador Sullivan countered with the U.S. position that the 1968 BLA should be referred to or made an annex of the MBA and not simply abrogated. On the following day Ambassador Sullivan requested the presence of Mr. William Pankonin, CINCPAC Chief of Civilian Personnel Policy, to participate in the labor working group discussions of the BLA and related issues. His expertise and experience, stated the Ambassador, would be of great assistance. CINCPAC promptly assured the Ambassador that Mr. Pankonin would be made available for the negotiations.[3]

(C) Citing the wide disparity between the Philippine draft article on labor (XI) and the proposal tabled by the United States, the Embassy requested

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1. AMEMB Manila 10214/131145Z Jul 76/USDEL 116, 10792/221201Z Jul 76/USDEL 147, and 11287/300931Z Jul 76/USDEL 166; SECSTATE 179510/202326Z Jul 76 and 184922/262318Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 190017Z Jul 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 10701/210924Z Jul 76/USDEL 141, 11135/271036Z Jul 76/USDEL 161, and 11170/290754Z Jul 76/USDEL 163; CINCPAC 220332Z Jul 76 and 300427Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 183397/232213Z Jul 76.
3. AMEMB Manila 9917/081201Z Jul 76/USDEL 95 and 9928/090118Z Jul 76/USDEL 97; CINCPAC 092316Z Jul 76.

clearance for a new approach which would retain the 1968 BLA except as modified by the new MBA. During exploratory sessions on 7 and 8 July, stated the Embassy, working drafts based on guidelines provided by CINCPAC had been developed regarding preferential employment, reductions in force, severance pay, recruitment, and payroll deductions. Statements from GOP officials as late as January 1976 had reflected the position that the BLA, with minor modifications, was satisfactory.[1]

(C) In view of the revised hard-line stand by the GOP that substantial revision or total replacement was required during these negotiations, it had become evident that the BLA of 1968 might have to be revised; therefore, State authorized the Embassy to include a statement in the general labor article to the effect that the article would be implemented by appropriate amendment of the BLA. The Ambassador was authorized to inform the Philippine delegation that if they would agree to a brief, general labor article in the MBA, the United States was willing to begin negotiations on amendments to the BLA at the same time. The U.S. delegation was instructed to make it clear that these would be handled as separate and distinct matters, and that it would not be necessary to conclude BLA negotiations simultaneously with the new bases agreement. In this message (12 July) the State Department designated a U.S. team consisting of Pankonin as principal spokesman, Albert H. Burns of CINCPACFLT, and Jack V. Compton of CINCPACAF for purposes of negotiation of amendments to the BLA. State directed that this team proceed to Manila and begin preparation for negotiations.[2]

(C) The Embassy replied to State that, in the judgment of the U.S. delegation, it was unnecessary to separate the labor issues from the overall negotiations. Such separation would be significantly counterproductive to the U.S. Forces labor situation in the Philippines by providing an avenue for renegotiation of the complete BLA and the recently completed three-year collective bargaining agreement. The U.S. delegation submitted for State Department review a text for the U.S. draft article on labor which retained the 1968 BLA but modified certain points therein. During the plenary session on 12 July, Ambassador Sullivan introduced Pankonin as part of the labor working group.[3]

(C) Both the State Department and CINCPAC concurred with the approach which sought to retain the 1968 BLA with necessary changes included in the MBA then being negotiated. State cautioned, however, that the new approach on the

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1. AMEMB Manila 10062/120644Z Jul 76/USDEL 108.
2. SECSTATE 172169/122249Z Jul 76.
3. AMEMB Manila 10275/141027Z Jul 76/USDEL 119, 10354/151049Z Jul 76/USDEL 122, and 10408/160542Z Jul 76/USDEL 128.

labor issue was based on speculation by the U.S. delegation that the labor area was not of critical importance to the GOP and that the discussion of labor would not prolong the talks. If it became evident that that was not the case, the U.S. delegation would revert to the stand that labor was a separate and distinct issue.[1]

(C) By the end of July little progress had been reported by the U.S. delegation toward an agreed position on the labor issue. By the middle of August the latest labor article provisions reflected several new GOP proposals which resulted in a greater difference between the U.S. and GOP positions than was evident one month before. The Embassy attributed the intransigence of the GOP delegation to a basic conceptual difference between the panels on whether they were negotiating modifications to the U.S.-GOP BLA of 1968 or exceptions to Filipino law. Nevertheless, the Ambassador indicated that the labor issue was only one of 25 important issues in the overall negotiations which appeared to require a political decision for resolution. Therefore, he did not consider the labor issue as critical enough to prolong the talks nor to warrant remanding it to separate renegotiation of the BLA.[2]

(C) The original draft MBA tabled by the U.S. delegation had contained no reference to nor clause on labor. By September this position had been modified to the point where the U.S. delegation submitted for State Department review a proposed labor article and annex in a 15-page message. The subjects covered in the proposed draft included preferential employment, recruitment, uniform standards, social security benefits, payroll deductions, security of employment, severance pay, a new committee of labor, resolution of disputes, regulation of contractors, manpower allocation, mid-year annual bonus, and general provisions. CINCPAC reiterated the importance of holding to the original U.S. Government objective to retain the BLA and its agreed minutes as modified by the terms of the MBA being negotiated. He provided technical comments/recommendations regarding the article and annex text discussed above in the event that its use became a political necessity. On 1 October CINCPACFLT emphasized to the Chief of Naval Operations the imperative that, if the draft submitted by the U.S. delegation were used, the modification and technical comments provided by CINCPAC should be incorporated intact.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 172219Z Jul 76; SECSTATE 180869/212313Z Jul 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 11222/300128Z Jul 76/USDEL 165 and 12161/130640Z Aug 76/ USDEL 204.
3. AMEMB Manila 13900/100746Z Sep 76/USDEL 241; CINCPACFLT 012311Z Oct 76, which cited CINCPAC 250504Z Sep 76.

The Unresolved Issues

(S) At the end of the seventh week of negotiations (31 July) the Ambassador noted that the end of July was the original target date for the completion of MBA negotiations. He advised the State Department that, in his judgment, the end of the negotiations phase was in sight. The two panels, which were surrogates for the Ministerial level, had reached agreement on a number of points, but a number of others were of great political sensitivity. Ambassador Sullivan intended to suggest to Ambassador Romualdez the consolidation of agreements into a single text, with the points of disagreement in brackets. Sullivan also intended to suggest a recess and a joint public announcement stressing the areas of agreement. The length of the recess would depend, to a large extent, on GOP intentions, but the Ambassador expected Marcos to wait for the outcome of the U.S. elections before resumption of negotiations.[1]

(S) After the ANZUS meeting in Canberra in early August (q.v.) Deputy Secretary of State Robinson and Admiral Gayler visited the Philippines. On 7 August during a call on President Marcos by Admiral Gayler and Ambassador Sullivan, Marcos referred to discussions held on the previous day with Secretary Robinson on the subject of the military base negotiations. He had suggested to Robinson that the two panels draw up a list of agreed and disagreed items. In addition, he suggested that Sullivan and Romualdez draw up a list of items which needed "political decisions." The two Chairmen reached agreement that the panels would prepare a document showing the areas of agreement and disagreement and that a summary of the various decisions needed at the political level would be prepared.[2]

(S) In mid-August the State Department requested the U.S. delegation to submit the list of the 25 important issues which seemed to require political decision for resolution in order to facilitate a review of the base negotiations at high levels in the U.S. Government. State also agreed that a single text, with points of disagreement bracketed, of negotiations to date would be useful.[3]

(S) The U.S. delegation replied with two messages, one listing the 25 issues which seemed to require political decision and the other the issues and the respective U.S. and GOP positions on the issues. As listed in the first of these messages, the issues were:[4]

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1. AMEMB Manila 11304/310530Z Jul 76/USDEL 168.
2. AMEMB Manila 11798/090219Z Aug 76 and 11883/100554Z Aug 76/USDEL 189.
3. SECSTATE 203560/172006Z Aug 76.
4. AMEMB Manila 12447/180725Z Aug 76/USDEL 214 and 12527/190311Z Aug 76/USDEL 217.

- The determination and demarcation of the facilities which will be authorized for use by the United States.

- The specific terms of United States use of the facilities for military purposes.

- The Philippine desire to stipulate agreed force levels for United States Forces in the Philippines.

- Whether it is to be "agreement of" or "coordination with" the United States commander that would be required for Philippine forces to use or operate in a facility authorized for use by the United States.

- Whether or not there should be mutually worked-out programs for the activities and technical operation of the facilities.

- Whether or not the Philippines should prohibit, by express provision of this Agreement, the introduction and storage of nuclear and other unconventional weapons in the Philippines, and the laying of mines in Philippine waters.

- Whether or not the Philippines, if its national security so dictates, is to take over the operation and administration of the facilities.

- Whether the entry of U.S. nuclear-powered vessels into Philippine ports should require prior approval or only advance notification, through an express provision of this Agreement.

- Whether the Philippines should allow the passage through Philippine airspace or waters of aircraft, vessels, or submarines carrying nuclear weapons or components thereof, or other unconventional weapons.

- Whether the Philippine base commander shall have authority to issue directives (rules and regulations on general matters involving security, administration, and command) applicable to all personnel within the base.

- Control of the movement of United States vessels within Subic Bay and the harbor areas, including anchorages.

- Whether the participation by the United States Forces in security activities within and off the base, and outside the facilities, shall be expressly provided for in the Agreement or whether such participation shall be at the discretion of the Philippine base commander.

- The ownership of and control over maps and cartographic information which result from surveys conducted by United States Forces in the Philippines.

- Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed by members of the U.S. Forces in the Philippines. If the Philippines consents to such an exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, a consequent issue is the objective procedure in determining whether a particular offense is one where the Philippine consent applies. In addition, if the Philippines exercise jurisdiction, the issue is whether or not the trial of members of the U.S. Forces, civilian component or dependents, shall be limited to civilian courts only.

- Whether, in the exercise of Philippine sovereign authority, the consent of the United States is necessary in the grant of rights to exploit natural resources within the facilities.

- Tax exemption.

- Whether employer-employee relations at the facilities authorized for use by the United States shall be governed by Philippine law or by the existing Base Labor Agreement of 1968, subject to the terms of this Agreement.

- Whether Philippine currency shall be the only legal tender within the facilities.

- Whether the ownership of buildings and other constructions which form part of the facilities shall pass to the Philippines upon the effective date of the Agreement or upon the relinquishment of the facilities.

- The nature of and the manner by which "defense support" shall be provided by the United States to the Philippines to modernize its armed forces.

- Whether the United States, upon relinquishment of the facilities, shall be required to convert them at its own expense in consonance with Philippine development requirements.

- The duration and manner of termination of the Agreement.

- Whether any doubt regarding any provision of the Agreement shall be resolved in favor of the territorial sovereign.

- How to resolve the status of the United States installations which will no longer be covered by this Agreement, such as Voice of America, the State Department Regional Relay Facility, and the American Cemetery.

- Whether the Agreement shall be authentic in both the Filipino and English language versions.

(C) In September the U.S. delegation summarized the unresolved issues confronting the working groups in an analysis by the U.S. working group teams (facilities, command and control, legal, labor, and taxation) of ways by which the issues might be resolved satisfactorily. After a detailed review and analysis of the various component parts of the issues involved, the U.S. delegation addressed the more delicate political issues which had been reserved for the attention of the Chairmen. Although some limited progress was made in sharpening the definition of these issues, the resolution would be dependent upon high level political discussions. In this category were:[1]

- RP-US cooperation (U.S. support for the modernization of the Philippine Armed Forces); in addition to the grant and credit component of our support, we should carefully consider whether the Services would be willing to provide for training and base management and joint manning procedures in addition to some stepping up of Service-to-Service training. This could be valuable "quid" as well as an investment for the future.

- Conversion of bases (U.S. support for making relinquished areas or facilities economically viable). We must continue to resist this open-ended obligation.

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1. AMEMB Manila 13899/100730Z Sep 76/USDEL 240.

- Interpretation (any doubts in provisions should be settled in favor of the Philippines). This is obviously unacceptable. Term of agreement. Washington has provided us with compromise language which we have not yet tabled.

(S) Early in September the JCS, noting the 25 issues listed by the Embassy as still to be resolved, requested CINCPAC to identify from the 25 issues those considered absolutely critical to continued effective military operations from Philippine bases in support of U.S. interests in the area. CINCPAC's reply on 14 September identified the issues and noted that suggested trade-offs or specific accommodations should be balanced by some reciprocal concession from the Philippine side. CINCPAC provided the following assessment:[1]

- Issue 1: Grant of Facilities.

  - Retention of fenced portion of Clark AB proper is necessary to effective U.S. military operations.

  - Crow Valley range is vital. Complex is only available area large enough to accommodate an electronic warfare range, realistic tactical range, and conventional air-to-ground gunnery/bombing range. As a result, it is only WESTPAC range that enables integrated training...for PACAF tactical forces. Relinquishment or relocation is unacceptable if air tactical training as now envisioned is to be continued in the Clark complex.

  - Camp O'Donnel communications station is essential.

  - Water shed at Clark AB (Zone "A" less fenced portion of base) is not vital. Relinquishment of part of water shed is feasible provided further analysis shows negligible effect of such relinquishment on water table supplying artesian wells.

  - MPS-11 site in Clark Zone "D" is necessary to safe, efficient operation of Crow Valley range and aircrew training.

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1. JCS 3099/071358Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 140003Z Sep 76.

- Exclusive U.S. use of all of Wallace Air Station is not necessary. While we recommend that Wallace remain a base designated for U.S. use, could accept relinquishment provided firm guidelines and operating procedures are developed which insure U.S. rights to operate and maintain essential equipment.

- John Hay is not required from a strict military operational point of view. Its importance to U.S. presence in Philippines lies in its contribution to U.S. personnel welfare and morale. In light of Philippine willingness to consider a no fee license arrangement, U.S. should be ready to make this type proposal. Any such arrangement must avoid jeopardizing appropriated fund support.

- Subic-Clark pipeline is vital.

- Retention of JAD-JAD water shed at Subic is not essential. However, all other water sheds at Subic...which presently provide the entire water supply for Subic-Cubi complex must be retained. Final water shed arrangement should provide for continued BLT training in the four water sheds and JEST area at Subic.

- Grande Island is very important to effective military operations and security and should not be released.

- Not necessary to retain all water areas of Subic. Some waters, not vital for unhampered operations, could be released; however, concur U.S. position...that agreement must specifically designate waters reserved for U.S. use and access, rather than allowing future designation by Phil Base Commander (PBC).

- Present arrangement for use of impact and troop training areas is satisfactory and should be retained.

- San Miguel communications station is required.

- With regard to Annex B, in the final analysis, consider "additional facilities" (American cemetery, Voice of America, etc.) as not directly supportive of effective U.S. military operations. Recommend delete "additional facilities" from Agreement proper and handle in exchange of notes. Deletion

could be used to obtain major Phil concession elsewhere and at the same time would accommodate Phil desires to avoid appearance of expanding extent of facilities in Agreement.

- Issue 2: Terms of use of facilities. U.S. position is critical to effective/unhampered military operations. Phil language is inhibiting and unacceptable. Can envisage no U.S. accommodation which doesn't jeopardize principle.

[redacted] Hesitant to provide Phils with any figures. If they insist, could, however, offer a "high figure" which represents a saturation level for the facilities.

- Issue 4: Joint use of facilities. U.S. position is essential for effective/unhampered military operations. As possible accommodation without jeopardizing principle, could accept alternate wording "in coordination with GOP, establish mutually agreed procedures for selective use of U.S. facilities." Realize strict interpretation this wording may be questionable and/or precedent setting.

- Issue 5: Mutual programs. Not clear just what Phils have in mind. Believe they are looking for U.S. to suggest something. Object to "mutually agreed" language...but could foresee involving Phils, on a selective basis, in some planning which would not interfere with our operations. Final decision should be reserved for U.S. by addition of langauge such as "where feasible."

[redacted]

- Issue 7: Phil takeover. Hold U.S. position. U.S. cannot be subjected to unilateral Phil decision of this nature. Recommend strike clause from Agreement. Phil concerns over national survival relate to U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Treaty.

Release of facilities under other conditions should be addressed, if at all, in Terms of Agreement, Article 22, not as separate issue.

- Issue 8: Entry of NPW. [redacted] Phil wording...is unacceptable.

- Issue 10: Issuance of directives. Retention of U.S. position is required for effective military operations. U.S. formulation is already an accommodation and we should hold the line.

- Issue 11: Control of movement. Retention of U.S. position on this issue is critical to effective/unhampered operations at Subic. When water areas for U.S. use are agreed, will need suitable language guaranteeing U.S. control within those waters.

- Issue 12: Security. [redacted] Prefer U.S. hold to position. Any U.S. accommodation should be reserved for the joint security plan.

- Issue 13: Ownership of maps. Not essential to effective military operations. Concur accommodation....

- Issue 14: Criminal jurisdiction. [redacted]

- Issue 15: Natural resources. Fully support U.S. position, however, it is not necessary to hold to language "right to agree upon" as long as assurances of unhampered operations are incorporated in Agreement. Phil proposal

not entirely unreasonable. Possible accommodation at Subic could be to suggest Phil participation in selected, controlled tree harvesting in water shed area.

- Issue 16: Taxation. Support U.S. position....Do not believe accommodation possible without jeopardizing principle and setting unfavorable precedents worldwide.

- Issue 17: Labor. Issue is vital. Effective/unhampered operation is directly related to Filipino work force operating and maintaining support facilities. Could incorporate in the new facilities agreement the essential elements and provisions of 1968 Base Labor Agreement (and its agreed minutes) necessary to protect U.S. Forces interests, as well as any modifications agreed to in present negotiations. We must retain work force management and operational prerogatives outlined...and, additionally, right to select Filipinos referred for employment, to terminate employees by reduction in force, and to discipline without binding arbitration.

- Issue 18: Currency. Not vital to effective military operations. Although undesirable, accommodation, with safeguards, could be made...but only as last resort.

- Issue 19: Title to buildings. Essential. Concerns and position expressed...remain valid.

- Issue 20: "Defense support". Phil position is unacceptable. On the other hand, U.S. position should more clearly state that grants will be in form of materiel and training, not outright cash payment. While issue does not directly affect military operations, the form and substance of quid will be pivotal issue.

- Issue 21: Conversion of facilities. U.S. position is not vital to our military operations in that area. Recognize, however, that the cost of accommodation would be unacceptable, both monetarily and as a precedent. Some Phil falloff on this issue already indicated. U.S. should hold to position simply from a monetary point of view and not agree to obligate itself to this type of undertaking.

- Issue 22: Term of Agreement. U.S. position is critical to continuing use of Phil bases for support of U.S. and Phil interests in area. Have no intentions of leaving Phil bases. Therefore, Agreement should opt for as long term as possible. Believe tie to MDT accomplished this in best way.

- Issue 23: Interpretation. Hold U.S. position. Envisage no U.S. accommodation which doesn't jeopardize principle or establish unacceptable precedent worldwide.

- Issue 24: Activities outside Agreement. U.S. position not necessary to effective military operations. However, U.S. should hold to position and insist on exchange of notes.

- Issue 25: Language. Could accept an authenticated Filipino text.

The AFP Modernization Package

(S) Among the unresolved issues was Article XIX of the Philippine draft MBA which was labeled "defense support", a euphemism for the compensation expected by the GOP from the U.S. Government as payment for U.S. use of the bases. Ambassador Romualdez, as Chairman of the GOP delegation, explained to Ambassador Sullivan the substance of Philippine thinking with respect to Article XIX which, according to Romualdez, resulted from a lengthy internal dispute eventually resolved by President Marcos. According to the Romualdez version, key GOP officials headed by Secretary of Defense Enrile desired to hold out for "rental" or "compensation." They were prepared to call this money "defense support," but wished to have it as a lump sum cash payment with no strings attached. Romualdez and other GOP officials, on the other hand, were prepared to have "defense support" spelled out in terms of security assistance, foreign military sales, and economic aid. Marcos eventually decided in favor of the latter. Enrile refused to redraft Article XIX, but did provide a "modernization plan" as "justification" for "defense support." Ambassador Sullivan believed the modernization plan to have been concocted especially for bargaining purposes.[1]

(S) On 8 August the U.S. delegation forwarded to the State Department the AFP modernization list provided by Enrile. The modernization list was attached to a letter from Enrile to President Marcos dated 29 March 1976 in which Enrile labeled the program a five-year AFP modernization plan to develop land forces,

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1. AMEMB Manila 10023/100426Z Jul 76/USDEL 105.

upgrade air and sea power and improve command and control over widely dispersed field forces. The list and cover letter carried GOP classification TOP SECRET.[1]

[redacted]

1. J53 HistSum Jul 76; AMEMB Manila 9916/081124Z Jul 76/USDEL 91, 92, 93, 94.
2. SECSTATE 171468/101906Z Jul 76.
3. Op. Cit., AMEMB Manila 10023/100426Z Jul 76/USDEL 105.

[redacted]

(C) Meanwhile, CINCPAC had reviewed the AFP modernization plan and informed the JCS that it appeared to be a unilateral GOP wish list which probably was not associated with any previously established AFP modernization program. CINCPAC informed the JCS that any AFP modernization program should be a coordinated joint effort based upon an assessment of the mutual threat and the capability of the GOP to support a given force structure. On 13 July, three days after CINCPAC's comment, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the Chairman, JCS had been tasked to provide, on an urgent basis, an assessment of the equipment acquisition program envisioned by Secretary Enrile. Specific areas of interest were the validity of the requirements in the list, GOP capability to maintain and operate new weapon systems included in the list, and new facilities required to support the weapon systems.[2]

(S) [redacted] CINCPAC viewed the list as a vehicle to express a dollar figure establishing a possible quid pro quo rather than a credible modernization plan. The types of items generally were valid because of the existing Muslim conflict and the projected threat, but the quantities and delivery dates were unrealistic. CINCPAC noted the absence of an airlift requirement and a ship repair facility as two obviously significant omissions. The most critical shortcoming then existing was that the AFP logistics system and facilities already were overburdened by the assets on hand. The AFP could not cope with the proposed acquisitions. CINCPAC provided a detailed line item analysis, and concluded with the observation that if modernization were to be accepted as a quid, both countries' interests would be best served by developing a plan that supported the current force structure while improving the ability to absorb future acquisitions.

[redacted]

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1. SECSTATE 173839/140047Z Jul 76 and 181985/230036Z Jul 76.
2. CINCPAC 100417Z Jul 76; JCS 2510/132222Z Jul 76.
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 150630Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 170346Z Jul 76.

MDT-The Automatic Response

[redacted]

(S) During Robinson's visit, he received an Aide Memoire from President Marcos quoting specific articles of the MDT, citing the U.S. Senate hearings in 1969, and requesting an authoritative and specific statement from the U.S. Government regarding its obligations under the MDT of 1951 relative to the security of the Philippines if attacked by external forces.[2]

(S) At the same time, Admiral Gayler, who had accompanied Robinson to the Philippines, reported to the Chairman, JCS on a meeting with Philippine Secretary of Defense Enrile. Enrile complained that the Philippines had had the short end of the MDT since 1946 [sic]. Specifically, he cited shortcomings in aid in 1973, various encroachments on Philippine sovereignty, and the lack of a firm multi-year program. [redacted]

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1. CINCPAC 312109Z Jul 76; AMEMB Manila 11355/020805Z Aug 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 11734/060900Z Aug 76 (EX).

[redacted] On the other hand, Enrile gave repeated assurances that there was no intention on the part of the GOP to interfere with the full use of the bases by the United States, aligned the Philippines with the United States in understanding the Soviet threat, and suggested that political and logistics support could suffice in the event of aggression against the off-shore islands. [redacted]

(S) In response to a tentative proposal by the U.S. State Department Secretary of State Kissinger visit Manila in October to discuss the MBA issues and the Marcos Aide Memoire, Marcos countered with a proposal to send Romulo and Romualdez to Washington in mid-September for consultation prior to Kissinger's visit in October. The Ambassador informed the State Department that, prior to the Kissinger visit proposal, Marcos had already decided to ask for an "informal" recess in the base negotiations and had instructed Romualdez that there were seven issues upon which he would "insist." Marcos had reviewed the issues compiled by the negotiating delegations and had concluded that many of the issues could be resolved by the working panels. [redacted] In view of the conflict of views and in the absence of a U.S. reply to his Aide Memoire, Marcos had decided that the negotiations should be recessed, preferably without public announcement. Ambassador Sullivan advised the State Department that Romualdez had proposed a tentative resumption of negotiations on 15 January 1977 and that GOP officials were drafting a paper for the U.S. Department of State based on instructions from President Marcos. However, Romualdez was evasive when Sullivan requested a list of the seven issues referred to by Marcos.[2]

(S) In a subsequent meeting with President Marcos on 5 September, Ambassador Sullivan was advised of Marcos' disappointment that no written reply to his Aide Memoire was forthcoming. He stated that it would be "pointless" for Romulo and Romualdez to attempt to discuss the issues in the negotiations without clarification of the obligations of both parties under the MDT. Therefore, Marcos advised Sullivan that Romulo and Romualdez would be authorized to meet with Secretary Kissinger on 22 September provided the first item of business concerned the Aide Memoire. If Kissinger was not prepared to provide a formal answer in writing at that meeting, Marcos expected him to state orally what the United States would be prepared to put in writing

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1. CINCPAC 080200Z Aug 76 (EX).
2. SECSTATE 213364/271811Z Aug 76 (EX); AMEMB Manila 13156/280958Z Aug 76 (EX).

at a later date. During the meeting between Sullivan and Marcos, Ambassador Sullivan noted Marcos' statement that he personally thought he and Secretary Kissinger could resolve all of the issues "in a single sitting." Marcos acknowledged certain emotional problems, but thought all of them were "tractable." As an aside, stated the Ambassador, Marcos mentioned the need for a satisfactory "quid" for defense support. Nevertheless, Marcos indicated that he would not be available to meet with Secretary Kissinger until after 16 October and suggested that a more precise time for a meeting could be resolved while Romulo and Romualdez were in Washington.[1]

(S) Ambassador Sullivan suggested to the State Department that, prior to the meeting between Romulo and Kissinger, it would be necessary for the Secretary to have the highest level approval of an answer to the Aide Memoire and a quid pro quo. Sullivan recalled his previously suggested figures for a reasonable quid offer and suggested that both sides should attempt to ascertain the issues upon which they were not prepared to compromise. Later, Secretary Kissinger informed Romulo that he would be unable to attend a 22 September meeting and suggested that it could be rescheduled for October while Romulo was in the United States to attend the United Nations General Assembly.[2]

The CONUS Meetings

(S) [redacted] Regarding the question of modernizing the AFP, Romulo cited the shopping list of desired equipment already supplied to the U.S. Government, and Enrile stated that the GOP desired a five-year assistance program, of which the first year's price tag would be about half a billion dollars. Kissinger replied that this was totally unrealistic and suggested that the GOP define its priorities in terms of equipment. Romulo countered that another way of approaching the problem would be in terms of how important the bases really are to the United States. [redacted]

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1. AMEMB Manila 13577/050408Z Sep 76 (EX).
2. AMEMB Manila 13609/070659Z Sep 76 (EX); SECSTATE 225997/132017Z Sep 76 (EX).

[redacted] Romulo also requested specific prohibitions in the bases agreement against storage or transit of nuclear weapons. While noting the difference between storage and transit, it was agreed this was a complicated issue the resolution of which would require the participation of President Marcos. The conferees agreed that the discussions during the meeting would be reported to President Marcos and that, in the meantime, the press would be told that the two Secretaries had made good progress in discussing the base negotiations and that the negotiations would continue.[1]

(U) On 21 October a Honolulu newspaper printed an Associated Press dispatch from Washington stating that the Philippines was asking the United States for several billion dollars' worth of military equipment as a price for a new agreement governing the U.S. military bases. This statement was attributed in the press dispatch to "American officials." The article stated that these officials were not taking the bid for massive arms shipments too seriously, and that the military aid component of the new agreement probably would be more in line with base agreements negotiated during the year with Spain, Turkey, and Greece. These agreements, stated the article, provided American aid averaging between $200 million and $250 million a year over a four-to-five-year period. The article also attributed to American officials the statement that the two countries had been unable to bridge the gap between the Philippine demands over sovereignty over the bases and the U.S. desire for operational control over them.[2]

~~(S)~~ During subsequent conversations between Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Romulo in Washington on 28 October, Kissinger handed Romulo an Aide Memoire from the U.S. Government dated 28 October 1976. On 23 November Romulo provided an Aide Memoire from his Government to Secretary Kissinger. The GOP Aide Memoire stated that the U.S. Aide Memoire had offered $900 million for a period of five years, one-half in military aid and the other half in economic aid. The GOP Aide Memoire stated that that amount did not meet its requirements, and that the GOP would need $2 billion for a period of five years, 50 percent to be for military purposes and 50 percent for economic assistance. Of the military portion, the GOP needed 75 percent in the form of grants and the balance in foreign military sales credit. The economic portion could be in the form of development aid and export-import bank credits.

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1. SECSTATE 250861/142125Z Oct 76 (EX), which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message dated 8 Oct 76.
2. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 21 Oct 76, "Manila Asking Billions in Arms," dateline Washington (AP).

In the GOP Aide Memoire, assurance was given that the GOP did not intend to hamper the United States' operational effectiveness nor infringe on the integrity of United States' command and security. These issues, stated the Aide Memoire, could be expedited so long as Philippine sovereignty in law and in fact was recognized. [redacted] Secretary Kissinger informed Romulo during that meeting that he saw no possibility of U.S. agreement to $2 billion and said the question would have to be left for consideration by the next Administration. Once again it was agreed that response to press inquiries would be that the two Secretaries had again discussed base negotiations, that further progress was made, and that the negotiations were continuing.[1]

The Next Move

(S) On 4 December the State Department informed the Embassy in Manila that wire service reports included somewhat distorted but nevertheless fairly accurate descriptions of the financial package proposed to the Philippines, and indicating that an agreement had been reached. The State Department was responding to press queries that discussions were continuing, that no agreement had been reached, but that the discussions did involve considerations of U.S. military and economic assistance.[2]

(U) On 5 December a Honolulu newspaper article cited a "State Department official" in reporting that progress had been made in negotiations with the Philippines for the continuation of the U.S. military bases in that country, but that no agreement had been reached. The article then cited other Government sources as stating that negotiations had provided for $1 billion in economic and military aid for continued base rights, that an agreement had been reached, and that a formal announcement was likely in several days. These sources, according to the article, said the agreement had been reached in Mexico City by Secretary of State Kissinger during meetings with representatives of the Philippine Government. Financial commitments in the new agreement, according to the article, were evenly split between economic and military aid.[3]

(U) On the following day (6 December) another press dispatch reported that Philippine authorities were upset by a sequence of events which they interpreted

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1. SECSTATE 287342/272004Z Nov 76 (EX), which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message DTG 232210Z Nov 76 and 287549/272005Z Nov 76 (EX), which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message of 24 November.
2. SECSTATE 295632/040215Z Dec 76.
3. Honolulu Advertiser, 5 Dec 76, "U.S.-Philippine Talks Reported Progressing," dateline Washington (UPI).

as a heavy-handed State Department effort to break a stalemate in negotiations over U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Romulo told the press that the Manila Government had rejected a U.S. proposal for $1 billion in total U.S. aid over the next five years. Romulo said, according to the article, that he had told Kissinger that the GOP wanted $1 billion in military aid alone over five years, with economic aid to be negotiated in a separate agreement. According to the article, Kissinger and Romulo had met in Mexico City during the inauguration of the Mexican President, but, according to Romulo, there was no agreement and reports that the Philippines was reversing itself following the personal intervention of President Marcos were false. American officials, according to the article, had been taken aback when Manila's initial price tag for military aid had amounted to almost $1 billion a year.[1]

(U) On the same day that Romulo's perturbation with press reports on the negotiations was reported from Washington, the Embassy in Manila reported an editorial in a Philippine newspaper entitled "U.S. Distorting RP Position on Bases Issues." The article stated that the Philippines had been pictured unfavorably in a canard peddled by the American press which made it appear that the Philippines had agreed to allow the United States to use the military bases in exchange for $1 billion in military and economic aid. The article cited Romulo's denial that any agreement had been reached and questioned the motives of the U.S. Administration and the U.S. press:[2]

* * * * *

> We do not buy the U.S. line that its maintenance of military bases here is for our protection. From our viewpoint, the Americans, for strategic defense reasons, need these bases more than we do. That is why we say that if the American military presence on Philippine soil will continue to mean a derogation from Philippine sovereignty, then we can do without these bases, and the Americans can pack up and leave. On the other hand, if the Americans truly recognize our sovereignty, as they claim they do, then they must agree to the following: (1) renunciation of extraterritorial rights on the bases; (2) acceptance of Philippine control (not token but substantial) over bases operations without necessarily hamstringing their effectiveness; (3) recognition of Philippine jurisdiction over a wide range of criminal offenses by American servicemen on or off base; (4)

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 6 Dec 76, "Philippines Rejects U.S. Aid Proposal: Wants $1 billion in Economic Assistance Alone," dateline Washington (AP).
2. AMEMB Manila 18899/060852Z Dec 76.

return of portions of the base areas that are no longer in active use; and (5) payment of substantial compensation for the use of these base lands. If the U.S. Government has agreed to pay substantial sums for the use of Spanish, Turkish, and Greek military bases, it should be prepared to do no less with respect to the Philippine military bases.

While the Philippine stand does not make for easy comprehension, let alone simple negotiations, the possibility of misunderstanding it is quite remote. However, distorting it is another matter, and to our mind, this is exactly what Washington and certain sectors of the American press did, when they made it appear that a new RP-US military bases agreement had been reached primarily, if not solely, on the basis of pecuniary considerations.

(C) In a major foreign policy address on 11 December, Marcos said progress in the base talks had been encouraging, but expressed concern at the misinterpretation of the GOP position in negotiations and singled out the report that the GOP had asked for $1 billion in military and economic aid in exchange for continued U.S. use of the military bases. At the same time, Marcos said that the redirection of GOP foreign policy "in no way connotes the severance of time-tested friendship between the Philippines and the United States." He stressed the GOP belief that the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific was necessary for regional peace and stability and that this view was shared by other nations in Asia. He reiterated that Philippine sovereignty over the bases was not negotiable, but that this should not "prejudice the effective use of facilities by the U.S. in any given situation threatening peace in Southeast Asia." He contended that there had been no agreement in negotiations on many questions "including manner and nature of paying rentals," and that these would await review by the new U.S. Administration. As interpreted by the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Marcos seemed to be assuring his audience that a resolution of the bases negotiations which would be satisfactory to the United States and the GOP was possible under the new Administration. Marcos stated explicitly that a condition for successful MBA negotiations was that the United States "resume" its original obligations under the Military Assistance Pact, and pay rentals in order to build self-reliance on the part of the Philippines. The President also stated that agreement was pending on the powers of the Filipino commander, jurisdiction over offenses, and the kind of weapons to be allowed in the bases, all of which questions were dependent upon the "review and consideration of the new [U.S.] Administration."[1]

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1. AMEMB Manila 19306/130912Z Dec 76.

(U) The U.S. Embassy in Manila advised the State Department on 15 December of another lengthy editorial headlined "U.S. Must Now Make Next Move on Bases Issues." The editorial speculated on the U.S. State Department's motivation in "prematurely leaking" information on the base talks, ascribing the intention of the State Department "to torpedo the negotiations completely so that everything will be set back to zero and the Philippines will have to start again from scratch with the new Carter Administration. Naturally, this would mean more protracted negotiations and a longer lease on life for the status quo on the bases." Concluding with Marcos' insistence on rentals and the fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to provide aid, the editorial stated that the next move was up to the United States."[1]

(U) On the following day (16 December) Romulo returned to Manila and, commenting on the base negotiations, stated that the GOP had not asked for military aid, but only just compensation for the continued use of the bases. On 17 December Marcos alluded to the "recent furor" about the GOP's reported acceptance of a $1 billion assistance package in return for use of the bases and stated that the GOP was waiting for the new Administration in the United States before proceeding with the talks. During a press conference on 4 January 1977, following a meeting of the GOP National Security Council, Marcos confirmed that the talks were at a standstill and that it was up to the United States to make the next move.[2]

(U) Meanwhile, on the U.S. military side, a joint State/Defense message on 18 November 1976 acknowledged the assumption of command of the 13th Air Force by MAJ GEN Freddie L. Poston effective 15 October 1976, replacing MAJ GEN Leroy J. Manor, who had been designated as CINCPAC Chief of Staff. The message appointed General Poston to replace General Manor as the principal deputy military adviser to the United States delegation to the MBA negotiations effective 18 November 1976.[3]

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1. AMEMB Manila 19411/150755Z Dec 76.
2. AMEMB Manila 19553/170848Z Dec 76, and 152/050739Z Jan 77.
3. SECSTATE 283570/191915Z Nov 76, which transmitted to CINCPAC the original State message DTG 181840Z Nov 76.

CHAPTER XI

OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Official Activities of the Commander in Chief

(U) Admiral Gayler's and Admiral Weisner's numerous trips, speeches, and press conferences are highlighted below. Distinguished visitors and visits by news media personnel are listed separately. Events for the year are listed chronologically.[1]

(U) San Diego Trip, 7-8 January: Admiral Gayler departed Honolulu for San Diego, CA on 7 January. Upon arrival at North Island Naval Air Station, the Admiral was briefed on the S-3A by RADM James B. Stockdale, Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Wing Pacific. Later that afternoon, he met with VADM P.D. Stroop and Teledyne Ryan officials to discuss Compass Cope, Mini-Drone, and Vertiwing systems. On 8 January Admiral Gayler met with VADM Robert B. Baldwin, Chief, Naval Air Pacific. That afternoon he went aboard the USS RANGER for change of command ceremonies in which Captain Leon A. Edney was relieved by Commander Samuel Carson Flynn as Commander of the Carrier Air Wing TWO.

(U) The French Receptions, 9 and 14 January: On the evening of 9 January Admiral Gayler attended a reception in honor of commanding officers and officers of the French ships RIVIERE and ENSEIGN de VAISSEAU HENRY given by the 14th Naval District Commander, RADM Ralph Wentworth. The commander of the RIVIERE reciprocated by being host to Admiral Gayler and RADM Wentworth at a dinner aboard RIVIERE on 14 January.

(U) Certificate of Merit Presentation, 14 January: Admiral Gayler presented Mrs. Gerald H. Clements, wife of the Chief, Air Force Personnel Branch for PACOM Headquarters, with a CINCPAC Certificate of Merit for her contributions to the Hawaii State educational system.

(U) Memorial Service, 15 January: Admiral Gayler flew by helicopter to Schofield Barracks where he attended a memorial service for the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., sponsored by the 25th Infantry Division.

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1. Material for this section was taken from J003/74 HistSums Jan-Dec 76.

(U) Retired Officers' Brief, 15 January: In the afternoon of 15 January the Admiral gave a briefing to Oahu retired flag and general officers in the PACOM Command Center.

(U) CODEL Visit, 16 January: Admiral Gayler was host to a delegation from the House Armed Services Committee at breakfast in the Camp H.M. Smith Flag Officers Mess. That evening, he gave a reception for them at Fort Ruger's Cannon Club.

(U) Chiefs of Mission Conference, 19-23 January: Chiefs of Mission from most East Asian countries held a three day conference at PACOM Headquarters during the period 19 to 23 January. On the 19th Admiral Gayler and Philip C. Habib, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-hosted a dinner at the Admiral's quarters honoring the visiting Chiefs of Mission.

(U) Honors Ceremony, 2 February: Admiral Gayler attended an honors ceremony for MAJ GEN Joseph Koler, Jr., outgoing Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, at Camp Smith's Bordelon Field.

(U) MAAG Chiefs' Conference, 3 February: Admiral Gayler gave the opening address to the Military Assistance Advisory Group Chiefs' Conference held in the CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Room. In attendance were senior MAAG representatives from countries throughout the PACOM.

(U) ANPA Address, 4 February: Admiral Gayler addressed the convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association on the Island of Hawaii.

(U) CONUS Trip, 12 February - 2 March: Admiral Gayler and party departed Hawaii on 12 February and arrived at Ellington Air Force Base, TX on the morning of 13 February. The Admiral then flew by helicopter to Texas A&M University where he made a presentation at the Student Conference on National Affairs (SCONA 21) and met with the delegates over lunch. That afternoon he flew by helicopter to Houston where he met with the editorial board of the Houston Post.

On 16 February the Admiral's party departed Ellington Air Force Base for Buckley Air National Guard Base in Colorado where the Admiral started a 7-day leave.

On 24 February Admiral Gayler joined a party from PACOM Headquarters and flew to Kansas City. He went by motorcade to Fort Leavenworth, KS, where he was met by MAJ GEN John H. Cushman, Commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff College. The Admiral addressed the college before departing for Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

On 25 February the Admiral met with William P. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense; General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); General Fred C. Weyand, USA, Army Chief of Staff; LT GEN E.F. Tighe, USAF, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and RADM Julian S. Lake, Commander, Naval Electronic Systems Command. That evening Admiral and Mrs. Gayler dined with Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce at her apartment.

On 26 February the Admiral breakfasted with Washington Post columnist Rowland Evans. Later that morning he flew to Boston where he made a luncheon presentation to the Harvard School of International Affairs, and later met with the University's president, Derek Bok. He returned to Washington later that evening.

On 27 February Admiral Gayler attended the Chairman's briefing in the Pentagon and addressed the National War College at Fort McNair, VA. Later that day the Admiral met with Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; General Weyand; and had dinner with Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Jr. (D.-LA).

On 28 February the Admiral had breakfast with Mr. George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

On 1 March the Admiral met with William I. Greener, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and later testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

On 2 March Admiral Gayler met with Admiral James L. Holloway, III, Chief of Naval Operations, and Secretary of the Army Martin R. Hoffmann.

On 3 March the Admiral met with Representative John C. Culver (D.-IA) before flying back to Honolulu.

(U) Governor's Luncheon, 17 March: Admiral Gayler attended a luncheon given by Hawaii Governor George Ariyoshi at Washington Place, the Governor's residence, to announce the Bicentennial World Hawaiian Canoe Championships.

(U) Samoa Trip, 19-20 March: Admiral Gayler departed Honolulu on 19 March for Pago Pago in American Samoa. Upon arrival he was met by the territorial governor and taken for a tour of the island. He returned the following day.

(U) New Zealand Trip, 24-26 March: The Admiral departed Hawaii on 24 March and arrived in Wellington, New Zealand on 25 March where he was met by U.S. Ambassador Armistead I. Selden, Jr. Admiral Gayler met with Prime

Minister Robert Muldoon and his cabinet and Opposition Party Party Leader Bill Rowling on the afternoon of 25 March. Later that afternoon he held a press briefing for the New Zealand media.

On 26 March the Admiral met with the Minister of Defense and Prime Minister Muldoon, and held a joint press conference with the Prime Minister. Later that afternoon he met with General/Sir Richard James Holden Webb, Chief of Defence Staff, and held a discussion with 20-30 officers of all branches of the New Zealand military.

(U) Change of Command, 6 April: Admiral Gayler attended a change of command ceremony at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station at which Colonel John Thatcher, USMC, former CINCPAC Protocol Officer, assumed command of Marine Air Group 24 from Colonel J.J. Went, USMC.

(U) CONUS Trip, 6-17 April: Admiral Gayler and party departed Hawaii on 6 April for Offutt Air Force Base, NE where the Admiral met with Strategic Air Command intelligence and operations personnel to discuss various exercises. He also met with members of the Joint Strategic Planning Staff and the Commander of the Strategic Air Command. The Admiral was interviewed by the Omaha World Herald prior to his departure for Peterson Field, Colorado Springs, CO for a tour of the Air Force Academy and an address to the Cadet Wing.

On 8 April the Admiral and his party flew to Chicago, IL where he addressed the Chicago Council on International Relations and met with news media representatives.

On 9 April Admiral Gayler flew to Maxwell Air Force Base, AL to address the Air War College.

On 12 April the Admiral flew to Norfolk, VA where he met with the Commandant, RADM J.A. Denton, Jr., and addressed the Armed Forces Staff College. That afternoon he flew to Washington where he had dinner with Ambassador Thomas Gates, Chief of U.S. Liaison Mission to Peking.

On 13 April the Admiral met with Senator Sam Nunn (D.-GA), Senator Robert P. Griffin (R.-MI), Representative Melvin Price (D.-IL), VADM H.D. Train, II, and Commander Ed Koczak.

On 14 April Admiral Gayler attended the Chairman's briefing and met with former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird; Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz; General David C. Jones, USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff; VADM E.K. Snyder, COMUSTDC; LT GEN E.F. Tighe, USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and Colonel C.J. Blastos, J5, JCS.

On 15 April the Admiral attended the Chairman's briefing and again met with Generals Jones and Brown, and met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth.

On 16 April the Admiral met with Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; LT GEN W.D. Johnson, USAF, Director, Defense Nuclear Agency; Mr. George Bush, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and Mr. George Vest.

(U) Reception, 23 April: Admiral Gayler attended a reception given by Consul General of the Republic of China Hoh-tu Liu at the consulate.

(U) NWC Discussion, 24 April: Admiral Gayler chaired a roundtable discussion with members of the National War College faculty and students at the Fleet Marine Force Pacific conference room at Camp Smith.

(U) Reception, 29 April: Admiral Gayler attended a reception in honor of the Emperor of Japan's birthday given by Consul General Masao Tsukamoto at the Consul's official residence in Honolulu.

(U) Honors Ceremony, 29 April: Admiral Gayler attended an honors ceremony at Camp Smith's Bordelon Field for General Louis Wilson, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

(U) Japan-Korea Trip, 2-6 May: Admiral Gayler and party departed Honolulu on 2 May for Yokota, Japan where the Admiral conferred on 3 May with 5th Air Force staff members. The Admiral departed Yokota and flew to Seoul, Korea where he was met by General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

On 4 May the Admiral met with General Stilwell and his staff; General NO Chae-Hyon, Chairman, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Honorable SUH Jyong-Chul, ROK Minister of National Defense.

On 5 May the Admiral met with General Stilwell before departing by helicopter for Camp Red Cloud, accompanied by LT GEN John T. Burns, USAF, Deputy COMUS Korea. He met with LT GEN John H. Cushman, I Corps Commander, and returned to Seoul where he met with Ambassador Richard Sneider at the Embassy.

Prior to returning to Hawaii on 6 May the Admiral met with MAJ GEN Don D. Pittman, USAF, Commander of the 314th Air Division at Osan Air Base, Korea.

(U) Punchbowl Ceremony, 11 May: Admiral Gayler attended and addressed a ceremony honoring the Medal of Honor recipients interred at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific at Punchbowl.

(U) Eglin/MacDill AFB Trip, 15-19 May: Admiral Gayler and party departed Hawaii on 15 May for Eglin Air Force Base, FL. After arriving in Florida, the Admiral drove to Pensacola Naval Air Station where he toured the Naval Aviation Museum.

On 17 May the Admiral held a series of discussions on air-to-surface guided weapons, air-to-air guided weapons, tactical electronic warfare systems, and other programs.

On 18 May the Admiral discussed armament center resources and test ranges before departing for MacDill Air Force Base, FL.

Upon arrival at MacDill Air Force Base, FL on 19 May, the Admiral was officially welcomed by General Hennessey, attended an intelligence overview by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and participated in a discussion on various topics led by General Brown, CJCS. The Admiral also sat in as Admiral Isaac Kidd, Commander in Chief Atlantic, discussed Soviet submarine operations in the Atlantic.

Other meetings and discussions on 19 May included: General Brown, CJCS, discussing DOD support of President Ford's FY 77 budget request; LT GEN Dennis P. McAuliffe discussing the Panama situation; Admiral James L. Holloway, III, on the Naval shipbuilding program; General Alexander Haig, SHAPE/CINCUSEUR, on fiscal programs; and Admiral Gayler on foreign military training and contingency plans and crisis management.

(U) U.S.-Korea Security Consultative Meeting, 26-27 May: Admiral Gayler was a delegate to the Ninth Annual United States-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting which was held in the CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Room at Camp Smith. The conference was chaired jointly by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ROK Minister of National Defense SUH Jyong-Chul, and included high level military and government officials from both countries. The main topic of discussion was the continued security of the Korean Peninsula and the U.S. role in keeping the peace.

(U) San Francisco-Seattle-Vandenberg Air Force Base Trip, 10-17 June: Admiral Gayler flew to San Francisco, CA on 10 June. On 15 June the Admiral visited the Boeing Developmental Center before flying to Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA where he was met by RADM William Harris, Commander, Medium Attack Tactical Electronic Warfare Wing Pacific. They discussed the A-6E and

EA-6B programs and took a flight in a TC-4C to demonstrate all-weather attack systems.

(U) New CINCPAC Announced, 16 June: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that Admiral Maurice Weisner would replace Admiral Gayler as Commander in Chief Pacific. Admiral Weisner was the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and would be replaced by Admiral Thomas Hayward, then Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet.

(U) 1st Marine Brigade Change of Command, 22 June: Admiral Gayler flew by helicopter to Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station to attend the change of command ceremony in which BGEN David M. Twomey assumed command of the 1st Marine Brigade from BGEN George W. Smith.

(U) SSP Trip, 23 June: Admiral Gayler visited the Naval Undersea Center at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station and took a short trip aboard the experimental Semi-Submerged Platform.

(U) Portrait of America, 2 July: Admiral Gayler participated in the State of Hawaii Bicentennial Pageant "Portrait of America" by giving a brief history of each Service branch as the band of that branch marched onto the field at Aloha Stadium.

(U) Presentation of the First Class Order of the Rising Sun Award, 9 July: Admiral Gayler was presented the First Class Order of the Rising Sun, the highest Japanese award to a foreigner, by Japan Defense Agency Director General Michita Sakata in ceremonies in Tokyo.

(U) The Conference Board Speech, 28 August: Admiral Gayler delivered a speech to the Conference Board, an organization of business and industrial leaders of the United States and Pacific, at the Mauna Kea Beach Hotel on the Island of Hawaii.

(U) Admiral Weisner Assumes Command, 30 August: In a change of command ceremony at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, Admiral Maurice F. Weisner relieved Admiral Noel Gayler as Commander in Chief Pacific. Remarks were delivered by Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr.

(U) Admiral Gayler Retires/Transfers Gray Eagle, 31 August: Aboard the USS RANGER (CV-61), Admiral Gayler was officially retired from the U.S. Navy. The retirement ceremony also included the transfer of the Gray Eagle award to RADM Martin D. Carmody, USN. (The "Gray Eagle of the Navy" was the naval aviator with the longest active service.)

(U) German Television Filming, 16 September: Admiral Weisner was filmed by Dr. Hans Berg, a producer for German Television, for the introductory portion of his production on U.S. military power in the Pacific.

(U) PS&S Reunion, 17 September: Admiral Weisner gave a Command Briefing and welcoming remarks to the Pacific Stars and Stripes reunion at the Hale Koa Hotel at Fort DeRussy.

(U) Korea-Japan Trip, 19-27 September: Admiral Weisner and party departed Hawaii on 19 September, arriving at Kimpo Airport on the 20th. Upon arrival Admiral Weisner was met by LT GEN John J. Burns, USAF, Deputy Commander, United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea.

On 21 September Admiral Weisner had an early morning conference with General Richard Stilwell, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. Later that morning he met with the Charge D'Affaires, Thomas Stern and the Country Team. That afternoon Admiral Weisner met with the Honorable SUH Jyong-Chul, ROK Minister of National Defense and General RO Chae-Hyon, Chairman, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. That evening the Admiral had discussions with LT GEN John H. Cushman, I Corps Commander, and visited the Systems Simulation and Analysis Activity at Camp Red Cloud.

On 22 September Admiral Weisner met with MAJ GEN Don D. Pittman, USAF, Commander, 314th Air Division and toured the 314th Air Division Tactical Air Control Center, the Olympic Game operational facilities, and the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. Later in the day the Admiral observed Exercise COPE STRIKE at Nightmare Range.

Prior to departing Korea in the morning of 23 September, Admiral Weisner met with Prime Minister CHOI Kyu-Hah and President Park Chung-Hee.

Upon arrival in Yokota, Japan in the afternoon of the 23rd, Admiral Weisner was met by LT GEN Walter T. Galligan, USAF, Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan. On the 24th the Admiral met with LT GEN John R. Guthrie, USA, Commander, U.S. Army Japan, and attended the dedication ceremonies of the new U.S. Embassy building.

On 27 September the Admiral met with Ambassador James D. Hodgson; Admiral Samejima Hiroichi, Chairman, Joint Staff Council; and Minister of Defense Michita Sakata before returning to Hawaii that evening.

(U) Address to Associated Press Association, 10 October: Admiral Weisner spoke to the Associated Press Association convention at the Mauna Kea Beach Hotel on the Island of Hawaii.

(U) Soldier's Medal Presentation, 8 October: Admiral Weisner presented the Soldier's Medal to Army Captain Roger E. Urbaniak of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, at Barbers Point Naval Air Station.

(U) PASOLS Address, 19 October: Admiral Weisner presented the keynote address to the Pacific Area Senior Officer's Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) at the Hale Koa Hotel at Fort DeRussy.

(U) CONUS Trip, 29 October-3 November: On 29 October Admiral Weisner and party departed Hawaii and arrived in California the following day. While in California the Admiral visited the Naval Air Station, North Island, and the Naval Air Station, Miramar.

On 1 November the Admiral visited and addressed the students and faculty of the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, PA. A question and answer session followed the Admiral's speech. On 2 November Admiral Weisner visited the Commander in Chief Atlantic and met with staff officers of that command. Also on 2 November the Admiral met with General DePuy, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

On 3 November the Admiral addressed the Armed Forces Staff College and visited the Strategic Air Command before returning to Hawaii that evening.

(U) Marine Corps Birthday Ball, 10 November: Admiral Weisner addressed the 201st Birthday Ball of the United States Marine Corps held at the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel in Honolulu.

(U) Veterans Day Speech, 11 November: Admiral Weisner addressed the annual Massing of the Colors ceremony at the Kawaiahao Church in Honolulu in honor of Veterans Day.

(U) MAAG Chiefs Conference, 17-19 November: Admiral Weisner sponsored the Military Assistance and Advisory Group Chiefs Conference held in the CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Room.

(U) Boy Scout Recognition Dinner, 18 November: Admiral Weisner addressed the Aloha Council, Boy Scouts of America, Eagle Recognition Dinner. The Admiral was presented a plaque awarding him the title of Distinguished Eagle Scout.

(U) Singapore-Hong Kong Trip, 5-9 December: Admiral Weisner departed on 5 December arriving in Singapore on 6 December. On 7 December he met with Ambassador John H. Holdridge; the U.S. Defense Attaché Office staff; the Country Team; Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the Minister of Defense; and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

On 8 December the Admiral flew to Hong Kong where he met with LT GEN Sir John Archer, Commander, British Forces. The Admiral also met with the Consul General and his staff before returning to Hawaii on 9 December.

(U) CONUS Trip, 9-13 December: Admiral Weisner and party departed Hawaii on 9 December and arrived at Andrews Air Force Base the following morning. The Admiral flew by helicopter to the Pentagon where he attended the Chairman's morning briefing and met with several military and government officials throughout the day. That evening, Admiral Weisner had dinner with Admiral Holloway, and attended the Navy Relief Ball at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

On 11 December Admiral Weisner met with General Brown and Mr. George Vest. That evening, he and Mrs. Weisner attended a dinner at the White House hosted by President and Mrs. Ford. On 12 December Admiral Weisner was the guest of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements at a Hunt Breakfast in Middleburgh, VA.

(U) Daedalians Speech, 14 December: Admiral Weisner addressed a dinner of the Daedalian Society.

Distinguished Visitors to the Command

(U) Distinguished visitors during 1976 included:

6-7 January: Mr. John A. Goldsmith, professional staff delegate to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

9-10 January: VADM Paul Kaufman, Deputy, Joint Strategic Planning Staff.

12 January: RADM Emile Chaline, Naval Attaché to the French Ambassador to the United States.

15 January: MAJ GEN Senjiro Nakajima, Chief J-3, Joint Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency.

17 January: Martin Hoffmann, Secretary of the Army.

26 January: Mr. Takuya Kubo, Vice Minister, Japan Defense Agency.

27 January: MAJ GEN Peter Falkland, designated head of the Australian Defence Staff.

29 January: LT GEN Walter T. Galligan, USAF, COMUS Japan.

29 January: MAJ GEN Thomas U. Greer, Commander, U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii.

30 January: RADM W.D. Robertson, Jr., Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.

2 February: Mr. Kohno and Admiral Ishida (JSDF, Ret.) of Shin Meiwa Industries in Japan.

5 February: Mr. John P. Constandy, Deputy Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, U.S. Department of State.

11 February: Mr. Yosigai of the U.S. Civil Service Commission.

12 February: LT GEN James F. Hollingsworth, USA, CG, I Corps Group.

4 March: Ambassador Nicholas Parkinson, Australian Ambassador to the United States.

4 March: VADM D.J. Murphy, USN, Director, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Ocean Surveillance Programs.

4 March: Former Republic of China Consul General Te-chieh Poo and the new Consul General, Hoh-tu Liu.

8 March: Japanese Counsul General Takaaki Hasegawa.

26 March: William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.

29 March: Dr. Don Jackson, Chief, National Security Agency Operations Group B.

29 March: RADM Neil Deitrich.

30 March: Mr. James Grooms, Special Consultant to the Director, National Security Agency.

31 March: Mr. Thomas Street, Grumman Aircraft Corporation.

1 April: General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, CG, U.S. Army Forces Command.

5 April: BGEN W.E. Brown, Jr., USAF, Chief, Strategic Operations Division, J3, JCS.

6 April: Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Ret.), former CINCPAC.

17 April: LT GEN Vernon A. Walters, USA, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

19 April: Incoming Japanese Consul General Masao Tsukamoto.

20 April: Dr. Donald R. Cotter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy).

20 April: William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.

21 April: RADM/Baron Gerard deCastel Bajac, French Commander in Chief Pacific Nuclear Test Center and Naval Forces Pacific.

21 April: BGEN Paz, J2, Philippine Air Force.

23 April: A Congressional delegation headed by Congressman Melvin Price (D.-IL).

23-24 April: Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs.

28 April: U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand Armistead I. Selden, Jr.

29 April: Mrs. Alan M. Schanel, National President of the American Legion Ladies Auxiliary.

29 April: General Louis Wilson, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

29 April: A visiting delegation of members of the New Zealand Parliament.

29 April: Governor of Hawaii, George R. Ariyoshi.

30 April: Ambassador Thomas S. Gates, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, People's Republic of China.

10 May: LT GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army.

10 May: Tongan Crown Prince Tupouto'a.

12 May: VADM Hoshinn and VADM Fukuchi, Japanese Imperial Navy (Ret.).

20 May: Mr. Charles T. Cross, Consul General, Hong Kong.

28 May: Elliott L. Richardson, U.S. Secretary of Commerce.

29 May: General Paul K. Carlton, Commander, Military Airlift Command.

1 June: Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D.-HI).

1 June: LT GEN Devol Brett, Chief, U.S. Element CENTO.

2 June: RADM Julian Lake, Commander, Naval Electronic Warfare Systems Command.

2 June: Mr. Richard Peters, Inspector General, Department of State.

3 June: RADM Donald Shelton, USN, DOD Representative to U.S.-Philippine base negotiations.

4 June: MAJ GEN Slade Nash, departing Chief MAAG, Republic of China.

8 June: COL Winston Choo, Director, General Staff, Singapore Armed Forces.

8 June: COL Patrick Sim, Director, Command and Staff College, Singapore.

8 June: Dr. Anthony Cardinale, Director of Overseas Dependent Education, and Dr. Edward Killin, Director, DOD Dependent Schools, Pacific Region.

9 June: Mr. Donald Brotzman, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

21 June: LT GEN W.W. Marshall, USAF, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command.

22 June: Mr. John McLeay, Minister of Construction, Australia.

24 June: Mr. Robert Flanegin, incoming Chargé D'Affaires, Fiji.

24 June: Mr. Benjamin A. Fleck, State Department Deputy Country Director, Philippines.

13 July: Sir Thomas Skinner, President, New Zealand Federation of Labor.

15 July: Professor Harry Rowan, Stanford School of Business.

15 July: Mr. Forster, Assistant Deputy Director for East Asia, U.S. Information Agency.

27 July: Richard Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to Korea.

13 August: Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D.-HI).

20 August: General Omar Bradley, General of the Army.

27-30 August: Mr. William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense.

29 September: Mr. William McMenamin, Deputy Chief, International Press Service.

5 October: Admiral Hiroichi Samejima, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency.

3 December: Philippine General Romeo C. Espino, Co-chairman, Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board.

21 December: Mrs. Norma Brown, President of the American Legion Ladies Auxiliary.

Press Conferences and Media Representative Visitors

(U) The following list reflects press conferences and visits by media representatives to Admirals Gayler and Weisner during 1976.

26 January: Mr. Rowland Evans, syndicated columnist for the Washington Post.

10 March: Mr. Phil Gialanella, Publisher; and Mr. John Simonds, Managing Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

13 March: Mr. Robert Miller, United Press International.

18 March: Admiral Gayler held a press conference at his Camp Smith Headquarters to discuss current events in the Pacific with representatives of the local media.

26 April: Admiral Gayler was interviewed by SSG Norman J. Oliver, CINCPAC J003-742 Media Supervisor, on behalf of the Pacific Stars and Stripes; the article was published on 18 May.

11 May: Admiral Gayler was interviewed by Mr. Robert Miller, United Press International.

14 May: Mrs. Dorothy Moses, New Zealand free-lance writer.

18 June: The editors of the Reader's Digest.

19 June: Television interview with Mr. Kim of the Korean Broadcasting System.

22 June: Ms. Karen Ahn, KITV Television, Honolulu.

23 June: Mr. John Given, Honolulu Advertiser.

24 June: Mr. Pete Pepper, KHON Television, Honolulu.

28 June: Mr. Bud Smyser and Mr. Lyle Nelson, Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

1 July: Admiral Gayler went to the studios of KGMB-TV in Honolulu where he was interviewed by Bob Sevey and Bob Jones on the public affairs program Camera Nine. The program was aired over that station on 4 July.

14 July: Mr. Bob Barr, Associated Press.

SECTION II--LEGAL ACTIVITIES

Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica

(U) On 10 September 1976 the Commander U.S. Naval Support Force, Antarctica (COMNAVSUPPFOR Antarctica) sent a letter to CINCPAC requesting assistance in efforts to gain strong DOD support for early enactment of legislation extending criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals in Antarctica. The letter pointed out that while the Uniform Code of Military Justice served to hold U.S. military personnel accountable for criminal conduct in Antarctica, the U.S. Supreme Court had consistently held that the Code did not apply to civilians during times of peace, even when such civilians accompanied U.S. Forces to overseas areas. Therefore, no clear basis existed for asserting legal authority over civilian participants in the U.S. Antarctic Program. No Federal statute, principle of common law, or international treaty or convention currently existed which would adequately hold U.S. civilian personnel in the Antarctic Program accountable for conduct which would otherwise be considered criminal. In recognition of this problem, an interagency effort in the late 1960's and early 1970's produced draft remedial legislation designed to amend Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The proposed legislation, initially numbered H.R. 5248, provided that U.S. nationals and certain specified foreign nationals committing a criminal act or omission would be held accountable as if they were subject to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The measure was renumbered H.R. 10548 and subsequently referred to the House Judiciary Committee on 4 November 1975. On 8 November 1976 CINCPAC endorsed the COMNAVSUPPFOR Antarctica letter to the Chairman, JCS, strongly recommending that JCS coordinate efforts with DOD and the Department of State to support early passage of H.R. 10548. The JCS responded that the legislative package had been endorsed to the Office of General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, with a request that the JCS be given an opportunity to comment on the legislative proposal when it was next introduced. The JCS said they would work to ensure that a favorable endorsement was obtained on the new legislative package.[1]

Publication of International Agreements with Japan

(C) At the 8 April meeting of the Joint Committee, Japanese representatives made a formal statement expressing disapproval of the release and publication

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1. COMNAVSUPPFOR Antarctica ltr of 10 Sep 76 with 3 endorsements, Subj: Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica; proposed Federal legislation concerning; J73/Memo/379-76 of 4 Nov 76, Subj: Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica; proposed Federal legislation concerning; JCS/Memo of 24 Nov 76, Subj: Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica; proposed Federal legislation concerning.

of an Air Traffic Control Agreement concluded in the Joint Committee in 1975. The agreement had been transmitted through DOD channels to the Department of State and submitted to Congress for review in compliance with the Case Act. The procedure was apparently published in the Federal Register, as is customary, and thus became public knowledge to the Japanese. In 1960 both governments agreed that all minutes and attached documents (including agreements) resulting from Joint Committee proceedings would be held confidential and not publicly released without prior mutual agreement. The Japanese feared that public knowledge of U.S. compliance with the Case Act would jeopardize their long-standing basis for refusal to submit agreements to the Diet. This knowledge could force them to release a number of sensitive understandings of a special nature which would be "politically explosive." The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo had requested guidance from the Department of State. The CINCPAC Judge Advocate also discussed the matter with the DOD General Counsel and U.S. Forces Japan Staff Judge Advocate to explore possible solutions.[1]

Executive Order Concerning Treaties

(U) During 1976 the Secretary of State proposed that the President sign an Executive Order pertaining to "Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States," which would require State Department approval before negotiating any international agreement, including arrangements between U.S. and foreign military services. CINCPAC noted, in an August 1976 message to the JCS, that operations in PACOM would be slowed considerably if the military had to obtain approval to negotiate the many routine working arrangements between the U.S. military and foreign governments.[2]

Dissident and Protest Activities

(U) On 28 April 1976 Judge Samuel King of the U.S. District Court of Hawaii orally announced findings in Butler vs Paxton. The suit was brought by 10 civilians against Colonel Paxton, 15th Air Base Wing Commander, and other military personnel for preventing the plaintiffs from entering Hickam AFB in 1972 for the purpose of a protest demonstration during the arrival of President Nixon and the Prime Minister of Japan. Judge King found that since the base was opened to the public for the day, the discriminatory exclusion of the plaintiffs from the base violated their Constitutional rights. The judge found the plaintiffs were damaged in the amount of $7,000 but did not award the damages because he found the defendants acted in good faith, with probable cause, and were thus immune. If the decision were appealed and the appellate court did not uphold the finding of immunity, the plaintiffs could still

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1. J73 WEB 19-25 Apr 76.
2. JCS 192146Z Aug 76, and 201548Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 262359Z Aug 76.

collect the damages in the future. The CINCPAC Judge Advocate noted that this case had implications which should be considered in similar situations in the future, such as the 1976 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting.[1]

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI) Residual Legal Functions

(U) The Commander, USMACTHAI anticipated that there would be no military support activities in Thailand after 20 July 1976; therefore, he established a holding detachment to which personnel with pending foreign criminal jurisdiction (FCJ) actions were attached. These personnel were assigned to units outside Thailand in order to avoid the residual Military Advisory Group manpower ceiling. Court-martial jurisdiction and claims authority for the Army in Thailand was assumed by U.S. Army Japan, for the Air Force by 13th Air Force, and for the Navy by Navy Legal Service Office, Subic Bay, Philippines. Administrative support for the 15 FCJ cases remaining in May 1976 was provided by the MACTHAI residual force. In reply to a COMUSMACTHAI inquiry on funds from each Service to support FCJ activities, Department of the Army replied that no special arrangements would be made. Normal procedures as provided in AR 27-50/SECNAVINST 5820/AFR 110-12 would be followed. Navy and Air Force concurred in that position.[2]

Legal Opinions

Disclosure of Information Concerning Nuclear Weapons

(U) On 31 March 1976, in response to the question of CINCPAC's discussing nuclear weapons information with the Governor of Hawaii, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) advised that the Atomic Energy Act of 1957 did not establish the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons. It was very restrictive, however, on the disclosure of classified information. The Act subjected a person to a fine of up to $2,500 for disclosure of restricted data to unauthorized personnel, and there was no authorization to disclose restricted data to the governor of a state except in emergency situations.[3]

International Law Concerning Visits of Warships to Foreign Ports

(U) On 6 April 1976, in response to a Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate inquiry as to whether the Government of New Zealand could inspect

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1. J73 WEB 3-9 May 76.
2. MACTHAI 210849Z May 76, 240356Z May 76, and 260940Z May 76; DA 262123Z May 76; CINCPAC 290222Z May 76.
3. J73/Memo/113-76 of 31 Mar 76, Subj: Disclosure of Information Concerning Nuclear Weapons.

U.S. naval vessels in New Zealand ports, the SJA replied that U.S. warships must respect New Zealand law concerning sanitation, but they were not subject to inspection. The only recourse available to New Zealand was to expel the ships from its harbors for any violations of the laws.[1]

Memorandum of Agreement for Exchange of Intelligence Officers

(U) On 19 May 1976 the SJA concurred in a proposed memorandum of agreement for the exchange of intelligence officers with Australia and New Zealand, but pointed out that the status of forces agreements were not reciprocal. Therefore, the Australian and New Zealand officers would be subjected to Federal and state laws in the United States.[2]

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction (FCJ)

PACOM FCJ Confinement Statistics

(U) The following is a breakout of U.S. personnel in post-trial confinement in foreign penal institutions in the PACOM as of 29 February 1976:[3]

Country	Air Force	Army	Navy	Total
Australia		1		1
Japan	18	19	90	127
Korea		10		10
Taiwan	3		3	6
Thailand	3	3		6
Total	24	33	93	150

(U) The CINCPAC percentage of the worldwide total personnel confined as of 29 February 1976 (300) was 50 percent, no change from 31 August 1975.[4]

Philippines Tax Case Against Local Hire U.S. Citizens[5]

(U) In May 1973 eleven U.S. national employees of the U.S. Navy at Subic Bay were tried and found guilty of violating the Philippine National Internal Revenue Code for failure to file income tax returns for the year 1969. The

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1. J73/Memo/120-76 of 6 Apr 76, Subj: International Law Concerning Visits of Warships to Foreign Ports.
2. J73/Memo/173-76 of 19 May 76, Subj: Memorandum of Agreement for Exchange of Intelligence Officers.
3. CINCPAC SJA Newsletter (1-76) of 19 Apr 76.
4. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 739.
5. J731 HistSum Dec 76.

U.S. Embassy, through diplomatic channels, expressed the U.S. Government's position that under Article XII, paragraph 2, of the U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement, the defendants were exempt from paying income tax on their U.S. salaries, as well as filing tax returns. This article provided that:

> No national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines by reason only of such employment, or his spouse and minor children and dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines except in respect to income derived from Philippine sources or sources other than the United States sources.

(C) Attempts at appeal by the defendents failed, and the court decision became final in August 1976 when the Supreme Court refused to entertain a plea to file a motion for reconsideration.

(C) After the criminal conviction, the Philippine Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed back taxes against the defendants. The defendants contested the assessment and the issue was referred to a civil tax court. The first hearing was set for 20 September 1976 in Quezon City where the defendants were represented by an attorney from the Navy Legal Service Office at Subic Bay.

(C) When the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered, diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue were intensified. The United States Embassy in Manila sent another note to the Philippine Foreign Office requesting consultation concerning the matter. Previous notes of 6 December 1975 and 16 September 1975 on the same subject had been unanswered. The tax case was also discussed in the Legal Affairs Committee of the Mutual Defense Board but the participants did not reach a satisfactory conclusion.

(C) On 25 September 1976 the State Department expressed its concern with the ramifications of both the criminal and civil cases. It was viewed that this represented a unilateral interpretation of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement by the Government of the Philippines, as well as an erosion of the general principle that one government should not tax income of another government's citizen-employees. This was particularly significant in view of the recently concluded Taxation Convention which provided in Article 20 for exemption from taxes by the Philippines of wages and salaries of U.S. citizen employees of U.S. Government agencies. Because a number of other DOD employees could be subject to similar suits, the State Department recommended serious

consideration of a high-level diplomatic effort, such as a personal approach by the Ambassador.

(C) On 5 October 1976 members of the Legal Affairs Committee met with the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Efren Plana, to discuss the tax case. Commissioner Plana took the position that he was bound by the Supreme Court decision in the criminal case to the effect that the defendants must pay their fine and further, that the criminal case would bind the decision of the tax court. Commissioner Plana appeared sympathetic to the problem and interested in exploring a solution. He indicated that he would discuss the matter with the Department of Foreign Affairs. At the meeting, Attorney Firmacion of the Olongapo Bureau of Internal Revenue, the instigator of the initial charges, suggested that a Presidential decree exempting the defendants would settle the entire matter. At the end of the year, however, the problem was still unsettled and the defendants were under the ominous cloud of a criminal conviction and pending civil suits.

Thailand FCJ Cases

Cases Involving Performance of Official Duty

(C) During 1976 there were four cases in Thailand involving the performance of official duty which came to the attention of the CINCPAC SJA. In an injury case involving Sergeant Michael L. Dichazi, Jr., USAF, the local Thai authorities decided not to prosecute. The case was officially closed on 4 February 1976 and Sergeant Dichazi was transferred from Thailand to preclude further involvement. In an accident case resulting in the deaths of two Thai nationals in February 1976, Specialist Five John Brehm, USA, was removed from Thailand, based on State Department instructions, in the face of possible prosecution. In an accident case resulting in the death of a Thai national in September 1975, Sergeant Paul Behrendt, USAF, was removed from Thailand on 25 March 1976, with State Department permission, in the face of impending prosecution. On 25 August 1976 Staff Sergeant William L. Turner, USA, who had been convicted on 22 May 1975 of causing death without intent for killing a Thai national, departed Thailand. Staff Sergeant Turner was originally sentenced to confinement for six years. This was reduced to four years and, on 23 August 1976, he was released from prison based on a royal pardon granted by His Majesty the King of Thailand. Since Staff Sergeant Turner's confinement was considered as not due to his own misconduct, the Secretary of the Army, in August 1976, approved a waiver of Rule 6, Table 1-3-3, paragraph 10314, DOD Pay Manual, which retroactively entitled him to all pay and allowances during his incarceration.[1]

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1. J73 HistSums Feb-Mar and Dec 76.

Residual Cases

(C) On 1 April 1976 American Embassy Bangkok proposed that the remaining FCJ cases in Thailand be handled in accordance with regular procedures with no unusual actions taken to obtain a release of the cases. The Departments of State and Defense concurred in this position. On 2 May 1976 the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force pointed out the problems that would be involved if the FCJ continued in Thailand, and noted that disposition of recent cases and discussions with personnel stationed in Thailand indicated that Thai officials were amenable to a speedy resolution of the cases. As a result of this view, CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC to seek the Embassy's concurrence to permit an early termination of the cases. CINCPAC supported the Air Force position, pointing out that the accused would be a burden on reduced U.S. military support personnel, be a possible irritant to the U.S. and Thai Governments, and pose a possibility of further involvement in international incidents. Therefore, CINCPAC requested that the Departments of State and Defense reconsider their decision to take no action for control of the FCJ cases. On 8 June 1976 Ambassador Whitehouse and Brigadier General Aderholt decided to withdraw from Thailand all military personnel pending FCJ who were not confined. Although the action was not coordinated with the Royal Thai Government (RTG), the Ambassador and COMUSMACTHAI were confident that there would not be a strong adverse RTG reaction to this move.[1]

Offshore Fishing Rights

(U) On 13 April 1976 President Ford signed the bill extending American control of fishing rights from 12 to 200 miles offshore. The law was to go into effect on 1 March 1977.[2]

Seventh Annual South Pacific Forum

(C) The Seventh Annual South Pacific Forum met on Nauru from 26 to 28 July 1976. The forum was composed of representatives from nine South Pacific islands to include New Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Cook Islands, Western Samoa, Tonga, and Niue. Unlike previous meetings this session produced considerable agreement and a formal declaration on law of the sea was issued. The declaration assumed that 200 mile exclusive economic zones would be established in the near future whether the LOS conference succeeded or

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 7994/010410Z Apr 76; SECSTATE 081254/1/040156Z Apr 76; CSAF 211945Z May 76; CINCPACAF 221925Z May 76; CINCPAC 290101Z May 76; USMACTHAI 081045Z Jun 76.
2. J73 WEB 12-18 Jan 76; CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. II, p. 760.

failed. The representatives pledged to avoid decisions which could benefit one or more members only, at the expense of the others and of the region as a whole.[1]

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1. J73 WEB 2-8 Aug 76.

SECTION III--MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

Plans for Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC), Hawaii

(U) Tripler Army Medical Center was an installation under the U.S. Army Health Services Command (HSC), Fort Sam Houston, TX. In December 1975, in conjunction with Program Budget Decision (PBD) 253, HSC was tasked by the Army Surgeon General to provide a time-phased transfer plan of TAMC to the U.S. Navy by January 1976. CINCPAC expressed concern regarding the failure to solicit his views on the transfer, and the JCS remarked that that portion of the PBD concerning TAMC was not staffed through them either. On 26 January 1976 the JCS further advised that, after careful reassessment, the Secretary of the Army concluded that it would be inappropriate to transfer TAMC to the Navy and the subject was dropped. Important considerations affecting the reassessment centered on the TAMC paramount mission to support WESTPAC contingencies, which included a medical teaching program and medical service sponsorship to the 25th Infantry Division.[1]

(U) On 10 February 1976 the Secretary of Defense tasked the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan within 90 days for an Army-operated tri-Service staffed TAMC. CINCPAC was among those with which the plan was to be coordinated prior to being presented to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment) for evaluation. The plan developed provided:[2]

- No change in patient care.
- Tri-Service staffing of professional medical and graduate medical education spaces only.
- Retention as Army spaces all command and control elements, administrative and logistical functions, veterinary, health and environment activities, and all civilian spaces.

(U) The Air Force indicated basic agreement with the Army concept, but the Navy wanted rotation of command and control authority among the Services. CINCPAC voiced reservations regarding any disruptive reorganization. He noted the outstanding patient care currently provided by Tripler and considered that

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1. JCS 5876/122119Z Jan 76 and 8173/261356Z Jan 76; CDRUSACSG 030252Z Jan 76.
2. SECDEF/Memo of 10 Feb 76, Subj: Staffing of Tripler Army Medical Center with Army, Navy, and Air Force Personnel; J76/Memo/97-76 of 27 May 76, Subj: Tri-Service Staffing of Tripler Army Medical Center.

the Army-developed plan appeared to minimize the possibility of disruptive turbulence. He agreed with the plan in general and, more specifically, he supported Army retention of key command and control billets. CINCPAC further recommended that the plan be implemented on a trial basis only, with provision for periodic evaluation.[1]

PACOM C-9 Aeromedical Airlift

(U) On 6 March 1976 CINCPAC expressed his concern to the JCS over a new MAC aeromedical evacuation schedule effective in PACOM 1 March 1976, about which he had not received adequate prior notice. The new schedule, which was viewed as degrading PACOM medical service for military personnel and dependents, was the direct result of withdrawal to CONUS of one C-9A aeromedical evacuation aircraft from the PACOM fleet of four. CINCPAC requested delay in withdrawal of the one C-9A, while the CINCPAC Surgeon reviewed the new schedule for adequacy. The Surgeon's review ultimately resulted in a completely revised definite schedule for PACOM-wide aeromedical evacuation, including the PLP 551 Travis-Clark mission segment effective 6 October 1976, thus relieving the deficiencies caused by the MAC change.[2]

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1. J76/Memo/97-76 of 27 May 76, Subj: Tri-Service Staffing of Tripler Army Medical Center; CINCPAC 020354Z Jun 76.
2. CINCPAC 280207Z Feb 76, 060325Z Mar 76, 120059Z Mar 76, and 250105Z Jun 76; CINCPACAF 130040Z Feb 76, 270200Z Feb 76, 030102Z Mar 76, 301916Z Mar 76, and 120210Z Jun 76; MAC 281755Z Feb 76 and 221630Z Sep 76.

SECTION IV--RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OFFICE ACTIVITIES

Operations Research/Systems Analysis in the PACOM

(U) In October 1976 the Systems Analysis Society of the Republic of China and Tamkang College hosted an Asian conference dealing with Operations Research/Systems Analysis (OR/SA) topics. Over 100 specialists in this field from Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States attended. This was the first time that OR/SA people from industrial and defense establishments in the Pacific all came together to discuss OR/SA methodology as applied to their common problems. Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer, the Chief of CINCPAC's Research and Analysis Office, was a keynote speaker. In anticipation of that event a memorandum to Admiral Weisner outlined the development of the OR/SA programs throughout the PACOM. A summary follows.[1]

(U) The Pacific Conference on Decision Analysis was a major milestone in a long and continuing program, supported by the Research and Analysis Office, for Asian allies to become self-sufficient and self-confident in analytical skills and capabilities that were applicable to defense planning and procurement problems. When Mr. Linsenmeyer joined the CINCPAC staff (on 31 October 1960, the first civilian employed by PACOM headquarters), he had already been working in this field as a member of CINCPACFLT's staff in coordination with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. Development of an OR/SA capability was subsequently expanded to include the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces. In 1966 he gave a series of lectures in the Joint Staff Office on the subject of military OR that resulted in establishment of a joint service analysis group. A Japanese Operations Research Society, bringing together defense and industrially oriented specialists, was established in the late 1960's. PACOM headquarters had continued to work with the Japanese OR/SA community, most recently in the KEEN STANDARDS and KEEN WAVE studies.

(U) Until 1969 Korea had no organized OR/SA program in their services or joint staff. They had a scattered cadre of people trained in OR/SA who began to promote the use of analytical methods in defense planning. With extensive support from CINCPAC and COMUS Korea, the Koreans had come to have OR/SA groups in their Service headquarters, on the joint staff, and in the Ministry of National Defense. In 1974 they established the Korean Military Operations Research Society.

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1. J021/Memo/239-76, 15 Sep 76, Subj: The Pacific Conference on Decision Analysis.

(U) Mr. Linsenmeyer had been invited to the Republic of China in 1970 to conduct a seminar on military OR for the Ministry of National Defense. Subsequently, an OR/SA adviser was attached to the MAAG staff and an analysis group was formed in the Plans section of the Ministry. This was followed by OR/SA teams in Service headquarters and the Combined Service Force. Tamkang College established a graduate program in OR/SA for military and civilians, using, in part, faculty members from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (at Monterey, CA) on leave of absence or sabbatical to enlarge the instructor staff in a program arranged by CINCPAC's Research and Analysis Office. In 1974 the Chinese had established the Systems Analysis Society of the Republic of China with headquarters at Tamkang.

(U) The Indonesians had observed the growth of OR/SA in China and in 1973 decided that they too would like to develop an analysis capability. With PACOM headquarters assistance an OR/SA adviser was attached to the staff of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group. The Indonesians had been slower to develop than the other countries, but small groups in the Indonesian Navy and Department of Defense and Security had been started.

(U) Thailand had a modest OR/SA program in 1975 when the OR/SA advisory billet was eliminated with other force reductions. Considerable training effort had been expended in preceding years; it was not known how well the program was faring.

(U) While there had been strong U.S./CINCPAC bond and involvement with those country groups, there had been little cross-talk among the Asian analysts and countries involved. The October conference was significant because it opened that dialogue.

(U) The basis for a continuing exchange of ideas was established, with Korea expressing an interest in hosting a similar conference in 1977. The Operations Research Society of Thailand and the Asia Institute of Technology had scheduled a Pacific regional meeting in May 1978.[1]

Indian Ocean Undersea Surveillance Study

(S) With the expansion of the PACOM effective 1 May 1976 to 17°E from 62°E, CINCPAC requested that his Review and Analysis Office (subsequently retitled the Research and Analysis Office) investigate the existing PACOM capabilities to provide undersea surveillance in the Indian Ocean.

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1. Memorandum Trip Report, Taiwan and Korea, Director, Research and Analysis Office, 26 Oct 76.

(C) The performance of such systems in existence or that were coming into the inventory was projected into the physical and acoustical environment of the Indian Ocean. These systems were the Sound Surveillance Underwater System (SOSUS), the Towed Array Sensor System (TASS), and a system called Surveillance TASS (SURTASS), plus a Moored Surveillance System (MSS). New systems, SPRAY and IOTA, were also examined regarding their estimated and projected acoustic and operational performance. All systems were compared. A TASSRAP computer output of Fleet Numerical Weather Central in Monterey, CA, which predicted the detection performance for the TASS throughout the Indian Ocean, was used as a baseline. Other outputs were compared and plotted to determine the coverage by various surveillance systems against submarine targets.

(S) The study findings indicated that programmed systems fell extremely short of a reasonable capability to provide adequate coverage in the area. Supplementary systems, specifically two forms of air-deployable acoustic arrays, were found to be effective in filling the deficiency if they were developed and introduced.

(C) Although the study had not been completed and released by the end of 1976 it was believed that in effect it had already served its purpose. The main thrust of the document had been to encourage the development and deployment of an air-droppable array capability to reduce the undersea surveillance deficiency, particularly in the Indian Ocean. A funded Air Deployable Array System development program had been established at the Naval Air Development Center under the sponsorship of the Naval Air Systems Command.[1]

Control of Lava Flow

(U) As explained in the 1975 CINCPAC Command History, military assistance might be sought to disrupt lava flow on the Island of Hawaii in the event a volcano eruption should threaten the city of Hilo. A report on activities in that regard for 1976 follows, summarizing the findings of a November technical conference. CINCPAC's Research and Analysis Office had provided primary technical coordination and CINCPAC's Special Operations Division in the Operations Directorate was action office where the use of PACOM resources might be required. The office worked closely with the State of Hawaii Director of Civil Defense; PACAF; the Army Corps of Engineers, Pacific Division; and the Volcano Observatory of the U.S. Geological Survey.

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1. J775 HistSum Dec 76; the Study, dated 30 Sep 76, was published as Research and Analysis Office Working Paper No. 4-76, Subj: CINCPAC Indian Ocean Undersea Surveillance Study (U), distributed 13 Jun 77.

(U) Bombing tests had been reasonably successful except for certain targets that contained harder, more dense, lava and resulted in impact pre-detonation of delayed action bombs. The Army had found that hand-emplaced XM-180 explosive cratering devices might be modified for use on certain targets, provided that personnel and explosives could be used in the "rough terrain, high temperature environment."

(U) The diversion techniques under consideration were believed to be a combination of disruption of lava supply channels, spatter cones, and lava tubes using bombs and military explosives; diversion of lava by construction barriers; and diversion and cooling of molten lava by using large amounts of water from the ocean or from nearby streams. The principal focus remained on the first two methods.

(U) In a series of three tests, PACAF had expended 22 MK82 (500-pound) and 14 MK84 (2,000-pound) bombs. They advised of the effects on spatter cones and lava tubes and channels, but noted that the properties of fresh hot lava were unknown and needed. They recommended further testing and the contingency storage of bombs on Oahu for lava control.

(U) The 25th Infantry Division concluded from their testing that, because of "optimizing of explosive effects and pin-point delivery accuracy, hand placement of explosives is considered a viable method for attempts at the control of laval flow." They acknowledged that rough terrain and high altitude might hamper hand-emplacement of explosives. In addition to technical recommendations regarding the design of the XM-180 explosive cratering device, they noted the need to "determine the ambient conditions surrounding hot lava." They believed it was necessary to determine the quality of heat insulation if needed for explosives or personnel; the physical properties and chemical composition of hot lava flows should be investigated, and, if it was possible, tests of explosive lava disruption methods under actual hot lava flow conditions would benefit the overall readiness of Army units.

(U) The Corps of Engineers outlined their barrier concepts as follows:[1]

- A hasty 2-3 mile ditch-mound about 10 feet high initially, and increased to 20 feet when possible, providing a barrier diverting lava flow to a cleared flow path south and east of Hilo to the sea.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 299-300; J774 HistSum Jan 77, which enclosed MFR of 10 Nov 76, Subj: Summary Report - Technical Conference on Control of Lava Flow.

- Located far enough away from eruption zone to allow maximum time for flow evaluation, decision, mobilization, and construction.

- Located away from urban area.

- Located above high rainfall belt, if possible, to facilitate rapid construction.

- Located where vehicle access is possible.

- Use historical flow data (velocity, depth, viscosity).

- Use heavy material for construction (local soil and heavy rock).

- Flow path located in undeveloped area along path of least resistance.

Further planning continued.

Redeployment Strategy Findings

(S) CINCPAC had long been on record questioning existing national level plans to redeploy certain PACOM forces to Europe in support of NATO under certain circumstances. (See discussions of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.) In November 1975 the Chief of Staff directed a study to assess the military implications of out-of-theater redeployment of selected PACOM forces to NATO in a worldwide conventional conflict with the USSR.

(S) The significant findings of the study, conducted by representatives of the Research and Analysis Office, the Plans Directorate, and the Stanford Research Institute, were as follows:[1]

The redeployment strategy:

- Imposed significant loss in total worldwide U.S. combat capability (in terms of CV/major surface combatant/ division days-in-theater) because of lengthy in-transit times required to redeploy forces to Europe.

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1. J773 HistSum Jan 77; CINCPAC Ltr Ser T12, 26 Jan 77.

- Degrades force ratios in the PACOM to a level which jeopardizes the survival of remaining U.S. Forces; improves force ratios in Europe only marginally and at a point which is too late to be decisive.

- Reduces forces in the PACOM to a level which provides no alternative other than U.S. accommodation to any strategy chosen by the USSR in the Pacific; increases USSR options for redeploying Soviet forces to Indian Ocean or Europe.

The study was forwarded to the JCS early in 1977.

Extension of Satellite Detection System to Hawaii

(U) The Navy/Air Force Satellite Detection System, Weapon System 434, was being upgraded and extended westward by adding a site on the Island of Maui in the State of Hawaii. The existing satellite fence consisted of a line of transmitter and receiver stations across the southern United States from Georgia to California. Representatives of the Naval Research Laboratory and the Army Engineers chose the Maui site, with the NRL leader subsequently briefing CINCPAC and component command staffs on site selection factors and improved capabilities of System 434 when the Maui station was completed.[1]

BALFRAM Seminar in Korea

(U) In August 1976 COMUS Korea had requested assistance in conducting a two-week seminar on the Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Method (BALFRAM) in support of military planning. The seminar was conducted from 1 to 24 November in Seoul by the Stanford Research Institute representative to CINCPAC under the sponsorship of the U.S.-Republic of Korea Operational Planning Staff of the United Nations Command-U.S. Forces Korea-Eighth U.S. Army. The seminar was divided into two classes, each of one-week duration, for the 15 U.S. and 23 ROK military and civilians who attended. A third week was spent in professional discussions on the use and application of BALFRAM with representatives of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services. COMUS Korea expressed his appreciation for the seminar.[2]

Service R&D Representatives to CINCPAC Staff

(U) In 1973 CINCPAC had first proposed that the PACOM (and Service components) play a larger role than before in "bridging the gap between

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1. J774 HistSum Jan 77.
2. J77 (SRI Rep) HistSum Jan 77; COMUS Korea 070809Z Dec 76.

real-world operational environment and the laboratories and development agencies." He had proposed that all Services send representation, but at that time only the Center for Naval Analyses had done so.[1]

(U) By mid-1975 that agency was no longer represented, but in August of that year a liaison representative of the U.S. Army's Systems Analysis Activity/ Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (AMSAA-JTCG/ME) began a one year tour, after which he was replaced by another representative of that agency. That representative was particularly interested in the lava control feasibility testing, described above, and certain other projects. Close Air Support aircraft for the Republic of Korea was one of these projects, and is discussed in the Security Assistance chapter of this history.

(U) One other program was the potential improvement of the U.S. combat helmet. The lightweight helmet developed by the Republic of Korea was studied and 50 helmets procured for study by U.S. agencies.[2]

(U) From 9 to 24 September members of the JTCG staff visited Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Hawaii to review systems analysis activities and capabilities.[3]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 38-39.
2. J77 HistSum Dec 76.
3. Ibid.

GLOSSARY

A

AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
AAFMPS	Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACFK	Alternate Command Facility, Kunia
ADC	Air Defense Center; Aerospace Defense Command
ADD	Agency for Defense Development
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADS	Automated Data Systems
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AFEM	Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
AFIS	Air Force Intelligence Service
AFIT	Air Force Institute of Technology
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
AIT	Ammunition in Thailand
ALCOP	Alternate Command Post
ALFA	Advanced Liaison Forward Area
AMPS	Automatic Mission Planning
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
AOB	Air Order of Battle
APPS	Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System
ASD(I&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIF	Airlift Service Industrial Fund
ASROC	Antisubmarine Rocket
ASSOTW	Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ASWEX	ASW Exercise
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network

B

BALFRAM	Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Method
BLA	Base Labor Agreement

C

C	Confidential
C^3	Command, Control, and Communications
CAT	Civil Action Team; Crisis Action Team
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CCK	Ching Chuan Kang (Air Base, Taiwan)
CCTL	CINCPAC Consolidated Target List
CCWT	Command Center Watch Team
CDRUSACSG	Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIL	Central Identification Laboratory
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief Europe
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCPACREPPHIL	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNTL	Command Nuclear Target List
COINS	Community On-line Intelligence Network System
COMAAC	Commander, Alaskan Air Command
COMIDEASTFOR	Commander, Middle East Force
COMMARCORBASEPAC	Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific
COMNAVSUPPFOR	Commander U.S. Naval Support Force
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMTHIRDFLT	Commander Third Fleet
COMUS	Commander, United States Forces
COMUS Japan	Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUS Korea	Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand
COMUSNAVPHIL	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines
COMUSSAG	Commander U.S. Support Activity Group
COMUSTDC	Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONAD	Continental Air Defense Command
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CPD	Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid)
CPLRI	Catalog of PACOM Logistics Rationalization Objectives

CPO	Civilian Personnel Office
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CROF	Consolidation and Reduction of Okinawa Facilities
CRT	Cathode-ray Tube
CS	Combat Support
CSG	CINCPAC Support Group; Combat Support Group
CSS	Combat Service Support
CT	Country Team; Communist Terrorist
CVAN	CINCPAC Voice Alert Network
CVO	Communications Validating Office

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attaché Office
DAST	Disaster Area Survey Team
DATT	Defense Attaché
DDI	Duty Director of Intelligence; Decisions and Design Incorporated
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DFAA	Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan)
DFR-PAC	Defense Fuel Region, Pacific
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAOLS	Defense Intelligence Agency On-Line System
DLSC	Defense Logistics Services Center
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DPS	Delegated Production System; Dynamic Planning System
DRCC	Disaster Relief Coordinating Center
DRIS	Defense Retail Interservice Support
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DYCIS	Dynamic Command Information System

E

E&ML	Environmental and Morale Leave
EALG	East Asia Liaison Group
EAP	Emergency Action Procedures
ECA	Executive Coordinating Agency

ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EDA	Excess Defense Articles (MAP)
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ERS	Emergency Relocation Site

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Agency; Foreign Assistance Appropriations; Foreign Assistance Act
FAISC	Fleet Auxiliary Intelligence Service Center
FBM	Fleet Ballistic Missile
FCC	Fleet Command Center
FCJ	Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
FDAA	Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
FDC	Forward Defense Concept
FIA	Freedom of Information Act
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FIP	Force Improvement Plan
FLEXRP	Flexible Reporting System
FLIR	Forward Looking Infrared Radar
FLSA	Fair Labor Standards Act
FLTSATCOM	Fleet Satellite Communications
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMS	Foreign Military Sales; Field Maintenance Squadron
FOCCPAC	Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific
FORSTAT	Force Status and Identity (Report)
FOSCI	Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center
FRD	Formerly Restricted Data
FRESH	Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii
FRETILIN	National Front for the Liberation of East Timor
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FX	Future Fighter
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GAO	General Accounting Office
GAPSAT	GAPFILLER Satellite
GCA	Ground Control Approach
GENSER	General Service (Electrical Transmission)
GFE	Gross Feasibility Estimator
GOA	Government of Australia
GOB	Ground Order of Battle
GOJ	Government of Japan

GOP	Government of the Philippines
GOS	Government of Singapore
GSA	General Services Administration

H

HAC	Hughes Aircraft Corporation
HF	High Frequency
HLH	Heavy Lift Helicopter
HRR	High Resolution Radar
HSC	Health Services Command
HSM	Hard Structure Munitions
HUMINT	Human Resources Intelligence
HULTEL	Hull-to-emitter Correlation

I

I&W	Indications and Warning
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IDHSC	Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Network
IEMATS	Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System
IFP	International Fellows Program
IHA	Indirect-hire Agreement
IJCS	Integrated Joint Communications System
IMETP	International Military Education & Training Program
IMM	Integrated Materiel Management
INDOCOM	Indonesia Communications Project
IOCTL	Indian Ocean Conventional Target List
IPAC	Intelligence Center Pacific
ISA	Interservice Support Agreement
ISS	Intelligence Support System; Interservice Support

J

JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JDO	Joint Duty Officer
JFAP	Japan Facilities Adjustment Program
JFY	Japan Fiscal Year
JISB	Joint Interservice Support Board

JLAC	Joint Labor Affairs Committee
JLPC	Joint Labor Policy Committee (PACOM)
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JPO	Joint Petroleum Office
JSA	Joint Security Area
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JTC	Joint Targeting Committee
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

K

KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to United States Army
KCDF	Korean Correlation and Sensor Direction Facility
KFCP	Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Program
KMR	Kapalama Military Reservation; Kwajalein Missile Range
KPA	Korean People's Army
KPCP	Kanto Plains Consolidation Plan
KSC	Korean Service Corps
KTMI	Korea Tacoma Marine Industries

L

LAADS	Low Altitude Aircraft Detection System
LAMPS	Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LASS	Lockheed Air Service, Singapore
LGB	Laser Guided Bomb
LN	Local National; Liaison
LNO	Limited Nuclear Option; Liaison Officer
LOA	Letter of Offer/Acceptance
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
LRMP	Long-Range Maritime Patrol

M

MAC	Military Airlift Command; Military Armistice Commission
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPEX	MAP Excess Program
MARISAT	Maritime Satellite
MBA	Military Bases Agreement
MC	Marine Corps; Munitions Control
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCI	Military Customs Inspector
MDB	Mutual Defense Board
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MEECN	Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MIA	Missing in Action
MIDEASTFOR	Middle East Force
MILAD	Military Advisor
MILADREP	Military Advisor's Representative
MILPRO-HI	Military Real Property Requirements-Hawaii
MIMEX	Major Item Excess Program
MIP	Material Improvement Program (Project); Management Improvement Plan
MME	Military Message Experiment
MOB	Missile Order of Battle
MOD	Ministry of Defense; Modernization
MOP	Message Output Processor
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOVRP	Movement Reports
MPC	Mobile Processing Center; Military Payment Certificate
MPO	Military Planning Office
MSAP	Military Security Assistance Projections
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSS	Moored Surveillance System
MTAT	Management Training Assistance Team
MTT	Mobile Training Team

N

NAMRU	Naval Medical Research Unit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCAMSEASTPAC	Naval Communication Area Master Station Eastern Pacific
NAVCOMMSTA	Naval Communication Station
NCA	National Command Authority
NCPAC	National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific
NEA	Northeast Asia

NEMVAC	Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation
NIS	National Intelligence Survey; Naval Investigative Service
NKTTL	North Korean Tactical Target List
NOB	Naval Order of Battle
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NPW	Nuclear-powered Warship
NRL	Naval Research Laboratory
NWSS	Navy WWMCCS Software Standardized

O

O&M	Operations and Maintenance
O&MN	Operations and Maintenance Navy
OASD(ISA)	Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
OBCP	Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan
ODRI	Office of the Defense Representative India
OODE	Office of Overseas Dependent Education
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPDS	Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPPA	Operation Plan Package Appraisal
OPR	Outstanding Performance Rating
OPREP	Operational Report
OPSCOMM	Operations Communications
OPSEC	Operations Security
OR/SA	Operations Research/Systems Analysis
OSI	Offshore Islands; Office of Special Investigations
OSIS	Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System
OSL	Overseas Limited Appointments
OSPJ	Offshore Procurement-Japan
OSS	Ocean Surface Surveillance

P

P&A	Price and Availability
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT	U.S. Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAF	Philippine Air Force; Pakistan Air Force
PAL	Permissive Action Link; Parcel Airlift; Price and Availability List

PAMIS	PSYOP Automated Management Information System
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PASOLS	Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar
PATMRG	PACOM Target Materials Review Group
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PC	Philippine Constabulary
PCH&T	Packing, Crating, Handling, and Transportation
PCS	Permanent Change of Station; Postal Courier Service
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum; Programmed Depot Maintenance
PDSC	PACOM Data Systems Center
PEB	Pre-Engineered Buildings
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PGM	Precision Guided Missiles
PIROP	PACOM Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives Program
PNG	Papua New Guinea
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum (MAP); Preparation for Overseas Movement (Units)
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
POW	Prisoner of War
PPDB	Point Positioning Data Base
PPGM	Planning Programming and Guidance Memorandum
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSMM	Patrol Ship Multi-Mission
PSYOP	Phychological Operations
PWG	Permanent Working Group
PWRMS	Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stocks
PWRS	Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks

R

R&D	Research and Development
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RADC	Rome Air Development Center
RCA	Riot Control Agent
RECA	Residual Capabilities Assessment
RIF	Reduction in Force
RNO	Regional Nuclear Options
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan); Required Operational Capability
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
RP	Republic of the Philippines; Release Point; Restoration Priority

RS	Relocatable Structures
RSAF	Republic of Singapore Air Force
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTG	Royal Thai Government; Reconnaissance Technical Group
RWR	Radar Warning Receivers

S

S	Secret
SA	Security Assistance
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Command Europe
SAFASIA	Security Assistance Force Asia
SAG	Systems Architectural Group
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCC	Security Consultative Committee (Japan); Space Computational Center
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting (Korea)
SDP	Sub-network Development Plan
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SE/SI	System Engineering/System Integration
SHF	Super High Frequency
SI	Special Intelligence
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SI/SAO	Special Intelligence/Special Activities Office
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SKCATL	South Korean Conventional Air Target List
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
SLOC	Sea Line of Communication
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOSUS	Sound Surveillance Underwater System
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSA	Security Support Arrangement
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSO	Special Security Office
ST	Short Tons
SURTASS	Surveillance TASS
SW	Special Weapons
SZG	Sub-Zone Group

T

TACAMO	Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TAD	Temporary Additional Duty
TAF	Tactical Air Forces
TAG	Target Action Group
TAMC	Tripler Army Medical Center
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command
TDCATL	Taiwan Defense Conventional Air Target List
TASS	Tactical Air Support Squadron; Towed Array Sensor System
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEREC	Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TI/TTM	Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Material
TLRG	Target List Review Group
TOR	Terms of Reference; Tactical Operations Room
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TRAM	Target Recognition Attack Multisensor
TS	Top Secret
TSP	Test Support Position
TSR	Telecommunications Service Request; Theater Sustaining Rate
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
TTY	Teletype

U

U	Unclassified
UCP	Unified Command Plan
U.N.	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
USACC-T	U.S. Army Communications Command-Taiwan
USAF	United States Air Force
USARJ	U.S. Army, Japan
USCINCEUR	U.S. Commander in Chief Europe
USCS	U.S. Customs Service
USCSB	U.S. Communications Security Board
USDAO	U.S. Defense Attaché Office
USDLG	U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USF	U.S. Forces
USFJ	U.S. Forces, Japan

USFK	U.S. Forces, Korea
USIB	U.S. Intelligence Board
USMACTHAI	U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand
USMILADREP	U.S. Military Advisor's Representative
USN	U.S. Navy
USREDCOM	U.S. Readiness Command
UTTAS	Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
UW	Unconventional Warfare

W

WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WICS	Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems
WRM	War Reserve Materiel
WRSA	War Reserve Stocks for Allies
WWABNCP	Worldwide Airborne Command Post
WWMCCS	Worlwide Military Command and Control System

INDEX

(U) Volumes I and II are integrated in this index. Annexes to the CINCPAC History are not included as each contains its own index. The volumes are paged consecutively. Volume I contains Chapters I-VI, pages 1-276. Volume II contains Chapters VII-XI, pages 277-520, and the glossary. The roman numeral following the subject denotes the volume, and the following figure(s) denote the page(s) in that volume.

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